Blaming hospitals isn’t wrong. But it’s incomplete—and it’s exactly the story insurers want told.
Zack Cooper argued this week in The New York Times that Americans may be blaming the wrong culprit for rising premiums. In his view, the bigger driver is hospital market power—fueled by years of consolidation that policymakers have done little to stop. On that point, he’s on solid ground saying that hospital prices have climbed steadily, and oversight has lagged.
Where the argument falls short is in how it portrays insurers. It suggests they are largely on the defensive—unable to push back on powerful hospital systems and left to rely on tools like prior authorization and claim denials as a workaround. In that telling, insurers come across less as drivers of the problem and more as constrained players navigating a difficult market.
That’s not consistent with what I saw working inside the industry, or with how the business is structured to operate.
Cooper’s academic work on hospital consolidation is serious and worth engaging with. But the argument he made in the Times—whether intended or not—tracks closely with a line the insurance industry has advanced for years. It’s a familiar frame, and one I recognize because I helped design it.
The industry’s oldest trick
When I was head of corporate communications at Cigna, one of my core job responsibilities was to ensure that the public and policymakers understood what we called the “true drivers” of medical inflation. Those drivers were never us. They were hospitals charging too much, drug companies gouging patients, and — when we needed a villain closer to home — ordinary Americans overusing the health care system. The finger-pointing was deliberate, coordinated, and effective. As any magician will tell you, misdirection is the oldest trick in the book.
AHIP, the industry’s trade and lobbying group, is running that same playbook today with the full force of the industry behind it. In recent months it has blanketed Washington with the message that “hospital costs account for more than 40 cents of every premium dollar” and that hospitals should “stop looking around for someone else to blame.” This is not an inaccurate claim. It is an incomplete one, deployed with the precision of a public relations campaign rather than the rigor of a policy argument. The fact that Cooper’s op-ed reinforces that message — even from an independent and credentialed source — is a gift to an industry that has been under unprecedented scrutiny since the murder of a UnitedHealthcare CEO in late 2024.
I am not suggesting Cooper wrote his piece on AHIP’s behalf. I am suggesting that a structurally incomplete argument, published in arguably the country’s most influential newspaper at this precise moment, serves the insurance industry’s interests whether or not that was anyone’s intention.
Who started the consolidation arms race?
Cooper’s framing also elides a crucial piece of history. Hospital consolidation did not happen in a vacuum. Hospitals began merging in significant part as a defensive response to the growing bargaining power of large insurers. Providers seeking to consolidate often cited a desire to acquire bargaining leverage with market-dominant payers, arguing that their own consolidation could counter the consolidation of increasingly powerful insurers.
Insurer consolidation begat hospital consolidation, which begat higher prices, which begat higher premiums. It is an arms race in which the only losers are patients and employers.
In the third episode of the HEALTH CARE un-covered Show, we take a deep dive into prior authorization’s toll — from doctors to federal policy — featuring Dr. Wendy Dean, Dr. Seth Glickman and Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-WA) on CMS’s new AI-driven WISeR model.
Cooper is right that hospital market power is now the dominant force driving costs. But the insurers that consolidated first — and that benefited by squeezing providers in the short run — helped create the conditions for the hospital consolidation wave that followed. Neither side’s hands are clean. The arms race, which dates back to the rapid horizontal consolidation that occurred in the insurance industry in the 1990s and early 2000s, is what patients are now paying for.
Now to the incentive problem Cooper’s framing obscures. In commercial insurance — particularly the self-funded arrangements that now cover most large employers — the insurer often earns fees tied to the total size of claims processed. Higher hospital prices mean larger claims. Larger claims can mean higher revenue for the insurer administering the plan. This is not a conspiracy. It is arithmetic. The incentive to hold the line on hospital prices is weaker than Cooper suggests because in many arrangements, higher costs flow through to the insurer’s bottom line.
The Affordable Care Act’s medical loss ratio rules were supposed to fix this by requiring insurers to spend 80% to 85% of premiums on care. What those rules actually do, in a rising-cost environment, is allow absolute profits to grow even as the percentage stays fixed. If the pie gets bigger, the insurer’s slice gets bigger too — even at the same ratio.
The network access trap
In markets where a single hospital system controls the majority of beds, the insurer faces a problem that has nothing to do with negotiating skill. It cannot exclude that hospital from its network and still have a product to sell. Employers and individuals will not buy a plan that locks them out of the dominant regional provider. The hospital knows this. The insurer knows this. What gets called “negotiation” in these markets is often closer to ratification.
The insurer’s response to this trap — when it cannot win at the hospital price table — is not to fight harder. It is to redirect. Costs that cannot be controlled at the source get shifted somewhere more manageable: onto patients, through higher deductibles and narrower benefits; onto providers, through prior authorization burdens and claims denials; onto employers, through premium increases framed as the inevitable result of “medical trend.”
This is the point Cooper comes closest to and doesn’t quite reach. He writes that insurers “are incentivized to lower health spending, but in many markets don’t have the ability to put meaningful pressure on hospital prices.” That’s true. What is also true is that they put pressure on everything else, which all too often has the effect of reducing access to medically necessary care.
Prior authorization, step therapy, utilization management — these are not crude approximations of cost control. They are the rational corporate adaptation to a problem the insurer has decided not to solve at its source. They extract value from the system by making care harder to access rather than cheaper to provide. And they do so in a way that is largely invisible to the public as a cost-shifting mechanism, because each individual denial looks like a clinical decision rather than a financial one.
In Q1 2026, 7 Big Insurers did what their shareholders demanded: hike premiums, slash benefits and dump the sick.
The most recent numbers the nation’s largest for-profit health insurers have shared with investors tell a story the industry is eager to tell Wall Street: the worst is over. After two brutal years of earnings misses, executive firings, and stock price collapses driven by unexpectedly high medical spending, the seven biggest publicly traded health insurers have now completed their first-quarter earnings reports for 2026 and their shareholders are cheering.
Every one of them beat analysts’ expectations in various ways, and most raised their full-year 2026 guidance. But before you read the company-by-company results, it is worth examining the mechanisms behind that recovery because the story the earnings releases tell is not quite the same as the story they leave out.
To get back into Wall Street’s good graces, insurers have:
raised premiums
cut benefits
narrowed their provider networks
exited markets that weren’t meeting investors’ profit expectations, and
shed members they deemed too costly to cover.
Across the seven companies, total medical membership fell by roughly four million people between the first quarter of 2025 and the first quarter of 2026, and from what executives signaled to investors, many more people likely will be dumped by the end of the year. The patients who already have lost coverage through market exits or who found their benefits reduced this year do not appear as line items in an earnings release. They appear in the year-over-year membership declines and skimpier benefits that analysts note with approval.
In second episode of the HEALTH CARE un-covered Show, we walk you through the full year 2025 earnings reports of seven of the largest for-profit health insurance corporations in the country.
The key metric driving the recovery is the medical loss ratio — the percentage of premium revenue that insurers actually spend on medical care. When that number falls, profits rise and investors get richer. Across the sector, medical loss ratios came down in the first quarter, or at least came in lower than Wall Street feared. Insurers credited tighter cost management, a milder flu season, and “repricing” — the practice of raising premiums and cutting benefits, particularly in Medicare Advantage plans, to close the gap between what they collect and what they pay out. (Financial analysts’ term for this is benefit buydown, which is unique among American industries.) Higher revenue coupled with devalued benefits produces better medical loss ratios from investors’ perspective.
The stock market has responded — but the picture is more complicated than a simple sector rebound. Most of these stocks are up year to date, measured from deeply depressed December 31 baselines. But look back a full year and a different story emerges: four of the seven companies are still worth less today than they were a year ago. Molina is down 43% over that period. Cigna and Elevance are each down about 6%. The “recovery” is real in the sense that stocks have bounced off their bottoms.
For much of the sector, it is not yet a return to full health, but the companies clearly are making good on their assurances to investors that they will do whatever it takes to improve their profit margins, regardless of the consequences to patients.
Here is what each of the seven reported — and what each report left out.
UnitedHealth Group
UNH Close (May 11): $384.44 YTD: +17.4% 1-year: +4.4% Dec 31: $327.56 | May 12, 2025: $368.36
UnitedHealth Group, the nation’s largest health insurer, reported first-quarter 2026 revenues of $111.7 billion, with adjusted earnings of $7.23 per share and a medical loss ratio of 83.9% — well below the 85.5% analysts had expected. The company raised its full-year adjusted earnings guidance to more than $18.25 per share.
UnitedHealth attributed the year-over-year declinedecline in its medical loss ratio to strong medical cost management and favorable reserve development, while acknowledging “consistently elevated utilization and unit cost trends.” In plain terms: patients are still using more care than the company would prefer, but UnitedHealth is getting better at managing around it.
The stock’s 17% year-to-date gain requires context. UnitedHealth ended 2025 at $327.56 — the result of a punishing year that included the Change Healthcare cyberattack, the killing of its insurance CEO, and mounting federal scrutiny of its Medicare Advantage risk-scoring practices. Then this past January, a disappointing fourth-quarter 2025 earnings report sent shares plunging nearly 20% in a single session, pushing the stock to its recent lows before the partial recovery began to take hold. The May 11 close of $384.44 leaves the stock about 4% above where it was a year ago — a modest gain that reflects recovery from a deep hole rather than a return to anything resembling its former heights.
CVS Health / Aetna
CVS Close (May 11): $92.23 YTD: +18.2% 1-year: +47.5% Dec 31: $78.03 | May 12, 2025: $62.52
CVS Health reported first-quarter net income of more than $2.9 billion as costs slowed for subscribers of its Aetna health plans. The company’s medical loss ratio fell to 84.6%, compared to 87.3% in the same period a year ago.
CVS attributed the decline primarily to better underlying performance in its government business and the absence of a premium deficiency reserve recorded in the prior year — a liability an insurer must set aside when anticipated claims are expected to exceed the premiums it has collected. Its absence is itself a sign of improved financial positioning.
Total revenue grew more than 6% to $100.4 billion. CVS raised its diluted earnings per share guidance and confirmed it is exiting the individual Affordable Care Act marketplace after this year. Total medical enrollment fell by roughly 600,000 members compared to year-end 2024, and more than one million year-over-year. This marked CVS’s fifth consecutive quarterly earnings beat.
CVS tells the clearest turnaround story in the group. Its stock is up 18% year to date and up nearly 48% from where it traded a year ago, when the company was in the depths of its earnings crisis and had just replaced its CEO. The trajectory is unambiguous — and so is the strategy behind it.
“Margins over membership”
That recovery was not an accident. It was a stated strategy. CVS CEO David Joyner has said repeatedly over the past year that the company is prioritizing “margins over membership” in its Medicare Advantage business. That means exactly what it says: CVS would rather have fewer, more profitable enrollees than a larger membership it cannot price to break even. On the commercial side, Joyner made the same calculus equally plain. “We do see elevated trends. We took a disciplined pricing approach to that in 2025, which has pressured membership, but we’re going to stay disciplined in our pricing approach,” he told investors last August.
“Pressured membership” is the corporate euphemism. What it describes is people being priced out of their plans, and what it means is that Aetna is once again purging customers it considers a drag on profit margins. (It has done that frequently over the past 25 years.)
The membership losses CVS reported this quarter — roughly 600,000 members gone, more than a million year-over-year — are the direct result of that strategy. Wall Street loved it.
Cigna
CI Close (May 11): $289.00 YTD: +5.6% 1-year: −6.5% Dec 31: $273.72 | May 12, 2025: $309.20
Cigna beat analysts on both earnings and revenue in the first quarter, posting $1.65 billion in profit. Its medical loss ratio came in at 79.8%, a favorable shift from the 82.2% posted a year earlier.
Cigna’s unusually low medical loss ratio reflects both aggressive cost management and a significant structural change. The MLR decline is partly attributable to the removal of its Medicare Advantage business, following Cigna’s sale of that book of business to Health Care Service Corporation. Medicare Advantage has been the primary driver of elevated medical costs across the industry. Cigna’s complete exit from MA made the numbers look cleaner.
Cigna also announced it will exit the individual ACA exchange market beginning in 2027. The company raised its full-year 2026 adjusted earnings guidance to at least $30.35 per share.
Evernorth, Cigna’s pharmacy benefit management and health services arm, generated $58.4 billion in revenue for the quarter, far more than the company’s health plan division. Like its peers, Cigna is increasingly a pharmacy and services company that also sells health insurance — not the other way around. (CVS now takes in more revenue from its PBM, Caremark, than from Aetna’s health plans and the company’s 9,000 retail stores.) Cigna’s stock has recovered to a 5.6% year-to-date gain but remains down about 6.5% from a year ago. A strong quarter has not answered the underlying question investors are asking: now that Cigna has exited Medicare Advantage and is exiting the ACA market, where does future growth come from?
Elevance
ELV Close (May 11): $381.84 YTD: +9.6% 1-year: −6.4% Dec 31: $348.40 | May 12, 2025: $407.98
Elevance Health (previously known as Anthem) reported $1.8 billion in first-quarter profit, down about 19% from the same period a year earlier, though the results exceeded Wall Street expectations. The company, which operates Blue Cross plans in 14 states, posted a medical loss ratio of 86.8% — slightly higher than a year ago, reflecting elevated costs in its Medicaid business, but better than analysts had feared.
Adjusted earnings per share came in at $12.58, above analysts’ consensus expectations. Elevance also raised its full-year 2026 adjusted earnings guidance.
One significant complication: Elevance’s results included a $935 million accrual tied to Medicare Advantage risk-adjustment data the company had previously submitted to federal regulators, where the ultimate liability remains uncertain. Risk-adjustment data — the system by which Medicare Advantage plans submit diagnosis codes to justify higher payments — has come under increasing regulatory scrutiny as a driver of what federal analysts estimate are tens of billions of dollars in annual overpayments to private insurers.
CEO Gail Boudreaux told investors that the company saw “moderately stronger retention” in its ACA segment and attributed better-than-expected results partly to a shift by remaining enrollees toward bronze-tier coverage — lower-premium, higher-deductible plans that tend to see lower utilization in the early months of the year. The stock is up nearly 10% year to date but remains about 6% below where it traded a year ago, with the risk-adjustment liability an unresolved overhang.
Humana
HUM Close (May 11): $274.24 YTD: +7.6% 1-year: +10.2% Dec 31: $254.84 | May 12, 2025: $248.93
Humana’s first-quarter results were the most complicated of the group — a beat on paper, but with enough asterisks to keep analysts cautious.
The company’s insurance segment MLR came in at 89.4%, edging out its own target of just under 90%, with medical and pharmacy cost trends running somewhat lower than anticipated. Revenue for the quarter reached $39.6 billion, up sharply from $32.1 billion a year earlier, driven largely by a 25% surge in Medicare Advantage enrollment.
But Humana did not raise its full-year guidance, unlike most of its peers. The company said it expects its second-quarter medical loss ratio to come in slightly above 91%, a deterioration from the first quarter — a signal that the cost pressures driving last year’s sector-wide crisis have not fully abated – and the expectation that Humana picked up many of the more costly MA enrollees that its competitors dropped.
Humana confirmed it expects to earn at least $9 per share for the full year and projects a full-year medical loss ratio of 92.75%, far higher than its rivals. Humana executives said the company’s primary objective is returning to a sustainable individual Medicare Advantage margin of at least 3% by 2028. Getting there will require continued benefit cuts, premium increases, and geographic retreats — all of which bear directly on the Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Humana’s plans. What that means is that Humana likely will purge many of its new MA enrollees in the same way it did in 2025 after it disappointed Wall Street the year before.
Humana’s stock recovered sharply after the Q1 report, closing Monday at $274.24 — up nearly 8% year to date and up about 10% from a year ago. But investors’ enthusiasm should be tempered by one number: Humana’s aggressive Medicare Advantage membership growth this quarter mirrors exactly what CVS did in 2024, just before badly missing its cost targets as expenses came in far higher than expected. If that pattern repeats, the recovery will be short-lived.
Centene
CNC Close (May 11): $56.35 YTD: +36.9% 1-year: −10.4% Dec 31: $41.15 | May 12, 2025: $62.87
Centene kicked off the year with better-than-expected revenue and adjusted earnings, signaling a recovery from a rough 2025. Its stock rose more than 13% the day after its earnings call — and at nearly 37% year to date, it is the strongest year-to-date performer in the sector so far in 2026.
The company posted total revenues of $49.9 billion, with its consolidated medical loss ratio falling slightly to 87.3%. Adjusted diluted earnings per share came in at $3.37, and Centene raised its full-year adjusted EPS guidance to above $3.40.
Centene is primarily a Medicaid and ACA marketplace insurer, and its recovery story is rooted in those markets. The company’s Medicaid medical loss ratio fell half a percentage point — driven by rate increases from states and continued cost management.
The ACA marketplace, however, remains a source of volatility. Centene’s ACA enrollment fell sharply as the expiration of enhanced premium tax credits pushed many lower-income consumers out of the market — a policy shift that, for Centene, paradoxically helped near-term financial results by reducing exposure to a segment that had been generating losses.
As with the rest of the sector, context matters. Centene ended 2025 at $41.15, deeply depressed from its year-ago price of $62.87. The stock has bounced hard off that bottom but remains down more than 10% from where it stood a year ago. The recovery is real but the hole it is recovering from is also real.
Molina
MOH Close (May 11): $185.17 YTD: +6.7% 1-year: −43.5% Dec 31: $173.54 | May 12, 2025: $327.69
Molina is the outlier in the sector’s recovery narrative — the one company whose headline numbers looked genuinely bad, even as management insisted the underlying story was better than it appeared.
Molina reported a 95% year-over-year drop in net income for the first quarter, falling to just $14 million from $298 million in the same period last year. The collapse was driven primarily by a one-time charge: a $93 million impairment of intangible assets tied to the company’s planned 2027 exit from the Medicare Advantage–Part D market.
Total revenue was $10.8 billion, with premium revenue down about 4% year over year. The consolidated medical loss ratio rose to 91.1%, up from 89.2% in the first quarter of 2025.
The company’s executives reaffirmed full-year guidance for about $42 billion in premium revenue and at least $5 in adjusted earnings per share, and CEO Joe Zubretsky called the quarter “solid under the circumstances.” Molina has described 2026 as a “trough year” for its Medicaid margins, with the expectation that new contracts and the exit from unprofitable Medicare lines will improve results in 2027.
The stock market has rendered a harsher verdict. Molina’s shares are down 43% from where they traded a year ago — by far the worst one-year performance in the sector. The 7% year-to-date gain is recovery from a floor, not a foundation. Investors who held the stock through 2025 have lost nearly half their money.
The Second Quarter Will Be the Real Test
From Wall Street’s perspective, the industry has stabilized. Whether the companies’ management teams have learned anything different is a question the second quarter will begin to answer.
Analysts have flagged Q2 as especially critical — particularly for Humana, whose aggressive Medicare Advantage membership growth while holding benefits stable mirrors a pattern CVS followed in 2024, before badly missing its medical loss ratio targets. If that pattern repeats, the stock gains of recent months will not hold.
More broadly, the mechanisms driving this quarter’s “recovery” — premium hikes, benefit cuts, member shedding, and structural exits from unprofitable markets — are not cost reductions. They are cost shifts. The medical spending did not go away. It was simply transferred: onto patients through higher out-of-pocket costs, onto states through Medicaid pressure, and onto the federal government through the ongoing overpayment dynamics in Medicare Advantage that regulators have not yet fully addressed.
Wall Street calls this a recovery but it is worth being precise about what has actually been recovered and what has simply been moved off the balance sheet and onto someone else’s.
Cigna’s earnings tell a story Wall Street loves but its retreat from the ACA Marketplace could accelerate a system already tipping toward collapse.
Cigna reported its first-quarter 2026 results last Thursday. Like most of the other big health insurance conglomerates that have reported so far, it did a better job of meeting Wall Street’s profit expectations in the first three months of the year than it did in all of 2025.
Total revenues rose 5% to $68.5 billion. Adjusted income from operations came in at $2.1 billion, or $7.79 per share — up 12% from a year ago, though missing analyst estimates by five cents. The company raised its full-year outlook for adjusted income from operations to at least $30.35 per share. David Cordani, in what he called a “somewhat bittersweet” moment as his final quarterly earnings call as CEO, described the results as reflecting “disciplined execution, deliberate portfolio shaping and a continued focus on targeted innovation.”
That jargon didn’t impress investors. Cigna’s stock price fell $3.19 on Thursday but was up 2.76% for the week, closing Friday at $282.90.
None of that is surprising. Cigna is a well-run company by the metrics Wall Street uses to measure well-run companies. What’s worth examining is what the numbers actually reveal about how the first quarter results were achieved and – equally if not more important – what Cigna announced alongside it.
Another big exit
The biggest news from Thursday’s release and call with analysts wasn’t about earnings. Cigna will stop offering plans on the Affordable Care Act marketplaces after the 2026 plan year. The exit will affect 369,000 members across 11 states, with coverage ending January 1, 2027.
Brian Evanko, who will succeed Cordani as CEO on July 1, framed the decision as a strategic choice to exit a market where Cigna is unlikely to achieve scale. “This is small business for us today, and it’s been shrinking in recent years,” he said.
He’s right about the numbers. What he didn’t say is why it’s shrinking — and what Cigna’s exit will do to the people left behind.
Cigna is by no means the first big insurer to announce an exit from the ACA Marketplace.Aetna pulled out at the end of 2025, forcing approximately 1 million members across 17 states to find new coverage for 2026. But even that headline understates the breadth of the retreat. At the end of 2025, when Congress chose not to renew some of the tax credits that had made ACA coverage affordable for millions of Americans, a wave of smaller insurers also left:Molina Healthcare announced significant changes to its service area; HAP CareSource exited Michigan; Chorus Community Health Plan withdrew; Mountain Health CO-OP left Wyoming; Primewell Health Services exited Arkansas and Mississippi; UM Health Plan and Michigan Care ended; and Celtic/WellCare left North Carolina. Blue Cross Blue Shield terminated PPO products in Arizona. And last month, Baylor Scott & White Health Plan announced it will no longer offer marketplace plans after the end of this year, affecting approximately 100,000 enrollees in Texas.
That means that before open enrollment for 2027 coverage even begins this fall, at least half a million people — Cigna’s 369,000 plus Baylor Scott & White’s 100,000, on top of the million who lost Aetna coverage last year — will either have to scramble to find comparable coverage (at a significantly higher price) or go uninsured.
And we may not yet know the full scope. Every spring and summer, health insurers file proposed premium rates with state regulators — filings that reveal what insurers are planning for the coming year. Those rate filings typically land in May and June. The Q2 earnings season follows in July and August. Each of those moments is an opportunity for another insurer to announce what Cigna announced Thursday. The exits we know about may be the beginning, not the end.
This is not a series of isolated corporate decisions. It is the beginning of a potential death spiral, and it is already in motion.
The mechanism is straightforward. ACA sign-ups for 2026 are already down by over 1 million people compared to the same period last year — the first decline since 2020. The main reason was the December 31, 2025 expiration of the enhanced premium tax credits that were enacted during the Biden administration. For subsidized enrollees who stayed in the same plan, average net premiums rose 114%. When premiums spike, the people who leave first are the healthy ones — younger, lower-utilization enrollees who do the math, decide the cost isn’t worth it and gamble that they’ll have another year of good health. The people who stay are the ones who have no choice: the chronically ill, the older, the people who know they will need care. The marketplace is already smaller and sicker, according to consultants and insurance executives, with more consumers choosing cheaper bronze plans that carry higher out-of-pocket costs.
A smaller, sicker pool means higher claims. Higher claims mean higher premiums. Higher premiums drive out even more healthy enrollees, which makes the pool sicker and more expensive still. And that is exactly what Evanko described when he noted that Cigna’s ACA enrollment had already dropped from 446,000 to 369,000 — a 17% decline in a single year.
The insurers aren’t abandoning a failed program. They are ensuring it fails — and then leaving before it does.
I wasn’t surprised to hear that Cigna is leaving the ACA Marketplace because it has never been a big player in the individual health insurance business. Around 90% of Cigna’s health plan enrollment is in its role as a third-party administrator (TPA) for large employers. The company also has sold all of its Medicare Advantage business.
What did surprise me was the company’s other big reveal: It has put its EviCore unit, which provides prior authorization and utilization management services to health plans (not just Cigna’s), up for sale. Evanko told analysts that the industry’s prior authorization standardization push (which I wrote about last Wednesday) could “open new doors for the EviCore business, which could potentially result in a partnership or a combination with complementary industry participants.”
EviCore is the prior authorization machinery — the infrastructure through which doctors’ requests for patient care get approved, delayed, or denied. Cigna is exploring selling it, or spinning it off, at precisely the moment that prior authorization is under the most intense public and regulatory scrutiny it has ever faced.
Think about what that means. Just days after the industry announced a voluntary reform campaign to standardize the prior authorization process, Cigna said it might sell the business unit that does the prior authorizing. That tells me that the company’s executives don’t think EviCore will be able to continue contributing to Cigna’s profits.
What the numbers say — and don’t
One of the most important numbers in any health insurer’s earnings report isn’t revenue. It’s the medical loss ratio — the percentage of premium dollars actually spent on patient care. The lower the MLR, the more the company keeps.
Cigna’s MLR for Q1 2026 was 79.8%, down from 82.2% a year ago. That 240-basis-point decline is the engine behind the strong earnings performance. For every dollar Cigna collected in premiums this quarter, it paid out roughly two cents less in medical claims than it did a year ago.
The company attributes the decline primarily to the 2025 sale of its Medicare Advantage business to Health Care Services Corporation — older, costlier populations leaving the risk pool.
What no analyst asked: Is the MLR decline connected to Cigna’s prior authorization practices? The company’s own Transparency Report, published in March, claims a 15% reduction in prior authorization volume. Did tighter scrutiny on the remaining high-cost requests contribute to lower medical costs and therefore a better MLR? We don’t know because Wall Street analysts chose not to ask.
Another thing analysts didn’t explore was litigation against its PBM, Express Scripts. Evernorth — the division that encompasses Express Scripts and that now accounts for 85% of Cigna’s revenue — generated $58.4 billion in adjusted revenues, driven by specialty drug volume and biosimilar adoption. What the earnings release doesn’t mention is that Express Scripts is currently the subject of federal RICO litigation alleging the company created a Swiss entity called Ascent Health Services to divert drug rebates away from plan sponsors and patients.
On Thursday’s call, analysts asked about Evernorth’s growth trajectory, capital deployment, the EviCore strategic review, and the CEO transition. No one asked what happens to the 369,000 people who will lose their Cigna coverage on January 1. No one asked whether the cascade of ACA exits constitutes a market failure requiring a policy response. No one asked what the prior authorization denial rate was for the quarter, or how many denials were later overturned on appeal.
Those questions have answers, but Wall Street analysts don’t ask because they assume most investors have little interest in such matters. And they are right.
New data shows middle-class Americans cutting essentials, dropping coverage, and delaying care — just as Pope Leo XIV calls health care a “moral imperative.”
Pope Leo XIV (who became pope a year ago this week) isn’t just the first American pontiff—he’s also, as a Chicago native and Villanova University alum, the first leader of the Roman Catholic Church to have experienced the U.S. health care system firsthand. So it shouldn’t come as a surprise that this world spiritual leader born as Robert Prevost would use his lofty new platform to call for radical change.
“Health cannot be a luxury for the few,”Leo told a recent conference on health care inequality in Europe organized by both Catholic bishops and the World Health Organization, adding that good health care is essential for social peace.
“Universal health coverage is not merely a technical goal to be achieved; it is primarily a moral imperative for societies that wish to call themselves just,” the pope said. “health care must be accessible to the most vulnerable, then, not only because their dignity requires it but also to prevent injustice from becoming a cause of conflict.”
In less than a year on the job, the new pontiff has shown a lot of political savvy, and a knack for good timing. Leo’s endorsement of health care as a human right coincided with a couple of new, important U.S. surveys showing that both rising insurance premiums and high out-of-pocket medical bills have become the major driver of an affordability crisis that is hitting middle-class families hard.
To back this up, the leading health care non-profit KFF conducted a followup survey with more than 800 Americans who last year had been enrolled in Affordable Care Act (ACA) insurance in 2025. It found broadly that most have been struggling to pay medical bills since Congress failed late last to extend the federal subsidies that had made ACA coverage affordable for many in recent years.
In the third episode of the HEALTH CARE un-covered Show, we take a deep dive into prior authorization’s toll — from doctors to federal policy — featuring Dr. Wendy Dean, Dr. Seth Glickman and Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-WA) on CMS’s new AI-driven WISeR model.
Most of the respondents (80%) said they were paying more now for health care than in 2025, with just over half (51%) reporting they are now spending “a lot more.” For middle-class Americans, the critical need to stay healthy has meant cutting their budget for other essentials. KFF found that a majority (55%) were reducing spending on food or other household basics, but that jumped to 62% for people getting treatment for chronic disease.
Faced with drastically higher monthly premiums, KFF found, has forced these families to make difficult, consequential choices. Some 28% switched into a different ACA plan in an effort to hold down their monthly premiums – which means much higher deductibles and thus the risk of large out-of-pocket medical expenses. Even worse, some 9% told the KFF survey that they have dropped health insurance altogether, which means they are one accident or major illness away from a financial disaster.
A 34-year-old Texan who dropped his Obamacare coverage told the KFF pollsters that the sole reason was the cost. “The prices are simply too high,” he said. “$800 a month for the absolute cheapest plan for two people. Our income is $120k, so we don’t qualify for subsidies in Texas. I don’t think we could afford our mortgage if I had to pay for health insurance.”
Another respondent reported that his “Income exceeded the subsidy limit, forcing us to pay the full cost, so we switched down to a bronze from a gold plan. Even doing that our premiums are 3 times what they were in 2025, with lower plan features and a higher deductible.”
About 22% of the KFF respondents said they are still insured, but not through the ACA Marketplace. In some cases that is because they were able to switch to an employers’ health plan or because they were now eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. But others, KFF noted, switched into different types of high-deductible plans or a cost-sharing group – solutions that often lead to considerable out-of-pocket expenses.
One 56-year-old Texas man surveyed by KFF said that as a reaction to the higher insurance premiums he would “attempt to use health care as little as possible” – with the hope that by carefully consulting with his doctors and pharmacists he would avoid paying any out-of-pocket expenses that aren’t absolutely necessary.
To understand how private equity, or PE, may be reshaping the way physicians experience the practice of medicine and their relationships with hospitals, insurers, and patients, we interviewed six doctors who have worked for PE-backed practices and four advisers who guide physicians through the partnership process.
We wanted to know if an infusion of capital from private investors with plans for expanding or restructuring a practice makes it easier for physicians in private practice to maintain a sense of independence and even lessens burnout. Or instead, if these transactions convert once-independent doctors into employees with less agency than before.
The physicians we interviewed included two urologists who ran one of the largest PE-backed specialty practices in the United States before it sold to Cardinal Health; two orthopedic surgeons and one obstetrician/gynecologist (ob/gyn) whose practices were acquired; and an anesthesiologist who saw his own practice disrupted when two PE-backed staffing companies shook up the local market. All but one agreed to speak on the record about their experiences. The other asked to remain anonymous because his comments focused largely on former colleagues.
When Investors View Doctors as Partners, Satisfaction with Private Equity Deals Is Higher
For physicians, the value of private equity investment is very much in the eye of the beholder, and it’s largely contingent on whether physicians are treated by the investors as employees or as business partners. The PE deals that go awry — sometimes publicly, due to litigation or physician departures — often involve ventures where PE firms extract profit by changing productivity standards, staffing models, and hours of operations. When profits are achieved by expanding a practice’s services or its geographic reach, there’s more opportunity, if not incentive, for partnership.
Specialties in which changes in technology or treatment protocols are redefining the role of physicians can create growth opportunities for PE firms and the practices themselves. Urology provides an instructive example. Over the past three decades, as treatment modalities for prostate cancer have evolved, urologists have assumed a more sizeable role in cancer care. While it can be lucrative to provide radiation therapy, immunotherapy, and oral oncolytics or infusions in outpatient settings, or establish ancillary businesses such as pharmacies, these require upfront capital and management expertise. Practices with 10 or fewer urologists, once the norm in the U.S., may lack the resources to take advantage of these opportunities. They also may struggle to compete with nearby health systems that command higher payments from insurers and larger discounts from suppliers.
Add in the difficulty of recruiting younger urologists to replace retiring doctors and administrative burdens such as managing payer contracting and cybersecurity threats and PE begins to look more like a savior than a threat. Indeed, while nearly half of urologists were employed by hospitals or other institutions as of 2019, PE acquisitions of urology practices have become a dominant form of practice consolidation in recent years.
Upfront Payment Leads to Practice Changes and a Big Payday
Solaris Health, at one point the largest of at least six PE-backed urology practices in the United States, scaled quickly — from 130 physicians when it was launched in 2020 to almost 800 in August 2025. It did so by pitching itself as a national practice controlled by physicians but backed by Lee Equity, a firm with investments in many specialties. Those who signed on received stock and a lump-sum payment that, in keeping with the conventions of PE transactions, was a multiple of a practice’s future income that physicians were willing to forgo. Although the cash is an advance on future earnings, the payment is often taxed at a capital gains rate, enabling physicians to reduce their tax burden and begin investing.
“I always tell doctors if you’re tempted to buy a boat with the money, don’t. Take the cash and invest it,” says Gary Kirsh, MD, cofounder of Solaris Health. He served as the company’s CEO until Cardinal Health, a pharmaceutical and medical products supplier, paid $1.9 billion for the business in 2025.
In the lead-up to such sales, PE firms recoup their investment through what’s known as “the scrape” — taking a percentage of practice profits, typically between 20 percent and 30 percent. While this makes a sizeable dent in physicians’ take-home pay, many PE firms promise to restore income to previous levels by increasing practice revenues or reducing expenses. Known as “income repair,” it’s a process that can take a few years to play out.
Raj Patel, MD, a urologist from Homewood, Ill., who joined Solaris Health in 2021 and served on its corporate board, was initially skeptical of promises of revenue growth because he was already so entrepreneurial. He also valued his independence. “I would tell my partners, our group doesn’t need private equity,” Patel says.
Over time, however, Patel began to see that joining a large PE-backed practice, with more than 120 urologists in the Chicago area alone, might be a way to enhance access for patients and professional satisfaction for doctors. Instead of everyone performing the same procedures and sending advanced cases to large health systems, they could begin to subspecialize and refer patients to one another.
While the MSO took a share of profits, it also assumed an equal share of an individual practice’s expenses, including the cost of hiring advanced practice providers to handle low-acuity cases and manage calls from staff in local emergency departments — a pain point for Patel’s practice, as this support was expected by hospitals but not reimbursed. Solaris also hired navigators to support patients as they explored different options for treatment. And it had the financial resources to invest in a laboratory for genetic testing, a pharmacy, and the data analytics to determine why some practices had better clinical outcomes or financial performance than others. Although clinicians are expected to follow clinical pathways, Patel says those are determined by clinicians that advise the MSO. “Physicians really need to lead that,” he says.
After he joined, Patel was also able to begin enrolling his patients in clinical trials, another income stream. As revenues increased, Patel achieved income repair in just one year. While some might worry this may lead to higher health care costs, Kirsh believes the opposite is true — that consolidation of physician practices enables clinicians to steer patients to outpatient settings, which, he says, can be significantly cheaper than hospital-based care due to lower fixed costs and the avoidance of facility fees.
Our business model is not to acquire scale and hold insurance companies hostage on rates. We’re creating a national network that shares best practices, professional management, and ancillary services, and doing it in a way that streamlines care for patients.
Gary Kirsh, MDcofounder, Solaris Health
Cardinal Health says it hasn’t made changes to Solaris’s operations or pricing since the acquisition; whether that holds true remains to be seen. Its management services organization, The Specialty Alliance, formed in 2025, now has a stake in the practices of roughly 3,000 providers specializing in gastroenterology and urology. The company also has acquired practices affiliated with Integrated Oncology Network, which has 50-plus community-based oncology centers and more than 100 providers. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.) has raised concerns that the company is buying physician practices as a means of locking customers and physicians into restrictive contracts for drugs and other supplies, reducing competition among wholesalers, and driving up costs. She’s also concerned that practice acquisitions will reduce competition between hospitals and nonhospital providers and has called on the Federal Trade Commission to scrutinize pending sales.
Soon after the deal was announced, Kirsh retired as CEO, handing the reins to James Weber, MD, a gastroenterologist from Southlake, Texas, who became CEO of Specialty Care Alliance after Cardinal acquired a majority stake in GI Alliance in November 2024 for $2.8 billion. Weber says Cardinal’s investment enabled his group to get off the private equity “merry-go-round” and begin partnering with urologists and other specialists who aren’t solely dependent on hospitals for delivering care. Instead of buying a stake in the MSO only to sell it again, as a private equity investor might, Cardinal sees value in building a long-term relationship with physicians as this diversifies its customer base and opens up the possibility of selling higher-margin products and services, Weber says. Rather than forcing such supplies and services upon doctors, Cardinal competes with other vendors in an open-bidding process and profits when the MSO gets the best deal it can — even if it’s from a competitor, he says.
Where Growth Is Harder to Achieve, Tensions Are Magnified
Partnering with private equity firms may have less upside for specialists who have reduced practice expenses to the bare minimum; have maximized their income from ancillary services like imaging, physical therapy, and durable medical equipment; or are working at full tilt. In these instances, income repair may be impossible, especially if the firm tacks on new charges or takes away benefits.
Two orthopedic surgeons we spoke with, one in Pennsylvania and the other in Florida, said partnering with PE had cost them financially. Both had worked in what they described as well-respected practices that faced competition from large academic medical centers intent on expanding, in one case by buying up primary care practices that influenced local referrals patterns. As nonprofits, the systems had several advantages: a lower tax rate and access to the federal 340B Drug Pricing Program, which allows safety-net providers to purchase drugs at a discount and receive reimbursement from insurers at market rates.
Adrienne Towsen, MD, an orthopedic surgeon from West Chester, Pa., says that after her 75-physician practice was sold in 2022 to a management company backed by PE, promised changes to back-office functions never materialized, and the accounting grew more opaque. Then came cuts. Doctors were told they needed to start paying for their own cellphone plans, as well as life and disability insurance. Management fees also increased, and the ancillary income physicians once earned from physical therapy and MRIs — worth as much $100,000 a year to each doctor — was carved out of their compensation.
While she had received an upfront payment, she found it didn’t make up for the cuts in her take-home pay. Towsen says part of the problem was that the revenue target she and her colleagues needed to hit to bring fees down was set at an all-time high, the year of the sale.
Towsen says she started to feel like she was caught in a bad relationship. Problematic behavior was followed by unfulfilled promises from management to do better. She wanted to exit, but the contract required her to pay back the lump sum if she left before three years. Leaving also would trigger a noncompete clause, severing relationships with patients she’d built over two decades. She resigned the first day she could, giving up her shares in the company.
Equally painful was the disruption in her relationships with patients. “I had very frank discussions with patients and told them exactly why I was leaving. They were upset,” she says. Many reported experiencing similar problems with other specialists.
I kept hearing, ‘I’m losing all my good doctors.’ It makes you feel so guilty.
Adrienne Towsen, MDorthopedic surgeon
When the Math Doesn’t Add Up
R. James Toussaint, MD, an orthopedic surgeon in Florida who worked in investment banking before going to medical school, chose to join The Orthopaedic Institute in Gainesville because it had a reputation for high-quality care and was large enough for him to subspecialize in foot and ankle surgery. When PE firms came calling in 2017, he had a hard time persuading his partners that it would be the PE firm that benefited, not them. “I had structured deals like this myself and knew what the benefits and drawbacks were. I also knew once you sell your house, it’s nearly impossible to buy it back,” he says.
Once the sale went through, he says the firm added new layers of management overhead, including executives tasked with business development and marketing. “These aren’t positions generating revenue the way surgeons do. They’re essentially cost centers,” Toussaint says.
Since he had already maximized the hours he worked, as well as opportunities to earn income from ancillary services like MRIs, physical therapy, and durable medical equipment, there wasn’t a way to offset these expenses and other management fees by working longer hours. “There’s no eighth day in the week to work,” he says.
He says the lump-sum payment he’d received wasn’t sufficient to cover the loss of income. After a couple of years, he decided to resign and negotiated a settlement to release him from the noncompete clause. He then joined the academic medical center that was once viewed as a competitor, a move he wishes he made sooner. “Looking back, the whole transaction just made no sense. I should have just left immediately because there literally was no upside.”
Toussaint says in some cases patients are left in the dark when physicians leave. “It’s embarrassing for the group,” he says. “So they just say they left or they retired and the patients are left trying to figure out where their doctor is. It’s unfortunate.”
We reached out to the private equity–backed ventures that help run the two orthopedic surgery practices for comment. Both offered to connect us to physicians with a different perspective.
John Stevenson, MD, a neurosurgeon who’s been at The Orthopaedic Institute for three decades, agreed the early days of partnering with a private equity–backed firm had its ups and downs, in part because they were the first orthopedic practice to do so and it took time to develop and execute a growth strategy. But over the long run, he says he’s come out ahead because he’s been able to see more patients with the help of midlevel clinicians and gained access to better insurance contracts, lower-cost supplies, and other resources that help patients, including staff with pain management expertise.
Jason Sansone, MD, an orthopedic surgeon in Madison, Wis., found it helpful to partner with the private equity–backed venture Towsen did — Healthcare Outcomes Performance Company (HOPCo). He’d been employed by a multistate health system but found its bureaucracy and the inability to innovate stifling. “We wanted more autonomy and offered to assume financial risk in exchange for it,” he says, but the health system insisted on an employment model.
In 2023, he and 10 other doctors struck out on their own, betting they could negotiate contracts with payers that would reward them based on the value of services they provided rather than the volume. “Sometimes that means more conservative treatments and other times, it’s just doing surgery instead of requiring patients to go through physical therapy and steroid injections that you know aren’t going to help,” he says. Having fought for their independence, he and his partners were reluctant to give up equity in their practice, so they hired HOPCo to provide management services and built an ambulatory surgery center as a joint venture. Sansone says he’d only consider giving up equity in the practice itself to fund an expansion. “We view private equity as a source of capital for growth rather than a means of generating liquidity,” he says.
From Boutique to Big Box Store
The ob/gyn we spoke with, now working in North Carolina, joined a large obstetrics practice just three months before its partners voted to sell it to a PE-backed venture. As a new hire, Dr. M (who asked for anonymity because his comments focused largely on former colleagues) wasn’t eligible for the lump-sum payment, but he figured that banding together with other doctors in his state would improve payer contracts and make it easier to participate in value-based contracts.
Dr. M didn’t anticipate how hard it would be to lose the ability to make business decisions — like choosing a vendor or launching an infusion clinic so pregnant patients experiencing nausea didn’t seek emergency care. Merging practices brings standardization that tends to lift low performers but restricts the flexibility of high performers, he says. “It’s like going from being a boutique specialty store to being bought out by Walmart. We were doing everything in-house and doing things well. It cheapened our brand.”
Dr. M also didn’t like having salaries capped. He figured his fellow physicians were leaving as much as $200,000 on the table each year despite seeing as many as 35 patients per day.
I think there are people who are happy just going to work and getting a paycheck, but if you are in medicine to take care of patients and be in business, private equity ownership is a frustrating thing.
Dr. MOb/gyn
After three years, Dr. M left to become a “locum tenens” provider, a temporary worker paid at a premium by a hospital to fill a critical workforce gap. While there is a baseline level of job insecurity inherent in being a locum provider, they usually command high hourly rates for short-term work, giving providers flexibility but potentially disrupting relationships between patients and providers. “Locums is inherently bad for obstetrics,” he says, and some doctors may avoid it because they can’t foster long-term relationships with patients, but he believes younger patients view doctors more interchangeably and prioritize having timely access to any doctor rather than a specific one. “They’re not necessarily as sentimental as their parents were,” he says.
Dr. M thinks locums jobs may be increasingly attractive to physicians with young families who want substantial time off and to new residency graduates who don’t want to work as employees in large provider groups but have trouble identifying smaller independent practices. As for his old colleagues, he says, “I’m not mad at them that they joined with private equity. I am more frustrated by the fact that they felt like they had to.”
Trying to Sidestep Private Equity
Not all medical specialties draw interest or upfront cash from private equity firms. Since the No Surprises Act went into effect in 2021, preventing hospitals from charging out-of-network rates for the services of emergency physicians, anesthesiologists, and other emergency care providers who opt out of insurance networks, PE firms have had less incentive to invest in their practices.
Marco Fernandez, MD, an anesthesiologist and former president of Midwest Anesthesia Partners, the largest group of independent anesthesiologists in Illinois, turned down such offers when they came in because he doesn’t like how PE-backed anesthesia groups tend to assign cases to certified nurse anesthetists and make physicians their supervisors. “We wanted to do our own cases and take care of our own patients,” he says. “If we’d sold or joined a staffing company, we’d be managing as many as 10 surgeries at once. It would make us glorified rescuers, running in for emergencies and filling out paperwork,” he says. “It’s a different level of stress.”
Retaining hospital contracts for the then-300-physician group became much harder when PE-backed staffing companies using such models stepped into the market, offering a less expensive service. “Within a two-week span, we lost two contracts,” Fernandez says. Some physicians in the group opted to join PE-backed ventures or become hospital employees. The remaining 100, who wanted to retain their model, now primarily serve ambulatory surgery centers or work in three hospitals as locum providers. Similar disruptions are playing out in other markets, leading to delays in surgeries.
Fernandez worries that not having the same anesthesia staff in facilities will impede communication and quality improvement, but he hasn’t found hospitals willing to subsidize a physician-centric approach. In 2022, he joined three other anesthesia groups in forming the Association for Independent Medicine, an advocacy organization that’s been calling for greater regulatory oversight of PE ventures and protections of clinicians’ decision-making. Another organization, the Coalition for Patient-Centered Care, is pursuing a similar mission, in part by asking state and federal lawmakers to apply antikickback and fraud and abuse laws to PE acquisitions of physician practices.
Partnership Is Crucial
The experiences of these physicians, while purely anecdotal, suggest private equity investment can be advantageous if the partnership is structured in a way that aligns physician and investor interests. “A lot of the bad case studies you see involve private equity firms turning physicians into employees whose income is tied to what they generate, mirroring what health systems do,” says Robert Aprill, a partner with Physician Growth Partners, an investment banking and advisory firm that represents physicians in transactions with PE firms. There’s higher satisfaction when investors tie compensation to practice profitability and add value by helping clinicians gain access to data and discounts on supplies, he says. “Private equity can become a vehicle to create super groups across state lines.”
Physicians have to be flexible, Patel says. “Whenever you sell to private equity, it’s not a lifetime achievement award where you walk away with a check. It’s a growth model. That’s where I see private equity deals fail. Both sides aren’t willing to grow together.”
If a partnership goes awry, there can be severe consequences for physicians. Toussaint says that half of the partners at his former practice were gone at the time he spoke with us, and that there was a “mind-boggling” amount of litigation happening. While MSOs typically pick up the cost of a defense, such expenses cut into the profitability, and thus the resale value, of the business. Towsen has also seen instances in which doctors departing from PE-backed ventures had to hire lawyers and forensic accountants to protect their interests.
Keep the Exit Pathway Clear and Well Lit
Too often physicians get distracted by the lump sum that private equity firms offer and sign away rights via letters of intent before showing them to a lawyer, says Randal Schultz, JD, CPA, a health care lawyer with Lathrop GPM in Kansas City. He encourages his clients to capture what matters most to them in contracts, including the hours and years they are expected to work, the terms of compensation that can and cannot be altered, and, perhaps most important, the circumstances under which they can exit without being subject to a noncompete clause or a clawback of the initial payment. “If you get terminated without cause, or they breach the contract, you should be able to walk away without any restrictions,” he says.
PE firms often understand and will try to exploit physicians’ risk aversion, Toussaint says. They know that clinicians with children and tuition bills in their future may be hesitant to start practicing in a new area. In addition to uprooting a family, they’d be subjecting themselves to additional background checks and licensing paperwork. “It’s really time-consuming and draining,” he says.
Ericka Adler, JD, LLM, who leads the health law practice at Roetzel and Andress in Chicago, encourages physicians to think about how they will continue to practice if things go south. “I’ve seen doctors who were terminated from their practices after selling it be subject to a noncompete clause,” she says. Adler also sees a lot of young doctors who are very opposed to working with a PE firm. They want an exit pathway written into their contracts if the practice they join decides to sell to one, so they can move on to a practice that isn’t PE-owned or PE-managed.
Invest in Yourself
Toussaint hopes physicians will consider a third way: capitalizing themselves. “If you have a good management team for your practice, tell them to borrow money to pay partners who want to retire. Then use some of that money to stay true to your growth strategy,” he says.
Now in academia, Toussaint warns the residents he trains to preserve their freedom at all costs. “I tell them your entire life as a doctor has been trying to get in — to the best high school, the best college, and the best medical school. Now your goal when you are negotiating these contracts is to figure out how the hell to get out.”
The diagnosis is simple: “Our health-care system broke in 2020,” says Dr Tom Dolphin, an anaesthetist in London and boss of the British Medical Association. “We like to pretend it didn’t, but it really did.” In the early months of 2020, hospitals paused normal activity to free up beds as they braced for a wave of covid-19 patients. The strategy helped in a moment of crisis. But, several years on, it is becoming clear that those measures did lasting damage to health-care systems. Understanding why is less straightforward.
From admission to discharge, hospital care is now harder to access, takes longer and is of worse quality. The resulting toll includes avoidable deaths. Almost everyone is affected: across 18 rich democracies, satisfaction with health-care quality fell sharply after the pandemic and remains well below the pre-pandemic norm (see chart). Few data sets track hospital performance across countries, so The Economist collected data on health-care systems from all over the world to identify where things are going awry.
Chart: The Economist
The ordeal begins outside the emergency room, or the accident-and-emergency department (A&E).Waiting times have become longer in America, Europe and elsewhere. Hospital entry halls are more crowded and their staff more overstretched than they were before the pandemic, says Dr Alex Janke, an emergency physician at the University of Michigan.
In some parts of Australia almost half of patients arriving by ambulance wait more than 30 minutes outside A&E before space can be found for them. About a quarter of patients experience such delays in Britain, double the level in 2019. In Canada a record number of sick and injured simply give up and leave emergency rooms before they are seen by staff.
Once in A&E, care is slow. More than a quarter of patients in England spend over four hours there, roughly twice the level in 2019. In Massachusetts, a state with good data, more than two in five endure such waits. In Australia, nearly half of patients do so. There has also been a steep rise in “trolley waits”, the time between a doctor’s decision to admit a patient from A&E to the hospital and when a patient gets a bed. Last year nearly one in ten emergency admissions in England, or some 550,000 people, had waited more than 12 hours on a trolley—a 67-fold increase since 2019.
The real trolley problem
The Royal College of Emergency Medicine estimates that trolley waits contributed to almost 5,000 avoidable deaths in Britain’s hospitals last summer (health authorities have disputed such figures in the past).
Millions are stuck on waiting lists. Waits for hip replacements, to take one example, were above pre-pandemic levels in 2024 in nine out of 11 OECD countries, for which data exist. Canada is perhaps the worst hit. The median waiting time for specialist treatment was 29 weeks in 2025, more than a third higher than the 2019 baseline, according to the Fraser Institute, a think-tank in Vancouver. That is the second-worst result since the survey began in 1993; the record of 30 weeks was set in 2024. France’s main hospital union says access to health care in the country is undergoing an “unprecedented deterioration”.
In many countries the challenges of hospitals are viewed as the product of domestic policy choices. Britain’s government, like Giorgia Meloni’s in Italy, was elected in part on a promise to reduce waiting lists; Australian voters have punished politicians for ambulances delayed outside A&E; and in France, where staffing shortages have forced the closure of some clinics, there is talk of déserts médicaux.
But the long-term effects of the pandemic on hospitals are consistent across countries. A paper published in January by Luigi Siciliani of the University of York and his co-authors finds no relationship between a health-care system’s characteristics, be it public or private, and the effect of covid on its function. How much funding a system had, its bed capacity and how many physicians it employed, had little to no relation with big jumps in waiting lists for elective surgeries between 2020 and 2023, which occurred across the board.
Hospitals are jammed up despite being well-resourced. Funding for health care is the highest it has ever been, outside covid. After stabilising in the 2010s, spending in the OECD rose to nearly 10% of GDP following the pandemic. Median spending per person in Europe has risen 13% in constant prices since 2019. There are also more helping hands. Hospitals added nearly 140,000 jobs in America last year, more than the entire rest of the economy. Hiring by England’s National Health Service has increased sharply: its headcount has grown by 25% since 2019 to employ some 1.4m people—or 2% of the population.
All this presents a productivity puzzle. Some hospitals seem to be faring worse with more resources. In Australia, where the hospital workforce grew by almost 20% from 2019-24, elective surgeries are basically flat—the only difference is that the sick are waiting longer to be seen. Though there has been a gradual recovery, “On any measure you want to use in England, productivity is below where it was pre-pandemic,” says Max Warner of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, a think-tank in London.
Hospital productivity is hard to measure, but a good rule of thumb for spotting any decline in productivity is when spending grows faster than output, or revenue. Even in Germany, where the public system is considered to be in good shape, three out of four hospitals lost money in 2024, up from a third in 2019, according to a recent report by Roland Berger, a consultancy. In America operating costs for hospitals increased by 7.5% in 2025, about twice as fast as prices, says Aaron Wesolowski of the American Hospital Association, an industry body. Accordingly operating-profit margins have stagnated since 2019, even as profits in the rest of America’s economy recovered and grew.
Experts differ on the reasons why hospitals, as big, complex systems, have never fully recovered. One explanation lies in the hospital workforce. About half of the growth last year in the operating expenses of American hospitals came from inputs such as labour costs, which grew by 5.6% in nominal terms. Pandemic-era stresses increased churn as doctors and nurses resigned, or retired early. Those who stayed have reduced their “discretionary effort”, voluntary overtime work that helped frail health-care systems surge in peak periods. Burnout remains high, says Dr Margot Burnell of the Canadian Medical Association.
Is there a manager in the house?
Both factors have created an acute need for staff, and spurred a big hiring drive. The knock-on effect is that health-care workers today are less experienced and perhaps less productive. In Britain the share of nurses with less than one year of experience has doubled since 2015, a trend explained also by efforts to improve nurse-to-patient ratios. Moreover, though doctors and nurses have been added quickly, in some countries hiring for other jobs vital to productivity, such as theatre assistants and hospital managers, has not kept pace.
The other half of rapidly rising costs comes from having more, and sicker, patients. Four factors apply across rich countries: longer waits have left patients sicker, sicker patients take longer to treat, longer treatments clog capacity, reduced capacity creates longer waits. It is a doom loop.
First, in many places the queue has never been longer. Across the OECD, a group of mostly rich countries, elective-surgery activity dipped in 2020 by 19%. This has left hospitals with a long to-do list on top of their ordinary flow of new patients. More than 3m missed hospital stays accumulated in France between 2019 and 2024, according to estimates by the country’s health-care unions. In January nearly 40% of those waiting for treatment in Britain—or 2.8m people—had been languishing for more than 18 weeks. That was up from 570,000 in the same month of 2019. Mr Siciliani says that in order to cut those lists, hospitals need not only to return to their pre-pandemic productivity, but also to “support a big surge in activity”.
That task is made harder by a second big change: patients are sicker now. Long waits for treatment have made patients’ conditions more complex. Some diseases, such as cancers, stayed undiagnosed for longer because people avoided hospitals and clinics during the pandemic. (In America this effect was compounded by a rising avoidance of treatment due to expense.) In addition, populations are older than they were a few years ago. All this has seen chronic conditions, such as heart disease, cancer and liver disease rise as a share of hospital workloads. Death rates, not adjusted for age, are higher than before the pandemic. “Patients are staying longer and cost more to treat,” says Dr Richard Leuchter, an acute-medicine specialist at the University of California, Los Angeles.
Patients who stay longer take up precious bed capacity. Bed occupancy is further inflated by poorly performing general-practitioner services and chock-full care homes for the elderly, both of which funnel a growing number of sick and infirm into hospitals. Research by Dr Leuchter shows that prior to the pandemic about 64% of American hospital beds were occupied at any given time; during the pandemic that figure shot up to and remained at 75%. In some states, the average is as high as 88% (85% is considered “safe”).
American hospitals look positively capacious next to public systems, which run much leaner. In Ireland more than 94% of beds were occupied in 2019; that went up to 96% in 2025. In Britain beds are often 90% occupied and delays in discharging patients have grown. That worsens the initial problem, delays at the A&E door.
Hospitals are trying to break free from the cycle. Many are demanding more money and staff. A few are trying novel approaches to make room for the sickest patients. Some American hospitals, such as Dr Leuchter’s, are trying “avoidance” strategies that refer stable A&E patients to clinics without overnight beds. Many countries are trying types of “community care” in which treatment occurs outside hospitals, sometimes in patients’ homes. In ageing societies, it was inevitable that hospital care would change: there would be relatively fewer nails in thumbs, and relatively more chronically ill. The pandemic simply made people sicker, sooner.
In 1970 before there was ESPN Sports Center, there was ABC’s “Wide World of Sports” and its iconic montage opening featuring a disastrous ski jump attempt by Yugoslavia’s Vinko Bogataj and Jim Kay’s voice-over “the thrill of victory and agony of defeat.” It’s an apt framework for consideration of current affairs in the U.S. today and an appropriate juxtaposition for consideration the winners and losers in the White House Office of Management and Budget FY2027 released Friday.
Last week’s “Thrill of Victory” includes the recovery of Dude 14, the F-15E Strike Eagle pilot shot down over Iran Friday, the college basketball men’s and women’s’ Final 4 contests, the successful launch of Artemis II by NASA and, for some, the additional funding ($441 billion/+44% vs. FY 2026) for the Department of War in the President’s proposed budget.
And last week’s “Agony of Defeat” includes continued anxiety about the economy, especially fuel prices, growing concern the war in Iran begun February 28 might extend at a heavy cost in lives and money, and for health industry supporters, a $15 billion (-12% vs. FY 2026) cut to HHS and the 10-year, $911 billion Medicaid reduction in federal funding for Medicaid enacted in 2025 (HR1 The Big Beautiful Bill).
In its current form, this budget is unlikely to be enacted October 1, 2026: it’s best viewed as a signal from the White House about priorities it deems most important to the MAGA faithful in Congress, 28 state legislatures and 26 Governors’ offices controlled by Republicans. Though its explosive growth in of War Department funding to $1.5 trillion is eye-popping, cuts to healthcare are equally notable. Both are calculated bets as the mid-term election draws near (6 months) and clearly OMB is betting healthcare cuts will be acceptable to its base. Its view is based on three assumptions:
1- Healthcare cost cutting is necessary to fund other priorities important to its base. And there’s plenty of room for cuts in Medicaid, prescription drugs and hospitals because waste, fraud and abuse are rampant in all.
Medicaid: Medicaid is a state-controlled insurance program that covers 76 million U.S. women, children and low-income seniors primarily through private managed care plans that contract with states. In HR1, a mandatory work requirement was applied to able-bodied adult enrollees with the expectation enrollment will drop and state spending for Medicaid services will be less. But its enrollees are less inclined to vote than seniors in Medicare and its funding burden can be shifted to states.
Prescription Drugs: The White House asserts its “favored nation” pricing program will bring down drug costs but the combination of voluntary participation by drug companies and impenetrable patent protections in U.S. law neutralize hoped-for cost reductions. The administration wants to lower drug spending using its blunt instruments it already has: accelerated approvals, price transparency, pharmacy benefits manager restrictions et al. while encouraging states to go further through price controls, restrictive formularies and, in some, importation. In tandem, the administration sees CMMI modifications of alternative payment models (i.e. LEAD) as a means of introducing medication management and patient adherence in new chronic care pilots. Recognizing prescription drug prices are a concern to its base and all voters, the administration will use its arsenal of regulatory and political tools to amp-up support for increased state and federal pricing constraints without imposing price controls—a red line for conservatives.
Hospitals: Hospital consolidation is associated with higher prices and increased spending with offsetting community benefits debatable. Hospitals represent 43% of total U.S. health spending (31% inpatient and outpatient services, 12% employed physician services). In 4 of 5 U.S. markets, 2 hospital systems control hospital services. And hospital cost increases have kept pace with others in healthcare (+8.9% in 2024 vs. +8.1% for physician services and 7.9% for prescription drugs) but other household costs, wage increases and inflation. Lobbyists for hospitals have historically favored hospital-friendly legislation like the Affordable Care Act preferred by Democrats. The Trump administration sees site neutral payments, 340B reductions, expanded price transparency, limits on NFP system tax exemptions et al. and Medicaid cuts necessary curtailment of wasteful spending by hospitals. They believe voters agree.
Backdrop: Per the National Health Care Fraud Association, 10% of health spending ($560 billion) was spent fraudulently in 2024: the majority in the areas above.
2- The public is dissatisfied by the status quo and supports overhaul of the U.S. healthcare system to increase its affordability and improve its accessibility.
Consolidation: Through its Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, the White House has served notice it believes healthcare affordability and unreasonable costs are the result of hyper consolidation among hospitals, insurers, and key suppliers in the healthcare supply chain. It has appointed special commissions, task forces, and filed lawsuits to flex its muscle believing the industry has pursued vertical and horizontal consolidation for the purpose of reducing competition and creating monopolies. It shares this view with the majority of voters.
Corporatization: In tandem with consolidation, the White House asserts that Big Pharma, Big Insurer, and Big Hospital have taken advantage of the healthcare economy at the expense of local operators and mom and pop services. It presumes they’re run as corporate strongarms that access capital and leverage aggressive M&A muscle to drive out competitors and bolster their margins and executive bonuses. The administration treads lightly on corporate healthcare, seeking financial and political support while voicing populist concerns about Corporate Healthcare. Photo ops with CEOs is valued by the White House; corporatization is recognized as a necessary plus with a few exceptions. By contrast, most voters see more harm than good. Thus, the administration courts corporate healthcare purposely and carefully.
Backdrop: Intellectually, the majority of voters understand healthcare is a business that requires capital to operate and margins to be sustainable. But many think most healthcare organizations put too much emphasis on short-term profit and inadequate attention on their mission and long-term performance.
3-The U.S. healthcare industry will be an engine for economic growth domestically and globally if regulated less and consumers play a more direct role.
The administration is resetting its trade policies in response to suspension of at-will tariff policies that dominated its first year. At home, it seeks improved market access for U.S. producers of healthcare goods and services. It will associate this effort with US GDP growth and expanded privatization in healthcare. And it will assert that expansion of global demand for U.S. healthcare products and services is the result of the administration’s monetary policy geared to innovation and growth. And it will play a more direct role in oversight of foreign-owned/controlled health products and services and impose limits of their use of U.S. data.
The administration also seeks to protect intellectual property owned by U.S. inventors and companies by increasing its policing at home and abroad. In this regard, the administration will play a more direct role in the application of AI-enabled solution providers and expedite technology-enabled interoperability.
Backdrop: U.S. healthcare is the world’s most expensive system, so protections against IP theft are important, but the administration’s legacy in healthcare will be technology-enabled platforms that enable scale, democratize science and shift the system’s decision-making (and financial risk) consumer self-care.
Final thought:
The U.S. healthcare system does not enjoy the confidence of the White House: its proposed FY27 budget illustrates its predisposition to say no to healthcare and yes to other pursuits. It bases its position on three assumptions geared to support from its conservative base.
This budget proposal clearly illustrates why state legislators and Governors will play a bigger role in its future at home and abroad. And it means consumer (voter) awareness and understanding on key issues will be key to the system’s future, lest it is remembered for the agony of its defeat than the thrill of its victory.
No one wants to see health insurance premiums rise. Individuals, small businesses and large employers are already under inflationary pressures. But it will be far worse if health insurance companies fail to help address rising costs facing healthcare providers.
Lengthy contract negotiations between health insurers and healthcare providers are becoming the norm, leaving patients — our shared customers — in a confusing and concerning ‘out-of-network’ status, while health insurers and providers point fingers at each other.
An overused but accurate phrase applies: healthcare providers are facing a perfect storm of pressures, particularly in California, and especially systems that serve large shares of Medi-Cal and Medicare patients.
Among our nation’s 6,000 hospitals, our flagship hospital, Community Regional Medical Center in Fresno, serves the fourth highest percentage of Medicaid patients and is fifth for overall government reimbursement.
While being one of America’s most essential hospitals is rewarding, recent federal changes designed to slow the growth of healthcare spending have resulted in a 15% reduction in Medicaid funding — roughly $1 trillion in cuts nationally over the next decade.
At the same time, California legislation increased the minimum wage for healthcare workers to $25 per hour. While there is none more deserving of this than healthcare professionals, the ripple effects are significant. At our organization these adjustments add $100 million annually in labor costs and will only grow.
Further constraining hospitals are the legal requirements to treat anyone who arrives in their emergency departments, regardless of ability to pay. What other industry is required to provide service first and figure out how to get paid for it later?
Our health system absorbed a $231 million reimbursement shortfall last year for the care of government-insured patients, and we must brace ourselves for more. Higher numbers of ER visits from underinsured patients, as well as higher levels of charity care and bad debt will further widen the gap between our cost for providing care and how much we’re reimbursed.
In the meantime, insurance companies want hospitals to agree to rates that don’t keep pace with rising costs. While government payers offer predictable approval processes and payment timelines, private health insurers increasingly rely on cumbersome prior authorizations, payment denials, paying less for services and slow reimbursement. These practices add administrative costs, strain cash flow, reduce overall reimbursement and threaten our fiscal stability.
Insurers face pressure from employers and members to limit the growth of premiums. But too often, that pressure is used to resist necessary and reasonable rate increases for providers. Health insurers often blame providers for the high cost of care, but hospitals like ours are keenly focused on greater efficiency. In fact, we’re a low-cost leader when compared to the average California hospital.
In some cases, insurance companies propose quality incentive programs as a substitute for adequate reimbursement, then publicly criticize health care providers when we find this unacceptable. I wholeheartedly support performance incentives as a tool for improvement, but not when these programs are used as a mechanism to transfer greater financial burden to hospitals.
As stalled negotiations become increasingly common, regulators and policymakers should take a broader view of healthcare costs by examining health insurer reserves, and their administrative and marketing expenses.
For safety-net healthcare providers like us, modest profit margins are not just about staying afloat, they are critical to reinvestment in technology, facilities, our workforce, and public health initiatives that are essential to the communities we serve.
There is much at stake if payers win the war of words over contract rates. Access to healthcare services, healthcare jobs and the stability of institutions that communities rely on will diminish.
When providers are forced to make deeper cuts to manage this convergence of pressures, patients ultimately pay the price.
Since 2000, most countries around the world have achieved or committed to pursuing universal coverage, or to ensuring their populations have “access to the full range of quality health services” without financial hardship. Nations have, however, pursued different paths to that end. China, with the world’s largest health system, achieved near-universal coverage in just over a decade. In 2000, less than a third of its citizens and permanent residents had coverage; by 2011, that figure had risen to 95 percent. While China’s highly centralized political system differs from many other countries, the government’s focus on rural and unemployed residents and its targeted health infrastructure investments can offer insights for policymakers around the world. China’s Pathway to Universal Coverage By the late 1990s, China’s collective and work-unit-based health insurance systems had largely collapsed following market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1998, the government launched Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), a mandatory program for employed people financed by a payroll tax. In response to the poor performance of the Chinese health system during the 2002 SARS outbreak, the Chinese government moved to make major improvements. This was realized in 2003 and 2007, when the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme and Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance were introduced to cover rural residents and urban unemployed citizens, respectively. To reduce inequities between the two groups, both programs were merged in 2016 to create Urban and Rural Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URRBMI). Today, UEBMI and URRBMI make up China’s basic medical insurance, which partially covers in- and outpatient care, primary and mental health care, pharmaceuticals, traditional Chinese medicine, and dental and eye care. Coverage grew rapidly between 2008 and 2011 through significant government subsidies for those enrolled in the two programs that now make up URRBMI, as well as massive government investment in improving primary care and public hospitals, and establishing a national essential drug list.
Since these coverage gains, China has seen a significant improvement in overall health outcomes, including a seven-year increase in average life expectancy, a 73 percent decrease in maternal mortality, an 86 percent decrease in child mortality, and lower rates of communicable diseases. However, China’s basic medical insurance faces some key challenges. Given China’s lower per capita income and more limited fiscal capacity compared to the United States, the government prioritizes universal baseline coverage rather than comprehensive benefits, resulting in high out-of-pocket costs — roughly a third of total health expenditures. The basic medical insurance program also has struggled to address systemic inequities between rural and urban residents. For example, the urban employed populations covered by UEBMI receive more comprehensive benefits packages, including medical savings accounts for out-of-pocket expenses. Migrant workers — who make up a fifth of China’s population — are another demographic whose coverage can be fragmented, partly because of the difficulty transferring between different insurance programs if they move to and from rural and urban areas. China also faces major challenges in health care delivery. Lacking a strong primary care system or primary care gatekeeping, hospitals are vastly overused by patients. When you add growing care utilization by China’s rapidly aging population and some people dropping coverage due to rising premiums and copayments, you get a health system under increasing pressure. In 2025, to ease some of this strain, the government announced plans to incentivize long-term enrollment by increasing government subsidies for length of time enrolled and developing long-term care insurance programs focused on older people. America’s Patchwork Health Insurance System Prior to 2010, the United States relied on a fragmented, employment-based health insurance system made up of private, largely employer-sponsored insurance and public programs like Medicaid and Medicare. It left nearly 16 percent of the population, more than 40 million Americans, uninsured. More people gained coverage following full implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, which:Expanded Medicaid eligibilityPrevented coverage denials for people with preexisting conditionsAllowed young adults to stay on their parents’ insurance until age 26Established health insurance marketplaces to purchase private plans.By 2023, the U.S. uninsured rate declined to an all-time low of 7.9 percent. However, following passage of the Trump administration’s budget reconciliation bill in July 2025 — featuring $900 billion in Medicaid cuts over the next 10 years — the U.S. is expected to return to pre-ACA highs of nearly 40 million uninsured by 2034.
U.S. coverage expansion relies heavily on voluntary enrollment in private plans, often with high deductibles and cost sharing, creating sizeable affordability barriers. In 2024, out-of-pocket costs increased to $1,632 per capita. For subsidized care through Medicaid or cost-sharing reductions, qualification is dependent on income and area of residence, creating variable coverage from state to state. While China structured its reforms to explicitly incorporate rural residents, unemployed urban residents, and migrant workers, U.S. coverage is hampered by the exclusion of groups like undocumented migrants and people with low incomes in non-Medicaid-expansion states. China and the United States have taken remarkably different paths to expanding health insurance coverage. The U.S. has relied on a fragmented public–private model with variable and dwindling government subsidies, resulting in persistent disparities in coverage and access — both of which are expected to only worsen in the coming decade. Meanwhile, despite a vastly different political structure to the U.S., China’s coverage gains are notable due to its massive population (nearly four times the U.S. population) and much lower per capita income. China offers a unique case study of a coordinated health insurance system designed to address disparities in access, ultimately achieving near-universal coverage in just over 10 years.
Medicaid is the public health insurance program for people with low income, including children, some adults, pregnant women, and people with disabilities. It was created in 1965 along with Medicare, the federal program that covers adults over age 65 and some people with disabilities, to expand access to a range of health services and to improve health outcomes for these groups.
More than 72 million people are enrolled in Medicaid, making it the single largest insurer in the United States. It is the principal source of health insurance for Americans with low incomes and covers a wide range of services, from preventive care to hospital stays and prescription drugs. Medicaid also pays for nearly half of all U.S. births, as well as end-of-life care for millions of Americans.
While the federal government and the states jointly fund Medicaid, each state runs its own program, subject to federal requirements. The federal government covers between 50 percent and 77 percent of the cost of insuring people with Medicaid, depending on the state.
What is Medicaid expansion?
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) expanded the number of Americans who are eligible for Medicaid and increased the federal government’s contribution toward covering these new enrollees. Starting in 2014, states became eligible for this additional federal funding if they expanded Medicaid eligibility for all adults up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level ($28,207 for a family of two, as of 2024). The ACA also made it easier for people to enroll in Medicaid, such as by eliminating the need for in-person interviews, reducing the amount of information applicants need to provide, and using data from other federal and state agencies to electronically verify eligibility information.
So far, 40 states, along with Washington, D.C., have expanded Medicaid as allowed under the ACA. The federal government pays for 90 percent of the coverage costs for new enrollees under the expansion; states pay for the remaining 10 percent.
What is Medicaid’s impact on health care access and health outcomes?
There is ample evidence showing that Medicaid coverage helps people gain better access to health care services, leading to improvements in health and well-being. Researchers found that low-income adults in Arkansas, which expanded Medicaid eligibility in 2014, have better access to primary care and preventive health services, improved medication compliance, and better self-reported health status than their counterparts in Texas, which has not expanded eligibility for the program. (It should be noted, however, that some of Arkansas’s gains were eroded in 2018, when the state became the first to implement work requirements for Medicaid beneficiaries.)
Other studies show Medicaid expansion is associated with decreased mortality rates, increased rates of early cancer diagnosis and insurance coverage among cancer patients, improved access to care for chronic disease, improved maternal and infant health outcomes, and better access to medications and services for people with behavioral and mental health conditions.
How does Medicaid expansion affect uninsured rates?
States that have expanded Medicaid have a much lower uninsured rate than states that haven’t, and the gap continues to widen. The uninsured rate in expansion states dropped 6.4 percentage points between 2013 and 2017, from 13 percent to 6.6 percent, according to census data. Moreover, health care disparities narrowed between whites, Blacks, and Hispanics in expansion states, with smaller differences seen in uninsured rates among working-age adults, as well as in the percentages who skipped needed care because of costs or who lacked a usual care provider.
The coverage gains in states that have expanded their Medicaid program are not solely the result of newly eligible individuals enrolling. Some of the gains are due to the enrollment of individuals already eligible for Medicaid who took the opportunity to sign up for the first time (sometimes referred to as the “welcome mat effect”).
What are the financial impacts of Medicaid expansion?
Medicaid expansion protects beneficiaries from financial stress by improving access to affordable care. A national study found that expansion was associated with significant improvements in low-income people’s financial well-being, leading to reduced levels of debt in collections and unpaid bills. People living in expansion states are also less likely than those in nonexpansion states to have medical debt. Another study comparing the experiences of low-income adults in Texas, which has not expanded Medicaid, to those of low-income adults in three southern states that have expanded Medicaid found that Texas respondents were much more likely to report financial barriers to getting health care.
Medicaid expansion has improved the financial stability of community health centers and safety-net hospitals. There is also evidence that Medicaid expansion provides an economic boost to states. Recent studies of expansion’s financial impacts all find positive economic effects for states, such as growth in the health sector and greater tax revenue from increased economic activity. Expanding Medicaid can also save states money by offsetting costs in other areas, including uncompensated care for the uninsured, mental health and substance use disorder treatment, and other non-Medicaid health programs. After accounting for these new savings and revenues, the net cost of expansion for states is much lower than its 10 percent “sticker price.” In some states, expansion has already paid for itself.
HENRY KOTULA 