Jefferson Health CFO walks back stance that Einstein is at risk without merger

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/jefferson-health-cfo-walks-back-stance-that-einstein-is-at-risk-without-merger.html?utm_medium=email

Jefferson Health Announces Partnership with Prepared Health to Coordinate  Care Transitions from Hospital to Home - Dina

Jefferson Health walked back its stance that Einstein Health Network’s flagship hospital is at risk of financial failure without a merger during the first day of arguments at a trial, according to Law360.

The Federal Trade Commission’s legal challenge to block the proposed merger of Einstein Healthcare Network and Jefferson Health started in court Sept. 14. The FTC argues that combining the two Philadelphia-based systems would reduce competition in the Philadelphia region and Montgomery County.

In response to the legal challenge, Jefferson Health and Einstein argued that the merger is a matter of survival for Einstein’s flagship hospital

The health systems argued that Einstein, which has only had annual operating profits twice since 2012, is on a path to financial failure without the deal and needs $500 million to invest in key capital projects and deferred maintenance. Further, the organizations said that without the infusion, Einstein will continue to weaken “as it is forced to cut services or close facilities.”

However, at day one of the trial, Jefferson Health CFO Peter DeAngelis conceded during arguments that Jefferson had no evidence that Einstein is in danger of insolvency, despite painting the finances as bleak, according to Law360. 

The hearing on the preliminary injunction is expected to last the entire week, but a decision won’t happen by the end of the week. An additional round of filings must be submitted by the FTC and the two health systems by Sept. 28. The judge overseeing the case hopes to issue a decision before Jan. 1, according to The Philadelphia Inquirer. 

 

 

 

 

Einstein’s flagship hospital at risk without merger, Jefferson and Einstein say

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-and-valuation/einstein-s-flagship-hospital-at-risk-without-merger-jefferson-and-einstein-say.html?utm_medium=email

FTC says merger of Jefferson and Einstein would raise hospital prices 6.9%

The merger of Einstein Healthcare Network and Jefferson Health is a matter of survival for Einstein’s flagship hospital, the two Philadelphia systems argued in a federal court filing this week, according to The Philadelphia Inquirer.

The health systems are attempting to overcome opposition to their merger from the Pennsylvania attorney general and the Federal Trade Commission.

A Sept. 14 hearing is slated on the FTC’s preliminary injunction request. 

A court filing from the two health systems argued that Einstein, which has only had annual operating profits twice since 2012, is on a path to financial failure and needs $500 million to invest in key capital projects and deferred maintenance.

Without the infusion, Jefferson and Einstein said Einstein will continue to weaken “as it is forced to cut services or close facilities,” the Inquirer reported.

“Einstein was unable to identify any alternative buyer to Jefferson that possessed the financial strength and scale necessary to address Einstein’s financial problems,” the filing read, according to the Inquirer. “No other potential strategic partners were willing and able to commit to keep EMCP [Einstein Medical Center Philadelphia] open with its current set of services.”

The FTC announced in February its intent to sue to block the merger, arguing that combining the two systems would reduce competition in Philadelphia and Montgomery County.

“Jefferson and Einstein have a history of competing against each other to improve quality and service,” the FTC said in the February announcement. “The proposed merger would eliminate the robust competition between Jefferson and Einstein for inclusion in health insurance companies’ hospital networks to the detriment of patients.”

The FTC said that with a combination, the two parties would own at least 60 percent of the inpatient general acute care service market around Philadelphia and at least 45 percent of that same market in Montgomery County.

 

 

 

FTC, Justice Department have new guidelines for vertical mergers

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Trump Administration Updates Vertical Merger Guidelines - Multichannel

Guidance on vertical mergers got its first major overhaul from the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice in more than 35 years under new joint guidelines published June 30.

Vertical mergers are those that combine firms or assets at different stages of the same supply chain, such as healthcare company CVS Health’s acquisition of insurer Aetna. Previously proposed mergers like that of insurers Humana and Aetna would be considered horizontal.

FTC Chairman Joe Simon said in a news release that the new guidances “are an important step forward in maintaining vigorous antitrust enforcement, and reaffirm our commitment to challenge vertical mergers that are anticompetitive and would harm American consumers.”

Leaders said that the guidelines explain FTC and Justice Department investigative practices and will give the business community clarity about antitrust concerns, such as the type of evidence the FTC and Justice Department review and how they define markets.

To read the full guidelines, click here

 

 

 

 

 

Penn State Health to acquire hospital from Geisinger

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-and-valuation/penn-state-health-to-acquire-hospital-from-geisinger.html?utm_medium=email

Penn State Health to acquire Geisinger Holy Spirit | ABC27

Penn State Health has signed a definitive agreement to acquire Holy Spirit Health System in Camp Hill, Pa., from Geisinger Health. 

Hershey, Pa.-based Penn State Health and Danville, Pa.-based Geisinger entered into the definitive agreement about eight months after signing a letter of intent.

Under the transaction, expected to be completed in October, Penn State Health will acquire Holy Spirit Hospital, its affiliated outpatient practices and urgent care centers, Ortenzio Heart Center, and West Shore EMS. After the transaction closes, Holy Spirit Hospital will be renamed Penn State Health Holy Spirit Medical Center.

“Holy Spirit’s hospital, employed medical group and strong community of independent practice physicians, working in collaboration with our Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, offers consumers a strong competitive alternative for healthcare services,” said Penn State Health CEO Steve Massini in a news release. “We’re pleased we could reach agreement with Geisinger to bring Holy Spirit into the Penn State Health family.”

The transaction requires regulatory approval by the Federal Trade Commission and the Pennsylvania attorney general. 

 

FTC to block Philadelphia area health system merger in 1st big hospital challenge in 3 years

https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/ftc-to-block-philadelphia-area-health-system-merger-in-1st-big-hospital-cha/573165/

Dive Brief:

  • The Federal Trade Commission has moved to block the proposed merger between two nonprofit Pennsylvania health systems over anticompetitive concerns in its first challenge to hospital M&A in more than three years.
  • Jefferson Health and Albert Einstein Healthcare Network both provide inpatient general acute care and inpatient acute rehabilitation services in Philadelphia County and Montgomery County. A marriage between the two systems, which agreed to definitively merge in September 2018, would harm patients because the two systems would no longer compete for patients and for inclusion in payer networks, the FTC says.
  • Jefferson and Einstein defended the deal Thursday in a joint statement provided to Healthcare Dive, saying they remain “confident our merger will result in continued high-quality care for our consumers.”

Dive Insight:

FTC Commissioner Christine Wilson has pledged to be tougher on hospital deals in 2020, including reviewing previously closed deals to see if they’ve delivered on promised cost and quality metrics. The last time the FTC questioned a major hospital merger was in 2016, when it urged Virginia and Tennessee not to approve the union of large operators Mountain States Health Alliance and Wellmont. The push was unsuccessful, and the two coalesced into rural system Ballad Health.

The deal, first announced in March 2018, has stagnated over the past two years as it was scrutinized by regulators at the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro.

“This merger would eliminate the competitive pressure that has driven quality improvements and lowered rates,” Ian Conner, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, said in a statement. The rivalry between the two nonprofit players for market dominance has resulted in upgraded medical facilities and technological investments, but that progress could stall if Jefferson and Albert Einstein combined, FTC said.

Jefferson and Einstein boast a combined roughly $5.9 billion in annual revenue, along with 18 hospitals, more than 50 outpatient and urgent care centers and a handful of rehab and post-acute facilities. Jefferson, the bigger player, has 14 hospitals across South Jersey and Philadelphia, Montgomery and Bucks counties.

The regulators said they will soon file a formal complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

The complaint alleges that as a result of the merger, Jefferson and Einstein would control at least 60% of the inpatient general acute care services market in North Philadelphia, and 45% in Montgomery. That includes services like medical or surgical diagnostics and treatments requiring an overnight stay.

Jefferson and Einstein manage six of the eight inpatient rehab facilities for recovering from serious, acute conditions in the Philadelphia region, and would control at least 70% of that market if combined.

The hospitals said their marriage represents a “creative effort” to increase access at a time when safety net hospitals are struggling.

“We believe we have presented a strong and comprehensive case as to how the merger would benefit the patients we serve and advance our academic mission without reducing competition for healthcare services,” the systems, which have had an academic partnership for more than two decades, said.

Several studies have debunked theories that bigger is better in terms of quality of care when it comes to health systems.

FTC plans to seek a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent Jefferson and Albert Einstein from consummating the merger pending an administrative trial scheduled to being in September this year.  

 

 

Hospital M&A spurs rising healthcare costs, MedPAC finds

https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/hospital-ma-spurs-rising-healthcare-costs-medpac-finds/566858/

Dive Brief:

  • Both vertical and horizontal hospital consolidation is correlated with higher healthcare costs, according to a congressional advisory committee on Medicare, in yet another study finding rampant mergers and acquisitions drive up prices for consumers.
  • The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission found providers with greater market share see higher commercial profit margins, leading to higher costs per discharge, though the direct relationship between market share and cost per discharge was not statistically meaningful itself.
  • MedPAC also found vertical integration between health systems and physician practices increases prices and spending for consumers. The top-down consolidation leads to higher prices for commercial payers and Medicare alike, as hospitals have more bargaining heft and benefit from Medicare’s payment hikes for hospital outpatient departments.

Dive Insight:

Hospital consolidation has become a major point of concern for policymakers, antitrust regulators and patient advocacy groups.slew of prior studies have found unchecked provider M&A contributes to higher healthcare costs, with the brunt often borne by consumers in the form of higher premiums and out-of-pocket costs.

Since 2003, the number of “super-concentrated” markets has increased from 47% to 57%, according to the MedPAC analysis of CMS and American Hospital Association data. Those markets, with a high amount of consolidation, rarely see new providers enter, which stifles competition, and are rarely reviewed by the government.

There’s been little change in antitrust regulation since the 1980s and, though the Federal Trade Commission has won several challenges to hospital consolidation in the 2010s, the agency only challenges 2% to 3% of mergers annually.

MedPAC also found super-concentrated insurance markets actually led to lower costs per discharge compared to lower levels of payer concentration, deflating somewhat hospital lobbies’ arguments that payer consolidation is driving prices higher.

Committee members called for more analysis of how macro trends like an aging population and federal policy could be driving consolidation and impacting prices, leading some to call for a revamp of the hospital payment framework itself.

“We have to change the way hospitals are paid. I don’t see another solution,” said Brian DeBusk, CEO of Tennesse-based DeRoyal Industries, a medical manufacturer. “Are you going to undo a thousand hospital mergers? Are you going to enact rate setting? I don’t see another way.”

MedPAC also looked at vertical integration, where hospitals snap up physicians practices downstream. According to the Physician Advocacy Institute, only 26% of physician practices were owned by hospitals in 2012, but by last year that number had spiked to 44%.

Since 2012, billing has shifted from physician offices to hospital outpatient departments, especially in specialty practices. In chemotherapy administration, for example, physician offices saw almost 17% less volume between 2012 and 2018, while outpatient centers saw a 53% increase in volume, according to MedPAC.

Physicians in hospital-owned practices also refer more patients to the hospital’s facilities and, despite a common stumping point that integration improves quality through care coordination, its effect on quality is “ambiguous,” MedPAC analyst Dan Zabinski said Thursday at the committee’s November meeting.

Despite the mountain of evidence, the AHA published a widely-decried study in September claiming acquired hospitals see a reduction in operating expenses and a statistically significant drop in readmission and mortality rates. The study was criticized for not using actual claims data in its analysis among other methodological and conflict of interest concerns.

Republican leaders in the House Energy and Commerce Committee asked MedPAC to study provider consolidation in August, and the body’s full findings will be included in its March report to Congress.​

 

 

 

 

 

TOP 6 HEALTHCARE MERGERS OF 2019

https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/finance/top-6-healthcare-mergers-2019?spMailingID=16768251&spUserID=MTg2ODM1MDE3NTU1S0&spJobID=1781800057&spReportId=MTc4MTgwMDA1NwS2

M&A activity continued to thrive among insurers and providers in 2019.

As was the case in 2018, the healthcare industry saw several megamergers occur in 2019.

Healthcare leaders pointed to industry consolidation as the year’s top priority, according to a Definitive Healthcare survey, with different reasons for pursuing mergers.

Related: Top 5 Healthcare Mergers of 2018

Providers sought to achieve scale in order to address staffing shortages while insurers looked to respond to the increasing influence of consumerism in healthcare.

While some mergers fell through, many organizations announced or finalized deals during the course of the year.

Below are six major healthcare mergers that were announced or completed in 2019.

1. CVS-AETNA

The nearly $70 billion megamerger received final judicial approval in September after an extended review by U.S. District Judge Richard J. Leon.

The merger originally received approval from the Department of Justice in October 2018 but was subject to questions and criticisms by numerous stakeholders.

The deal was marked by scrutiny over vertical mergers, with Leon noting that his approval shouldn’t be seen as a rubber stamp.

 

2. CENTENE-WELLCARE

Centene Corp. announced a $17.3 billion merger with WellCare Health Plans in March, a move seen as doubling down on the marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act.

The merged company will be based in St. Louis and encompass 22 million members, $97 billion in revenues, and $5 billion in EBITDA for 2019.

The pending transaction has already received regulatory approval from 25 states.

Earlier this month, Centene agreed to sell its subsidiary IlliniCare Health to CVS Health, including its Medicaid and Medicare Advantage plans in Illinois.

3. DIGNITY-CHI

Dignity Health and Catholic Health Initiatives finalized a $29 billion megamerger between the two Catholic health systems in February.

Renamed as “CommonSpirit,” the Chicago–based health system has a footprint in 21 states, with more than 700 care sites and 142 hospitals.

In November, the system released its Q1 2020 financials highlighted by $7.1 billion in revenues and a net loss of $227 million.

 

4. HARVARD PILGRIM-TUFTS

Harvard Pilgrim Health Care and Tufts Health Plan announced an intention to merge in August, potentially serving nearly 2.4 million plan members across New England.

As part of the proposed deal, Tufts CEO Tom Croswell would serve as CEO of the merged company while Harvard Pilgrim CEO Michael Carson would serve as president.

The two Massachusetts-based insurers told The Boston Globe earlier this month that the merger would benefit consumers with more affordable health coverage.

 

5. TOTAL HEALTH CARE-PRIORITY HEALTH

Total Health Care and Priority Health received final regulatory approval from the Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services (DIFS) in late November.

The two Michigan-based healthcare organizations, which announced plans to merge in late August, plan to complete the deal by the end of 2019.

Prior to receiving approval from state regulators, Total Health Care members approved the merger earlier this fall.

As part of the merger, the two Michigan-based healthcare organizations will also be establishing a $25 million foundation to improve health outcomes in Detroit.

 

6. DARTMOUTH-HITCHCOCK-GRANITEONE HEALTH

Two New Hampshire-based health systems agreed to merge nine months after signing a letter of intent to merge.

The new merged system will be renamed “Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health GraniteOne” and includes Catholic Medical Center in Manchester.

Both organizations will maintain their locations and local leadership as part of the deal.

 

 

 

Assessing Responses to Increased Provider Consolidation in Six Markets: Final Report

https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/65qfhbzz7fabx9oypsteg6d1aghz4fsj

INTRODUCTION

Few communities in the United States have been exempt from the recent wave of consolidation among health care providers, whether it is hospital-to-hospital mergers and acquisitions (horizontal consolidation) or hospital acquisitions of physician groups and other ambulatory service providers (vertical consolidation). Increased provider concentration has been demonstrated to lead to higher provider reimbursement rates and thus higher premiums for people with private insurance, although outcomes vary, market to market.

To examine the strategies that private insurance companies and employer-purchasers use to constrain health care cost growth and how they are affected by increased provider consolidation, we conducted six market level, qualitative case studies, focusing on mid-sized health care markets in which there had been recent consolidation activity

These are: Detroit, Michigan; Syracuse, New York; Northern Virginia; Indianapolis, Indiana; Asheville, North Carolina; and Colorado Springs, Colorado.

BACKGROUND

Hospital and hospital-physician consolidation has accelerated in recent years, creating dominant local and regional health care systems. In nine out of ten metropolitan areas, the provider market is considered highly concentrated. Although merging hospitals and health systems claim they can achieve greater efficiencies and better care coordination through their consolidation, the economic literature almost universally finds that hospitals that merge charge prices above those of surrounding hospitals. Indeed, hospital mergers have been found to increase the average price of hospital services by 6 to 40 percent.  Another study found that hospital acquisition of physician practices increased outpatient prices by 14 percent. At the same time, increased market concentration is strongly associated with lower quality care. There is also evidence that the prices of independent, non-acquired hospitals also increase in the wake of a rival’s acquisition.

Increases in provider prices have been a key factor driving the growth of commercial health insurance costs over the past decade. Annual family premiums have now surpassed $20,000, and the average annual deductible has increased 100 percent over the last 10 years. While policymakers have focused attention on rising health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket costs (for employers and employees alike), provider consolidation—and its role as a major health care cost driver—has received less attention in the media and among policymakers.

APPROACH

In a series of six market-level, qualitative case studies, we assessed the impact of recent provider consolidations, the resulting provider concentration, the ability of market participants (and, where relevant, regulators) to respond to those consolidations, and strategies for constraining cost growth while maintaining high-quality care. Our case studies focus on the employer-sponsored group insurance market, though we recognize that providers and insurers are often operating across multiple sources of insurance, including Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed care, and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplaces.  We do not attempt to quantify the effect of provider consolidation in these markets, such as through provider rate or premium changes.

For each case study, we conducted an environmental scan of local media and published literature about market conditions and structured interviews with insurer, provider, and employer representatives, as well as other experts on the health care market. We also interviewed 10 national experts on provider consolidation and payer-provider network negotiations. Over the six case studies, we conducted 77 interviews with local respondents. Each case study, as well as an interim cross-cutting report, can be found at https://chir georgetown edu/provider-consolidation-case-studies/ .

We focused on mid-sized markets that had experienced recent horizontal or vertical consolidation. We identified these through an environmental scan of local media and research literature and a review of trends in market concentration indices, primarily via the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The six study markets were chosen to reflect geographic diversity as well as a range of market dynamics (see Table).

In markets such as Asheville, for instance, hospital mergers and acquisitions over the last decade have left the Mission Health System virtually without competition.

Observers describe other markets, such as Colorado Springs and Detroit, as relatively competitive even with recent provider consolidation. Across all six markets, hospitals purchased or entered into clinical affiliations with physician group practices. In some markets, such as Northern Virginia and Colorado Springs, hospital systems faced competition for physician practices from outside private equity firms and practice management companies.

In four out of our six markets, the Blue Cross Blue Shield affiliate was the dominant insurer in the commercial group market, with well over half the market share. Their dominance extended to all types of employers, including for third-party administrator contracts with self-funded employer plans. In two of our markets, the local health care system or systems were the largest private employers. In the other four, the health systems were among the top three or four employers. The states in our case studies were evenly split in having Certificate of Need laws, the lack of which some stakeholders suggested contributed to significant health system construction and concomitant increases in utilization and, less intuitively, prices (explained further, below).

FINDINGS

1. Hospitals are in various phases of empire-building

Across the six markets, the hospitals’ motivations for consolidation are similar, with stakeholders reporting a pursuit of greater market share and a desire to increase their negotiating leverage with payers to demand higher reimbursement. These observations run counter to the justifications often cited by hospital systems that consolidation is needed to create efficiencies and improve care coordination. Following consolidation, the hospitals and hospital systems in our studied markets have engaged in various phases of empire building.

While approaches varied, providers had similar goals in expanding their empire: to increase their geographic footprint, acquire points of referral (such as free-standing emergency departments and physician practices), or build new facilities in areas with a higher proportion of commercially insured residents. In all study markets except Indianapolis, a larger multi-state health system acquired or merged with a local independent provider to gain new entry or additional market share in a particular region Hospital system expansion was also not limited only to study markets: many hospital systems were expanding their footprint across the state.

In addition to consolidation, hospitals have pursued other strategies to gain greater leverage in negotiations with payers. For example, the Syracuse hospital systems have developed clinical niches, so that they are perceived by local residents as the best facility for certain services, such as orthopedics or cancer care In Indianapolis, each of the four health systems carved out “mini-monopolies” within geographic boundaries that have historically been respected by the other systems. For many years, systems largely did not compete directly, although this de facto arrangement has broken down recently.

2. Providers are exercising their increased market clout

Consolidation appears to be having the providers’ desired effect in our study markets: hospital systems reportedly use their market clout to seek higher reimbursement from payers. For example, a payer representative in Colorado noted that when an independent hospital is acquired by one of the major health systems: “the next thing I know, I see a 100 percent increase [in prices] ”. Similarly, payers in Detroit noted a “toughened stance” from a local hospital system following a recent consolidation.  They, along with payers in other markets, also noted that when independent local hospitals are acquired by large national systems, negotiations shift from the local provider to the central corporate office, where there are fewer long-standing relationships, less understanding of local needs, and often a demand to take all or none of the hospitals in the system.

Even non-dominant hospitals appear to benefit from the consolidation of their rivals. For example, a small hospital in Northern Virginia was able leverage its position as an alternative to the dominant Inova Health System, effectively telling insurers: “If you think it’s healthy to have independent health systems in this market, then give us [higher prices] ”. In other cases, hospitals appear to use their market power to build more market power. For example, Asheville’s Mission hospital reportedly used its dominance to pressure physician groups to join their accountable care organization (ACO).

At the same time, our case studies provide examples of constraints on market power. The local nature of health care delivery sometimes demands that providers “play nice” in the sandbox. In Syracuse, executives of the providers and payers have longstanding personal and professional relationships. “Everyone knows each other and we all go to the same meetings,” said one observer, who believed the tight-knit nature of the community contributed to less-than-hardball tactics in the negotiating room. In Northern Virginia, some thought Inova, based just outside of D C , had been relatively restrained in its demands for increased reimbursement in part to avoid raising red flags with federal regulators.

3. Payers have tools to constrain cost growth, but lack the incentive and ability to deploy them effectively

As third-party administrators for self-insured employer-sponsored group health plans, insurers are typically paid a percentage of the overall cost of the plan. As a result, these insurers have a perverse incentive to keep costs high and growing, limiting their motivation to pursue aggressive strategies to reduce provider prices, a phenomenon one respondent called “middleman economics.” This incentive for payers is compounded by the fact that some of the more obvious strategies to contain costs (cutting or threatening to cut a high-cost hospital from their plan networks, for example) are likely to result in negative publicity and resistance from employers and their employees. The result is a strong incentive for commercial insurers to agree to providers’ demands for price increases each year, which employers and their employees will feel more gradually over time than a provider termination. The result is that employers and employees become the proverbial “frogs in the pot of water.”

Payers identify several cost containment strategies, but all come with downsides. Payers in our study markets do negotiate to limit price increases and are pursuing some cost containment strategies, but none identified a “magic bullet” approach that would moderate price growth while minimizing negative feedback from employers and employees.

Network design

One obvious strategy for insurers in response to a provider’s demand for a price increase would be to decline to contract with that provider and terminate them from their network. However, most payers and purchasers described this as a non-viable “nuclear option.” In addition to concerns about bad publicity, unhappy employer customers, and lost competitive advantage over other payers, quite often the provider at issue is essential to an adequate network, either because it is the sole provider within a reasonable geographic distance or because of its dominance in a particular clinical specialty.

Payers in several markets also noted that, more often than not, employers “don’t have their back” during provider negotiations, taking away their ability to credibly threaten to drop the provider from the network. Many large employers were loath to limit their employees’ choice of providers. Without the ability to credibly cite demand for lower prices from employers, insurers have less leverage in their negotiations with providers.

There are exceptions to this rule, but they were quite rare in the study markets. The only exception we observed was when Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina (BCBSNC) terminated Mission Health System, Asheville’s only hospital system, from its network for two months in 2018. When BCBSNC, the dominant insurer in North Carolina, did so, it reportedly faced little public backlash. Rather, the public largely took BCBSNC’s side in the dispute Mission was forced to rejoin the network without the hoped-for price increases.

Designing “narrow” network product is another option for payers. By offering to drive more patient volume to a limited set of providers, payers can, in theory, extract greater price concessions. But payers across our study markets have found little interest among employer customers in narrow network products. As with the “nuclear option,” employers were typically not willing to restrict their employees’ choice, with several noting that the savings rarely outweigh the perceived limits on employees’ choices.  At the same time, several payers are successfully marketing narrow network products in the individual market, where consumers may be more price sensitive and appear more willing to accept a constraint on their choice of providers in exchange for a lower premium.

Provider tiering and centers of excellence

A few payers in our markets offer plans that tier providers based on cost and quality, so that enrollees who choose lower cost providers will pay lower cost-sharing. However, the strategy is limited to markets in which there is sufficient competition so that lower-cost options are available. Payers and purchasers also noted that they often lacked the necessary data to effectively tier providers, and that patients lacked access to real-time pricing tools to enable them to make cost-effective choices.

In Asheville, a tiering strategy is difficult because the Mission Health System is so dominant. However, at least one large, self-funded employer in Asheville has designated out-of-state “centers of excellence” hospital systems that can offer lower prices and high quality for certain elective procedures. Even after reimbursing enrollees’ travel costs, this employer said, it is still more cost effective than receiving the care at Mission. However, there is a small set of elective procedures that can be performed at these facilities, and the bulk of enrollees’ care must be delivered locally.

Risk-sharing arrangements

Payers in Detroit and Northern Virginia suggested they were pinning at least some cost-containment hopes on risk-sharing arrangements with providers. In this they are following the Medicare program, and several hospital systems in our study markets participate in Medicare risk-sharing programs. However, most payers acknowledged that risk-sharing arrangements they have implemented to date have had only a limited impact. Current arrangements have largely involved only upside risk for providers, with the aim of having the provider take on more downside financial risk at a future date. Payers reported deploying risk-sharing arrangements with physician group practices more than hospitals, likely because they have greater leverage with physicians in most of the studied markets. For example, while hospital executives in Northern Virginia told us they had been presented with possible risk-sharing payment models, they declined to participate due to their lack of “economic incentive.”

Provider-payer partnerships

In some cases, payers have taken a “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” tactic, by entering into partnerships or joint ventures with health systems. For example, in 2012 Aetna entered into a joint venture with Inova in Northern Virginia to create Innovation Health. More recently, the self-insured General Motors plan entered into an exclusive partnership with the Henry Ford Health System in Detroit. While it is too early to say what the impact of the GM-Henry Ford partnership will have, observers in Northern Virginia largely dismissed Innovation Health’s impact on the market, noting that Aetna had obtained no discernible competitive advantage from the venture.

4. Employers’ tools to help control costs are limited

Unable (or unwilling) to push back on high and rising provider prices, employers have historically looked elsewhere to contain costs. Across our six markets, the most widespread strategy among employers to constrain their health plan costs has been to shift them to employees, largely through higher deductibles Increasing deductibles and other enrollee cost-sharing has been an attractive strategy because it can be ratcheted up slowly over time, limiting employee pushback. At the same time, several employer respondents in our study markets observed that this cost-shifting strategy may have been tapped out, noting that many of their employees can no longer afford the deductibles. One also observed that, because of high provider prices, employees often exceed their deductible after just one imaging service or ER visit, limiting its utility as a cost-containment tactic.

Employers reported investing in employee wellness programs. However, they were unable to document whether these programs generated savings. This is not surprising given that the weight of the evidence to date suggests minimal, if any, return on investment. Employers also touted on-site primary care as a promising strategy in Indianapolis, in part because they offer a subscription-based (capitated) model for the delivery of primary care services. However, not all employers have the requisite size or centralized location to offer this service.

Another strategy, direct contracting, is similarly limited to employers with sufficient size and human resources capacity to bypass payers and negotiate with providers. But this trend may be catching on among some Large employers in both Detroit and Indianapolis are actively considering direct contracting, and as noted above, General Motors directly contracted with the Henry Ford system in 2018. In 2019, the Peak Health Alliance, a coalition of employers and citizens of Summit County, Colorado, successfully negotiated price discounts from local providers, lowering 2020 premiums an estimated 11 percent. It remains to be seen whether such efforts are replicable outside of Summit County and if employers will, over the long term, be able to strike better bargains than private payers.

Employers also differ dramatically in their level of engagement and willingness to push insurers to deliver lower prices. One significant impediment is the lack of access to claims data, which would enable them to identify and address cost drivers.  Indeed, in Indiana, a coalition of large, self-funded employers was forced to take Anthem to court in order to obtain access to their claims data, even though they bear the financial risk of their plans. For many other employers, the expertise and knowledge needed to negotiate effectively with sophisticated provider systems are well outside their core competency; they have delegated that responsibility to their third-party administrators and will continue to do so.

5. Public policy strategies have had limited effectiveness

Across our six markets, anti-trust and other public policy strategies have been deployed to constrain the ill-effects of market concentration, but they have had limited effectiveness.

Anti-trust enforcement

Stakeholders in Northern Virginia suggested that the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) intervention in Inova’s attempted acquisition of a smaller independent hospital in Prince William County has had a dampening effect on what had been a region-wide buying spree. However, respondents suggested perhaps the FTC intervention was too little, too late, noting that it would be hard for the “super concentrated” region to become any more concentrated. Nationwide, a lack of resources, a narrow focus on horizontal consolidation within local markets, and some negative court decisions have limited the FTC’s ability to be more than a speed bump to the consolidation boom of the past 10 years.

State attorneys general (AGs) have also played a role in our markets. When the for-profit hospital chain HCA acquired Mission Health System in Asheville, the state AG demanded a 10-year commitment that HCA will not close rural hospitals or require major cuts to services. Similarly, in the wake of Optum’s acquisition of the DaVita Medical Group, which owned many of the largest primary care practices in Colorado Springs, that state’s AG imposed time-limited restrictions on Optum and its owner UnitedHealthCare to mitigate anti-trust concerns in the Colorado Springs market. Specifically, UnitedHealthCare had to lift its exclusive Medicare Advantage contract with one of the two major hospital systems for at least 3.5 years and honor DaVita’s prior agreement with Humana (the main Medicare Advantage competitor in Colorado Springs) through at least 2020.

The “Certificate of Public Advantage” or COPA, has been another tool used by states to limit anti-competitive behavior, post-merger. A COPA allows a state, rather than the FTC, to oversee antitrust issues after a consolidation among providers. In North Carolina, the state legislature granted a COPA to Mission after it merged with the competing hospital system in Asheville in 1998. However, COPAs can be subject to “regulatory capture,” where regulators become overly influenced by the industry they are meant to police At least in North Carolina, the COPA appeared to do little to limit Mission’s acquisition of other nearby hospitals or physician groups. In 2015, Mission lobbyists convinced the legislature to repeal the COPA, paving the way for its purchase by the for-profit HCA system.

Certificate of Need laws

Stakeholders offered competing views on the value of state certificate of need (CON) laws. These laws generally require the state’s review and approval of new hospital facilities. Some observers argued that lifting these laws would encourage competing hospitals to enter the market, potentially putting pressure on the dominant hospital system to lower prices However, while Indianapolis experienced a hospital building boom after it repealed its CON law, payers and purchasers alike report that the increase in capacity not only led to a spike in utilization, it also, somewhat counterintuitively, drove hospitals to hike their unit prices. With more competition, hospitals had fewer patients but the same (or higher) overhead costs, leading them to demand higher prices from commercial insurers.

Rate setting and purchasing alliances

Market and public policy failure to adequately counter rising costs has prompted policymakers in some states to consider using the power of the government to set provider payment rates or to encourage the formation of multi-purchaser alliances to demand price concessions from providers. For example, a bill promoted by the Colorado insurance department would have linked some hospital reimbursement to the amount reimbursed by Medicare, while the administrator of North Carolina’s state employee health plan has proposed setting rates via reference to the Medicare program. Although Maryland was not part of our market case study, stakeholders in Northern Virginia attributed that state’s lower hospital prices to its all-payer rate setting program.

As noted above, Colorado leaders have also encouraged the formation of locally based purchasing alliances—built on the Peak Health Alliance model—that could combine the purchasing power of multiple employers to directly negotiate with hospitals.  Although a payer would be sought to administer the plan, their role in contracting with providers would be greatly diminished.  The concept of employer purchasing pools is not new: past efforts, such as California’s PacAdvantage program, ultimately floundered But it is too soon to tell if these nascent efforts to harness government—or employers’—purchasing power will generate significant cost savings or the type of political support needed to initiate and sustain them.

LOOKING AHEAD

As the literature and our case studies show, consolidation leads to higher provider prices and ultimately higher premiums for consumers. Any policy discussion about improving health care affordability will need to confront the limits of the market to constrain provider monopolies and their resulting increased negotiation leverage.

Misaligned incentives among commercial payers and the “must have” status of many hospital systems mean that market-based tools to hold health care costs down have been largely ineffective or difficult to replicate. And, with 90 percent of markets in the country already highly consolidated, the prospect of greater anti-trust enforcement is “too little, too late.”

In addition to the public policies discussed above, states have implemented or are considering requiring providers to work within cost growth targets and leveraging the power of state agencies to demand price concessions from providers. For example, Delaware and Massachusetts have set targets for annual increases in health care spending, while Montana’s state employee plan recently began setting a Medicare-based “reference price” for covered hospitalizations. In California, state agencies are consolidating their pharmacy purchasing authorities to negotiate lower drug prices, pursuant to a 2019 executive order by Governor Newsom. Also, in litigation that has been closely watched because it could embolden more post-consolidation anti-trust lawsuits nationwide, the California AG and a coalition of roughly 1,500 self-funded employers reached a settlement agreement with one of that state’s largest health systems, Sutter Health, over allegations that Sutter used its market power to drive up prices.

Policymakers can also do more to activate or assist employers in demanding lower prices. The first step is to help inform employers about the true drivers of health care costs by banning clauses in payer-provider contracts that prohibit the sharing of data on reimbursement rates. Employers, particularly those that self-fund their plans, should not have to sue their third-party administrator (as they did in Indiana) to gain access to their own data. Being able to clearly see the data on hospital prices has sparked a number of Indiana employers to demand change. However, if incremental steps such as data sharing don’t ultimately reduce provider prices, it could increase the support for more dramatic steps, such as rate-setting, in response to provider consolidation. “The status quo isn’t an option anymore,” one large employer told us. Indeed, the status quo is no longer an option for most employers, and certainly not for their employees, who are bearing an ever greater burden of the cost of care.

 

 

FTC to probe impacts of state antitrust protections for local hospital mergers

https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/hospitals-health-systems/ftc-to-probe-impacts-state-antitrust-protections-for-local-hospital?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT0RZNE4yTm1PV1psTmpNeSIsInQiOiJ5R3gxMEwrdUhPWUdZVlBTZ3NWWkdMV08xOCtObDdFaGdHaE1hN0o4Z2p5WnBaN3hjd2lDVm5ybnBhWUtUNFdlTW1LcndtaTN1WUtNVzg1NmUrQjJmWEhqTWpJR3BkUmVuZmVNS2FzdmRWdENuMEtNT0tJMXozUW93N0lVQmZ5WSJ9&mrkid=959610

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued orders to five health insurance companies and two health systems seeking data to study the effects of state-level regulatory approvals known as certificates of public advantage (COPAs) that protect local hospital mergers from antitrust scrutiny.

Federal officials said they want to study the impact of COPAs and hospital consolidation on prices, quality, access, the innovation of healthcare services and employee wages.

The FTC issued orders to Aetna, Anthem, BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Cigna and United Healthcare for patient-level commerical claims data. 

Orders were also issued to Ballad Health in Tennessee and Virginia as well as Cabell Huntington Hospital in West Virginia for aggregated patient billing and discharge data, along with health system employee wage data and other information relevant for analyzing the health systems’ prices, quality, access and innovation. Both health systems were approved for COPAs last year.

Ballad Health was formed in 2018 through the merger of Mountain States Health Alliance and Wellmont Health System. Under a COPA in Tennessee and a similar agreement in Virginia, officials said they agreed to serve oversight and enforceable commitments that include investing $308 million over 10 years to improve population health, expanding access to care and supporting health research and medical education.

Cabell Huntington Hospital was allowed to acquire nearby St. Mary’s Medical Center under a similar cooperative agreement with the state that was initially challenged by federal regulators.

Tennessee regulators describe COPAs as written approvals governing mergers among two or more hospitals that provide “state action immunity to the hospitals from state and federal antitrust laws by replacing competition with state regulation and active supervision. The goal of the COPA process is to protect the interests of the public in the region affected and the state.”

However, the feds say while COPAs “purport to immunize mergers and collaborations from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine,” the approvals are in need of further study. As Kaiser Health News reported, the federal antitrust exemption dates back to a Supreme Court ruling in the 1940s and has been rarely used to allow hospital mergers. There has been little research (PDF) on the impacts of COPAs.

In June, the FTC held a public workshop examining research on the price effects of three COPAs approved in the 1990s—including Benefis Health System in Montana, Palmetto Health in South Carolina and Mission Health in North Carolina—to inform the current study design. Officials said they intend to collect information over the next several years to conduct retrospective analyses of the Ballad Health and Cabell COPAs.

Once the study is complete, the FTC intends to report publicly the study’s findings and will use them to help in future advocacy and enforcement by the agency and to better inform stakeholders about COPAs. 

 

 

 

Market Consolidation on Trial

Market Consolidation on Trial

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California Attorney General Xavier Becerra alleges that Sutter Health used its pre-eminent market power to artificially inflate prices. Photo: Rich Pedroncelli/Associated Press

As a jury trial draws near in a major class-action lawsuit alleging anticompetitive practices by Northern California’s largest health system (PDF), a new CHCF study shows the correlation between the prices consumers pay and the extensive consolidation in the state’s health care markets. Importantly, the researchers estimated the independent effect of several types of industry consolidation in California — such as health insurers buying other insurers and hospitals buying physician practices. The report, prepared by UC Berkeley researchers, also examines potential policy responses.

While other states have initiated antitrust complaints against large hospital systems and medical groups in the past, the case against Sutter Health is unique in both the expansive nature of the alleged conduct and in the scale of the potential monetary damages. The complaint goes beyond claims of explicit anticompetitive contract terms and argues that by virtue of its very size and structure, the Northern California system imposed implicit or “de facto” terms that led to artificially inflated prices. Sutter Health vigorously denies the allegations.

The formation of large health systems like Sutter is neither new (PDF) nor unique to California (PDF). Several factors seem to be encouraging their growth, including payment models that place health care providers at financial risk for the cost of care, increased expectations from policymakers and payers around the continuum of patient needs that must be managed, and economies of scale for investments in information technology and administrative services. Some market participants also point to consolidation in other parts of the health care system, such as health plans and physician groups, as encouragement for their own mergers.

Economic Consolidation in California

In general, economists study two major categories of market consolidation:

  • Horizontal consolidation: Entities of the same type merge, such as the merger of two hospitals or insurance companies, or the merger of providers into a physician network.
  • Vertical consolidation: Entities of different types merge, such as when a hospital purchases a physician practice or when a pharmacy buys an insurance company.

To measure market consolidation, the CHCF study relied on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a metric used by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. An HHI of between 1,500 and 2,500 is considered moderately concentrated, and 2,500 or above is considered highly concentrated. According to this measure, horizontal concentration is high in California among hospitals, insurance companies, and specialist providers (and moderately high among primary care physicians), even though the level of concentration in all but primary care has remained relatively flat from 2010 to 2018.

The percentage of physicians in practices owned by a hospital or health system increased dramatically in California between 2010 and 2018 — from 24% in 2010 to 42% in 2018. The percentage of specialists in practices owned by a hospital or health system rose even faster, from 25% in 2010 to 52% in 2018.

Consolidation Is Not Clinical Integration

While this study defined and quantified the extent of consolidation across several industry segments in California, it is important to note that it did not define, quantify, or evaluate clinical integration within the state. Clinical integration has been defined by others in many ways, but generally involves arrangements for coordinating and delivering a wide range of medical services across multiple settings.

As the CHCF study authors point out, other analysis has shown that various types of clinical integration can lead to broader adoption of health information technology and evidence-based care management processes. Data from the Integrated Healthcare Association suggests that certain patient benefit designs and provider risk-sharing arrangements associated with clinical integration can lead to higher quality and lower costs.

Crucially, an emerging body of law (PDF) suggests that clinical integration does not require formal ownership and joint bargaining with payers.

Relationship Between Consolidation and Health Insurance Premiums

Among the six variables analyzed in the CHCF study, three showed a positive and statistically significant association with higher premiums: insurance company mergers, hospital mergers, and the percentage of primary care physicians in practices owned by hospitals and health systems. The remaining three variables studied — specialist provider mergers, primary care provider mergers, and the percentage of specialists in practices owned by a hospital and health system — were statistically insignificant.

The figure below shows the independent relationship between market concentration and premiums for these three variables. As the lines move left to right, concentration increases — that is, fewer individual insurers, hospitals, or providers occupy the market. The vertical axis shows the average premiums associated with each level of market concentration. In short, regardless of the industry structure represented by the other variables, insurer consolidation, hospital consolidation, and hospital-physician mergers each lead to higher premiums.

Unexplained Price Variation and Growth

Health insurance premiums rise when the underlying cost of medical care increases. California ranks as the 16th most expensive state on average in terms of the seven common services the researchers studied, after adjusting for wage differences across states. Among all states, California has the eighth-highest prices for normal childbirth, defined as vaginal delivery without complications. Childbirth is the most common type of hospital admission, and the relatively standardized procedure is comparable across states.

Even within California, prices vary widely and are growing rapidly. For example, the 2016 average wage-adjusted price for a vaginal delivery was twice as high in Rating Area 9 (which has Monterey as its largest county) as it was in Rating Area 19 (San Diego) — $22,751 versus $11,387. (See next figure.) Prices for the service are increasing rapidly across counties — rising anywhere from 29% in San Francisco from 2012 to 2016 to 40% in Orange County over the same period.

The authors of the CHCF report investigated the impact of various types of consolidation on the prices of individual medical services in California. For cesarean births without complications, a 10% rise in hospital HHI is associated with a 1.3% increase in price.

Potential Policy Responses to Consolidation

While the study shows significant associations between various types of market concentration and the prices consumers pay, policymakers should carefully consider implementing steps that restrain the inflationary impact of consolidation while allowing the benefits of clinical integration to proliferate. To that end, the authors of the CHCF report offered a series of recommendations, which include:

Enforce antitrust laws. Federal and state governments should scrutinize proposed mergers and acquisitions to evaluate whether the net result is procompetitive or anticompetitive.

Restrict anticompetitive behaviors. Anticompetitive behaviors, such as all-or-nothing and anti-incentive contract terms, should be addressed through legislation or the courts in markets where providers are highly concentrated.

Revise anticompetitive reimbursement incentives. Reimbursement policies that reduce competition, such as Medicare rules that implicitly reward hospital-owned physician groups, should be adjusted.

Reduce barriers to market entry. Policies that restrict who can participate in the health care market, such as laws prohibiting nurse practitioners from practicing independently from a physician, should be changed when markets are concentrated.

Regulate provider and insurer rates. If antitrust enforcement is not successful and significant barriers to market entry exist — including those in small markets unable to support a competitive number of hospitals and specialists — regulating provider and insurer rates should be considered.

Encouraging meaningful competition in health care markets is an exceedingly difficult task for policymakers. It is no easier to promote the benefits of clinical integration while restraining the inflationary aspects of economic consolidation through public policy. Despite these challenges, the rapid rise in health care premiums and prices in the state require a fresh look at the consequences of widespread horizontal and vertical consolidation in California.