Anticipating the future promise of AI in medicine

https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/14/artificial-intelligence-medicine-eric-topol/?utm_source=The+Weekly+Gist&utm_campaign=41103e2ef1-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_02_14_09_16&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_edba0bcee7-41103e2ef1-41271793

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A group of American and Chinese researchers published data this week showing that artificial intelligence (AI) is as accurate as physicians in diagnosing common clinical conditions in children. Scientists built an AI model using neural networks to process patient history, physical exam and lab data, clinical symptoms and other information to automatically generate a diagnosis. Using that model to evaluate the records of over 600,000 Chinese pediatric patients, the diagnostic accuracy of the AI-driven model was largely equivalent to that of physicians. Looser privacy standards in China make it easier to aggregate the data for AI-driven diagnosis, presenting a potential roadblock for replicating the results in the US. However, researchers cite the potential for AI to complement physician diagnosis, as algorithms recognize patterns that are often missed by doctors.

The scale of this study is impressive, but it’s hardly the first to illustrate the promise of AI in improving diagnosis and even substituting for high-cost clinical labor. However, few AI technologies have been able to make the leap from promising algorithm to real clinical application. Writing in Nature Medicine, digital-medicine guru Dr. Eric Topol recently reviewed the science and application of AI across clinical care, and found that while he “couldn’t find one discipline in medicine that doesn’t have significant AI potential impact”, there is an “AI chasm” between the developing science and real clinical impact. Most AI research is retrospective, and Topol identifies the need for true gold-standard, prospective studies. But he says that real impact, likely in visual diagnosis, could be imminent, with studies demonstrating AI analysis of radiographic images, retinal scans and skin lesions that is equal to or better than a doctor’s read. Topol doesn’t cite one key barrier of AI implementation: professional guilds, who have vested interest in keeping the diagnostic business in the hands of their members. Regardless, AI represents a promising path to reducing reliance on expensive human labor, one that is sure to be adopted as cost pressures mount. While we’d predict the first impact will come from automating “back-office” functions, doctors who resist AI are fighting a losing battle. 

Successful physicians will ascertain how to use AI to augment their practice—and the ones who blindly resist its use may be most in danger of being rendered obsolete.

 

 

Asking the wrong question about physician consolidation

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1077558719828938?utm_source=The+Weekly+Gist&utm_campaign=41103e2ef1-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_02_14_09_16&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_edba0bcee7-41103e2ef1-41271793&

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A paper out this week from Rice University healthcare economist Vivian Ho is the latest analysis to posit that vertical integration of doctors and hospitals does little to improve care quality. Researchers evaluated 29 primarily hospital-focused quality and patient satisfaction measures and found that higher levels of vertical integration were associated with improved performance on just a small number of metrics—and increased market concentration was associated with lower scores on all patient satisfaction measures.

Before concluding that vertical integration generates little improvement in quality, it’s worth looking a little deeper at the methodology of this study, as well as the larger drivers of hospital-physician integration. Researchers used a blunt measure of vertical integration, combining health systems’ self-reported physician alignment model with a standard index of hospital market concentration (on the theory that lower hospital-to-hospital competition indicates greater vertical integration). The performance measures examined are hospital-focused, ignoring outpatient care quality, as well as the nuance of whether the “integrated” physicians in any market are responsible for the outcomes measured (employing primary care doctors and orthopedic surgeons would have little impact on measures of hospital treatment of heart attacks).

In a press release, the author notes: “If patient welfare doesn’t improve after integration, there may be other reasons why physicians and hospitals are forming closer relationships—perhaps to raise profits.” That’s right: there are many motives for vertical integration. Surely profitability has been a driver, as well as the rising complexity and deteriorating economics of running an independent practice. In the real world, physician alignment strategies are rarely driven by the primary goal of improved quality. However, many health systems have begun to recognize that closer financial alignment is a necessary (but far from sufficient) requirement to enable real progress on quality improvement. Regardless of alignment approach, though, quality improvement results from the hard work of care process redesign and cultural change, not as the inevitable result of vertical integration. Success stories are still too few and far between, but we believe there is value in leveraging vertical integration to make this work easier. Condemning vertical integration seems a harsh verdict; a more appropriate criticism would be that much of the heavy lifting of care redesign is yet to begin.

 

 

Here come the Millennials!

We spend an awful lot of time in healthcare talking about the Baby Boomers. No surprise, America has spent decades—six-and-a-half of them, to be exact—contending with the impact of this historically large generation on nearly every aspect of our national life. From politics to economics to culture, the Baby Boom reshaped almost every facet of our society, and healthcare has been no exception. The fact that over 10,000 Boomers join the Medicare ranks every day means they’ll have a transformative effect on how healthcare is delivered and paid for—up to and including the sustainability of the Medicare program itself. So it may come as a shock to Boomers to learn that, starting in 2019, it’s no longer All About Them. This year America passes a new milestone: Baby Boomers are now outnumbered by Millennials. As the chart below shows, Boomers (whose average age is now 63), will be surpassed this year by America’s new Largest Generation. Born between 1981 and 1996, the Millennials are now 30 years old on average, and there are 72.5M of them, compared to 72.0M Boomers—a gap that will continue to widen. (Thanks to immigration, we have another 14 years until we hit “peak” Millennial, according to Census Bureau projections.)

This demographic achievement alone ought to earn Millennials a participation trophy—obviously, not their first. (Forgive the sarcasm…we’re Gen X-ers, it’s what we do.) But this changing demographic landscape brings big implications for healthcare. Boomers are just entering their peak “senior care” consumption years now, and we’ll have a quarter-century or more of very expensive care to fund for a generation that is by all indications more riven with chronic disease but more likely to live into very old age than previous cohorts. That creates the imperative for population health approaches that allow care for seniors to be delivered in lower-acuity settings. At the same time, however, Millennials are really just entering the healthcare system. For the next several years, most of their care needs will be driven by having babies and caring for growing families. But just as the last of the Boomers get their Medicare cards in 2029, the Millennials will begin to enter their “upkeep” years—demanding a variety of diagnostics, surgeries, and procedures to keep them thriving. Who will pay for all of that specialty care, and where will it be delivered? Today’s health system planners would do well to begin to look ahead to future capacity needs, and economic models.

The Millennials bring dramatically different service expectations as well. This is a generation raised in the era of Amazon. One-click purchases, same-day delivery, frictionless transactions, personalized offerings, low institutional loyalty—all of that will shape the way this generation thinks about consuming healthcare, with huge implications for providers. This is a high-information generation, whose adult years have seen a pervasive shift from physical to digital commerce, and they’ll expect healthcare to follow that trend. Ask today’s pediatric providers how different the Millennials are as parent-consumers—you’ll quickly get the picture. Even as physicians, hospitals and others scramble to retool care delivery to more efficiently manage the swelling ranks of seniors, they’ll need to keep a close eye on the preferences of Millennials, upon whom their future fortunes will rely, and who won’t tolerate the hurry-up-and-wait ethos that still pervades American medicine.

(Spoiler alert: waiting in the wings is Gen Z, digital natives born in 1997 and after. Guess what? There’s even more of them!)

 

Testing a new role for ambulance services

https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/emergency-triage-treat-and-transport-et3-model?utm_source=The+Weekly+Gist&utm_campaign=41103e2ef1-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_02_14_09_16&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_edba0bcee7-41103e2ef1-41271793

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On Thursday, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) announced the launch of a new payment pilot that would pay ambulance providers to deliver an expanded range of care services, and to transport patients to alternative care settings. Expected to launch next year, the Emergency Triage, Treat and Transport Model (ET3) is a five-year, voluntary payment model that would reimburse care such as onsite and telemedicine-enabled assessment, transport to an alternative care site, or treatment in place in response to a 911 call. The model will require ambulance providers and local governments responsible for 911 dispatch to cooperate on triage and care delivery and will provide funds to assist in integrating services. The agency also plans to invite state Medicaid programs and private insurers to collaborate in model adoption.
We’ve long been impressed by programs that use “community paramedics” to provide in-home assessment of homebound patients with complex care needs. As one participant told us, paramedics are ideally suited to assess a home situation; they have “seen everything” so nothing fazes them, and patients who frequently call 911 are comfortable with letting a paramedic in their home and are often willing to engage with them on broader care issues. Yet few of these programs have enjoyed sufficient funding to scale services. At first blush, the ET3 program could be one of the most innovative payment models CMMI has yet proposed, with the potential not only to eliminate thousands of unnecessary ED visits and provide more appropriate care in a lower-cost setting, but also to link at-risk patients with ongoing care management and social resources.

 

 

‘Told’ is the word most linked to negative hospital reviews on Yelp

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/patient-engagement/told-is-the-word-most-linked-to-negative-hospital-reviews-on-yelp.html

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When looking at hospital reviews on Yelp, researchers found the word most associated with negative reviews, including those with one-star ratings, was “told,” a study published in the Journal of General Internal Medicine found.

The researchers, from Philadelphia-based Penn Medicine, analyzed 51,376 reviews for 1,566 U.S. hospitals and found the word “told” appeared in 20 percent of the posts (9,578 in total). Reviews that included the word “told” averaged 1.78 stars out of five stars.

The one-star reviews the researchers saw that contained “told” highlighted frustrations about information that was ostensibly shared (“They never told me the cost of any of the procedures”), anger at a lack of listening (“I told her I did not want to discuss it any more but she persisted to badger me”) and feelings of futility (“Some examined me and told me there was nothing they could do for me”).

“Oftentimes, words such as ‘told’ hint at a breakdown in communication,” Anish Agarwal, MD, a National Clinician Scholars fellow and emergency medicine physician at Penn Medicine, said in a news release. “I suspect that patients are not feeling listened to or heard and this could be driving poor experiences and low reviews.”

For the positive hospital reviews, the word “friendly” was found in about 11 percent of them (5,594 in all). Along with the word “great,” “friendly” correlated the most with five-star reviews. In these reviews, patients often focused on hospital staff’s demeanor and attentiveness (“The entire staff was very friendly and made sure we were taken care of”).

“Patients value communication highly in their overall experience when they’re in the hospital,” Dr. Agarwal said. “As healthcare transitions to being more patient-centered, I think hospitals and providers need to continue to work on how we improve communication, how we listen and how we approach all patient interactions.”

 

 

 

Market Concentration and Potential Competition in Medicare Advantage

https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/feb/market-concentration-and-potential-competition-medicare

Market concentration and competition

ABSTRACT

  • Issue: Medicare Advantage (MA), the private option to traditional Medicare, now serves roughly 37 percent of beneficiaries. Congress intended MA plans to achieve efficiencies in the provision of health care that lead to savings for Medicare through managed competition among private health plans.
  • Goal: Two elements are needed for savings to accrue: a sound payment policy and effective competition among the private plans. This brief examines the latter.
  • Methods: We use data from 2009–17 to describe market structure in MA, including the insurers offering plans and enrollment in each U.S. county. We measure both actual and potential competitors for each county for each year.
  • Key Findings and Conclusions: MA markets are highly concentrated and have become more concentrated since 2009. From 2009–17, 70 percent or more of enrollees were in highly concentrated markets, dominated by two or three insurers. Since the payment system used to reimburse insurers selling in the MA market relies on competition to spur efficiency and premiums that more closely reflect insurers’ actual costs, these developments suggest that taxpayers and beneficiaries will overpay. We also find an average of six potential entrants into MA markets, which points to a source of competition that may be activated in MA. To tap into potential competition, further research is needed to understand the factors affecting entry into MA markets.

Introduction

Medicare Advantage (MA), the private option to traditional Medicare (TM), now serves roughly 37 percent of beneficiaries through health care plans. Federal subsidy of the premiums of MA plans is intended to create a “level playing field,” so that the government pays MA plans based on what beneficiaries would typically cost in TM. This approach is based on Alain Enthoven’s concept of “managed competition,” wherein private plans that provide better benefits and higher-quality care at a lower price than TM would attract beneficiaries. Two elements are needed for this approach to work: a sound payment policy and effective competition among the private plans. This issue brief examines the latter.

Recent data show that many MA markets are served by just one or a small number of insurers.1 In 2012, 97 percent of county markets in the MA program were designated as highly concentrated according to the definitions used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), with a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of greater than 2,500.2 In 2016, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission observed that local markets for MA plans were becoming increasingly concentrated.3 Recently, courts have blocked mergers that would further erode competition within the MA market.4

This issue brief updates information about the market structure in the MA program. We report on traditional measures of market structure, such as concentration ratios and the HHIs, and a simple count of the number of insurers offering plans in a market. We also include the “two-firm concentration ratio,” or the share of enrollment accounted for by the top two firms. We also offer new perspectives on competition in MA. First, we comment on competition and choice from the standpoint of a beneficiary by examining the number of plans available. Second, we introduce the idea of “potential competition” in an MA market. Potential competition, like actual competition, can constrain market power. Third, we consider the role of TM in constraining the market power of MA insurers.

Actual and Potential Competition

News stories about consumers’ choices among Medicare Advantage plans often begin with a statement such as “On average, seniors will have a choice of 21 plans, although at least 40 plans will be accessible in some counties and large metropolitan areas of the country.”5 But such accounts give a misleading indication of competition in the MA program, because many insurers offer multiple health plan products in the same market. In this issue brief, we measure the number of MA plans but also focus on the number of different insurers in the market to assess competition at the insurer level.

An insurer needs to be wary of potential as well as actual competitors. Insurers that set premiums high may enable competitors to gain footholds in a market. A market is said to be “contestable” if it is relatively easy for a potential entrant to contest for market share.6Barriers to entry, the magnitude of one-time entry costs, and the availability of comparably efficient technology all influence contestability of a market. Here, we identify “potential competitors,” or insurers that are in a position to contest a county-defined market and therefore pose a competitive threat to incumbents. Insurers licensed to operate MA plans in a state have already crossed some local regulatory barriers and contract with some local providers. We therefore measure potential competition by the number of health insurers participating in some MA markets within the state but not in a particular county.

Data and Measurement

We use data from 2009–17 to describe market structure in MA, including the insurers offering plans in each county and the level of enrollment by county and plan. From these data we measure both actual and potential competitors for each county for each year. Actual competitors are those insurers that participate in MA in a specific county; potential competitors are the insurers participating in MA in a state but not in the county of interest. These data also allow us to compute concentration ratios and the HHI for each county and in each year. In some analyses we categorize the counties according to the HHI corresponding to the FTC/DOJ classifications of concentration: 1) not concentrated, HHI <1,501; 2) moderately concentrated, HHI=1,501–2,500; and 3) highly concentrated, HHI >2,500.

Results

As shown in Exhibit 1, in 2017 Medicare beneficiaries could choose from a relatively large number of private plans (roughly seven) by the standards of the private insurance market. The number of insurers declined from 2009 to 2011 then remained steady through 2017, averaging 2.5 in 2017. For comparison, in 2017, the average metropolitan area had two insurers competing in the health insurance marketplaces created by the Affordable Care Act.

Insurer concentration increased from 2009 to 2011 (the number of insurers selling MA plans fell from 4.5 to 2.9) then remained at about the same, high level of concentration. The two-firm concentration ratio was already high in 2009 (81%); it rose to 91 percent by 2011 and stayed there through 2017. The average county-level HHI was 4,914 in 2009, rising to 6,360 in 2013, and declining slightly to 6,285 in 2017. To put this in perspective, a market with two equal-size health plans would have an HHI of 5,000. The average MA market is therefore even more concentrated than that. Notably, the number of potential competitors also fell over the same period. Nevertheless there are now more potential than actual competitors in each county.

Exhibit 2 shows that 70 percent or more of MA enrollees were in highly concentrated markets (HHI>2,500). Few MA enrollees were able to choose a plan in a market not dominated by two or three insurers.

Virtually all Medicare enrollees face MA markets that are moderately to highly concentrated. Exhibit 3 shows the distribution of all Medicare enrollees (in MA and TM) by the levels of MA concentration. We stratify markets (i.e., counties) into quartiles according to the size of the total population of Medicare beneficiaries. The table reports mean population and mean HHI for each quartile of the total Medicare population. Among sparsely populated markets, which are largely rural, the mean HHI is 6,684 — indicating that they are highly concentrated. This is in part because of the difficulty that managed care plans, like HMOs and PPOs, have in establishing provider networks in rural areas where providers are scarce and provider markets are highly concentrated. In highly populated markets, the average HHI shows that they too are highly concentrated HHI = 3,774), but the index value is considerably lower than in sparsely populated markets.

Exhibit 4 shows the average numbers of potential entrants in counties grouped by the three HHI ranges. In recent years, there has been little difference in the number of potential competitors in areas with high or low concentration, implying that potential competitors are no more attracted to highly concentrated markets and may not discipline competition any more strongly in areas with few actual competitors. This was not true in earlier years, during which the number of potential competitors was higher in areas with less current competition. The number of potential competitors in moderately concentrated counties has remained steady over the nine-year period.

While Medicare beneficiaries have a choice between TM and MA, in assessing the competitive forces on MA plans we assume that the actual or potential competition from other MA plans matters most. The market position of an MA insurer in relation to TM received examination in connection with two recently proposed mergers, between Aetna and Humana and between Anthem and Cigna. The U.S. Department of Justice challenged these mergers on antitrust grounds, arguing that the proposed consolidations would threaten effective competition in MA. In the Aetna-Humana case, Judge Bates observed: “The weight of the evidence presented at trial indicates ‘industry [and] public recognition’ of a distinct market for Medicare Advantage. Competition within that market, between Medicare Advantage plans, is far more intense than competition with products outside of it.”7 While the role of traditional Medicare in affecting competition in the MA market deserves further analysis, competition among MA plans is where most of market discipline is likely to arise. While the presence of TM likely affects the conduct of MA plans, existing evidence suggests that the primary drivers of consumer choices are differences in the premiums, quality of care, and benefits among MA plans.8

Implications of MA Market Concentration

Even though 37 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in private plans, when compared with employer-based health insurance Medicare’s transition to managed care has been slow. Traditional Medicare is the last major bastion of open-network, fee-for-service health insurance, although the fee-for-service component is beginning to change with the spread of accountable care organizations. Competition or lack thereof of in a market plays a role in accelerating or attenuating this shift. Consumer choices tend to be driven by the better value (premiums and quality) that can turn more favorable with increased competition.

Several forces may have driven greater concentration in MA markets since 2009. First, consolidation in the health insurance industry generally may have affected the MA market structure.9 Concentration in provider markets also has been increasing, which has made price negotiations for health care services more difficult for insurers, especially smaller ones.10 Medicare policy changes over these years may have inadvertently limited the supply and market entry of MA insurers. When Medicare rules were changed to require all MA plans to create networks of providers, the effect of provider concentration was heightened and some health insurers were less willing to remain in and/or enter MA markets. This effect may have been especially significant in rural areas.11 At the same time, there appears to be a substantial number of potential MA insurer entrants in most moderate to highly concentrated markets, yet there appears to have been little clear impact on market outcomes in terms of premiums and quality.

Together, the confluence of these forces continues to push MA markets in the direction of greater concentration. Since the payment system used to reimburse insurers selling in the MA market relies on competition to drive premiums toward insurers’ actual costs, these developments suggest that taxpayers and beneficiaries will overpay for MA products, compared with what they might have paid in markets with more robust competition.

Need for Further Analysis

A competitive market is intended to deliver good products to consumers at low prices. Ultimately, the effect of Medicare Advantage market power on prices or quality of care needs to be assessed empirically. There is some, but limited, evidence on the exercise of MA market power.12 Further research is needed to understand how potential competitors affect the actions of existing competitors. It also will be important to understand the barriers to market entry for potential competitors, especially those that might be lowered to spur greater competition.

 

 

The Fiscal Case for Medicaid Expansion

https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/fiscal-case-medicaid-expansion

Fiscal Case for Medicaid Expansion 21x9

After a two-and-a-half-year lull in which no state took up the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) provision to expand Medicaid eligibility to more Americans living in poverty, 2019 has already ushered in an expansion in Virginia. And as many as six more states are waiting in the wings. In November, voters in Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah overwhelmingly approved state ballot initiatives to expand Medicaid. And in January, new governors supportive of expansion took office in Kansas and Wisconsin. The prospect of Medicaid expansion in these five states plus Maine, where implementation is finally under way following a 2017 ballot referendum, means that as many as 300,000 uninsured Americans may gain coverage this year.

But concerns about the cost of expanding eligibility for Medicaid have been a roadblock to implementation in these states, along with the dozen others that have yet to expand the program. Here, we look at the cost to states of expanding eligibility for Medicaid, and what expansion means in practice for state budgets.

The Federal Government Pays 90 Percent of the Total Cost of Medicaid Expansion

Beginning in 2014, the ACA offered states the option to expand eligibility for Medicaid to individuals with incomes up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level, or roughly $17,000 per year for a single person. (Previously, the federal government required Medicaid be available only to children, parents, people with disabilities, and some people over age 65, and gave states considerable discretion at setting income eligibility levels.) While Medicaid is a jointly funded partnership between the federal government and the states, the ACA provided 100 percent federal funding to cover the costs of newly eligible enrollees until the end of 2016 in states that took up the expansion. The federal government currently pays 93 percent of the total costs, and this year alone will provide an estimated $62 billion to fund expansion, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

In 2020, the federal share will drop to 90 percent where, barring a change to the law, it will stay. This leaves states on the hook for at most 10 percent of the total cost of enrollees in the new eligibility category — considerably less than the roughly 25 percent to 50 percent of the cost that states pay for enrollees eligible for Medicaid under pre-ACA criteria.

States Realize Savings from Expansion

Opponents of Medicaid expansion in states that have yet to implement it worry that even a 10 percent contribution to the cost of extending Medicaid coverage to more people will result in a large increase in state spending. But the experience of a long list of states suggests otherwise. That’s because expansion allows states to realize savings by moving adults who are in existing state-funded health programs into expansion coverage. Expansion also allows states to reduce their spending on uncompensated care as uninsured people gain coverage.

The table below offers a snapshot of what this looked like in Montana, where Medicaid expansion took effect in January 2016. In FY2017, the total cost of Medicaid expansion was $576.9 million. Because the federal match was 95 percent to 100 percent during this time, the state’s share was $24.5 million. But the state then experienced a series of offsets, or savings it realized from not spending money on separate health-related programs fully funded by the state, such as substance use disorder programs. The state also realized savings when some groups who were previously covered under existing Medicaid were moved to the expansion population, which has a higher federal matching rate. Taken together, these offsets added up to $25.2 million, leaving Montana with a surplus of $700,000 in FY2017. One study found that Arkansas and Kentucky amassed enough surplus because of offsets during the first two years of expansion, when the federal government was footing the entire bill, to cover the costs of expansion through FY2021.

Net Costs Are a Minuscule Portion of States’ Overall Budgets

It’s also worth noting that even if Montana had been responsible for 10 percent of the total cost in FY2017, or $57.7 million, after offsets were applied, the net cost to the state — or the amount it actually spent on Medicaid expansion — would have been $32.5 million, only about 1 percent of Montana’s general fund expenditures of $236.5 billion in FY2017. In Nebraska1 and in Kansas, two of the states that may be among the next to implement expansion, estimates have shown that the state cost after offsets is less than 1 percent of the general fund.

Paying the Balance

Of the 32 states that, along with the District of Columbia, have implemented Medicaid expansion, nine are using taxes — on cigarettes; alcohol; or hospital, provider, or health plan fees — to help pay for it. The ballot initiative approved by voters in Utah in November increased the state’s sales tax by 0.15 percent with the requirement that the new revenue be used to pay for the cost of expansion there. (Even so, earlier this week, Utah Governor Gary Herbert signed into law a bill approved by the Republican-led legislature that will scale back the full Medicaid expansion that voters approved.)

States that expand Medicaid also realize economic benefits beyond increased federal funds. For example, a Commonwealth Fund-supported study found that as a result of new economic activity associated with Medicaid expansion in Michigan, including the creation of 30,000 new jobs mostly outside the health sector, state tax revenues are projected to increase $148 million to $153 million a year from FY2019 through FY2021.

A U.S. Senate bill cosponsored by Senator Doug Jones (D–Ala.), who has advocated for his state to adopt expansion, could help reassure states skittish about expanding because of the impact on their budget. The legislation would grant states, regardless of when they adopt expansion, the same levels of federal matching funds that states that expanded the program in 2014 received (100% federal funding for the first three years, phasing down over three more years to 90%).

Indeed, a national study confirmed that during the two years when the federal government paid all of the costs for newly eligible enrollees, Medicaid expansion did not lead to any significant increases in state spending on Medicaid or to reductions in spending on other priorities such as education. But even at a lesser percent match, the fiscal case for expansion is compelling.

A future To the Point post will examine the broader economic benefits associated with Medicaid expansion.