On Tuesday, Amazon unveiled its latest healthcare offering, RxPass, which will deliver generic prescription drugs to Prime members who pay an additional flat $5 monthly surcharge. The service, which currently covers 53 medications for common conditions, requires consumers to pay out-of-pocket rather than through insurance, but does not limit the number of drugs a subscriber can receive for the flat monthly fee.
RxPass is not yet able to ship medications to eight states, including (notably) California, Texas, and Pennsylvania.
The Gist:Paying $60 a year to avoid the hassle of going to a pharmacy or dealing with another mail-order delivery program will be a very attractive offer for many of the 168M US-based Amazon Prime subscribers, as much for the convenience as for the potential cost savings.
But the concept isn’t novel. Case in point: Walmart continues to offer its $4 generic drug program, launched in 2006. Given that the average Prime member is 37 years old, Amazon’s flat-fee service offering will target a younger demographic with fewer medication needs—and complement the service offered by PillPack, acquired in 2018, which is built for older customers on multiple medications. An evolutionary, not revolutionary, step in Amazon’s ongoing moves into healthcare.
Healthcare leaders now need to strike a delicate balance that requires managing financial and growth metrics, increasing the speed of transformation, and building the health systems of tomorrow. So how do we redefine compensation models to reward all these behaviors?
Executive compensation might not spring to mind as a key driver of healthcare transformation, nor does it seem naturally connected to critical issues such as health equity, patient safety, or quality of care – just a few of the areas where significant changes can be made to transform healthcare. But, in fact, executives leading not-for-profit health systems today are tasked with delivering measurable results that improve the health status of their patients and their communities. And to ensure that these new performance metrics are met, we must change how we think about —and deliver—compensation.
Defining a new model
While executive compensation has always been tied to specific objectives, they have historically leaned heavily toward financial performance, volume and margins, with a modest portion of compensation aligned to quality of care and patient outcomes. But transformative approaches such as population health, value-based care, patient wellness and health outcomes are shifting the mark.
Healthcare leaders now need to strike a delicate balance that requires managing financial and growth metrics, increasing the speed of transformation, and building the health systems of tomorrow. So how do we redefine compensation models to reward all these behaviors?
Some might say that the answer lies in adjusting incentive plans. While incentive plans across health care have not changed significantly in the past decade, the sophistication of the plans has changed, reflecting greater attention to delivering a better patient experience. But delivering better experiences does not imply that health systems have transformed from the top down. In my mind, adjusting incentive plans only solves part of the problem.
If we want true health care transformation—and we should, in order to best serve patients and communities—health systems need to re-evaluate the outcomes for each stakeholder and create incentives to evolve leadership as a whole. We need to rethink executive compensation models to align with value-based care, patient experience, and the resulting outcomes, along with traditional performance measurements.
Leading through lingering disruption
But rethinking executive compensation models won’t be an easy task, especially given the external challenges and changes thrust upon the health care system over the last few years.
As with nearly every other aspect of health care, pay for performance was disrupted during the pandemic. Demand for health services changed dramatically, labor and attrition issues intensified, and supply chain problems and operational costs increased. These new pressures required executives to manage through long periods of uncertainty where meeting operational pay-for-performance goals was nearly impossible. Fast-forward to today, the executive talent market remains extraordinarily competitive. Demand outpaces supply due to higher-than-typical retirements, effects of the great resignation, the need for new skill sets and overall burnout.
As a result, there has been upward pressure on compensation to address and fulfill unexpected but immediate needs such as rewarding executives for managing in a unique and challenging performance environment, increasing efforts to recruit and retain, and recognizing leaders for their hard-won accomplishments.
Considerations and changes
When considering adjusting models for 2023 and beyond, CEOs and compensation committees need to take these pressures and disruptions into account. They should look closely at their own compensation data from the past two years – not as a lighthouse for future compensation, but as data that may need to be set aside due to the volume of performance goals and achievements that were up-ended by the pandemic. When relying on external industry data, the same rules apply; smaller data sets or those that don’t account for the past two years may be misleading, so review carefully before using limited data sets to inform adjusted models.
Just as important, CEOs and compensation committees should consider new performance measurements tied to both financial and quality or value-based transformation metrics. We don’t need to eliminate traditional financial and operational goals because viability is still a business mandate. But how can we articulate compensation-driven KPIs for stewardship of patient and community health, improved outcomes and reduced cost of care? Too many measures are akin to having no measures at all.
The compensation mix should take into account a more focused approach to long-term measures. The old paradigm of 12-month incentive cycles is not enough to address the time required to truly transform health care. Another consideration should be performance-based funding of deferred compensation based on achieving transformation goals, and greater use of retention programs to support the maintenance of a stable executive team during the transformation period. Covid-19 proved how crisis can be an accelerator for change. True transformation should blend the skills gained from crisis management with planful, thoughtful and intentional change.
In addition, some metrics may need to incorporate a discretionary component, considering ongoing disruption within the workforce, supply chain limitations, and energy, equipment and labor cost increases. More organizations are also including health equity, DE&I, and ESG goals in incentive programs to tighten alignment with mission-critical board-mandated goals.
There are four elements that are vital in the journey to transform health care from “heads in beds” to the public-service-oriented organizations that they were meant to be—and can be again. With mounting pressure from patients, communities, and payers to boards and employees, CEOs and compensation committees must become key drivers of change, setting the right goals and incentives from the top down.
Affordability: can patients afford the care they need?
Quality: is the care being delivered of the utmost quality?
Usability: how can we reduce hurdles to undertaking the care plan?
Access: are all community members able to access needed care?
Solving for each of these elements is one of the biggest challenges we face, and as we begin to emerge from the disruption of the pandemic, leaders will be watched closely to ensure that they deliver—and can clearly show the path to delivery.
Ideally, end achievements would include patients spending less to achieve better health; payers controlling costs and reducing risk; providers realizing efficiencies and greater patient satisfaction; and alignment of medical supplier pricing to patient outcomes. And when you zoom out to reveal the bigger picture, all of these pieces come together to achieve healthier populations and lower overall health care costs, while still meeting the financial goals of the organization.
We’re asking a lot of already-overburdened health care executives. Stakeholders must prove that we value leaders with the right mindset and skillset in order to attract executives who can shepherd organizations through the transformation journey. This requires a setting where there is supportive leadership, a compelling mission and opportunity for personal growth and development. It will not be easy, but without rethinking how we design compensation models from the top down, it will be unnecessarily challenging.
When it comes to her feelings about investing in care delivery startups, it’s a real “mixed bag” for Ulili Onovakpuri, managing partner at Kapor Capital. This is because a lot of them operate on a cash-pay model. She summarized the issue quite succinctly: there’s an incredible amount of innovation happening, but the people who could benefit the most from this type of care will be the last ones to receive it.
Healthcare investors are facing a myriad of care delivery startups seeking their capital. And it’s an interesting time in the care delivery startup space — there’s more and more questions arising about how much scrutiny should be applied to the way these companies are growing, what should be included in their gross margins, and how they should be valued.
When it comes to her feelings about investing in care delivery startups, it’s a real “mixed bag” for Ulili Onovakpuri, managing partner at Kapor Capital. She said so Sunday at Engage at HLTH, a patient engagement summit hosted by MedCity News in Las Vegas.
Healthcare is a stratified experience in the U.S. Onovakpuri drew attention to the fact that this stratification is getting worse with the advent of provider startups that operate on a cash-pay model, such as Sesame and Tia.
These types of cash-pay providers usually offer a simpler healthcare experience compared to the endless bureaucracy and billing confusion patients face in the traditional healthcare system. This can be very attractive to patients — they don’t want to deal with months-long wait times to see a provider, nor do they wish to navigate the Kafkaesque ordeal of trying to understand and pay their healthcare bills.
In Onovakpuri’s view, these cash-pay providers “are good for some” — those who can afford it. But those who lack the means to pay for care outside the traditional healthcare delivery system don’t get to take part in these startups’ care model, regardless of how innovative or convenient it may be.
“If I’m honest, it’s hard for me because I see a lot of great tech every single day, and when I talk to them, I’m like, ‘Wait, this is awesome — how much is this?’ and then I say, ‘Well, we can’t do it because the people that we care the most about can’t afford it.’ And it’s hard, because they’re probably the folks who need it the most,” Onovakpuri said.
She summarized the issue quite succinctly: there’s an incredible amount of innovation happening, but the people who could benefit the most from this type of care will be the last ones to receive it.
“Innovation is great, but it’s another dividing factor we face,” Onovakpuri declared.
Onovakpuri noted another key concern: the fact that many of the country’s most talented physicians are opting to leave their hospitals and health systems to work for cash-pay care delivery startups. She said she can understand why they make this choice (they are understandably fed up with the inefficiency of standard systems), but it still is a problem because it exacerbates hospitals’ labor shortage crisis and makes their patients wait times even longer to receive care.
In its Q3 earnings call, Oscar Health CEO Mario Schlosser revealed that the “insurtech” has pulled out of the MA market in Texas and New York, leaving it with only one Florida-based plan. Oscar entered the MA business with high hopes in 2020, but counted fewer than 5K MA members in Q3 2022.
Although its Affordable Care Act exchange enrollment has nearly doubled since last year, now covering more than 1M lives, Oscar is still struggling with high medical loss ratios, which have kept it from turning a profit. The company’s stock price is at an all-time low, having declined over 90 percent from its peak, shortly after its 2021 IPO.
The Gist: Like Bright HealthCare before them, Oscar pulling out of MA is another sign that the chance of meaningful disruption from “insurtechs” has nearly vanished. While still privately held, Oscar achieved fame in the early 2010s through catchy marketing that targeted a young, tech-savvy client base, and its move into MA before the pandemic signaled broader ambitions.
Oscar’s travails illustrate just how hard it is to start an insurance company from scratch, even with an intriguing and comprehensive technology platform. The company proved unable to overcome its lack of market power in negotiations with providers, and faced difficulty managing a small, unstable risk pool.
Now that more traditional insurers are improving their mobile tech interfaces and telehealth offerings, the differentiated value Oscar offers to its members has clearly diminished.
In a press release, London-based telemedicine provider Babylon Health said it intends to divest Meritage Medical Network, its 1,800-physician independent practice association located in Northern and Central California. Babylon claims the sale will allow it to better focus on its core business model of digital-first, value-based care contracts. After going public last year at $4.2B, Babylon’s valuation has fallen over 95 percent.
The Gist: Yet another highly touted healthcare startup with digital-first “solutions” has announced a massive pullback in its care footprint. As we wrote about Bright Health last week, these companies have failed to meet investor demands, and mustnowshutter services or sell assets to buy time to prove their core business model can actually turn a profit.
In Babylon’s case, integrating established physician practices into a digital-first, value-based care model was always going to be costly, challenging and time-consuming—too slow to deliver the returns demanded by an increasingly difficult investor market.
Coming off a $1.2B net loss in 2021, Minneapolis-based insurtech Bright Health announced this week it will stop offering commercial and Medicare Advantage (MA) plans in all states except Florida and California, where it will solely offer MA plans. In its remaining markets, the company plans to focus on its care delivery and provider support business, NeueHealth. Bright has reportedly struggled to contain its medical spend, due to rapid growth and COVID-related costs; its claims processing backlog also earned a $1M fine from the Colorado Department of Insurance last April. Once valued at over $11B, Bright’s stock has lost 95 percent of its value since going public in June 2021.
The Gist: The largest digital health IPO to date is now rapidly shrinking, not even two years later—and Bright is not alone amongst its peers. After years of hype, most insurtechs still have minimal market share, and most have yet to turn a profit. With a market cap now under $1B—and dropping by the day—Bright could be an easy pickup for an established health plan interested in its consumer-centric technology, though given reports of dissatisfied beneficiaries, the value of that technology is still unclear.
Amazon and several other major companies have made numerous attempts to “disrupt” health care over the years without much success. But new acquisitions in primary care, home health care, and more may allow them to more successfully expand into the industry, David Wainer writes for the Wall Street Journal.
Competition heats up in the health care industry
According to Wainer, the United States spends a greater proportion of its economy on medical services than any other developed nation, making health care “too big of an opportunity to ignore” for many companies, including those in technology, retail, and more.
For example, Amazon has launched several forays into health care in recent years, although not all of them have been successful. Some of these health care efforts include its now defunct partnership with Berkshire Hathaway and JPMorgan Chase, as well as Amazon Care, the company’s primary care service that will shut down at the end of the year.
Amazon has also acquired several smaller health care companies in an effort to expand its reach. In 2018, Amazon purchased PillPack for $1 billion as a way to expand its online pharmacy business. Similarly, Amazon in July reached an agreement to acquireOne Medical, a primary care company, for roughly $3.9 billion.
Several other companies, including retailers like Walmart and Walgreens and large insurers like UnitedHealth Group* (UHG) and CVS Health‘s Aetna, are also looking to expand their health care offerings. In fact, CVS announced last week that it had purchased home health care company Signify Health for roughly $8 billion—beating out several other competitors.
So far, “[s]hifting social attitudes and market conditions have helped fuel the wave” of health care acquisitions from major companies, Wainer writes, and more are likely to occur going forward.
What companies are targeting in health care
In contrast to the more traditional fee-for-service model, many health care startups are moving toward value-based care, which encourages providers to help prevent illnesses, rather than just treat them.
According to Wainer, UHG, which includes a pharmacy benefit manager, an insurance business, and 60,000 physicians, has made the most progress transitioning to value-based care so far. For example, many of the multi-specialty physician practices UHG has purchased through its medical provider arm Optum Care focus on proactively providing patients home, virtual, and on-site care to help them stay out of the hospital.
In addition, UHG and Walmart last week announced a partnership to provide services and “improve the patient experience” for certain Medicare Advantage enrollees. Through the partnership, UHG will use analytics to help Walmart clinics deliver value-based care to patients.
Aside from value-based care, many companies, including Amazon and CVS, are looking to expand their businesses into primary care. Currently, there is a nationwide shortage of primary care doctors, which has led to worse health outcomes for many Americans.
By providing primary care services directly to consumers, Amazon and other companies are hoping to use the relationship between patients and their providers to sell even more services, such as prescription drug deliveries and more.
Overall, “staying healthy probably will never be the sort of frictionless, one-click experience that Amazon pioneered,” Wainer writes, but the company’s current involvement in the health care industry “is a testament to the fact that there’s a lot of money to be made by fixing America’s broken system.” (Wainer, Wall Street Journal, 9/9)
*Advisory Board is a subsidiary of Optum, a division of UnitedHealth Group. All Advisory Board research, expert perspectives, and recommendations remain independent.
Amazon announced it will shut down Amazon Care—its primary care service sold to employer health plans—by the end of the year. There’s one thing that Amazon’s decision will surely mean: It will continue to be fashionable to mock Amazon.
People may look at this, compare it to Amazon’s Haven misadventure, and say that everyone (including Advisory Board) who speculated that Amazon could succeed in health care is either naïve or delusional.
But there’s more to it.
In looking at what Amazon reportedly said about the challenges facing Amazon Care, we believe that the acquisition of One Medical is the clearest signal yet that Amazon intends to succeed at health care.
The problems with Amazon Care
Amazon Care appears to have struggled to understand the nuances and demands of care delivery, as detailed recently in the Washington Post. Clearly, the tension between expectations for growth and quality were real. This raised questions for us: Was Amazon going to truly “iterate” on its health care capabilities? When it came to care delivery, would Amazon get better, or would it do enough to get by?
Amazon concedes that its product was not comprehensive enough for its employer partners. It’s unclear whether that means it simply wasn’t saving them money, even if employees were using it. At the same time, we wonder how hard it was to persuade employees to embrace Amazon-branded health care or to attract employees to a product centered on virtual and home-based care—or some combination of the two.
Remember: Everyone had to try out telehealth in 2020 because, in many cases, they had no choice. There isn’t any similarly powerful and pervasive force pushing anyone to virtual-first care today. People tend to like virtual visits, but that doesn’t mean that they want to receive all adequately satisfy users or keep care from fragmenting with its mosaic of services, channels, and providers.
What shutting down Amazon Care suggests about Amazon’s health care ambition
Amazon’s willingness to jettison its homegrown but underperforming health care business suggests three things.
One Medical is the centerpiece of Amazon’s health care strategy, not simply one component among many. When viewed this way, the details of the acquisition make more sense than they did four weeks ago. Knowing that a virtual and home-based model wasn’t attractive for employers, we can understand more clearly why Amazon wanted a partner with both in-person and digital health capabilities. Knowing that its own product was struggling, we can see why it was willing to pay a huge premium for One Medical.
Amazon is iterating on its health care capabilities, but it is iterating at an enormous scale. “Fail fast” is axiomatic in technology. It’s usually applied to minimum viable products—applications and services that are quickly built, delivered, and assessed for their ability to meet customer demands and gain traction in the market. Products that don’t meet those demands are replaced as quickly as possible. Obviously, Amazon Care was not a minimum viable product. It was rolled out three years ago, and it offered telehealth services in all 50 states and in-home services in seven markets. But when you look at the pivot Amazon seems to be making from virtual and home-based care with Amazon Care to in-person and virtual with One Medical, it’s hard not to reach for the “fail fast” comparison.
Amazon is a different kind of competitor in health care. We can’t think of another organization that would spend years building out a care delivery enterprise, roll it out in 50 states, and then simply shut it down. We also can’t think of another organization whose alternative care delivery plan is to spend nearly $4 billion on another company. It’s not just the scale and the money—it’s the willingness to throw around those assets that makes Amazon a potentially potent competitor.
There are still enormous execution challenges for Amazon and One Medical. Massive disruption of the industry is not a given, no matter how much money is spent or how many companies are bought and/or fail.
It seems likely that the impact of Amazon on the market will be centered, at least for the immediate future, on the same direct-to-consumer approach that One Medical has taken and at which Amazon is expert in its other lines of business.
That does not mean Amazon can be dismissed as a dilettante or a dabbler in health care. Its mere presence in the market already seems to have sparked a bidding war for Signify Health. Amazon’s continued iteration of its approach to health care demands ongoing attention.
Radio Advisory’s Rachel Woods sat down with Advisory Board’s Sarah Hostetter and Vidal Seegobin to discuss the good and bad elements of private equity and what leaders can do to make it a valuable partner to their practices.
Private equity (PE) tends to get a bad rap when it comes to health care. Some see it as a disruptive force that prioritizes profits over the patient experience, and that it’s hurting the industry by creating a more consolidated marketplace. Others, however, see it as an opportunity for innovation, growth, and more movement towards value-based care.
Radio Advisory’s Rachel Woods sat down with Advisory Board‘s Sarah Hostetter and Vidal Seegobin to discuss the good and bad elements of PE and what leaders can do to make it be a valuable partner to their practices.
Rachel Woods: Clearly there are a lot of feelings about private equity. I’m frankly not that surprised, because the more we see PE get involved in the health care space, we hear more negative feelings about what that means for health care.
Frankly, this bad guy persona is even seen in mainstream media. I can think of several cable medical dramas that have made private equity, or maybe it’s specific investors, as the literal enemy, right? The enemy of the docs that are the saviors of their hospital or ER or medical practice. Is that the right way we should be thinking about private equity? Are they the bad guy?
Sarah Hostetter: The short answer is no. I think private equity is a scapegoat for a lot of the other problems we’re seeing in the industry. So the influx of money and where it’s going and the influence that that has on health care. I think private equity is a prime example of that.
I also think the horror stories all get lumped together. So we don’t think about who the PE firm is or what is being invested in. We put together physician practices and health systems and SNPs, and we lump every story all together, as opposed to considering those on their individual merits.
Woods: And feeds to this bad guy kind of persona that’s out there.
Hostetter: Yeah. And like you said, the media doesn’t help, right? If the average consumer is watching and seeing different portrayals or lumped portrayals, it’s not helping.
Vidal Seegobin: Private equity, as all actors in our complex ecosystem, is not a monolith, and no one has the monopoly on great decisions in health care, nor do they have a monopoly on the bad decisions in health care. And so if you attribute a bad case to private equity, then you also have to attribute the positive returns done from a private equity investment as well.
Hostetter: Agree with what Vidal’s saying, but bottom line is that every stakeholder is not going to have the same outcomes or ripple effects from a private equity deal. It really depends on the deal itself, the market, and the vantage points that you take.
Woods: I want to actually play out a scenario with the two of you and I want you to talk about the positive and the potentially negative consequences for different sectors or different stakeholders.
So let’s take the newest manifestation that Sarah, you talked to us through. Let’s say that there is a PE packed multi-specialty practice heavily in value-based care. That practice starts to get bigger. They acquire other practices, including maybe even some big practices in a market and they start employing all of the unaffiliated or loosely affiliated practices in the market.
I am guessing that every health system leader listening to this episode is already starting to sweat. What does this mean for the incumbent health system?
Seegobin: So I think one thing that’s going to be pretty clear is that size does confer clear advantages and health care is part and parcel that kind of benefit. What I think is challenging is when we’re entering into a moment where access to capital is challenging for health systems in particular and we’re going to need to scale up investments, health systems could see themselves falling further and further behind as private equity makes smart investments into these practices to both capture and retain volume. And as a consequence of that, reduces the amount of inpatient demand or the demand to their bread and butter services.
Hostetter: And I think it’s really important that you phrase the question, Rae, as health system. Because we so often equate health system and hospital.
But a health system includes lots of hospitals, it includes ambulatory facilities, a range of services. And so I think for systems to equate health system and hospital, it’s really hard when any type of super practice or large backed practice comes into the market.
Whether we are talking about a plan backed practice, a PE backed practice, or just a really large independent group. There are pressures on health systems who think of their job or their primary service as the hospital. And there is a moment where the power dynamics can shift in markets away from the health system, if they aren’t able to pivot their strategy beyond just the hospital.
Woods: Which is exactly why health systems see this scenario as, let’s just say it, threatening. Sarah, then how do the physicians feel? Do they have the opposite feelings as the incumbent health systems?
Hostetter: There’s a huge range. Private equity is incredibly polarizing in the physician practice world, the same way that it is in other parts of the industry. So I think there is a hope from some practices that private equity is a type of investor that is aligned with them.
Physicians who go into private practice historically tend to be more entrepreneurial. They are shareholders in their own practice, so there are some natural synergies between private equity, business minded folks, and these physicians.
Also, even though I go into a small business, it takes a lot to run a small business, so there are potentially welcome synergies and help that you can get from a PE firm. On the flip side of that, there are groups who would never in a million years consider taking a private equity investment and are unwilling to have these conversations.
Woods: There is a tendency, especially in the conversation that we’re having, for folks to think about private equity as being something that primarily impacts the provider space, at least when it comes to health care. But I’m not sure that that’s actually true. So what consequences, good or bad, might the payers feel? Might the life sciences companies feel?
Seegobin: So one common refrain when talking about private equity and their acquisition or partnering with traditional health care businesses like physician practices is that they are immediately focused on cutting costs. So they are going to consolidate all of the purchasing contracts, they are going to make pretty aggressive decisions about real estate, all the types of cost components that run the business.
Now, if you are a kind of life sciences or a diagnostic business for whom you would depend on being an incumbent in those contracting decisions, you’re worried that the private equity is either going to direct you to a lower cost provider, or in many cases, another business that the private equity firm owns as well, right?
They would love to keep synergies within the portfolio of businesses that they’ve acquired and they partner. So if you were relying on incumbent or historical purchasing practices with these physician practices, it can be disrupted, depending on the arrangement.
Hostetter: And then I think there’s a range of potential implications for payers. So you have some payers who themselves are aggregating independent practices, and they’re targeting the same type of practices that the PE firms that are betting on value-based care are targeting. They are targeting primary care groups who are big in Medicare Advantage. So there’s some inherent competition potentially for the physician practice landscape there.
Woods: Well, and I think they’re trying to offer the same thing, right? They’re trying to offer capital. They’re trying to do that with the promise of autonomy. And they’re coming up against a competitive partner that is saying, “I can do both of those things and I can do it better and faster.”
Hostetter: Yeah. And both of them are saying we can do it better and faster than hospitals. That’s the other thing, right?
Woods: Which, that part is probably true.
Hostetter: Yeah. Their goals are aligned and they believe they can get there different ways. And I think autonomy is a big sticking point here for me or a big bellwether for me, because I think whoever can get to value-based care while preserving autonomy is going to win. You have to have some level of standardization to do value-based care well. You can’t just let everyone do whatever they want. You need high quality results for lower cost. That inherently requires standardization. So who can thread the needle of getting that standardization while preserving a degree of autonomy?
It’s fascinating, as we’ve had this call, it was suggested multiple times that payers actually might be the end of the line for some of these PE deals. That there’s a lot of alignment between what payers are trying to do with their aggregation and what PE firms who are investing in primary care do, and hey, payers have a lot of money too. So could we actually see some of these PE deals end with a payer acquisition? Because they’re trying to achieve similar things, just differently.
Three years after it began piloting a primary care service for its employees that blended telehealth and in-person medical services, Amazon plans to cease operations of its Amazon Care service.
Amazon announced Wednesday afternoon that it would end Amazon Care operations after December 31. In an email to Amazon Health Services employees, Neil Lindsay, senior vice president of Amazon Health Services, said Amazon Care wasn’t a sustainable, long-term solution for its enterprise customers.
Amazon provided a copy of the email to Fierce Healthcare.
The decision only impacts Amazon Care and Care Medical teams and not Amazon’s other healthcare services.
While operating Amazon Care, the company “gathered and listened to extensive feedback” from its enterprise customers and their employees and evolved the service to continuously improve the experience for customers.
“However, despite these efforts, we’ve determined that Amazon Care isn’t the right long-term solution for our enterprise customers, and have decided that we will no longer offer Amazon Care after December 31, 2022,” Lindsay wrote.
“This decision wasn’t made lightly and only became clear after many months of careful consideration. Although our enrolled members have loved many aspects of Amazon Care, it is not a complete enough offering for the large enterprise customers we have been targeting, and wasn’t going to work long-term,” he said.
The online retail company piloted virtual urgent care and primary care service with its employees and their families in the Seattle region in 2019.
Amazon Care has since expanded rapidly with telehealth services available in all 50 states and in-person services in at least seven cities, including Dallas, D.C. and Baltimore. As part of its ambitions in healthcare, Amazon then focused on ramping up partnerships with employers and signed on other companies as clients including Silicon Labs, TrueBlue, Whole Foods Market, Precor—a Washington-based fitness equipment company that was acquired by Peloton—and Hilton.
Some industry insiders have said that Amazon Care struggled to gain a foothold with employer clients.
The company was on track to rapidly expand its hybrid care model to more than 20 additional cities in 2022, including major metropolitan areas like San Francisco, Miami, Chicago and New York City.
If the One Medical deal goes through, it would significantly expand Amazon’s foothold in the nearly $4 trillion healthcare market, specifically in the competitive primary care market.
One Medical markets itself as a membership-based, tech-integrated, consumer-focused primary care platform. The company operates 188 offices in 29 markets. At the end of March, One Medical had 767,000 members.
The deal also gives Amazon rapid access to the lucrative employer market as One Medical works with 8,000 companies.
The One Medical acquisition has not yet closed.
Lindsay said the company’s work building Amazon Care has deepened its understanding of “what’s needed long-term to deliver meaningful health care solutions for enterprise and individual customers.“
“I believe the health care space is ripe for reinvention, and our efforts to help improve the health care experience can have an immensely positive impact on our quality of life and health outcomes. However, none of these reasons make this decision any easier for the teams that have helped to build Amazon Care, or for the customers our Care team serves,” he wrote.
The decision to cease Amazon Care’s operations will likely mean some employees will be laid off. Lindsay said in his email to employees that many Amazon Care employees will have an opportunity to join other parts of the Health Services organization or other teams at Amazon. “Well also support employees looking for roles outside of the company,” he said.