Hospital Market Consolidation

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/54-health-systems-with-the-most-hospitals.html

Image result for hospital consolidation

The following health systems contain the most short-term acute care hospitals in the United States.

The number of short-term acute care hospitals is based on data from the American Hospital Directory, which is based on hospitals’ CMS cost reports. Data was accessed Dec. 4. The list includes nonprofit, public and for-profit organizations. There are 54 organizations listed here; numbering does not serve as a ranking or reflect ties in the number of hospitals.

Note: Figures reflect facilities that fall under the category of “short term acute care” as defined by CMS. Numbers do not include psychiatric, rehabilitation, children’s, critical access, long-term or “other” types of hospitals, and may differ from systems’ marketing materials.

1. HCA Healthcare (Nashville, Tenn.) — 174
2. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (Washington, D.C.) — 143
3. Community Health Systems (Franklin, Tenn.) — 119
4. Ascension Health (St. Louis) — 78
5. Tenet Healthcare (Dallas) — 59
6. LifePoint Health (Brentwood, Tenn.) — 45
7. Trinity Health (Livonia, Mich.) — 44
8. Prime Healthcare Services (Ontario, Calif.) — 42
9. Providence Health & Services (Renton, Wash.) — 41
10. Kaiser Permanente (Oakland, Calif.) — 39
11. Dignity Health (San Francisco) — 36
12. Catholic Health Initiatives (Englewood, Colo.) — 34
13. Steward Health Care System (Boston) — 32
14. Adventist Health System (Winter Park, Fla.) — 31
15. Indian Health Service (Rockville, Md.) — 31
16. UPMC (Pittsburgh) — 29
17. Universal Health Services (King of Prussia, Pa.). — 28
18. Christus Health (Irving, Texas) — 26
19. Quorum Health (Brentwood, Tenn.) — 26
20. Sutter Health (Sacramento, Calif.) — 26
21. Baylor Scott & White Health (Dallas) — 20
22. Banner Health (Phoenix) — 19
23. Mercy Health (Cincinnati) — 18
24. SSM Health (St. Louis) — 18
25. Intermountain Healthcare (Salt Lake City) — 17
26. Mercy (Chesterfield, Mo.) — 17
27. UnityPoint Health (Des Moines, Iowa) — 17
28. Northwell Health (Great Neck, N.Y.) — 16
29. Prospect Medical Holdings (Los Angeles) — 15
30. Adventist Health (Roseville, Calif.) — 14
31. Centura Health (Englewood, Colo.) — 14
32. Aurora Health Care (Milwaukee) — 13
33. BayCare Health System (Clearwater, Fla.) — 13
34. Franciscan Health (Mishawaka, Ind.) — 13
35. Memorial Hermann (Houston) — 13
36. Texas Health Resources (Arlington) — 13
37. Ardent Health Services (Nashville, Tenn.) — 12
38. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp. (Memphis) — 12
39. Cleveland Clinic — 12
40. Duke LifePoint (Brentwood, Tenn.) — 12
41. Hospital Sisters Health System (Springfield, Ill.) — 12
42. Sentara Healthcare (Norfolk, Va.) — 12
43. Bon Secours Health System (Marriottsville, Md.) — 11
44. Carolinas HealthCare System (Charlotte, N.C.) — 11
45. Hackensack Meridian Health (Edison, N.J.) — 11
46. Mayo Clinic (Rochester, Minn.) — 11 (includes short-term acute care hospitals in Rochester, Phoenix and Jacksonville, Fla., as well as those part of Mayo Clinic Health System)
47. McLaren Health Care (Flint, Mich.) — 11
48. NYC Health + Hospitals (New York City) — 11
49. Presence Health (Chicago) — 11
50. RWJBarnabas Health (West Orange, N.J.) — 11
51. Advocate Health Care (Downers Grove, Ill) — 10
52. Allina Health (Minneapolis) — 10
53. Novant Health (Winston-Salem, N.C.) — 10
54. University Hospitals (Cleveland) — 10

 

CVS merger with Aetna: Health care cure or curse?

https://theconversation.com/cvs-merger-with-aetna-health-care-cure-or-curse-88670?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20December%206%202017%20-%2089557547&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20December%206%202017%20-%2089557547+CID_461096d86af0ad8c2eedceabf8b8a42f&utm_source=campaign_monitor_us&utm_term=CVS%20merger%20with%20Aetna%20Health%20care%20cure%20or%20curse

The announcement that CVS plans to acquire Aetna for US$69 billion raises hope and concerns.

The transaction would create a new health care giant. Aetna is the third-largest health insurer in the United States, insuring about 46.7 millionpeople.

CVS operates 9,700 pharmacies and 1,000 MinuteClinics. A decade ago, it also purchased Caremark and now operates CVS/Caremark, a pharmacy benefits manager, a type of business that administers drug benefit programs for health plans. CVS/Caremark is one of the three largest pharmacy benefits managers in the United States. Along with ExpressScripts and OptummRXTogether, these three control at least 80 percent of the market.

Should American consumers be happy or concerned about the proposed merger? As a professor of health law and bioethics, I see compelling arguments on both sides.

Good for consumers, or for the companies?

CVS and Aetna assert they are motivated by a desire to improve services for consumers and that the merger will lower health care costs and improve outcomes.

Many industry experts have postulated, however, that financial gain is at the heart of the deal.

CVS has suffered declining profits as consumers turn to online suppliers for drugs. Reports that Amazon is considering entry into the pharmacy business raise the specter of increasingly fierce competition.

The merger would provide CVS with guaranteed business from Aetna patients and allow Aetna to expand into new health care territory.

The heart of the deal

The merger would eliminate the need for a pharmacy benefits manager because CVS would be part of Aetna.

Pharmacy benefits managers, which sprang up in the early 2000s in response to rising costs of care, administer drug benefit programs for health plans. Most large employers contract with pharmacy benefits managers that are different from their health insurers.

Nevertheless, a consolidation along the lines of a CVS/Caremark and Aetna merger would not be unprecedented. The nation’s largest health insurance company, United Healthcare, operates its own pharmacy benefits manager, OptumRx.

Pharmacy benefits managers process and pay prescription drug claims, negotiate with manufacturers for lower drug prices, and can employ other cost-saving mechanisms. They thus act as intermediaries between the insurer and pharmacies.

They also make a lot of money. They have been controversial in recent years for how they do so, allegedly keeping a keener focus on profits than on patients.

The merger has not been finalized and requires approval from government regulators, which isn’t always easy to get. In 2016 the U.S. Department of Justice sued to block two health insurer mergers: one between Aetna and Humana and a second between Anthem and Cigna. The government objected on antitrust grounds, arguing that the mergers would unduly restrict competition. Both efforts were abandoned.

CVS and Aetna argue that their proposed merger is different. It is a vertical rather than a horizontal merger, which means that it would combine companies providing different services for patients (insurance and filling prescriptions) rather than two companies doing the same thing.

However, the Trump administration is currently opposing another vertical merger, that between AT&T and Time Warner. It is unclear whether the administration will likewise oppose the CVS/Aetna merger.

Benefits of a merger

There is some evidence that a merger could help consumers.

A merger could result in more negotiating power. Combining the power of a leading pharmacy and a top insurer may allow CVS/Aetna to negotiate more effectively for price discounts from drug and device manufacturers.

It also could cut out the middleman. PBMs themselves have been blamed for raising health care costs. They often do not pass on negotiated drug discounts to consumers, but rather keep the money themselves. In addition, many believe they “make money through opaque rebates that are tied to drug prices (so their profits rise as those prices do).” With the merger, CVS/Aetna would not need CVS/Caremark to function as an intermediary. Eliminating a profit-seeking middleman from the picture could lower consumer prices.

The merger could provide easy access to health care for minor injuries and illnesses. CVS said it plans to expand its MinuteClinics, walk-in clinics that provide treatment by nurse practitioners for minor conditions. Also, CVS said it would offer more services, such as lab work, nutritional advice, vision and hearing care, and more. Thus, CVS promises that its clinics will become “health hubs.”

Many patients could turn to these clinics instead of seeking more expensive care from physicians or emergency rooms. Furthermore, health hubs could provide “one-stop shopping” convenience for some patients. This could be particularly beneficial to elderly individuals or those with disabilities.

Another benefit could be improved and expanded data analytics, which could result in better care. Combining information from patients’ health insurers with that of their pharmacies, including nonprescription health purchases, may promote better care. CVS pharmacists and health hub providers would be able to monitor and counsel patients regarding chronic disease management, pain management, prenatal care and other matters. Such attention could reduce the risk of complications and hospitalizations and thus also decrease expenditures.

Increase of other risks?

Skeptics argue that the CVS/Aetna merger is unlikely to yield cost savings and improved outcomes. They note that mergers in the health care sector generally lead to higher, not lower, prices and worry about other adverse consequences.

If the market shrinks to fewer pharmacy benefits managers because of consolidation, costs may actually increase. The remaining pharmacy benefits managers may have little incentive to compete with each other by demanding discounts from drug companies. As noted above, they may actually profit from higher pharmaceutical prices and thus welcome increases.

After the merger, Aetna may require those it insures to use only CVS pharmacies. In addition, it may require individuals to turn to CVS MinuteClinics for certain complaints even if patients prefer to visit their own doctors. Such restrictions would mean less choice for consumers, and many may find them to be very distressing.

The merger could also decrease competition and bar other companies from entering the pharmacy market. For example, Aetna may refuse to cover prescription drugs that are not purchased from CVS. In that case, Amazon may find it extremely difficult if not impossible to break into the industry. Less competition, in turn, often means higher prices for consumers.

It is difficult to predict the precise consequences of a CVS/Aetna merger. One way or another, however, its impact will likely be significant.

 

Advocate-Aurora Merger Latest in Healthcare Consolidation Trend

http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/leadership/advocate-aurora-merger-latest-healthcare-consolidation-trend?spMailingID=12500545&spUserID=MTY3ODg4NTg1MzQ4S0&spJobID=1300449776&spReportId=MTMwMDQ0OTc3NgS2#

Image result for advocate health care headquarters

Image result for aurora health care headquarters

Deal likely to steer clear of FTC pitfall that foiled Advocate’s prior merger plans.

Advocate Health Care and Aurora Health Care announced plans Monday for a merger that would create the 10th-largest not-for-profit health system in the country.

The proposed deal would serve as a “50-50 merger” between Chicago-based Advocate and Milwaukee-based Aurora, with no job layoffs expected, the companies said. Should the deal receive regulatory approval, the merged system, which would go by the name Advocate Aurora Health, is projected to have a total operating revenue of about $11 billion and employ 70,000 people across hundreds of facilities in Illinois and Wisconsin, including 27 hospitals.

The announced merger continues a trend among health systems to merge, buy, or sell. Since the Tenet-Vanguard merger in 2013, a $4.3 billion acquisition, large-scale mergers between health systems have become routine to keep pace with an increasingly competitive and consolidated industry.

As health systems and hospitals adjust to the push for value-based care, alternative payments and accountable care organizations, systems with less experience and knowledge have to factor in how they will achieve those goals.

The attraction of corporate consolidation

David Chou, Chief Information and Digital Officer for Children’s Mercy Kansas City, says healthcare organizations are pursuing mega-merger deals in order to maintain relevance. A company used to need $6 billion to compete, a number that has since ballooned to $10 billion, he says.

Companies have pushed toward consolidation also to achieve scale, which can enable cost-reduction and improve financial viability. Chou says healthcare companies ultimately aim to mirror the “classic Kaiser model,” referencing industry giant Kaiser Permanente of Oakland, California. In 2016, Kaiser Permanente’s total operating revenue was $64.6 billion.

Sarah Wilson, a senior analyst with Decision Resources Group, says a specific amount, such as Chou’s $10 billion figure, isn’t always a prerequisite to staying relevant, but she agreed that large-scale mergers have become increasingly common in the healthcare sector. She attributes this to the increasing cost of healthcare delivery despite the push to drive down costs.

Distance makes the heart grow fonder

Ken Field, JD, MBA, who worked for the FTC from 2006 through 2012 and now co-chairs Jones Day’s global healthcare practice, says Advocate’s proposed merger with Aurora is likely to sidestep the controversy that spoiled Advocate’s prior plan to merge with NorthShore University HealthSystem.

Given their respective geographic footprints, Advocate and Aurora appear to be complements to one another, not substitutes, Field says. While Aurora, located 93 miles north of Chicago, does serve some patients in northern Illinois, its primary clientele base hails from Wisconsin.

By contrast, Advocate’s failed NorthShore merger entailed two systems serving some of the same Chicagoland areas. Advocate defended its merger plans successfully at trial, but the decision was overruled on appeal. The prolonged and expensive legal fight ended last March.

The FTC’s acting chair, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, cited the foiled Advocate-NorthShore merger as among her team’s 2017 victories in the fight to protect competition in healthcare markets—a series of victories that mark a shift in the case law affecting the business of healthcare.

“Last year we successfully blocked two major hospital mergers, winning victories in cases involving healthcare systems in the suburbs of Chicago and the Harrisburg area of Pennsylvania,” Ohlhausen said during a speech last month at the American Bar Association’s fall forum, according to her remarks as prepared for delivery. “Together, these two cases moved an important area of the law into a much more settled place and will likely serve both the agency and the public for many years to come. We have already started building on that very sound foundation.”

Field says these two cases affirmed the FTC’s analytical framework for hospital competition as the appropriate interpretation of the law. So now there’s precedent to support the FTC’s model, which could soon prove decisive in a similar case in South Dakota, where the FTC and state attorney general are challenging Sanford Health’s planned acquisition of Mid Dakota Clinic.

Even with the new direction-setting in Washington under President Trump, the FTC’s approach to protecting competition in healthcare is expected to stay the course.

“The only indication so far is that they’re going to continue applying the same model and with the same vigor that we experienced in the last administration,” Field says.

The FTC declined to comment on Advocate’s planned Aurora merger, noting that the commission does not confirm the existence of any investigation.

Dust settling after the announcement

Wilson, the analyst, says effective mega-mergers rely on a significant amount of backend work prior to the announcement. After the plan is unveiled, companies must follow due diligence in meetings with federal and state regulatory authorities to secure approval.

“I think there’s that process of speaking with regulators, going through all of the paperwork and preparing for the actual merger to ensure you have alignment,” Wilson says. “Once you get down to the closing of the deal, [companies] make sure to have their mission, vision and values lined up. It’s a lot of work getting everything ready, speaking with employees and working through best practices.”

The risk of duplication of duties remains at a company with two CEOs, which is an interesting obstacle to face. Chou said he will be interested to see who “calls the shots” after the merger is formalized.

Citing her experience in handling health system mergers and acquisitions, Wilson says “50-50 mergers” are not uncommon. The move to keep two CEOs could be successful since the companies do not compete in the same market, she says.

Another challenge includes how to combine each company’s assets and decide on how to implement practices which provide the best care to patients. Chou advised both companies to focus on fostering a cohesive environment for employees and providing the best care for patients, rather than fixating on the politics of the merger.

Wilson echoed Chou’s sentiments, saying the post-announcement process should be deliberative and ensure employees understand the merger and its effects on the company culture.

 

A nation of McHospitals?

https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/11/08/hospital-chains-dominate-health-care-000574

Franchises-Lede-ByNeilWebb.jpg

For years, the nation’s hospital chains worked to get bigger, bigger, bigger. In the 1980s and 1990s, for-profit companies like HCA and Tenet emerged as juggernauts, snapping up local hospitals and opening clinics in one town after another. Their ambitious not-for-profit cousins, the big academic medical centers like Harvard-affiliated Partners Healthcare, scooped up smaller rivals in response. Just four years ago, the Tennessee-based Community Health Systems spent $7.6 billion to buy a competitor and become the nation’s largest for-profit hospital company, with more than 200 hospitals in 29 states.

Today, in any town or city, in any region of the country, you’ll almost certainly see the same scenario: Only a handful of hospitals, sometimes owned and operated by a company thousands of miles away.

As the pace and scale of consolidation picked up, the outcome long appeared inevitable: an American future in which a handful of hospital chains dominate American health care, with brands like Tenet and Catholic Health Initiatives and the Mayo Clinic competing for patients the way Panera and Chipotle and the Olive Garden compete for diners.

But something happened on the way to becoming a nation of McHospitals. That ambitious growth, driven by dreams of dominating a transformed health care landscape and recently fueled by Obamacare revenues, hit a wall.

In the past year, two of the nation’s three largest for-profit hospital systems, Tenet and Community Health Systems, began selling off dozens of their hospitals while entertaining bids to break up their entire companies. Prominent not-for-profit chains like Partners Healthcare are reporting nine-digit losses. Even Mayo Clinic is pulling back from some rural locations in the Midwest.

In part, the shift is just a typical business cycle working its way through the health care industry. “There are these testosterone-driven waves of deal making” in health care, said Jeff Goldsmith, a hospital consultant. “And then there are waves of post-coital regret that follow.”

But in part, the change is driven by policy decisions being made in Washington — how health care is paid for, and who has access to it. And as that shift unfolds, it’s raising questions that will shape American health care for a generation: What will the future of hospital ownership look like? What should it look like?

Even at the height of merger mania, no one could quite agree on whether the McHospital trend was a good thing or not. Some people — mostly in the hospital industry — argued that consolidation was long overdue, and that large companies’ deeper pockets and economies of scale would keep costs down and improve the quality of care for patients. Obamacare gave hospitals financial incentives to manage entire populations, rather than just get paid patient-by-patient — an effort that required building big data sets and buying up other services too, like physician practices.

But others were concerned about the growing concentration of ownership of the nation’s hospitals by a shrinking number of companies. It put local hospitals’ decades-long relationship with their communities at risk, as important local institutions started reporting to shareholders or distant nonprofit boards. These worriers foresaw a future in which just a handful of chains competed to carve out the most lucrative segments of health care, like cardiac procedures and orthopedic surgery, and offered substandard care for everyone else. And despite the chains’ promises, years of reports have shown that when hospitals combine, their prices tend to go up.

Providers’ growing market power has “been the leading reason for the [rise] in health care spending” for decades, Bob Berenson, a former Carter and Clinton administration official said in 2015. (“And in conventional political circles,” he added, “it’s still being overlooked.”)

But the changes underway are starting to transform the nature of the hospital itself — and could open the door to a landscape even more different than we imagine.

Radical shifts

The direction of the American hospital has shifted radically over time. Initially, hospitals were charity wards where the poor went to die. But as cities grew, and health care became more expensive and capital-intensive, hospitals became destinations for wealthier patients: Top hospitals were the ones that could afford the latest medical technologies and perform the most complex surgeries. The creation of Medicare in 1967 fueled new revenue and attracted more competitors, leading to the birth of major chains.

Today, about two-thirds of the nation’s 5,000 hospitals are parts of chains, up from about half of hospitals just 15 years ago, and the share of for-profit hospitals has steadily climbed — more than one in five hospitals are now owned by investors, rather than run as a not-for-profit or by the government. Established hospitals are grappling with how to balance institutional advantages like high-end facilities and expensive technologies with the need to stay nimble and adapt to health care’s changes. It’s a hard balance to strike, and after a few boom years, the industry is experiencing its worst financial performance since the great recession.

It’s always been expensive to own and operate a hospital. Preparing for possible emergencies requires round-the-clock staffing and immense sunk costs. Most major hospitals also try to offer dozens of different business lines, from cardiac surgery to behavioral health care — but that’s only gotten harder as niche competitors chip away at the most lucrative high-end services. It also got pricier thanks to the latest merger mania, as hospital chains collectively took on billions of dollars in debt to buy up their competitors and acquire other services, like physician offices.

An industry that had already consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s — seeking new efficiencies and to get bigger when negotiating with insurance companies — received new incentives under Obamacare, as millions of newly insured patients entered the market and hospital chains raced to capture the new customers. But the Affordable Care Act also accelerated changes to health care payments in ways that made hospitals seem a little outmoded.

Medicare, other federal programs and insurance companies are increasingly shifting away from fee-for-service reimbursement — in which doctors and hospitals are rewarded for the number of procedures they perform — toward “alternative payment models” with more incentives for follow-up care and improved long-term outcomes. That’s encouraged hospitals to make new investments, like buying up nursing homes and hiring more workers to deliver home-based and long-term care. Some hospital leaders are actively talking about trying not to fill their beds, which would’ve sounded like heresy in the industry just a decade ago.

Charlie Martin, a legendary health care investor who founded two hospital companies, said the old model is doomed as new technologies allow care to be delivered outside of the hospital — leaving behind large, costly facilities that are better suited to 1990 than 2020.

“Half the business that’s in there is going to go away,” Martin said. “This is going to be a beatdown like we’ve never seen before.”

Martin said he’s now investing in services like post-acute care and home health, which are more agile and positioned to take advantage of the changes in payment. In this emerging world, a low-cost aide who can keep an elderly patient out of the hospital may end up being more profitable for Martin than paying a team of doctors when that patient breaks a hip and needs days of hospital care.

“The hospitals of today are too expensive to be health care facilities” in the long run, Martin said. “I can’t carry the carcass around.” (He added that consolidation’s benefits are overrated. “There are other ways to get scale now, like purchasing groups” that allow hospitals to get bulk discounts despite not having a common owner, Martin argued. “A lot of the advantages that came through the multihospital systems are now available for anybody.”)

Too big to fail?

So, are big hospitals — and big hospital chains — destined to go the way of Sears, an institution decimated by smaller and nimbler competitors? Not necessarily. There’s still a viable path — and often a need — for big hospitals themselves, typically the largest employers in their cities and towns. While fee-for-service payment is slowly getting phased down, it isn’t going away overnight, if ever. A decade after policymakers began pushing hospitals to adopt alternative payment models, those models still represent less than 30 percent of payments to the average health care provider. Fee-for-service remains the most common way of getting paid.

And local hospitals have an advantage that many businesses don’t: They’re often so important to their towns and cities that lawmakers and other local leaders don’t want to let them fail, even if their margins suffer. And in markets where there isn’t much competition, hospitals continue to charge huge rates that have very little connection to quality of care. Yale researcher Zack Cooper and colleagues have found that hospitals with effective monopolies have prices more than 15 percent higher than hospitals in markets with four or more competitors.

What that all means: The hospitals that Martin and others see as lumbering dinosaurs don’t all need to evolve to virtual campuses just yet. No one’s forcing them to. The old model of going to a hospital for surgery and other intensive services will persist for years or decades, barring major technological leaps ahead, and it may stay lucrative for the most prominent, dominant facilities. There’s no easy, obvious disruptor that wants to start building hospitals and compete for these services, at least for these now.

So then the question is: Who’s going to own them? Many experts think the near future, at least, will belong to regional health systems. They’re able to take advantage of local monopolies that allow them to raise prices, while not being burdened by the debt and expenses that can go along with aggressive acquisitions of national chains. And from North Carolina to California, many of these local chains continue to thrive and edge out national competitors with better financial performance. Indiana University Health System last month announced it’s expanding into Fort Wayne, the state’s second-largest city, even as Community Health Systems – a national chain that operates a hospital network in the city – has seen local profits fall and anger rise, as doctors and employers claim the chain has neglected its facilities and should sell hospitals that have become dirty and dingy. (Community’s president told doctors in 2016 that the chain would pull out of Fort Wayne, Bloomberg reported, although the company rejected a subsequent buyout offer and now says it’s committed to staying.)

What’s good for these regional chains may not be good for patients or the insurance system that pays for their care, though, as lower levels of competition mean higher prices. Martin Gaynor, an economist at Carnegie Mellon and former FTC official who studies consolidation, points to UPMC’s decision this month to spend $2 billion to build three new specialty hospitals in the Pittsburgh area, further cementing its control of the local market — even if experts question whether large, specialty facilities are needed at all. “Don’t forget that residents of Western Pennsylvania are the ones who will mostly pay for this,” Gaynor tweeted after the announcement.

“There’s a near-stranglehold on these markets by dominant health systems,” said Gaynor, noting that many regions get carved up between two or three major chains. “Some means need to be developed to free that up.”

It’s not clear how that would happen or who wants to do it. The Trump administration has gestured toward unlocking those markets, with a few lines in a recent executive orderpromising to limit “excessive consolidation.” The Federal Trade Commission under the Obama administration also jumped in to aggressively block hospital mergers, too. But taking on the hospital industry has been viewed as a political nonstarter for years. And hospitals don’t have much reason to loosen their own monopolies, at least in the short run.

There’s an intriguing possibility that some consultants are wrestling with: What if a company like Walmart or Apple decides to go for the health care market — and really go for it, as executives from each company have hinted in the past — and set up outpatient centers in their stores around the country. Hospitals would suddenly face new pressures from a well-capitalized competitor that already gets a lot of foot traffic, like Walmart, or has been ruthlessly committed to growth, like Apple. Patients frustrated with the traditional medical system might start opting for these retail alternatives, disrupting the entire chain of how Americans get care.

A dramatic move like that would shake up how health care is delivered. It would also flip the paradigm. Rather than hospitals desperately trying to expand and establish themselves as a national brand, an existing national brand — not a health care brand, but a big consumer brand — could suddenly have a health care presence in many major markets.

But a move like that remains some distance off. Walmart’s effort to quickly scale up small retail health clinics has stalled. Apple has publicly flirted with investing in a health care facility for so long, it raises the question of why the company hasn’t.

And that points to the most likely outcome for hospitals in the next 30 years. Boring as it may be, many of them aren’t going anywhere. No one else is competing for the expensive, high-end services that only hospitals can offer. They’re still too big to fail — just so long as they don’t get any bigger.

 

Trump to Scrap Critical Health Care Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare Again

Related image

 President Trump will scrap subsidies to health insurance companies that help pay out-of-pocket costs of low-income people, the White House said late Thursday. His plans were disclosed hours after the president ordered potentially sweeping changes in the nation’s insurance system, including sales of cheaper policies with fewer benefits and fewer protections for consumers.

The twin hits to the Affordable Care Act could unravel President Barack Obama’s signature domestic achievement, sending insurance premiums soaring and insurance companies fleeing from the health law’s online marketplaces. After Republicans failed to repeal the health law in Congress, Mr. Trump appears determined to dismantle it on his own.

Without the subsidies, insurance markets could quickly unravel. Insurers have said they will need much higher premiums and may pull out of the insurance exchanges created under the Affordable Care Act if the subsidies were cut off. Known as cost-sharing reduction payments, the subsidies were expected to total $9 billion in the coming year and nearly $100 billion in the coming decade.

“The government cannot lawfully make the cost-sharing reduction payments,” the White House said in a statement.

It concluded that “Congress needs to repeal and replace the disastrous Obamacare law and provide real relief to the American people.”

In a joint statement, the top Democrats in Congress, Senator Chuck Schumer of New York and Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, said Mr. Trump had “apparently decided to punish the American people for his inability to improve our health care system.”

“It is a spiteful act of vast, pointless sabotage leveled at working families and the middle class in every corner of America,” they said. “Make no mistake about it, Trump will try to blame the Affordable Care Act, but this will fall on his back and he will pay the price for it.”

Lawmakers from both parties have urged the president to continue the payments. Mr. Trump had raised the possibility of eliminating the subsidies at a White House meeting with Republican senators several months ago. At the time, one senator told him that the Republican Party would effectively “own health care” as a political issue if the president did so.

“Cutting health care subsidies will mean more uninsured in my district,” Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Republican of Florida, wrote on Twitter late Thursday. She added that Mr. Trump “promised more access, affordable coverage. This does opposite.”

But Speaker Paul D. Ryan, Republican of Wisconsin, praised Mr. Trump’s decision and said the Obama administration had usurped the authority of Congress by paying the subsidies. “Under our Constitution,” Mr. Ryan said, “the power of the purse belongs to Congress, not the executive branch.”

The future of the payments has been in doubt because of a lawsuit filed in 2014 by House Republicans, who said the Obama administration was paying the subsidies illegally. Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the United States District Court in Washington agreed, finding that Congress had never appropriated money for the cost-sharing subsidies.

The Obama administration appealed the ruling. The Trump administration has continued the payments from month to month, even though Mr. Trump has made clear that he detests the payments and sees them as a bailout for insurance companies.

This summer, a group of states, including New York and California, was allowed to intervene in the court case over the subsidies. The New York attorney general, Eric T. Schneiderman, said on Thursday night that the coalition of states “stands ready to sue” if Mr. Trump cut off the subsidies.

What the administration has done to weaken the health law.

Mr. Trump’s decision to stop the subsidy payments puts pressure on Congress to provide money for them in a spending bill.

Senator Lamar Alexander, Republican of Tennessee and the chairman of the Senate health committee, and Senator Patty Murray of Washington, the senior Democrat on the panel, have been trying to work out a bipartisan deal that would continue the subsidy payments while making it easier for states to obtain waivers from some requirements of the Affordable Care Act. White House officials have sent mixed signals about whether Mr. Trump was open to such a deal.

The decision to end subsidies came on the heels of Mr. Trump’s executive order, which he signed earlier Thursday.

With an 1,100-word directive to federal agencies, the president laid the groundwork for an expanding array of health insurance products, mainly less comprehensive plans offered through associations of small employers and greater use of short-term medical coverage.

It was the first time since efforts to repeal the landmark health law collapsed in Congress that Mr. Trump has set forth his vision of how to remake the nation’s health care system using the powers of the executive branch. It immediately touched off a debate over whether the move would fatally destabilize the Affordable Care Act marketplaces or add welcome options to consumers complaining of high premiums and not enough choice.

Most of the changes will not occur until federal agencies write and adopt regulations implementing them. The process, which includes a period for public comments, could take months. That means the order will probably not affect insurance coverage next year, but could lead to major changes in 2019.

“With these actions,” Mr. Trump said at a White House ceremony, “we are moving toward lower costs and more options in the health care market, and taking crucial steps toward saving the American people from the nightmare of Obamacare.”

“This is going to be something that millions and millions of people will be signing up for,” the president predicted, “and they’re going to be very happy.”

But many patients, doctors, hospital executives and state insurance regulators were not so happy. They said the changes envisioned by Mr. Trump could raise costs for sick people, increase sales of bare-bones insurance and add uncertainty to wobbly health insurance markets.

Chris Hansen, the president of the lobbying arm of the American Cancer Society, said the order “could leave millions of cancer patients and survivors unable to access meaningful coverage.”

In a statement from six physician groups, including the American Academy of Family Physicians, the doctors predicted that “allowing insurers to sell narrow, low-cost health plans likely will cause significant economic harm to women and older, sicker Americans who stand to face higher-cost and fewer insurance options.”

While many health insurers remained silent about the executive order, some voiced concern that it could destabilize the market. The Trump proposal “would draw younger and healthier people away from the exchanges and drive additional plans out of the market,” warned Ceci Connolly, the chief executive of the Alliance of Community Health Plans.

Administration officials said they had not yet decided which federal and state rules would apply to the new products. Without changing the law, they said, they can rewrite federal regulations so that more health plans would be exempt from some of its requirements.

The Affordable Care Act has expanded private insurance to millions of people through the creation of marketplaces, also known as exchanges, where people can purchase plans, in many cases using government subsidies to offset the cost. It also required that plans offered on the exchanges include a specific set of benefits, including hospital care, maternity care and mental health services, and it prohibited insurers from denying coverage to people with pre-existing medical conditions.

The executive order’s quickest effect on the marketplaces would be the potential expansion of short-term plans, which are exempt from Affordable Care Act requirements. Many health policy experts worry that if large numbers of healthy people move into such plans, it would drive up premiums for those left in Affordable Care Act plans because the risk pool would have sicker people.

“If the short-term plans are able to siphon off the healthiest people, then the more highly regulated marketplaces may not be sustainable,” said Larry Levitt, a senior vice president for the Kaiser Family Foundation. “These plans follow no rules.”

Mr. Trump’s order would also eventually make it easier for small businesses to band together and buy insurance through entities known as association health plans, which could be created by business and professional groups. A White House official said these health plans “could potentially allow American employers to form groups across state lines” — a goal championed by Mr. Trump and many other Republicans — allowing more options and the formation of larger risk pools.

Association plans have a troubled history. Because the plans were not subject to state regulations that required insurers to have adequate financial resources, some became insolvent, leaving people with unpaid medical bills. Some insurers were accused of fraud, telling customers that the plans were more comprehensive than they were and leaving them uncovered when consumers became seriously ill.

The White House said that a broader interpretation of federal law — the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 — “could potentially allow employers in the same line of business anywhere in the country to join together to offer health care coverage to their employees.”

The order won applause from potential sponsors of association health plans, including the National Federation of Independent Business, the National Restaurant Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Associated Builders and Contractors, a trade group for the construction industry.

The White House released a document saying that some consumer protections would remain in place for association plans. “Employers participating in an association health plan cannot exclude any employee from joining the plan and cannot develop premiums based on health conditions” of individual employees, according to the document. But state officials pointed out that an association health plan can set different rates for different employers, so that a company with older, sicker workers might have to pay much more than a firm with young, healthy employees.

“Two employers in an association can be charged very different rates, based on the medical claims filed by their employees,” said Mike Kreidler, the state insurance commissioner in Washington.

Mr. Trump’s order followed the pattern of previous policy shifts that originated with similar directives to agencies to come up with new rules.

Within hours of his inauguration in January, he ordered federal agencies to find ways to waive or defer provisions of the Affordable Care Act that might burden consumers, insurers or health care providers. In May, he directed officials to help employers with religious objections to the federal mandate for insurance coverage of contraception.

Both of those orders were followed up with specific, substantive regulations that rolled back Mr. Obama’s policies.

In battles over the Affordable Care Act this year, Mr. Trump and Senate Republicans said they wanted to give state officials vast new power to regulate insurance because state officials were wiser than federal officials and better understood local needs. But under Thursday’s order, the federal government could pre-empt many state insurance rules, a prospect that alarms state insurance regulators.

Another part of Mr. Trump’s order indicates that he may wish to crack down on the consolidation of doctors, hospitals and other health care providers, a trend that critics say has driven up costs for consumers. Mr. Trump said that administration officials, working with the Federal Trade Commission, should report to him within 180 days on federal and state policies that limit competition and choice in the health care industry.

Right After Trump Blamed High Drug Prices On Campaign Cash, Drugmakers Gave More

Right After Trump Blamed High Drug Prices On Campaign Cash, Drugmakers Gave More

“The cost of medicine in this country is outrageous,” President Donald Trump said at a rally in Louisville, Ky., two months after his inauguration. He went on about how identical pills have vastly lower price tags in Europe.

“You know why?” the president asked, before spreading his hands wide. “Campaign contributions, who knows. But somebody is getting very rich.”

It was March 20, 2017.

The next day, drugmakers donated more money to political campaigns than they had on any other day in 2017 so far, according to a Kaiser Health News analysis of campaign spending in the first half of the year reported in Federal Election Commission filings.

Eight pharmaceutical political action committees made 134 contributions, spread over 77 politicians, on March 21. They spent $279,400 in all, showering Republicans and Democrats in both legislative bodies with campaign cash, according to FEC filings. The second-highest one-day contribution tally was $203,500, on June 20.

Brendan Fischer, who directs election reform programs at the Campaign Legal Center, said he found the timing of the contributions interesting: “I think it’s entirely possible that the drug companies sought to curry favor with members of Congress in order to head off any sort of potential attack on their industry by the press or by the federal government.”

During the Louisville rally, Trump also promised to lower drug prices, and pharmaceutical stocks tumbled afterward.

Although drug industry PACs have different structures and protocols, they are equipped to mobilize quickly to disperse funds to legislators.

“Writing a check doesn’t require much beyond putting pen to paper,” Fischer said.

FEC records show Merck’s PAC led the way that day, donating $148,000 to 60 candidates on March 21. House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) received three maximum contributions to his various PACs from the drugmaker, totaling $15,000. Behind him with $7,500 was Sen. Tom Carper (D-Del.), who sits on the Senate Finance Committee.

Merck spokeswoman Claire Gillepsie said the contributions were “not tied to specific events.”

“Decisions on contributions are made at the beginning of a cycle and are approved by a contributions committee,” she said. A White House official referred requests for comment to the presidential campaign, which did not respond.

Companies may donate funds or lobby ahead of impending legislative issues and executive orders, or they may react to something a politician says.

“Presidents get a lot of attention to what they say,” said former congressman Lee Hamilton, who founded the Indiana University Center on Representative Government after three decades in the House of Representatives. “[Companies] have to react to that and defend the drug prices.”

Overall, FEC records show Merck spent $242,500 on campaign contributions and $3.7 million on lobbying in the first half of 2017.

The drugmaker, which makes diabetes pill Januvia, cancer drug Keytruda and shingles vaccine Zostavax, responded to outrage over drug prices earlier this year by revealing on its website that the average list prices of its drugs increased from 7.4 percent to 10.5 percent each year since 2010. Merck said discounts and rebates also increased, meaning it took home less money. But Thomson Reuters pointed out that the price increases outpaced inflation.

FEC records don’t indicate why a company donated to a politician or what that contribution led to, but when House Democrats accused Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah) of failing to schedule a hearing on prescription drug price hikes in 2015, The Intercept pointed out that the pharmaceutical industry had been among Chaffetz’s top campaign contributors.

Pharmaceutical lobbying dollars have also swelled in 2017, Kaiser Health News previously reported. In their disclosures, drug companies listed tax reform and drug pricing among issues on which they lobbied Congress.

March 21 was also the date of the National Republican Congressional Committee’s annual fundraising dinner, featuring Trump as keynote speaker. The event, which raises money for House Republicans, drew a record-breaking $30 million from a variety of industries, the NRCC reported.

But on that day, drugmakers also gave generously to Democrats and senators, according to FEC filings.

Pfizer and Novo Nordisk PACs donated $76,900 and $38,500 on March 21, respectively, to several dozen candidates on March 21, according to their filings. Five additional pharmaceutical PACs spent between $1,000 and $5,000 on contributions that day.

The companies say the timing was coincidental. A Novo Nordisk spokesman said the March 21 contributions from its PAC had been scheduled in advance “and in no way were tied to any specific statement.”

Pfizer spokeswoman Sharon Castillo said it takes three to four weeks to orchestrate and approve a PAC contribution.

“Pfizer’s political contributions to candidates and elected officials from both parties are led by two guiding principles — preserve and further the incentives for innovation, and protect and expand access to medicines and vaccines for the patients we serve,” Castillo said.

Pfizer’s PAC donated more than any pharmaceutical PAC in the first half of 2017, contributing $418,400 in all — nearly 70 percent more than the first six months of the 2015 election cycle, according to FEC records. In February of this year, the company’s CEO was among several executives from drugmaking firms and other global companies to pen a letter to Congress in support of tax reform. In December 2016, Pfizer received a letter from the Senate Special Committee on Aging, asking it to explain its price increases for the opioid overdose reversal drug, naloxone.

“Pfizer is committed to addressing the prevention, treatment and effective response to the growing opioid abuse in the United States,” Castillo said, adding that the company is donating up to 1 million naloxone doses and $1 million in grants toward opioid addiction awareness efforts.

Novo Nordisk has spent $178,000 on campaign contributions so far this year, or nearly four times more than it spent the first six months of 2015, according to its filings with the FEC. The company is one of the top three insulin makers, and in July, Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) sent the companies letters asking them to justify their price increases. In November, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-Md.) asked the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the insulin makers for possible price collusion. The companies have denied the allegations.

“We’re certainly aware of policymakers’ concerns about the price of insulin, and we’re committed to collaborate with all those involved in the healthcare supply chain to ensure patient access,” said Novo Nordisk spokesman Ken Inchausti.

“From the public record, you can’t tell for sure” what prompted the spike in political contributions from pharmaceutical companies, said Tony Raymond, a former analyst at the Federal Election Commission who founded Political Money Line to track campaign finance. The PACs could have been “killing two birds with one stone” by donating to legislators across the board on the night of the NRCC fundraiser, or they could have been responding to what Trump said.

“We’re talking about a couple phone calls and then they could courier a check over to someone,” he said.

Antitrust in the Labor Market: Protectionist, or Pro-Competitive?

https://promarket.org/antitrust-labor-market-protectionist-pro-competitive/

Image result for Antitrust in the Labor Market: Protectionist, or Pro-Competitive?

Redirecting antitrust enforcement to confront monopsony power would be a substantial departure from the way it has been conducted in recent decades, but just because a policy has been in place for a long time does not mean it is a success, and recent evidence implies a significant policy change is necessary and justified.

The very first sentence of the United States submission to the OECD’s “Global Forum on Competition” in 2015 reads “The U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice do not consider employment or other non-competition factors in their antitrust analysis.”

Employment isn’t a “competition factor?” A growing body of evidence, drawn from both micro and macro sources, implies that the labor market has been slack since the Great Recession thanks to an aggregate demand shortfall. The employment-to-population ratio, labor force participation, job-to-job and geographic mobility, and the job ladder as a whole have all stagnated for almost a decade, and even before 2008 these indicators had barely made up ground since the recession of the early 2000s. Wages have been stagnant, and thus the labor share of national income has been in decline.

Over an even longer period, worker compensation has failed to keep pace with productivity gains per capita. The broadening literature on the rise of earnings inequality between firms, controlling for worker characteristics, implies that workers do not receive sufficient job offers to equalize the earnings they receive across firms. All of these phenomena are explained by rising monopsony power in the labor market.

The recent paper by De Loecker and Eeckhout makes this point explicit: the ability of employers to extract rents in the labor market causes a reduction in the market demand for labor, and this in turn motivates all of the manifestations of a slack labor market just described, as well as the rising markups that are the central finding of that paper. Profits have risen, reflecting rising market power in both labor and product markets—a finding that is consistent with the aggregate analysis done by Barkai.

So if monopsony power constrains employment, why not consider it a factor in antitrust analysis? After all, the premise of economic analysis in antitrust is that market power threatens welfare by restricting output and raising prices. Why doesn’t market power threaten welfare by reducing demand for labor and lowering wages?

Existing antitrust policy treats maximizing consumer welfare as the ultimate end goal of antitrust policy, and that policy aim makes sense in a world of little market power, where profits are low and the economy is assumed to be on its production possibility frontier. In that world, maximizing consumer welfare is a suitable summary statistic for overall wellbeing.

Moreover, since the revolution in antitrust policy associated with Robert Bork put such an emphasis on sustaining an “economies” defense—meaning that potentially efficiency-enhancing aspects of corporate mergers and conduct must be weighed against inefficiencies arising from market power—the potential for monopsony power has been considered a plus. After all, enforcers and courts generally assumed that any gains at the expense of workers would be passed to consumers in the form of lower prices, since product markets would be competitive (and if not, the potential for entry would exert a disciplining influence). In that world, caring about employment, wages, or other labor market outcomes looks like protectionism, impeding the competitive pressure that yields the best outcomes for consumers, and favoring certain privileged “insider” workers at the expense of others.

We know now that we don’t live in that world, and that revelation calls for a wholesale re-think of the proper goals of antitrust policy, very much including whether the sole focus on consumer welfare makes sense when powerful corporations squeeze workers and then pocket the gains for themselves and their shareholders.

What would it actually look like to bring antitrust into the labor market?

As with any enforcement regime, antitrust often starts with the lowest-hanging fruit: out-and-out written evidence of anti-competitive practices, such as the Justice Department’s 2010 lawsuit against Silicon Valley employers for colluding not to hire one another’s programmers. This is partly why the recent increase in the use of non-compete clauses has drawn attention in antitrust circles. As a would-be vertical restraint, non-compete clauses aren’t as easy to target under antitrust as horizontal collusion, but they are there, in writing—prohibitions on competition in the labor market, to the benefit of employers. And they should be banned, or at the very least subjected to a high burden of proof requiring a substantive defense on the part of employers who impose them, plus an affirmative finding that they do not act to reduce wages or restrict job offers.

The same dynamic is at play in prohibitions on poaching in franchising agreements, which Alan Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter recently found to be prevalent in franchising contracts and which, to my knowledge, the federal competition regulators have never touched—even though they do regulate other provisions of those contracts. Franchising networks are a hybrid beast, somewhere between horizontal and vertical, but a blanket prohibition on poaching throughout a franchisor’s network certainly starts to look like a horizontal agreement not to compete.

It’s important to understand, though, that these written restraints of trade are symptoms of the broader decline in worker power, and meaningful antitrust enforcement should go after the causes. Reclassification of workers as independent contractors is a broader concern—not only anti-competitive in itself, but as a means to engage in other coercive conduct and corporate structures. Studies show that reclassifications result in immediate wage reductions and no other changes in terms of employment, suggesting that they amount to employer’s exploiting their wage-setting power by changing the legal structure of their business.

And beyond the act itself, classifying workers as independent contractors allows employers to avoid liability for minimum wage, maximum hours, workplace safety, and a host of other entitlements associated with statutory employment. The idea was that employment inherently signifies control, and with control ought to come responsibility—and by extension, if employers do not bear responsibility, then they should not be able to exercise control. What employers have realized now, as enforcement regimes in both labor and antitrust have weakened, is that they can have the control without the responsibility. For example, contracting terms often prevent workers from simultaneously working for others—an exercise of control if ever there was one, and an anti-competitive vertical restraint in the context of an independent contractor.

Employers can have that control without first establishing themselves as a monopoly—in fact, reclassification is increasingly standard operating procedure in many industries, which means that treating it as a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act should not require that outright monopolization must first be shown.

This is the fundamental issue behind the litigation over whether Uber’s drivers ought to be considered employees, and if not, whether the business amounts to a price-fixing conspiracy between the company and hundreds of thousands of independent businesses who drive for it. I’ve written before about the antitrust lawsuit against Uber on these grounds. The case was recently dealt a severe blow in the form of an appellate ruling that upheld the company’s mandatory arbitration clause—meaning that if the lower court decides Uber did not itself void the arbitration clause by hastening the case with a move to summary judgment, then the case will likely be thrown out of court.

That brings us to yet another way in which employers exercise monopsony power: mandatory arbitration and class action waivers for employment claims, about which the Supreme Court is set to hear a case this term. The issue there is that expansive readings of the Federal Arbitration Act have essentially said that individual rights protected by both the constitution and federal statute can be voided by bilateral waivers—as though the parties are equally situated and at liberty to reject such provisions in employment agreements and elsewhere. Of course, the whole point of monopsony is that jobs are scarce, and hence employers have leverage with which to extract concessions, be they out-and-out wage reductions or agreements not to litigate disputes. Thus, another aim of antitrust enforcement in labor markets ought to be bans on litigation waivers between parties that are not similarly situated economically as restraints of trade—and the competition authorities ought to make their views known to the Supreme Court on this issue. After all, private action is a pillar of federal antitrust policy, and so arbitration clauses are not just themselves restraints of trade, but they also inhibit enforcement against other restraints, as the fate of the Uber antitrust case shows.

Finally, there’s the elephant in the room when it comes to antitrust: merger review, the bulk of what the agencies do about enforcing the laws they’re entrusted to carry out. Claims that mergers reduce employment are not entertained as arguments against them—in fact, they are likely to be considered arguments in favor, as they show some motivation for the transaction beyond raising prices for consumers. And yet we know anecdotally that recently-consummated mergers have in fact had adverse employment impacts. A systematic study of the labor market impact of past mergers has yet to be conducted, to my knowledge—such an exercise would be a valuable component of assessing the impact and success of the current competition policy regime, including whether these job losses do actually end up benefiting consumers in the form of lower prices, as merging parties invariably claim, versus their shareholders and executives.

In conclusion, the view that the competition authorities expressed to the OECD in 2015 looks increasingly out of touch with the labor market and the broader macroeconomic conditions that currently exist. It is true that redirecting antitrust enforcement to confront monopsony power would be a substantial departure from the way it has been conducted in recent decades, and as such there are both court decisions and agency policies that go against it. But just because a policy has been in place for a long time does not mean it is a success, and recent evidence implies a significant policy change is necessary and justified—much as an intellectual movement in academia once shifted antitrust policy substantially, it’s time for new evidence to change it once again.

Study: Hospitals on doctor-buying spree raise legal questions

http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/study-hospitals-doctor-buying-spree-and-raises-legal-questions?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTkRWa1ptVTJNMlUyWldVeCIsInQiOiJGaXFrTXRvUlM4YjFhbHpsVUtRSEh2ZmlCaElBOXh0cVwvejFndVg1WnhTNjEzYmZnTjVIZVMrNjdPeEREOXc4R0I4V0pFN1VZSW5VQVNCYWEycjFIejlmSEZcL1V6VnJ2ZkpUd3k1ekhkY1BidzAyNWdDZGhwRlZacHNudExqclpwIn0%3D

Image result for M&A

Bigger and fewer doctor practices drive up prices for patients, employers and taxpayers, several studies confirm.

Hospitals have gone on a doctor-buying spree in recent years, in many areas acquiring so many independent practices they’ve created near-monopolies on physicians.

Research published Tuesday throws new light on the trend, showing that large doctor practices, many owned by hospitals, exceed federal guidelines for market concentration in more than a fifth of the areas studied.

But it goes further, helping answer some of health policy’s frequently asked questions: How could this happen? Where are the regulators charged with blocking mergers that have been repeatedly shown to drive up the price of health care?

The answer, in many cases, is that they’re out of the game.

Doctor deals are typically far too small to trigger official notice to federal antitrust authorities or even attract public attention, finds a paper published in the journal Health Affairs.

When it comes to most hospital-doctor mergers, antitrust cops operate blind.

“You have a local hospital system and they’re going in and buying one doctor at a time. It’s onesies and twosies,” said Christopher Ody, a Northwestern University economist and one of the study’s authors. “Occasionally they’re buying a group of five. But it’s this really small scale” that adds up to big results, he said.

The paper, drawing from insurance data in states covering about an eighth of the population, found that 22 percent of markets for primary care doctors, surgeons, cardiologists and other specialties were “highly concentrated” in 2013. That means that, under Federal Trade Commission guidelines, a lack of competitors substantially increased those doctors’ ability to raise prices without losing customers.

The research didn’t sort physician groups by ownership. But other studies show that large, predominant practices are increasingly owned by hospitals, which see control of doctors as a way to both coordinate care and ensure patient referralsand revenue.

According to one study, hospitals owned 26 percent of physician practices in 2015, nearly double the portion from 2012. They employed 38 percent of all physicians in 2015, up from 26 percent three years earlier.

In the study by Ody and colleagues, only 15 percent of the growth by the largest physician groups from 2007 to 2013 came from acquisitions of 11 doctors or more.

About half the growth of the big practices involved acquisitions of 10 or fewer doctors at a time. About a third of the growth came not from mergers but from hiring doctors out of medical school or other sources.

Federal regulations require notification to anti-monopoly authorities only for mergers worth some $80 million or more — far larger than any acquisition involving a handful of doctors.

Very few of the mergers that drove concentration over the market-power red line — or even further — in the studied areas would have surpassed that mark or a second standard that identifies “presumably anti-competitive” combinations.

But the little deals add up. In 2013, 43 percent of the physician markets examined by the researchers were highly or moderately concentrated according to federal guidelines that gauge monopoly power by market share and number of competitors.

(A market with three practices in a particular specialty, each with a third of the business, would be at the lower end of what’s considered highly concentrated. A market with one doctor group doing at least 50 percent of the business would be highly concentrated no matter how many rivals it had.)

Bigger and fewer doctor practices, fueled largely by hospital acquisitions, do drive up prices for patients, employers and taxpayers, several studies confirm.

Part of the increase results from a reimbursement quirk. Medicare and other insurers pay hospital-based doctors more than independent ones. But another part comes from the lock on business held by large practices with few rivals, Ody said.

“It’s a problem,” said Martin Gaynor, a health care economist at Carnegie Mellon University and former head of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics. “All the evidence that we have so far … indicates that these acquisitions tend to drive up prices, and there’s other evidence that seems to indicate it doesn’t do anything in terms of enhancing quality.”

The American Hospital Association, a trade association, declined to comment on the study since officials hadn’t seen it. But the AHA often argues that “hospital deals are different” and that doctor acquisitions keep patients from falling through the cracks between inpatient and outpatient care.

The FTC has moved to block or undo a few sizable doctor mergers, including an orthopedics deal in Pennsylvania and an attempt by an Idaho hospital system to buy a medical practice with dozens of doctors.

But the agency largely lacks the tools to challenge numerous smaller transactions that add up to the same result, said Ody.

An FTC spokeswoman declined to comment on the study’s findings.

Ody urged state attorneys general and insurance commissioners to look more closely at doctor combos. Sometimes state officials can question mergers overlooked by federal authorities. Or they can block anti-competitive practices, such as when hospitals seek to exclude competitor physicians from insurance networks.

Beyond that, “I hope that people notice this [research], and I hope people think creatively about what kinds of solutions might be appropriate for this,” he said. “I don’t know what they are.”

Carolinas HealthCare, UNC Health Care reveal intent to merge

http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/carolinas-healthcare-unc-health-care-reveal-intent-merge?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWkRabU1tTmxOek13Wm1FMyIsInQiOiJQYzBXSkh1OU5ZZmpSdndteUpUUEtiZHBHOE5RekdPYVoyOXBWaE80aHBRMCtJZjNHM01xaU1lWW9PeThMdzNlWWZ6ZHFlUHJmcmVXRFBRXC83WllsV1hudzFZR241U1J4WE15ODBmTFwvUVZSZCs3TDdzSHdKSGFaaWR5bUlSQUFiIn0%3D

Image result for carolinas health system headquartersImage result for unc health system

 

Health systems say they are entering negotiations to combine clinical, medical education and research units.

rolinas HealthCare System and UNC Health Care announced on Thursday that they are negotiating a merger that would transform them into a health system earning an estimated $14 billion in annual revenue.

Both organizations have signed a letter of intent to join their clinical, medical education and research resources and the letter kicks off a period of exclusive negotiations, with the goal of entering into final agreements by year’s end.

Together, the health systems would be focused on four strategic areas: increasing access and affordability, advancing clinical care expertise, growing their renowned academic enterprise and contributing to the region’s economic vibrancy.

“The opportunities to be a national model and to elevate health in North Carolina are nearly limitless,” Carolinas CEO Gene Woods said in a statement.

Woods would serve as chief executive officer of the new entity and UNC Health CEO William Roper, MD, would take on the role of executive director.

Woods noted that since the two organizations already serve almost 50 percent of all patients who visit rural hospitals in the state, they are well positioned to participate in the reinvention of rural healthcare and to transform cancer treatment.

Levine Cancer Institute, which is part of Carolinas, cares for more than 10,000 new patients a year, and more than a thousand participate in clinical trials through a ‘care-close-to-home’ model at some 25 locations throughout the Carolinas.

“Combined with UNC Health Care’s National Cancer Institute designation, with more than $70 million in joint cancer research grants for clinical trials, we will create a cancer network that is second to none in the country,” Woods said.

Roper added that merging would enable the combined organization to provide a wider range of care services, build clinical destination centers, advance care in pediatrics, transplants and other services and expand their medical education offerings.

Executives of the two health systems also said the partnership would give them the leverage to negotiate better deals with insurance companies and vendors, potentially saving millions of dollars.

The plans for consolidation would be submitted to the Federal Trade Commission for ruling on whether the size of the new entity might inflate the cost of healthcare in the state or limit the choice of doctors and hospitals.

In Appalachia, Two Hospital Giants Seek State-Sanctioned Monopoly

http://khn.org/news/in-appalachia-two-hospital-giants-seek-state-sanctioned-monopoly/

Image result for hospital monopoly

Looking out a fourth-floor window of his hospital system’s headquarters, Alan Levine can see the Appalachian Mountains that have defined this hardscrabble region for generations.

What gets the CEO’s attention, though, is neither the steep hills in the distance nor one of his Mountain States Health Alliance hospitals across the parking lot. Rather, it’s a nearby shopping center where his main rival ­— Wellmont Health System, which owns seven area hospitals — runs an urgent care and outpatient cancer center. Mountain States offers the same services just up the road.

“Money is being wasted,” Levine said, noting that duplication of medical services is common throughout northeastern Tennessee and southwestern Virginia where Mountain States and Wellmont have been in a health care “arms race” for years, each trying to outduel the other for the doctors and services that will bring in business.

The companies now want to merge, which would create a monopoly on hospital care in a 13-county region that studieshave placed among the nation’s least healthy places. The merger’s savings would pay for a range of public health services that they can’t afford now, the companies project. And they are trying to pull it off without Washington regulators’ approval, breaking with hospitals’ usual path to consolidation.

In a typical case, a plan that eliminates so much competition in a market would almost certainly provoke a court battle with the Federal Trade Commission, which enforces antitrust laws and challenges anti-competitive behavior in the health industry.

To avert such a fight, the hospitals are using an obscure legal maneuver available in Tennessee and Virginia and some other states.

Generally known as a Certificate of Public Agreement (COPA), the process works like this: If regulators in Virginia and Tennessee agree that the merger is in the public interest, Wellmont and Mountain States would operate as one company under a state-supervised agreement governing key parts of their operations, including setting prices. The states’ approval would prevent the FTC from challenging the merger under federal antitrust law.

Their decisions could come as soon as this month.

In exchange for approval, Mountain States and Wellmont promise to use money saved from the merger to offer mental health and addiction treatment services and attack public health concerns, such as obesity and smoking — areas previously neglected by the systems that don’t increase hospital admissions and bring in big revenue, hospital officials said

“The question that needs to be asked is whether tight state oversight of a monopoly is better than failed competition,” said Robert Berenson, a health policy expert at the Urban Institute.

Little-Used And Rarely Challenged Mechanism

The federal antitrust exemption made possible under a COPA dates to a Supreme Court ruling in the 1940s used only about a dozen times to allow hospital mergers. One was an hour away from here, in Asheville, N.C.

There’s little scholarly research on COPAs’ results.

Last summer, the FTC dropped its challenge to a merger of two West Virginia hospitals after the state adopted a COPA law and permitted the deal.

In recent years, hospital mergers and acquisitions have created behemoth health systems that have used their status to demand high payments from insurers and patients. Studies by health economists have repeatedly found that consolidation means higher prices.

But the same calculus may not apply here and in other regions where a preponderance of patients are poor or uninsured, officials from both Mountain States and Wellmont say.

While President Donald Trump and Republicans in Congress stress the value of free-market principles in health care, both hospitals argue that in their part of Appalachia the market has led to unnecessary spending, driven up health costs and forced them to focus on services that produce the highest profits rather than meet the community’s most pressing health needs. In this deeply conservative region where death rates from cancer and heart disease are among the nation’s highest, the hospitals say only a state-sanctioned monopoly can help them control rising prices and improve their population’s health.

Without their proposed merger, Levine said, both hospital systems would likely have to sell to an out-of-market chain. That would likely eliminate local control of the facilities and could lead to massive layoffs and the closure of hospitals and services, he said. Together, the two hospital systems employ about 17,000 people.

The FTC, which is urging the states to reject the hospitals’ plan, contends the hospitals could form an alliance or take other steps short of a merger to accomplish the benefits they say one will bring. The agency says the hospitals’ market probably would be no worse off if one chain merged with a company outside the area.

Feds Wary Of Promises

The hospitals are making big promises to sell their deal. They say no hospitals would close for at least five years, although some could be converted to specialized health facilities to treat problems such as mental health or drug addiction. After the merger, all qualified doctors would have staff privileges at all hospitals to treat patients. No insurer would pay lower rates than others. The new hospital system would spend at least $160 million over 10 years to improve public health, expand medical research and support graduate medical education for work in rural areas.

The FTC maintains the hospitals’ pledges are unreliable and dismissed them as having “significant shortcomings, gaps and ambiguities” in an analysis filed with state regulators in January.

Levine said the plan is the best deal for the community given the factors that handicap the hospitals. Those include declining populations and Medicare reimbursement rates that are lower here than other parts of the country because of lower average wages. Another concern is the cost of caring for uninsured people — neither Virginia nor Tennessee expanded Medicaid under the health law, which would have lowered uninsured rates.

“Competition is and should be the first choice, but in an area where competition becomes irrational and there are limited choices, there has to be a Plan B. If not this, then what?” he said.

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tennessee, the state’s largest health insurer, is not opposing the hospitals’ combination, a spokesman said. But its counterpart in Virginia, Anthem, hasn’t been persuaded.

“Anthem does not believe that there are any commitments that will protect Southwest Virginia and Northeast Tennessee health care consumers from the negative impact of a state-sanctioned monopoly,” the company said in a statement.

Wanted: Better Job Prospects

The proposed COPA has strong support among large employers in the region, including Eastman, a Kingsport, Tenn., chemical company with $9 billion in annual revenue that employs more than 7,000 people locally. “We get local governance, input and control … and that’s a lot better situation for us,” said David Golden, a senior vice president at Eastman.

Still, walking around Johnson City — the region’s largest city with almost 67,000 people — it’s easy to feel an unease among small employers and residents about a merger. Many worry about possible job cuts.

“Eliminating duplication of services means eliminating people,” said Dick Nelson, 60, who runs a coffee and art shop downtown and has lived here for 27 years. “I don’t care how much health care costs because my insurance will pay it,” he said.

In Kingsport, where Wellmont and Mountain States each has a hospital, Thorp is leery about a merger, too. “It’s an economic move, not an enhancement of medical care,” said Thorp, who runs a newsstand downtown. “We pride ourselves here for having good education and health care. They say there won’t be any services or jobs cut, but if that’s the case then what’s the point of the merger?”

Levine said no place better supports the case for a hospital merger than Wise County in southwestern Virginia, a scenic area with about 40,000 people whose three hospitals all operate below half their capacity. Mountain States and Wellmont each own a hospital in Norton, the county seat with 4,000 residents. Despite few patients, the hospitals still bear hard-to-cut costs for buildings, equipment and adequate staffing levels, Levine said.

On a recent weekday morning, Lonesome Pine Hospital, a Wellmont facility in Big Stone Gap, Va., looked nearly deserted. No volunteers or staffers were visible inside its main entrance and fewer than a fifth of its 70 acute-care beds were being used.

A five-minute drive away, Mountain States’ Norton Community Hospital’s 129 beds are about a quarter filled. Its maternity unit delivers fewer than five babies a week. The hospital offers hyperbaric oxygen therapy — a treatment that pays well under Medicare’s reimbursement rates — to help diabetics heal their wounds. But it has no endocrinologists to help diabetics manage their disease to avoid such complications. Despite a high rate of heart disease in the community, there’s no cardiologist on staff.

Whether a state-sanctioned merger will resolve the incongruities — here or in other poor regions — depends on how firmly regulators hold the hospitals to their pre-merger commitments. If the merger plan gets rejected, Mountain States and Wellmont will resume arch-competitive business practices that do not always put community interests first, said Bart Hove, Wellmont’s CEO.

“It’s about competing for the dollar in any way you can and extracting a dollar from your competition,” Hove said. “You do what you can to drive patients to your hospital.”