By Barring Profits on Basic Coverage, Switzerland Keeps Insurers from Denying Care

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/barring-profits-basic-coverage-switzerland-keeps-robqc

Roughly two-thirds of the U.S. population has health coverage through private insurance companies. Despite paying about $1,600 a year out of pocket on deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance, Americans have no guarantee their insurer will cover the cost of their care. Because insurance companies in the United States seek to maximize their profits, they have an incentive to deny payment for some services, even for recommended care, and to raise monthly premiums and out-of-pocket costs.

Switzerland has also struggled to make health care affordable for all residents, with one of the highest levels of out-of-pocket spending per person in the world, comparable to the U.S. average. Like the U.S., it relies largely on private health insurance, with residents choosing among competing insurers. But unlike the U.S., Switzerland bars insurers from profiting off basic plans. That difference helps explain why nearly a third of the U.S. population has medical bills or debt they are paying off over time, while only 2 percent of the Swiss population reports the same problem.

Regulating Private Insurers in Switzerland

Switzerland’s current system of mandatory basic health insurance (obligatorische Krankenpflegeversicherung, or OKP) was established in 1996 and requires all residents to purchase health insurance from authorized private insurers. Today, 100 percent of the population is covered through OKP, and everyone has access to the same nationally defined baseline benefits package, regardless of insurer. Because everyone is enrolled, costs are spread out across healthier residents and those who need more costly care.

Premiums are set by insurers but subject to federal approval. All plans include a minimum annual deductible of CHF 300 (USD 340), 10 percent coinsurance capped at CHF 700 (USD 794) annually, and a daily hospital fee; adults can choose plans with deductibles up to CHF 2,500 (USD 2,835) in exchange for lower premiums. The Swiss government also caps the price of services and what insurers pay providers to control costs.

While the federal government sets these baseline standards, it does not sell insurance directly. Residents choose among private insurers based on premiums, deductibles, provider restrictions, and networks, while guaranteed a core set of protections. Those who don’t enroll are assigned a plan by their local government and are responsible for late fees and past-due bills.

The most fundamental feature of the Swiss insurance market is that insurers are prohibited from earning a profit on basic health plans and must use a community-rating premium structure that shares costs between sicker and healthier individuals. Any surplus collected from basic premiums that exceeds paid claims must either be held in reserve to cover future costs or be returned to policyholders. Insurers also cannot deny coverage for any medically necessary care included in the basic package.

Insurance companies can, however, profit from supplementary private insurance, which covers services such as dental care and private or semiprivate hospital rooms. For these plans, insurers can reject applicants and vary premiums based on health status, age, and sex.

Despite federal regulations, affordability remains a major hurdle in the Swiss health system. Out-of-pocket spending is among the highest in the world, and premiums, which do not vary with income, can burden families who do not qualify for subsidies. Still, the system rests on a strong commitment to social solidarity, and some Swiss see these costs as the price of insuring everyone, even the most vulnerable. Because deductibles and coinsurance on basic plans are capped each year and claims for covered care cannot be refused, few residents fall into medical debt.

America’s Underregulated Private Insurance Market

The U.S. private insurance market is not entirely unregulated: the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibits insurers from denying enrollment based on preexisting conditions, age, or sex. The ACA also requires plans to cover essential health benefits and cap out-of-pocket spending, and it provides income-based subsidies for coverage bought through the marketplaces.

Since private insurers are permitted to operate for profit, they still have an incentive to limit what they pay out to maximize their earnings. While people cannot be denied enrollment, insurers can delay payment for doctor-recommended services or deny claims altogether by arguing the care was not medically necessary or by citing other technicalities.

In 2025, one in five U.S. working-age adults with private insurance said they or a family member had been denied treatment their doctor recommended in the past year, and about 40 percent of them said the denial led to delayed care. More than two in five adults whose claim was denied reported it led to medical debt they are still paying off. In one survey, most working-age adults with private coverage who were paying off medical bills or debt blamed insurance companies.

Fact: More than three in four adults in the U.S. who are underinsured — meaning their out-of-pocket costs are unaffordable relative to their income — are covered by private insurers.

While both Switzerland and the United States have an individual mandate requiring residents to enroll in a health plan — which is necessary for maintaining balanced risk pools — enforcement differs greatly. Since 2019, the ACA’s federal tax penalty for going without coverage has been reduced to $0, and only four states and Washington, D.C., impose their own financial penalties.

In both countries, a person’s insurer, out-of-pocket spending, and provider networks vary widely. But while federal regulation in Switzerland ensures all residents have robust minimum coverage standards, without fear of insurers creating obstacles to care in pursuit of their own profit, American patients have far fewer protections against companies that refuse or stall payment for care.

The Democrats Already Have a Healthcare Playbook for 2029

As the midterm elections approach, politicians are debating healthcare within the broader context of “affordability,” or, more precisely, the challenge voters say they are facing in paying their regular bills. An interesting battle within the Democratic Party is underway over the appropriate response to this concern, with some favoring Medicare for All and others voicing skepticism about that approach.

Leading congressional Democrats, including Sen. Ron Wyden of the Finance Committee, are hedging their bets, but the most likely scenario is still one of incrementalism rather than sweeping reform.

Medicare for All has always been more effective as a rallying cry for the Democratic Party than as a roadmap for getting a bill through Congress. Although many voters are exasperated with the state of American healthcare, support for Medicare for All falls when its costs, which are considerable, are made clear to survey respondents. There is also a broad lack of confidence in the government’s ability to competently manage healthcare insurance for the entire country.

A potential guide for what Democrats might do in lieu of Medicare for All can be found in a document posted in July by Wyden on behalf of many of his Senate colleagues. It lists scores of ideas for reforming healthcare insurance and care delivery, including through the possible adoption of Medicare for All, although the balance of the paper points toward more public control and regulation than a major push for a monolithic public plan.

Wyden is following the playbook Democrats used to successfully advance the Affordable Care Act (ACA) from 2008 to 2010. In the months leading up to the 2008 election, then-Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus had worked with outside experts and fellow Democrats to draft a white paper on healthcare, which he released just days after then-Sen. Barack Obama won the presidency. That document would serve as the blueprint for the bill Baucus would draft and pass in the Senate in 2009, which later became the foundational ACA law.

Many healthcare concepts that are now familiar because of their inclusion in the ACA were promoted in the Baucus white paper, including the individual mandate, new premium subsidies for non-employer coverage for individuals with incomes below 400 percent of the federal poverty line, a large Medicaid expansion, and accountable care organizations, which are provider-led—as opposed to insurer-owned—managed care plans.

Wyden is explicit in his July release that he views the development work conducted by Baucus before 2009 as a model for what he hopes to accomplish in the run-up to 2029. However, he framed the ideas presented in the July release not as proposals he supports but as ideas for which he is soliciting feedback (responses to his “request for information” are due by October 2). It is possible, depending on what occurs in November 2028, that Wyden will publish a more prescriptive plan after the election to signal more clearly his intentions for 2029.

Wyden’s document zeroes in on consumer dissatisfaction with aspects of private insurance and divides the ideas under review into three categories: lowering costs for consumers and making enrolling in insurance easier, removing barriers to accessing care and lowering administrative costs, and regulating the for-profit companies providing insurance and care to patients.

Some of the more noteworthy concepts included in the document include:

  • reversing most of the budget cuts and regulatory changes implemented during the second Trump administration
  • developing transition plans that might allow Medicare for All to be approved with less immediate disruption to the current coverage of many Americans
  • creating an option for states to offer single-payer coverage
  • creating a nationwide “public option,” sponsored and run by the federal government, that would be offered to consumers buying individual coverage through the exchanges established by ACA and which might use Medicare’s regulations to set reimbursement rates for services or allow the government to negotiate rates with the providers of services in each market
  • developing new Medicare or Medicaid “buy-in” options that could be offered to all Americans regardless of their employment status and incomes
  • creating a single online entry point for enrolling in coverage that both those getting employer-sponsored and non-group coverage could use
  • allowing states to add to essential health benefits based on emerging evidence of effective services
  • stricter state oversight over premium increases requested by insurance plans, potentially including caps
  • eliminating deductibles and coinsurance for some “non-shoppable” services, and applying lower limits on total annual out-of-pocket costs based on a person’s income
  • reinstating the enhanced premium credits in place from 2021 to 2025 that the GOP Congress allowed to expire
  • allowing the ACA premium credits to go to lower-income workers enrolled in employer coverage, which the current “firewall” prohibits and which might be provided irrespective of the share of the premium paid by workers, and
  • restricting the business practices of for-profit companies participating in the healthcare industry, including insurance companies, private equity investors, and other “middlemen”

The connecting theme behind these ideas is a publicly regulated system, with the government taking on the responsibility of providing affordable coverage options for all Americans, with cost-sharing that is capped relative to household income. Wyden and other Democrats are willing to consider all manner of new controls and subsidies to ensure these objectives are achieved, but it is of course easier to promise these outcomes than to deliver them. An especially formidable obstacle is likely to be the service providers who believe Medicare and Medicaid’s payment rates are too low to serve as guides for private coverage too. Cutting payments to all providers is easier than designing reforms that more precisely target waste and inefficiency, but the ability of Democrats to overcome industry opposition to payment reductions in 2029, as they did when writing the ACA, is not assured.

In addition, even with some provider cuts, the aggregate federal cost of a plan that includes some of the more prominent ideas in the Wyden plan (not including Medicare for All), could be significant. For instance, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that rolling back policies that tightened administration of the ACA credits, along with reinstating on a permanent basis the enhancement of the credits originally approved in 2021, would increase projected federal budget deficits by $662 billion over 10 years. Democrats are certain to favor tax hikes on well-to-do Americans in 2028, but it is not yet clear that those potential sources of new revenue would be sufficient to fully offset the most expensive ideas the Wyden document teases.

The heavy investment Senate Democrats are making in the development of their 2029 agenda for healthcare contrasts with the GOP’s approach, which is less focused. The Trump administration released a one-page framework earlier this year (“The Great Healthcare Plan”), but there has been little follow-up and no visible movement among congressional Republicans to approve new legislation.

Republicans should take the Wyden document seriously. If voters opt once again for change in 2028 rather than continuity, it is near certain Democrats will use the power voters granted them to prioritize passage of a major healthcare bill. The GOP could make that scenario less likely to occur if it developed, promoted, and tried to advance an alternative approach. There are multiple sound ideas they could embrace to make healthcare more affordable without excessive reliance on public regulation, such as by allowing consumers to keep the savings when they choose lower-cost insurance and care providers. Refining those ideas and putting them into legislation would put the party in a better position to compete with what is coming from their opponents in both 2026 and 2028.

340B Rebate Fight Puts Hospital Cash Flow on the Line

https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/cfo/340b-rebate-fight-puts-hospital-cash-flow-line

A new lawsuit from the American Hospital Association and four safety-net hospitals challenges a proposed federal drug rebate model, raising fresh concerns about liquidity, administrative spending and the financial stability of providers.


KEY TAKEAWAYS

Hospitals would pay wholesale prices for certain drugs upfront and seek 340B discounts through rebates.

Hospital groups estimate annual administrative expenses could exceed $1 billion, nearly double the federal government’s estimate of approximately $537 million.

The revised pilot is scheduled to begin January 1, 2027, but a new legal challenge could disrupt implementation.

The financial stakes of the federal 340B Drug Pricing Program are back in court. The American Hospital Association (AHA), the Maine Hospital Association and four safety-net hospitals filed a federal lawsuit October 9 seeking to block a revised rebate pilot that could change how participating providers obtain discounts on certain outpatient drugs.

The plaintiffs also requested a temporary restraining order to prevent the program from taking effect January 1, 2027. They argue that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) failed to adequately assess the program’s financial consequences and consider less burdensome alternatives.


Under the current 340B model, eligible hospitals generally purchase covered outpatient medications at discounted prices. The revised pilot would instead require providers to buy participating drugs at wholesale acquisition cost, submit claims data and receive rebates for the difference between that price and the 340B ceiling price.

That change could create a significant working-capital challenge. Hospitals would have to front more money for medications and wait for rebates, while also managing claims submissions, payment reconciliation, potential denials and additional compliance work.

The cost estimates are the real disagreement. Hospital analyses cited by the AHA put annual administrative expenses above $1 billion, compared with the federal government’s estimate of roughly $537 million. The hospital groups contend that the government failed to fully account for startup costs, staff training, vendor expenses and the financial burden of advancing funds for drug purchases.

For hospitals operating on narrow margins, those expenses could have consequences well beyond the pharmacy department. Maine Hospital Association President Jeff Austin has said hospitals in the state average less than two weeks of cash on hand, underscoring how quickly additional working-capital demands could become a liquidity concern.

The HRSA, meanwhile, says the rebate model would improve transparency and program integrity by allowing individual transactions to be verified before rebates are paid. The agency also says the approach would help prevent overlapping discounts under 340B and the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program. The pilot is voluntary for manufacturers, and HRSA has approved plans from 10 manufacturers covering 18 drugs for the planned January launch, according to the lawsuit.

What CFOs should be watching

A shift from upfront discounts to retrospective rebates could increase cash-conversion-cycle pressure, require new investments in revenue-cycle and pharmacy systems, and expose hospitals to reconciliation delays. CFOs should therefore model potential cash requirements, assess vendor and staffing needs, and coordinate with pharmacy, compliance and legal teams rather than waiting for the litigation to conclude.

If the plaintiffs’ cost projections prove accurate, hospitals may have to redirect funds from patient assistance, specialty services and other community programs to cover administrative overhead and drug purchases. Smaller rural providers could be especially vulnerable because they have fewer reserves to absorb delays.

This is not the first legal challenge to the rebate approach. A federal judge temporarily blocked the original pilot in December 2025, and HHS later withdrew that version. HRSA announced the revised program in August 2026, but the latest lawsuit puts its planned launch back in question.

For now, CFOs should treat January 2027 as a planning deadline, not a settled outcome. The ultimate decision could shape how hospitals manage drug costs, liquidity and 340B-funded services for years to come.

ProPublica Wants to Hear About Your Prior Authorization Denial

Insurers promised to cut back on prior authorization. Now, ProPublica wants to know whether patients are still being denied or delayed care – and they need your help.

Last year, many of the country’s biggest health insurers promised to cut back on prior authorization. That’s the extra approval step insurers require before they’ll pay for a treatment, test, drug or piece of medical equipment. The pledge came after years of anger from patients, doctors and lawmakers in both parties.

I was skeptical then and I’m skeptical now. Prior authorization makes money for insurers. Every delay and every denial can mean care that never gets paid for. Companies don’t easily give up tools that pad their bottom line.

ProPublica is now trying to find out whether the promises meant anything. Reporters Max Blau and Brandon Roberts are investigating how insurers’ continued use of prior authorization is affecting patients. They want to know if people are still facing delayed or missed care.

I’m delighted they’re doing this. ProPublica can do the kind of reporting my small team can’t do yet – and they need your help.

If you’re covered by Medicaid, CHIP, an ACA marketplace plan or Medicare, and you’ve had a prior authorization request delayed or denied, they want to hear from you. That includes people in Medicare Advantage plans, where prior authorization is especially prevalent. It also includes people in traditional Medicare, where it has been rare until very recently.

The Trump administration is testing a program called WISeR that brings prior authorization into traditional Medicare for certain services in several states. Private tech companies are doing the reviews. As we have reported previously, this could be the start of turning traditional Medicare into something that looks a lot more like Medicare Advantage. If you’re in traditional Medicare and have run into WISeR, ProPublica wants to hear about it.

The reporters also want to hear from people who see the process from the inside. That includes doctors, nurses and office staff who fight these battles every day. It also includes regulators and people who work for insurance companies.

That last group matters. I know from my own years in the industry how much insiders know that the public never sees. If you work at an insurer and you’ve seen how prior authorization really works, please consider reaching out.

ProPublica says it will read everything submitted and won’t publish anything without your consent.

You can share your story here.

Why workers are giving up health insurance

Amber Kostka, who owns The Stockpot restaurant in Hampton Roads, Va., says she has tried to do right by her employees by offering them health insurance, alongside good wages and a 401k.

But as costs have risen—premiums have roughly tripled since the company first started offering health insurance in 2018—her employees are increasingly telling her they can’t afford health insurance. That’s even though she splits the cost of premiums with employees, which are roughly $400 a month.

Instead, employees are dropping out of the plan and going uninsured, she says. About 35% of her eligible employees now buy the employer-sponsored health insurance, she says, down from 50% prior to COVID. She wants to warn them about the risks of going without insurance, she says, but also knows their finances are extremely tight. “It’s just a cost thing, at the end of the day,” she says. “You can’t stop paying for groceries.”

Her employees aren’t alone. The share of working-age U.S. adults without health insurance rose to 11.2% in 2026, up from 8.9% in 2024, according to new research from the Commonwealth Fund. People don’t have health insurance because the costs of everything—including gasoline, housing, and food—are rising, and they’re deciding they can’t afford to pay for even employer-sponsored plans like Kostka’s. “The whole system just seems like a complete gamble with people’s lives,” she says.

Some people are looking at the price of plans on the Affordable Care Act marketplace and deciding they can’t afford health insurance. Premiums on the ACA marketplaces increased by an average of 58% in 2026 after Congress decided last year not to renew expiring subsidies.

Ironically, these uninsured Americans may be helping drive the cost of health care even higher, fueling a cycle in which health insurance gets more expensive, forcing more people to drop coverage. As hospitals field more uninsured patients, they have to pass the costs of uncompensated care onto someone. “When providers have to provide a lot of uncompensated care, how do they make themselves whole? They raise prices,” says Beth Umland, director of employer research for Marsh, the health benefits consultant company formerly known as Mercer.

Of course, having more uninsured Americans isn’t the only reason costs are rising. A Marsh survey of employers recently found that they expected total health benefit costs per employee to rise 8.2% in 2027, the highest increase since 2003. One reason was that the consolidation of health systems was leading to higher prices, as some systems had monopolies in certain markets. Another was that lower government spending for public health programs was leading to higher costs for private sector plans.

“This is starting to feel—’unsustainable’ is the word you hear,” she says.

Many of the reasons why health care costs are rising may seem minimal until you start adding them up, Umland says. For example, more doctors are using AI scribes in care, which are helping them bill for more services, making care more expensive, she says. A clause of the No Surprises Act, which was passed by Congress in 2020 to protect patients from surprise medical bills but which allows disputes to be settled by arbitration, has also added billions to costs, she says.

There are also increasingly more treatments available for patients, and those treatments are more expensive than the ones they’re replacing, she says. One example: GLP-1s, which may save insurers money in the long run on health costs but which are expensive upfront. “That’s just a whole new category of expense that didn’t exist before,” she says.

In its survey, Marsh found that many employers were planning to pass costs onto employees after years of trying not to do so.

Overall, workers are paying on average about $7,471 annually towards premiums for employer-sponsored family health benefits this year, up 9% from 2025, according to a new employer health benefits survey from KFF. Workers at small firms with less than 200 employees—like Kostka’s—are especially hard hit, paying about $9,687 towards family coverage: $2,847 more than workers in larger firms.

And even as they pay more for health care, the plans available to them are getting costlier to use. The average deductible for employer sponsored plans has increased 34% over the last 10 years, according to KFF.

What employers are doing

Kostka says there have recently been fewer health insurers in her area to choose from. Two years ago, she switched from just buying insurance outright for her employees, which many small businesses do, to self-funding the plan. She was able to do this because her employees are relatively young and healthy, she says, making her risk of incurring big medical costs for cancer or a catastrophic illness relatively low.

But she knows she’s just a major diagnosis away from being dropped from the self-funded plan, she says. “It’s a little bit of a gamble right now,” she says.

There are some things employers can do to push back against high health care costs, says Jim Winkler, chief strategy of the Business Group on Health, which published its own recent survey of employers which projected health care costs to rise 9% in 2027, the highest forecast the group has ever recorded.

Some employers are dropping coverage for GLP-1s for weight loss to save money, he says. Others are trying to drive employees toward what are called Centers of Excellence—essentially hospitals or medical practices with high ratings that may save money in the long-term since employees won’t need to return again and again for care. Some employers are also telling employees to try to find cheap, legitimate medications where they can—from sites like GoodRx, for example—and reimbursing them, rather than getting medications from a pharmacy benefit manager.

“We’re just painting a really challenging picture for health care costs,” he says, “which leads employers down the path of needing to find things to do to take action to mitigate them.”

A small number of employers are deciding not to offer health care at all and are instead offering employees cash to buy their own plans through the ACA marketplace. This option, called an ICHRA (Individual Coverage Health Reimbursement Arrangement) is pushed by Republicans, Winkler says, and was introduced during the first Trump Administration.

Small employers, though, often can only choose from available plans, and if there aren’t many, they don’t have much room to negotiate.

It’s a problem facing Mas Torito, owner of Kokoro restaurant in Denver. He spent close to $150,000 in premium payments for his employees in 2025 and is on track to spend $200,000 in 2026. That’s about 2.7% of revenues; most restaurants only have margins of 2-3%.

“Really since COVID, every single year feels like there are these extra pressures on us,” he says.

Kokoro has been in business for 40 years, and some of Torito’s employees have been working at the restaurant the whole time. He suspects that having an older pool of employees is part of what’s driving his health care costs up every year.

“I think they see the number of claims and costs every year going up,” he says, “and that translates into higher premiums.”

Like Kostka, Torito is committed to offering health insurance for his employees, even as his own costs rise. And like Kostka, he’s hearing from more employees that they can’t afford it. Now, only about 40% of his employees buy the insurance, he says.

“I get it,” he says. “The deductible keeps going up every year, the insurance keeps going up. It’s enough where people are really thinking, ‘Hey, do I want insurance or not?’”

Is AHA Right to be Concerned?

Last week, the American Hospital Association released a study by Kaufman Hall, its preferred data vendor, that took issue with methodologies used by critics of hospital consolidation:

“These findings suggest that a more comprehensive analysis of hospital M&A transactions, one that considers impacts on all patients served, broadens the focus to impacts beyond pricing, and considers the consequences if an M&A transaction is not permitted to proceed, would ensure not only competitive but also healthy hospital markets that can continue to provide the fullest possible range of services.”

The report discusses how hospital merger reviews should look beyond the potential impact on commercial insurance prices and consider what proposed transactions mean for all patients, particularly the nearly 60% of hospital patient days attributable to Medicare, Medicaid and Medicare Advantage beneficiaries whose payment rates are largely set by government programs.” Drawing on analyses of challenged and canceled transactions, the report also finds that hospitals seeking partners often serve more vulnerable communities and face greater financial pressures, and that when proposed deals do not move forward, struggling hospitals can experience significant financial deterioration that threatens services, workforce stability and access to care.”

Kaufman Hall added this disclaimer: “The findings contained in this document may contain predictions based on current data and historical trends. Any such predictions are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Kaufman Hall accepts no responsibility for actual results or future events.

Also last week, a Health Affairs commentary “In 2026, States Are Leading On Health Care Affordability” noted that “Research has consistently shown that hospital prices are the largest driver of commercial health care spending growth. Hospital markets are dominated by monopolies, which enable hospitals to charge higher prices without improving quality or outcomes. State policymakers are increasingly looking for options to limit excessive hospital prices. Our research shows that capping the highest, most egregious prices charged by hospitals can meaningfully improve health care affordability while still allowing hospitals to generate a healthy margin…

A key driver of rising health care prices is consolidation in health care systems, including through hospital acquisitions of physician practices. These acquisitions, which are a form of vertical integration, increase hospital prices by 3 to 5%. This can be attributed to greater bargaining power, more intensive coding practices, and hospitals charging facility fees at what were previously independent physician practices but are now treated as “hospital outpatient departments.” To address these issues, states are increasingly considering facility fee bans or “site-neutral” policies that would cap prices for certain routine hospital outpatient services that could be provided safely in an office setting.”

Both positions are defensible.

Not for profit and public hospitals are at a disadvantage in managing their finances because they’re obligated to serve entire communities without regard to local economies or population health. Investor-owned hospitals and insurance companies have fewer restrictions and can exit markets at will.

And almost every hospital is dependent on reimbursement from commercially insured patients to offset what is the widely-accepted calculus that Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement doesn’t cover the total cost of care provided enrollees. Thus, across the hospital industry, the playbook has been straightforward: to optimize hospital finances….

  • Maximize the attractiveness of hospital services that attract privately insured patients via contracting with private insurers.
  • Negotiate favorable rates with private insurers to enhance cost-shifting to Medicare and Medicaid by private plans.
  • Optimize leverage (scale) over insurers by consolidating hospitals, acquiring physician practices, expanding ancillary activities and deploying capital to potentially profitable ventures.
  • Advocate for state and federal laws that dissuade hospital price caps, 340B cuts, site-neutral payments, unreasonable price transparency requirements and limits on private-equity partnerships.
  • Assert that hospitals are efficient stewards of the public’s trust but disadvantaged by corporate insurers and drug companies that are allowed to enter and exit markets at will, price at “what the market will bear” and put shareholder profit above all else.

This scheme has worked for 40 years to enable hospitals to control at least 50% of total health spending: 31% for traditional hospital services, 12% of total physician services, and ventures, partnerships, ancillary services and post-acute services in addition. In the aggregate, hospitals are the most important cog in the healthcare wheel. They’re labor intense, capital intense, complicated businesses that enjoy public trust that’s slipping away, especially among the 25 million who work in the industry.  Complicating matters, distinctions between rural and government safety net hospitals and highly profitable investor-owned and not-for-profit systems are attracting unwanted scrutiny from regulators and in media coverage.

While Kaufman Hall raises legitimate questions about current methodologies used by state and federal regulators to assess consolidation, it does not answer the bigger question: what role should hospitals play in the U.S. system as AI-derived clinical innovation proliferates, labor and supply costs accelerate and fewer people can afford services?

It’s not clear.

  • Should “hospital services” be redefined bifurcating facility-dependent inpatient services (Part A) and an expanded set of services inclusive of self-care provided in homes, schools, workplaces and virtually?
  • Should “community-benefits” and “charity care” be redefined so that methodologies are consistent and gaming to receive tax benefits eliminated?
  • Should hospital clinical performance be linked to improved outcomes and lower costs (affordability)?
  • Should local primary care and preventive health services (inclusive of nutrition, physical and mental health, prophylactic dentistry) be integrated with hospital services to improve population health and control demand for hospital services?
  • Should specialized tertiary and quaternary hospital programs be rationalized to optimize outcomes and improve efficiency?
  • Should consolidated hospital systems disclose administrative costs, functions and allocation methodologies publicly?
  • Should hospital boards be required to conduct scenario planning that’s comprehensive?
  • Should hospital administrative services and costs be standardized to facilitate caps on spending and management performance comparisons?
  • Should physician ownership of hospitals be enabled to increase competition?

And many others.

The American Hospital Association is right to be concerned about how regulators are addressing hospital consolidation and its impact on prices. And they’re right to challenge methodologies applied to questions about hospital prices and competition. But they fall short in offering a vision for the future of the health system that’s plausible, affordable and compelling. Rather, they offer a hospital-centric vision based on suspect assumptions and inadequate sensitivity to market trends not directly associated with traditional health services.

Every stakeholder in the health system—including hospitals and physicians—face heightened pressure to eliminate unnecessary utilization and costs due to willful or unknowing fraud. Just as insurer prior authorization practices have been frustrating to providers, unnecessary care is confounding to regulators and employers. The use of agentic AI tools to examine appropriateness of tests, procedures, medications and visits will exponentially change how “quality of care” is defined and regulated, and how its delivered. It’s a big deal everywhere, especially in Medicaid programs.

The Biggest Health Care Companies in America Don’t Treat Anyone

It started as a simple question. Who are the biggest health care companies in the United States?

If you rank the ten largest health care companies in America by revenue, you will not find a single hospital system or drugmaker. Not Pfizer, not Eli Lilly, not the Mayo Clinic or HCA. Every company in the top ten is a middleman, and together they take in about $2.6 trillion a year.

Above is a list showing how much of every dollar of revenue each company keeps as net income. Then read about what these companies actually do.

Three of these companies are insurers that swallowed pharmacy benefit managers: UnitedHealth owns Optum Rx; CVS owns Caremark and Aetna; and Cigna owns Express Scripts. Three are drug distributors that move pills from the factory to the pharmacy and touch almost none of them. Three more are built on Medicare and Medicaid managed care. Every one of them sits between the people who deliver care and the money that pays for it.

McKesson, Cencora and Cardinal Health each keep somewhere between half a cent and a penny of profit on every dollar of revenue. Cencora reported $294 billion in sales in fiscal 2024 and $1.5 billion in profit. That is a rounding error as a margin. And yet all three rank among the thirty largest companies in the world.

No other rich country works this way

The sheer size of these companies is another distinctly American feature of the system. On the 2026 Fortune Global 500, UnitedHealth ranks fourth in the world, ahead of Apple; McKesson is seventh; CVS is ninth; and Cigna, where I worked for 15 years, ranks 14th in the U.S. and 21st in the world. Every health care company near the top of the global list is an American intermediary in one way or another. There is no foreign health care business of any nature that comes close.

The closest thing another country has to one of our giants is Allianz, in Germany. Allianz is the largest insurance company in Europe. But it is a general insurer built on property, life and asset management, and health is a minor line. Even at home, Allianz is only the third largest health insurer in Germany. There, roughly nine in ten people are covered by nonprofit sickness funds, which are barred by law from operating as for profit and must send any surplus in funds back into the system.

And then there are Britain’s National Health Service (NHS), which is funded by taxes; Canada’s single-payer system financed through the provinces; and Japan’s nonprofit insurance system based on a standardized national fee schedule.

None of these countries built the kind of for-profit middleman layer that exists in the U.S., where some of those companies have grown into the largest corporations in the world. Pharmacy benefit managers are also a uniquely American creation, which helps explain why that entire category of health care giant does not exist elsewhere.

What the middleman layer costs

The United States spent $5.3 trillion on health care in 2024. That was the first year the country ever crossed $5 trillion, and it is the most recent year with actual figures rather than projections. (The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates total U.S. health spending will reach $6 trillion this year.)

A large share of that money never reaches care and instead is consumed by the U.S. health care system’s complicated administration and payment systems.

In 2021, the United States spent $925 per person on health administration, meaning the overhead of insurers and government programs. The average wealthy country spent $245. That gap of $680 a person accounts for about 12% of the entire difference between what America spends on health and what its peers spend. As a share of the total, administration eats about 7.6% of U.S. health spending against 3.8% across comparable nations. We devote twice the share of every health dollar to running our absurd machinery.

The $925 figure counts insurer and government overhead and does not include what hospitals and doctors spend on billing, coding and prior authorization just to get paid. When those costs are included, estimates put total administrative spending between 15% and 25% of all U.S. health care spending — or, based on 2024 spending, roughly $800 billion to $1.3 trillion a year.

The countries with the leanest administrative spending tend to be those (you guessed it!) with the fewest middlemen.

Middlemen spend to keep the status quo

I know how a system this profitable defends itself because I used to help do it. Back at my old gig at Cigna, my team and I wrote talking points for lobbyists to use with lawmakers, and we doled out campaign cash to candidates we liked.

The health sector spent $743.9 million lobbying the federal government in 2024, more than any other sector of the economy and the only one to clear $700 million. UnitedHealth alone spent $16.6 million in the 2024 election cycle. The insurance industry’s trade group, AHIP, and the biggest insurance conglomerates pour tens of millions more into the same effort year after year, and the pharmacy benefit managers keep their own operation running through another insurance industry funded trade group called the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association (PCMA), whose spending has roughly doubled since 2022.

That spending helps protect Medicare Advantage payments, fight efforts to rein in pharmacy benefit managers and oppose proposals that would move the country toward universal coverage. Compared with the $70 billion in combined profit of the seven biggest for-profit insurers last year, the lobbying bill is relatively small.

The price of “choice”

The industry says all of this is the price of “choice,” which they want folks to believe is sacred. It is the argument insurers and their allies reach for every time Congress looks at a single-payer bill or public option or any other approach, for that matter, that could move us closer to reining in the worst abuses of the industry.

Americans say they want to choose their own doctor and their own hospital, but that is exactly the kind of choice the middleman system can take away through narrow networks and prior authorization. What the industry defends instead is the choice among insurers. And for most working people, even that choice is made by an employer. We pay hundreds of billions of dollars a year to run a marketplace of middlemen, and in return we get narrower networks and more denials than patients face in the countries that never built the marketplace at all.

Depending on the results of the next two election cycles, Congress will almost certainly debate how to restructure health care again, with the familiar goals of lowering costs, expanding coverage and improving care. But any serious attempt to do that will have to confront the enormous middleman industry the current system has created and allowed to flourish.

The Health Care Scare Is Back

As voters sour on private insurers and health care reform gains political momentum, decades-old warnings about “choice,” “wait times” and “slippery slopes” are resurfacing.

If you want a sense of where the health care debate is headed as we enter the final stretch before the midterm elections, take a look at what has been published over just the past week.

Last Wednesday, the New York Post published an op-ed by Pacific Research Institute President Sally Pipes warning that Medicare for All would be a “real-life nightmare.” That same day, another Pipes column, this one in Newsmax, warned that a public option would be the first step toward a “complete government takeover of health insurance.” And also last Wednesday, Reason published a piece warning that universal health care means “long waits, rationed care, and unmet medical needs.”

These old tropes are familiar to me, as I am sure they are to many readers. And there is a reason they are back getting airtime.

Health care costs have become a major vulnerability for politicians heading into November. A KFF poll this summer found that 51% of voters considered health care costs an “extremely important” issue for candidates to address. Earlier KFF polling found that 61% said health care costs would have a major impact on which party’s candidates they support. And it is Americans’ sentiments about health care costs that have pushed many Medicare for All candidates over the finish line and lit a fire under current members of Congress who are now seeking a way to increase competition in the health insurance space by creating a nonprofit health plan that would be operated by the federal government.

Americans are increasingly fed up with private health insurers. Complaints about denied care, prior authorization, rising premiums and exorbitant out-of-pocket requirements have put insurers under a level of scrutiny I haven’t seen in years. It’s not just Abdul El Sayed. It’s Marjorie Taylor Green, too.

And it’s because of this political storm brewing that the health insurance industry’s longtime defenders are coming out swinging.

I know Sally Pipes’ work especially well. Pipes, who grew up in Canada but has lived in the U.S. for years, has spent decades warning Americans about reforms that might move the United States closer to a system like our neighbors to the north have. When I was an insurance executive, she was always useful to us.

During the industry’s campaign against Michael Moore’s Sicko, for example, we drew on Pipes’ work to portray Canada’s health care system as a cautionary tale. I wrote about that in the Washington Post. And during the debate over what became the Affordable Care Act, she was a forceful critic of the public insurance option insurers desperately wanted to keep out of the final bill.

She was a reliable ally of the health insurance industry then, and she clearly is returning to that role once again.

In her New York Post column last week, Pipes reaches for one of the oldest and most effective arguments against health care reform: “choice.” Pipes says that (currently) employers can switch insurance companies, people buying their own coverage can shop among plans and Medicare beneficiaries can choose between traditional Medicare and privately run Medicare Advantage plans. Medicare for All, she warns, would take that “choice” away.

It’s an argument that has worked before because “choice” sounds pretty good. Who wants fewer “choices” when it comes to their health care? (That’s a rhetorical question. But one answer is the insurance industry, which has been eliminating “choice” and competition for decades now.)

The trick is that much of the “choice” Pipes is talking about is an illusion. Americans with employer-sponsored coverage most certainly do not get to choose their insurance company. Their employer does. And even if you can choose among a handful of health plans at work, all of them at most U.S. businesses that can still afford to offer coverage are operated by the insurance company your employer chose. That’s not the same as being able to choose your doctors or hospitals, which is the “choice” Americans really want. Your health insurer decides which doctors and hospitals are in your network and can require prior authorization before it will pay for care your doctor recommends.

In other words, Americans may have (some) “choice” of plans – with varying levels of deductibles and copayments – but that doesn’t necessarily mean they have a meaningful “choice” when it comes to their health care.

Pipes’ second column last week reveals something else about the “choice” argument. She warns in Newsmax that a public option would have advantages private insurers couldn’t match, eventually drive them from the market and put the country on a “slippery slope” toward single-payer health care. (I can’t tell you how many times I warned about that so-called “slippery slope” when I ran communications at Cigna.) So Pipes essentially is arguing that private insurers must continue to be protected from additional competition in the name of giving Americans “choices.” But give Americans the “choice” of a public plan—and the possibility that millions might prefer it to what private insurers are selling—and suddenly “choice” itself becomes the problem. She ignores the fact that seniors have long been able to choose a public option – traditional Medicare – or one operated by a private insurer – Medicare Advantage. I can assure you that Medicare Advantage is extraordinarily profitable for private insurers. No one should worry that insurance companies won’t continue to make money if people younger than 65 can also at long last be able to choose a public option.

Reason, the libertarian magazine that has been a persistent critic of the Affordable Care Act, Medicare for All and any concept that would allow the government to pass legislation that would interfere with insurance companies’ business practices, published its own warning last week under the headline: “Universal Healthcare Sounds Great. Here’s What’s Happening in Countries That Have It.”

The piece focuses heavily on Canada and Britain, arguing that people in those countries face long waits for care in overcrowded hospitals, and it cites examples of patients who received inadequate care. Those problems are real and shouldn’t be dismissed. Neither Canada nor Britain has a perfect health care system. But the United States sure as hell doesn’t either. Millions of Americans never get the care they need because they can’t afford to buy health insurance. Millions more with insurance can’t use it because of unaffordable out-of-pockets costs and have no “choice” but to go without the care they need.

Reason leans heavily on one of the most familiar scare tactics used against universal health care: the wait times. In Canada, you might wait a few months for an elective procedure like a knee replacement, and in the U.K. see a specialist or get a procedure. In Britain, you might find yourself in an NHS queue. But in either country, unlike in the U.S., you will not have to wait long at all to see your primary care doctor or be admitted to a hospital for medically urgent care.

To be sure, waiting for an elective procedure or imaging annoys many Canadians and Brits. They are real problems. But in this country, we ration care in a way that creates far more harm than waiting in a queue for a few weeks or months for non-urgent care. In the United States, if you can’t afford care, you don’t wait a few months or get thrown on a waiting list – you all too often never get the care. Because in the U.S. of A, if you’re one of the nearly 30 million Americans who are uninsured, or who can’t cover their deductibles, you don’t get it until you get so sick you have to go to the ER. And then you get saddled with hundreds or thousands of dollars in medical debt.

So comparatively, Americans put off the procedures, scans and medications they need. Americans live with pain and hope whatever is wrong doesn’t get worse. In the worst cases, folks in this country die prematurely with conditions that could have been treated because they couldn’t afford to get the care that could have saved their lives.

Reason has been making versions of this argument for years. The magazine has previously published pieces with headlines including “Medicare for All Is Bad Medicine,” “Why Bernie Sanders’ Medicare for All Is a Bad Idea,” and “Medicare for All Would Actually Be a Government Takeover of Health Care.” (“Government takeover” ranked right up there with “slippery slope” when I was an insurance industry propagandist. Get ready to hear both lies again and again and again between now and November.)

Not only did I find propaganda like this effective in my old job, I’ve also seen it effective in real life.

Obviously, the only way we are going to fix our health care system is by debating the difficult things. We can debate Medicare for All. We can debate a public option. Both proposals deserve serious scrutiny if we want to get the next version of our health care system right.

But the attacks against these reforms deserve scrutiny, too — especially when they come from the same people and organizations that have been making them for decades, and when those arguments have historically served the interests of a health insurance system with an enormous financial stake in preventing reform.

Medicare Advantage enrollees more likely to leave after new complex diagnosis

Medicare Advantage enrollees who developed a new complex condition, such as congestive heart failure or Alzheimer’s disease, were more likely to leave their plan for traditional Medicare the next year, according to a study published Aug. 21 in JAMA Health Forum.

Medicare Advantage (MA), the private alternative to traditional Medicare, covered 54% of Medicare beneficiaries in 2025, the study noted. MA plans offer perks traditional Medicare doesn’t guarantee, such as spending caps and built-in drug coverage, but they also use prior authorization and limited networks that can slow down care. Folks with bigger health needs have left MA at higher rates than healthier enrollees.

However, leaving isn’t simple. In most states, insurers don’t have to sell Medigap, the supplemental coverage that fills traditional Medicare’s gaps, to someone who skipped it when they first signed up. That can leave beneficiaries who get sick later stuck without that backup option.

The study was led by Mark K. Meiselbach, Ph.D., of the Department of Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and his team, who said past studies treated a new diagnosis as simply yes-or-no and mostly tracked switches to traditional Medicare. The researchers wanted to see whether leaving MA increases with the number of new conditions a person develops and to separate switches to traditional Medicare from switches to a different MA plan, something earlier research hadn’t done.

JAMA Health Forum finds Medicare Advantage members with new complex diagnoses increasingly switch to traditional Medicare, highlighting MediGap barriers, state protections, and plan limits.

The retrospective cohort study used Medicare enrollment and claims data from 2016 through 2021, analyzed in late 2025 and early 2026. Researchers tracked beneficiaries who stayed in an MA plan all of 2016 and had no complex condition through 2018. Using a standard federal algorithm, they flagged eight conditions: heart attack, Alzheimer disease, atrial fibrillation, chronic kidney disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), depression, congestive heart failure and stroke.

A treatment group of 219,942 beneficiaries developed one of those conditions in 2019; a comparison group of 834,984 did not develop one through 2021. Using a difference-in-differences design, researchers compared how disenrollment changed for each group before and after 2019, then checked whether that change depended on how many new conditions someone developed, their state’s Medigap rules, and whether their MA plan was a health maintenance organization (HMO).

Developing any new complex condition raised MA disenrollment by 3.3 percentage points. Almost all of that increase came from people leaving for traditional Medicare rather than switching to a different MA plan. The more conditions someone developed, the more likely they were to leave: 1.4 percentage points with one new condition, up to 12.8 points among the 1,010 people with four or more. A new Alzheimer’s disease diagnosis had the single biggest effect, an 8.6 percentage point increase, while the rest ranged from 2.9 to 5.0 points.

Beneficiaries in the four states with Medigap guaranteed-issue and community-rating rules, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts and New York, were 1.5 percentage points more likely to leave for traditional Medicare than beneficiaries elsewhere. Those enrolled in HMO plans were less likely to leave for traditional Medicare but more likely to switch to a different MA plan.

Dual-eligible beneficiaries, who qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid, left for traditional Medicare at higher rates and switched MA plans less often, which the authors said tracks with Medicaid reducing their need for Medigap. Plan star ratings didn’t matter much: those in 4- or 5-star plans left at about the same rate as those in 3-star plans after a new diagnosis, suggesting star ratings don’t capture how well a plan serves sicker members.

“These findings underscore the difficulty of making an initial enrollment decision in Medicare,” the study’s authors wrote in the discussion. “Beneficiaries cannot foresee all of their future health needs when they first enroll in MA, but the consequences of that decision may depend on health events that occur years later.”

Strengths in this study include the tracked disenrollment trends before 2019, not just a single before-and-after comparison, and the study found no sign the groups were already diverging. The results also held up after adjusting for other chronic conditions people developed.

However, there are limits. Since new conditions were identified from claims, which usually show up after a diagnosis, the authors said their numbers likely undercount the true effect rather than overstate it. Counting conditions is also an imperfect stand-in for true complexity, and the group with four or more new conditions was small, just 1,010 people, so those figures carry more uncertainty. The data ends in 2021 and doesn’t reflect newer MA plan designs.

The authors confirmed that state Medigap protections make it easier for more ill beneficiaries to switch to traditional Medicare, but expanding those protections more broadly could push Medigap premiums up for everyone. And MA star ratings, as they currently work, may not reflect how well a plan actually serves members whose health needs have grown more complex.

Where Do Our Health Insurance Premiums Go?

Big Insurance has hauled in $500B in profits since 2014— enough to cover extending the enhanced ACA subsidies and leave $150B — yet it’s gone to shareholders and executive bonuses instead of patients.

As open enrollment begins and Congress remains deadlocked on whether to extend the ACA’s enhanced premium subsidies, one question looms large: Where does all the money we pay for health coverage actually go?

It’s a fair question. Premiums and out-of-pocket costs have risen relentlessly over the past decade. Since the Affordable Care Act was fully implemented, the average premium for an ACA marketplace plan has doubled, and the average deductible for a Silver plan has increased by 92%. Every year, families pay more, yet the coverage often feels thinner.

What the Insurers Say

Health insurance companies routinely claim these increases simply reflect rising medical costs and higher utilization. For example, when justifying rate hikes in 2024, Cigna of Texas wrote:

“The increasing cost of medical and pharmacy services and supplies accounts for a sizable portion of the premium rate increases.”

But the financial filings of these same companies tell a different story.

What the Numbers Show

As Wendell Potter recently wrote, from 2014 to 2024 the seven largest publicly traded health insurance companies, UnitedHealth Group, CVS/Aetna, Cigna, Elevance (formerly Anthem), Humana, Centene, and Molina, reported that they collectively made more than half a trillion dollars in profits.

That’s money collected from individuals, employers and taxpayers for health coverage — dollars that didn’t go to medical care but instead flowed to corporate shareholders and executive bonuses. To put this in perspective, those profits alone could fund the enhanced ACA premium subsidies for another ten years, at an estimated cost of $350 billion.

Stock Buybacks: Enrollees’ Money, Executives’ Reward

Over the same period, these seven companies spent $146 billion buying back their own stock or, in other words, using premium dollars from patients and employers to boost share prices and executive compensation (the CEOs and many other top executives of big insurers are compensated primarily through stock grants and options).

Stock buybacks don’t lower premiums, expand networks, or improve care. They simply make investors and executives richer. If that same money had been reinvested in enrollees, it could have provided premium-free health coverage to more than 5 million families for an entire year, based on the average employer-sponsored plan cost of $27,000 in 2026.

Lobbying With Our Premium Dollars

Insurers aren’t just rewarding shareholders, they’re also shaping the political system that protects their profits. Since 2014, the seven largest insurers and their trade association, AHIP, have spent $618 million on lobbying.

That’s money that could have been used to lower out-of-pocket costs or improve patient care, but instead it’s spent to influence Congress and federal agencies to maintain the status quo.

The Real Problem — and the Real Solution

As the cost of health insurance continues to climb, politicians debate how to control those costs and expand coverage. But the truth is, there’s already enough money in the system to cover everyone. It’s just being siphoned off by insurance corporations for profits, lobbying, and stock buybacks.

Though some have been calling for less regulation of Big Insurance, that is not the answer and is partly how we ended up in this situation. Right now, Big Insurance is allowed to use premium dollars and tax dollars on things that do nothing to improve anyone’s health – such as stock buybacks and lobbying – instead of on medical care.

Rather than asking families and taxpayers to pay more, it’s time to demand accountability from insurers. At a minimum, they should not be allowed to use premium dollars, or taxpayer dollars, to enrich shareholders through stock buybacks (which wasn’t even legal until the 1980s) or lobby for policies that drive up costs.

If we want to contain health care costs, the first step is simple: Stop the profiteering by Big Insurance.