Market Concentration and Potential Competition in Medicare Advantage

https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/feb/market-concentration-and-potential-competition-medicare

Market concentration and competition

ABSTRACT

  • Issue: Medicare Advantage (MA), the private option to traditional Medicare, now serves roughly 37 percent of beneficiaries. Congress intended MA plans to achieve efficiencies in the provision of health care that lead to savings for Medicare through managed competition among private health plans.
  • Goal: Two elements are needed for savings to accrue: a sound payment policy and effective competition among the private plans. This brief examines the latter.
  • Methods: We use data from 2009–17 to describe market structure in MA, including the insurers offering plans and enrollment in each U.S. county. We measure both actual and potential competitors for each county for each year.
  • Key Findings and Conclusions: MA markets are highly concentrated and have become more concentrated since 2009. From 2009–17, 70 percent or more of enrollees were in highly concentrated markets, dominated by two or three insurers. Since the payment system used to reimburse insurers selling in the MA market relies on competition to spur efficiency and premiums that more closely reflect insurers’ actual costs, these developments suggest that taxpayers and beneficiaries will overpay. We also find an average of six potential entrants into MA markets, which points to a source of competition that may be activated in MA. To tap into potential competition, further research is needed to understand the factors affecting entry into MA markets.

Introduction

Medicare Advantage (MA), the private option to traditional Medicare (TM), now serves roughly 37 percent of beneficiaries through health care plans. Federal subsidy of the premiums of MA plans is intended to create a “level playing field,” so that the government pays MA plans based on what beneficiaries would typically cost in TM. This approach is based on Alain Enthoven’s concept of “managed competition,” wherein private plans that provide better benefits and higher-quality care at a lower price than TM would attract beneficiaries. Two elements are needed for this approach to work: a sound payment policy and effective competition among the private plans. This issue brief examines the latter.

Recent data show that many MA markets are served by just one or a small number of insurers.1 In 2012, 97 percent of county markets in the MA program were designated as highly concentrated according to the definitions used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), with a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of greater than 2,500.2 In 2016, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission observed that local markets for MA plans were becoming increasingly concentrated.3 Recently, courts have blocked mergers that would further erode competition within the MA market.4

This issue brief updates information about the market structure in the MA program. We report on traditional measures of market structure, such as concentration ratios and the HHIs, and a simple count of the number of insurers offering plans in a market. We also include the “two-firm concentration ratio,” or the share of enrollment accounted for by the top two firms. We also offer new perspectives on competition in MA. First, we comment on competition and choice from the standpoint of a beneficiary by examining the number of plans available. Second, we introduce the idea of “potential competition” in an MA market. Potential competition, like actual competition, can constrain market power. Third, we consider the role of TM in constraining the market power of MA insurers.

Actual and Potential Competition

News stories about consumers’ choices among Medicare Advantage plans often begin with a statement such as “On average, seniors will have a choice of 21 plans, although at least 40 plans will be accessible in some counties and large metropolitan areas of the country.”5 But such accounts give a misleading indication of competition in the MA program, because many insurers offer multiple health plan products in the same market. In this issue brief, we measure the number of MA plans but also focus on the number of different insurers in the market to assess competition at the insurer level.

An insurer needs to be wary of potential as well as actual competitors. Insurers that set premiums high may enable competitors to gain footholds in a market. A market is said to be “contestable” if it is relatively easy for a potential entrant to contest for market share.6Barriers to entry, the magnitude of one-time entry costs, and the availability of comparably efficient technology all influence contestability of a market. Here, we identify “potential competitors,” or insurers that are in a position to contest a county-defined market and therefore pose a competitive threat to incumbents. Insurers licensed to operate MA plans in a state have already crossed some local regulatory barriers and contract with some local providers. We therefore measure potential competition by the number of health insurers participating in some MA markets within the state but not in a particular county.

Data and Measurement

We use data from 2009–17 to describe market structure in MA, including the insurers offering plans in each county and the level of enrollment by county and plan. From these data we measure both actual and potential competitors for each county for each year. Actual competitors are those insurers that participate in MA in a specific county; potential competitors are the insurers participating in MA in a state but not in the county of interest. These data also allow us to compute concentration ratios and the HHI for each county and in each year. In some analyses we categorize the counties according to the HHI corresponding to the FTC/DOJ classifications of concentration: 1) not concentrated, HHI <1,501; 2) moderately concentrated, HHI=1,501–2,500; and 3) highly concentrated, HHI >2,500.

Results

As shown in Exhibit 1, in 2017 Medicare beneficiaries could choose from a relatively large number of private plans (roughly seven) by the standards of the private insurance market. The number of insurers declined from 2009 to 2011 then remained steady through 2017, averaging 2.5 in 2017. For comparison, in 2017, the average metropolitan area had two insurers competing in the health insurance marketplaces created by the Affordable Care Act.

Insurer concentration increased from 2009 to 2011 (the number of insurers selling MA plans fell from 4.5 to 2.9) then remained at about the same, high level of concentration. The two-firm concentration ratio was already high in 2009 (81%); it rose to 91 percent by 2011 and stayed there through 2017. The average county-level HHI was 4,914 in 2009, rising to 6,360 in 2013, and declining slightly to 6,285 in 2017. To put this in perspective, a market with two equal-size health plans would have an HHI of 5,000. The average MA market is therefore even more concentrated than that. Notably, the number of potential competitors also fell over the same period. Nevertheless there are now more potential than actual competitors in each county.

Exhibit 2 shows that 70 percent or more of MA enrollees were in highly concentrated markets (HHI>2,500). Few MA enrollees were able to choose a plan in a market not dominated by two or three insurers.

Virtually all Medicare enrollees face MA markets that are moderately to highly concentrated. Exhibit 3 shows the distribution of all Medicare enrollees (in MA and TM) by the levels of MA concentration. We stratify markets (i.e., counties) into quartiles according to the size of the total population of Medicare beneficiaries. The table reports mean population and mean HHI for each quartile of the total Medicare population. Among sparsely populated markets, which are largely rural, the mean HHI is 6,684 — indicating that they are highly concentrated. This is in part because of the difficulty that managed care plans, like HMOs and PPOs, have in establishing provider networks in rural areas where providers are scarce and provider markets are highly concentrated. In highly populated markets, the average HHI shows that they too are highly concentrated HHI = 3,774), but the index value is considerably lower than in sparsely populated markets.

Exhibit 4 shows the average numbers of potential entrants in counties grouped by the three HHI ranges. In recent years, there has been little difference in the number of potential competitors in areas with high or low concentration, implying that potential competitors are no more attracted to highly concentrated markets and may not discipline competition any more strongly in areas with few actual competitors. This was not true in earlier years, during which the number of potential competitors was higher in areas with less current competition. The number of potential competitors in moderately concentrated counties has remained steady over the nine-year period.

While Medicare beneficiaries have a choice between TM and MA, in assessing the competitive forces on MA plans we assume that the actual or potential competition from other MA plans matters most. The market position of an MA insurer in relation to TM received examination in connection with two recently proposed mergers, between Aetna and Humana and between Anthem and Cigna. The U.S. Department of Justice challenged these mergers on antitrust grounds, arguing that the proposed consolidations would threaten effective competition in MA. In the Aetna-Humana case, Judge Bates observed: “The weight of the evidence presented at trial indicates ‘industry [and] public recognition’ of a distinct market for Medicare Advantage. Competition within that market, between Medicare Advantage plans, is far more intense than competition with products outside of it.”7 While the role of traditional Medicare in affecting competition in the MA market deserves further analysis, competition among MA plans is where most of market discipline is likely to arise. While the presence of TM likely affects the conduct of MA plans, existing evidence suggests that the primary drivers of consumer choices are differences in the premiums, quality of care, and benefits among MA plans.8

Implications of MA Market Concentration

Even though 37 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in private plans, when compared with employer-based health insurance Medicare’s transition to managed care has been slow. Traditional Medicare is the last major bastion of open-network, fee-for-service health insurance, although the fee-for-service component is beginning to change with the spread of accountable care organizations. Competition or lack thereof of in a market plays a role in accelerating or attenuating this shift. Consumer choices tend to be driven by the better value (premiums and quality) that can turn more favorable with increased competition.

Several forces may have driven greater concentration in MA markets since 2009. First, consolidation in the health insurance industry generally may have affected the MA market structure.9 Concentration in provider markets also has been increasing, which has made price negotiations for health care services more difficult for insurers, especially smaller ones.10 Medicare policy changes over these years may have inadvertently limited the supply and market entry of MA insurers. When Medicare rules were changed to require all MA plans to create networks of providers, the effect of provider concentration was heightened and some health insurers were less willing to remain in and/or enter MA markets. This effect may have been especially significant in rural areas.11 At the same time, there appears to be a substantial number of potential MA insurer entrants in most moderate to highly concentrated markets, yet there appears to have been little clear impact on market outcomes in terms of premiums and quality.

Together, the confluence of these forces continues to push MA markets in the direction of greater concentration. Since the payment system used to reimburse insurers selling in the MA market relies on competition to drive premiums toward insurers’ actual costs, these developments suggest that taxpayers and beneficiaries will overpay for MA products, compared with what they might have paid in markets with more robust competition.

Need for Further Analysis

A competitive market is intended to deliver good products to consumers at low prices. Ultimately, the effect of Medicare Advantage market power on prices or quality of care needs to be assessed empirically. There is some, but limited, evidence on the exercise of MA market power.12 Further research is needed to understand how potential competitors affect the actions of existing competitors. It also will be important to understand the barriers to market entry for potential competitors, especially those that might be lowered to spur greater competition.

 

 

1 big thing: Everything will be a fight

https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-vitals-d6671137-65fb-49a1-a603-d7e53ab977de.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosvitals&stream=top

Manny Pacquiao Fight GIF - Find & Share on GIPHY

Insurers and hospitals came out swinging yesterday against Democrats’ proposal to let people older than 50 buy into Medicare — a reminder that almost any expansion of public health coverage will provoke a battle with the health care industry.

Between the lines: Politically, an age-restricted Medicare buy-in is about as moderate as it gets for Democrats in the age of “Medicare for All.”

  • It is not a proposal for universal coverage, and it’s a far cry from trying to eliminate private insurance. It would be optional, only a relatively small slice of people would have the option, and they would need to pay a monthly premium.

Yes, but: Being on the more moderate end of the political spectrum does not shield you from a fight.

  • Expanding Medicare would hurt hospitals’ bottom lines, because Medicare pays hospitals less than private insurance does.
  • That’s why the Federation of American Hospitals said yesterday that the idea “would harm more Americans than it would help.”
  • The buy-in plan would primarily compete with employer-based health coverage (that’s what people between 50 and 65 are likely to have). And America’s Health Insurance Plans said the idea “is a slippery slope to government-run health care for every American.”

The bottom line: Any proposal that would compete with (never mind eliminate) private coverage, particularly employer coverage, will meet this kind of resistance.

That’s why Medicaid is the public program Democrats and industry can agree to love. Expanded access to Medicaid has rarely been an alternative to commercial insurance — it’s usually an alternative to being uninsured.

  • The uninsured were the primary beneficiaries of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, and the Medicaid buy-in proposals now popping in the states are aimed at the people who are most likely to be foregoing private ACA coverage because of its cost.

 

 

 

Kamala Harris’ ‘Medicare for all’ would mean massive disruption for healthcare, and the industry is prepared to fight it

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/healthcare/kamala-harris-medicare-for-all-would-mean-massive-disruption-for-healthcare-and-the-industry-is-prepared-to-fight-it

Image result for Kamala Harris' 'Medicare for all' would mean massive disruption for healthcare, and the industry is prepared to fight it

Democratic presidential contender Sen. Kamala Harris wants to “move on” from the current healthcare system in favor of a plan that would roll everyone in the U.S. onto a government plan known as “Medicare for all,” doing away with private health insurance.

As the California Democrat and others in her party make their case, however, they will face considerable opposition not only in the insurance industry, but across the healthcare sector, which would see massive upheaval from the plan. And polling suggests that the public, roughly half of which relies on private insurance, isn’t quite on board.

Drug companies, insurers, doctors, and hospitals have united in recent months to fight national government healthcare. One healthcare industry group, called the Partnership for America’s Health Care Future, has launched a five-figure digital ad campaign arguing that “Medicare for all” would cause massive disruption, higher taxes, lower quality care, and less choice for patients. It plans to spend six figures bashing “Medicare for all” over the course of 2019.

“Whether it’s called Medicare for all, single payer, or a public option, one-size-fits-all healthcare will mean all Americans have less choice and control over the doctors, treatments, and coverage,” said Lauren Crawford Shaver, the group’s executive director.

Other candidates for the Democratic nomination, such as Sens. Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, are, like Harris, co-sponsors of the Medicare for All Act, legislation led by Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt. Although it has “Medicare” in the name, the bill would go much further than current Medicare, which covers adults 65 and older and people with disabilities. It would pay for emergency surgery, prescription drugs, mental healthcare, and eye care without a copay.

Children would be enrolled in the government plan soon after the the bill’s passage, and the rest would be gradually phased in after four years. This would mean that roughly half of the U.S. population, the 177 million people in the U.S. covered by private health insurance mostly through work, would be moved onto a government plan. Employers would pay higher taxes rather than pay for private plans.

In defending the need for a government system, Sanders has blasted insurance companies, saying upon unveiling the bill that they “make billions of dollars in profits and make industry CEOs extremely wealthy.”

But healthcare providers, not just insurers, benefit from the current fragmented system, in which insurance is purchased by employers, the government, and individuals. They charge private insurers more to make up for the gap left by patients who are uninsured or are on government programs, which pay less for their services.

If all privately insured individuals were to have Medicare instead, and if it were to pay the same rates it does now, then doctors and hospitals would see big losses caring for patients who moved from private coverage to the government plan. Healthcare providers have said that if taxes don’t go up to pay for the difference, then doctors and hospitals will face pay cuts and layoffs, leading to facility closures and long lines for care.

Hospitals serve as the main employer in many communities. For patients, that would mean losing not only a healthcare plan they might be satisfied with, but also doctors they worked with for years or hospitals they relied on in their communities.

The Medicare for All Act has not been scored by the Congressional Budget Office, but analyses from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and the left-leaning Urban Institute found it would raise government spending over a decade by $32.6 trillion.

Overall healthcare spending, though, would actually fall by $2 trillion, as private spending on healthcare would collapse. The cut would be achieved, however, through paying 40 percent less to providers than what they were getting from private insurance.

Another obstacle to “Medicare for all” is the fact that the public isn’t fully convinced by the idea of nixing private insurance, a recent poll from the Kaiser Family Foundation shows. Initially, 56 percent of those polled favored the Medicare for All Act, but then when they learned it would do away with private health insurance, the support fell to 37 percent.

Candidates are going to face pushback within their party. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other Democratic leaders have not embraced government healthcare, instead pushing for adding funding to Obamacare.

But proponents of allowing the government to have a more extensive role in healthcare point out that waste is prevalent in the current system. Patients receive unnecessary medical care, such as repeated tests or surgeries that either don’t make them healthier or even make them worse.

These proponents agree with Harris that health insurance companies are unnecessary. Wendell Potter, an advocate of a government-financed healthcare system and president of the Business Initiative for Health Policy, said in a statement that polling results show the healthcare industry’s misinformation campaign to spread “fear, uncertainty, and doubt” was effective. He said that commercial health insurance companies don’t have an incentive to lower healthcare costs and make sure patients can access care.

Potter, a former health insurance executive, described how the information campaign worked, saying the goal was to “make people believe that private health insurance companies were a necessary part of the healthcare system, and to scare them into thinking that a ‘Medicare for all’ system was expensive and impractical, and that it would cause a significant drop off in the quality of care.”

 

 

 

 

Reforming Stark/Anti-Kickback Policies

https://www.brookings.edu/events/reforming-stark-anti-kickback-policies/?utm_campaign=Economic%20Studies&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=69407322

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An event from the USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy

In recent years, the health care system has accelerated experimentation into new payment and delivery models that reward care coordination, integration, and value.  However, observers and market participants have expressed concerns that long-standing anti-fraud rules in Medicare and Medicaid prevent innovation and hold back potentially promising new arrangements.  In 2018, the Trump administration sought stakeholder feedback on how the regulations implementing those laws might be modified to promote value-based, coordinated, integrated care delivery while protecting taxpayers and beneficiaries from fraud.

On January 30, 2019 the USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy will host Eric Hargan, the Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services, for a discussion about this effort. Following his presentation, experts in health care payment and delivery system reform will discuss the issue and the path forward.

 

 

 

38 hospitals sue HHS over site-neutral payment rule

https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/38-hospitals-sue-hhs-over-site-neutral-payment-rule?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT0RrNVpXSmpZV1UzTTJVdyIsInQiOiJNNFh6MElhd0lmVE5Zc09kZTl5d3BPc1h3ZkRpZGNIbWhHSE9RNVp5NkN1MFwvXC9kK3h6WHh5KzRHTWdsQTlWZ203aitRRnhUYWZ5QTVScVZcL01HaTkyUm5LNDRvanVuY0NUdVN4Y0czMzRkMzdNZzMrdVp6WjlmV2N5WHYxMEkrNCJ9

Hospitals named in the suit include Vanderbilt Medical Center, Atrium Health, Rush University Medical Center, Ochsner Clinic Foundation, Montefiore.

A month and a half after several hospital advocacy groups joined together to sue the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services over it’s finalized site-neutral payment policy, 38 hospitals have followed, filing suit against HHS Secretary Alex Azar for a policy they say will deprive hospitals of hundreds of millions of dollars and could compel them to cut patient services due to loss of reimbursement.

The complaint argues that medical services provided in hospital outpatient departments are more “resource-intensive”–and therefore more costly–than those performed in an independent physician’s office. It also sharply criticized Secretary Azar, saying he “has blatantly disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive, acted well beyond his authority and nullified that statutory exemption” that would have had hospital outpatient centers reimbursed for services at the higher grandfathered rate previously legislated.

The hospitals suing include Vanderbilt Medical Center, Atrium Health hospitals, Rush University Medical Center, Ochsner Clinic Foundation, Montefiore Health System and many others.

THE IMPACT

The outpatient prospective payment system seeks to equalize what physician offices and hospital outpatient departments are paid for certain clinical visits, a change that will be phased in over two years. The new rule cuts payments for hospital outpatient clinic visits at off-campus provider- based facilities in order to level them out against what is paid to physician offices. Half of the total reduction, $380 million, will take effect in 2019 and the remaining cuts will be phased the next year.

THE TREND

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 amended the Social Security Act such that Medicare pays the same rates for medical services regardless of whether they are provided in a physician’s office or in an “off campus” hospital department. At the time, Congress provided an exemption from the rule for all off-campus hospital outpatient departments that were providing services before the enactment.

The AHA, in the suit they are part of, said the Azar’s reversal on the grandfathered exemption exceeds the administration’s legal authority. The AHA previously called the OPPS final rule  “unsupportable analyses and erroneous policy rationales,” and said it will have “negative consequences” for patients, with those in rural and vulnerable communities getting hit especially hard. The AHA and other hospital associations are already challenging the 340B policy included in the current outpatient rule.

ON THE RECORD

“The Secretary’s unlawful rate cut directly contravenes clear congressional directives and will impose significant harm on affected off-campus hospital outpatient departments and the patients they serve. Accordingly, this Court should declare the Secretary’s Final Rule to be ultra vires and enjoin the agency from implementing any payment methodology other than OPPS rates for all E/M services provided by excepted off-campus PBDs,” the complaint states.

Mark Polston, a partner with King & Spalding, the firm representing the plaintiffs: “Our clients’ mission is to provide high-quality healthcare. They have relied for years upon their off-campus departments to expand access to care and bring hospital services directly to their communities, many of which are underserved by other providers. Congress preserved their ability to do that work when it excepted them from the changes contained in Section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. But the Secretary overstepped his bounds when he took that away. We are asking the court to reinstate the decision Congress made to preserve our clients’ ability to bring the best possible care to their patients.” Mark Polston, a partner with King & Spalding, the firm representing the plaintiffs:

 

 

 

Medicare Advantage industry sees slower growth for 2019

https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190116/NEWS/190119927/medicare-advantage-industry-sees-slower-growth-for-2019

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Medicare Advantage insurers added 1.4 million members to their rosters for 2019 coverage, as they looked to grow membership in a market known for being politically safe and predictably lucrative. But Advantage membership is growing at a slower pace compared with previous years. 

According to the latest federal data showing enrollment as of this month, 22.4 million people are enrolled in Medicare Advantage for 2019 coverage—an alternative to the traditional Medicare program in which private insurers contract with the federal government to administer program benefits. That’s an increase of 6.8% since January 2018. Health insurers, however, managed to grow their Advantage membership base by more than 1.5 million in both 2016 and 2017.

Some industry experts were expecting more. “The formula was there: Health plans were aggressive, they got nice rate increases, the rules around benefit design relaxed a little bit,” explained Jeff Fox, president of Gorman Health Group, which provides technology and other services to Medicare Advantage plans.

Fox expected Advantage enrollment to increase by double-digits over the past year, as health plans invested heavily in marketing and the federal government provided one of the biggest rate increases for the plans in years at 3.4%. The Trump administration also granted Advantage plans the flexibility to provide more supplemental benefits in 2019, such as transportation and in-home care.

But Fox said distraction from the craziness of the November midterm elections may have kept some seniors from enrolling during the annual open enrollment that lasted from Oct. 15 to Dec. 7, 2018. While the CMS data captures some of the sign-ups from open enrollment, figures out next month are likely to be higher.

Despite the slower pace, many Advantage insurers still experienced big enrollment increases as they picked up more market share. About half of all members are covered by just three companies. UnitedHealth held onto the top spot, adding nearly 500,000 Advantage members in the past year for a total 5.7 million. UnitedHealth holds more than a quarter of the total Medicare Advantage market share.

Humana remained the No. 2 Advantage insurer with 3.9 million members, an increase of 10.4% over January 2018. But thanks to its acquisition of Aetna, CVS Health took the No. 3 spot with 2.2 million Advantage enrollees. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Anthem rounded out the top five insurers with the most Advantage members.

On a percentage basis, Anthem and Aetna grew membership the fastest. Anthem’s Medicare Advantage membership spiked 53% to 1.1 million members compared with the same time last year. The Indianapolis-based insurer has long focused on serving employers, but recently turned its sights to growing Medicare Advantage rolls through acquisitions and expansions in places where it already operates.

Anthem bought Florida-based Medicare plans HealthSun in December 2017 and America’s 1st Choice in February 2018, together giving Anthem about 170,000 more Advantage members. Anthem CEO Gail Boudreaux told investment analysts in July that the company would focus on selling group Medicare Advantage plans and serving medically complex dual-eligible members in 2019.

CVS Health, meanwhile, grew its Medicare membership by 26.7% in 2018 to 2.2 million through its acquisition of Aetna. The deal is still technically awaiting a federal judge’s approval. In a research note Monday, Barclays equity analyst Steve Valiquette noted that Aetna’s membership growth was driven by its expansion into about 360 new counties. Valiquette wrote that the growth experienced by some public health insurers during the annual enrollment period for 2019 coverage was driven more by market share gains than by industry growth.

Medicare Advantage enrollment is climbing as the baby boomer generation ages rapidly into Medicare. Those seniors are used to employer-sponsored managed-care plans and are choosing Advantage over traditional Medicare more often than previous generations did. Seniors also often get more benefits, including dental care, eyeglasses and gym memberships, with an Advantage plan. 

Medicare Advantage also enjoys support from both political parties and is able to weather swings from one federal administration to the next, whereas insurers that sell plans in the individual market, for example, may have to deal with more volatility.

Moreover, Medicare Advantage margins tend to hover between 4% to 5%, whereas Medicaid margins come in at 2% to 3% and the individual market historically has had even lower margins, S&P analyst Deep Banerjee told Modern Healthcare in August. The group employer business has higher margins, but that market isn’t growing like Medicare Advantage is.

 

 

 

Health Care Costs 101: A Continuing Economic Threat

https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/HealthCareCosts18.pdf

https://www.chcf.org/publication/health-care-costs-101-economic-threat/

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US health spending reached $3.3 trillion in 2016, or $10,348 per capita, and accounted for 17.9% of gross domestic product (GDP). Health spending slowed somewhat in 2016, following the coverage expansions of 2015 and 2014. National health spending increased 4.3% in 2016, down from 5.8% in 2015 and 5.1% in 2014. Despite this slowdown, 2016 health spending grew 1.5 percentage points faster than the economy (GDP grew at a rate of 2.8%).

Looking ahead, health spending is projected to grow at an average rate of 5.5% per year (1.0 points faster than the economy) between 2017 and 2026. At this rate, health care would consume a growing portion of the economy, totaling $5.7 trillion and accounting for one-fifth of GDP by 2026.

Health Care Costs 101: A Continuing Economic Threat (PDF), which relies on the most recent data available, details how much is spent on health care in the US, which services are purchased, and who pays.

Key findings include:

  • Per capita health spending increased 3.5% in 2016 and crossed the $10,000 per capita threshold for the first time.
  • Prescription drug spending declined dramatically from 8.9% in 2015 to 1.3% in 2016, driven in part by fewer new medications on the market, slower brand-name drug spending, and reduced spending on generic drugs.
  • Households and the federal government each accounted for 28% of health spending in 2016.
  • As ACA coverage expansion matured in 2016, the rate of increase in federal spending slowed to 3.9%, lower than private business (5.0%) or households (4.6%).
  • Federal subsidies for ACA marketplace (individual coverage) premiums and cost sharing totaled $33 billion, accounting for 3.5% of federal health spending and 3.0% of private health insurance spending.
  • Public health insurance, including Medicare and Medicaid, paid the largest share of spending (41%) in 2016. Private health insurance paid for a third of health spending and consumers’ out-of-pocket spending accounted for 11%.

The full report, a quick reference guide, and all of the charts found in the report are available under Related Materials. Also available are the datafiles and previous years’ reports.  These materials are part of CHCF’s California Health Care Almanac, an online clearinghouse for key data and analyses describing the state’s health care landscape.