Back in 2020, Steward Health Care System needed $400 million to dig it “out of a deep financial hole.” Instead of investing in the struggling health system, Steward’s owner, Cerberus Capital Management, reportedly convinced Steward’s landlord, Medical Properties Trust (MPT), to provide the cash infusion.
Cerberus also sold its majority stake in Steward to a group that included the health system’s CEO Ralph de la Torre, MD, WSJ reported.
MPT had to put up millions of dollars for its tenant over a series of financial deals, and recent Congressional inquiries uncovered more details about how that went down. The first part of the cash infusion came in $205 million from MPT to invest in overseas hospitals in a joint venture with Steward. The second half was covered when MPT forgave the mortgage for a Steward hospital and paid $200 million for two Utah hospitals.
In the end, Cerberus ended up with a whopping $800 million in profit while Steward filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy this week, WSJ reported.
Oh, and de la Torre bought a $40 million yacht with the proceeds of a 2021 payout related to his ownership of Steward.
After covering the Medicare privatization crisis for over two years, an investigative reporter takes a step back and examines what’s at stake.
Medicare, the country’s largest and arguably most successful health care program, is under duress, weakened by decades of relentless efforts by insurance companies to privatize it.
A rapidly growing Medicare Advantage market — now 52% of Medicare beneficiaries, up from 37% in 2018 — controlled by some of the largest and most powerful corporations in the world, threatens to both drain the trust fund and eliminate Medicare’s most important and controversial component: its ability to set prices.
It is not an overstatement to call it a heist of historic proportions, endangering the health not only of the more than 65 million seniors and people with disabilities who depend on Medicare but all Americans who benefit from the powerful role that Medicare has historically played in reining in health care costs.
The giant corporations that dominate Medicare Advantage have rigged the system to maximize payments from our government to the point that they are now being overpaid between $88 billion and $140 billion a year. The overpayments could soar to new heights if the insurers get their way and eliminate traditional Medicare.
All of America’s seniors and disabled people who depend on Medicare could soon be moved to a managed care model of ever-tightening networks, relentless prior authorization requirements and limited drug formularies. The promise of a humane health care system for all would be sacrificed at the altar of the almighty insurer dollar.
The Medicare Payments Advisory Commission (MedPAC), the independent congressional agency tasked with overseeing Medicare, last month released a searing report which found that Medicare spends 22% more per beneficiary in Medicare Advantage plans than if those beneficiaries had been enrolled in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. That’s up from a 6% estimate in the prior year.
A similar cost trend exists for diagnosis coding.
Medicare Advantage plans and their affiliated providers increasingly upcoded diagnoses to get higher reimbursements. In 2024, overpayments due to upcoding could total $50 billion, according to MedPAC, up from $23 billion in 2023. These enormous overpayments drive up the cost of premiums — MedPAC’s conservative estimate is that the premiums paid to Medicare out of seniors’ Social Security checks will be $13 billion higher in 2024 because of those overpayments.
There is evidence that Americans and lawmakers are starting to wake up.
Medicare Advantage enrollment growth slowed considerably in 2023. Support within the Democratic Party for Medicare Advantage is cratering. In 2022, 147 House Democrats signed an industry-backed letter supporting Medicare Advantage. This year, just 24 House Democrats signed the letter. Earlier this month, the Biden administration cut Medicare Advantage base payments for the second year in a row(while still increasing payments overall), over the fierce opposition of the insurance lobby. The investment bank Stephens called Biden’s decision a “highly adverse” outcome for insurers. Wall Street has taken note, punishing the stock price of the largest Medicare Advantage insurers, with Barron’s noting that Wall Street’s “love affair” with Humana is “ending in tears.” The cargo ship is turning. It is up to us to determine if that will be enough.
We can’t attack a problem if we don’t know how to diagnose it. I spoke with some of the most knowledgeable critics of Medicare Advantage about the danger the rapid expansion of Medicare privatization presents to the American public.
Rick Gilfillan is a medical doctor who in 2010 became the first director of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). He would go on to serve as CEO of Trinity Health from 2013 to 2019. In 2021 he launched an effort to halt the involuntary privatization of Medicare benefits.
“Right now, all investigations are finding tremendous overpayments,” Gilfillan said. “The overpayments are based on medical diagnoses that may or may not be meaningful from a patient care standpoint. Insurers are using chart reviews, nurse home visits and AI software to find as many diagnoses as possible and thereby inflate the health risks of the patients and the premium they get from Medicare. The overpayments are just outrageous,” he said.
The problem could get worse if the Supreme Court curtails the powers of regulatory agencies, as it may do this year. “It would make a huge difference in what CMS would be able to do,” Gilfillan said.
The logic behind Medicare privatization is that seniors and people with disabilities use too much care, egged on by their doctors. If true, a solution could have been to enforce the Stark Law, which bans physicians from having financial relationships with providers they refer to, or other anti-kickback statutes. States could also enforce laws 33 of them have enacted that prohibit the “corporate practice of medicine.”
Instead, health insurers were invited and incentivized by previous administrations to compete with the original Medicare program and “manage” beneficiaries’ care. Under this model— set in its modern form in 2003 — Medicare Advantage insurers are paid a rate based on a complex risk modeling process and estimated costs.
But Medicare Advantage plans have never been cheaper than traditional Medicare, as MedPAC has repeatedly pointed out.
This is a far more complex approach than the fee-for-service model in which CMS sets prices in health care in a public and transparent manner, Gilfillan notes. The prices negotiated by Medicare Advantage companies, by contrast, are not disclosed.
“With fee-for-service, a patient is provided a service, treatment or medication. The physician who provides the service charges a specific amount for that service,” Gilfillan said. “And then Medicare pays whatever it decided it was worth for that service. The benefit is you pay for what you get.”
Some Medicare Advantage plans use a “capitated” approach in paying primary care physicians. The amount is based on the premium they receive for the patient. The more codes submitted, the higher the capitation, the greater the profit. That approach is having far-reaching economic impacts on health care, said Hayden Rooke-Ley, an Oregon-based lawyer and health care consultant who co-authored a recent New England Journal of Medicine article on the corporatization of primary care. It is the capitation model, he says, that drives the rampant upcoding among Medicare Advantage plans.
From Horizontal to Vertical
“An undercovered aspect of Medicare Advantage is the way it is fueling vertical consolidation” in the insurance business, Rooke-Ley added, noting that until recent years, insurers bulked up by buying smaller competitors (known as horizontal integration). “With so much government money, we’re seeing insurance companies restructuring themselves as vertically integrated conglomerates [through the acquisition of physician practices, clinics and pharmacy operations] to become even more profitable, especially in Medicare Advantage.”
“A key part of this strategy is to own primary care practices,” he said, citing Humana’s partnership with the private-equity firm Welsh Carson to become the largest owner of Medicare-based primary care, CVS/Aetna’s acquisition of Oak Street, and UnitedHealth’s roll up of doctors practices across the country.
As Rooke-Ley explained, control of primary care allows insurance companies to more easily manipulate “risk scores” to increase payments from the government by claiming patients are in worse health than they really are.
“The easiest way to increase risk scores, short of simply fabricating diagnosis codes, is to control the behavior of physicians and other clinicians,” he said.
“When an insurance company owns the physician practice, it can configure workflows, technology, and incentives to drive risk coding.
UnitedHealth, for example, can preferentially schedule Medicare Advantage patients – and it can choose to reach out to health plan enrollees it identifies with its data as having high ‘coding opportunities.’ It can require its doctors to go to risk-code training, and it can prohibit doctors from closing their notes before they address all the ‘suggested’ diagnosis codes.”
“While Medicare Advantage insurance companies tout all their provider acquisitions as investments in value-based care, the concern is that it’s really just looking like a game of financialization,” Rooke-Ley said. “MA was supposed to save Medicare money, but the exact opposite has happened.
According to MedPAC, the government will over-subsidize MA to the tune of $88 billion this year, with $54 billion of that due to excess risk coding relative to what we see in traditional Medicare. That’s a staggering amount of money that could go directly to patients and clinicians by strengthening traditional Medicare.”
Two Possible Futures
There are two options for the future of Medicare, said Dr. Ed Weisbart, former chief medical officer of the pharmacy benefit manager Express Scripts, which Cigna bought in 2018, who now leads the Missouri chapter of Physicians for a National Health Program.
In one future, he said, “We will change the trajectory and get rid of the profiteers, and manage to divert the funds that are being profiteered to patient care.”
In another future, the business practices of Medicare Advantage plans “will be unfettered and more damaging and harmful than they are today,” he said. “If we continue on this course we’ll find an increasingly polarized health care system that caters increasingly to the wealthy and privileged. The barriers to care will be worse.”
Of late, private equity investors in healthcare services have faced intense criticism that their business practices have compromised patient safety and raised costs for consumers. March 5, the FTC, DOJ and HHS announced the launch of an investigation into the inner workings of PE in healthcare. It comes on the heels of U.S. Senate investigations in their Finance, HELP and Budget Committees to explore legislative levers they might pull to address their growing concerns about affordability, competition and accountability in the industry.
PE funds don’t welcome the spotlight.
Their business model lends to misinformation and disinformation: company takeovers by new owners are rarely treated as good news unless the circumstance under prior ownership was dire. Even then, attention shifts quickly to the fairness of the PE business model playbook: acquire the asset on favorable terms, replace management, reduce operating costs, grow and the sell in 5-7 years at a profit using debt to finance the deal along the way. In exchange, the PE fund’s General Partner gets an annual management fee of 2% plus 20% of the value they create when they sell the company or take it public, and favorable tax treatment (carried interest) on their gain.
Concern about PE in healthcare services comes at a particularly delicate time: hospitals. nursing homes, outpatient care, medical practices, clinics et al) are still feeling the after-effects of the pandemic, proposed reimbursement bumps by Medicare for hospitals and physicians do not offset medical inflation and the Change Healthcare cybersecurity breach February 21 has created cash flow issues for all.
Concern about PE ownership was high already.
Innovations funded through PE-backed organizations have been drowned out by the steady drip of peer reviewed and industry-sponsored studies a causal relationship between PE ownership decreased quality and patient safety and increased prices and worker discontent. Nonetheless, PE-owns 4% of hospitals (among 36% that are investor-owned, 13% of medical practices and 6% of nursing homes today and they’re increasing in all cohorts of health services.
Here are the facts:
Private equity enjoys significant influence in public policy including healthcare. Direct lobbying activity by PE funds in Congress and state legislatures is well-funded and effective, especially by the It is increasingly 20 global fund sponsors that control 46% of assets under management. Cash on hand and fund-raising by PE are strong and healthcare remains an important but non-exclusive target of PE investing.
2023 was a down year for PE, 2024 will be strong: the IPO market and sponsor- to sponsor transactions dipped, and deal values shrank. Even with interest rates remaining high, returns exceeded overall growth in the stock market for deals consummated. At the same time, PE raised $1.2 trillion last year and has $2.6 trillion of dry powder to invest. Healthcare services will be a target as PE deal activity increases in 2024.
In U.S. healthcare, PE investments are significant and increasing. Technology-enabled services that lower unit costs and AI-based solutions that enable standardization and workforce efficiency will garner higher valuations and greater PE interest than traditional services. Valuations will recover from record 2023 lows and dry powder will be deployed for roll-ups despite antitrust concerns and government investigations. Congress will investigate the impact on PE on patient safety, prices and competition and, in tandem with FTC and DOJ issue guidance: compliance will be mandated and financial penalties added. But displacement of PE in health services is unlikely.
Some notable data:
Private equity funds have $2.49 trillion of cash on hand to invest—up 7% from 2022. They raised $1.2 trillion globally in 2023. 26% of its global dry powder is more than 4 years old—undeployed.
Private equity groups globally are sitting on a record 28,000 unsold companies worth more than $3tn. 40% of the companies waiting to be sold are at least four years old. Last year, the combined value of companies that the industry sold privately or on public markets fell 44% and the value of companies sold to other buyout groups fell 47%.
Private equity investments in almost every sector in healthcare are significant, and until lately, increasing. Last year, deals were down 16.2% (from 940 to 788) cutting across every sector. In some sectors, like physician services, PE deals were tuck-in’s to their previous platform investments increasing from 75 deals in 2012 to 484 deals in 2021.
PE investments in US healthcare exceeded $1 trillion in the last 10 years. Investments in healthcare services i.e. acute, long-term, ambulatory and physician services– have been less profitable to investors than PE investments in technology, devices and therapeutics (based on the ratio of Enterprise Value to EBITDA) but exceed equity-market returns overall.
Peer reviewed studies have shown causal relationships between private equity ownership of hospitals, nursing homes and medical practices with lower operating costs, higher staff turnover, high prices and higher profits.
My take:
Like it or not, private equity investment in healthcare is here to stay. The likelihood of higher taxes paid by employers and individuals to fund the health system is nil. The majority (69%) of the public think it wasteful and inefficient (See Polling below). The majority believe it puts its profits above all else. The majority think it needs major change. That’s not new, but it’s felt more intensely and more widely than ever.
That means accommodation for private capital, including private equity, is not a major concern to voters: the prices they pay matters more than who owns the organization.
Tighter regulation of private equity, including more rights given to the Limited Partners who invest in the PE funds and limitations on public officials who become fund advisors, are likely. Bad actors will be vilified by regulators and elected officials. Media scrutiny of specific PE funds and their GPs will intensify as PE public reporting regulations commence. And investments made by not-for-profit multi-hospital systems and independent hospitals will be critical elements in upcoming Congressional and regulatory policy setting about their community benefit accountability and tax exemptions.
The public’s major concern about its healthcare industry is affordability. To the extent PE-backed solutions offer lower-cost, higher-value alternatives on a playing field that’s level with respect to equitable access and demand-management, they will be at the table.
To the extent PE-backed solutions cherry-pick the system’s low-hanging fruit at the expense of patient safety and affordability sans any regulatory restriction, they’ll breed public discontent from those they choose to ignore.
So, the reality is this: PE’s focus is generating profits for its GP and their LPs. Doing business in a socially responsible way is a fund’s prerogative. Some do it better than others.
PE is part of healthcare’s solution to its poorly structured, perpetually inadequate and mal-distributed funding. But creating a level playing field through meaningful regulatory reform is necessary first.
PS Among the stickier issues facing hospitals is site-neutral payments. Hospitals oppose the proposal reasoning the overhead structure for their outpatient services (HOPD) include indirect & direct costs for services provided those unable to pay i.e. emergency services. Proponents of the change argue that what’s done is the key, not where it’s done, and uniform pricing is common sense. Leavitt Partners has advanced a compromise: a Unified Ambulatory Payment System for HOPDs, ASCs and physician clinics that would be applied to 66 services starting
Dallas, TX-based US Anesthesia Partners (USAP), one of the nation’s largest providers of anesthesia services, reached a settlement with the Colorado Attorney General’s Office, which had alleged that USAP engaged in anticompetitive behavior in the state.
Although it denies any wrongdoing, USAP agreed to relinquish exclusive contracts with five Colorado hospitals and revise its practice of adding noncompete agreements to its physician contracts.
This settlement is separate from the similar FTC suit against USAP and its creator-turned-minority owner, private-equity (PE) firm Welsh, Carson, Anderson, and Stowe. That suit, filed in federal district court in Texas in September 2023, alleges that USAP monopolized the Texas anesthesiology market in order to drive up prices unlawfully.
The Gist:USAP isn’t the only large anesthesia group in the news this week for allegations of anticompetitive behavior—hospitals in New York and Florida are suing North American Partners in Anesthesia, claiming it stifles competition by forcing its physicians to sign noncompete agreements.
Health systems and regulators are increasingly dissatisfied with the highly concentrated anesthesia provider market, which has become dominated by large, PE-backed groups.
Because the Colorado case was settled out of court, no precedent has been established for antitrust enforcement, but the result of the ongoing FTC suit against USAP may have significant ramifications for other large, PE-backed physician organizations.
Tuesday, the, FTC, and DOJ announced creation of a task force focused on tackling “unfair and illegal pricing” in healthcare. The same day, HHS joined FTC and DOJ regulators in launching an investigation with the DOJ and FTC probing private equity’ investments in healthcare expressing concern these deals may generate profits for corporate investors at the expense of patients’ health, workers’ safety and affordable care.
Thursday’s State of the Union address by President Biden (SOTU) and the Republican response by Alabama Senator Katey Britt put the spotlight on women’s reproductive health, drug prices and healthcare affordability.
Friday, the Senate passed a $468 billion spending bill (75-22) that had passed in the House Wednesday (339-85) averting a government shutdown. The bill postpones an $8 billion reduction in Medicaid disproportionate share hospital payments for a year, allocates $4.27 billion to federally qualified health centers through the end of the year and rolls back a significant portion of a Medicare physician pay cut that kicked in on Jan. 1. Next, Congress must pass appropriations for HHS and other agencies before the March 22 shutdown.
And all week, the cyberattack on Optum’s Change Healthcare discovered February 21 hovered as hospitals, clinics, pharmacies and others scrambled to manage gaps in transaction processing. Notably, the American Hospital Association and others have amplified criticism of UnitedHealth Group’s handling of the disruption, having, bought Change for $13 billion in October, 2022 after a lengthy Department of Justice anti-trust review. This week, UHG indicates partial service of CH support will be restored. Stay tuned.
Just another week for healthcare: Congressional infighting about healthcare spending. Regulator announcements of new rules to stimulate competition and protect consumers in the healthcare market. Lobbying by leading trade groups to protect funding and disable threats from rivals. And so on.
At the macro level, it’s understandable: healthcare is an attractive market, especially in its services sectors. Since the pandemic, prices for services (i.e. physicians, hospitals et al) have steadily increased and remain elevated despite the pressures of transparency mandates and insurer pushback. By contrast, prices for most products (drugs, disposables, technologies et al) have followed the broader market pricing trends where prices for some escalated fast and then dipped.
While some branded prescription medicines are exceptions, it is health services that have driven the majority of health cost inflation since the pandemic.
UnitedHealth Group’s financial success is illustrative:
it’s big, high profile and vertically integrated across all major services sectors. In its year end 2023 financial report (January 12, 2024) it reported revenues of $371.6 Billion (up 15% Year-Over-Year), earnings from operations up 14%, cash flows from operations of $29.1 Billion (1.3x Net Income), medical care ratio at 83.2% up from 82% last year, net earnings of $23.86/share and adjusted net earnings of $25.12/share and guidance its 2024 revenues of $400-403 billion. They buy products using their scale and scope leverage to pay less for services they don’t own less and products needed to support them. It’s a big business in a buyer’s market and that’s unsettling to many.
Big business is not new to healthcare:
it’s been dominant in every sector but of late more a focus of unflattering regulator and media attention. Coupled with growing public discontent about the system’s effectiveness and affordability, it seems it’s near a tipping point.
David Johnson, one of the most thoughtful analysts of the health industry, reminded his readers last week that the current state of affairs in U.S. healthcare is not new citing the January 1970 Fortune cover story “Our Ailing Medical System”
“American medicine, the pride of the nation for many years, stands now on the brink of chaos. To be sure, our medical practitioners have their great moments of drama and triumph. But much of U.S. medical care, particularly the everyday business of preventing and treating routine illnesses, is inferior in quality, wastefully dispensed, and inequitably financed…
Whether poor or not, most Americans are badly served by the obsolete, overstrained medical system that has grown up around them helter-skelter. … The time has come for radical change.”
Johnson added: “The healthcare industry, however, cannot fight gravity forever. Consumerism, technological advances and pro-market regulatory reforms are so powerful and coming so fast that status-quo healthcare cannot forestall their ascendance. Properly harnessed, these disruptive forces have the collective power necessary for U.S. healthcare to finally achieve the 1970 Fortune magazine goal of delivering “good care to every American with little increase in cost.”
He’s right.
I believe the U.S. health system as we know it has reached its tipping point. The big-name organizations in every sector see it and have nominal contingency plans in place; the smaller players are buying time until the shoe drops. But I am worried.
I am worried the system’s future is in the hands of hyper-partisanship by both parties seeking political advantage in election cycles over meaningful creation of a health system that functions for the greater good.
I am worried that the industry’s aversion toprice transparency, meaningful discussion about affordability and consistency in defining quality, safety and value will precipitate short-term gamesmanship for reputational advantage and nullify systemness and interoperability requisite to its transformation.
I am worried that understandably frustrated employers will drop employee health benefits to force the system to needed accountability.
I am worried that the growing armies of under-served and dissatisfied populations will revolt.
I am worried that its workforce is ill-prepared for a future that’s technology-enabled and consumer centric.
I am worried that the industry’s most prominent trade groups are concentrating more on “warfare” against their rivals and less about the long-term future of the system.
I am worried that transformational change is all talk.
It’s time to start an adult conversation about the future of the system. The starting point: acknowledging that it’s not about bad people; it’s about systemic flaws in its design and functioning. Fixing it requires balancing lag indicators about its use, costs and demand with assumptions about innovations that hold promise to shift its trajectory long-term. It requires employers to actively participate: in 2009-2010, Big Business mistakenly chose to sit out deliberations about the Affordable Care Act. And it requires independent, visionary facilitation free from bias and input beyond the DC talking heads that have dominated reform thought leadership for 6 decades.
Or, collectively, we can watch events like last week’s roll by and witness the emergence of a large public utility serving most and a smaller private option for those that afford it. Or something worse.
P.S. Today, thousands will make the pilgrimage to Orlando for HIMSS24 kicking off with a keynote by Robert Garrett, CEO of Hackensack Meridian Health tomorrow about ‘transformational change’ and closing Friday with a keynote by Nick Saban, legendary Alabama football coach on leadership. In between, the meeting’s 24 premier supporters and hundreds of exhibitors will push their latest solutions to prospects and customers keenly aware healthcare’s future is not a repeat of its past primarily due to technology. Information-driven healthcare is dependent on technologies that enable cost-effective, customized evidence-based care that’s readily accessible to individuals where and when they want it and with whom.
And many will be anticipating HCA Mission Health’s (Asheville NC) Plan of Action response due to CMS this Wednesday addressing deficiencies in 6 areas including CMS Deficiency 482.12 “which ensures that hospitals have a responsible governing body overseeing critical aspects of patient care and medical staff appointments.” Interest is high outside the region as the nation’s largest investor-owned system was put in “immediate jeopardy” of losing its Medicare participation status last year at Mission. FYI: HCA reported operating income of $7.7 billion (11.8% operating margin) on revenues of $65 billion in 2023.
Former New York Jets superstar Joe Namath can be seen every year during Medicare open enrollment hocking plans that tell seniors how great their life would be if only they signed up for a Medicare Advantage plan. From October 15 to December 7 last year alone, Joe Namath ads ran 3,670 times, according to iSpot, which tracks TV advertising.
But the company behind those ads, now called Blue Lantern Health, and their products, HealthInsurance.com and the Medicare Coverage Helpline, have an expansive rap sheet of misconduct, including prosecutions by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, and a recent bankruptcy filing that critics say is designed to jettison the substantial legal liabilities the firm has incurred. In September 2023, the company became Blue Lantern; before that, it was called Benefytt; and before that, Health Insurance Innovations. Forty-three state attorneys general had settled with the company in 2018, with it paying a $3.4 million fine. A close associate of the company, Steven Dorfman, has also been prosecuted by the FTC, in addition to the Department of Justice.
Namath himself has a bit of a checkered past when it comes to his business associates—in the early 1970s, he co-owned a bar frequented by members of the Colombo and Lucchese crime families, according to reporting at the time cited in a 2004 biography. Due to the controversy surrounding the bar, Namath was forced by the NFL Commissioner to sell his interest in it. Last year, it was revealed that Namath had employed a prolific pedophile coach at his football camp, also in the 1970s, and the 80-year-old ex-quarterback is now being sued by one of the coach’s victims.
The Namath ads are the main illustration of the behemoth Medicare Advantage marketing industry, which is designed to herd seniors into Medicare Advantage plans that restrict the doctors and hospitals that seniors can go to and the procedures they can access through the onerous “prior authorization” process, and it costs the federal government as much as $140 billion annually compared to traditional Medicare. Over half of seniors—nearly 31 million people—are now in Medicare Advantage, and there is little understanding of the drawbacks of the program. Seniors are aware that they may receive modest gym or food benefits but typically do not realize that they may be giving up their doctors, their specialists, their outpatient clinics, and their hospitals in favor of an in-network alternative that may be lower quality and farther away.
How so many seniors are lured into Medicare Advantage
Blue Lantern—with its powerful private equity owner Madison Dearborn—may be the key to understanding how so many people have been ushered into Medicare Advantage—and the pitfalls that private equity’s rapid entrance into health care can create for ordinary Americans.
While Blue Lantern is just one company, it is a Rosetta Stone for everything that is wrong with American health care today—fraud, profiteering, lawbreaking, no regard for patient care—where only the public comes out the loser.
Blue Lantern uses TV ads and, at least until regulators began poking around, a widespread telemarketing operation, being one of the main firms charged with generating “leads” that are then sold to brokers and insurers, as Medicare Advantage plans are banned from cold-calling. Court filings reviewed by HEALTH CARE Un-Covered allege that after legal discovery, Blue Lantern (then known as Benefytt) at minimum dialed seniors over 17 million times, potentially in violation of federal law that requires telemarketers to properly identify themselves and who they are working for—ultimately, in this case, insurers that generate huge profits from Medicare Advantage.
The Namath ads have been running since 2018 when the company was named Health Insurance Innovations—the same year the FTC began prosecuting Simple Health Plans, along with its then-CEO Steven Dorfman. The Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel identified Health Insurance Innovations as a “successor” to Simple Health Plans. After five years of likely exceptionally costly litigation, for which Dorfman is represented by jet-set law firm DLA Piper, on February 9, the FTC won a $195 million judgment against Simple Health Plans and Dorfman. The FTC alleged in 2019 that Dorfman had lied to the court when he said that he did not control any offshore accounts. The FTC found $20 million, but the real number is probably higher.
Friends in high places
In February 2020, Trump’s Secretary of Health and Human Services, Alex Azar, said that the Namath ads might not “look or sound like the future of health care,” but that they represented “real savings, real options” for older Americans.
In March 2020, Health Insurance Innovations (HII) changed its name to Benefytt, and in August 2020, it was acquired by Madison Dearborn Partners. Madison Dearborn has close ties to the Illinois Democratic elite, pumping over $916,000 into U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel’s campaigns for Congress and mayor of Chicago.
In September 2021, HII settled a $27.5 million class action lawsuit. The 230,000 victims received an average payout of just $80.
In July 2022, the SEC charged HII/Benefytt and its then-CEO Gavin Southwell with making fraudulent representations to investors about the quality of the health plans it was marketing. “HII and Southwell…told investors in earnings calls and investor presentations that HII’s consumer satisfaction was 99.99 percent and state insurance regulators received very few consumer complaints regarding HII. In reality, HII tracked tens of thousands of dissatisfied consumers who complained that HII’s distributors made misrepresentations to sell the health insurance products, charged consumers for products they did not authorize and failed to cancel plans upon consumers’ requests,” the SEC found, with HII/Benefytt and Southwell ultimately paying a $12 million settlement in November 2022.
By August 2022, Benefytt had paid $100 million to settle allegations that it had fraudulently directed people into “sham” health care plans. “Benefytt pocketed millions selling sham insurance to seniors and other consumers looking for health coverage,” the FTC’s Director of Consumer Protection, Samuel Levine, said at the time.
Bankruptcy and another name change
In May 2023, Benefytt declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy—where the company seeks to continue to exist as a going concern, as opposed to Chapter 9, when the company is stripped apart for creditors—in the Southern District of Texas. The plan of bankruptcy was approved in August. The Southern Texas Bankruptcy Court has been mired in controversy in recent months as one of the two judges was revealed to be in a romantic relationship with a woman employed by a firm, Jackson Walker, that worked in concert with the major Chicago law firm Kirkland and Ellis to move bankruptcy cases to Southern Texas and monopolize them under a friendly court. While the other judge on the two-judge panel handled the Benefytt case, Jackson Walker and Kirkland and Ellis were retained by Benefytt, and the fees paid to Jackson Walker by Benefytt were delayed by the court as a result of the controversy.
In September 2023, Benefytt exited bankruptcy and became Blue Lantern.
The August approval of the bankruptcy plan was vocally opposed by a group of creditors who had sued Benefytt over violations of the Telephone Consumer Privacy Act (TCPA). The creditors asserted that Benefytt had substantial liabilities, with millions of calls made where Benefytt did not identify the ultimate seller—Medicare Advantage plans run by UnitedHealth, Humana, and other firms prohibited from directly contacting people they have no relationship with—and violations fined at $1,500 per willful violation.
Attorneys for those creditors stated in a filing reviewed by HEALTH CARE Un-Covered that Madison Dearborn always planned “to steer Benefytt into bankruptcy,” if they were unable to resolve the substantial liabilities they owed under the TCPA.
Madison Dearborn “knew that Benefytt’s TCPA liabilities exceeded its value, but purchased Benefytt anyway, for the purpose of trying to quickly extract as much money and value as they could before those liabilities became due,”
the August 25, 2023, filing stated on behalf of Wes Newman, Mary Bilek, George Moore, and Robert Hossfeld, all plaintiffs in proposed TCPA class action suits. The filing went on to say that the bankruptcy was inevitable “if—after siphoning off any benefit from the illegal telemarketing alleged herein—[Madison Dearborn] could not obtain favorable settlements or dismissals for the telemarketing-related lawsuits against Benefytt.”
Under the bankruptcy plan, Blue Lantern/Benefytt is released from the TCPA claims, but individuals harmed can affirmatively opt-out of the release, which is why the bankruptcy court justified its approval. Over 7 million people—the total numbers in Benefytt’s database, according to the plaintiffs—opting out of the third-party release is an enormous administrative hurdle for plaintiffs’ lawyers to pass, massively limiting the likelihood of success of any class-action litigation against Blue Lantern going forward.
Their attorney, Alex Burke, stated in court that “[t]his bankruptcy is an intentional and preplanned continuation of a fraud.” His statement was before 3,670 more Namath ads ran during 2023 open enrollment.
In response to requests for comment from HEALTH CARE un-covered, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services did not answer questions about Benefytt and why the company was simply not barred from the Medicare Advantage market altogether.
Corporations have used the bankruptcy process in recent years to free themselves from criminal and civil liability, with opioid marketer Purdue Pharma being the most prominent recent example. The Supreme Court is reviewing the legality of Purdue’s third-party releases currently, with a decision expected in late spring.
The role that private equity plays in keeping Benefytt going cannot be overstated.
Without Madison Dearborn or another private equity firm eager to take on such a risky business with such a long history of legal imbroglios, it is almost certain that Benefytt would no longer exist—and the Joe Namath ads would disappear from our televisions. Instead, Madison Dearborn keeps them going, suckering seniors into Medicare Advantage plans.
This is part and parcel of the ongoing colonization by private equity into America’s health care system. Private equity is making a major play into Medicare Advantage.
It has pumped billions of dollars into purchasing hospitals. It has invested in hospice care. It is gobbling up doctors’ groups. It is acquiring ambulance companies. It is hoovering up nurse staffing firms. It is making huge investments into health tech. It is in nursing homes. And it is in health insurance. Nothing about America’s health care system is untouched by private equity.
That’s a problem, experts say.
“I’ve been screaming at the TV every time Joe Namath gets on—it is not an official Medicare website,” said Laura Katz Olson, a professor of political science at Lehigh University who has written on private equity’s role in the health care system.
“Private equity has so much money to deploy, which is far more than they have opportunities to buy. As such, they are desperately looking for opportunities to invest. There’s a lot of money in Medicare Advantage—it’s guaranteed money from the federal government, which makes it perfect for the private equity playbook.”
Eileen Appelbaum, the co-director at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, who has also studied private equity’s role in health care, concurred that private equity was a perfect fit for Medicare marketing organizations.
“I think basically the whole privatized Medicare situation is ready for all kinds of exploitation and misrepresentations and denying people the coverage that they need,” she said. “My email is inundated with these totally misleading ads. Private equity took a look at this and said, “look at that, it’s possible to do something that’s misleading and make a lot of money.”
Madison Dearborn receives a large portion of its capital from public pension funds like the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) and the Washington State Investment Fund—people who are dependent on Medicare. Appelbaum said that the pension funds exercise little oversight over their investments in private equity. “Pension funds may have the name of the company that they are invested in, they’re told that it’s ‘part of our health care investment portfolio,’ but they don’t find out what they really do until there’s a scandal.
It is amazing that pension funds give so much money to private equity with so little information about how their money is being spent.”
Walgreens announced this week that it will be shutting down all of its Florida-based VillageMD primary care clinics. Fourteen clinics in the Sunshine State have already closed, with the remaining 38 expected to follow by March 15.
This move comes in the wake of a $1B cost-cutting initiative announced by Walgreens executives last fall, which included plans to shutter at least 60 VillageMD clinics across five markets in 2024.
Last month VillageMD exited the Indiana market, where it was operating a dozen clinics.
Despite downsizing its primary-care footprint, Walgreens says it remains committed to its expansion into the healthcare delivery sector, having invested $5.2B in VillageMD in 2021 and purchased Summit Health-CityMD for $9B through VillageMD in 2023.
The Gist:Having made significant investments in provider assets, Walgreens now faces the difficult task of creating an integrated and sustainable healthcare delivery model, which takes time.
Unlike long-established healthcare providers who feel more loyal to serving their local communities, nontraditional healthcare providers like Walgreens can more easily pick and choose markets based on profitability.
While this move is disruptive to VillageMD patients in Florida and the other markets it’s exiting, Walgreens seems to be answering to its investors, who have been dissatisfied with its recent earnings.
On Sunday, Miami, FL-based Cano Health, a Medicare Advantage (MA)-focused primary care clinic operator, filed for bankruptcy protection to reorganize and convert around $1B of secured debt into new debt.
The company, which went public in 2020 via a SPAC deal worth over $4B, has now been delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. After posting a $270M loss in Q2 of 2023, Cano began laying off employees, divesting assets, and seeking a buyer. As of Q3 2023, it managed the care of over 300K members, including nearly 200K in Medicare capitation arrangements, at its 126 medical centers.
The Gist:
Like Babylon Health before it, another “tech-enabled” member of the early-COVID healthcare SPAC wave is facing hard times. While the low interest rate-fueled trend of splashy public offerings was not limitedto healthcare, several prominent primary care innovators and “insurtechs” from this wave have struggled, adding further evidence to the adages that healthcare is both hard and difficult to disrupt.
Given that Cano sold its senior-focused clinics in Texas and Nevada to Humana’s CenterWell last fall, Cano may draw interest from other organizations looking to expand their MA footprints.
In mid-January, General Catalyst (GC) and Summa Health announced the signing of a non-binding LOI for GC to acquire Summa, which, if consummated, would be a groundbreaking transaction. Summa Health is a vertically integrated not-for-profit health system located in Akron, Ohio that operates acute care hospitals, a network of health care services, a physician group practice, and a health plan. Like much of the health system sector, Summa has found the operating environment for the past couple of years to be challenging.
GC is a venture capital firm that had approximately $25B in assets under management at the end of 2022, across a dozen fund families and a number of sectors, including its Health Assurance funds, that have a stated mission of “creating a more proactive, affordable & equitable system of care.”
Health Assurance has investments in more than 150 digital health companies worldwide and has implemented working relationships with more than a dozen of the country’s most noteworthy health systems and hospital operators.
In October, GC announced the formation of a new venture called the Health Assurance Transformation Corporation (HATCo), for the purpose of providing financial and operational advisory assistance to health systems, including using GC’s suite of digital health companies. At that time, HATCo announced plans to buy a health system in order to drive transformation in the delivery of care by leveraging technology, updating workforce/staffing models, and becoming more proactive in creating revenue streams for health systems.
Their plans included an intent to streamline operations and find efficiencies using technology, as well as implementing value-based payment models, including fully capitated risk contracts to incentivize better utilization management, an initiative that requires significant data analytics.
GC had been looking for a system with market relevance and a sweet spot in terms of size – big enough to have a full complement of services, but nimble enough to accept significant change. In Summa, it has also found a system that maintains its own health plan, which GC can use to help accelerate the shift to capitated models.
The transaction that Summa and GC are contemplating is a new and innovative attempt at addressing the underlying problems that plague the acute care industry.
In particular, 1) a continued reliance on fee-for-service revenue when reimbursement has been pressured from every angle and rate increases have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of providing care, 2) capital to fund a growing list of competing needs, and 3) the challenges of staffing for quality in a tight market for clinical labor. Summa appears to be banking on the idea that GC and the data- and technology driven solutions that reside within their portfolio companies can ease those pressures.
HATCo’s proposed purchase of Summa requires a conversion of the health system to for profit. The purchase price of the health system will contribute to the corpus for a large foundation that will address social determinants of health in the Akron community, and the operating entities would become subsidiaries of HATCo.
HATCo has stated publicly that it will continue Summa’s existing charity care commitment, that Summa’s existing management team will stay in place, and the health system Board will continue to have local community representation. HATCo has also emphasized that it plans to hold Summa for an extended period and have it serve as a digital innovation testing ground and incubation site for new healthcare IT, where it believes that aligning incentives will drive financial improvement and better care.
Innovative approaches to meaningful problems should be applauded but there is skepticism.
Will bottom line pressures affect the quality of care?
Will the typical investment horizon of venture capital align with the time frames needed to prove these solutions are taking hold?
Health system evolution has traditionally been measured in decades, rather than the 5-7 year hold periods that private capital prefers. There are also perceived conflicts to consider as Summa will be paying the GC-owned companies for their services. Acute care hospitals are central elements of their communities and their constituents are broader than most companies, often including large workforces, union leadership, politicians, government regulators, and of course patients and their families.
This transaction will receive significant scrutiny with any number of constituents taking issue with a health system’s purchase by a venture capital firm. One hurdle is the conversion process itself, which requires review and approval by the Ohio Attorney General and regulators may want to impose restrictions on GCs ability to operate that are incompatible with its plans. The hurdles to closing are daunting, but the challenges facing health systems are equally daunting.
And while this proposed combination may not come to fruition, the need for innovative solutions remains.
The physician-led healthcare network formed to save hospitals from financial distress. Now, hospitals in its own portfolio need bailing out after years of alleged mismanagement.
Steward Health Care formed over a decade ago when a private equity firm and a CEO looking to disrupt a regional healthcare environment teamed up to save six Boston-based hospitals from the brink of financial collapse. Since that time, Steward has expanded from a handful of facilities to become the largest physician-led for-profit healthcare network in the country, operating 33 community hospitals in eight states, according to its own corporate site.
However, Steward has also found itself once again on the precipice of failure.
Steward’s ongoing issues in Massachusetts have played out in regional media outlets in recent weeks. Massachusetts Gov. Maura Healey warned there would be no bailout for Steward in an interview on WBUR’s Radio Boston.
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health said it is investigating concerns raised about Steward facilities and began conducting daily site inspections at some Steward sites to ensure patient safety beginning Jan. 31.
However, the tide may have begun to change. Steward executives said on Feb. 2 they had secured a deal to stabilize operations and keep Massachusetts hospitals open — for now. Steward will receive bridge financing under the deal and consider transferring ownership of one or more hospitals to other companies, a Steward spokesperson confirmed to Healthcare Dive on Feb. 7.
While politicians welcomed the news, some say Steward’s long term outlook in the state is uncertain. Other politicians sought answers for how a prominent system could seemingly implode overnight.
“I am cautiously optimistic at this point that [Steward] will be able to remain open, because it’s really critical they do,” said Brockton City Councilor Phil Griffin. “But they owe a lot of people a lot of money, so we’ll see.”
However, the business model wasn’t immediately a financial success. Steward didn’t turn a profit between 2011 and 2014, according to a 2015 monitoring report from the Massachusetts attorney general. Instead, Steward’s debt increased from $326 million in 2011 to $413 million at the end of the 2014 fiscal year, while total liabilities ballooned to $1.4 billion in the same period as Steward engaged in real estate sale and leaseback plays.
Under the 2010 deal, Steward agreed to assume Caritas’ debt and carry out $400 million in capital expenditures over four years to upgrade the hospitals’ infrastructure. However, that capital expenditure could come in part from financial engineering, such as monetizing Steward’s own assets, according to Zirui Song, associate professor of health care policy and medicine at the Harvard Medical School who has studied private equity’s impact on healthcare since 2019.
Cerberus did not contribute equity into Steward after making its initial investment of $245.9 million, according to the December 2015 monitoring report. Meanwhile, according to reporting at the time, de la Torre wanted to expand Steward. Steward was on its own to raise funds.
Such deals are typically short-sighted, Song explained. When hospitals sell their property, they voluntarily forfeit their most valuable assets and tend to be saddled with high rent payments.
Healthcare Dive spoke with four workers across Steward’s portfolio who said Steward’s emphasis on the bottom line negatively impacted the company’s operations for years.
Terra Ciurro worked in the emergency department at Steward Health Care-owned Odessa Regional Medical Center in January 2022 as a travel nurse. She recalled researching Steward and being attracted to the fact the company was physician owned.
“I remember thinking, ‘That’s all I need to know. Surely, doctors will have their heart in the right place,’” Ciurro said. “But yeah — that’s not the experience I had at all.”
The emergency department was “shabby, rundown and ill-equipped,” and management didn’t fix broken equipment that could have been hazardous, she said. Nine weeks into her 13-week contract and three hours before Ciurro was scheduled to work, Ciurro said her staffing agency called to cut her contract unceremoniously short. Steward hadn’t paid its bills in six months, and the agency was pulling its nurses, she said she was told.
In Massachusetts, Katie Murphy, president of the Massachusetts Nurses Association, which represents more than 3,000 registered nurses and healthcare professionals who work in eight Steward hospitals, said there were “signals” that Steward facilities had been on the brink of collapse for “well over a year.”
Steward hospitals are often “significantly” short staffed and lack supplies from the basics, like dressings, to advanced operating room equipment, said Murphy. While most hospitals in the region got a handle on staffing and supply shortages in the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, at Steward hospitals shortages “continued to accelerate,” Murphy said.
A review of Steward’s finances by BDO USA, a tax and advisory firm contracted last summer by the health system itself to demonstrate it was solvent enough to construct a new hospital in Massachusetts, showed Steward had a liquidity problem. The health system had few reserves on hand last year to pay down its debts owed to vendors, possibly contributing to the shortages. The operator carried only 10.2 days of cash on hand in 2023. In comparison, most healthy nonprofit hospital systems carried 150 days of cash on hand or more in 2022, according to KFF.
One former finance employee, who worked for Steward beginning around 2018, said that the books were routinely left unbalanced during her tenure. Each month, she made a list of outstanding bills to determine who must be paid and who “we can get away with holding off” and paying later.
Food, pharmaceuticals and staff were always paid, while all other vendors were placed on an “escalation list,” she said. Her team prioritized paying vendors that had placed Steward on a credit hold.
The worker permanently soured on Steward when she said operating room staff had to “make do” without a piece of a crash cart — which is used in the event of a heart attack, stroke or trauma.
She stopped referring friends to Steward facilities, telling them “Don’t go — if you can go anywhere else, don’t go [to Steward], because there’s no telling if they’ll have the supplies needed to treat you.”
Away from regulatory review
Massachusetts officials maintain that it hasn’t been easy to see what was happening inside Steward.
Steward is legally required to submit financial data to the MA Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA) and to the Massachusetts Registration of Provider Organizations Program (MA-RPO Program), according to a spokesperson from the Health Policy Commission, which analyzes the reported data. Under the latter requirement, Steward is supposed to provide “a comprehensive financial statement, including information on parent entities and corporate affiliates as applicable.”
However, Steward fought the requirements. During Stuart Altman’s tenure as the chair of the Commission from 2012 to 2022, Altman told Healthcare Dive that the for-profit never submitted documents, despite CHIA levying fines against Steward for non-compliance. Steward even sued CHIA and HPC for relief against the reporting obligations.
Steward is currently appealing a superior court decision and order from June 2023 that required it to comply with the financial reporting requirements and produce audited financial reports that cover the full health system, Mickey O’Neill, communications director for the HPC told Healthcare Dive. As of Feb. 6, Steward’s non-compliance remained ongoing, O’Neill said.
Without direct insight into Steward’s finances, the state was operating at a disadvantage, said John McDonough, professor of the practice of public health at The Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. He added that some regulators saw a crisis coming generally, “but the timing was hard to predict.”
Altman gives his team even more of a pass for not spotting the Steward problem.
“There was no indication while I was there that Steward was in deep trouble,” Altman said. Although Steward was the only hospital system that failed to report financial data to the HPC, that alone had not raised red flags for him. “[CEO] Ralph [de la Torre] was just a very contrarian guy. He didn’t do a lot of things.”
Song and his co-author, Sneha Kannan, a clinical research fellow at Harvard Medical School, are hopeful that in the future, regulatory agencies can make better use of the data they collect annually to track changes in healthcare performance over time. They can potentially identify problem operators before they become crises.
“State legislators, even national legislators, are not in the habit of comparing hospitals’ performances on [quality] measures to themselves over time — they compare to hospitals’ regional partners,” Kannan said. “Legislators, Medicare, [and] CMS has access to that information.”
However, although there’s interest from regulators in scrutinizing healthcare quality more closely — particularly when private equity gets involved — a streamlined approach to analyzing such data is still a “ways off,” according to the pair. For now, all parties interviewed for this piece agreed that the best way to avoid being caught off guard by a failing system was to know how such implosions could occur.
“If there’s a lesson from [Steward],” McDonough ventured, “it is that the entire state health system and state government need to be much more wary of all for-profits.”
HENRY KOTULA 