Market Concentration and Potential Competition in Medicare Advantage

https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/feb/market-concentration-and-potential-competition-medicare

Market concentration and competition

ABSTRACT

  • Issue: Medicare Advantage (MA), the private option to traditional Medicare, now serves roughly 37 percent of beneficiaries. Congress intended MA plans to achieve efficiencies in the provision of health care that lead to savings for Medicare through managed competition among private health plans.
  • Goal: Two elements are needed for savings to accrue: a sound payment policy and effective competition among the private plans. This brief examines the latter.
  • Methods: We use data from 2009–17 to describe market structure in MA, including the insurers offering plans and enrollment in each U.S. county. We measure both actual and potential competitors for each county for each year.
  • Key Findings and Conclusions: MA markets are highly concentrated and have become more concentrated since 2009. From 2009–17, 70 percent or more of enrollees were in highly concentrated markets, dominated by two or three insurers. Since the payment system used to reimburse insurers selling in the MA market relies on competition to spur efficiency and premiums that more closely reflect insurers’ actual costs, these developments suggest that taxpayers and beneficiaries will overpay. We also find an average of six potential entrants into MA markets, which points to a source of competition that may be activated in MA. To tap into potential competition, further research is needed to understand the factors affecting entry into MA markets.

Introduction

Medicare Advantage (MA), the private option to traditional Medicare (TM), now serves roughly 37 percent of beneficiaries through health care plans. Federal subsidy of the premiums of MA plans is intended to create a “level playing field,” so that the government pays MA plans based on what beneficiaries would typically cost in TM. This approach is based on Alain Enthoven’s concept of “managed competition,” wherein private plans that provide better benefits and higher-quality care at a lower price than TM would attract beneficiaries. Two elements are needed for this approach to work: a sound payment policy and effective competition among the private plans. This issue brief examines the latter.

Recent data show that many MA markets are served by just one or a small number of insurers.1 In 2012, 97 percent of county markets in the MA program were designated as highly concentrated according to the definitions used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), with a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of greater than 2,500.2 In 2016, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission observed that local markets for MA plans were becoming increasingly concentrated.3 Recently, courts have blocked mergers that would further erode competition within the MA market.4

This issue brief updates information about the market structure in the MA program. We report on traditional measures of market structure, such as concentration ratios and the HHIs, and a simple count of the number of insurers offering plans in a market. We also include the “two-firm concentration ratio,” or the share of enrollment accounted for by the top two firms. We also offer new perspectives on competition in MA. First, we comment on competition and choice from the standpoint of a beneficiary by examining the number of plans available. Second, we introduce the idea of “potential competition” in an MA market. Potential competition, like actual competition, can constrain market power. Third, we consider the role of TM in constraining the market power of MA insurers.

Actual and Potential Competition

News stories about consumers’ choices among Medicare Advantage plans often begin with a statement such as “On average, seniors will have a choice of 21 plans, although at least 40 plans will be accessible in some counties and large metropolitan areas of the country.”5 But such accounts give a misleading indication of competition in the MA program, because many insurers offer multiple health plan products in the same market. In this issue brief, we measure the number of MA plans but also focus on the number of different insurers in the market to assess competition at the insurer level.

An insurer needs to be wary of potential as well as actual competitors. Insurers that set premiums high may enable competitors to gain footholds in a market. A market is said to be “contestable” if it is relatively easy for a potential entrant to contest for market share.6Barriers to entry, the magnitude of one-time entry costs, and the availability of comparably efficient technology all influence contestability of a market. Here, we identify “potential competitors,” or insurers that are in a position to contest a county-defined market and therefore pose a competitive threat to incumbents. Insurers licensed to operate MA plans in a state have already crossed some local regulatory barriers and contract with some local providers. We therefore measure potential competition by the number of health insurers participating in some MA markets within the state but not in a particular county.

Data and Measurement

We use data from 2009–17 to describe market structure in MA, including the insurers offering plans in each county and the level of enrollment by county and plan. From these data we measure both actual and potential competitors for each county for each year. Actual competitors are those insurers that participate in MA in a specific county; potential competitors are the insurers participating in MA in a state but not in the county of interest. These data also allow us to compute concentration ratios and the HHI for each county and in each year. In some analyses we categorize the counties according to the HHI corresponding to the FTC/DOJ classifications of concentration: 1) not concentrated, HHI <1,501; 2) moderately concentrated, HHI=1,501–2,500; and 3) highly concentrated, HHI >2,500.

Results

As shown in Exhibit 1, in 2017 Medicare beneficiaries could choose from a relatively large number of private plans (roughly seven) by the standards of the private insurance market. The number of insurers declined from 2009 to 2011 then remained steady through 2017, averaging 2.5 in 2017. For comparison, in 2017, the average metropolitan area had two insurers competing in the health insurance marketplaces created by the Affordable Care Act.

Insurer concentration increased from 2009 to 2011 (the number of insurers selling MA plans fell from 4.5 to 2.9) then remained at about the same, high level of concentration. The two-firm concentration ratio was already high in 2009 (81%); it rose to 91 percent by 2011 and stayed there through 2017. The average county-level HHI was 4,914 in 2009, rising to 6,360 in 2013, and declining slightly to 6,285 in 2017. To put this in perspective, a market with two equal-size health plans would have an HHI of 5,000. The average MA market is therefore even more concentrated than that. Notably, the number of potential competitors also fell over the same period. Nevertheless there are now more potential than actual competitors in each county.

Exhibit 2 shows that 70 percent or more of MA enrollees were in highly concentrated markets (HHI>2,500). Few MA enrollees were able to choose a plan in a market not dominated by two or three insurers.

Virtually all Medicare enrollees face MA markets that are moderately to highly concentrated. Exhibit 3 shows the distribution of all Medicare enrollees (in MA and TM) by the levels of MA concentration. We stratify markets (i.e., counties) into quartiles according to the size of the total population of Medicare beneficiaries. The table reports mean population and mean HHI for each quartile of the total Medicare population. Among sparsely populated markets, which are largely rural, the mean HHI is 6,684 — indicating that they are highly concentrated. This is in part because of the difficulty that managed care plans, like HMOs and PPOs, have in establishing provider networks in rural areas where providers are scarce and provider markets are highly concentrated. In highly populated markets, the average HHI shows that they too are highly concentrated HHI = 3,774), but the index value is considerably lower than in sparsely populated markets.

Exhibit 4 shows the average numbers of potential entrants in counties grouped by the three HHI ranges. In recent years, there has been little difference in the number of potential competitors in areas with high or low concentration, implying that potential competitors are no more attracted to highly concentrated markets and may not discipline competition any more strongly in areas with few actual competitors. This was not true in earlier years, during which the number of potential competitors was higher in areas with less current competition. The number of potential competitors in moderately concentrated counties has remained steady over the nine-year period.

While Medicare beneficiaries have a choice between TM and MA, in assessing the competitive forces on MA plans we assume that the actual or potential competition from other MA plans matters most. The market position of an MA insurer in relation to TM received examination in connection with two recently proposed mergers, between Aetna and Humana and between Anthem and Cigna. The U.S. Department of Justice challenged these mergers on antitrust grounds, arguing that the proposed consolidations would threaten effective competition in MA. In the Aetna-Humana case, Judge Bates observed: “The weight of the evidence presented at trial indicates ‘industry [and] public recognition’ of a distinct market for Medicare Advantage. Competition within that market, between Medicare Advantage plans, is far more intense than competition with products outside of it.”7 While the role of traditional Medicare in affecting competition in the MA market deserves further analysis, competition among MA plans is where most of market discipline is likely to arise. While the presence of TM likely affects the conduct of MA plans, existing evidence suggests that the primary drivers of consumer choices are differences in the premiums, quality of care, and benefits among MA plans.8

Implications of MA Market Concentration

Even though 37 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in private plans, when compared with employer-based health insurance Medicare’s transition to managed care has been slow. Traditional Medicare is the last major bastion of open-network, fee-for-service health insurance, although the fee-for-service component is beginning to change with the spread of accountable care organizations. Competition or lack thereof of in a market plays a role in accelerating or attenuating this shift. Consumer choices tend to be driven by the better value (premiums and quality) that can turn more favorable with increased competition.

Several forces may have driven greater concentration in MA markets since 2009. First, consolidation in the health insurance industry generally may have affected the MA market structure.9 Concentration in provider markets also has been increasing, which has made price negotiations for health care services more difficult for insurers, especially smaller ones.10 Medicare policy changes over these years may have inadvertently limited the supply and market entry of MA insurers. When Medicare rules were changed to require all MA plans to create networks of providers, the effect of provider concentration was heightened and some health insurers were less willing to remain in and/or enter MA markets. This effect may have been especially significant in rural areas.11 At the same time, there appears to be a substantial number of potential MA insurer entrants in most moderate to highly concentrated markets, yet there appears to have been little clear impact on market outcomes in terms of premiums and quality.

Together, the confluence of these forces continues to push MA markets in the direction of greater concentration. Since the payment system used to reimburse insurers selling in the MA market relies on competition to drive premiums toward insurers’ actual costs, these developments suggest that taxpayers and beneficiaries will overpay for MA products, compared with what they might have paid in markets with more robust competition.

Need for Further Analysis

A competitive market is intended to deliver good products to consumers at low prices. Ultimately, the effect of Medicare Advantage market power on prices or quality of care needs to be assessed empirically. There is some, but limited, evidence on the exercise of MA market power.12 Further research is needed to understand how potential competitors affect the actions of existing competitors. It also will be important to understand the barriers to market entry for potential competitors, especially those that might be lowered to spur greater competition.

 

 

Walgreens settles False Claims suits for $270 million

https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/walgreens-settles-false-claims-suits-270-million?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT0RrNVpXSmpZV1UzTTJVdyIsInQiOiJNNFh6MElhd0lmVE5Zc09kZTl5d3BPc1h3ZkRpZGNIbWhHSE9RNVp5NkN1MFwvXC9kK3h6WHh5KzRHTWdsQTlWZ203aitRRnhUYWZ5QTVScVZcL01HaTkyUm5LNDRvanVuY0NUdVN4Y0czMzRkMzdNZzMrdVp6WjlmV2N5WHYxMEkrNCJ9

Two cases emerged from whistleblower claims about improper billing related to discounted drug prices and insulin pens.

Pharmacy giant Walgreens will pay nearly $270 million dollars as part of two major settlements, one that alleged the company had improperly billed federal healthcare programs for insulin pens it distributed to beneficiaries who didn’t need them and another that alleged Walgreens failed to disclose and charge lower drug prices offered through a discount program.

Both settlements were approved in mid-January and unsealed Tuesday. Walgreens must pay the United States and state governments a total of $269.2 million. Both cases arose from lawsuits filed by whistleblowers under the False Claims Act. Walgreens did not admit any wrongdoing as part of either settlement.

THE IMPACT

The DOJ said as a result of the conduct alleged in both cases, federal programs were inappropriately taxed. The alleged inappropriate disbursement of insulin resulted in the waste of valuable medication and created the potential for misuse “such as the improper resale of insulin pens on the Internet.” Because the company did properly disclose its discounted drug prices, federal healthcare programs paid out higher reimbursements than were actually warranted.

MORE ON THE CASES

The first settlement resolved allegations that Walgreens improperly billed Medicare and other federal healthcare programs for “hundreds of thousands” of insulin pens dispensed to beneficiaries who didn’t need them. According to a statement from the Department of Justice, it was alleged that Walgreens programmed its electronic pharmacy management system to prevent its pharmacists from dispensing less than a full box of five insulin pens, whether the patient needed that amount or not. It also said Walgreens falsely stated that they had not exceeded limits set on total days of supply in its reimbursement claims. This settlement totaled $209.2 million.

In this case, the DOJ said Walgreens admitted that when a federal health program denied a claim because the reported days of supply for a full carton of five insulin pens exceeded the federal program’s days-of-supply limit, the company dispensed and billed for the full carton and reduced the reported days of supply to conform to the program’s days-of-supply limit. Walgreens also admitted that it “repeatedly” reported days-of-supply data to federal health programs that differed from the days-of-supply calculated according to the standard pharmacy billing formula.

The company will pay $60 million as part of a second settlement to resolve allegations it overbilled Medicaid by failing to disclose and charge Medicaid the lower drug prices that it offered the public through a discount program called the Prescription Savings Club. Legally, the company must seek reimbursement only for the “the lowest of certain drug price points, including the ‘usual and customary price'” namely the price offered through such programs as the PSC. Those prices were not disclosed, causing overpayment from Medicaid to Walgreens, the DOJ said. The agency also said that Walgreens admitted it did not identify its PSC program prices as its U&C prices for the drugs on the PSC program formulary, resulting in overpayments.

ON THE RECORD

“Walgreens is pleased to have resolved these matters with the Department of Justice. The company fully cooperated with the government and has admitted no wrongdoing. Walgreens is a company of pharmacists living and working in the communities we serve, and we have always taken the safety and reliability of the medicines our patients need very seriously. We are resolving these matters because we believe it is in the best interest of our customers, patients and other stakeholders to move forward…In relation to these matters, Walgreens has entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services. The CIA builds upon the company’s already existing comprehensive compliance program,” Walgreens said in a statement.

“In both settlements, Walgreens admitted and accepted responsibility for conduct the Government alleged in its complaints under the False Claims Act,” the DOJ said in a statement.

Harbinger of things to come as the Healthcare Landscape becomes Dominated by Massive, Vertically-Integrated Competitors

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/walmart-cvs-health-hammer-out-new-pbm-pharmacy-network-deal&#8211;.html

Subs: CVS Pharmacy exterior

Verticals gonna vertical

As we wrote last week, the recent dust-up between CVS’s pharmacy benefit management (PBM) subsidiary Caremark and Walmart, during which the retail giant threatened to sever its relationship with CVS over a dispute regarding reimbursement levels before finally coming to a settlement, is a harbinger of things to come as the healthcare landscape becomes dominated by massive, vertically-integrated competitors.

new investigative piece from The Columbus Dispatch this week seems to confirm this view. Examining previously-undisclosed data about CVS’s drug plan pricing practices as part of Ohio’s Medicaid program, the article reveals that CVS paid its own retail pharmacies much higher reimbursement rates than it offered to key competitors Walmart and Kroger to provide generic drugs to Medicaid beneficiaries. According to the article, CVS would have had to pay Walmart pharmacies 46 percent more, and Kroger pharmacies 25 percent more, to match the levels of reimbursement it paid its own retail pharmacies, data that are cited in a state report on the Medicaid pharmacy program that CVS is engaged in a court battle to keep secret. The reimbursement differential is “startling information”, according to a former Justice Department antitrust official quoted in the article. A spokesman for CVS maintained that the PBM’s payment rates are “competitive” and influenced by a complex range of factors. Underscoring the opaque and complicated methodology drug plans use to determine payments to retail pharmacies, independent pharmacy operators were paid more than CVS stores, as were Walgreens stores. A separate analysis of PBM pricing behavior in New York uncovered similar evidence, according to Bloomberg.

The Ohio and New York pharmacy stories are yet more evidence that, as healthcare companies continue to expand their control over greater segments of the “value chain”—combining, for example, insurance, distribution, and care delivery—they are able to flex their market power in ways that look increasingly anti-competitive. Hospitals that “own” their referral sources, insurers that “own” the delivery of care, and pharmacies that “own” drug benefit managers all edge closer to creating closed, proprietary platforms that can lock out competitors in any one segment.

That’s a feature, not a bug—indeed, much of the logic of population health is predicated on “network integrity”: keeping consumers inside a fully-controlled ecosystem of care to enable better coordination and reduce duplication and inefficiencies. Yet as giant healthcare corporations turn themselves into Amazon-style “everything stores”, we need to keep a watchful eye on competition.

Red flags to watch for: using the courts to maintain secret agreements or block the free flow of talent or information, “vertical tying” behavior that requires all-or-nothing contracting, and pricing strategies that leverage market power in one segment to raise prices in another.

The biggest flaw in using “market competition” to lower the cost of care: most companies hate actually competing in the marketplace—a problem made even more vexing by vertical integration.

 

 

 

Loosening Up Stark and Anti-Kickback Laws: What Would It Look Like?

https://mailchi.mp/burroughshealthcare/pc9ctbv4ft-1611881?e=7d3f834d2f

Image result for Stark and Anti-Kickback Laws

The Department of Health and Human Services under the Trump administration has taken a deregulatory approach toward healthcare delivery. Its efforts on the payer side includes expanding the availability of individual health insurance policies that don’t conform to the rules of the Affordable Care Act, and more recently liberalizing the use of tax credits to purchase them.

However, the HHS has made one of its boldest proposals on the provider side. Over the summer, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services issued a request for information (RFI) regarding potentially loosening up the Stark and anti-kickback laws.

Originally signed into law in 1972, the Anti-Kickback Statute barred any sort of renumeration to a provider to induce the referral of a patient. The Stark Law, enacted in 1990, bars doctors from referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to any ‘designated facility’ in which they have any form of a financial relationship. Both laws have been updated – and strengthened – numerous times in the intervening years. The HHS’ proposed changes would signal a shift away from how those laws are interpreted.

According to Mark Hardiman, partner with the Nelson Hardiman healthcare law firm in Los Angeles, the move represents a desire by HHS “to move all payments away from fee-for-service and make the providers at risk on both the upside and downside.”

Although the proportion of fee-for-service payments made to Medicare providers has shrunk in recent years, it still comprises the majority. A total of $392 billion in Medicare fee-for-service payments were made in 2017, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation, 56 percent of all payments made from the program. Although that’s down from 70 percent of all Medicare payments made a decade prior, the continuing aging of the Baby Boomer population and healthcare cost inflation is putting pressure on CMS and HHS to find ways to continue to pare back costs. Coordinated care initiatives such as accountable care organizations comprise just a small fraction of all Medicare payments, and many providers are balking about taking on too much downside financial risk when forming accountable care organizations.

 According to HHS, the intent is to make it easier for providers to implement value-based care initiatives. “Removing unnecessary government obstacles to care coordination is a key priority for this administration,” said HHS Deputy Secretary Eric Hargan of the rationale behind the regulatory review. “We need to change the healthcare system so that it puts value and results at the forefront of care, and coordinated care plays a vital role in this transformation.”

Nonetheless, the hospital sector has been generally supportive of regulatory changes. In testimony to a U.S. House Ways and Means subcommittee over the summer, Michael Lappin, chief integration officer at Advocate Aurora Health, observed that strict liability rules discourage value-based arrangements.

So, what would the healthcare delivery environment resemble with looser regulations governing both laws?

   According to Hardiman, the changes HHS is seeking to the regulations are far from sweeping.
“They are really on the margins, and they are not signaling a fundamental shift in the enforcement of the Stark and  Anti-Kickback Law,” he said. 

Why would there not be a major regulatory unraveling? Hardiman notes that doing so would create chaos in healthcare delivery. Moreover, qui tam(whistleblower) lawsuits in healthcare have become a major source of income for attorneys, and they would object to too much of an unwinding. Data from the non-profit watchdog organization Taxpayers Against Fraud bears that out: Of the more than $3.7 billion in False Claims Act settlements reached in 2017, $2.4 billion involved litigation involving healthcare enterprises. It was the eighth consecutive year that healthcare case settlements topped $2 billion. Hardiman also noted that more and more litigation is being settled for large sums even when the U.S. Justice Department declines to intervene in a case.

Hardiman believes that if the regs are loosened, they would likeliest be in the form of a “series of fraud and abuse waivers.” They would cover initiatives such as managed care ventures or ACOs, making it easier for hospitals and physicians to collaborate on care coordination, as well create models to more equitably share expenses and profits and encourage cross-referrals.

“You are going to see a much more comprehensive definition as to what types of risk-sharing arrangements will not be reviewed as renumeration under the kickback statute,” Hardiman said. “I wouldn’t be surprised to see safe harbors around Medicare Advantages, ACOs, and participants in other innovative risk-sharing arrangements.”

Individual physicians and medical groups may also have the opportunity to pay inducements to patients to lose weight or engage in another health-enhancing activity – something they are currently barred from doing under most circumstances.

“Everybody knows we’re heading toward a value-based coordinated care model,” Hardiman said. “And promoting and incentivizing it is still a risky business. You want at least some practical guideposts.” 

 

Fifth Circuit Hits Pause on ACA Lawsuit Over Government Shutdown

https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/strategy/fifth-circuit-hits-pause-aca-lawsuit-over-government-shutdown

At the urging of the Trump administration, an appellate judge put legal wrangling over the Obama-era law’s constitutionality on hold until the partial government shutdown ends.

The appeals process to review a ruling that declared the entire Affordable Care Act invalid will have to wait until attorneys for the federal government have funding to proceed.

Fifth Circuit Court Judge Leslie H. Southwick issued a stay in the case Friday, granting a request filed earlier in the week by the U.S. Department of Justice.

The pause comes three weeks into a partial government shutdown that’s poised to become this weekend the longest in U.S. history, as President Donald Trump insists that Congress authorize $5.7 billion for a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico and Democrats refuse to do so.


While most of the federal government was funded by earlier legislation, this shutdown affects about 800,000 federal workers and inhibits the work of several agencies that handle health-related tasks.

Both the plaintiffs and federal defendants agreed that a stay would be appropriate. But the California-led coalition of Democratic state attorneys general challenging the lower court’s decision and the U.S. House of Representatives—which, newly under Democratic control, is seeking to intervene in the case to defend the ACA—opposed the stay request.

 

 

 

 

Healthcare’s vertical mergers kick-started a massive industry shift in 2018. Will it pay off?

https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/healthcare-s-vertical-mergers-kick-started-a-massive-industry-shift-2018-will-it-pay-off?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTnpBNE1HTmtObUl3WVRkayIsInQiOiJFOU1xMDRPMGtzMCtnWXU4MExUVFAzZ3Jrdm5cL2s3S1dMRkVldTRWS2QyNmJZU255UWRIWW14QmtXVkJ2T2VTeGpYTVBvQXZWWW1JVnB0S0crTXV3aFhDS0wrY3NzTmtEYmJEMHdvSG03bGkxS2ZlREdiaWZydFZkbkdlXC9tTHE1In0%3D&mrkid=959610&utm_medium=nl&utm_source=internal

Mergers and acquisitions deals consolidation

Two massive megamergers in CVS-Aetna and Cigna-Express Scripts dominated the conversation around mergers and acquisitions in healthcare.

Whether you think the mergers will help or hurt consumers, both deals have sparked a distinct shift across the industry as competitors search for ways to keep pace. It also frames 2019 as the year in which five big vertically integrated insurers in CVS, UnitedHealth, Cigna, Anthem and Humana begin to take shape.

Combined, the mergers totaled nearly $140 billion.

Both CVS and Cigna closed their transactions in the fourth quarter with promises that their new combined companies would “transform” the industry. Unquestionably, it’s already triggered some response from other players. Whether those companies can make good on their promises to improve care for consumers remains to be seen, and the payoff may not come for several years, as 2019 is likely to be a year of initial integration.

While CVS and Cigna hogged most of the spotlight, several other notable transactions across the payer sector could have smaller but similarly important consequences going forward.

WellCare acquires Meridian Health Plans for $2.5B

In May, WellCare picked up Illinois-based Meridian Health Plans for $2.5 billion, acquiring a company with an established Medicaid footprint with 1.1 million members. The deal boosted WellCare’s membership by 26%.

But the transaction also thrust WellCare back onto the ACA exchanges. Meridian has 6,000 marketplace members in Michigan.

Importantly, the acquisition gave WellCare a new pharmacy benefit manager in Meridian Rx. CEO Kenneth Burdick said it would provide “additional insight into changing pharmacy costs and improving quality through the integration of pharmacy and medical care.”

WellCare also makes out on CVS-Aetna transaction

WellCare was also a beneficiary of the CVS-Aetna deal after the Department of Justice required Aetna to sell off its Part D business in order to complete its merger.

The deal adds 2.2 million Part D members to WellCare, tripling its existing footprint of 1.1 million.

Humana goes after post-acute care

2018 was the year of post-acute care acquisitions for Humana. The insurer partnered with two private equity firms to buy Kindred Healthcare for $4.1 billion in a deal that was first announced last year. It used a similar purchase arrangement to invest in hospice provider Curo Health Service in a $1.4 billion deal.

Both acquisitions give Humana equity stake in the companies, with room to make further investments down the road. Kindred, in particular, is expected to further Humana’s focus on data analytics, digital tools and information sharing and improve the continuity of care for patients even after they leave the hospital.

Not to be outdone, rival Anthem also closed its purchase of Aspire Health, one of the country’s largest community-based palliative care providers.

UnitedHealth keeps quietly buying up providers, pharmacies

With ample reserves, UnitedHealth is always in the mix when it comes to acquisitions. This year was no different. The insurance giant snapped up several provider organizations to add to its OptumHealth arm. In June, it was one of two buyers of hospital staffing company Sound Inpatient Physicians Holdings for $2.2 billion. It also bought out Seattle-based Polyclinic for an undisclosed sum. The physician practice has remained staunchly independent for more than a century.

Most notably, UnitedHealth is still in the process of closing its acquisition of DaVita Medical Group. DaVita recently dropped the price of that deal from $4.9 billion to $4.3 billion in an effort to speed up Federal Trade Commission approval.

The Minnesota-based insurer is also clearly interested in specialty pharmacies to supplement its PBM OptumRx. UnitedHealth bought Genoa Healthcare in September, adding 435 new pharmacies under its umbrella. Shortly after, it bought up Avella Specialty Pharmacy, a specialty pharmacy that also offers telepsychiatry services and medication management for behavioral health patients.

Centene invests in a tech-forward PBM

Perhaps in an effort to keep pace with Cigna and CVS, Centene has made smaller scale moves in the PBM space, investing in RxAdvance, a PBM launched by former Apple CEO John Sculley. Following an initial investment in March, Centene sunk another $50 million into the company in October and then announced plans to roll the solution out nationally. Notably, CEO Michael Neidorff has said he is pushing the PBM to move away from rebates and toward a model that relies on net pricing.

“You talk about ultimate transparency—that gets us there,” he said recently.

 

 

 

DOJ recovered $2.5 billion in 2018 healthcare false claim cases

https://medcitynews.com/2018/12/doj-recovered-2-5-billion-in-2018-healthcare-false-claim-cases/?utm_campaign=MCN%20Daily%20Top%20Stories&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=68616131&_hsenc=p2ANqtz–fq1sdxIB88xY-ain-FJhljI6XCajKx4jjImF-6g7OJCDVEtx0Bo9c1pP788k3hLe6ehxSYBoP-w51DLgGo5izH2qh5g&_hsmi=68616131

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

According to the DOJ, this is the ninth consecutive year that the organizations’ civil healthcare fraud settlements and judgments have exceeded $2 billion.

As part of the federal government’s increasing focus on issues of healthcare fraud, particularly in the Medicare space, the U.S. Department of Justice recovered $2.5 billion in settlements and judgments from False Claims Act Cases over the past year.

According to the DOJ, this is the ninth consecutive year that the organizations’ civil health care fraud settlements and judgments have exceeded $2 billion.

While the $2.5 billion number represents federal losses, the DOJ also said it also helped recover significant funds for state Medicaid programs

“Every year, the submission of false claims to the government cheats the American taxpayer out of billions of dollars,” Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General Jesse Panuccio said in a statement.

“In some cases, unscrupulous actors undermine federal healthcare programs or circumvent safeguards meant to protect the public health … The nearly three billion dollars recovered by the Civil Division represents the Department’s continued commitment to fighting fraudsters and cheats on behalf of the American taxpayer.”

The False Claims Act has its roots in groups trying to defraud the military during and after the Civil War and was significantly strengthened since 1986 when Congress increased incentives for whistleblowers to file lawsuits alleging false claims.

In healthcare, organizations across the industry were hit with False Claims cases including drug companies, medical device manufacturers, payer organizations and healthcare providers.

The single largest recovery over the past year was a $625 million settlement paid by drug wholesaler AmerisourceBergen to resolve a number of claims including that the company illegally repackaged injectable cancer drugs into pre-filled syringes and billing multiple doctors for individual drug vials.

The DOJ also brought cases against drug companies who increased drug prices by funding Medicare co-payments meant to serve as a check on healthcare costs.

In one instance, United Therapeutics Corporation paid $210 million over allegations that it illegally used a foundation to funnel co-pay obligations for Medicare patients taking its drugs. Pfizer paid nearly $24 million in a similar case, with the government alleging that the company raised the price of a cardiac drug called Tikosy by 40 percent over three months

One major case against Massachusetts-based medical device company Alere resulted in a $33.2 million settlement over allegations that it sold unreliable diagnostic devices meant to detect acute coronary syndromes, heart failure, drug overdose and other serious conditions.

On the provider side, the DOJ recovered $270 million from DaVita subsidiary HealthCare Partners Holdings for upcoding and providing inaccurate information to inflate Medicare Advantage payments.

Another major case was against former health system Health Management Associates which allegedly engaged in major Medicare fraud including illegal kickbacks to physicians for referrals, incorrect billing for observation and outpatient services and inflated facility fees.

When it comes to health plans, the government’s case against UnitedHealth Group over allegations that it knowingly obtained inflated risk adjustment payments for its Medicare Advantage beneficiaries is still ongoing.