Category Archives: Antitrust

Understanding the Role of the FTC, DOJ, and States in Challenging Anticompetitive Practices Of Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers

Posted on by • Posted in All or Nothing Clauses, Anti-Tiering/Anti-Steering Clauses, Anticompetitive Contract Clauses, Antitrust, Clayton Act, Cross Market Mergers, Dept of Justice (DOJ), Exclusive Contracting Clauses, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act 1914, FTC Act, Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 1976, Horizontal Merger, Horizontal Mergers, Non-Compete Agreements, Sherman Antitrust Act, The Clayton Act 1914, The Sherman Act 1890, Vertical Consolidation • Leave a comment
Understanding the Role of the FTC, DOJ, and States in Challenging Anticompetitive Practices Of Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers

Policymakers and the media have been increasingly attentive to mergers and acquisitions and other potentially anticompetitive practices of hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers.

Consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency and help some struggling providers to keep their doors open in relatively underserved areas, but it can also reduce market competition and ease pressure on providers to lower prices or invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear evidence of improvements in quality, which has implications for consumers and employers. As a result, some have proposed strengthening antitrust regulation—which aims to protect competitive markets—as a tool for tackling rising health care costs, increasing the affordability of care, and reducing the large number of adults with medical debt.

Federal and state antitrust agencies play a role in challenging anticompetitive practices of health care providers and other businesses. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for enforcing federal antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. State attorneys general (AG) offices also have the authority to bring action under federal antitrust law, as well as under state statutes, which sometimes expand upon federal law.

This issue brief explains the role of federal and state antitrust agencies in challenging anticompetitive practices among health care providers, including the legal authority of federal and state agencies, the role that they play in enforcing antitrust laws, and proposed options for strengthening their authority. The brief focuses on health care providers, though many of the principles discussed in this issue brief apply to the practices of other health care entities as well, such as health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) (which are currently being reviewed by the FTC).  While the focus of this brief is on the role of government agencies, antitrust law also authorizes private parties, such as employer health plans, to challenge anticompetitive practices in the courts.

What types of anticompetitive practices do governments challenge and why?

Governments challenge anticompetitive practices to promote competitive markets, often for the benefit of consumers (e.g., patients and health plan enrollees).1 Governments seek to address a variety of anticompetitive practices that may lead to higher prices without commensurate improvements in quality of care. These include anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions (referred to as “mergers” in this brief), and other activities that hinder competition (referred to as “nonmerger anticompetitive practices” in this brief).

Provider consolidation can be beneficial to consumers in some instances and detrimental in others. On the one hand, consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency, such as by allowing providers to purchase supplies in bulk at a discount or by facilitating the coordination of care across different providers. On the other hand, consolidation has the potential to lead to worse outcomes for consumers by increasing providers’ market power and decreasing competition, which enhances the ability of providers to negotiate for higher prices (increasing costs for consumers and employers) and reduces the pressure on providers to invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear indications of quality improvements, though the strength of this evidence varies based on the type of consolidation and provider.

There are three main types of mergers:

  • Horizontal mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer the same or similar services, such as when a health system acquires a hospital or when two physician practices that provide overlapping services merge. Horizontal mergers can raise concerns about competition because they, by definition, reduce competitiveness when occurring between providers in the same market, and because consolidated entities can take actions to increase and protect their market power.
  • Vertical mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer different services along the same supply chain, such as when a hospital acquires a physician practice. Vertical mergers can raise anticompetitive concerns, for example, if physicians refer patients to hospitals within their health system rather than to competing hospitals. Some mergers may entail both vertical and horizontal consolidation (e.g., if a health system acquires a physician group that provides services offered by the system’s existing physician group).
  • Cross-market mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that operate in different geographic markets.2 Cross-market mergers may raise concerns about competition, for example, if a health system with providers in different areas of a state is able to use its dominant position in one market to negotiate higher prices in another when contracting with a given health plan (e.g., a state employee plan with enrollees that reside in several markets).

Governments also challenge other types of anticompetitive practices, such as the use of anticompetitive clauses in contracts between providers and insurers or providers and workers. Anticompetitive contract clauses give dominant parties an unfair advantage over potential competitors and can lead to higher prices. For example, some health systems have highly regarded hospitals (also known as “must have” hospitals) that insurers need to include in their provider networks in order to attract enrollees, which gives these systems substantial bargaining leverage over insurers. These health care systems can in turn use this bargaining leverage to pressure insurers to contract with all providers in the system (through “all-or-nothing clauses”), shielding expensive or low-quality members from competition with more desirable providers. The textbox below provides definitions of various anticompetitive contract clauses.

Common Types of Anticompetitive Contract Clauses3

  1. All-or-nothing clauses require an insurer that wants to contract with a particular provider in a system (such as a must-have hospital) to contract with all providers in that system.
  2. Anti-tiering/anti-steering clauses prevent an insurer from putting a given provider in a non-preferred provider network tier or from using other incentives or tools to steer patients to competing providers. This can incentivize patients to use that provider, even if a higher-value provider is also in-network.
  3. Exclusive contracting clauses prohibit an insurer from including competing providers in their provider network, so that a given provider is the only in-network option in a given area.
  4. Non-compete clauses prevent a worker employed with a given provider from taking a job with a competing provider or starting a new practice within a certain distance for some duration of time.
  5. Most favored nation clauses require a provider to offer an insurer the lowest rates of all the insurers with which it has contracted. While the examples above create favorable terms for providers in their contracts with insurers, most favored nation clauses create favorable terms for insurers in their contracts with providers.4

What federal antitrust laws govern anticompetitive practices?

There are three primary federal antitrust laws—the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act—that prohibit anticompetitive mergers and other anticompetitive practices.

  • The Sherman Act (1890) broadly prohibits anticompetitive practices. It has been used to challenge various anticompetitive practices, such as mergers, wage suppression, agreements among competing businesses to fix prices, and anticompetitive contracting clauses.
  • The Clayton Act (1914) builds on the Sherman Act by explicitly prohibiting anticompetitive mergers as well as other types of anticompetitive practices that are not clearly addressed by the Sherman Act (such as by barring the same individual from serving on the board of directors for two competing health systems, with some exceptions). Additionally, as amended under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976, the law requires that merging entities report their plans in advance to federal regulators in certain cases where the transaction exceeds a specified value ($111.4 million in 2023), which gives regulators time to investigate and intervene if needed.
  • The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act (1914) created the FTC and prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The FTC Act encompasses the same types of violations that are covered by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, in addition to other anticompetitive practices, and grants the FTC regulatory authority. Unlike the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities.5

Some forms of business practices, such as almost all instances where competitors coordinate to raise prices, are inherently illegal under federal law. The legality of other types of business practices depends on the context. For instance, when government agencies challenge a merger, courts assess whether the merger would likely harm competition in a given market.

What is the FTC’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?

Two federal agencies—the FTC and DOJ—have overlapping, as well as distinct, authority to challenge anticompetitive practices under federal law. The FTC is the only entity that can enforce the FTC Act. Although this Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities, the FTC has the authority to enforce the Clayton Act against nonprofit entities (in addition to for-profit entities), such as by challenging anticompetitive mergers among nonprofits. The DOJ has the authority to enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts. States can also bring lawsuits under federal antitrust law, as can some private parties, such as competing providers.

The FTC focuses on “protecting the public from deceptive or unfair business practices and from unfair methods of competition.” This includes challenging activities such as misleading advertisements, violations of consumers’ data privacy, and efforts to accumulate market power through mergers and other anticompetitive practices. For instance, the FTC sued Facebook in 2020, alleging, in part, that the company had sought to maintain its monopoly power by buying up competitors, such as Instagram and WhatsApp.

The FTC plays a larger role than the DOJ in enforcing federal antitrust law in health care provider markets, though there are gaps in its authority. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in certain areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets (see more below). However, although the FTC has broad authority to challenge anticompetitive mergers, its authority to challenge other anticompetitive practices often excludes nonprofits. Nonprofit ownership is common in provider markets. For example, nonprofits account for about three-fifths (58%) of community hospitals in 2023. The DOJ may fill in for the FTC when the FTC does not have the authority to challenge nonprofit providers that are engaging in certain anticompetitive practices (see example of Atrium Health below).

The FTC has successfully challenged several hospital mergers over the past two decades. Beginning in the 1990s and for several years afterwards, the FTC had difficulty challenging hospital mergers in the courts, allowing rapid consolidation in the hospital sector to continue unabated.6 Since the late 2000s, the FTC has since been more successful in challenging hospital mergers, reflecting advances in both economics and the FTC’s new legal strategies.7 However, the FTC challenges only a fraction of hospital mergers, and it is difficult to know the extent to which mergers that go unchallenged have an adverse impact on consumers, in terms of costs and quality. For instance, in 2022, the FTC challenged 3 hospital mergers and, in each case, the hospitals abandoned their plans to merge, while one analysis documented 53 hospital merger announcements in that year. The same analysis identified more hospital merger announcements in the years prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., 92 in 2019).

Example: FTC & Advocate Health Care Network

In 2015, the FTC brought a legal challenge against a proposed merger of two Chicago-area health systems: Advocate Health Care Network and NorthShore University Health System. The FTC argued that the combined entity would control over half of the market for general acute care inpatient hospital services, compared to the next largest provider, which would have only controlled 15% of the market. The court placed a temporary block on the merger, and the systems ultimately abandoned their plans to merge before the case went to trial.

The FTC has played a smaller role in challenging physician mergers. A key challenge is that physician mergers tend to be smaller, and physician groups often grow slowly over time by acquiring small group practices and hiring new physicians. As a result, physician groups often do not need to report mergers to federal regulators as their transactions tend to fall below Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting thresholds (though regulators can still challenge mergers that they learn about in other ways). Additionally, because they tend to be small, any given merger may not have an appreciable effect on market power, even if the cumulative effect of these mergers leads to a large concentration of market power over time.

Vertical mergers in health care provider markets have largely escaped FTC enforcement and the FTC has never challenged a cross-market merger, though it has expressed interest in both practices. For instance, in 2021, the FTC announced that it would begin to study the effect of vertical mergers between health care facilities and physician groups. The FTC previously conducted studies of horizontal mergers in advance of successful litigation. The FTC has also investigated specific instances of cross-market mergers, although it has yet to bring a challenge.

Example: FTC & St. Luke’s Health System

In 2012, St. Luke’s Health System in Idaho attempted to acquire Saltzer Medical Group, a physician practice group. Although this proposed acquisition had elements of a vertical merger, the FTC challenged it as a horizontal merger, i.e., on the basis that St. Luke’s would obtain a dominant market share for adult primary care physician services. Courts ruled in favor of the FTC and ordered that St. Luke’s divest Saltzer Medical Group.  This was the first time that the FTC received a court decision for a case challenging a hospital or health system’s acquisition of competing physician practices.

The FTC has not played a large role in overseeing nonmerger anticompetitive practices in nonprofit health care provider markets, such as the use of anticompetitive contract clauses. This may reflect the fact that the FTC’s authority to challenge and regulate nonmerger anticompetitive practices generally excludes nonprofit entities. Nonetheless, the FTC has brought legal challenges in some instances, such as cases where separate physician groups have coordinated with each other to raise prices. Relatedly, the FTC drew on its regulatory authority when it proposed a rule in 2023 that would ban non-compete clauses between employers and workers.

What is the DOJ’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?

The DOJ enforces a wide range of laws on behalf of the federal government, including—through its Antitrust Division—anticompetitive practices. For instance, in one landmark antitrust case in the 1990s, the DOJ sued Microsoft, alleging that the company had illegally sought to protect its monopoly power. The DOJ argued that the company had done so, in part, by requiring computer manufacturers that wanted to use Microsoft’s popular Windows operating system to also include Internet Explorer as a default.

Although the FTC typically oversees the conduct of health care providers, the DOJ has occasionally done so as well (see example below).

Example: DOJ & Atrium Health

In 2016, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Carolinas Healthcare System, also known as “Atrium Health.” The DOJ claimed that Atrium had violated federal antitrust law by, among other things, entering into contracts with insurers that contained anti-steering and anti-tiering clauses. Atrium Health system and the DOJ reached a settlement agreement before trial where the system agreed, in part, to stop using these contract clauses.

The DOJ typically takes the lead in promoting competition in health insurance markets. For instance, in 2017, the DOJ, along with some state governments, successfully prevented a proposed merger between Anthem and Cigna—which would have been the largest merger of health insurance companies on record—and a proposed merger between Aetna and Humana.

How do the FTC and DOJ work together on antitrust issues?

The FTC and DOJ have a clearance process to determine which agency will investigate and challenge a given merger. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in different areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets. The division of labor is formalized through a clearance process that determines which agency will investigate a proposed transaction based on its expertise and other factors, such as its capacity and ties to a given case.

The FTC and DOJ collaborate on guidelines that establish how they determine whether to challenge a given merger. This includes the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which, as the name suggests, outline the criteria that the FTC and DOJ consider when reviewing horizontal mergers. For instance, the guidelines indicate that the agencies evaluate the effects of a merger on market concentration based on a measure known as the “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” (HHI) (see textbox below). The guidelines also indicate that the agencies consider the possible benefits of a given merger, such as whether a merger might allow research to be conducted more effectively.

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

The HHI is calculated based on provider market shares for a given product—such as inpatient general acute care services or inpatient orthopedic surgical services—and geographic market. The HHI for a market can range from nearly 0 (a perfectly competitive market) to 10,000 (a market with a single provider).  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines define the level of market concentration as follows:

Unconcentrated: HHI < 1,500

Moderately concentrated: HHI between 1,500 and 2,500

Highly concentrated: HHI > 2,500

Although markets for inpatient hospital services are now often highly concentrated, there is wide variation across the country. For instance, one study estimated that, in 2021, the New York City metro area had an HHI of 753 for inpatient hospital services, while the Wilmington, North Carolina metro area had an HHI of 7,600.

The FTC and DOJ have also released a set of Vertical Merger Guidelines, though the FTC withdrew from these guidelines in 2021. Some economists are more critical of the Vertical Merger Guidelines than the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, perhaps reflecting the fact that there is less consensus about the effects of vertical consolidation and the proper role of antitrust enforcement.

In July 2023, the FTC and DOJ released a draft version of their updated merger guidelines, which would apply to both horizontal and vertical mergers and which indicate that the agencies will be scrutinizing a broader range of mergers. Among other changes, the draft guidelines expand the definition of highly concentrated markets, rely on a lower threshold for identifying large changes in market concentration, consider the combined effect of a series of acquisitions (e.g., of a health system acquiring several small physician practices over time), and add an explicit discussion of the agencies’ views on how workers may be negatively impacted when their employers merge. These guidelines might also be used to challenge cross-market mergers, although this is not yet clear. The deadline for public comments on the draft guidelines is September 18, 2023.

In addition to working together on general merger guidelines, the DOJ and FTC have in the past collaborated on antitrust policy statements that are specific to health care, though both agencies withdrew from these statements in February 2023 and July 2023, respectively, arguing that the statements are outdated based on changes in health care markets.8

What is the role of states in enforcing antitrust law?

States can bring legal challenges under federal antitrust law. States may do so through their AG offices as either a purchaser of health care (for instance, through state employee health plans) or on behalf of their residents. States sometimes file lawsuits jointly with each other or with the federal government, which can help overcome resource constraints. States and the federal government may play complementary roles, with the federal government providing greater resources and general antitrust expertise and states providing more specialized knowledge of local market conditions.

Most states have passed laws that expand oversight of provider mergers, which may lead to additional legal challenges. Thirty-four states and DC require that at least some hospitals notify state AG offices of their plans to merge, expanding on federal reporting requirements. For instance, Rhode Island requires all hospitals to do so, regardless of the value of the transaction. Additionally, thirteen states and DC require that some or all types of providers receive approval from the government prior to merging, instead of requiring that the government file a lawsuit to challenge a merger. Eleven states require AG offices to consider relatively expansive criteria when reviewing health care mergers. For instance, California law requires the AG office to consider criteria such as the general public’s interest and the effect of a merger on access to care.

Some states have prohibited certain types of anticompetitive contract clauses. These laws either broadly prohibit a given type of clause or ban their use in only specific circumstances. Regarding contracts between insurers and dominant providers, two states (Massachusetts and Nevada) have laws restricting at least some all-or-nothing clauses and anti-tiering or anti-steering provisions, and five states (Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin) have laws restricting exclusive contracting. Additionally, 22 states restrict non-compete provisions—which dominant providers sometimes use in contracts with their workers—and 20 states restrict most favored nation clauses, which dominant insurers sometimes use in their contracts with providers.

Example: California & Sutter Health

In 2018, the California AG joined a lawsuit that had been initiated on behalf of some group health plans against Sutter Health, a large nonprofit health system in the state. The parties argued that Sutter had used anticompetitive contract clauses—such as all-or-nothing and anti-tiering provisions—to increase prices. In 2019, Sutter agreed to a settlement agreement that required the system to abandon the relevant contract clauses and to pay $575 million in damages, among other things.

Some states have enacted laws that have the potential to shield health care providers from antitrust scrutiny in certain instances.  For example, 19 states have Certificate of Public Advantage (COPA) laws, which immunize a merger from antitrust challenges while directly regulating the merged entity for a period of time, such as by limiting price increases or prohibiting certain contracting practices. The intent of COPA laws is to facilitate mergers that are perceived as being beneficial overall while mitigating anticompetitive concerns through state oversight. However, the FTC and some researchers have been critical of these laws, arguing, for example, that states have not followed through in providing ongoing oversight following a given merger. Other state policies, such as Certificate of Need (CON) statutes—which attempt to reduce costs by restricting, for example, the construction of new facilities when they do not meet a community need—may also play a role in limiting competition or preventing antitrust scrutiny.

What are the potential remedies in antitrust enforcement?

Federal or state agencies challenging a merger can seek structural remedies or conduct remedies (also known as “behavioral remedies”).

  • Structural remedies mitigate consolidation by preventing a merger from moving forward, breaking up mergers that have already taken place, or requiring a merged entity to sell off a portion of its business.
  • Conduct remedies entail restrictions or requirements imposed on providers after a merger, such as by limiting the prices providers can charge, prohibiting providers from engaging in certain contracting practices, or requiring providers to spend a minimum amount on community benefits.

Conduct remedies may be less effective than structural remedies in certain circumstances, as they tend to be time-limited and government agencies may not have the resources to monitor and enforce them. However, where markets are already concentrated and regulators are reluctant to break up merged entities, conduct remedies may be the only option.

When the government challenges proposed mergers before they occur, the recourse is typically to prevent the merger from moving forward. Antitrust enforcers have only infrequently attempted to unwind mergers that have already taken place, which the FTC describes as a “difficult and potentially ineffective” process.

There are other ways in which the government can be successful in challenging anticompetitive mergers. For example, the government and merging providers may avoid trial through a settlement agreement or consent decree. In this scenario, the government drops its legal challenge in exchange for structural or conduct remedies. Additionally, providers may abandon a merger after a lawsuit is announced or a court makes a preliminary ruling against the merger or may decide not to attempt to merge in the first place in anticipation that doing so would be successfully challenged in court.

Example: FTC & Phoebe Putney Health System

In 2011, Phoebe Putney Health System acquired a hospital from HCA in Albany, Georgia. The FTC challenged the merger and eventually reached a settlement agreement with the providers. The settlement agreement allowed the merger to persist but imposed conduct remedies, including that Phoebe Putney notify the FTC before acquiring other health care providers in the area.

The outcomes of successful legal challenges to nonmerger anticompetitive practices are similar, though the remedy would involve abandoning the relevant business practice (e.g., no longer using anticompetitive contract clauses).

What are some practical challenges facing antitrust enforcement?

There are at least a few challenges that may limit the ability of the federal government and states to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust enforcement:

  • It is difficult to break up mergers after they have already occurred, and many provider markets are already highly concentrated. For example, one study estimated that the vast majority (90%) of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) had highly concentrated hospital markets in 2016 (i.e., with an HHI above 2,500), most (65%) had highly concentrated specialist physician markets, and nearly two in five (39%) had highly concentrated markets for primary care physicians. Breaking up a merger after providers have already consolidated can be difficult. At the same time, regulating the behavior of merged providers—such as through restrictions on the prices they charge—may be difficult to do on an ongoing basis.
  • Some regions cannot support competitive provider markets. For instance, rural communities may not have enough residents to support several providers that offer the same service.
  • Antitrust litigation can be complex and expensive. Without adequate funding, it may be impractical to challenge a large number of provider business practices that raise anticompetitive concerns.
  • Antitrust agencies may have difficulty staying ahead of market trends. For example, it could take time for the government to develop strong guidelines for challenging vertical or cross-market mergers and to accumulate enough evidence to convince courts that these practices harm competition. In the meantime, these mergers will likely continue.
  • The benefits of competitive provider markets for individuals with health insurance will depend in part on the competitiveness of health insurance markets. The study referenced above also estimated that most MSAs (57%) had highly concentrated insurance markets in 2016. When insurance markets are not competitive, cost savings from competitive provider markets might not be fully passed along to consumers.

What policies have been proposed to strengthen antitrust law and enforcement?

Several federal and state policy proposals have been floated to help antitrust regulators more easily identify and challenge anticompetitive mergers and regulate markets that are already concentrated. One set of policies would make it easier for governments to enforce antitrust law, such as by requiring more providers to report any planned mergers, lowering the legal standards by which mergers are deemed anticompetitive, and mandating that providers receive approval from the government before merging. Another set of policies would increase the scope of antitrust law, such as by giving the FTC full authority to regulate nonprofit providers and outlawing certain anticompetitive contracting clauses. A third set of proposals would improve the infrastructure of antitrust enforcement, such as by increasing funding for antitrust agencies, creating agencies to monitor health care markets (as some states have done), and establishing specialized courts for antitrust cases.

Discussion

The FTC, DOJ, and states seek to promote competition in health care markets to encourage providers to lower costs for consumers and provide high quality medical care. Over the years, FTC, DOJ, and some states have challenged mergers as well as other anticompetitive practices. Nonetheless, there are inherent challenges to an approach that relies solely on efforts to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust regulation, particularly given the already high level of market concentration of providers across the country.

Several policy ideas have been floated at the federal and state level that are intended to strengthen antitrust regulation. However, given the challenges facing antitrust regulation and pro-competition policies, some policymakers have proposed a more direct regulatory approach, such as by capping prices or price growth or by establishing global budgets for hospitals. Some proponents of these approaches have highlighted that antitrust efforts and regulatory approaches could play complimentary roles. For instance, caps on health care prices could serve as a backstop in concentrated markets where at least some providers would not otherwise offer competitive rates or in small markets that are unable to support competition. Antitrust regulation may also play a useful role under price regulation, for example, by encouraging providers to compete for patients by offering higher quality care.

Justice Department conducting antitrust probe against UnitedHealth Group

Posted on by • Posted in Antitrust, Competition, Dept of Justice (DOJ), Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Investigation, Market Consolidation, Market Power, Monopoly, Monopoly Behavior, UnitedHealth Group, UnitedHealthcare • Leave a comment

https://mailchi.mp/fc76f0b48924/gist-weekly-march-1-2024?e=d1e747d2d8

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has been investigating UHG for anticompetitive behavior since last October, as first revealed by the Examiner News earlier this week and subsequently confirmed by the Wall Street Journal. 

The DOJ is reportedly interested in Optum’s acquisitions of physician groups and how their relationships with UHG’s health plans affects competition.

The probe appears to be wide-ranging, but there are no indications of if or when the DOJ plans to file charges. UHG is no stranger to antitrust attention: the DOJ failed to block its purchase of Change Healthcare in 2022, and its planned acquisition of home healthcare company Amedisys is still subject to a federal probe. 

The Gist: The Biden administration has made antitrust scrutiny a key plank of its policy platform, having recently launched high-profile investigations into several large companies including Apple, Amazon, and Google. 

Although these probes span major sectors of the US economy, healthcare consolidation has been a particular focus for the White House. 

As the nation’s both largest employer of physicians and largest health insurance company, UHG is an unsurprising target within the healthcare industry. Recently finalized federal merger guidelines have changed how the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) gather M&A information, but not the laws or legal precedent upon which cases are ruled, so it remains to be seen if regulators’ new approach will translate into stronger enforcement.

US Anesthesia Partners settles with Colorado regulators

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https://mailchi.mp/fc76f0b48924/gist-weekly-march-1-2024?e=d1e747d2d8

Dallas, TX-based US Anesthesia Partners (USAP), one of the nation’s largest providers of anesthesia services, reached a settlement with the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, which had alleged that USAP engaged in anticompetitive behavior in the state.

Although it denies any wrongdoing, USAP agreed to relinquish exclusive contracts with five Colorado hospitals and revise its practice of adding noncompete agreements to its physician contracts.

This settlement is separate from the similar FTC suit against USAP and its creator-turned-minority owner, private-equity (PE) firm Welsh, Carson, Anderson, and Stowe. That suit, filed in federal district court in Texas in September 2023, alleges that USAP monopolized the Texas anesthesiology market in order to drive up prices unlawfully. 

The Gist: USAP isn’t the only large anesthesia group in the news this week for allegations of anticompetitive behavior—hospitals in New York and Florida are suing North American Partners in Anesthesia, claiming it stifles competition by forcing its physicians to sign noncompete agreements. 

Health systems and regulators are increasingly dissatisfied with the highly concentrated anesthesia provider market, which has become dominated by large, PE-backed groups. 

Because the Colorado case was settled out of court, no precedent has been established for antitrust enforcement, but the result of the ongoing FTC suit against USAP may have significant ramifications for other large, PE-backed physician organizations.

What a Biden-Trump Re-Match means for Healthcare Politics: How the Campaigns will Position their Differences to Voters

Posted on by • Posted in 2024 Election Issues, ACA, Access & Quality of Healthcare, Access to IVF Treatments, Affordability, Antitrust, Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Policy, High Drug Prices, Market Consolidation, Market Power, Medicaid, Medicare, Monopoly Behavior, Out of Pocket Expenses, Price Transparency, Public Health • Leave a comment
What a Biden-Trump Re-Match means for Healthcare Politics: How the Campaigns will Position their Differences to Voters

With the South Carolina Republican primary results in over the weekend, it seems a Biden-Trump re-match is inevitable. Given the legacies associated with Presidencies of the two and the healthcare platforms espoused by their political parties, the landscape for healthcare politics seems clear:

Healthcare IssueBiden PolicyTrump Policy
Access to Abortion‘It’s a basic right for women protected by the Federal Government’‘It’s up to the states and should be safe and rare. A 16-week ban should be the national standard.’
Ageism‘President Biden is alert and capable. It’s a non-issue.’‘President Biden is senile and unlikely to finish a second term is elected. President Trump is active and prepared.’
Access to IVF Treatments‘It’s a basic right and should be universally accessible in every state and protected’‘It’s a complex issue that should be considered in every state.’
Affordability‘The system is unaffordable because it’s dominated by profit-focused corporations. It needs increased regulation including price controls.’‘The system is unaffordable to some because it’s overly regulated and lacks competition and price transparency.’
Access to Health Insurance Coverage‘It’s necessary for access to needed services & should be universally accessible and affordable.’‘It’s a personal choice. Government should play a limited role.’
Public health‘Underfunded and increasingly important.’‘Fragmented and suboptimal. States should take the lead.’
Drug prices‘Drug companies take advantage of the system to keep prices high. Price controls are necessary to lower costs.’‘Drug prices are too high. Allowing importation and increased price transparency are keys to reducing costs.’
Medicare‘It’s foundational to seniors’ wellbeing & should be protected. But demand is growing requiring modernization (aka the value agenda) and additional revenues (taxes + appropriations).’‘It’s foundational to senior health & in need of modernization thru privatization. Waste and fraud are problematic to its future.’
Medicaid‘Medicaid Managed Care is its future with increased enrollment and standardization of eligibility & benefits across states.’‘Medicaid is a state program allowing modernization & innovation. The federal role should be subordinate to the states.’
Competition‘The federal government (FTC, DOJ) should enhance protections against vertical and horizontal consolidation that reduce choices and increase prices in every sector of healthcare.’‘Current anti-trust and consumer protections are adequate to address consolidation in healthcare.’
Price Transparency‘Necessary and essential to protect consumers. Needs expansion.’‘Necessary to drive competition in markets. Needs more attention.’
The Affordable Care Act‘A necessary foundation for health system modernization that appropriately balances public and private responsibilities. Fix and Repair’‘An unnecessary government takeover of the health system that’s harmful and wasteful. Repeal and Replace.’
Role of federal government‘The federal government should enable equitable access and affordability. The private sector is focused more on profit than the public good.’‘Market forces will drive better value. States should play a bigger role’

My take:

Polls indicate Campaign 2024 will be decided based on economic conditions in the fall 2024 as voters zero in on their choice. Per KFF’s latest poll, 74% of adults say an unexpected healthcare bill is their number-one financial concern—above their fears about food, energy and housing. So, if you’re handicapping healthcare in Campaign 2024, bet on its emergence as an economic issue, especially in the swing states (Michigan, Florida, North Carolina, Georgia and Arizona) where there are sharp health policy differences and the healthcare systems in these states are dominated by consolidated hospitals and national insurers.

  • Three issues will be the primary focus of both campaigns: women’s health and access to abortion, affordability and competition. On women’s health, there are sharp differences; on affordability and competition, the distinctions between the campaigns will be less clear to voters. Both will opine support for policy changes without offering details on what, when and how.
  • The Affordable Care Act will surface in rhetoric contrasting a ‘government run system’ to a ‘market driven system.’ In reality, both campaigns will favor changes to the ACA rather than repeal.
  • Both campaigns will voice support for state leadership in resolving abortion, drug pricing and consolidation. State cost containment laws and actions taken by state attorneys general to limit hospital consolidation and private equity ownership will get support from both campaigns.
  • Neither campaign will propose transformative policy changes: they’re too risky. integrating health & social services, capping total spending, reforms of drug patient laws, restricting tax exemptions for ‘not for profit’ hospitals, federalizing Medicaid, and others will not be on the table. There’s safety in promoting populist themes (price transparency, competition) and steering away from anything more.

As the primary season wears on (in Michigan tomorrow and 23 others on/before March 5), how the health system is positioned in the court of public opinion will come into focus.

Abortion rights will garner votes; affordability, price transparency, Medicare solvency and system consolidation will emerge as wedge issues alongside.

PS: Re: federal budgeting for key healthcare agencies, two deadlines are eminent: March 1 for funding for the FDA and the VA and March 8 for HHS funding.

UnitedHealth Group takes Wall Street hit because of investors’ fears about Medicare Advantage profitability, Department of Justice antitrust investigation

Posted on by • Posted in Antitrust, Dept of Justice (DOJ), Health Insurance Industry, Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), Medicare Advantage, Utilization Trends • Leave a comment
https://wendellpotter.substack.com/p/unitedhealth-group-takes-wall-street?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=142147224&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

STAT News today published an op-ed I coauthored with Dr. Philip Verhoef, president of Physicians for a National Health Program, making the point that investors are among the growing number of stakeholders who are souring on big, for-profit insurance companies like the ones I used to work for (Cigna and Humana). 

We focused specifically on investors’ concerns about the continued profitability of Medicare Advantage plans most of the big insurers own and operate.

Several companies have lost billions of dollars in market capitalization over the past several weeks as they have reported what they maintain is higher than usual utilization of health care goods and services by seniors enrolled in MA plans. 

Today, the companies–especially UnitedHealth Group, the market leader with 7.6 million Medicare Advantage enrollees–are losing billions more in market cap on the news, broke yesterday by the Wall Street Journal, that the Department of Justice is investigating UnitedHealth’s many acquisitions over the years.

UnitedHealth and most of the other companies are no longer just insurance companies. They’ve moved rapidly into health care delivery by buying physician practices and clinics, and three of them, UnitedHealth, Cigna and CVS/Aetna, control 80% of the pharmacy benefit management business. 

As Phil and I wrote in our op-ed:

Investors in MA insurance companies experienced a rude awakening in late January, with insurer stocks plummeting in the face of earnings reports showing profits falling far below expectations in the last quarter of 2023. Companies like CVS Health and UnitedHealth Group saw losses of 5.2% and 6.2% respectively, while Humana, whose business model relies heavily on the MA program, fell an astonishing 14.2%. These insurers cited higher than average health care utilization rates as the culprit and warned that 2024 would likely see more of the same. At the same time, private equity investment in MA has fallen, showing waning confidence in the program. 

We went on to note that both Democrats and Republicans in Congress are increasingly concerned about MA insurers’ business practices and, among other things, have introduced bills to crack down on egregious overpayments to MA plans. 

The WSJ reported yesterday that the Justice Department has launched an antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth, which has become not only the country’s biggest U.S. health insurer but also a leading manager of drug benefits “and a sprawling network of doctor groups.”

The Journal’s Anna Wilde Mathews and Dave Michaels wrote that:

The investigators have in recent weeks been interviewing healthcare-industry representatives in sectors where UnitedHealth competes, including doctor groups, according to people with knowledge of the meetings.

The DOJ’s investigation of UnitedHealth is wide-ranging. Among other things, according to the Journal, “investigators have asked whether and how the tie-up between UnitedHealthcare [the insurance division] and Optum’s medical groups might affect its compliance with federal rules that cap how much a health-insurance company retains from the premiums it collects. (Optum is the company’s division that encompasses the pharmacy benefit manager Optum Rx and the many clinics and physician practices it owns.)

HEALTH CARE un-covered explained last month how UnitedHealth essentially is paying itself billions of dollars every month and circumventing the intent of a federal law that requires insurers to spend at least 80% of premium dollars on their health plan enrollees’ health care.

I know from sources within the Justice Department that investigators saw that piece, as well as the comprehensive analysis we published earlier of the scores of acquisitions UnitedHealth has made in recent years that have enabled it to catapult to the top five of the Fortune 500 list of American companies. 

Those sources told me that the DOJ is very concerned about the consolidation within both the health insurance business and the hospital industry. Many U.S. hospitals, in an ongoing effort to negotiate from an enhanced position of strength with UnitedHealth and the other vertically integrated insurers, have merged with each other in recent years and become part of huge health-care delivery systems.

At the close of trading on the New York Stock Exchange yesterday, shares of UnitedHealth Group’s share were down $11.90 or 2.27%. Investors are continuing to head for the exits today. As I write this, the company’s stock price has fallen another $20 (4%) to $494.00. That’s way down from the company’s 52-week high of $554.70.

Shares of most of the other big publicly traded insurers (Centene, Cigna, CVS/Aetna, Elevance, Humana and Molina) are also down, ranging from $.83 at CVS to $11.51 at Humana.

Nurse sues UPMC over alleged labor abuses

Posted on by • Posted in Antitrust, Class Action Lawsuit, Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Labor Abuses, Labor Relations, Labor Spend Management, Lawsuit, Market Consolidation, Market Power, Market Share, Mergers & Acquisitions, Monopoly, Monopoly Behavior, Nurses, Unfair Business Practices, Unfair Labor Practices • Leave a comment
https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/nurse-sues-upmc-monopoly-labor-abuse-pennsylvania/705287/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Issue:%202024-01-23%20Healthcare%20Dive%20%5Bissue:58423%5D&utm_term=Healthcare%20Dive

The lawsuit filed in federal court seeks to represent thousands of other UPMC employees.

Dive Brief:

  • A nurse is suing the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center for allegedly leveraging its monopoly control over the employment market in Pennsylvania to keep wages down and prevent workers from leaving for competitors, all while increasing their workload.
  • The lawsuit, filed late last week in a federal court, seeks class action status to represent other staff at the nonprofit health system. Plaintiff Victoria Ross, who worked as a nurse at UPMC Hamot in Erie, Pennsylvania, seeks damages and is asking the judge to enjoin UPMC from continuing its unfair business practices.
  • If granted class action status, the lawsuit could represent thousands of current and former UPMC workers, including registered nurses, medical assistants and orderlies. UPMC has denied the allegations in statements to other outlets but did not respond to a request for comment by time of publication.

Dive Insight:

UPMC has grown steadily over the past few decades into the largest private employer in Pennsylvania, employing 95,000 workers overall.

From 1996 to 2018, the system acquired 28 competing healthcare providers, greatly expanding its market power, according to the lawsuit. The acquisitions also shrunk the availability of healthcare services. Over the same period, UPMC closed four hospitals and downsized operations in three other facilities, eliminating 1,800 full- and part-time jobs, the lawsuit said.

UPMC relied on “draconian” mobility restrictions and labor law violations to lock employees into lower pay and subcompetitive working conditions, according to the 44-page complaint.

Specifically, the system enacted restraints like noncompete clauses and “do-not-rehire blacklists” to stop workers from leaving. Meanwhile, UPMC allegedly suppressed workers’ labor law rights to prevent them from unionizing.

“Each of these restraints alone is anticompetitive, but combined, their effects are magnified. UPMC wielded these restraints together as a systemic strategy to suppress worker bargaining power and wages,” the lawsuit said. “As a result, UPMC’s skilled healthcare workers were required to do more while earning less — while they were also subjected to increasingly unfair and coercive workplace conditions.”

According to the complaint, UPMC has faced 133 unfair labor practice charges since 2012, and 159 separate allegations. Roughly 74% of the violations were related to workers’ efforts to unionize, the lawsuit said.

Meanwhile, UPMC workers’ wages have fallen at a rate of 30 to 57 cents per hour on average compared to other hospital workers for every 10% increase in UPMC’s market share, said the lawsuit, citing a consultant’s economic analysis.

The lawsuit also noted that UPMC’s staffing ratios have been decreasing, even as staffing ratios on average have increased at other Pennsylvania hospitals.

The alleged labor abuses and UPMC’s market power are linked, according to the complaint.

“Had UPMC been subject to competitive market forces, it would have had to raise wages to attract more workers and provide higher staffing levels in order to avoid degrading the care it provided to its patients, and in order to prevent losing patients to competitors who could provide better quality care,” the lawsuit said.

UPMC is facing similar labor allegations. In May, two unions filed a complaint asking the Department of Justice to investigate labor abuses at the nonprofit.

Hospitals were plagued by staffing shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many facilities still bemoan the difficulty of hiring and retaining full-time workers, and point to shortages (of nurses in particular) as the reason for overworked employees and poor staffing ratios.

Yet some studies suggest that’s not the case. One recent analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data found employment in hospitals — including registered nurses — is now slightly higher than it was at the start of the pandemic.

Despite the controversy, UPMC — which now operates 40 hospitals with annual revenue of $26 billion — continues to try and expand its market share. Late last year, the system signed a definitive agreement to acquire Washington Health Care Services, a Pennsylvania system with more than 2,000 employees and two hospitals. The deal faces pushback from local unions.

Healthcare 2024: The 10 Themes that will Dominate Discussion

Posted on by • Posted in Accountable Care Organization (ACO), Antitrust, Board, Board Effectiveness, C-Suite, Distrust, Health Policy, Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Market Consolidation, Market Trends, Market Uncertainty, Non-Profit Healthcare Industry, Physician Independence, Public Health, Workforce Issues, Workforce Strategy • Leave a comment
Healthcare 2024: The 10 Themes that will Dominate Discussion

The U.S. health system has experienced three major shifts since the pandemic that set the stage for its future:

  • From trust to distrust: Every poll has chronicled the decline in trust and confidence in government: Congress, the Presidency, the FDA and CDC and even the Supreme Court are at all-time lows. Thus, lawmaking about healthcare is met with unusual hostility.
  • From big to bigger: The market has consistently rewarded large cap operators, giving advantage to national and global operators in health insurance, information technology and retail health. In response, horizontal consolidation via mergers and acquisitions has enabled hospitals, medical practices, law firms and consultancies to get bigger, attracting increased attention from regulators. Access to private capital and investor confidence is a major differentiator for major players in each sector.
  • From regulatory tailwinds to headwinds: in the last 3 years, regulators have forced insurers, hospitals and drug companies to disclose prices and change business practices deemed harmful to fair competition and consumer choice. Incumbent-unfriendly scrutiny has increased at both the state and federal levels including notable bipartisan support for industry-opposed legislation. It will continue as healthcare favor appears to have run its course.

Some consider these adverse; others opportunistic; all consider them profound. All concede the long-term destination of the U.S. health system is unknown. Against this backdrop, 2024 is about safe bets.

These 10 themes will be on the agenda for every organization operating in the $4.5 trillion U.S. healthcare market:

  1. Not for profit health: “Not-for-profit” designation is significant in healthcare and increasingly a magnet for unwelcome attention. Not-for-profit hospitals, especially large, diversified multi-hospital systems, will face increased requirements to justify their tax exemptions. Special attention will be directed at non-operating income activities involving partnerships with private equity and incentives used in compensating leaders. Justification for profits will take center stage in 2024 with growing antipathy toward organizations deemed to put profit above all else.
  2. Insurer coverage and business practices: State and federal regulators will impose regulatory constraints on insurer business practices that lend to consumer and small-business affordability issues.
  3. Workforce wellbeing: The pandemic hangover, sustained impact of inflation on consumer prices, increased visibility of executive compensation and heightened public support for the rank-and-file workers and means wellbeing issues must be significant in 2024.
  4. Board effectiveness: The composition, preparedness, compensation and independent judgement of Boards will attract media scrutiny; not-for-profit boards will get special attention in light of 2023 revelations in higher education.
  5. Employer-sponsored health benefits: The cost-effectiveness of employee health benefits coverage will prompt some industries and large, self-insured companies to pursue alternative strategies for attracting and maintaining a productive workforce. Direct contracting, on-site and virtual care will be key elements.
  6. Physician independence: With 20% of physicians in private equity-backed groups, and 50% in hospital employed settings, ‘corporatization’ will encounter stiff resistance from physicians increasingly motivated to activism believing their voices are unheard.
  7. Data driven healthcare: The health industry’s drive toward interoperability and transparency will will force policy changes around data (codes) and platform ownership, intellectual property boundaries, liability et al. Experience-based healthcare will be forcibly constrained by data-driven changes to processes and insights.
  8. Consolidation: The DOJ and FTC will expand their activism against vertical and horizontal consolidation that result in higher costs for consumers. Retrospective analyses of prior deals to square promises and actual results will be necessary.
  9. Public health: State and federal funding for public health programs that integrate with community-based health providers will be prioritized. The inadequacy of public health funding versus the relative adequacy of healthcare’s more lucrative services will be the centerpiece for health reforms.
  10. ACO 2.0: In Campaign 2024, abortion and the Affordable Care Act will be vote-getters for candidates favoring/opposing current policies. Calls to “Fix and Repair” the Affordable Care Act will take center stage as voters’ seek affordability and access remedies.

Every Board and C suite in U.S. healthcare will face these issues in 2024.

Physician-Owned Hospitals: The Answer for Better Care?

Posted on by • Posted in 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, ACA, Antitrust, Competition, For-Profit, Health Policy, Health Policy Research, Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Market Consolidation, Market Power, Medicaid, Monopoly, Office of Inspector General (IG), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Ownership, Physician Owned Hospitals, Specialty Hospitals, Stark Law, Tax Exempt Status, Uncompensated Care • Leave a comment

https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/998353?form=fpf#vp_1

This discussion was recorded on November 16, 2023. This transcript has been edited for clarity.

Robert D. Glatter, MD: Welcome. I’m Dr Robert Glatter, medical advisor for Medscape Emergency Medicine. Joining me today is Dr Brian Miller, a hospitalist with Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine and a health policy expert, to discuss the current and renewed interest in physician-owned hospitals.

Welcome, Dr Miller. It’s a pleasure to have you join me today.

Brian J. Miller, MD, MBA, MPH: Thank you for having me.

History and Controversies Surrounding Physician-Owned Hospitals

Glatter: I want to start off by having you describe the history associated with the moratorium on new physician-owned hospitals in 2010 that’s related ultimately to the Affordable Care Act, but also, the current and renewed media interest in physician-owned hospitals that’s linked to recent congressional hearings last month.

Miller: Thank you. I should note that my views are my own and don’t represent those of Hopkins or the American Enterprise Institute, where I’m a nonresident fellow nor the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, of which I’m a Commissioner.

The story about physician-owned hospitals is an interesting one. Hospitals turned into health systems in the 1980s and 1990s, and physicians started to shift purely from an independent model into a more organized group practice or employed model. Physicians realized that they wanted an alternative operating arrangement. You want a choice of how you practice and what your employment is. And as community hospitals started to buy physicians and also establish their own physician groups de novo, physicians opened physician-owned hospitals.

Physician-owned hospitals fell into a couple of buckets. One is what we call community hospitals, or what the antitrust lawyers would call general acute care hospitals: those offering emergency room (ER) services, labor and delivery, primary care, general surgery — the whole regular gamut, except that some of the owners were physicians.

The other half of the marketplace ended up being specialty hospitals: those built around a specific medical specialty and series of procedures and chronic care. For example, cardiac hospitals often do CABG, TAVR, maybe abdominal aortic aneurysm (triple A) repairs, and they have cardiology clinics, cath labs, a cardiac intensive care unit (ICU), ER, etc. There were also orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals, which were sort of like an ambulatory surgery center (ASC) plus several beds. Then there were general surgical specialty hospitals. At one point, there were some women’s health–focused specialty hospitals.

The hospital industry, of course, as you can understand, didn’t exactly like this. They had a series of concerns about what we would historically call cherry-picking or lemon-dropping of patients. They were worried that physician-owned facilities didn’t want to serve public payer patients, and there was a whole series of reports and investigations.

Around the time the Affordable Care Act passed, the hospital industry had many concerns about physician-owned specialty hospitals, and there was a moratorium as part of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act. As part of the bargaining over the hospital industry support for the Affordable Care Act, they traded their support for, among other things, their number one priority, which is a statutory prohibition on new or expanded physician-owned hospitals from participating in Medicare. That included both physician-owned community hospitals and physician-owned specialty hospitals.

Glatter: I guess the main interest is that, when physicians have an ownership or a stake in the hospital, this is what the Stark laws obviously were aimed at. That was part of the impetus to prevent physicians from referring patients where they had an ownership stake. Certainly, hospitals can be owned by attorneys and nonprofit organizations, and certainly, ASCs can be owned by physicians. There is an ongoing issue in terms of physicians not being able to have an ownership stake. In terms of equity ownership, we know that certain other models allow this, but basically, it sounds like this is an issue with Medicare. That seems to be the crux of it, correct?

Miller: Yes. I would also add that it’s interesting when we look at other professions. When we look at lawyers, nonlawyers are actually not allowed to own an equity stake in a law practice. In many other professions, you either have corporate ownership or professional ownership, or the alternative is you have only professional ownership. I would say the hospital industry is one of the few areas where professional ownership not only is not allowed, but also is statutorily prohibited functionally through the Medicare program.

Unveiling the Dynamics of Hospital Ownership

Glatter: A recent study done by two PhDs looked at 2019 data on 20 of the most expensive diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). It examined the cost savings, and we’re talking over $1 billion in expenditures when you look at the data from general acute care hospitals vs physician-owned hospitals. This is what appears to me to be a key driver of the push to loosen restrictions on physician-owned hospitals. Isn’t that correct?

Miller: I would say that’s one of many components. There’s more history to this issue. I remember sitting at a think tank talking to someone several years ago about hospital consolidation as an issue. We went through the usual levers that us policy wonks go through. We talked about antitrust enforcement, certificate of need, rising hospital costs from consolidation, lower quality (or at least no quality gains, as shown by a New England Journal of Medicine study), and decrements in patient experience that result from the diseconomies of scale. They sort of pooh-poohed many of the policy ideas. They basically said that there was no hope for hospital consolidation as an issue.

Well, what about physician ownership? I started with my research team to comb through the literature and found a variety of studies — some of which were sort of entertaining, because they’d do things like study physician-owned specialty hospitals, nonprofit-owned specialty hospitals, and for-profit specialty hospitals and compare them with nonprofit or for-profit community hospitals, and then say physician-owned hospitals that were specialty were bad.

They mixed ownership and service markets right there in so many ways, I’m not sure where to start. My team did a systematic review of around 30 years of research, looking at the evidence base in this space. We found a couple of things.

We found that physician-owned community hospitals did not have a cost or quality difference, meaning that there was no definitive evidence that the physician-owned community hospitals were cheaper based on historical evidence, which was very old. That means there’s not specific harm from them. When you permit market entry for community hospitals, that promotes competition, which results in lower prices and higher quality.

Then we also looked at the specialty hospital markets — surgical specialty hospitals, orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals, and cardiac hospitals. We noted for cardiac hospitals, there wasn’t clear evidence about cost savings, but there was definitive evidence of higher quality, from things like 30-day mortality for significant procedures like treatment of acute MI, triple A repair, stuff like that.

For orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals, we noted lower costs and higher quality, which again fits with operationally what we would know. If you have a facility that’s doing 20 total hips a day, you’re creating a focused factory. Just like if you think about it for interventional cardiology, your boards have a minimum number of procedures that you have to do to stay certified because we know about the volume-quality relationship.

Then we looked at general surgical specialty hospitals. There wasn’t enough evidence to make a conclusive thought about costs, and there was a clear trend toward higher quality. I would say this recent study is important, but there is a whole bunch of other literature out there, too.

Exploring the Scope of Emergency Care in Physician-Owned Hospitals

Glatter: Certainly, your colleague Wang from Johns Hopkins has done important research in this sector. The paper, “Reconsidering the Ban on Physician-Owned Hospitals to Combat Consolidation,” by you and several colleagues, mentions and highlights the issues that you just described. I understand that it’s going to be published in the N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy.

One thing I want to bring up — and this is an important issue — is that the risk for patients has been talked about by the American Hospital Association and the Federation of American Hospitals, in terms of limited or no emergency services at such physician-owned hospitals and having to call 911 when patients need emergent care or stabilization. That’s been the rebuttal, along with an Office of Inspector General (OIG) report from 2008. Almost, I guess, three quarters of the patients that needed emergent care got this at publicly funded hospitals.

Miller: I’m familiar with the argument about emergency care. If you actually go and look at it, it differs by specialty market. Physician-owned community hospitals have ERs because that’s how they get their business. If you are running a hospital medicine floor, a general surgical specialty floor, you have a labor delivery unit, a primary care clinic, and a cardiology clinic. You have all the things that all the other hospitals have. The physician-owned community hospitals almost uniformly have an ER.

When you look at the physician-owned specialty hospitals, it’s a little more granular. If you look at the cardiac hospitals, they have ERs. They also have cardiac ICUs, operating rooms, etc. The area where the hospital industry had concerns — which I think is valid to point out — is that physician-owned orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals don’t have ERs. But this makes sense because of what that hospital functionally is: a factory for whatever the scope of procedures is, be it joint replacements or shoulder arthroscopy. The orthopedic surgical specialty hospital is like an ASC plus several hospital beds. Many of those did not have ERs because clinically it didn’t make sense.

What’s interesting, though, is that the hospital industry also operates specialty hospitals. If you go into many of the large systems, they have cardiac specialty hospitals and cancer specialty hospitals. I would say that some of them have ERs, as they appropriately should, and some of those specialty hospitals do not. They might have a community hospital down the street that’s part of that health system that has an ER, but some of the specialty hospitals don’t necessarily have a dedicated ER.

I agree, that’s a valid concern. I would say, though, the question is, what are the scope of services in that hospital? Is an ER required? Community hospitals should have ERs. It makes sense also for a cardiac hospital to have one. If you’re running a total joint replacement factory, it might not make clinical sense.

Glatter: The patients who are treated at that hospital, if they do have emergent conditions, need to have board-certified emergency physicians treating them, in my view because I’m an ER physician. Having surgeons that are not emergency physicians staff a department at a specialty orthopedic hospital or, say, a cancer hospital is not acceptable from my standpoint. That’s my opinion and recommendation, coming from emergency medicine.

Miller: I would say that anesthesiologists are actually highly qualified in critical care. The question is about clinical decompensation; if you’re doing a procedure, you have an anesthesiologist right there who is capable of critical care. The function of the ER is to either serve as a window into the hospital for patient volume or to serve as a referral for emergent complaints.

Glatter: An anesthesiologist — I’ll take issue with that — does not have the training of an emergency physician in terms of scope of practice.

Miller: My anesthesiology colleagues would probably disagree for managing an emergency during an operating room case.

Glatter: Fair enough, but I think in the general sense. The other issue is that, in terms of emergent responses to patients that decompensate, when you have to transfer a patient, that violates Medicare requirements. How is that even a valid issue or argument if you’re going to have to transfer a patient from your specialty hospital? That happens. Again, I know that you’re saying these hospitals are completely independent and can function, stabilize patients, and treat emergencies, but that’s not the reality across the country, in my opinion.

Miller: I don’t think that’s the case for the physician-owned specialty cardiac hospitals, for starters. Many of those have ICUs in addition to operating rooms as a matter of routine in addition to ERs. I don’t think that’s the case for physician-owned community hospitals, which have ERs, ICUs, medicine floors, and surgical floors. Physician-owned community hospitals are around half the market. Of that remaining market, a significant percentage are cardiac hospitals. If you’re taking an issue with orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals, that’s a clinical operational question that can and should be answered.

I’d also posit that the nonprofit and for-profit hospital industries also operate specialty hospitals. Any of these questions, we shouldn’t just be asking about physician-owned facilities; we should be asking about them across ownership types, because we’re talking about scope of service and quality and safety. The ownership in that case doesn’t matter. The broader question is, are orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals owned by physicians, tax-exempt hospitals, or tax-paying hospitals? Is that a valid clinical business model? Is it safe? Does it meet Medicare conditions of participation? I would say that’s what that question is, because other ownership models do operate those facilities.

Glatter: You make some valid points, and I do agree on some of them. I think that, ultimately, these models of care, and certainly cost and quality, are issues. Again, it goes back to being able, in my opinion, to provide emergent care, which seems to me a very important issue.

Miller: I agree that providing emergent care is an issue. It’s an issue in any site of care. The hospital industry posits that all hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) have emergent care. I can tell you, having worked in HOPDs (I’ve trained in them during residency), the response if something emergent happens is to either call 911 or wheel the patient down to the ER in a wheelchair or stretcher. I think that these hospital claims about emergency care coverage —these are important questions, but we should be asking them across all clinical settings and say what is the appropriate scope of care provided? What is the appropriate level of acuity and ability to provide emergent or critical care? That’s an important question regardless of ownership model across the entire industry.

Deeper Dive Into Data on Physician-Owned Hospitals

Glatter: We need to really focus on that. I’ll agree with you on that.

There was a March 2023 report from Dobson | DaVanzo. It showed that physician-owned hospitals had lower Medicaid, dual-eligible, and uncompensated care and charity care discharges than full-service acute care hospitals. Physician-owned hospitals had less than half the proportion of Medicaid discharges compared with non–physician-owned hospitals. They were also less likely to care for dual-eligible patients overall compared with non–physician-owned hospitals.

In addition, when COVID hit, the physician-owned hospitals overall — and again, there may be exceptions — were not equipped to handle these patient surges in the acute setting of a public health emergency. There was a hospital in Texas that did pivot that I’m aware of — Renaissance Hospital, which ramped up a long-term care facility to become a COVID hospital — but I think that’s the exception. I think this report raises some valid concerns; I’ll let you rebut that.

Miller: A couple of things. One, I am not aware that there’s any clear market evidence or a systematic study that shows that physician-owned hospitals had trouble responding to COVID. I don’t think that assertion has been proven. The study was funded by the hospital industry. First of all, it was not a peer-reviewed study; it was funded by an industry that paid a consulting firm. It doesn’t mean that we still shouldn’t read it, but that brings bias into question. The joke in Washington is, pick your favorite statistician or economist, and they can say what you want and have a battle of economists and statisticians.

For example, in that study, they didn’t include the entire ownership universe of physician-owned hospitals. If we go to the peer-reviewed literature, there’s a great 2015 BMJ paper showing that the Medicaid payer mix is actually the same between physician-owned hospitals vs not. The mix of patients by ethnicity — for example, think about African American patients — was the same. I would be more inclined to believe the peer-reviewed literature in BMJ as opposed to an industry-funded study that was not peer-reviewed and not independent and has methodological questions.

Glatter: Those data are 8 years old, so I’d like to see more recent data. It would be interesting, just as a follow-up to that, to see where the needle has moved — if it has, for that matter — in terms of Medicaid patients that you’re referring to.

Miller: I tend to be skeptical of all industry research, regardless of who published it, because they have an economic incentive. If they’re selecting certain age groups or excluding certain hospitals, that makes you wonder about the validity of the study. Your job as an industry-funded researcher is that, essentially, you’re being paid to look for an answer. It’s not necessarily an honest evaluation of the data.

Glatter: I want to bring up another point about the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) and the data on how physician-owned hospitals compared with acute care hospitals that are non–physician-owned and have you comment on that. The Dobson | DaVanzo study called into question that physician-owned hospitals treat fewer patients who are dual-eligible, which we know.

Miller: I don’t think we do know that.

Glatter: There are data that point to that, again, looking at the studies.

Miller: I’m saying that’s a single study funded by industry as opposed to an independent, academic, peer-reviewed literature paper. That would be like saying, during the debate of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), that you should read the pharmaceutical industries research but take any of it at pure face value as factual. Yes, we should read it. Yes, we should evaluate it on its own merits. I think, again, appropriately, you need to be concerned when people have an economic incentive.

The question about the HRRP I’m going to take a little broader, because I think that program is unfair to the industry overall. There are many factors that drive hospital readmission. Whether Mrs Smith went home and ate potato chips and then took her Lasix, that’s very much outside of the hospital industry’s control, and there’s some evidence that the HRRP increases mortality in some patient populations.

In terms of a quality metric, it’s unfair to the industry. I think we took an operating process, internal metric for the hospital industry, turned it into a quality metric, and attached it to a financial bonus, which is an inappropriate policy decision.

Rethinking Ownership Models and Empowering Clinicians

Glatter: I agree with you on that. One thing I do want to bring up is that whether the physician-owned hospitals are subject to many of the quality measures that full-service, acute care hospitals are. That really is, I think, a broader context.

Miller: Fifty-five percent of physician-owned hospitals are full-service community hospitals, so I would say at least half the market is 100% subject to that.

Glatter: If only 50% are, that’s already an issue.

Miller: Cardiac specialty hospitals — which, as I said, nonprofit and for-profit hospital chains also operate — are also subject to the appropriate quality measures, readmissions, etc. Just because we don’t necessarily have the best quality measurement in the system in the country, it doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t allow care specialization. As I’d point out, if we’re concerned about specialty hospitals, the concern shouldn’t just be about physician-owned specialty hospitals; it should be about specialty hospitals by and large. Many health systems run cardiac specialty hospitals, cancer specialty hospitals, and orthopedic specialty hospitals. If we’re going to have a discussion about concerns there, it should be about the entire industry of specialty hospitals.

I think specialty hospitals serve an important role in society, allowing for specialization and exploiting in a positive way the volume-quality relationship. Whether those are owned by a for-profit publicly traded company, a tax-exempt facility, or physicians, I think that is an important way to have innovation and care delivery because frankly, we haven’t had much innovation in care delivery. Much of what we do in terms of how we practice clinically hasn’t really changed in the 50 years since my late father graduated from medical school. We still have rounds, we’re still taking notes, we’re still operating in the same way. Many processes are manual. We don’t have the mass production and mass customization of care that we need.

When you have a focused factory, it allows you to design care in a way that drives up quality, not just for the average patient but also the patients at the tail ends, because you have time to focus on that specific service line and that specific patient population.

Physician-owned community hospitals offer an important opportunity for a different employment model. I remember going to the dermatologist and the dermatologist was depressed, shuffling around the room, sad, and I asked him why. He said he didn’t really like his employer, and I said, “Why don’t you pick another one?” He’s like, “There are only two large health systems I can work for. They all have the same clinical practice environment and functionally the same value.”

Physicians are increasingly burned out. They face monopsony power in who purchases their labor. They have little control. They don’t want to go through five committees, seven administrators, and attend 25 meetings just to change a single small process in clinical operations. If you’re an owner operator, you have a much better ability to do it.

Frankly, when many facilities do well now, when they do well clinically and do well financially, who benefits? The hospital administration and the hospital executives. The doctors aren’t benefiting. The nurses aren’t benefiting. The CNA is not benefiting. The secretary is not benefiting. The custodian is not benefiting. Shouldn’t the workers have a right to own and operate the business and do well when the business does well serving the community? That puts me in the weird space of agreeing with both conservatives and progressives.

Glatter: I agree with you. I think an ownership stake is always attractive. It helps with retention of employed persons. There’s no question that, when they have a stake, when they have skin in the game, they feel more empowered. I will not argue with you about that.

Miller: We don’t have business models where workers have that option in healthcare. Like the National Academy of Medicine said, one of the key drivers of burnout is the externalization of the locus of control over clinical practice, and the current business operating models guarantee an externalization of the locus of control over clinical practice.

If you actually look at the recent American Medical Association (AMA) meeting, there was a resolution to ban the corporate practice of medicine. They wanted to go more toward the legal professions model where only physicians can own and operate care delivery.

Glatter: Well, I think the shift is certainly something that the AMA would like and physicians collectively would agree with. Having a better lifestyle and being able to have control are factors in burnout.

Miller: It’s not just doctors. I think nurses want a better lifestyle. The nurses are treated as interchangeable lines on a spreadsheet. The nurses are an integral part of our clinical team. Why don’t we work together as a clinical unit to build a better delivery system? What better way to do that than to have clinicians in charge of it, right?

My favorite bakery that’s about 30 minutes away is owned by a baker. It is not owned by a large tax-exempt corporation. It’s owned by an owner operator who takes pride in their work. I think that is something that the profession would do well to return to. When I was a resident, one of my colleagues was already planning their retirement. That’s how depressed they were.

I went into medicine to actually care for patients. I think that we can make the world a better place for our patients. What that means is not only treating them with drugs and devices, but also creating a delivery system where they don’t have to wander from lobby to lobby in a 200,000 square-foot facility, wait in line for hours on end, get bills 6 months later, and fill out endless paper forms over and over again.

All of these basic processes in healthcare delivery that are broken could have and should have been fixed — and have been fixed in almost every other industry. I had to replace one of my car tires because I had a flat tire. The local tire shop has an app, and it sends me SMS text messages telling me when my appointment is and when my car is ready. We have solved all of these problems in many other businesses.

We have not solved them in healthcare delivery because, one, we have massive monopolies that are raising prices, have lower quality, and deliver a crappy patient experience, and we have also subjugated the clinical worker into a corporate automaton. We are functionally drones. We don’t have the agency and the authority to improve clinical operations anymore. It’s really depressing, and we should have that option again.

I trust my doctor. I trust the nurses that I work with, and I would like them to help make clinical decisions in a financially responsible and a sensible operational manner. We need to empower our workforce in order to do that so we can recapture the value of what it means to be a clinician again.

The current model of corporate employment: massive scale, more administrators, more processes, more emails, more meetings, more PowerPoint decks, more federal subsidies. The hospital industry has choices. It can improve clinical operations. It can show up in Washington and lobby for increased subsidies. It can invest in the market and not pay taxes for the tax-exempt facilities. Obviously, it makes the logical choices as an economic actor to show up, lobby for increased subsidies, and then also invest in the stock market.

Improving clinical operations is hard. It hasn’t happened. The Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the private community hospital industry has had flat labor productivity growth, on average, for the past 25 years, and for some years it even declined. This is totally atypical across the economy.

We have failed our clinicians, and most importantly, we have failed our patients. I’ve been sick. My relatives have been sick, waiting hours, not able to get appointments, and redoing forms. It’s a total disaster. It’s time and reasonable to try an alternative ownership and operating model. There are obviously problems. The problems can and should be addressed, but it doesn’t mean that we should have a statutory prohibition on professionals owning and operating their own business.

Glatter: There was a report that $500 million was saved by limiting or banning or putting a moratorium on physician-owned hospitals by the Congressional Budget Office.

Miller: Yes, I’m very aware of those data. I’d say that the CBO also is off by 50% on the estimation of the implementation of the Part D program. They overestimated the Affordable Care Act market enrollment by over 10 million people — again, around 50%. They also estimated that the CMS Innovation Center initially would be a savings. Now they’ve re-estimated it as a 10-year expenditure and it has actually cost the taxpayers money.

The CBO is not transparent about what its assumptions are or its analysis and methods. As a researcher, we have to publish our information. It has to go through peer review. I want to know what goes into that $500 million figure — what the assumptions are and what the model is. It’s hard to comment without knowing how they came up with it.

Glatter: The points you make are very valid. Physicians and nurses want a better lifestyle.

Miller: It’s not even a better lifestyle. It’s about having a say in how clinical operations work and helping make them better. We want the delivery system to work better. This is an opportunity for us to do so.

Glatter: That translates into technology: obviously, generative artificial intelligence (AI) coming into the forefront, as we know, and changing care delivery models as you’re referring to, which is going to happen. It’s going to be a slow process. I think that the evolution is happening and will happen, as you accurately described.

Miller: The other thing that’s different now vs 20 years ago is that managed care is here, there, and everywhere, as Dr Seuss would say. You have utilization review and prior authorization, which I’ve experienced as a patient and a physician, and boy, is it not a fun process. There’s a large amount of friction that needs to be improved. If we’re worried about induced demand or inappropriate utilization, we have managed care right there to help police bad behavior.

Reforming Healthcare Systems and Restoring Patient-Centric Focus

Glatter: If you were to come up with, say, three bullet points of how we can work our way out of this current morass of where our healthcare systems exist, where do you see the solutions or how can we make and effect change?

Miller: I’d say there are a couple of things. One is, let business models compete fairly on an equal playing field. Let the physician-owned hospital compete with the tax-exempt hospital and the nonprofit hospital. Put them on an equal playing field. We have things like 340B, which favors tax-exempt hospitals. For-profit or tax-paying hospitals are not able to participate in that. That doesn’t make any sense just from a public policy perspective. Tax-paying hospitals and physician-owned hospitals pay taxes on investments, but tax-exempt hospitals don’t. I think, in public policy, we need to equalize the playing field between business models. Let the best business model win.

The other thing we need to do is to encourage the adoption of technology. The physician will eventually be an arbiter of tech-driven or AI-driven tools. In fact, at some point, the standard of care might be to use those tools. Not using those tools would be seen as negligence. If you think about placing a jugular or central venous catheter, to not use ultrasound would be considered insane. Thirty years ago, to use ultrasound would be considered novel. I think technology and AI will get us to that point of helping make care more efficient and more customized.

Those are the two biggest interventions, I would say. Third, every time we have a conversation in public policy, we need to remember what it is to be a patient. The decision should be driven not around any one industry’s profitability, but what it is to be a patient and how we can make that experience less burdensome, less expensive, or in plain English, suck less.

Glatter: Safety net hospitals and critical access hospitals are part of this discussion that, yes, we want everything to, in an ideal world, function more efficiently and effectively, with less cost and less red tape. The safety net of our nation is struggling.

Miller: I 100% agree. The Cook County hospitals of the world are deserving of our support and, frankly, our gratitude. Facilities like that have huge burdens of patients with Medicaid. We also still have millions of uninsured patients. The neighborhoods that they serve are also poorer. I think facilities like that are deserving of public support.

I also think we need to clearly define what those hospitals are. One of the challenges I’ve realized as I waded into this space is that market definitions of what a service market is for a hospital, its specialty type or what a safety net hospital is need to be more clearly defined because those facilities 100% are deserving of our support. We just need to be clear about what they are.

Regarding critical access hospitals, when you practice in a rural area, you have to think differently about care delivery. I’d say many of the rural systems are highly creative in how they structure clinical operations. Before the public health emergency, during the COVID pandemic, when we had a massive change in telehealth, rural hospitals were using — within the very narrow confines — as much telehealth as they could and should.

Rural hospitals also make greater use of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs). For many of the specialty services, I remember, your first call was an NP or a PA because the physician was downstairs doing procedures. They’d come up and assess the patient before the procedure, but most of your consult questions were answered by the NP or PA. I’m not saying that’s the model we should use nationwide, but that rural systems are highly innovative and creative; they’re deserving of our time, attention, and support, and frankly, we can learn from them.

Glatter: I want to thank you for your time and your expertise in this area. We’ll see how the congressional hearings affect the industry as a whole, how the needle moves, and whether the ban or moratorium on physician-owned hospitals continues to exist going forward.

Miller: I appreciate you having me. The hospital industry is one of the most important industries for health care. This is a time of inflection, right? We need to go back to the value of what it means to be a clinician and serve patients. Hospitals need to reorient themselves around that core concern. How do we help support clinicians — doctors, nurses, pharmacists, whomever it is — in serving patients? Hospitals have become too corporate, so I think that this is an expected pushback.

Glatter: Again, I want to thank you for your time. This was a very important discussion. Thank you for your expertise.

Robert D. Glatter, MD, is an assistant professor of emergency medicine at Zucker School of Medicine at Hofstra/Northwell in Hempstead, New York. He is a medical advisor for Medscape and hosts the Hot Topics in EM series.

Brian J. Miller, MD, MBA, MPH, is a hospitalist and an assistant professor of medicine at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. He is also a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. From 2014 – 2017, Dr Miller worked at four federal regulatory agencies: Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and the Food & Drug Administration (FDA).

Jefferson, Lehigh Valley Health plan to merge into 30-hospital system

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https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-and-valuation/jefferson-lehigh-valley-health-plan-to-merge-into-30-hospital-system.html?origin=CEOE&utm_source=CEOE&utm_medium=email&utm_content=newsletter&oly_enc_id=2893H2397267F7G

Pennsylvania health systems Jefferson and Lehigh Valley Health Network have signed a non-binding letter of intent to combine.

Philadelphia-based Jefferson and Allentown, Pa.-based LVHN announced the letter Dec. 19 in a news release, with expectations to close the transaction in 2024. Combined, Jefferson and LVHN would form a system with 30 hospitals, more than 700 sites of care and more than 62,000 employees. 

Jefferson CEO Joseph Cacchione, MD, will serve as CEO of the expanded system — dubbed for now as Jefferson Enterprise — and LVHN President and CEO Brian Nester, DO, will serve as its executive vice president and COO. Dr. Nester will also serve as president of the legacy LVHN, reporting directly to Dr. Cacchione. An integrated board of trustees and leadership team will be made up of members from both systems, specifics of which are expected in the definitive agreement.

“The healthcare landscape and our communities’ needs are changing; it is critical leading systems evolve and make investments in the future of care and wellness — growing and protecting access to enhanced, affordable, high-quality and innovative care, particularly for historically underserved patients,” Dr. Cacchione said in the release. 

The merger is another development out of Jefferson, which has seen a year of change. Dr. Cacchione assumed the CEO post in September 2022, and the system has since welcomed a new president, CFO, and dean of its medical school and physicians group. Earlier this year, Jefferson rolled out a reorganization plan to operate as three divisions instead of five, which involved layoffs affecting executives and a later workforce reduction of about 400 positions.  

Cost-cutting has been in effect at LVHN, too. The 13-hospital system, which includes nearly 3,000 physicians and advanced practice clinicians, eliminated approximately 240 positions as part of restructuring this fall. 

“In Jefferson, we have found an ideal partner that shares our culture and commitment to excellence in clinical care and a learning environment, and that has done a fabulous job in establishing a highly successful health plan with a sharp focus on the well-being of Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries,” Dr. Nester said. “The expertise derived from these operations is becoming a crucial competency for health systems to deliver on their mission, and Jefferson Health Plans will help drive improvements in health outcomes, especially in vulnerable populations. We are also very excited about the opportunity to expand academic and talent development programs that will further bolster our provider pipeline and enhance our ability to attract and retain top talent to the benefit of the communities we both serve.”

Cigna abandons Humana merger talks

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https://mailchi.mp/79ecc69aca80/the-weekly-gist-december-15-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

Following rumors of a potential merger reported last month by the Wall Street Journal, the paper shared this week that Bloomfield, CT-based Cigna is no longer pursuing an acquisition of Louisville, KY-based Humana.

According to insiders, the $140B merger was scuttled when the two health insurance giants couldn’t agree on price and other terms.

Instead, Cigna announced that it will be focusing on smaller, bolt-on acquisitions, and is reportedly still considering divesting its Medicare Advantage business.

Cigna also announced $10B of stock buybacks to assuage shareholders, who reacted negatively to the rumored deal, dropping the company’s stock price by nearly 10 percent since merger rumors surfaced. 

The Gist: While there are several reasons why this deal may have been called off—Wall Street’s adverse reaction, antitrust concerns, leaking of the talks before the parties were ready—this likely isn’t the end of either payer’s pursuit of greater scale, as both stand in UnitedHealth Group’s giant shadow. 

Given Cigna and Humana have each had potential mergers with other payers blocked by the courts, and federal antitrust scrutiny is only increasing, we’re wondering if each may be also looking at nontraditional partners (as Humana explored with Walmart in 2018), though the universe of companies with an interest in a vertically-integrated insurance and care business—and deep enough pockets—is small.