Nearly 50% of U.S. adults report struggling to keep up with the cost of healthcare, with four in ten ringing in the new year with medical debt. Medical debt is a major burden that often forces people to delay–and sometimes forgo–access to care. Not only do outstanding medical bills undermine health, but they also represent the most common type of collections, with estimates ranging anywhere from $81 to $140 billion.
With problematic hospital practices gaining national media attention – including rejecting appointments for patients with outstanding medical bills and going so far as to sue such patients – the issue of medical debt is front and center for many Americans.
A glimpse into the state of hospital billing practices
Hospital watchdogs have started collecting valuable data on hospital billing practices to inform patients about these practices and potentially put pressure on hospitals to improve.
In an effort to capture the varied nature of hospital billing and collection practices, the Lown Institute is building a database of financial assistance policies and billing and collection practices across 2,500 hospitals with the support of Arnold Ventures. Initial results are expected to be available in mid-2024 with a full report issued in 2025.
Also interested in evaluating the current state of hospital’s financial practices, in 2021, the Leapfrog Group added questions to their hospital survey around billing and collections. Researchers from the Leapfrog Group, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, and Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine published a recent analysis of this data in JAMAwhere they found that many hospitals are still falling short when it comes to billing ethics. Although the data set of 2,270 hospitals was not nationally representative, it provides an interesting glimpse into the billing practices of some U.S. hospitals.
Here are the key takeaways:
754 hospitals (33.2%) reported that they “take legal action against patients for late payment or insufficient payment of a medical bill.” Rural hospitals were 38% more likely than urban hospitals to take legal action against patients.
1,020 (44.9%) hospitals did not routinely send patients itemized bills within 30 days of final claims adjudication or date of service for patients without insurance.
125 (5.5%) hospitals did not provide access to billing representatives capable of investigating billing errors, offering price adjustment, and establishing payment plans.
Ultimately, only 38% of surveyed hospitals reported meeting all three proposed billing quality standards. Interestingly, hospitals with worse Leapfrog safety grades were less likely to meet all three billing standards compared to hospitals with better grades. It’s not clear what’s behind this pattern, but it could be an issue of capacity (hospitals with more resources and staff have an easier time abiding by safety protocol and billing standards), or potentially profiteering (hospitals more concerned with making money may be both understaffing hospitals and suing patients).
So, how can we encourage better billing practices and reduce harm caused by medical debt?
The JAMA study authors recommend standardizing measurement and reporting of hospital billing practices to “increase accountability, reduce variation in billing practices, and reduce barriers in access to care in the US.”
Some states are taking these recommendations to the policy-level, working to make healthcare more affordable for patients. To date, eight states limit medical debt interest and two states restrict credit reporting of medical debt. Current policy proposals on the docket include New York’s Senate Bill S5909B, which seeks to ban hospitals from suing patients making less than 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL).
This research is important to not only provide further insight into how hospitals financially support, or undermine, their patients, but also inform policy efforts to improve healthcare affordability and hospital accountability moving forward.
We’ve been getting more and more questions about our Fair Share Spending work that assesses whether hospitals are giving back enough in financial assistance and community health investments to justify their generous tax breaks. Two new reports—one from a United States Senate committee and one from the American Hospitals Association—delve into this space and provide very different views. Here’s what you need to know.
Sanders report calls out hospitals
Nonprofit hospitals receive an estimated $28 billion in total tax breaks each year, but give back far less in meaningful community benefits. A Lown Institute report found that nonprofit hospitals received $14 billion more in tax breaks than they spent on financial assistance and community health programs in 2020, what we call a Fair Share Deficit. About three quarters of hospitals failed to give back to their communities in amounts commensurate with their tax exemption.
In August, four US Senators sent letters to the IRS asking for clarification on how hospitals are complying with the community benefit standard. And this week majority staff of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee, chaired by Senator Bernie Sanders, released a report showing how some large hospital systems spend little on financial assistance, despite paying their CEOs whopping 8-figure salaries.
The Sanders report highlights examples of nonprofit hospitals engaging in aggressive billing activities such as sending patients’ medical debt to collections and denying care to patients with outstanding medical debt. The report also adds a new analysis of how much the 16 largest nonprofit hospital systems spend on financial assistance (free and discounted care for patients who can’t afford to pay). They find that 12 of these systems spent less than $0.02 for each dollar in revenue on financial assistance, and six gave less than $0.01.
The report also called attention to “massive salaries” for some system CEOs, like Commonspirit whichpaid their CEO $35 million in 2021. Lown Institute data shows vast inequities at some hospitals, with some CEOs making up to 60 times what other hospital workers make.
This underinvestment in financial assistance causes real harm to patients. When hospitals charge patients for care they can’t afford, patients go into debt and often sacrifice basic needs and avoid additional care. An estimated 100 million Americans are in medical debt, and most owe at least some to hospitals.If hospitals paid off their $14 billion fair share deficit, it would be enough to erase the debt of 18 million Americans, which would be a huge step forward for fairness in the country.
AHA provides opposing view
The American Hospitals Association just published their analysis of hospital community benefit spending, finding that hospitals spent $130 billion in 2020, amounting to 15.5% of hospital expenses. That’s far more than other studiesestimate.
How can the AHA estimate be so different? The answer depends on what’s being counted as a “community benefit.” When you imagine programs to improve community health, you might think of free immunizations, health fairs and educational classes, food pantries and other nutritional assistance, investments in affordable housing, healthcare for the homeless, etc. However, spending on those types of programs made up only 1.8% of hospital expenses in 2020, according to the AHA’s report.
Financial assistance, free or discounted care for eligible patients, is another important category of community benefit spending. But the AHA report doesn’t break out this amount on its own; instead, they lump it in together with Medicaid shortfall and other unreimbursed costs of government programs.
While it’s important that hospitals care for patients with Medicaid, the “shortfall” they report does not go towards tangible community programs or into the pockets of patients. Instead, this is an accounting item related to the discounted prices in Medicaid. Hospitals offer discounts on care to insurers all the time, but these aren’t considered community benefits–why should Medicaid discounts be any different? Most hospitals already make up this shortfall from public insurers by charging private insurers more than their costs of care. The same goes for Medicare shortfall, which the AHA report also includes in their total, despite this not even being considered a “community benefit” by the IRS.
The AHA report also includes bad debt, which is money the hospital expected to get from patients but never received. The AHA argues this spending is a benefit to the community because many patients who don’t pay would have qualified for financial assistance. However, in the real world, policies on financial assistance vary widely and getting access to it can be easy or hard. If a hospital goes to great lengths to make their financial assistance application simple and accessible, and give more in assistance as a result, that should be rewarded. On the other hand, if hospitals make getting assistance hard and hound low-income patients to pay their bills or send their debt to collection agencies, that hardly seems like a “community benefit.”
What can policymakers do?
The Sanders report adds to existing evidence that nonprofit hospitals could do much more to improve community health and earn their tax-exempt status. How can federal policymakers improve transparency and incentives around the community benefit standard? See some of our key recommendations for Congress on this issue.
Private equity (PE) acquisitions in healthcare have exploded in the past decade. The number of private equity buyouts of physician practices increased six-fold from 2012-2021. At least 386 hospitals are now owned by private equity firms, comprising 30% of for-profit hospitals in the U.S.
Emerging evidence shows that the influence of private equity in healthcare demands attention. Here’s what’s in the latest research.
What is private equity?
There are a few key characteristics that differentiate private equity firms from other for-profit companies. At a 2023 event hosted by the NIHCM Foundation, Assistant Professor of Health Care Management at The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania Dr. Atul Gupta explained these factors:
Financial engineering. PE firms primarily use debt to finance acquisitions (that’s why they’re often known as “leveraged buyouts”). But unlike in other acquisitions, this debt is placed on the balance sheet of the the target company (ie. the physician practice or hospital).
Short-term goals. PE firms make the majority of their profits when they sell, and they look to exit within 5-8 years. That means they generally look for ways to cut costs quickly, like reducing staff or selling real estate.
Moral hazard. PE companies can make a big profit even if their target firm goes bankrupt. This is different from most investments where the success of the investor depends on how well the target company does.
The nature of private equity itself has serious implications for healthcare, in which the health of communities depends on the long-term sustainability and quality improvement of hospitals and physician practices. But are these concerns borne out in the real world?
PE acquisition and adverse events
A recent study in JAMA from researchers at Harvard Medical School and the University of Chicago analyzed patient mortality and the prevalence of adverse events at hospitals acquired by private equity compared to non-acquired hospitals. The study used Medicare claims from more than 4 million hospitalizations from 2009-2019, comparing claims at 51 PE-acquired hospitals and 249 non-acquired hospitals to serve as controls.
In-hospital mortality decreased slightly at PE-acquired hospitals compared to controls, but not 30-day mortality. This may be because the patient mix at PE-acquired hospitals shifted more toward a lower-risk group, and transfers to other acute care hospitals increased.
However, there were concerning results for patient safety. The rate of adverse events at PE-acquired hospitals compared to control hospitals increased by 25%, including a 27% increase in falls, 38% increase in central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI), and double the rate of surgical site infections. The authors found the rates of CLABSI and surgical site infections at PE-acquired hospitals alarming because overall surgical volume and central line placements actually decreased.
What could be behind these higher rates of adverse events after PE acquisition? In a Washington Post op-ed, Dr. Ashish Jha, dean of the School of Public Health at Brown University, writes that it’s down to two things: staffing levels and adherence to patient safety protocols. “Both cost money, and it is not a stretch to connect cuts in staffing and a reduced focus on patient safety with an increased risk of harm for patients,” he writes.
Social responsibility impact
Private equity acquisitions may have a negative effect on patient safety, but what about social responsibility? In a recent report from PE Stakeholder on the impact of Apollo Global Management’s reach into healthcare, the authors use the Lown Institute Hospitals Index to understand hospitals owned by Apollo perform on social responsibility. Lifepoint Health, a health system owned by Apollo, was ranked 222 out of 296 systems on social responsibility nationwide. And in Virginia, North Carolina, and Arizona, some of the worst-ranked hospitals in the state for social responsibility are those owned by Lifepoint Health, the PE Stakeholder report shows.
Apollo Global Management is the second largest private equity firm in the United States, with $598 billion total assets under management, according to thereport. The PE stakeholder report outlines concerning practices by Apollo, including putting high levels of debt that lowers hospitals’ credit ratings and increases their interest rates, cutting staff and essential healthcare services, and selling off real estate for a quick buck. If we care about hospital social responsibility we should clearly be concerned about private equity acquisitions.
The bigger picture
Private equity buyouts did not come from out of nowhere, so what does this trend tell us about our healthcare system? PE acquisitions are in many ways a symptom of larger issues in healthcare, such as increasing administrative burden, tight margins, and lack of regulation on consolidation. For owners of private physician practices that face a lot of administrative work, deciding to sell to a PE firm to reduce this workload and focus on patient care (not to mention, getting a hefty payout) is a tempting proposal.
In the Washington Post, Ashish Jha describes what made his colleague decide to sell his practice to a PE firm: “The price he was getting was very good, and he was happy to outsource the headache of running the business (managing billing, making sure there was adequate coverage for nights and weekends, etc.).”
“In many ways, private equity is both a response to and an accelerator of broader health system trends – one in which consolidation is happening quickly, care is being delivered by larger and larger entities, and corporate influence is growing.”Jane M. Zhu, MD, MPP, MSHP, Associate Professor of Medicine at Oregon Health & Science University, at NIHCM Foundation Event
PE buyouts are also indicative of a larger trend, what some researchers call the “financialization” of health. As Dr. Joseph Bruch at the University of Chicago and colleagues describe in the New England Journal of Medicine, financialization refers to the “transformation of public, private, and corporate health care entities into salable and tradable assets from which the financial sector may accumulate capital.”
Financialization is a sort of merging of the financial and healthcare sectors; not only are financial actors like private equity buying up healthcare providers, but healthcare institutions are also acting like financial firms. For example, 22 health systems have investment arms, including nonprofit system Ascension, which has its own private equity operation worth $1 billion. The financialization of healthcare is also reflected in the boards of nonprofit hospitals. A 2023 study of US News top-ranked hospitals found that a plurality of their board members (44%) were from the financial sector.
What we can do about it?
What can we do to mitigate harms caused by PE acquisitions? In Health Affairs Forefront, executive director of Community Catalyst Emily Stewart and executive director of the Private Equity Stakeholder Project Jim Baker provide some policy ideas to stop the “metastasizing disease” of private equity:
Joint Liability. Currently PE firms can put all of their debt on the balance sheet of the firm they acquire, letting them off the hook for this debt and making it harder for the acquired company to succeed. “Requiring private equity firms to share in the responsibility of the debt…would prevent them from making huge profits while they are saddling hospitals and nursing homes with debts that ultimately impact worker pay and cut off care to patients,” write Stewart and Baker.
Regulate mergers. Private equity acquisitions often go under the radar because the acquisitions are small enough to not be reported to authorities. But the U.S. Federal Trade Commission could be more aggressive in evaluating mergers and buyouts by PE, as they have done recently in Texas, where a PE firm has been buying up numerous anesthesia practices.
Transparency of PE ownership. It can be hard to know when hospitals are bought by a PE firm. The Department of Health and Human Services could require disclosure of PE ownership for hospitals as they have done for nursing homes.
Remove tax loopholes. The carried interest loophole allows PE management fees to be taxed at as capital gains, which is a lower rate than corporate income. Closing this loophole would remove a big incentive that makes PE buyouts so attractive for firms.
“It is clear that the problem is not the lack of solutions but rather the lack of political will to take on private equity,” write Steward and Baker.
We need not to not only stem the tide of PE acquisitions sweeping through healthcare, but address the financialization of healthcare more broadly, to put patients back at the center of our health system.
I recently had dinner with my good friend and colleague, Dave Blom. For many years, Dave was the President and CEO of Ohio Health. During his tenure, Ohio Health was one of America’s most successful health systems by any measure. Dave Blom was known nationally as a calm, steady, and thoughtful hospital leader.
Dave and I were talking about the difficulties of leading and managing complex healthcare organizations in the post-Covid era. The hospital problems of finance, staffing, access, and inflation have been well itemized and documented. While the day-to-day operating problems are undeniably significant and persistent, Dave and I agreed that the hospital leadership issues that really matter right now center around the ability of hospital executives to possess and demonstrate an authentic emotional IQ to lead a diverse workforce in such difficult circumstances.
Such a realization is supported by the recognition that no matter how technically excellent they are, hospitals are just not like other organizations in other industries. Taking care of patients—in fact, taking care of communities—is not only managerially complicated but emotionally testing. Leadership gets much more complicated in the current environment.
Having moved the conversation to this point Dave and I then took on the definition of a workable and effective leadership emotional IQ. That emotional IQ is characterized by the following:
Empathy. During Covid, when leadership was challenged at every level and at every American organization, the value of personal empathy moved to the forefront. Empathy is defined as “the ability to understand and share the feelings of another.” More directly, a hospital CEO needs to understand and share the feelings of his or her entire organization. Great hospital leaders understand the difference between sympathy and empathy. Sympathy is a passive emotion, an emotion that notes and cares about a problem but doesn’t necessarily act on that problem. Empathy is an active emotion. A leader with empathy not only notes the problem but immediately moves to be of help either at the personal or organizational level, whichever is required.
Vulnerability. Vulnerability is defined as “the willingness to show emotion or to allow one’s weakness to be seen or known.” Historically, executive leadership—especially in corporate situations—has been trained and encouraged not to show emotion or weakness. But organizations are changing, and the composition of the hospital workforce is different. The patient care process is emotional in and of itself and the daily operational interaction demands a different kind of leadership—a leadership that is comfortable with both emotion and weakness.
Humility. Executives who show humility “are willing to ask for help and don’t insist on everything done their way; they are quick to forgive and are known for their patience.” Humility also reflects changing organizational ecosystems. Humility is not generally indicative or compatible with the “military command” model of leadership. It is more supportive of a collaborative and cooperative leadership model, which has at its core a heavy dose of decentralization and delegation.
As our dinner was coming to a close, we took note of two other leadership observations.
First, when you create a leadership team that fully embraces the principles of empathy, vulnerability, and humility, then that emotional IQ combination creates the highest order goal of organizational trust. All of this is exceptionally meaningful since organizational trust is more important than ever, given that it is in such short supply at all levels of American society. Dave Blom then advanced the discussion to one further point. When you gain the full value of empathy, vulnerability, and humility and you add to that the organizational trust you have established, all the principled prerequisites for establishing corporate and managerial integrity are in place. Empathy plus vulnerability plus humility equals organizational trust. And then empathy plus vulnerability plus humility plus trust equals organizational integrity.
The emotional IQ of leadership is not created by accident. It requires a hyper-aware organization at both the management and Board level. It requires governance and executive leaders who understand that hospital success cannot be achieved by technical and clinical excellence alone. That success must be built on a platform of an emotional IQ that is supported, valued, and shared by the entire hospital community.
please. Two for us and three hanging.”
HENRY KOTULA 