After UnitedHealth Group CEO Andrew Witty’s appearances at two congressional committee hearings last week, I had planned to write a story about what the lawmakers had to say. One idea I considered was to publish a compilation of some of the best zingers, and there were plenty, from Democrats and Republicans alike.
I reconsidered that idea because I know from the nearly half-century I have spent on or around Capitol Hill in one capacity or another that those zingers were carefully crafted by staffers who know how to write talking points to make them irresistible to the media. As a young Washington correspondent in the mid-to-late’70s, I included countless talking points in the stories I wrote for Scripps-Howard newspapers. After that, I wrote talking points for a gubernatorial candidate in Tennessee. I would go from there to write scads of them for CEOs and lobbyists to use with politicians and reporters during my 20 years in the health insurance business.
I know the game. And I know that despite all the arrows 40 members of Congress on both sides of the Hill shot at Witty last Wednesday, little if anything that could significantly change how UnitedHealth and the other big insurers do business will be enacted this year.
Money in politics is the elephant in any Congressional hearing room or executive branch office you might find yourself in (and it’s why I coauthored Nation on the Take with Nick Penniman).
You will hear plenty of sound and fury in those rooms but don’t hold your breath waiting for relief from ever-increasing premiums and out-of-pocket requirements and the many other barriers Big Insurance has erected to keep you from getting the care you need.
It is those same barriers doctors and nurses cite when they acknowledge the “moral injury” they incur trying to care for their patients under the tightening constraints imposed on them by profit-obsessed insurers, investors and giant hospital-based systems.
Funny not funny
Cartoonist Stephan Pastis captured the consequences of the corporate takeover of our government, accelerated by the Supreme Court’s 2010 landmark Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission ruling, in his Pearls Before Swine cartoon strip Sunday.
Rat: Where are you going, Pig?
Pig: To a politician’s rally. I’m taking my magic translation box.
Rat: He doesn’t speak English?
Pig: He speaks politicianish. This translates it into the truth. Come see.
Politician: In conclusion, if you send me to Washington, I’ll clean up this corrupt system and fight for you everyday hard-working Americans. God bless you. God bless the troops. And God bless America.
Magic translation box: I am given millions of dollars by the rich and the powerful to keep this rigged system exactly as it is. Until you change that, none of this will ever change and we’ll keep hoping you’re too distracted to notice.
Politician’s campaign goon: We’re gonna need a word with you.
Magic translation box: This is too much truth for one comic strip. Prepare to be disappeared.
Rat: I don’t know him.
Back to Sir Witty’s time on the hot seat. It attracted a fair amount of media coverage, chock full of politicians’ talking points, including in The New York Times and The Washington Post. (You can read this short Reuters story for free.) Witty, of course, came equipped with his own talking points, and he followed his PR and legal teams’ counsel: to be contrite at every opportunity; to extol the supposed benefits of bigness in health care (UnitedHealth being by far the world’s largest health care corporation) all the while stressing that his company is not really all that big because it doesn’t, you know, own hospitals and pharmaceutical companies [yet]; and to assure us all that the fixes to its hacked claims-handling subsidiary Change Healthcare are all but in.
Congress? Meh. Paying for care? WTF!
Wall Street was relieved and impressed that Witty acquitted himself so well. Investors shrugged off the many barbs aimed at him and his vast international empire. By the end of the day Wednesday, the company’s stock price had actually inched up a few cents, to $484.11. A modest 2.7 million shares of UnitedHealth’s stock were traded that day, considerably fewer than usual.
Instead of punishing UnitedHealth, investors inflicted massive pain on its chief rival, CVS, which owns Aetna. On the same day Witty went to Washington, CVS had to disclose that it missed Wall Street financial analyst’s earnings-per-share expectations for the first quarter of 2024 by several cents. Shareholders’ furor sent CVS’ stock price tumbling from $67.71 to a 15-year low of $54 at one point Wednesday before settling at $56.31 by the time the New York Stock Exchange closed. An astonishing 65.7 million shares of CVS stock were traded that day.
Postscript: I do want to bring to your attention one exchange between Witty and Rep. Buddy Carter (R-Ga.) during the House Energy and Commerce committee hearing. Carter is a pharmacist who has seen firsthand how UnitedHealth’s virtual integration–operating health insurance companies with one hand and racking up physician practices and clinics with the other–and its PBM’s business practices have contributed to the closure of hundreds of independent pharmacies in recent years. He’s also seen patients walk away from the pharmacy counter without their medications because of PBMs’ out-of-pocket demands (often hundreds and thousands of dollars). And he’s seen other patients face life-threatenng delays because of industry prior authorization requirements. Carter was instrumental in persuading the Federal Trade Commission to investigate PBMs’ ownership and business practices. He told Witty:
I’m going to continue to bust this up…This vertical integration in health care in general has got to end.
Policymakers and the media have been increasingly attentive to mergers and acquisitions and other potentially anticompetitive practices of hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers.
Consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency and help some struggling providers to keep their doors open in relatively underserved areas, but it can also reduce market competition and ease pressure on providers to lower prices or invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear evidence of improvements in quality, which has implications for consumers and employers. As a result, some have proposed strengthening antitrust regulation—which aims to protect competitive markets—as a tool for tackling rising health care costs, increasing the affordability of care, and reducing the large number of adults with medical debt.
Federal and state antitrust agencies play a role in challenging anticompetitive practices of health care providers and other businesses. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for enforcing federal antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. State attorneys general (AG) offices also have the authority to bring action under federal antitrust law, as well as under state statutes, which sometimes expand upon federal law.
This issue brief explains the role of federal and state antitrust agencies in challenging anticompetitive practices among health care providers, including the legal authority of federal and state agencies, the role that they play in enforcing antitrust laws, and proposed options for strengthening their authority. The brief focuses on health care providers, though many of the principles discussed in this issue brief apply to the practices of other health care entities as well, such as health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) (which are currently being reviewed by the FTC). While the focus of this brief is on the role of government agencies, antitrust law also authorizes private parties, such as employer health plans, to challenge anticompetitive practices in the courts.
What types of anticompetitive practices do governments challenge and why?
Governments challenge anticompetitive practices to promote competitive markets, often for the benefit of consumers (e.g., patients and health plan enrollees).1 Governments seek to address a variety of anticompetitive practices that may lead to higher prices without commensurate improvements in quality of care. These include anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions (referred to as “mergers” in this brief), and other activities that hinder competition (referred to as “nonmerger anticompetitive practices” in this brief).
Provider consolidationcan be beneficial to consumers in some instances and detrimental in others. On the one hand, consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency, such as by allowing providers to purchase supplies in bulk at a discount or by facilitating the coordination of care across different providers. On the other hand, consolidation has the potential to lead to worse outcomes for consumers by increasing providers’ market power and decreasing competition, which enhances the ability of providers to negotiate for higher prices (increasing costs for consumers and employers) and reduces the pressure on providers to invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear indications of quality improvements, though the strength of this evidence varies based on the type of consolidation and provider.
There are three main types of mergers:
Horizontal mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer the same or similar services, such as when a health system acquires a hospital or when two physician practices that provide overlapping services merge. Horizontal mergers can raise concerns about competition because they, by definition, reduce competitiveness when occurring between providers in the same market, and because consolidated entities can take actions to increase and protect their market power.
Vertical mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer different services along the same supply chain, such as when a hospital acquires a physician practice. Vertical mergers can raise anticompetitive concerns, for example, if physicians refer patients to hospitals within their health system rather than to competing hospitals. Some mergers may entail both vertical and horizontal consolidation (e.g., if a health system acquires a physician group that provides services offered by the system’s existing physician group).
Cross-market mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that operate in different geographic markets.2 Cross-market mergers may raise concerns about competition, for example, if a health system with providers in different areas of a state is able to use its dominant position in one market to negotiate higher prices in another when contracting with a given health plan (e.g., a state employee plan with enrollees that reside in several markets).
Governments also challenge other types of anticompetitive practices, such as the use of anticompetitive clauses in contracts between providers and insurers or providers and workers. Anticompetitive contract clauses give dominant parties an unfair advantage over potential competitors and can lead to higher prices. For example, some health systems have highly regarded hospitals (also known as “must have” hospitals) that insurers need to include in their provider networks in order to attract enrollees, which gives these systems substantial bargaining leverage over insurers. These health care systems can in turn use this bargaining leverage to pressure insurers to contract with all providers in the system (through “all-or-nothing clauses”), shielding expensive or low-quality members from competition with more desirable providers. The textbox below provides definitions of various anticompetitive contract clauses.
All-or-nothing clauses require an insurer that wants to contract with a particular provider in a system (such as a must-have hospital) to contract with all providers in that system.
Anti-tiering/anti-steering clauses prevent an insurer from putting a given provider in a non-preferred provider network tier or from using other incentives or tools to steer patients to competing providers. This can incentivize patients to use that provider, even if a higher-value provider is also in-network.
Exclusive contracting clauses prohibit an insurer from including competing providers in their provider network, so that a given provider is the only in-network option in a given area.
Non-compete clauses prevent a worker employed with a given provider from taking a job with a competing provider or starting a new practice within a certain distance for some duration of time.
Most favored nation clauses require a provider to offer an insurer the lowest rates of all the insurers with which it has contracted. While the examples above create favorable terms for providers in their contracts with insurers, most favored nation clauses create favorable terms for insurers in their contracts with providers.4
What federal antitrust laws govern anticompetitive practices?
There are three primary federal antitrust laws—the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act—that prohibit anticompetitive mergers and other anticompetitive practices.
The Sherman Act (1890) broadly prohibits anticompetitive practices. It has been used to challenge various anticompetitive practices, such as mergers, wage suppression, agreements among competing businesses to fix prices, and anticompetitive contracting clauses.
The Clayton Act(1914) builds on the Sherman Act by explicitly prohibiting anticompetitive mergers as well as other types of anticompetitive practices that are not clearly addressed by the Sherman Act (such as by barring the same individual from serving on the board of directors for two competing health systems, with some exceptions). Additionally, as amended under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976, the law requires that merging entities report their plans in advance to federal regulators in certain cases where the transaction exceeds a specified value ($111.4 million in 2023), which gives regulators time to investigate and intervene if needed.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act(1914) created the FTC and prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The FTC Act encompasses the same types of violations that are covered by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, in addition to other anticompetitive practices, and grants the FTC regulatory authority. Unlike the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities.5
Some forms of business practices, such as almost all instances where competitors coordinate to raise prices, are inherently illegal under federal law. The legality of other types of business practices depends on the context. For instance, when government agencies challenge a merger, courts assess whether the merger would likely harm competition in a given market.
What is the FTC’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?
Two federal agencies—the FTC and DOJ—have overlapping, as well as distinct, authority to challenge anticompetitive practices under federal law. The FTC is the only entity that can enforce the FTC Act. Although this Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities, the FTC has the authority to enforce the Clayton Act against nonprofit entities (in addition to for-profit entities), such as by challenging anticompetitive mergers among nonprofits. The DOJ has the authority to enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts. States can also bring lawsuits under federal antitrust law, as can some private parties, such as competing providers.
The FTC focuses on “protecting the public from deceptive or unfair business practices and from unfair methods of competition.” This includes challenging activities such as misleading advertisements, violations of consumers’ data privacy, and efforts to accumulate market power through mergers and other anticompetitive practices. For instance, the FTC sued Facebook in 2020, alleging, in part, that the company had sought to maintain its monopoly power by buying up competitors, such as Instagram and WhatsApp.
The FTC plays a larger role than the DOJ in enforcing federal antitrust law in health care provider markets, though there are gaps in its authority. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in certain areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets (see more below). However, although the FTC has broad authority to challenge anticompetitive mergers, its authority to challenge other anticompetitive practices often excludes nonprofits. Nonprofit ownership is common in provider markets. For example, nonprofits account for about three-fifths (58%) of community hospitals in 2023. The DOJ may fill in for the FTC when the FTC does not have the authority to challenge nonprofit providers that are engaging in certain anticompetitive practices (see example of Atrium Health below).
The FTC has successfully challenged several hospital mergers over the past two decades. Beginning in the 1990s and for several years afterwards, the FTC had difficulty challenging hospital mergers in the courts, allowing rapid consolidation in the hospital sector to continue unabated.6 Since the late 2000s, the FTC has since been more successful in challenging hospital mergers, reflecting advances in both economics and the FTC’s new legal strategies.7 However, the FTC challenges only a fraction of hospital mergers, and it is difficult to know the extent to which mergers that go unchallenged have an adverse impact on consumers, in terms of costs and quality. For instance, in 2022, the FTC challenged 3 hospital mergers and, in each case, the hospitals abandoned their plans to merge, while one analysis documented 53 hospital merger announcements in that year. The same analysis identified more hospital merger announcements in the years prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., 92 in 2019).
Example: FTC & Advocate Health Care Network
In 2015, the FTC brought a legal challenge against a proposed merger of two Chicago-area health systems: Advocate Health Care Network and NorthShore University Health System. The FTC argued that the combined entity would control over half of the market for general acute care inpatient hospital services, compared to the next largest provider, which would have only controlled 15% of the market. The court placed a temporary block on the merger, and the systems ultimately abandoned their plans to merge before the case went to trial.
The FTC has played a smaller role in challenging physician mergers. A key challenge is that physician mergers tend to be smaller, and physician groups often grow slowly over time by acquiring small group practices and hiring new physicians. As a result, physician groups often do not need to report mergers to federal regulators as their transactions tend to fall below Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting thresholds (though regulators can still challenge mergers that they learn about in other ways). Additionally, because they tend to be small, any given merger may not have an appreciable effect on market power, even if the cumulative effect of these mergers leads to a large concentration of market power over time.
Vertical mergers in health care provider markets have largely escaped FTC enforcement and the FTC has never challenged a cross-market merger, though it has expressed interest in both practices. For instance, in 2021, the FTC announced that it would begin to study the effect of vertical mergers between health care facilities and physician groups. The FTC previously conducted studies of horizontal mergers in advance of successful litigation. The FTC has also investigated specific instances of cross-market mergers, although it has yet to bring a challenge.
Example: FTC & St. Luke’s Health System
In 2012, St. Luke’s Health System in Idaho attempted to acquire Saltzer Medical Group, a physician practice group. Although this proposed acquisition had elements of a vertical merger, the FTC challenged it as a horizontal merger, i.e., on the basis that St. Luke’s would obtain a dominant market share for adult primary care physician services. Courts ruled in favor of the FTC and ordered that St. Luke’s divest Saltzer Medical Group. This was the first time that the FTC received a court decision for a case challenging a hospital or health system’s acquisition of competing physician practices.
The FTC has not played a large role in overseeing nonmerger anticompetitive practices in nonprofit health care provider markets, such as the use of anticompetitive contract clauses. This may reflect the fact that the FTC’s authority to challenge and regulate nonmerger anticompetitive practices generally excludes nonprofit entities. Nonetheless, the FTC has brought legal challenges in some instances, such as cases where separate physician groups have coordinated with each other to raise prices. Relatedly, the FTC drew on its regulatory authority when it proposed a rule in 2023 that would ban non-compete clauses between employers and workers.
What is the DOJ’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?
The DOJ enforces a wide range of laws on behalf of the federal government, including—through its Antitrust Division—anticompetitive practices. For instance, in one landmark antitrust case in the 1990s, the DOJ sued Microsoft, alleging that the company had illegally sought to protect its monopoly power. The DOJ argued that the company had done so, in part, by requiring computer manufacturers that wanted to use Microsoft’s popular Windows operating system to also include Internet Explorer as a default.
Although the FTC typically oversees the conduct of health care providers, the DOJ has occasionally done so as well (see example below).
Example: DOJ & Atrium Health
In 2016, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Carolinas Healthcare System, also known as “Atrium Health.” The DOJ claimed that Atrium had violated federal antitrust law by, among other things, entering into contracts with insurers that contained anti-steering and anti-tiering clauses. Atrium Health system and the DOJ reached a settlement agreement before trial where the system agreed, in part, to stop using these contract clauses.
The DOJ typically takes the lead in promoting competition in health insurance markets. For instance, in 2017, the DOJ, along with some state governments, successfully prevented a proposed merger between Anthem and Cigna—which would have been the largest merger of health insurance companies on record—and a proposed merger between Aetna and Humana.
How do the FTC and DOJ work together on antitrust issues?
The FTC and DOJ have a clearance process to determine which agency will investigate and challenge a given merger. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in different areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets. The division of labor is formalized through a clearance process that determines which agency will investigate a proposed transaction based on its expertise and other factors, such as its capacity and ties to a given case.
The FTC and DOJ collaborate on guidelines that establish how they determine whether to challenge a given merger. This includes the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which, as the name suggests, outline the criteria that the FTC and DOJ consider when reviewing horizontal mergers. For instance, the guidelines indicate that the agencies evaluate the effects of a merger on market concentration based on a measure known as the “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” (HHI) (see textbox below). The guidelines also indicate that the agencies consider the possible benefits of a given merger, such as whether a merger might allow research to be conducted more effectively.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The HHI is calculated based on provider market shares for a given product—such as inpatient general acute care services or inpatient orthopedic surgical services—and geographic market. The HHI for a market can range from nearly 0 (a perfectly competitive market) to 10,000 (a market with a single provider). The Horizontal Merger Guidelines define the level of market concentration as follows:
Unconcentrated: HHI < 1,500
Moderately concentrated: HHI between 1,500 and 2,500
Highly concentrated: HHI > 2,500
Although markets for inpatient hospital services are now often highly concentrated, there is wide variation across the country. For instance, one study estimated that, in 2021, the New York City metro area had an HHI of 753 for inpatient hospital services, while the Wilmington, North Carolina metro area had an HHI of 7,600.
The FTC and DOJ have also released a set of Vertical Merger Guidelines, though the FTC withdrew from these guidelines in 2021. Some economists are more critical of the Vertical Merger Guidelines than the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, perhaps reflecting the fact that there is less consensus about the effects of vertical consolidation and the proper role of antitrust enforcement.
In July 2023, the FTC and DOJ released a draft version of their updated merger guidelines, which would apply to both horizontal and vertical mergers and which indicate that the agencies will be scrutinizing a broader range of mergers. Among other changes, the draft guidelines expand the definition of highly concentrated markets, rely on a lower threshold for identifying large changes in market concentration, consider the combined effect of a series of acquisitions (e.g., of a health system acquiring several small physician practices over time), and add an explicit discussion of the agencies’ views on how workers may be negatively impacted when their employers merge. These guidelines might also be used to challenge cross-market mergers, although this is not yet clear. The deadline for public comments on the draft guidelines is September 18, 2023.
In addition to working together on general merger guidelines, the DOJ and FTC have in the past collaborated on antitrust policy statements that are specific to health care, though both agencies withdrew from these statements in February 2023 and July 2023, respectively, arguing that the statements are outdated based on changes in health care markets.8
What is the role of states in enforcing antitrust law?
States can bring legal challenges under federal antitrust law. States may do so through their AG offices as either a purchaser of health care (for instance, through state employee health plans) or on behalf of their residents. States sometimes file lawsuits jointly with each other or with the federal government, which can help overcome resource constraints. States and the federal government may play complementary roles, with the federal government providing greater resources and general antitrust expertise and states providing more specialized knowledge of local market conditions.
Most states have passed laws that expand oversight of provider mergers, which may lead to additional legal challenges. Thirty-four states and DC require that at least some hospitals notify state AG offices of their plans to merge, expanding on federal reporting requirements. For instance, Rhode Island requires all hospitals to do so, regardless of the value of the transaction. Additionally, thirteen states and DC require that some or all types of providers receive approval from the government prior to merging, instead of requiring that the government file a lawsuit to challenge a merger. Eleven states require AG offices to consider relatively expansive criteria when reviewing health care mergers. For instance, California law requires the AG office to consider criteria such as the general public’s interest and the effect of a merger on access to care.
Some states have prohibited certain types of anticompetitive contract clauses. These laws either broadly prohibit a given type of clause or ban their use in only specific circumstances. Regarding contracts between insurers and dominant providers, two states (Massachusetts and Nevada) have laws restricting at least some all-or-nothing clauses and anti-tiering or anti-steering provisions, and five states (Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin) have laws restricting exclusive contracting. Additionally, 22 states restrict non-compete provisions—which dominant providers sometimes use in contracts with their workers—and 20 states restrict most favored nation clauses, which dominant insurers sometimes use in their contracts with providers.
Example: California & Sutter Health
In 2018, the California AG joined a lawsuit that had been initiated on behalf of some group health plans against Sutter Health, a large nonprofit health system in the state. The parties argued that Sutter had used anticompetitive contract clauses—such as all-or-nothing and anti-tiering provisions—to increase prices. In 2019, Sutter agreed to a settlement agreement that required the system to abandon the relevant contract clauses and to pay $575 million in damages, among other things.
Some states have enacted laws that have the potential to shield health care providers from antitrust scrutiny in certain instances. For example, 19 states have Certificate of Public Advantage (COPA) laws, which immunize a merger from antitrust challenges while directly regulating the merged entity for a period of time, such as by limiting price increases or prohibiting certain contracting practices. The intent of COPA laws is to facilitate mergers that are perceived as being beneficial overall while mitigating anticompetitive concerns through state oversight. However, the FTC and some researchers have been critical of these laws, arguing, for example, that states have not followed through in providing ongoing oversight following a given merger. Other state policies, such as Certificate of Need (CON) statutes—which attempt to reduce costs by restricting, for example, the construction of new facilities when they do not meet a community need—may also play a role in limiting competition or preventing antitrust scrutiny.
What are the potential remedies in antitrust enforcement?
Federal or state agencies challenging a merger can seek structural remedies or conduct remedies (also known as “behavioral remedies”).
Structural remedies mitigate consolidation by preventing a merger from moving forward, breaking up mergers that have already taken place, or requiring a merged entity to sell off a portion of its business.
Conduct remedies entail restrictions or requirements imposed on providers after a merger, such as by limiting the prices providers can charge, prohibiting providers from engaging in certain contracting practices, or requiring providers to spend a minimum amount on community benefits.
Conduct remediesmay be less effective than structural remedies in certain circumstances, as they tend to be time-limited and government agencies may not have the resources to monitor and enforce them. However, where markets are already concentrated and regulators are reluctant to break up merged entities, conduct remedies may be the only option.
When the government challenges proposed mergers before they occur, the recourse is typically to prevent the merger from moving forward. Antitrust enforcers have only infrequently attempted to unwind mergers that have already taken place, which the FTC describes as a “difficult and potentially ineffective” process.
There are other ways in which the government can be successful in challenging anticompetitive mergers. For example, the government and merging providers may avoid trial through a settlement agreement or consent decree. In this scenario, the government drops its legal challenge in exchange for structural or conduct remedies. Additionally, providers may abandon a merger after a lawsuit is announced or a court makes a preliminary ruling against the merger or may decide not to attempt to merge in the first place in anticipation that doing so would be successfully challenged in court.
Example: FTC & Phoebe Putney Health System
In 2011, Phoebe Putney Health System acquired a hospital from HCA in Albany, Georgia. The FTC challenged the merger and eventually reached a settlement agreement with the providers. The settlement agreement allowed the merger to persist but imposed conduct remedies, including that Phoebe Putney notify the FTC before acquiring other health care providers in the area.
The outcomes of successful legal challenges to nonmerger anticompetitive practices are similar, though the remedy would involve abandoning the relevant business practice (e.g., no longer using anticompetitive contract clauses).
What are some practical challenges facing antitrust enforcement?
There are at least a few challenges that may limit the ability of the federal government and states to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust enforcement:
It is difficult to break up mergers after they have already occurred, and many provider markets are already highly concentrated. For example, one study estimated that the vast majority (90%) of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) had highly concentrated hospital markets in 2016 (i.e., with an HHI above 2,500), most (65%) had highly concentrated specialist physician markets, and nearly two in five (39%) had highly concentrated markets for primary care physicians. Breaking up a merger after providers have already consolidated can be difficult. At the same time, regulating the behavior of merged providers—such as through restrictions on the prices they charge—may be difficult to do on an ongoing basis.
Some regions cannot support competitive provider markets. For instance, rural communities may not have enough residents to support several providers that offer the same service.
Antitrust litigation can be complex and expensive. Without adequate funding, it may be impractical to challenge a large number of provider business practices that raise anticompetitive concerns.
Antitrust agencies may have difficulty staying ahead of market trends. For example, it could take time for the government to develop strong guidelines for challenging vertical or cross-market mergers and to accumulate enough evidence to convince courts that these practices harm competition. In the meantime, these mergers will likely continue.
The benefits of competitive provider markets for individuals with health insurance will depend in part on the competitiveness of health insurance markets. The study referenced above also estimated that most MSAs (57%) had highly concentrated insurance markets in 2016. When insurance markets are not competitive, cost savings from competitive provider markets might not be fully passed along to consumers.
What policies have been proposed to strengthen antitrust law and enforcement?
Several federal and state policy proposals have been floated to help antitrust regulators more easily identify and challenge anticompetitive mergers and regulate markets that are already concentrated. One set of policies would make it easier for governments to enforce antitrust law, such as by requiring more providers to report any planned mergers, lowering the legal standards by which mergers are deemed anticompetitive, and mandating that providers receive approval from the government before merging. Another set of policies would increase the scope of antitrust law, such as by giving the FTC full authority to regulate nonprofit providers and outlawing certain anticompetitive contracting clauses. A third set of proposals would improve the infrastructure of antitrust enforcement, such as by increasing funding for antitrust agencies, creating agencies to monitor health care markets (as some states have done), and establishing specialized courts for antitrust cases.
Discussion
The FTC, DOJ, and states seek to promote competition in health care markets to encourage providers to lower costs for consumers and provide high quality medical care. Over the years, FTC, DOJ, and some states have challenged mergers as well as other anticompetitive practices. Nonetheless, there are inherent challenges to an approach that relies solely on efforts to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust regulation, particularly given the already high level of market concentration of providers across the country.
Several policy ideas have been floated at the federal and state level that are intended to strengthen antitrust regulation. However, given the challenges facing antitrust regulation and pro-competition policies, some policymakers have proposed a more direct regulatory approach, such as by capping prices or price growth or by establishing global budgets for hospitals. Someproponents of these approaches have highlighted that antitrust efforts and regulatory approaches could play complimentary roles. For instance, caps on health care prices could serve as a backstop in concentrated markets where at least some providers would not otherwise offer competitive rates or in small markets that are unable to support competition. Antitrust regulation may also play a useful role under price regulation, for example, by encouraging providers to compete for patients by offering higher quality care.
Last Thursday, the Senate Finance Committee heard testimony from experts who offered damning testimony about hospital consolidation (excerpts below). Committee Chair Ron Wyden (D-OR) gaveled the session to order with this commentary:
“I’d like to talk about health care costs and quality. Advocates for proposed mergers often say they will bring lower health costs due to increased efficiency. Time after time, it’s simply not proven to be the case. When hospitals merge, prices go up, not down. When insurers merge, premiums go up, not down. And quality of care is not any better with this higher cost. “
Ranking Member Mike Crapo (R-ID) offered a more conciliatory assessment in his opening statement: “In exploring and addressing these problems, we have the opportunity to build on our efforts to improve medication access and affordability by taking a broader look at the health care system through a similarly bipartisan, consensus-based lens…We need to examine the drivers of consolidation, as well as its effects on care quality and costs, both for patients and taxpayers. We also need to develop focused, bipartisan and bicameral solutions that reduce out-of-pocket spending while protecting access to lifesaving services.”
Congress’ concern about consolidation in healthcare is broad-based. Pharmacy benefits managers and health insurers face similar scrutiny. Drug price control referenda have passed in several states and a federal cap was included in the Inflation Reduction Act.
The reality is this: the entire U.S. health system is on trial in the court of public opinion for ‘careless disregard for affordability’. And hospitals are seen as part of the problem justifying consolidation as a defense mechanism.
What followed in this 3-hour hearing was testimony from 3 experts critical of hospital consolidation, a Colorado community hospital CEO who opined to competition with big hospital systems and a Peterson Foundation spokesperson who offered that data access and transparency are necessary to mitigate consolidation’s downside impact.
None of their testimony was surprising. Nor were questions from the 25 members of the committee. It’s a narrative that played out in House Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means Committee hearings last month. It’s likely to continue.
Often, Congressional Hearings on healthcare issues amount to little more than political theatre. In this one, four key themes emerged:
Consolidation among hospitals has adversely impacted quality of care and affordability of healthcare. Prices have gone up without commensurate improvements in quality harming consumers.
Larger organizations use horizontal and vertical integration to strengthen their positions relative to smaller competitors. Physician employment by hospitals is concerning. Rural and safety net hospitals are impaired most.
Anti-trust efforts, price transparency mandates, data sharing and value-based programs have not been as effective as anticipated.
Physicians are victims of consolidation and corporatization in U.S. healthcare. They’re paid less because others are paid more.
While committee members varied widely in the intensity of their animosity toward hospitals, a consensus emerged that the hospital status quo is not working for voters and consumers.
My take:
Consolidation is part of everyday life. Last Tuesday’s bombshell announcement of the merger of the PGA Tour and the Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund caught the golfing world by surprise. Anti-trust issues and monopolistic behaviors are noticed by voters and lawmakers. Hospital consolidation is no exception festering suspicions among lawmakers and voters that the public’s good is ill-served. And studies showing that charity care among not-for-profit hospitals is lower than for-profit confuse and complicate.
As I listened to the hearing, I had questions…
Were all relevant perspectives presented?
Was the information provided by witnesses and cited in Committee member questioning accurate?
Will meaningful action result?
But having testified before Congressional Committees, I find myself dismissive of most hearings which seem heavy on political staging but light on meaningful insight. Many are little more than political theatre. Hospital consolidation seems different. There seems to be growing consensus that it’s harmful to some and costly to all.
Sadly, this hearing is the latest evidence that the good will built by hospital heroics in the pandemic is now forgotten. It’s clear hospital consolidation is an issue that faces strong and increased headwinds with evidence mounting—accurate or not– showing more harm than good.
On Monday, Minnetonka, MN-based UHG’s Optum division made a $3.3B all-cash offer to acquire Baton Rouge, LA-based Amedisys, one of the country’s largest home health companies.
Optum’s bid came several weeks after Bannockburn, IL-based Option Care Health, a home health company specialized in drug and infusion services, offered to purchase Amedisys in an all-stock transaction valued at $3.6B. Amedisys itself acquired hospital-at-home company Contessa Health for $250M in 2021. While its Board of Directors is now evaluating whether UHG has made a “Superior Proposal”, a UHG acquisition of Amedisys would likely be subject to significant regulatory oversight, as the payer recently closed on its purchase of home health company and Amedisys-competitor LHC Group in a deal that was heavily scrutinized by the Federal Trade Commission.
The Gist: UHG, the nation’s largest health insurer, is on a tear to bring the country’s largest home health providers under its Optum umbrella—and it has the deep pockets to outbid nearly anyone else trying to do the same.
While some questioned the value of an Option Care-Amedisys combination, UHG would get to plug another asset into its scaled continuum of home-based care, allowing it to steer beneficiaries away from high-cost post acute care and continue to increase profitable intercompany eliminations.
If UHG’s bid for Amedisys is accepted, it would also gain its first hospital-at-home asset in Contessa, providing it with the opportunity to fully redirect—and reduce—its inpatient care spend.
Less than a month after CVS Health acquired Oak Street Health, the primary care provider plans to expand into four more states.
The company plans to open value-based primary care centers in Little Rock, Arkansas; Des Moines and Davenport, Iowa; Kansas City, Kansas and Richmond, Virginia, beginning this summer.
Oak Street Health will operate centers in 25 states by the end of the year.
The provider also aims to open new centers in existing markets this year with additional centers planned for Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
CVS finalized its $10.6 billion acquisition of the Medicare-focused primary care company in early May, picking up, at the time, about 169 medical centers in 21 states.
The acquisition significantly broadens CVS Health’s primary care footprint and the retail pharmacy giant said the deal will improve health outcomes and reduce costs for patients, particularly for those in underserved communities.
The two deals will help advance the health giant’s push into value-based care and mark its latest moves to get further into healthcare services.
Oak Street specializes in treating Medicare Advantage patients and its network of clinics is expected to grow to over 300 centers by 2026.
The provider says it developed an integrated care model that incorporates behavioral healthcare and social determinants support and patients can access care in-center, in-home and through telehealth appointments.
Oak Street Health says it has reduced patient hospital admissions by approximately 51% compared to Medicare benchmarks, and driven a 42% reduction in 30-day readmission rates and a 51% reduction in emergency department visits.
“One of the most critical ways we advance our mission to rebuild healthcare as it should be is by bringing our high-quality primary care and unmatched patient experience to more older adults across the country,” said Mike Pykosz, Oak Street Health’s CEO. “We look forward to meeting and caring for new deserving patients in Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas and Virginia, as well as the opportunity to create meaningful jobs for those passionate about improving health outcomes for patients and bridging health equity gaps in their communities.”
The CVS-Oak Street Health deal marks the latest example of vertical integration in healthcare. In addition to operating thousands of pharmacies and MinuteClinics, CVS also is the parent company of major health insurer Aetna and pharmacy benefit manager CVS Caremark.
An enlightening piece published this week in Stat News lays out exactly how UnitedHealth Group (UHG) is using its vast network of physicians to generate new streams of profit, a playbook being followed by most other major payers. Already familiar to close observers of the post-Affordable Care Act healthcare landscape, the article highlights how UHG can use “intercompany eliminations”—payments from its UnitedHealthcare payer arm to its Optum provider and pharmacy arms—to achieve profits above the 15 to 20 percent cap placed on health insurance companies.
So far in 2022, 38 percent of UHG’s insurance revenue has flowed into its provider groups, up from 23 percent in 2017. And UHG expects next year’s intercompany eliminations to grow by 20 percent to a total of $130B, which would make up over half of its total projected revenue.
The Gist:
The profit motive behind payer-provider vertical integration is as clear as it is concerning for the state of competition in healthcare.
UHG now employs or affiliates with 70K physicians—10K more than last year—seven percent of the US physician workforce, and the largest of any entity.
Given the weak antitrust framework for regulating vertical integration, the federal government has proven unable to stop the acquisition of providers by payers. Eventually, profit growth for these vertically integrated payers will have to come from tightening provider networks, and not just acquiring more assets. That could prompt regulatory action or consumer backlash, if the government or enrollees determine that access to care is being unfairly restricted.
Until then, the march of consolidation is likely to continue.
UHG closed its $13B acquisition of data analytics company Change in early October, just weeks after the Justice Department failed in its bid to block the sale on antitrust grounds. In court proceedings, UHG denied it intended to use Change data to give its insurance arm, UnitedHealthcare, a competitive advantage against the rival insurers who use Change as an electronic data interchange clearinghouse.
But a new ProPublica report highlights how communications between UHG and consulting firm McKinsey & Co. point to this potential data advantage as one of the clear upsides from acquiring Change. The McKinsey report was explicitly dismissed by the US District Court judge who, in his ruling in UHG’s favor, was persuaded by testimony from senior executives and evidence of UHG’s history of maintaining internal data firewalls.
The Gist: UHG has a longstanding business interest in maintaining the trust of rival insurers that use its data analytics unit, OptumInsight. Voluntary and internally imposed firewalls between the UHG’s insurance arm and its other businesses are key to maintaining this trust. Although Justice Department lawyers could not provide convincing evidence that UHG has or intends to breach its firewalls, there is still reason to monitor any such activity closely.
The failure of the McKinsey report to sway the court against the deal illustrates how difficult it is for the Justice Department to challenge vertical mergers, even when there is compelling evidence that such deals may impact competition.
On Monday, a federal judge denied the Department of Justice (DOJ)’s attempt to block UHG’s $13B purchase of Change Healthcare, a technology firm specializing in claims processing and data analytics.
The DOJ sought to block the purchase on antitrust grounds, arguing that UHG would have access to technologies that its rivals use to compete, but the judge, writing in a sealed ruling, found the DOJ’s case inadequate. It is unclear at this point whether the DOJ will appeal.
Change will now join UHG’s OptumInsight division, though in response to anticompetitive concerns, the ruling ordered UHG to sell part of Change’s claims payment and editing business, as it had already planned to do.
The Gist: Antitrust regulators have had much greater success at challenging horizontal healthcare mergers but have struggled to find solid footing to fight vertical deals.
The UHG-Change case was closely watched in part because of the precedent it would have set in terms of holding “platform” aggregators in check. As UHG and other healthcare titans continue to acquire assets up and down the value chain (physician practices, ambulatory surgery centers, clinics, telehealth capabilities, risk products), it’s increasingly clear that the government will face an uphill climb to question the competitive effects of these vertical M&A activities.
According to a Wall Street Journal report, CVS is expected to submit a bid to purchase Dallas-based Signify Health, which supports physicians, payers, and health systems with tools and technology to provide in-home care. Signify acquired accountable care organization manager Caravan Health earlier this year. Last week, the Journalreported that Signify, valued at more than $4B, was looking for buyers. While CVS is said to be interested, so are private equity firms and other managed care companies.
The Gist: CVS CEO Karen Lynch told investors during last week’s earnings call that the company plans to grow its primary care and home health offerings through mergers and acquisitions. The Signify bid, along with reports that CVS considered acquiring concierge primary care company One Medical, suggests that the retail pharmacy and insurance giant is charging ahead with its strategy of creating a vertically-integrated healthcare company.
As several newly public digital health and value-based care companies have seen share prices plummet and capital dry up in a cooling economy, they are becoming targets for large insurers and tech companies who have seen their own fortunes grow during the pandemic. Watch for more announcements from these “platform assemblers” in the months to come.
Steward Health Care is abandoning its proposal to sell five Utah hospitals to HCA Healthcare, and New Jersey-based RWJBarnabas Health dropped its plan to purchase New Brunswick, NJ-based Saint Peter’s Healthcare System. These pivots come just weeks after the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed suits to block the transactions, saying they would reduce market competition. The FTC said in a statement that these deals “should never have been proposed in the first place,” and “…the FTC will not hesitate to take action in enforcing the antitrust laws to protect healthcare consumers who are faced with unlawful hospital consolidation.”
The Gist: These latest mergers follow the fate of the proposed Lifespan and Care New England merger in Rhode Island, and the New Jersey-based Hackensack Meridian Health and Englewood Health merger, which were both abandoned after FTC challenges earlier this year.
Antitrust observers find these recent challenges unsurprising, as all were horizontal, intra-market deals of the kind that commonly raise antitrust concerns. What will be more telling is whether antitrust regulators can successfully mount challenges of cross-market mergers, or vertical mergers between hospitals, physicians, and insurers.
HENRY KOTULA 