Hospital Market Consolidation

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/54-health-systems-with-the-most-hospitals.html

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The following health systems contain the most short-term acute care hospitals in the United States.

The number of short-term acute care hospitals is based on data from the American Hospital Directory, which is based on hospitals’ CMS cost reports. Data was accessed Dec. 4. The list includes nonprofit, public and for-profit organizations. There are 54 organizations listed here; numbering does not serve as a ranking or reflect ties in the number of hospitals.

Note: Figures reflect facilities that fall under the category of “short term acute care” as defined by CMS. Numbers do not include psychiatric, rehabilitation, children’s, critical access, long-term or “other” types of hospitals, and may differ from systems’ marketing materials.

1. HCA Healthcare (Nashville, Tenn.) — 174
2. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (Washington, D.C.) — 143
3. Community Health Systems (Franklin, Tenn.) — 119
4. Ascension Health (St. Louis) — 78
5. Tenet Healthcare (Dallas) — 59
6. LifePoint Health (Brentwood, Tenn.) — 45
7. Trinity Health (Livonia, Mich.) — 44
8. Prime Healthcare Services (Ontario, Calif.) — 42
9. Providence Health & Services (Renton, Wash.) — 41
10. Kaiser Permanente (Oakland, Calif.) — 39
11. Dignity Health (San Francisco) — 36
12. Catholic Health Initiatives (Englewood, Colo.) — 34
13. Steward Health Care System (Boston) — 32
14. Adventist Health System (Winter Park, Fla.) — 31
15. Indian Health Service (Rockville, Md.) — 31
16. UPMC (Pittsburgh) — 29
17. Universal Health Services (King of Prussia, Pa.). — 28
18. Christus Health (Irving, Texas) — 26
19. Quorum Health (Brentwood, Tenn.) — 26
20. Sutter Health (Sacramento, Calif.) — 26
21. Baylor Scott & White Health (Dallas) — 20
22. Banner Health (Phoenix) — 19
23. Mercy Health (Cincinnati) — 18
24. SSM Health (St. Louis) — 18
25. Intermountain Healthcare (Salt Lake City) — 17
26. Mercy (Chesterfield, Mo.) — 17
27. UnityPoint Health (Des Moines, Iowa) — 17
28. Northwell Health (Great Neck, N.Y.) — 16
29. Prospect Medical Holdings (Los Angeles) — 15
30. Adventist Health (Roseville, Calif.) — 14
31. Centura Health (Englewood, Colo.) — 14
32. Aurora Health Care (Milwaukee) — 13
33. BayCare Health System (Clearwater, Fla.) — 13
34. Franciscan Health (Mishawaka, Ind.) — 13
35. Memorial Hermann (Houston) — 13
36. Texas Health Resources (Arlington) — 13
37. Ardent Health Services (Nashville, Tenn.) — 12
38. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp. (Memphis) — 12
39. Cleveland Clinic — 12
40. Duke LifePoint (Brentwood, Tenn.) — 12
41. Hospital Sisters Health System (Springfield, Ill.) — 12
42. Sentara Healthcare (Norfolk, Va.) — 12
43. Bon Secours Health System (Marriottsville, Md.) — 11
44. Carolinas HealthCare System (Charlotte, N.C.) — 11
45. Hackensack Meridian Health (Edison, N.J.) — 11
46. Mayo Clinic (Rochester, Minn.) — 11 (includes short-term acute care hospitals in Rochester, Phoenix and Jacksonville, Fla., as well as those part of Mayo Clinic Health System)
47. McLaren Health Care (Flint, Mich.) — 11
48. NYC Health + Hospitals (New York City) — 11
49. Presence Health (Chicago) — 11
50. RWJBarnabas Health (West Orange, N.J.) — 11
51. Advocate Health Care (Downers Grove, Ill) — 10
52. Allina Health (Minneapolis) — 10
53. Novant Health (Winston-Salem, N.C.) — 10
54. University Hospitals (Cleveland) — 10

 

CVS merger with Aetna: Health care cure or curse?

https://theconversation.com/cvs-merger-with-aetna-health-care-cure-or-curse-88670?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20December%206%202017%20-%2089557547&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20December%206%202017%20-%2089557547+CID_461096d86af0ad8c2eedceabf8b8a42f&utm_source=campaign_monitor_us&utm_term=CVS%20merger%20with%20Aetna%20Health%20care%20cure%20or%20curse

The announcement that CVS plans to acquire Aetna for US$69 billion raises hope and concerns.

The transaction would create a new health care giant. Aetna is the third-largest health insurer in the United States, insuring about 46.7 millionpeople.

CVS operates 9,700 pharmacies and 1,000 MinuteClinics. A decade ago, it also purchased Caremark and now operates CVS/Caremark, a pharmacy benefits manager, a type of business that administers drug benefit programs for health plans. CVS/Caremark is one of the three largest pharmacy benefits managers in the United States. Along with ExpressScripts and OptummRXTogether, these three control at least 80 percent of the market.

Should American consumers be happy or concerned about the proposed merger? As a professor of health law and bioethics, I see compelling arguments on both sides.

Good for consumers, or for the companies?

CVS and Aetna assert they are motivated by a desire to improve services for consumers and that the merger will lower health care costs and improve outcomes.

Many industry experts have postulated, however, that financial gain is at the heart of the deal.

CVS has suffered declining profits as consumers turn to online suppliers for drugs. Reports that Amazon is considering entry into the pharmacy business raise the specter of increasingly fierce competition.

The merger would provide CVS with guaranteed business from Aetna patients and allow Aetna to expand into new health care territory.

The heart of the deal

The merger would eliminate the need for a pharmacy benefits manager because CVS would be part of Aetna.

Pharmacy benefits managers, which sprang up in the early 2000s in response to rising costs of care, administer drug benefit programs for health plans. Most large employers contract with pharmacy benefits managers that are different from their health insurers.

Nevertheless, a consolidation along the lines of a CVS/Caremark and Aetna merger would not be unprecedented. The nation’s largest health insurance company, United Healthcare, operates its own pharmacy benefits manager, OptumRx.

Pharmacy benefits managers process and pay prescription drug claims, negotiate with manufacturers for lower drug prices, and can employ other cost-saving mechanisms. They thus act as intermediaries between the insurer and pharmacies.

They also make a lot of money. They have been controversial in recent years for how they do so, allegedly keeping a keener focus on profits than on patients.

The merger has not been finalized and requires approval from government regulators, which isn’t always easy to get. In 2016 the U.S. Department of Justice sued to block two health insurer mergers: one between Aetna and Humana and a second between Anthem and Cigna. The government objected on antitrust grounds, arguing that the mergers would unduly restrict competition. Both efforts were abandoned.

CVS and Aetna argue that their proposed merger is different. It is a vertical rather than a horizontal merger, which means that it would combine companies providing different services for patients (insurance and filling prescriptions) rather than two companies doing the same thing.

However, the Trump administration is currently opposing another vertical merger, that between AT&T and Time Warner. It is unclear whether the administration will likewise oppose the CVS/Aetna merger.

Benefits of a merger

There is some evidence that a merger could help consumers.

A merger could result in more negotiating power. Combining the power of a leading pharmacy and a top insurer may allow CVS/Aetna to negotiate more effectively for price discounts from drug and device manufacturers.

It also could cut out the middleman. PBMs themselves have been blamed for raising health care costs. They often do not pass on negotiated drug discounts to consumers, but rather keep the money themselves. In addition, many believe they “make money through opaque rebates that are tied to drug prices (so their profits rise as those prices do).” With the merger, CVS/Aetna would not need CVS/Caremark to function as an intermediary. Eliminating a profit-seeking middleman from the picture could lower consumer prices.

The merger could provide easy access to health care for minor injuries and illnesses. CVS said it plans to expand its MinuteClinics, walk-in clinics that provide treatment by nurse practitioners for minor conditions. Also, CVS said it would offer more services, such as lab work, nutritional advice, vision and hearing care, and more. Thus, CVS promises that its clinics will become “health hubs.”

Many patients could turn to these clinics instead of seeking more expensive care from physicians or emergency rooms. Furthermore, health hubs could provide “one-stop shopping” convenience for some patients. This could be particularly beneficial to elderly individuals or those with disabilities.

Another benefit could be improved and expanded data analytics, which could result in better care. Combining information from patients’ health insurers with that of their pharmacies, including nonprescription health purchases, may promote better care. CVS pharmacists and health hub providers would be able to monitor and counsel patients regarding chronic disease management, pain management, prenatal care and other matters. Such attention could reduce the risk of complications and hospitalizations and thus also decrease expenditures.

Increase of other risks?

Skeptics argue that the CVS/Aetna merger is unlikely to yield cost savings and improved outcomes. They note that mergers in the health care sector generally lead to higher, not lower, prices and worry about other adverse consequences.

If the market shrinks to fewer pharmacy benefits managers because of consolidation, costs may actually increase. The remaining pharmacy benefits managers may have little incentive to compete with each other by demanding discounts from drug companies. As noted above, they may actually profit from higher pharmaceutical prices and thus welcome increases.

After the merger, Aetna may require those it insures to use only CVS pharmacies. In addition, it may require individuals to turn to CVS MinuteClinics for certain complaints even if patients prefer to visit their own doctors. Such restrictions would mean less choice for consumers, and many may find them to be very distressing.

The merger could also decrease competition and bar other companies from entering the pharmacy market. For example, Aetna may refuse to cover prescription drugs that are not purchased from CVS. In that case, Amazon may find it extremely difficult if not impossible to break into the industry. Less competition, in turn, often means higher prices for consumers.

It is difficult to predict the precise consequences of a CVS/Aetna merger. One way or another, however, its impact will likely be significant.

 

KKR Closes $1.45 Billion Health Care Strategic Growth Fund

http://media.kkr.com/media/media_releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=1050109

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Aims to Back Innovative Growth Companies

KKR, a leading global investment firm, today announced the final closing of KKR Health Care Strategic Growth Fund (including parallel vehicles, “HCSG” or the “Fund”), a $1.45 billion fund dedicated to health care growth equity investment opportunities in the Americas. KKR will be investing more than $265 million of capital in the Fund alongside external investors through KKR’s balance sheet and employee commitments.

“The health care sector has demonstrated strong fundamentals throughout multiple cycles,” said Ali Satvat, KKR Member and Head of KKR’s Health Care Strategic Growth investing efforts. “Significant advances in medical innovation have yielded new products and services for patients, while consolidation and novel approaches to care delivery have the potential to improve clinical outcomes and reduce associated costs. These dynamics have created a significant market opportunity and an unmet need for strategic growth capital. We look forward to working with high-growth companies in the health care space for which KKR can be a unique partner in helping them achieve scale.”

The Fund received strong backing from a diverse group of new and existing global investors, including public pensions, insurance companies, family offices, and high net worth individual investors. “We are pleased that our enthusiasm for the attractive health care growth opportunities that the Fund enables is shared among a diversified group of global investors. This interest in the space, along with our strong team and record in health care, has helped us significantly exceed our initial target for the fundraise,” said Alisa Wood, Member and Head of KKR’s Private Market Products Group.

HCSG aims to generate strong returns for investors by investing in health care-related companies advancing innovative products or services and led by high-quality management teams. In particular, HCSG expects to make equity investments of up to $100 million and focuses on themes such as clinical / technological innovation, cost containment, and consolidation of therapeutic offerings or care providers.

“KKR’s health care investment team has been investing globally across the health care sector for more than 20 years, resulting in extensive industry experience, an established reputation within the space, and a strong track record of scaling health care-related companies,” said Jim Momtazee, KKR Member and Head of KKR’s Health Care investment team. “We believe that we can be a valuable partner to management teams running innovative, high-growth companies by leveraging this experience.”

KKR has deployed approximately $12 billion globally in the health care space across private markets. Beyond delivering financial capital, KKR helps companies grow by providing access to the firm’s operational expertise, global infrastructure, deep network, and resources from its more than 100 current portfolio companies worldwide. Over the last year, KKR has executed a number of transactions as part of the firm’s health care growth equity strategy, including Ebb Therapeutics (formerly known as Cerêve), Slayback Pharma, and Ajax Health.

 

Under ACA, largest health plans net lion’s share of underwriting gains while smaller players struggle

https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/health-plan-financial-performance-aca-deloitte?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTkdKallqUmhOV1prTmpZMyIsInQiOiIzV0NnWXA2amJKeHRybHVFTWl3bCtXMHpQXC92SXRnZyt0WGV0VFFUTkxoQk1UTHlyMGRlTFZkc3V2aXM0cGY5Q1Fndmh0ck5venI0OVJVMWhpNHQrakJWSytReEVBc2N4Y1lwRXBHQmZ2RGR6bk9cLzJxREZIbDk2VWQ2bzFKSmZvIn0%3D&mrkid=959610&utm_medium=nl&utm_source=internal

Financial market data. Image: Pixabay

The gap between the haves and have-nots has grown wider in the health insurance sector—and policy changes may be the culprit.

Most health plans are relatively small, posting an annual revenue of less than $2 billion, and are generally close to just breaking even financially. But the top three largest fully insured health plans by revenue—UnitedHealth Group, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Anthem—“exhibit performance that is dramatically differentiated from that of other market participants,” according to a new analysis from Deloitte.

For example, between 2011 and 2016, the top three saw their share of underwriting gains rise considerably even as their share of enrollment and revenue declined. By 2016, those three plans generated 84% of all underwriting gains in the fully insured market, while they accounted for just 55% in 2011. The top 10 plans, meanwhile, accounted for 92% of all underwriting gains in 2016.

What was behind that trend? Post-2014, one of the main reasons was the “number and magnitude of the losses suffered by many other health plans,” particularly in Affordable Care Act commercial individual products, the analysis said. Those losses were so large that they offset almost all the underwriting gains posted by the health plans not in the top three or top 10—thus magnifying the largest plans’ share.

For-profit insurers also grew faster and posted significantly higher margins than their nonprofit peers, the analysis found. While for-profit plans accounted for 66% of all underwriting gains in 2011, that share rose to 76% by 2016. Nonprofit plans, in comparison, saw their underwriting margins slip from 2.3% in 2011 to 0.8% in 2016.

The analysis also looked at health plan performance on the company and state levels. It found a significant increase in the number of plans with annual losses, a steep decline in average margins and widening variation among plans’ performance from 2011-2016. In addition, the number of states with health insurance market turbulence and unfavorable health plan financial performance increased.

Deloitte said its findings showed how large of a role public policy has played in driving change in the insurance markets in recent years. In addition, it highlighted the financial benefits associated with national scale.

Yet the firm also pointed out that it’s worth paying attention to how smaller-scale nonprofit plans are faring, given that they “play critical roles in their local communities and healthcare ecosystems.”

These plans, it noted, may lack the resources to withstand more disruption and “down years.” But with Republicans moving to unwind the ACA, that’s exactly what might lie ahead.

 

 

Advocate-Aurora Merger Latest in Healthcare Consolidation Trend

http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/leadership/advocate-aurora-merger-latest-healthcare-consolidation-trend?spMailingID=12500545&spUserID=MTY3ODg4NTg1MzQ4S0&spJobID=1300449776&spReportId=MTMwMDQ0OTc3NgS2#

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Deal likely to steer clear of FTC pitfall that foiled Advocate’s prior merger plans.

Advocate Health Care and Aurora Health Care announced plans Monday for a merger that would create the 10th-largest not-for-profit health system in the country.

The proposed deal would serve as a “50-50 merger” between Chicago-based Advocate and Milwaukee-based Aurora, with no job layoffs expected, the companies said. Should the deal receive regulatory approval, the merged system, which would go by the name Advocate Aurora Health, is projected to have a total operating revenue of about $11 billion and employ 70,000 people across hundreds of facilities in Illinois and Wisconsin, including 27 hospitals.

The announced merger continues a trend among health systems to merge, buy, or sell. Since the Tenet-Vanguard merger in 2013, a $4.3 billion acquisition, large-scale mergers between health systems have become routine to keep pace with an increasingly competitive and consolidated industry.

As health systems and hospitals adjust to the push for value-based care, alternative payments and accountable care organizations, systems with less experience and knowledge have to factor in how they will achieve those goals.

The attraction of corporate consolidation

David Chou, Chief Information and Digital Officer for Children’s Mercy Kansas City, says healthcare organizations are pursuing mega-merger deals in order to maintain relevance. A company used to need $6 billion to compete, a number that has since ballooned to $10 billion, he says.

Companies have pushed toward consolidation also to achieve scale, which can enable cost-reduction and improve financial viability. Chou says healthcare companies ultimately aim to mirror the “classic Kaiser model,” referencing industry giant Kaiser Permanente of Oakland, California. In 2016, Kaiser Permanente’s total operating revenue was $64.6 billion.

Sarah Wilson, a senior analyst with Decision Resources Group, says a specific amount, such as Chou’s $10 billion figure, isn’t always a prerequisite to staying relevant, but she agreed that large-scale mergers have become increasingly common in the healthcare sector. She attributes this to the increasing cost of healthcare delivery despite the push to drive down costs.

Distance makes the heart grow fonder

Ken Field, JD, MBA, who worked for the FTC from 2006 through 2012 and now co-chairs Jones Day’s global healthcare practice, says Advocate’s proposed merger with Aurora is likely to sidestep the controversy that spoiled Advocate’s prior plan to merge with NorthShore University HealthSystem.

Given their respective geographic footprints, Advocate and Aurora appear to be complements to one another, not substitutes, Field says. While Aurora, located 93 miles north of Chicago, does serve some patients in northern Illinois, its primary clientele base hails from Wisconsin.

By contrast, Advocate’s failed NorthShore merger entailed two systems serving some of the same Chicagoland areas. Advocate defended its merger plans successfully at trial, but the decision was overruled on appeal. The prolonged and expensive legal fight ended last March.

The FTC’s acting chair, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, cited the foiled Advocate-NorthShore merger as among her team’s 2017 victories in the fight to protect competition in healthcare markets—a series of victories that mark a shift in the case law affecting the business of healthcare.

“Last year we successfully blocked two major hospital mergers, winning victories in cases involving healthcare systems in the suburbs of Chicago and the Harrisburg area of Pennsylvania,” Ohlhausen said during a speech last month at the American Bar Association’s fall forum, according to her remarks as prepared for delivery. “Together, these two cases moved an important area of the law into a much more settled place and will likely serve both the agency and the public for many years to come. We have already started building on that very sound foundation.”

Field says these two cases affirmed the FTC’s analytical framework for hospital competition as the appropriate interpretation of the law. So now there’s precedent to support the FTC’s model, which could soon prove decisive in a similar case in South Dakota, where the FTC and state attorney general are challenging Sanford Health’s planned acquisition of Mid Dakota Clinic.

Even with the new direction-setting in Washington under President Trump, the FTC’s approach to protecting competition in healthcare is expected to stay the course.

“The only indication so far is that they’re going to continue applying the same model and with the same vigor that we experienced in the last administration,” Field says.

The FTC declined to comment on Advocate’s planned Aurora merger, noting that the commission does not confirm the existence of any investigation.

Dust settling after the announcement

Wilson, the analyst, says effective mega-mergers rely on a significant amount of backend work prior to the announcement. After the plan is unveiled, companies must follow due diligence in meetings with federal and state regulatory authorities to secure approval.

“I think there’s that process of speaking with regulators, going through all of the paperwork and preparing for the actual merger to ensure you have alignment,” Wilson says. “Once you get down to the closing of the deal, [companies] make sure to have their mission, vision and values lined up. It’s a lot of work getting everything ready, speaking with employees and working through best practices.”

The risk of duplication of duties remains at a company with two CEOs, which is an interesting obstacle to face. Chou said he will be interested to see who “calls the shots” after the merger is formalized.

Citing her experience in handling health system mergers and acquisitions, Wilson says “50-50 mergers” are not uncommon. The move to keep two CEOs could be successful since the companies do not compete in the same market, she says.

Another challenge includes how to combine each company’s assets and decide on how to implement practices which provide the best care to patients. Chou advised both companies to focus on fostering a cohesive environment for employees and providing the best care for patients, rather than fixating on the politics of the merger.

Wilson echoed Chou’s sentiments, saying the post-announcement process should be deliberative and ensure employees understand the merger and its effects on the company culture.

 

CVS Health to acquire Aetna for $69B: 5 things to know

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/payer-issues/cvs-health-to-acquire-aetna-for-69b-5-things-to-know.html

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CVS Health inked a definitive merger agreement to acquire all outstanding shares of Aetna for roughly $69 billion in cash and stock.

Here are five things to know.

1. The deal, unanimously approved by the boards of directors of each firm Dec. 3, is one of the largest transactions this year. It values Aetna at about $207 per share, higher than previous estimates of $200 to $205 per share. When including the assumption of Aetna’s debt, the transaction totals $77 billion.

2. Upon closing, Aetna’s Chairman and CEO Mark Bertolini will join CVS Health’s board of directors, along with two other Aetna leaders. Aetna will operate as a standalone business unit under the CVS Health umbrella, and the insurer’s management team will helm the subsidiary.

3. The companies said the deal will provide localized, community-based care across CVS Health’s 9,700-plus pharmacies and 1,100 clinics. Sources familiar with the deal told Reuters CVS Health plans to significantly extend health services at its pharmacies under the merger.

4. The transaction is slated to close in the second half of 2018. It is subject to regulatory approvals.

5. Rita Numerof, PhD, president of Numerof & Associates, said in an emailed statement to Becker’s Hospital Review, “Having the combined market clout puts Aetna more in a position akin to UnitedHealthcare in its ability to leverage an integrated PBM in negotiating prices and establishing preferred tiers with manufacturers.” She added, “With CVS’s large and growing clinical services footprint, Aetna can steer patients to CVS pharmacies and clinics — in many cases avoiding the costs of higher ER or other outpatient services. The merger can make expanded CVS services in-network and others out-of-network, putting additional pressure on conventional health systems to lower the costs of their outpatient services.”

The central questions behind the CVS-Aetna deal

https://www.axios.com/questions-behind-cvs-aetna-deal-2502001650.html

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CVS Health’s proposed $66 billion buyout of Aetna, scooped by the Wall Street Journal, would create a sprawling health care empire with roughly $240 billion of annual revenue. Only Walmart would be larger, in terms of annual revenue among U.S. companies.

Looking ahead: Health insurance, prescription drug coverage, quick clinic visits and behind-the-scenes negotiating on drug prices would all be under one umbrella. But a slew of questions surround any potential deal, and the companies aren’t commenting on “rumors or speculation.”

The proposed transaction highlights the desire within the health care industry to consolidate more. Acquiring Aetna would give CVS even more patient data, as well as more leverage to get lower drug prices from pharmaceutical companies. But it’s not a slam dunk the deal would reach the finish line.

The biggest potential obstacles:

  • Antitrust: CVS and Aetna don’t have a lot of overlapping businesses, making it appear the deal would have better odds of passing antitrust muster than Aetna’s failed deal for Humana. The companies do, however, have sizable footprints in Medicare Part D prescription drug plans. They have 7.6 million combined Part D members, according to the latest federal data, which equates to about 17% of Medicare’s Part D enrollment.
  • Savings: The companies would presumably tout savings (i.e., money saved from layoffs and consolidating vendor contracts). But would the combined CVS-Aetna undoubtedly lead to lower health insurance premiums and better deals for drugs at the pharmacy counter? This is arguably the most central question.
  • Other relationships: CVS just signed a deal with Anthem, a major insurance competitor to Aetna, to run some of the operations of Anthem’s new pharmacy benefit manager. The Aetna buyout would complicate CVS’ new Anthem agreement.
  • The Trump wild card: Trump made it clear in his latest executive order that his administration will “focus on promoting competition in health care markets and limiting excessive consolidation.” The CVS-Aetna deal is a direct challenge to that order.
  • What’s old is new again: Health insurers used to own pharmacy benefit managers but sold them off several years ago. Now they are integrating back together. Will they eventually splinter off again if Wall Street demands it?

Why Major Hospitals Are Losing Money By The Millions

https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2017/11/07/hospitals-losing-millions/#67f501c67b50

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A strange thing happened last year in some the nation’s most established hospitals and health systems. Hundreds of millions of dollars in income suddenly disappeared.

This article, part two of a series that began with a look at primary care disruption, examines the economic struggles of inpatient facilities, the even harsher realities in front of them, and why hospitals are likely to aggravate, not address, healthcare’s rising cost issues.

According to the Harvard Business Review, several big-name hospitals reported significant declines and, in some cases, net losses to their FY 2016 operating margins. Among them, Partners HealthCare, New England’s largest hospital network, lost $108 million; the Cleveland Clinic witnessed a 71% decline in operating income; and MD Anderson, the nation’s largest cancer center, dropped $266 million.

How did some of the biggest brands in care delivery lose this much money? The problem isn’t declining revenue. Since 2009, hospitals have accounted for half of the $240 billion spending increase among private U.S. insurers. It’s not that increased competition is driving price wars, either. On the contrary, 1,412 hospitals have merged since 1998, primarily to increase their clout with insurers and raise prices. Nor is it a consequence of people needing less medical care. The prevalence of chronic illness continues to escalate, accounting for 75% of U.S. healthcare costs, according to the CDC.

Part Of The Problem Is Rooted In The Past

From the late 19th century to the early 20th, hospitals were places the sick went to die. For practically everyone else, healthcare was delivered by house call. With the introduction of general anesthesia and the discovery of powerful antibiotics, medical care began moving from people’s homes to inpatient facilities. And by the 1950s, some 6,000 hospitals had sprouted throughout the country. For all that expansion, hospital costs remained relatively low. By the time Medicare rolled out in 1965, healthcare consumed just 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Today, that number is 18%.

Hospitals have contributed to the cost hike in recent decades by: (1) purchasing redundant, expensive medical equipment and generating excess demand, (2) hiring highly paid specialists to perform ever-more complex procedures with diminishing value, rather than right-sizing their work forces, and (3) tolerating massive inefficiencies in care delivery (see “the weekend effect”).

How Hospital CEOs See It

Most hospital leaders acknowledge the need to course correct, but very few have been able to deliver care that’s significantly more efficient or cost-effective than before. Instead, hospitals in most communities have focused on reducing and eliminating competition. As a result, a recent study found that 90% of large U.S. cities were “highly concentrated for hospitals,” allowing those that remain to increase their market power and prices.

Historically, such consolidation (and price escalation) has enabled hospitals to offset higher expenses. As of late, however, this strategy is proving difficult. Here’s how some leaders explain their recent financial struggles:

“Our expenses continue to rise, while constraints by government and payers are keeping our revenues flat.”

Brigham Health president Dr. Betsy Nabel offered this explanation in a letter to employees this May, adding that the hospital will “need to work differently in order to sustain our mission for the future.”

A founding member of Partners HealthCare in Boston, Brigham & Women’s Hospital (BWH) is the second-largest research hospital in the nation, with over $640 million in funding. Its storied history dates back more than a century. But after a difficult FY 2016, BWH offered retirement buyouts to 1,600 employees, nearly 10% of its workforce.

Three factors contributed to the need for layoffs: (1) reduced reimbursements from payers, including the Massachusetts government, which limits annual growth in healthcare spending to 3.6%, a number that will drop to 3.1% next year, (2) high capital costs, both for new buildings and for the hospital’s electronic health record (EHR) system, and (3) high labor expenses among its largely unionized workforce.

“The patients are older, they’re sicker … and it’s more expensive to look after them.”

That, along with higher labor and drug costs, explained the Cleveland Clinic’s economic headwinds, according to outgoing CEO Dr. Toby Cosgrove. And though he did not specifically reference Medicare, years of flat reimbursement levels have resulted in the program paying only 90% of hospital costs for the “older,” “sicker” and “more expensive” patients.

Of note, these operating losses occurred despite the Clinic’s increase in year-over-year revenue. Operating income is on the upswing in 2017, but it remains to be seen whether the health system’s new CEO can continue to make the same assurances to employees as his predecessor that, “We have no plans for workforce reduction.”

“Salaries and wages and … and increased consulting expenses primarily related to the Epic EHR project.”

Leaders at MD Anderson, the largest of three comprehensive cancer centers in the United States, blamed these three factors for the institution’s operational losses. In a statement, executives attributed a 77% drop in adjusted income last August to “a decrease in patient revenues as a result of the implementation of the new Epic Electronic Health Record system.”

Following a reduction of nearly 1,000 jobs (5% of its workforce) in January 2017, and the resignation of MD Anderson’s president this March, a glimmer of hope emerged. The institution’s operating margins were in the black in the first quarter of 2017, according to the Houston Chronicle.

Making Sense Of Hospital Struggles

The challenges confronting these hospital giants mirror the difficulties nearly all community hospitals face. Relatively flat Medicare payments are constraining revenues. The payer mix is shifting to lower-priced patients, including those on Medicaid. Many once-profitable services are moving to outpatient venues, including physician-owned “surgicenters” and diagnostic facilities. And as one of the most unionized industries, hospitals continue to increase wages while drug companies continue raising prices – at three times the rate of healthcare inflation.

Though these factors should inspire hospital leaders to exercise caution when investing, many are spending millions in capital to expand their buildings and infrastructure with hopes of attracting more business from competitors. And despite a $44,000 federal nudge to install EHRs, hospitals are finding it difficult to justify the investment. Digital records are proven to improve patient outcomes, but they also slow down doctors and nurses. According to the annual Deloitte “Survey of US Physicians,” 7 out of 10 physicians report that EHRs reduce productivity, thereby raising costs.

Harsh Realities Ahead For Hospitals

Although nearly every hospital talks about becoming leaner and more efficient, few are fulfilling that vision. Given the opportunity to start over, our nation would build fewer hospitals, eliminate the redundancy of high-priced machines, and consolidate operating volume to achieve superior quality and lower costs.

Instead, hospitals are pursuing strategies of market concentration. As part of that approach, they’re purchasing physician practices at record rates, hoping to ensure continued referral volume, regardless of the cost.

Today, commercial payers bear the financial brunt of hospital inefficiencies and high costs but, at some point, large purchasers will say “no more.” These insurers may soon get help from the nation’s largest purchaser, the federal government. Last month, President Donald Trump issued an executive order with language suggesting the administration and federal agencies may seek to limit provider consolidation, lower barriers to entry and prevent “abuses of market power.”

With pressure mounting, hospital administrators find themselves wedged deeper between a rock and a hard place. They know doctors, nurses, and staff will fight the changes required to boost efficiency, especially those that involve increasing productivity or lowering headcount. But at the same time, their bargaining power is diminishing as health-plan consolidation continues. The four largest insurance companies now own 83% of the national market.

What’s more, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) announced last week a $1.6 billion cut to certain Medicare Part B drug payments along with reduced reimbursements for off-campus hospital outpatient departments in 2018. CMS said these moves will “provide a more level playing field for competition between hospitals and physician practices by promoting greater payment alignment.”

The American healthcare system is stuck with investments that made sense decades ago but that now result in hundreds of billions of dollars wasted each year. Hospitals are a prime example. That’s why we shouldn’t count on hospital administrators to solve America’s cost challenges.

Change will need to come from outside the traditional healthcare system. The final part of this series explores three potential solutions and highlights the innovative companies leading the effort.

 

GRAPHIC: The era of big hospitals

https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/11/08/trends-in-us-hospitals-000576

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Once primarily rooted in communities and run as charities, hospitals have morphed into huge businesses… and they are getting bigger. Fueled in part by an increase in revenues under the Affordable Care Act, hospitals have been expanding and merging, in some cases becoming chains of more than 100 hospitals.

And it doesn’t seem to matter if the hospitals are officially not-for-profit or for-profit… the distinction seems increasingly irrelevant. In fact, it appears that in terms of patient care, nonprofit chains are among the most profitable hospital systems in the country. Instead of paying shareholders, the nonprofits can simply plow their profits back into the hospitals in the form of new equipment, buildings or spend it on personnel… fueling even more expansion.

A nation of McHospitals?

https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/11/08/hospital-chains-dominate-health-care-000574

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For years, the nation’s hospital chains worked to get bigger, bigger, bigger. In the 1980s and 1990s, for-profit companies like HCA and Tenet emerged as juggernauts, snapping up local hospitals and opening clinics in one town after another. Their ambitious not-for-profit cousins, the big academic medical centers like Harvard-affiliated Partners Healthcare, scooped up smaller rivals in response. Just four years ago, the Tennessee-based Community Health Systems spent $7.6 billion to buy a competitor and become the nation’s largest for-profit hospital company, with more than 200 hospitals in 29 states.

Today, in any town or city, in any region of the country, you’ll almost certainly see the same scenario: Only a handful of hospitals, sometimes owned and operated by a company thousands of miles away.

As the pace and scale of consolidation picked up, the outcome long appeared inevitable: an American future in which a handful of hospital chains dominate American health care, with brands like Tenet and Catholic Health Initiatives and the Mayo Clinic competing for patients the way Panera and Chipotle and the Olive Garden compete for diners.

But something happened on the way to becoming a nation of McHospitals. That ambitious growth, driven by dreams of dominating a transformed health care landscape and recently fueled by Obamacare revenues, hit a wall.

In the past year, two of the nation’s three largest for-profit hospital systems, Tenet and Community Health Systems, began selling off dozens of their hospitals while entertaining bids to break up their entire companies. Prominent not-for-profit chains like Partners Healthcare are reporting nine-digit losses. Even Mayo Clinic is pulling back from some rural locations in the Midwest.

In part, the shift is just a typical business cycle working its way through the health care industry. “There are these testosterone-driven waves of deal making” in health care, said Jeff Goldsmith, a hospital consultant. “And then there are waves of post-coital regret that follow.”

But in part, the change is driven by policy decisions being made in Washington — how health care is paid for, and who has access to it. And as that shift unfolds, it’s raising questions that will shape American health care for a generation: What will the future of hospital ownership look like? What should it look like?

Even at the height of merger mania, no one could quite agree on whether the McHospital trend was a good thing or not. Some people — mostly in the hospital industry — argued that consolidation was long overdue, and that large companies’ deeper pockets and economies of scale would keep costs down and improve the quality of care for patients. Obamacare gave hospitals financial incentives to manage entire populations, rather than just get paid patient-by-patient — an effort that required building big data sets and buying up other services too, like physician practices.

But others were concerned about the growing concentration of ownership of the nation’s hospitals by a shrinking number of companies. It put local hospitals’ decades-long relationship with their communities at risk, as important local institutions started reporting to shareholders or distant nonprofit boards. These worriers foresaw a future in which just a handful of chains competed to carve out the most lucrative segments of health care, like cardiac procedures and orthopedic surgery, and offered substandard care for everyone else. And despite the chains’ promises, years of reports have shown that when hospitals combine, their prices tend to go up.

Providers’ growing market power has “been the leading reason for the [rise] in health care spending” for decades, Bob Berenson, a former Carter and Clinton administration official said in 2015. (“And in conventional political circles,” he added, “it’s still being overlooked.”)

But the changes underway are starting to transform the nature of the hospital itself — and could open the door to a landscape even more different than we imagine.

Radical shifts

The direction of the American hospital has shifted radically over time. Initially, hospitals were charity wards where the poor went to die. But as cities grew, and health care became more expensive and capital-intensive, hospitals became destinations for wealthier patients: Top hospitals were the ones that could afford the latest medical technologies and perform the most complex surgeries. The creation of Medicare in 1967 fueled new revenue and attracted more competitors, leading to the birth of major chains.

Today, about two-thirds of the nation’s 5,000 hospitals are parts of chains, up from about half of hospitals just 15 years ago, and the share of for-profit hospitals has steadily climbed — more than one in five hospitals are now owned by investors, rather than run as a not-for-profit or by the government. Established hospitals are grappling with how to balance institutional advantages like high-end facilities and expensive technologies with the need to stay nimble and adapt to health care’s changes. It’s a hard balance to strike, and after a few boom years, the industry is experiencing its worst financial performance since the great recession.

It’s always been expensive to own and operate a hospital. Preparing for possible emergencies requires round-the-clock staffing and immense sunk costs. Most major hospitals also try to offer dozens of different business lines, from cardiac surgery to behavioral health care — but that’s only gotten harder as niche competitors chip away at the most lucrative high-end services. It also got pricier thanks to the latest merger mania, as hospital chains collectively took on billions of dollars in debt to buy up their competitors and acquire other services, like physician offices.

An industry that had already consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s — seeking new efficiencies and to get bigger when negotiating with insurance companies — received new incentives under Obamacare, as millions of newly insured patients entered the market and hospital chains raced to capture the new customers. But the Affordable Care Act also accelerated changes to health care payments in ways that made hospitals seem a little outmoded.

Medicare, other federal programs and insurance companies are increasingly shifting away from fee-for-service reimbursement — in which doctors and hospitals are rewarded for the number of procedures they perform — toward “alternative payment models” with more incentives for follow-up care and improved long-term outcomes. That’s encouraged hospitals to make new investments, like buying up nursing homes and hiring more workers to deliver home-based and long-term care. Some hospital leaders are actively talking about trying not to fill their beds, which would’ve sounded like heresy in the industry just a decade ago.

Charlie Martin, a legendary health care investor who founded two hospital companies, said the old model is doomed as new technologies allow care to be delivered outside of the hospital — leaving behind large, costly facilities that are better suited to 1990 than 2020.

“Half the business that’s in there is going to go away,” Martin said. “This is going to be a beatdown like we’ve never seen before.”

Martin said he’s now investing in services like post-acute care and home health, which are more agile and positioned to take advantage of the changes in payment. In this emerging world, a low-cost aide who can keep an elderly patient out of the hospital may end up being more profitable for Martin than paying a team of doctors when that patient breaks a hip and needs days of hospital care.

“The hospitals of today are too expensive to be health care facilities” in the long run, Martin said. “I can’t carry the carcass around.” (He added that consolidation’s benefits are overrated. “There are other ways to get scale now, like purchasing groups” that allow hospitals to get bulk discounts despite not having a common owner, Martin argued. “A lot of the advantages that came through the multihospital systems are now available for anybody.”)

Too big to fail?

So, are big hospitals — and big hospital chains — destined to go the way of Sears, an institution decimated by smaller and nimbler competitors? Not necessarily. There’s still a viable path — and often a need — for big hospitals themselves, typically the largest employers in their cities and towns. While fee-for-service payment is slowly getting phased down, it isn’t going away overnight, if ever. A decade after policymakers began pushing hospitals to adopt alternative payment models, those models still represent less than 30 percent of payments to the average health care provider. Fee-for-service remains the most common way of getting paid.

And local hospitals have an advantage that many businesses don’t: They’re often so important to their towns and cities that lawmakers and other local leaders don’t want to let them fail, even if their margins suffer. And in markets where there isn’t much competition, hospitals continue to charge huge rates that have very little connection to quality of care. Yale researcher Zack Cooper and colleagues have found that hospitals with effective monopolies have prices more than 15 percent higher than hospitals in markets with four or more competitors.

What that all means: The hospitals that Martin and others see as lumbering dinosaurs don’t all need to evolve to virtual campuses just yet. No one’s forcing them to. The old model of going to a hospital for surgery and other intensive services will persist for years or decades, barring major technological leaps ahead, and it may stay lucrative for the most prominent, dominant facilities. There’s no easy, obvious disruptor that wants to start building hospitals and compete for these services, at least for these now.

So then the question is: Who’s going to own them? Many experts think the near future, at least, will belong to regional health systems. They’re able to take advantage of local monopolies that allow them to raise prices, while not being burdened by the debt and expenses that can go along with aggressive acquisitions of national chains. And from North Carolina to California, many of these local chains continue to thrive and edge out national competitors with better financial performance. Indiana University Health System last month announced it’s expanding into Fort Wayne, the state’s second-largest city, even as Community Health Systems – a national chain that operates a hospital network in the city – has seen local profits fall and anger rise, as doctors and employers claim the chain has neglected its facilities and should sell hospitals that have become dirty and dingy. (Community’s president told doctors in 2016 that the chain would pull out of Fort Wayne, Bloomberg reported, although the company rejected a subsequent buyout offer and now says it’s committed to staying.)

What’s good for these regional chains may not be good for patients or the insurance system that pays for their care, though, as lower levels of competition mean higher prices. Martin Gaynor, an economist at Carnegie Mellon and former FTC official who studies consolidation, points to UPMC’s decision this month to spend $2 billion to build three new specialty hospitals in the Pittsburgh area, further cementing its control of the local market — even if experts question whether large, specialty facilities are needed at all. “Don’t forget that residents of Western Pennsylvania are the ones who will mostly pay for this,” Gaynor tweeted after the announcement.

“There’s a near-stranglehold on these markets by dominant health systems,” said Gaynor, noting that many regions get carved up between two or three major chains. “Some means need to be developed to free that up.”

It’s not clear how that would happen or who wants to do it. The Trump administration has gestured toward unlocking those markets, with a few lines in a recent executive orderpromising to limit “excessive consolidation.” The Federal Trade Commission under the Obama administration also jumped in to aggressively block hospital mergers, too. But taking on the hospital industry has been viewed as a political nonstarter for years. And hospitals don’t have much reason to loosen their own monopolies, at least in the short run.

There’s an intriguing possibility that some consultants are wrestling with: What if a company like Walmart or Apple decides to go for the health care market — and really go for it, as executives from each company have hinted in the past — and set up outpatient centers in their stores around the country. Hospitals would suddenly face new pressures from a well-capitalized competitor that already gets a lot of foot traffic, like Walmart, or has been ruthlessly committed to growth, like Apple. Patients frustrated with the traditional medical system might start opting for these retail alternatives, disrupting the entire chain of how Americans get care.

A dramatic move like that would shake up how health care is delivered. It would also flip the paradigm. Rather than hospitals desperately trying to expand and establish themselves as a national brand, an existing national brand — not a health care brand, but a big consumer brand — could suddenly have a health care presence in many major markets.

But a move like that remains some distance off. Walmart’s effort to quickly scale up small retail health clinics has stalled. Apple has publicly flirted with investing in a health care facility for so long, it raises the question of why the company hasn’t.

And that points to the most likely outcome for hospitals in the next 30 years. Boring as it may be, many of them aren’t going anywhere. No one else is competing for the expensive, high-end services that only hospitals can offer. They’re still too big to fail — just so long as they don’t get any bigger.