CMS’ 2024 Health Spending Report: Key Insights

As media attention focused on Minneapolis, Greenland and Venezuela last week, the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) released its 2024 Health Expenditures report Thursday: the headline was “Health care spending in the US reached $5.3 trillion and increased 7.2% in 2024, similar to growth of 7.4% in 2023, as increased demand for health care influenced this two-year trend. “

Less media attention was given two Labor Department reports released the Tuesday before:

  • Prices: The consumer-price index (CPI) for December came in somewhat higher than expected with an increase of 0.3% and 2.7% over the past 12 months. Overall inflation isn’t rising, but it also isn’t coming down.
  • Wages: The Labor Department reported average hourly earnings after inflation in the last year rose 0.7% during the first five months of this year, but real hourly earnings have declined 0.2% since May. They’re stuck.

Prices are increasing but wages for most hourly workers aren’t keeping pace. That’s why affordability is the top concern for voters.

Meanwhile, the health economy continues to grow—no surprise.  It’s a concern to voters only to the extent it’s impacting their ability to pay their household bills. They don’t care or comprehend a health economy that’s complex and global; they care about their out-of-pocket obligations and surprise bills that could wipe them out.

As Michael Chernow, MedPAC chair and respected Harvard Health Policy professor wrote:

“The headline number, 7.2% growth in 2024, is concerning but hardly a surprise. It follows 7.4% growth in 2023. This rate of NHE growth is not sustainable. It exceeds general inflation and growth in the gross domestic product (GDP), pushing the share if GDP devoted to health care spending to 18%  in 2024; the share of GDP devoted to health care is projected to rise to 20.3% by 2033. In fact, these figures may be an underestimate of the fiscal burden of the health care system because spending on some things, such as employer administrative costs, are not captured… Given all the attention to prices and insurer profits, it is important to note that those factors are not the main drivers of spending growth—this time, it’s not the prices, stupid. There was virtually no excess medical inflation (medical inflation above general inflation) for 2023 or 2024. In fact, prices for retail drugs (net of rebates) rose at a rate below inflation. There will certainly be cases of rising prices driving spending, but on average, price growth is not the problem. This does not mean high-priced products and services are not an important component of spending growth, but instead it implies that their contribution to spending growth on average stems from their greater use, not rising prices. The main driver of spending growth is greater volume and intensity of care…”

My take:

Since 2000 to 2024, total healthcare spending in the U.S. has been volatile:

  • 2000–2007: High growth, typically 6–8% per year (driven by rising utilization and prices).
  • 2008–2013: Growth slowed to 3–4% during and after the Great Recession.
  • 2014–2016: Growth ticked up to 4.5–5.8% with ACA coverage expansion.
  • 2017–2019: Moderation around 4.5%.
  • 2020: COVID‑19 shock—growth slowed to ~2% due to deferred care.
  • 2021: Rebound to ~4%.
  • 2022: 4.8%, close to pre‑pandemic norms.
  • 2023: 7.4%, fastest since 1991–92.
  • 2024: 7.2%, reaching $5.3 trillion (18% of GDP)

Between 2000 and 2024, total health spending in the U.S. increased $3.9 trillion (279%) while the U.S. population grew by 58 million (20.4%). 2025 spending is expected to follow suit. The underlying reason for the disconnect between health spending and population growth is more complicated than placing blame on any one sector or trend: it’s true in the U.S. and every other developed system in the world. Healthcare is expensive and it’s costing more.

This is good news if you’ve made smart bets as an investor in the health industry but it’s problematic for just about everyone else including many in the industry who’ve benefited from its aversion to spending controls and cost cutting.

The current environment for the healthcare economy is increasingly hostile to the status quo. Voters think the system is wasteful, needlessly complicated and profitable. Lawmakers think it’s no man’s land for substantive change, defaulting to price transparency, increased competition and state regulation in response. Private employers, who’ve bear the brunt of the system’s ineffectiveness, are timid and reformers are impractical about the role of private capital in the health economy’s financing.

The healthcare economy will be an issue in Campaign 2026 not because aggregate spending increased 7-8% in 2025 per CMS, but because it’s no longer justifiable to a majority of Americans for whom it’s simply not affordable. Regrettably, as noted in Corporate Board Member’s director surveys, only one in five healthcare Boards is doing scenario planning with this possibility in mind.

P.S. The President released his Great Healthcare Plan last Thursday featuring his familiar themes—price transparency for hospitals and insurers, most favored pricing and elimination of PBMs to reduce prescription drug costs—along with health savings accounts for consumers in lieu of insurance subsidies. The 2-page White House release provided no additional details.

Is HCA the Exception or the Rule?

Last Tuesday, HCA, the largest investor-owned hospital system, released their Q4 2025 and year-end earnings and they’re impressive. The 190-hospital system reported:

  • Net income of $6.8 billion in 2025, a 17.8% increase year over year.
  • Revenue of $75.6 billion, a 7.1% increase year over year.
  • On a same facility basis, growth in revenue of 6.6%, equivalent admissions of 2.4% and net revenue per equivalent admission of 4.1% versus prior year.
  • For 2026, projected a net income between $6.5 billion and $7 billion and adjusted EBITDA between $15.6 and $16.5 billion on revenue between $76.5 billion and $80 billion.

CFO Mike Marks told the 16 analysts on the investor call “Consolidated adjusted EBITDA increased 12.1% over prior year, and we delivered a 90-basis point improvement in adjusted EBITDA margin. Cash flow from operations was $2.4 billion in the (4th) quarter and $12.6 billion for the year. This represents a 20% increase in operating cash flow in 2025 over full year 2024.”

And CEO Sam Hazen added “Let me add to just the whole resiliency agenda. This is not an episodic event for us. It just happens to be a maturation of what in my estimation is cultural within HCA, and that is being cost effective in finding ways to leverage scale, utilize best practices. Now we have tools… that are in front of us as opportunities to create even more consistency, efficiencies and transparency in the company’s overall cost. And that’s why the program is lining up in a well-timed manner with some of the enhanced premium tax credit challenges.

But we see this program continuing to mature. And as we get more capable at using these tools, it’s going to help us find even more opportunities. But this is not a onetime event. It’s a cultural dynamic in our company around being cost effective, being high quality and finding ways to improve from a process standpoint and a leverage standpoint with our overall scale.”

Shares of HCA closed at $488.27 last week, down from its peak at $527.55 (January27). Per MarketWatch, “shares of HCA Healthcare Inc rose $1.19% to $488.27 Friday on what proved to be an around grim trading session for the stock market, with the S&P Index falling 0.43% to 6939.03 and Dow (DJIA) falling 0.36% to 48,892.47. The stock demonstrated a mixed performance when compared to some of its competitors Friday, as Community Health Systems (CYH) rose 1.26% to $3.21 and Tenet (THC) fell 0.11% to $189.28.”

Hospital stock market analysts are keen to gauge how companies like these are navigating choppy waters for healthcare.  It’s understandable: Healthcare is one of the 11 sectors that comprises the overall S&P 500 and is 9.6% of its weighting. Historically, the healthcare index had beaten the S&P (30-year average 9% vs. 8% overall) but in recent years, it has lagged largely because regulatory policy changes and healthcare budget volatility dampened investor confidence.

Investors are increasingly hedging their bets in healthcare services reasoning even market bell-weathers like HCA face headwinds. And that sentiment has profound impact on operators in not-for-profit health sectors like community and rural hospitals, nursing and home care and ancillary services like EMS, hospice care and others that see their credit-worthiness slipping and costs for debt capital increasing.

My take

HCA is not an exception. It is culturally geared to the business of running hospitals and amassing scale in its markets vis a vis outpatient services and physician relationships. It follows a playbook geared to earnings per share and strategic deployment of capital to optimize its ROC, and it rewards its leaders accordingly. These are not unique to HCA.

And, like other systems, HCA is a lightning rod for critics. Studies have shown for-profit hospitals lean on staffing, aggressive on procurement, concerning to physicians and increasingly problematic to private insurers. Those same studies have shown quality of care to be comparable and charity care to be at or above same-market competitors. But this discipline also enables a higher price to cost ratio, a better payer mix and pruning of clinical services where margins are thin. Again, leverage in payer contracts and high pricing are not unique to the HCA playbook. Some not-for-profit systems have done the same or better.

What’s unique for each system like HCA are 1-the markets in which they enjoy leverage by virtue of scale and 2-the aggressiveness whereby they use their leverage. Ownership status—not for profit vs. investor-owned—matters in some markets and organizations more than others. But market dominance by any system, and how it’s leveraged, is a differentiator.

Case in point: In Asheville NC, HCA’s Mission Health dominates. HCA paid $1.5 billion for the legacy Mission-St. Joseph’s system in 2019. Despite, difficult media coverage and 3 warnings from CMS about quality shortcomings, it’s profitable.

On December 10, 2025, I had quadruple by-pass surgery there. Over the course 2 ED visits in November, the 5-day inpatient stay and post-surgical interactions since, I had the opportunity to see its operations firsthand. The bottom line for me is this: HCA Healthcare is a successful business. It operates Mission aggressively and profitably. Every employee knows it. Staffing is lean. There are no frills. Coordination of care is a crap shoot: connectivity between offices, services, and physicians is limited; price transparency is a joke and care navigation for patients like me is haphazard.  But all say patient care is not compromised as my surgical experience confirmed. Every hospital aspires for the same. All are trying to do more with less.

HCA’s financial success is not the exception in acute care, but it’s certain to draw attention to business practices that enable results like it enjoyed last year across the spectrum of hospital care. And it’s certain to intensify competition between hospitals to get the upper hand.

References in addition to citations in the sections that follow:

HCA faces up to $1.4B hit from ACA, Medicaid headwinds Beckers January 27, 2026 https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/why-hca-says-it-can-navigate-2026-policy-uncertainty

3 healthcare threats that will soon become a crisis too big to solve

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/3-healthcare-threats-soon-become-crisis-too-big-solve-pearl-m-d–tfuvc/

Most industries enjoy a luxury that U.S. healthcare does not. In professional services, retail, logistics and software, leaders can respond quickly when conditions change. Companies can shrink or expand the workforce, adopt innovative technologies or reconfigure operations within months.

Healthcare lacks that flexibility. Training new physicians takes a decade, making it difficult to adjust workforce supply to meet changing demand. And unlike other industries, hospitals cannot rapidly cut services or reduce capacity. In fact, most clinical service changes require regulatory approval, turning cost reduction into a multiyear process.

With timelines like these, course correction in healthcare is inherently slow. Problems that might have been manageable persist. And by the time leaders act, threats frequently become too large to reverse.

Three of the nation’s most pressing healthcare problems now face this reality:

Threat 1: The affordability cliff

Over the past 25 years, the nation’s total healthcare spending has climbed from $2 trillion to $5.3 trillion.

Businesses and the government have played “hot potato” in response to these rising costs. Employers slowed wage growth and switched to high-deductible health plans to offset ever-higher premiums. In parallel, Medicare and Medicaid set payment increases below the rising cost of delivering care, driving hospitals and physicians to make up the difference through higher charges in the private market.

The financial impact on families has been devastating. With healthcare costs rising faster than wages, half of Americans say they cannot afford their out-of-pocket expenses should they experienced a major illness.

For businesses, the government and families, these financial challenges are mounting with no relief in sight. In 2024, U.S. medical costs rose more than 7% for the second consecutive year, pushing healthcare’s share of the economy to roughly 18%. Out-of-pocket spending by consumers climbed 7.2%, exceeding $500 billion, as demand for hospital care, prescription drugs and physician services outpaced insurer projections. Moreover, insurance premiums are projected to rise by roughly 9% this year.

Congressional action (and inaction) is amplifying these pressures. The expiration of enhanced subsidies on the insurance exchanges is driving double- and even triple-digit percentage premium increases for roughly 20 million enrollees. And beginning this year, another 8 to 10 million Americans could lose Medicaid coverage as new eligibility restrictions take effect.

Absent major intervention, healthcare spending is projected to exceed $7 trillion by the end of the decade, consuming more than one-fifth of the U.S. economy. At that point, small businesses will have dropped coverage for millions of employees, and a growing share of federal spending will be diverted to interest payments on the national debt, squeezing Medicare, Medicaid and other healthcare programs as demand for medical care rises.

As long as the economy stays strong, businesses and policymakers will respond with incremental changes that dull the pain but fail to address the cause. Consequently, when the next recession begins (perhaps sooner than later, according to historical analyses), the economic crisis will become so large that solutions dependent on improving patients’ health will be too small and take too long to succeed. That brings up the second major challenge.

Threat 2: The chronic disease epidemic

Since the final decade of the 21st century, the United States has experienced a sustained and worsening epidemic of chronic disease.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, roughly 194 million U.S. adults now live with at least one chronic condition. About 130 million report multiple chronic diseases.

You might assume that if the healthcare system could prevent younger generations from developing these conditions, total costs would fall. But prevention alone cannot offset the cumulative burden of chronic disease already embedded in the American population.

To understand why, consider a single condition: diabetes.

A patient newly diagnosed with diabetes can usually control it and avoid serious, costly complications through lifestyle changes and relatively low-cost medications.

But when diabetes remains poorly controlled for a decade, biological damage accumulates. Each year, the risk of kidney failure or heart attack rises significantly. As a result, the cost of caring for a single patient with long-standing diabetes outweighs the savings that result from preventing diabetes in multiple newly diagnosed patients.

The math: On average, people with diabetes incur medical costs about 2.6 times higher than those without the disease (around $25,000 more per patient each year).

But when diabetes progresses to kidney failure, spending jumps into an entirely different category. Medicare costs for one patient’s hemodialysis treatment is approximately $100,000 annually. That’s not accounting for the cost of treating a patient’s likely cardiovascular disease, the leading cause of death among people with diabetes.

As such, to offset the medical care costs for a patient with a history of diabetes, our nation would need to prevent four new cases.

Add all these pieces together and diabetes alone accounts for more than $300 billion in direct medical costs each year, plus another $100 billion in indirect costs from disability and lost productivity.

Furthermore, effective chronic disease control requires large upfront investment, while the financial returns arrive years later. Act now, and the returns will be substantial. Based on CDC estimates, better prevention and control of chronic disease could avert up to half of all heart attacks, strokes, cancers and kidney failures, reducing national healthcare spending by $1 to $1.5 trillion each year. But if policymakers wait (while healthcare spending rises 7% or more annually), by the time they confront the crisis, they won’t be able to proceed financially since the required investment will be far more expensive than the payoff, at least in the short run.

Finally, if the U.S, wants to effectively prevent and control chronic disease as the means to reduce healthcare costs, there’s a third challenge our nation will need to address.

Threat 3: Training doctors for the wrong future

Ask medical leaders what they view as the greatest threat to high-quality care in the United States, and most will point to the growing physician shortage.

The Association of American Medical Colleges projects a shortfall of up to 86,000 physicians by 2036, with nearly half of that deficit in primary care. But those projections rest on a false assumption: the way doctors deliver care will be the same in 2036 as it is today.

If the United States has any hope of containing healthcare costs and reversing the chronic disease epidemic, it won’t happen by simply training more physicians.

Instead, countering those threats will require a transformation in how care is delivered. And generative AI will play a central role. But how?

Today, advances in medical knowledge allow physicians to effectively follow well-defined, evidence-based pathways for managing chronic disease in all but the most complex cases. As a result, most routine management tasks (monitoring, medication adjustments and decision support) are primed for generative AI. This transition has already begun.

A San Francisco startup, Mercor, recently earned a $10 billion valuation after recruiting more than 30,000 clinicians to help train AI systems to perform specialized medical tasks. Meanwhile, Utah just became the first state to launch a pilot allowing an AI system to renew prescriptions for 250 commonly used, non-controlled medications under physician oversight.

The implications for medical practice are clear. We can expect that generative AI will take on more routine chronic disease management, leaving primary care physicians more time to focus on complex clinical tasks. With AI support, they will increasingly care for patients who today are referred to specialists.

Specialists, in turn, will spend less time on evaluation and follow-up visits and more time performing procedures and advanced interventions that require human judgment and technical skill.

The combination of healthier patients and the redistribution of work (enabled by generative AI) will ease the physician-shortage problem. To prepare for this outcome, medical schools and residency programs will need to quickly integrate generative AI into every aspect of training. If not, physicians in many specialties will find themselves trained for the roles of the past, not the skills they will require a decade from now.

When Systems Fail, They Fail Together

When chronic disease becomes widespread and clinicians are overwhelmed, America’s health deteriorates, complications ensue and healthcare costs surge.

When chronic disease is managed effectively, the opposite occurs: hospitalizations fall, costly complications become rarer and the demand for specialty care declines.

For decades, healthcare has consumed an ever-larger share of GDP, while clinicians practiced medicine much as their mentors have for generations.

That era is ending. With costs accelerating and incremental fixes exhausted, healthcare is approaching a breaking point. Act aggressively, now, and the nation can prevent and better control chronic disease, avert hundreds of thousands of heart attacks, strokes and kidney failures, and flatten healthcare inflation.

By contrast, wait another decade and there will be no way to rein in spending or chronic disease. And if workforce adaptation is delayed, as many as 30% of physicians will find themselves trained for a version of medicine that no longer exists.

We still have a choice, but the clock is ticking.

Hawley and Warren Introduce “Break Up Big Medicine Act” to Force Separation of Insurers, PBMs and Providers

Bipartisan bill modeled on the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act would require health care conglomerates to divest vertically integrated subsidiaries.

Today, Senate ideological-opposites, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) and Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), introduced the Break Up Big Medicine Act, a Glass Steagall Act for health care. From the right, Hawley has built a reputation as a populist critic of corporate exploiters. From the left, Warren has spent years hammering Wall Street and Big Tech for their grip on markets. Together, their new bill aims at the corporate, monopolistic conglomerates that now control much the U.S. health care system — particularly where Big Insurance and its subsidiaries blur the lines between health delivery and Wall Street calculations.

At its core, the legislation prevents common ownership of a medical provider organization and one or more of the following: an insurance company, pharmacy benefit manager (PBM), or a prescription drug or medical device wholesaler. The bill requires individuals who currently own, operate, or control both types of entities to divest from one category (either the provider organization or the insurer, PBM, or wholesaler) within one year of the bill’s enactment. Failure to do so would result in penalties and enforcement from the Federal Trade Commission.

Why “Glass-Steagall for Health”?

The original Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in June 1933 during the Franklin Roosevelt administration. Congress and Roosevelt believed it was imperative to break up the risky entanglement of commercial and investment banking, which contributed to the 1929 stock market crash that led to the Great Depression. Millions of Americans lost their life savings when thousands of banks failed and confidence in the country’s financial system collapsed. The Glass-Steagall Act helped separate banks from speculative securities operations, established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to protect depositors and for decades served as a regulatory firewall that protected Americans’ savings.

In recent years, health insurers have morphed into Wall Street-controlled bank-like institutions that bear little resemblance to the nonprofit organizations most of them were just a few years ago. In fact, many of the country’s biggest health insurers are essentially financial institutions that also own a health insurance company.

Today’s major players are not just covering (and not covering) our health care costs — they are amassing profits across a sprawling set of subsidiaries that have mutated these health insurers into monopolistic corporations similar to the “trusts” Franklin Roosevelt’s cousin Teddy ordered broken up and to the vertically integrated banking titans of the 1920s.

For example:

  • UnitedHealth Group, owner of UnitedHealthcare (a health insurer), also owns Optum Bank (which has more HSA assets under management than any other financial institution), Optum Ventures, Change Healthcare, PBMs, speciality pharmacies, and over 2,000 medical provider organizations;
  • CVS Health operates both insurance products (through Aetna) and PBMs (through Caremark) and owns a major pharmacy retail chain that shapes prescription pricing and competition;
  • Cigna has been bringing in far more revenue from the pharmacy supply chain since it bought Express Scripts in 2018 than from its many health plans; and
  • Elevance, which operates Blue Cross plans in 14 states, also owns a PBM, clinical operations and, like UnitedHealth, a financial institution with millions in HSA assets under management.

The joint ownership of insurance companies, PBMs, medical provider organizations, and pharmacies allows the parent companies to game a little known regulation called the medical loss ratio (MLR). The ACA requires that insurers have MLRs of at least 80-85%, meaning they must spend 80-85% of premium dollars on medical care. When insurance companies own a PBM, a provider group or pharmacy, they can count premium dollars they “spend” with to those entities as “medical care” for purposes of the MLR, when in reality they are self-dealing – and often inflating the amount they pay their affiliated providers to meet the MLR requirements and avoid sending rebates to their customers for noncompliance. As a consequence large health care conglomerates have little if any incentive to contain costs. The self-dealing actually drives costs higher while enabling them to convert more premium dollars to profits than Congress intended when it included the MLR provision in the Affordable Care Act.

Taken together, Big Insurance profits from vertical integration by pooling their subsidiaries’ reach and capital, investing in and paying themselves and influencing the cost of and access to care for millions of Americans throughout the health care ecosystem.

The fact that Hawley and Warren are uniting on this important legislation is reflective of the broader national conversation about the nation’s health care affordability issue, which has created a medical debt crisis that a broad-swath of Americans now blame on Big Insurance.

Warren and Hawley recognize the critical importance of structurally separating companies within our health care system to protect patients and make prices more affordable.

The original Glass-Steagall Act was passed after many banks had already become insolvent. The Break Up Big Medicine Act could prevent a similar catastrophe.

The Misleading Chart That Killed the ACA Subsidies

GOP leaders cited data from a Trump-aligned think tank to argue the ACA is “unaffordable”. Health economists say the numbers were spun and the full story tells the opposite.

In December, when Capitol Hill was consumed by a debate over whether to extend the subsidies that had held down premiums for individual health insurance under the Affordable Care Act since the COVID-19 crisis, Senate Majority Leader John Thune took to the floor to make his case against any extension.

“Obamacare has utterly failed to control health care costs,” argued the South Dakota Republican, who also claimed the government-backed health plan is riddled with what he called “waste, fraud and abuse.” As Thune spoke, he stood before a supersized chart that he said clinched the case for ending the subsidies.

“This graph illustrates that, and it understates the problem,” the GOP leader said, pointing to the chart where a red line symbolizing the costs of ACA insurance jutted skyward. It made a case that since 2014 the premiums for Obamacare coverage have not just outstripped inflation but have increased more than double the rate of employer-based health plans.

In the days that followed, Thune’s GOP caucus held the line and successfully resisted a Democratic push to save the subsidies, even as many of their constituents were getting notices in the mail that their ACA-plan premiums for 2026 would increase sharply – doubling, or more, in some cases.

But some health care experts who looked at the large chart that was so central to Thune’s argument said they could not disagree more with the senator’s claim of an Obamacare affordability crisis. They note that while there was indeed a spike in ACA premium costs in 2017 and 2018 – largely the result of political decisions made by Thune’s fellow Republicans – in the years from 2019 through 2025 the ACA increases were actually lower than in employer-based insurance.

“This is being used as evidence that the individual market is, in some way, particularly inefficient – and I just don’t think there’s any reason for that,” said Matthew Fiedler, senior fellow at the Center for Health Policy at the Brookings Institute. He added: “There has been research that has compared individual-market to employer-market premiums. And what it actually finds is that individual-market premiums” – those offered under ACA – “seem to be a little bit lower than employer-market premiums.”

Thune wasn’t the only top Republican who offered the questionable statistics as a central argument for ending the Obamacare subsidies. House Speaker Mike Johnson tweeted out the same chart on the social-media site X on Dec. 15, lashing out at what he dubbed “the Unaffordable Care Act.”

But where did top Republicans get their arguably misleading information? The answer can be found in the small logo at the top of the controversial chart – that of a small and, until recently, fairly obscure Trump-aligned policy think tank called the Paragon Health Institute. It is led by Brian Blase, who was a member of Trump’s National Economic Council during the president’s first term.

Just a few years old, Paragon under Blase has positioned itself as the leading voice for a Trump-led health care overhaul that has promoted the belief that ACA-supported health insurance is both riddled with fraud and wildly inefficient for taxpayers. And its latest chart on ACA costs isn’t the first time Paragon has been accused of pushing misleading statistics to make its case.

In August, Blase and Paragon claimed that Obamacare is overrun with “phantom enrollees” – insisting that millions of ACA enrollees who’d filed no insurance claims was evidence that unscrupulous brokers had profited by signing up people without their knowledge. But Paragon’s report, which also was cited repeatedly by Republicans seeking to block the extended subsidies, was blasted by groups such as the American Hospital Association.

An AHA vice president, Aaron Wesolowski, wrote in a blog post “that Paragon developed these allegations using inaccurate data, dubious assumptions, and an apparent lack of understanding of how health insurance actually works.” He and other experts explained that while there was a real problem with 200,000 of the more than 25 million people who had signed up for coverage in the ACA marketplace, the vast number of zero-claims patients were not “phantoms” but young people who didn’t see a doctor, people who were only in Obamacare plans for months before getting a new job, or plan-switchers who were double-counted.

The story of Paragon is the health care version of a much bigger story that anyone who’s followed American politics over the last decade will recognize: How misinformation and distortions are amplified in a media and social media ecosystem.

Andrew Sprung, a health care writer who picked apart the Paragon chart on ACA costs in his Substack newsletter, said this type of propaganda “goes straight onto Fox News and into the mouth of Trump allies who deter the Republicans from cutting a deal” that might save the Obamacare subsidies and thus make health coverage more affordable for middle-class families, including their own constituents.

To Sprung and other health watchdogs, the statistical jiu-jitsu that Paragon performed in its analysis of ACA premiums versus employer-based plans is typical of how it helps ultra-conservatives win the PR wars against publicly supported health care in America. The spin helps leaders like Thune and Johnson keep their more moderate members in line.

In fact, Thune, again citing Paragon statistics, noted in his Senate floor speech that if you extend the chart back to 2013, Obamacare premiums appear to have risen some 221% – before he quickly acknowledged that this number is skewed by the difficulties insurers faced in setting rates in the first year of open enrollment.

But health care analysts note that other factors – most of them tied to Republican hostility toward any type of public health care – fundamentally undercut the argument from Paragon and its allies on Capitol Hill that Obamacare is a failure because inflation is baked into the program.

In a post headlined “Lies, damned lies, statistics, and Republican talking points about the ACA,” Sprung notes that the first spike in ACA premiums occurred in 2017 because a three-year, federally funded reinsurance program included in the original 2010 law had expired and insurers recalculated their costs based on a risk pool that was older and sicker than anticipated. As a result, premiums in the benchmark Silver plans under the ACA rose that year by 20%.

But that didn’t end the turmoil for Obamacare, because when Trump took office in 2017 and – with Blase in the White House as a policy adviser – Republicans pushed hard to repeal the ACA. That didn’t happen, of course, but the new administration did make changes like shortening the enrollment period and scaling back recruitment and marketing, as well as reducing cost-sharing payments to insurers.

The chaos the changes caused spooked insurers, who raised premiums a second time in 2018, by an average of 34%. But the failure of the ACA repeal effort in the Senate that same year ushered in a period of stability in which – contrary to Paragon’s argument about the inefficiency of Obamacare – ACA premiums actually outperformed health plans offered by employers. Sprung cited government statistics that premiums for individual plans rose from 2018-23 by 13%, compared to 29% for employer plans.

Brookings’ Fiedler agreed. “You’ll see there’s this period where premiums are actually declining in the individual market,” he said, noting that not only did insurers overshoot with the Obamacare premium hikes of the mid-2010s but that the enhanced subsidies that began under COVID-19 brought in younger, healthier enrollees while encouraging increased competition for new customers.

None of the non-fiction narrative around what has really happened in the marketplace since the passage of Obamacare supports the GOP’s core argument that health care backed by the ACA is riddled with “waste, fraud and abuse.” Instead, Paragon looks to be spinning its own storyline that is to the liking of its donors, like the billionaire libertarians of the Koch family, which supported the think tank in 2021 with a $2 million donation from the aligned organization, Stand Together. Groups aligned with Leonard Leo, the former Federalist Society officer who was the architect of the right-wing takeover of the Supreme Court, have also donated.

The failure by Congress to extend the ACA subsidies ahead of their expiration shows that the right’s deceptive spin-doctoring is working, for now.

That zeitgeist may change once the voodoo economics of a misleading line chart is swamped by the tide of horror stories about soaring out-of-pocket costs for regular folks who can no longer afford the care they need.

How much will TrumpRx really cut down your drug costs?

President Trump on Thursday unveiled his lower-cost drug platform TrumpRx, touting it as “one of the most transformative health care initiatives of all time.”

“This launch represents the largest reduction in prescription drug prices in history by many, many times,” he added. 

But health policy experts and consumer advocates are skeptical about how many people will benefit, and how significant the deals are. 

The platform features coupons for 43 drugs, ranging from 33 to 93 percent off the list price and treating conditions for obesity, respiratory illnesses, infertility, bladder issues and menopause.

Several observers were quick to note that the advertised prices achievable with the coupons were still higher than the prices one might pay with insurance coverage. 

“If you have insurance, your out-of-pocket costs are probably going to be less than the discounted list price that’s being advertised on TrumpRX,” Juliette Cubanski, deputy director of the Program on Medicare Policy at KFF, told The Hill.  

“For people who are looking at this website and maybe they recognize a drug that they take, they really need to understand how their out-of-pocket cost under insurance would compare to the TrumpRx price.” 

Cubanski noted, however, that some of the medications on TrumpRx aren’t well covered by insurance — such as weight loss and in vitro fertilization drugs, meaning a wider swathe of Americans may find savings on TrumpRx. 

“It’s a valuable effort for some medications, for some people, and I think especially people who don’t have good coverage of some of these medications,” she said. 

Notably, the offerings on TrumpRx are all branded versions of the drugs sold directly by drugmakers who’ve entered “most favored nation” (MFN) pricing agreements with the Trump administration. 

Many of the medications listed on the website have generic alternatives available on the market at significantly lower prices. 

Protonix, a branded medication made by Pfizer that reduces stomach acid, is advertised as having a 55 percent discount on TrumpRx, taking the medication from $447.28 to $200.10 for 30 tablets at a strength of 20 mg. 

But according to GoodRx, its generic equivalent, pantoprazole, can be bought for $10.47 for the same number of tablets at the same dosage with the coupon it offers. Without the coupon, the cost is estimated at just less than $80. 

Another Pfizer product, Tikosyn, for an irregular heartbeat, is shown to have a 50 percent discounted price of $336 for 60 0.125 mg capsules. Generic Tikosyn, dofetilide, is shown to be available for $23.06 on GoodRx with a standard coupon, signifying a 94 percent discount from the $373.96 cost. 

Generics currently make up the majority of prescription medications taken in the U.S., with the Food and Drug Administration estimating in 2023 that 91 percent of prescriptions are filled as generics. 

Anthony Wright, executive director of FamiliesUSA, a nonpartisan consumer health advocacy group, dismissed TrumpRx as a “trumped-up catalog of coupons.” 

“This is not actually lowering drug prices. It steers consumers to the existing drug company programs for uninsured patients that have been around for a while,” said Wright. “This is pretty limited in terms of both who it effects, what drugs it offers and what the benefits are, especially compared to what already existed previously.” 

Ashish Jha, who served as the Biden administration’s White House COVID-19 response coordinator, did not share that skepticism. He called TrumpRx a “good thing” that “is going to be really, really helpful for people who don’t have health insurance” in remarks to The Hill’s sister network NewsNation.

TrumpRx.gov explicitly states that people on government health plans such as Medicaid are ineligible to use the coupons. 

The prohibition on federal health plan enrollees from using TrumpRx coupons likely has to do with the anti-kickback statute in the U.S., which criminalizes willfully offering or exchanging anything of value for reimbursable items through federal programs like Medicaid. 

The Hill has reached out to the Trump administration for clarity on whether all private health insurance enrollees can use TrumpRx coupons. 

But even if this cohort can access the coupons, the scope of TrumpRx appears to be “quite limited in scale,” according to Yunan Ji, assistant professor of strategy at Georgetown’s McDonough School of Business.

It really only applies to cash-pay patients. So, just considering the scale is cash-pay patients we’re thinking about, you know, a percent of the uninsured, plus some of the people who may be underinsured because their insurance coverage may be limited, but the scope is quite limited at the moment,” she said. 

Roughly 8 percent of the U.S. is uninsured, and with its current offering of just 43 drugs, TrumpRx currently stands to benefit a small subset of that population. Administration officials said more medication would be added in the coming weeks. 

“The thing about MFN in general — so this is interesting, because MFN is something I teach my MBA students — is that actually, in the long run, it actually puts upward pricing pressure,” said Ji.

Trump’s signature drug price policy requires countries to sell drugs in the U.S. at least as cheaply as they are offered in other countries. 

When companies are aware that their clients, like the U.S., are expecting MFN pricing, they may set their initial launch prices of new drugs at an elevated level, Ji said. Another outcome of MFN pricing could be that drug launches in other countries with strict pricing regulations will be delayed.

Trump acknowledged the global impact that his MFN pricing policy could have on other countries when announcing the launch of TrumpRx. 

“Drug prices in other nations will go up by doing this, they had to agree,” he said. “In many cases, the drug costs will go up by double and even triple for them, but they’re going way down for the United States.” 

Companies are tired of absorbing tarifffs

Businesses that held the line on tariff-related price increases last year might be passing more of those costs on to consumers at the start of 2026.

Why it matters: 

The Trump administration is celebrating how little its huge levies have impacted inflation. But new signs indicate the policies are appearing with a lag, complicating their push to address affordability concerns.

Zoom out: 

Many companies reassess pricing at the start of the year — one factor that historically makes January a month of above-average price increases.

  • Tariffs could be supercharging that historic trend: Companies might finally be raising prices to address the costs they ate throughout much of last year.
  • Adobe’s Digital Price Index rose by the most, month on month, in its 12-year history in January — even faster than at the height of the inflation shock in 2022.
  • “The strong increase could be a sign of greater tariff pass-through to start off the new year,” with large price changes for electronics, furniture, bedding and appliances, economists at UBS wrote in a note.

Yes, but: 

The bank’s economists caution that the series can be volatile, and it was down sharply in November, so it could be a head fake.

State of play: 

Official government inflation data for January is not scheduled to be released until next week, pending a government shutdown. Still, there’s other evidence that January could be a spicy month for price hikes.

  • The Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing survey sub-index for prices ticked up to 59 in January, from 58.5, the highest since September.

Zoom in: 

While there is still caution that higher prices could crimp demand, several references in the Federal Reserve’s compilation of anecdotal information from across the U.S. point to price increases in the new year.

  • In Atlanta, for instance, “many contacts expect to implement price increases in the first half of 2026 to preserve margins, especially those who held prices steady in 2025,” according to the most recent Beige Book.
  • The Philadelphia Fed notes that many businesses anticipated “tariffs to seep into general price levels.”

In a speech this morning, Richmond Fed president Tom Barkin said that he has spoken with about 75 companies since the start of the year, and described a dynamic within companies regarding price-setting.

  • “In boardrooms around the country, sales and finance teams are debating how aggressively to increase prices, for example, in the context of increased tariff-driven input costs,” Barkin said.
  • “If I can stereotype: Sales doesn’t want to pass through those costs at the risk of lost volume; finance doesn’t want to eat the cost at the risk of reduced margins,” Barkin said.
  • “I imagine some finance teams have done well recently (at least based on the increases I’ve seen in my streaming services and homeowners insurance),” he added.

What they’re saying: 

“The Fed is telling us, ‘Don’t worry, the inflationary effects of [tariffs] will subside,’ but I am a little bit skeptical of that,” James Knightley, chief international economist at ING, told reporters in Washington, D.C., this morning.

  • “I do get the sense that there is some delay related to the Supreme Court decision — a lot of companies are hoping it will just disappear,” Knightley said, referring to a pending decision about the legality of the bulk of President Trump’s tariffs.
  • “There is a risk that costs end up getting passed along to you and I in time … it just will come through more slowly,” Knightley said.

Trump administration pressed on details of drug price deals

https://www.axios.com/2026/02/03/trump-drug-price-deals-pfizer-eli-lilly

The Trump administration is facing new pressure to disclose details about its confidential pricing agreements with big drug companies and whether they meaningfully lower costs for patients.

Why it matters: 

President Trump has touted the “most favored nation” drug pricing deals as one of his signature accomplishments, but most of the details have been kept under wraps, including how the new prices are calculated.

Driving the news: 

The advocacy group Public Citizen filed a Freedom of Information Act suit last week, seeking the text of the deals the administration struck with Eli Lilly and Pfizer.

  • Those and other agreements were touted in high-profile Oval Office ceremonies as a step toward lowering U.S. drug prices and aligning them with what’s paid in other developed countries.
  • The deals have been described in broad terms, but questions remain about basic matters like what exactly the companies agreed to.
  • The administration is “shaking hands with pharma CEOs and telling us they fixed drug pricing and then not disclosing any text,” said Peter Maybarduk, access to medicines director at Public Citizen. “It makes it hard to believe, makes it hard to understand, makes it hard to assess.”

Congressional Democrats also wrote to Pfizer, Eli Lilly, AstraZeneca and Novo Nordisk in December asking for details of their respective agreements.

  • The letter to Pfizer said the company and the administration seem to be “attempting to shield themselves from oversight, accountability, and specifics that could inform consumers about whether this agreement will save money.”
  • An administration official said: “Because the drug pricing agreements contain confidential, proprietary and commercially sensitive information, they will not be released publicly.”
  • None of the four companies provided more details when asked about the agreements. A Novo Nordisk spokesperson said “this agreement will bring semaglutide medicines to more American patients at a lower cost,” referring to the active ingredient in its blockbuster weight-loss drugs.

Between the lines: 

The deals would for the most part not lower existing drug prices for a huge segment of the public that gets coverage through Medicare or workplace insurance.

  • Instead, the most-favored nation prices would apply to Medicaid. One unanswered question is how much lower would those prices be, since drugmakers already are required to have low prices for Medicaid.
  • The deals also anticipate most-favored nation prices for newly launched drugs in future years. But it’s not fully clear how that would work, since drugs are usually launched in the United States first and there wouldn’t yet be prices abroad to use as a comparison.
  • There would also be discounted drugs sold through the government’s direct-to-consumer website TrumpRx. But the portal is built around cash purchases, which many cannot afford.

The big picture: 

Trump has railed against what he calls “global freeloading” and ending the way the U.S. pays more for drugs than other developed countries. But policy experts have questioned whether manufacturers will only meet him halfway, raising prices abroad without cutting them in the U.S.

  • “You can kind of see why the pharmaceutical industry wouldn’t be so opposed if what they end up getting is maybe a slightly lower price in the U.S. and higher prices in other countries,” said Juliette Cubanski, deputy director of the Program on Medicare Policy at KFF.
  • The Trump administration has also proposed new payment models to incorporate most-favored nation pricing into Medicare, which would lead to savings.
  • But the changes are tests that would only apply in certain geographic areas, and analysts say they would not have a drastic impact on Medicare spending.

The bottom line: 

Maybarduk, of Public Citizen, acknowledged that the goals of the drug pricing efforts are laudable, even if the practical effects remain unclear.

  • “The thing that we agree with here, of course, is that Americans pay too much for drugs, and we pay more than other countries for drugs.”

What is “Medically Necessary”?

How Big Health Insurers hijacked a medical term and built a denial machine around it.

We hear the term “medically necessary” used every day by insurance companies as a reason to deny or delay health care. While doctors were hard at work treating patients, insurers quietly co-opted the term, and that’s causing serious problems now.

If you ask most doctors to define ‘medically necessary,’ you’ll get some version of: “The test, therapy, drug or procedure that will do the best job of treating my patient.” It’s that simple: whatever is best for my patient.

If you ask an insurer, you may get some legal definition about care “provided for the cure or relief of a health condition, illness, injury or disease (looks good so far, but wait there’s more!), and is not for experimental, investigational or cosmetic purposes and is necessary for and appropriate to the….” The problem begins with the meaning of “necessary and appropriate.”

The terms ‘necessary’ and ‘appropriate’ are left to interpretation. My doctor may feel that a certain test or medication is necessary and appropriate, but someone else may disagree. So how do insurers resolve that disagreement? This is where things go off the rails.

They resolve it by having a medical director they employ review what my doctor wants for me – and that medical director becomes the sole arbiter of what care I can have that will be covered by my health plan. That medical director can sign off on a denial of a claim or a request, and many times they justify that denial by saying the treatment isn’t medically necessary – for reasons that are entirely defined by the health plan.

It seems a clear conflict of interest when an anonymous medical director – possibly lacking in both expertise and experience – rejects a course of treatment laid out by a physician specializing in that disease or condition who has a history with that particular patient. But it happens all the time.

These medical directors work for the company that is denying the claim or request. They have been granted stock and stock options in that company. Their bonus is tied to the financial performance of the company. To say they are impartial and doing what is best for the patient is laughable at best.

Frequently, these medical directors are reviewing requests in areas outside their specialty. In addition, they make these determinations without ever seeing the patient, or reviewing the medical records, studies or lab results that led the treating physician to make the recommendation in the first place. An investigation by ProPublica found that Cigna medical directors were signing off on denials once every 1.2 seconds. This isn’t clinical review; this is profit enhancement.

This brings us to another problem: “coverage policies.” Insurance corporations have created a whole library of coverage policies, and they differ from health plan to health plan. If you’ve never read one of these coverage policies let me save you some time and trouble. Get up now and place your head between the door and the door jam. Now slam the door. You just achieved the headache and confusion that reading a long coverage policy would give you in a fraction of the time. You’re welcome.

Even if you read the policy and think it’s got you covered, you still aren’t home free. A medical director can overrule the policy and still deny the care. Also, that coverage policy may be different for each health plan, and they change from time to time. I am struck by this basic question: Why should the care you receive depend on the insurance card in your wallet and not your clinical situation? The answer, of course, is because that’s how the insurance companies want it.

So, what do we do about this? Let me give you two relatively easy solutions.

First, follow a coverage policy.

If only there was a group of doctors that represented every specialty, we could get them to meet and determine universal coverage policies that could be mandated for all health insurance, both government and commercial. Wouldn’t that be nice? Doctors could then provide good care to patients without having to figure out a library of different coverage policies. Wait, a group like that does exist. It’s called the RUC.

The RUC (Relative Value Scale Update Committee) is an American Medical Association specialty panel, a volunteer group of 32 physicians and over 300 physician advisors who represent every medical specialty. The committee evaluates thousands of individual services across the medical spectrum. Why don’t we ask them to develop a universal set of clinical coverage policies?

Second, fix the denial system. Pass a law that says whenever an insurer denies payment or a request for care, that denial must be signed by a medical doctor, and signing that denial qualifies as “the practice of medicine.” This would make those denials and the doctor who signed off on them subject to all the responsibilities and accountabilities required to practice medicine.

This includes:

  • having an active license in the state where the patient is seeking care; practicing within your specialty;
  • documenting your decision-making in the patient’s medical record, including the information you reviewed to come to your decision; and
  • being liable for malpractice if your decision causes harm to the patient and is not clinically justified.

Let’s assume we had this in place right now and applied it to a real-world situation: the GLP-1 coverage debate. When these glucagon-like peptide-1 drugs for diabetes and weight loss came to market they would have gone before the RUC for a clinical coverage policy. Let’s say the RUC determines that the drugs should be covered for individuals with a BMI over 30 who have tried and failed other diet programs, or for people with a BMI between 25 and 30 who have significant cardiac risk or are diabetic.

Now we have a universal coverage guideline. The doctors prescribing the drug have a very clear understanding of who will be covered and when, and it would apply to all patients regardless of which insurance company they had. As long as the prescribing physician stays inside the guidelines, no denials would be expected.

Let’s take an example from the flip side. A doctor wants to prescribe an expensive chemotherapy regimen to an elderly patient with cancer. The insurer could have that request reviewed and possibly denied by a medical director. However, that medical director would need to be an oncologist with a valid license in the state where the patient is getting treatment. If that oncologist reviews the patient information, denies the chemotherapy for valid clinical reasons, and documents those reasons in the patient’s chart, then the insurer can deny the request.

These two changes would eliminate so many problems, improve the lives of doctors, improve the lives of patients, and reduce administrative costs.

So why hasn’t this been done already? Well the one thing these changes would not do is increase the stock prices of insurance companies.

To put it more succinctly, it’s profits over patients. That’s why.

Senate Judiciary: UnitedHealth Turned Medicare Advantage Risk Adjustment Into a Profit Engine

A new report from the Republican-led Senate Judiciary Committee describes how UnitedHealth Group has turned a safeguard for sick patients in the Medicare Advantage program into a profit-making strategy.

The report, How UnitedHealth Group Puts the Risk in Medicare Advantage Risk Adjustment, details how Medicare Advantage (MA) payments (seemingly designed to compensate health insurers more for enrolling patients with greater health needs) have increasingly rewarded insurers with the resources, data and scale to capture and maximize diagnosis codes. According to the committee, UnitedHealth Group has leveraged its size, vertical integration and advanced data and AI capabilities to consistently stay ahead of efforts by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to curb excess payments tied to coding intensity.

Read the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s How UnitedHealth Group Puts the Risk in Medicare Advantage Risk Adjustment here.

After reviewing more than 50,000 pages of internal UnitedHealth documents, Judiciary Committee investigators found that the company built a vast diagnosis-capture infrastructure that includes in-home health risk assessments, secondary chart reviews, “pay-for-coding” arrangements with providers, and tightly controlled clinical workflows within UnitedHealth-aligned medical practices. These efforts, the report states, go well beyond neutral documentation and instead amount to an aggressive strategy to maximize risk scores and, by extension, federal payments.

The committee, chaired by Sen. Chuck Grassley, (R-Iowa), warns that even when CMS attempts to rein in abuse (such as excluding more than 2,000 diagnosis codes from the risk-adjustment model) UnitedHealth appears uniquely positioned to identify new, untapped diagnoses among the thousands that remain. Because UnitedHealth also sells its diagnostic criteria, coding tools and workforce to rival insurers, its strategies can quickly spread across the entire Medicare Advantage market.

The report concludes with this:

While Senator Grassley’s staff will continue to evaluate the information produced by UHG, this initial review has revealed how UHG has been able to profit from the way that CMS risk adjusts payments to MAOs. The investigation has also shown that risk adjustment in MA has become a business in itself—by no means should this be the case. MAOs should receive payments that are commensurate to the complexity and acuity of the Medicare beneficiaries that they insure, not their knowledge of coding rules and their ability to find new ways to expand inclusion criteria for diagnoses. Taxpayers and patients deserve accurate and clear-cut risk adjustment policies and processes.

But what makes these findings especially notable is who commissioned the investigation in the first place. Grassley was one of the original architects and longtime champions of Medicare Advantage when it was enacted back in 2003. In recent years, he now warns that the program’s “promise of efficiency and choice” has been undermined by vertical consolidation, blinded oversight and systemic risk-code gaming.

In past inquiries — spurred by reporting from outlets like The Wall Street Journal and findings from the Health & Human Services’ Office of Inspector General — he has demanded answers from UnitedHealth over the use of in-home assessments and chart reviews that allegedly drove billions of dollars in additional payments to the company.

Continuing the bipartisan scrutiny of MA insurers, CMS recently released its proposed payment rates for MA plans in 2027. Notably, CMS is proposing to exclude diagnosis codes added to a patient’s chart during chart reviews by AI or insurers from their risk score; something many reform advocates and I have long supported. These changes and this investigation are important steps in reining in the abuses by MA insurers and reason for hope we are on the right track.