Tag Archives: Uncompensated Care

Healthcare bankruptcies more than triple in 2017

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https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/healthcare-bankruptcies-more-than-triple-in-2017.html

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Regulatory changes, the rise of high-deductible health plans and advances in technology are a few of the factors that have taken a toll on healthcare companies’ finances, and these challenges may lead many hospitals and other medical companies to restructure their debt or file for bankruptcy in the coming year, according to Bloomberg.

Although hospitals are expected to face financial challenges in the year ahead, many healthcare companies are already struggling. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, healthcare bankruptcy filings have more than tripled in 2017. Healthcare bankruptcies are on the rise as filings across the broader economy have fallen since 2010, according to the report.

The challenges in the healthcare sector may hit rural hospitals the hardest due to the reduction in Disproportionate Share Hospital payments.

The ACA calls for annual ggregate reductions to DSH payments from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2020. Subsequent legislation delayed the start of the reductions until fiscal year 2018, which began Oct. 1, and pushed the end date back to fiscal year 2025.

David Neier, a partner at Winston & Strawn, told Bloomberg the cuts to DSH payments may “single-handedly throw hospitals into immediate financial distress.”

 

Skyrocketing out-of-pocket spending outpaces wage growth

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https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/skyrocketing-out-of-pocket-spending-outpaces-wage-growth/506734/

Dive Brief:

  • In the latest study to show how out-of-pockets costs could create barriers to care, the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) found that out-of-pocket spending is outpacing wage growth.
  • The average deductible for people with employer-based health insurance increased from $303 in 2006 to $1,505 in 2017.
  • Researchers also found that average payments for deductibles and coinsurance skyrocketed faster than overall cost for covered benefits. That’s happened while average copayments have decreased.

Dive Insight:

KFF researchers reviewed health benefit claims from the Truven MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters Database to calculate the average that members pay for deductibles, copayments and coinsurance. What they found should not surprise anyone in healthcare or with employer-based health insurance — deductibles and overall out-of-pocket health costs are rising.

The organization found patient cost-sharing “rose substantially faster than payments for care by health plans as insurance coverage became a little less generous” between 2005 and 2015.

Deductibles went from accounting for less than 25% of cost-sharing payments in 2005 to almost half in 2015. The average payments toward deductibles rose 229% from $117 to $386 and the average payments toward coinsurance increased 89% from $134 to $253 in that period.

On the plus side, copayments fell by 36% from $218 to $139 as payers and employers have moved more costs to healthcare utilization.

Overall, patient-cost sharing increased by 66% from an average of $469 in 2005 to $778 in 2015. Average payments by health plans also increased 56% from $2,932 to $4,563.

While out-of-pocket health costs have skyrocketed, wages in the same period increased by 31%.

The KFF study comes on the heels of a JPMorgan Chase Institute report that found Americans are struggling with out-of-pocket costs. In many cases, JPMorgan Chase Institute found that people are delaying healthcare payments until they get “liquid assets.” In fact, healthcare payments spike in March and April when Americans get tax refunds.

In another recent study on the topic, HealthFirst Financial Patient Survey said more than 40% of respondents are “very concerned” or “concerned” about whether they could pay out-of-medical bills over the next two years. More than half said they are worried that they might not be able to afford a $1,000 bill, 35% were concerned about a $500 bill and 16% said they’re worried about paying a bill less than $250.

Those amounts are usually well below health plan deductibles. The Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research & Educational Trust 2017 Employer Health Benefits Survey recently found that health plan deductibles often exceed $3,000.

That could be a problem not just for those individuals. Providers and hospitals are already struggling with sagging reimbursements and payer cost-saving measures and policies. More bad debt would only make matters worse.

 

The GOP’s Strategy for Killing Obamacare Now Looks Like This

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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-22/the-gop-s-strategy-for-killing-obamacare-now-looks-like-this

The mandate to buy health insurance is the broccoli of Obamacare—the part you have to accept if you want the goodies, like affordable coverage of people with costly pre-existing conditions. Now Senate Republicans are saying you don’t have to eat your broccoli anymore. They eliminate the penalty for lack of coverage in their version of the $1.5 trillion tax cut bill, which they aim to vote on after Thanksgiving.

Could removing the penalty, which effectively kills the individual mandate, possibly make sense? Health-care economists describe the mandate as a necessary evil. Without it, they say, healthy people will roll the dice and choose to go uncovered, leaving insurance pools made up of sicker, older people who are costlier to cover. But the impact of the requirement is regressive. Well-off families generally get health insurance through their employers, so those who pay the tax for noncoverage tend to be poorer, some working two or three jobs to make ends meet.

For Senate Republicans, killing the individual mandate is a beautiful twofer. First, it’s a way to limit the red ink from their tax package. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates ending the mandate would save $318 billion over 10 years, because the people who dropped coverage wouldn’t get subsidies. Savings would continue after 2027. That’s crucial because under the Byrd rule, a measure can pass the Senate with a simple majority only if it doesn’t add to deficits beyond 10 years. Second, gutting the mandate would partially fulfill Republicans’ long-standing objective of getting rid of Obamacare entirely.

The downside for Republicans is that the repeal gambit has breathed new life into the pro-Obamacare coalition, which argues that Republicans are financing tax cuts for the rich by reducing the number of people with health insurance. “Adding ACA repeal to the corporate tax giveaway has fanned the flames of resistance into a roaring inferno,” says Ben Wikler, the Washington director of MoveOn.org, a liberal activist group. The Congressional Budget Office said on Nov. 8 that repealing the mandate would increase the number of uninsured Americans by 13 million and raise premiums by 10 percent “in most years” of the next decade.

Within hours of Senate Republicans’ announcing their intentions to kill the mandate, a coalition of trade groups for doctors, hospitals, and insurers urged them not to, warning that doing so would raise premiums. In Virginia, a CNN exit poll showed health care was voters’ top issue by more than 2 to 1. Democrat Ralph Northam won voters most concerned about health care 77 percent to 23 percent en route to his decisive election as their next governor.

This leaves Republicans in an awkward spot. While they crave the savings that come from repealing the mandate, they don’t love the reason why—namely, millions fewer people would be insured. That’s something they’ve always insisted wouldn’t happen. As recently as July, two White House officials wrote a Washington Post op-ed ridiculing the notion that millions of people “value their insurance so little that they will simply drop coverage next year following the repeal of the individual and employer mandates.”

Republicans are trying to have it both ways. Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, said that dropping the mandate wouldn’t cut Medicaid. The CBO predicts that of the 13 million people who drop coverage, 5 million will be current Medicaid recipients. Senator Claire McCaskill, a Missouri Democrat, balked. “Where do you think the $300 billion is coming from?” she asked Hatch. “Is there a fairy that’s dropping it on the Senate?”

It’s not just the Republicans who have a complicated relationship with the mandate. Democrats need it to make Obamacare hang together, yet they know it’s unpopular and regressive. Seventy-nine percent of the 6.7 million households that paid the mandate tax for 2015 had incomes under $50,000, and 37 percent made below $25,000, according to Internal Revenue Service data. Republicans tweak Obamacare’s defenders by arguing that if financially hard-pressed families want to drop their policies—and lose the government subsidies that go with them—that’s their right.

Democrats say the mandate gets people to do something that’s in their best interest and keeps emergency rooms from being swamped by uninsured sick people. (Republicans used to make this argument.) But the mandate is also a way to get healthy families to subsidize less-healthy ones, rather than just cover their own risks. That’s what makes it unpopular. “That’s sort of the trap,” says Christopher Pope, a senior fellow at the conservative Manhattan Institute.

Also, the mandate probably isn’t as effective as Democrats have argued. In its Nov. 8 report, the CBO said that for its next estimate, it’s changing its model for how people behave. While results won’t be ready until after Congress wants to finish the tax bill, it said, the effects “would probably be smaller than the numbers reported in this document.” In other words, it won’t reduce coverage as much—or save as much money. It could be that Obamacare needs to rely less on the stick (mandates) and more on the carrot (subsidies that hold down the cost of premiums).

A new CBO estimate that played down the impact of mandate repeal could work out quite nicely for the Republicans. They could point to the Joint Committee on Taxation’s current high estimate for savings to pay for the tax cut, and then next year’s lower estimate of coverage losses from the CBO to claim that eliminating the mandate wasn’t so harmful after all. “Politics is a funny business,” says Pope. “You use whatever weapon you can grab hold of.”

BOTTOM LINE – By dropping Obamacare’s individual mandate, Senate Republicans can raise billions to pay for their tax cuts—and undercut a key part of the health-care law.

 

Repealing the individual mandate would do substantial harm

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https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/11/21/repealing-the-individual-mandate-would-do-substantial-harm/?utm_campaign=Brookings%20Brief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=58686618

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he tax legislation reported by the Senate Finance Committee last week included repeal of the individual mandate, which was created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and requires individuals to obtain health insurance coverage or pay a penalty. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that this proposal would cause large reductions in insurance coverage, reaching 13 million people in the long run.

Supporters of repealing the individual mandate have argued that the resulting reductions in insurance coverage are not a cause for concern because they would be voluntary. Rigorous versions of this argument acknowledge that individuals who drop coverage would lose protection against high medical costs, find it harder to access care, and likely experience worse health outcomes, but assert that the very fact that these individuals would choose to drop insurance coverage shows that they will be better off on net. On that basis, advocates of repealing the mandate claim that its repeal would do no harm. However, this argument suffers from two serious flaws.

The first flaw in this argument is that it assumes individuals bear the full cost of their decisions about whether to obtain insurance coverage; in fact, one person’s decision to go without health insurance coverage shifts costs onto other people. Notably, CBO has estimated that the departure of healthy enrollees from the individual market spurred by repeal of the individual mandate will increase individual market premiums by 10 percent, causing some in that market to involuntarily lose coverage and causing those who remain to bear higher costs. In addition, many of those who become uninsured will end up needing health care but not be able to pay for it, imposing costs on other participants in the health care system. Because individuals who choose to become uninsured do not bear the full cost of that decision, they may choose to do so even in circumstances where the benefits of coverage—accounting for its effects on both the covered individual and the rest of society—exceed its costs.

The second flaw in this argument is that it assumes individual decisions about whether to purchase health insurance coverage reflect a fully informed, fully rational weighing of the cost and benefits. In fact, there is strong reason to believe that many individuals, particularly the healthier individuals most affected by the mandate, are likely to undervalue insurance coverage. This likely reflects a variety of well-documented psychological biases, including a tendency to place too much weight on upfront costs of obtaining coverage (including the “hassle costs” of enrolling) relative to the benefits insurance coverage would provide if the individual got sick and needed care at some point in the future. It is therefore likely that many people who would drop insurance coverage due to repeal of the individual mandate would end up worse off, even solely considering the costs and benefits to the individuals themselves.

The considerations described above mean that, in the absence of subsidies, an individual mandate, or some combination of the two, many people will decline to obtain insurance coverage despite that coverage being well worth society’s cost of providing it. Furthermore, unless the current subsidies and individual mandate penalty provide too strong an incentive to obtain coverage that results in too many people being insured—a view that appears inconsistent with the available evidence—then reductions in insurance coverage due to repealing the individual mandate would do substantial harm.

The remainder of this analysis takes a closer look at the two flaws in the argument that reductions in insurance coverage caused by repeal of the individual mandate would do no harm. The analysis then discusses why these considerations create a strong case for maintaining an individual mandate.

INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO DROP INSURANCE COVERAGE IMPOSE SUBSTANTIAL COSTS ON OTHER PEOPLE

As noted above, supporters of repealing the individual mandate have often argued that the resulting reductions in insurance coverage would do no harm because they are the outcome of voluntary choices. One major flaw in this argument is that one person’s decision to drop insurance coverage imposes costs on other people through a pair of mechanisms: increases in individual market premiums and increases in uncompensated care. I discuss each of these mechanisms in greater detail below.

Increases in individual market premium reduce coverage and increase others’ costs

Repealing the individual mandate would reduce the cost of being uninsured and, equivalently, increase the effective cost of purchasing insurance coverage. That increase in the effective cost of insurance coverage would, in turn, cause many people to drop coverage. Because individuals with the most significant health care needs are likely to place the highest value on maintaining insurance coverage, the people dropping insurance coverage would likely be relatively healthy, on average. In the individual market, those enrollees’ departure would raise average claims costs, requiring insurers to charge higher premiums to the people remaining in the individual market.[1]

CBO estimates that, because of this dynamic, repealing the individual mandate would increase individual market premiums by around 10 percent. Those higher premiums would push some enrollees who are not eligible for subsidies out of the individual market. Higher premiums would impose large costs on unsubsidized enrollees who remained in the ACA-compliant individual market—around 6 million people—while increasing federal costs for subsidized enrollees who remain insured.[2]

CBO’s estimates are at least qualitatively consistent with empirical evidence on the effects of the individual mandate. Perhaps the best evidence on this point comes from Massachusetts health reform. Research examining the unsubsidized portion of Massachusetts’ individual market estimated that Massachusetts’ individual mandate increased enrollment in the unsubsidized portion of its individual market by 38 percent, reducing average claims costs by 8 percent and premiums by 21 percent. Similarly, research focused on the subsidized portion of Massachusetts’ market found that the mandate appears to have been an important motivator of enrollment, particularly among healthier enrollees.

Direct evidence on the effects of the ACA’s mandate is relatively scant because it is challenging to disentangle the effect of the mandate from the effect of other policy changes implemented by the ACA. However, it is notable that the uninsured rate among people with incomes above 400 percent of the federal poverty level fell by almost one-third from 2013 to 2015. This trend is consistent with the view that the ACA’s individual mandate has increased insurance coverage since these individuals are not eligible for the ACA’s subsidies, and implementation of the ACA’s bar on varying premiums or denying coverage based on health status, taken on its own, would have been expected to actually reduce insurance coverage in this group. Because this estimate applies to only a relatively small slice of the population, it cannot easily be used to determine the total effect of the individual mandate on insurance coverage, but it does suggest that the mandate has had meaningful effects.

Repealing the individual mandate could also cause broader disruptions in the individual market for some period of time. Insurers would find it challenging to predict exactly what the individual market risk pool would look like after repeal of the mandate. Some insurers might elect to limit their individual market exposure until that uncertainty is resolved, particularly since the Trump Administration has signaled an intent to pursue other significant policy changes affecting the individual market. That uncertainty could cause some insurers to withdraw from the market, potentially leaving some enrollees without any coverage options. Alternatively, insurers could elect to raise premiums by even more than they expect to be necessary (e.g., by more than the CBO 10 percent estimate cited above) to ensure that they are protected in all scenarios, with significant costs to both individuals and the federal government. It is uncertain how widespread these types of broader disruptions would be in practice, but they are possible.

It is important to note that one person’s decision about whether to purchase individual market coverage affects the premiums faced by others because of a conscious policy choice: the decision to bar insurers from varying premiums or denying coverage based on health status. Without those regulations, individual coverage decisions would have little or no effect on the premiums charged to others. But policymakers and the public have, appropriately in my view, concluded that these regulations perform a valuable social function by ensuring that health care cost burdens are shared equitably between the healthy and the sick. Having made that decision, other aspects of public policy must take account of the fact that one person’s decision to go uninsured has consequences for the market as a whole.

Some newly uninsured individuals would need care, but be unable to pay for it

Dropping insurance coverage also allows individuals to shift a portion of the cost of the care they receive onto others in the form of uncompensated care. Even in the group of comparatively healthy individuals who elect to drop their coverage, some will get sick and need health care. Some of these individuals might be able to pay for that care out of pocket, but others—particularly those who get seriously ill—would likely be unable to pay for it. In some cases, that would cause these individuals to forgo needed care, but in other cases they would receive care without paying for it, either due to the legal requirement that hospitals provide care in emergency situations or through various other formal and informal mechanisms. (Although individuals would often still be able to access care without paying for it, they would frequently still be billed for that care, with potential downstream consequences for their ability to access credit.)

Uninsured individuals receive large quantities of uncompensated care in practice. Estimates based on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey indicate that a non-elderly individual uninsured for the entire year received $1,700 in uncompensated care, on average, during 2013. Consistent with that fact, increases in the number of uninsured individuals increase the amount of uncompensated care. In the context of the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, a randomized controlled trial of the effects of expanded Medicaid coverage, having Medicaid coverage was estimated to reduce the amount of uncompensated care an individual receives by almost $2,200 per year, on average. Quasi-experimental research has similarly found that increases in the number of uninsured individuals in a hospital’s local area increase the amount of uncompensated care a hospital delivers and that the expansion in insurance coverage achieved by the ACA substantially reduced hospitals’ uncompensated care burdens.

Precisely who bears the cost of uncompensated care, particularly in the long run, is not entirely clear. A portion of uncompensated care costs are borne by federal, state, and local government programs and, therefore, are ultimately borne by taxpayers. In 2013, around three-fifths of uncompensated care was financed by federal, state, and local government programs explicitly or implicitly aimed at this purpose. Increases in uncompensated care burdens are likely to lead to increases in spending on these programs. In some cases, those increases will happen automatically. For example, CBO finds that repealing the individual mandate will increase federal spending on the Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program, which is intended to defray uncompensated care costs, by $44 billion over the next ten years because the formula for determining DSH payments depends on the uninsured rate. In other cases, changes may occur more indirectly, perhaps because higher uncompensated care burdens create political pressure to expand these programs (or make it harder to cut them).

The impact of uncompensated care therefore depends to a significant degree on how non-profit hospitals cope with reduced operating margins. Evidence on this point is relatively limited. However, in instances where increases in uncompensated care burdens cause providers to incur outright losses, they are likely to ultimately force facilities to close, which could reduce access to care or increase prices charged to those enrolled in private insurance by reducing competition. In instances where increases in uncompensated care burdens merely trim positive operating margins, lower margins presumably force hospitals to reduce capital investments or to reduce cross-subsidies to other activities such as medical education or research.Recent research focused on the hospital sector, which accounts around three-fifths of all uncompensated care, suggests that providers also bear a significant portion of uncompensated care costs in the form of lower operating margins. However, this does not imply that uncompensated care costs are ultimately borne by hospitals’ owners. Indeed, this research finds that reductions in operating margins in response to increases in uncompensated care occur almost exclusively among non-profit hospitals, plausibly because for-profit hospitals are adept at locating in geographic areas where the demand for uncompensated care is relatively low. (Greater distortions where providers choose to locate and what services they choose to offer may be an important cost of increased uncompensated care.)

INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO DROP INSURANCE COVERAGE MAY HARM THE INDIVIDUALS THEMSELVES

The argument that reductions in insurance coverage due to repeal of the individual mandate do no harm because they are voluntary has a second important flaw; specifically, this argument assumes that individual decisions about whether to obtain health insurance coverage reflect a fully informed, fully rational weighing of the costs and benefits. There is strong reason to doubt that assumption.

Economists commonly note that many people decline to take-up health even in settings where that coverage is free or nearly so. For example, analysts at the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) have estimated that, in 2016, there were 6.8 million people who were eligible for Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program, but not enrolled in those programs, despite the fact that these programs had negligible premiums. Similarly, for this year’s Marketplace open enrollment period, analysts at KFF estimated that among uninsured individuals eligible to purchase Marketplace coverage, around two-fifths could obtain a bronze plan for a premium of zero, but few expect all of these individuals to enroll.

This type of behavior is very challenging to explain as the outcome of a fully informed, fully rational decision-making process. The fact that individuals who do not purchase insurance coverage can shift significant costs to others, as discussed above, can help explain why some individuals value insurance at less than the cost of providing it. But these factors cannot explain why enrollees would decline to obtain coverage that is literally free to them. In principle, “hassle costs” of enrolling in coverage could explain decisions to forgo coverage in these instances, but those hassle costs would need to be implausibly large to explain a decision to forgo an offer of free insurance coverage.

Precisely why individuals decline to take up insurance coverage even in settings where it seems clearly in their interest to do so is not fully understood. This review article catalogues a wide variety of psychological biases that may play a role, but three seem particularly important in this context:

  • Present bias: Economists have documented that individuals generally exhibit “present bias,” meaning that they place a large weight on current costs and benefits relative to similar costs and benefits in the future. In the context of insurance coverage, this type of bias is likely to cause individuals, particularly those who are currently healthy, to place too much weight on the upfront premium and hassle costs required to enroll in health insurance relative to the benefit of having insurance coverage if they get sick at some point in the future. This may cause individuals to decline to obtain insurance coverage even when it is in their economic interest, including in instances where the premium required to enroll is literally zero.

Overweighting of small up front hassle costs appears to lead suboptimal decisions in many economic settings, but the retirement saving literature provides a particularly striking example. Simply being required to return a form to enroll in an employer’s retirement plan has been documented to sharply reduce take-up of that plan, even in circumstances where employees forgo hundreds or thousands of dollars per year in employer matching contributions by declining to participate.

  • Overoptimistic perceptions of risk: One core function of health insurance is to provide protection against relatively rare, but very costly, illnesses. Indeed, a large fraction of the total value of a health insurance contract is delivered in those states of the world. In 2014, around 5 percent of the population accounted for around half of total health care spending.[3] But because these events are comparatively rare, many individuals, particularly healthier individuals, may have difficulty forming accurate perceptions of the risks they face. Research on Medicare Part D has found that individuals tend to place too much weight on premiums relative to expected out-of-pocket costs when choosing plans, providing some evidence that individuals do indeed underestimate risk (although research focused on insurance products other than health insurance has concluded that individuals may sometimes overestimate risk). Like present bias, misperceptions of risk can cause hassle or premium costs to receive too much weight relative to the actual benefits of coverage.
  • Inaccurate beliefs about affordability: Enrollees could also have inaccurate information about the availability of coverage. Survey evidence has suggested that, as of early 2016, almost 40 percent of uninsured adults were unaware of the existence of the ACA’s Health Insurance Marketplaces. Additionally, approximately two-thirds of those who were aware of the Marketplaces had not investigated their coverage options, with most saying that they had not done so because they did not believe that they could afford coverage. Individuals’ beliefs about whether coverage is affordable may be accurate in some instances, but it is likely that they are not accurate in many other cases. Inaccurate beliefs may cause many individuals to fail to investigate their coverage options, including some who are eligible for free or very-low-cost coverage.

REDUCTIONS IN INSURANCE COVERAGE FROM REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE WOULD DO SUBSTANTIAL HARM

The factors identified above provide strong economic rationale for implementing some combination of subsidies and penalties to strengthen the financial incentive to obtain health insurance coverage. These policy tools can compensate for the fact that individual decisions to go without coverage do not account for the ways in which those decisions increase costs for others. Similarly, in many (though not all) instances, financial incentives can help counteract psychological biases that cause individuals to go without insurance coverage even when it is against their own economic interest.

This discussion does not, of course, speak directly to how large subsidies and penalties should be. At least in theory, it is possible to overcompensate for the factors catalogued in the preceding section by creating too large an incentive to obtain coverage and thereby causing too many people to become insured. This occurs if the cost of the additional health care individuals receive when they become insured plus the administrative costs of providing that coverage exceeds the health benefits of the additional health care and the improved protection against financial risk.

Estimating the optimal size of subsidies and penalties is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, it is notable that virtually no one in the current policy debate is arguing that the United States insures too many individuals. Furthermore, there is reason to doubt that this is an empirically relevant concern. For example, the research on Massachusetts health reform by Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski that was discussed earlier used their estimates to calculate the “optimal” mandate penalty to apply to unsubsidized enrollees. They conclude that just offsetting adverse selection justifies a mandate penalty similar in size to the one included in the ACA; also accounting for either uncompensated care or imperfections in consumer decision making could justify a considerably larger penalty.

It therefore seems difficult to justify repealing the individual mandate on the grounds that current policies provide an excessive overall incentive to obtain insurance coverage. Of course, policymakers might believe that it would be preferable to swap the mandate for larger subsidies, perhaps because they believe that it is inappropriate to penalize individuals for not obtaining coverage. In principle, sufficiently large increases in subsidies could offset the reduction in insurance coverage that repealing the individual mandate would cause. But such an approach would require large increases in federal spending since it would keep insurance enrollment at its current level by providing larger subsidies to each enrolled individual. In any case, the Senate Finance Committee bill does not take this approach. Rather than increasing spending on insurance coverage programs to mitigate coverage losses, the bill uses the reduction in spending on coverage programs caused by repealing the mandate (which results from lower enrollment in those programs) to finance tax cuts.

 

 

 

 

 

Medicaid Expansion Has Improved the Financial Outlook for Safety-Net Hospitals

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http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/nov/financial-impact-state-medicaid-expansion-safety-net-hospitals

Abstract

  • Issue: Safety-net hospitals play a vital role in delivering health care to Medicaid enrollees, the uninsured, and other vulnerable patients. By reducing the number of uninsured Americans, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was also expected to lower these hospitals’ significant uncompensated care costs and shore up their financial stability.
  • Goal: To examine how the ACA’s Medicaid expansion affected the financial status of safety-net hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid and in states that did not.
  • Methods: Using Medicare hospital cost reports for federal fiscal years 2012 and 2015, the authors compared changes in Medicaid inpatient days as a percentage of total inpatient days, Medicaid revenues as a percentage of total net patient revenues, uncompensated care costs as a percentage of total operating costs, and hospital operating margins.
  • Findings and Conclusions: Medicaid expansion had a significant, favorable financial impact on safety-net hospitals. From 2012 to 2015, safety-net hospitals in expansion states, compared to those in nonexpansion states, experienced larger increases in Medicaid inpatient days and Medicaid revenues as well as reduced uncompensated care costs. These changes improved operating margins for safety-net hospitals in expansion states. Margins for safety-net hospitals in nonexpansion states, meanwhile, declined.

Background

Through their missions or legal mandate, safety-net hospitals provide care to all patients, regardless of their ability to pay.1 They include public hospitals, which are often providers of last resort in their communities; academic medical centers, which combine their teaching function with a mission to serve vulnerable populations; and certain private hospitals.

Safety-net hospitals deliver a significant level of care to low-income patients, including Medicaid enrollees and the uninsured, typically providing services that other hospitals in the community do not offer — trauma, burn care, neonatal intensive care, and inpatient behavioral health, as well as education for future physicians and other health care professionals. They are also an important source of care to uninsured individuals who are ineligible for Medicaid or subsidized marketplace coverage because of their citizenship status.2

Several studies have suggested major reductions in uncompensated care and improved financial status at safety-net institutions in states that expanded Medicaid compared to those in states that did not expand.3,4 However, these results were based on interviews with a limited number of safety-net health system executives and staff. Our analysis expands on this research by examining changes in key financial metrics — that is, uncompensated care, Medicaid costs and revenues, and total hospital margins–across safety-net hospitals nationally using standardized data.

When compared to other short-term acute care hospitals, hospitals that met our safety-net hospital criteria had substantially higher Medicaid revenue and uncompensated care levels than non-safety-net hospitals. Safety-net hospitals, however, had lower operating margins (Exhibit 1).

Below we discuss findings on the impact of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid expansion on safety-net hospitals’ financial status. The ACA allowed states to expand Medicaid eligibility to nonelderly adults with incomes up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level. The reduction in the number of uninsured under the ACA coverage expansions was expected to reduce the uncompensated care that hospitals provide, thus improving their financial status. As of 2015, 31 states and the District of Columbia had expanded Medicaid, while 19 states had not.5

We measure changes in the financial status of safety-net hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid prior to 2015 (326 hospitals) versus safety-net hospitals in states that did not expand or expanded in 2015 or after (268 hospitals). (See “How We Conducted This Study” for complete methods.)

Key Findings

Our analysis of Medicare cost report data for federal fiscal years 2012 and 2015 shows a sizable contrast in financial performance between safety-net hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid under the ACA and those in states that did not. Performance metrics included the following:

    • Hospital operating margins.6 Operating margins improved for safety-net hospitals located in Medicaid expansion states compared with declines for those in states that did not expand. From 2012 to 2015, operating margins for safety-net hospitals in Medicaid expansion states increased from –3.2 percent to –2.1 percent in 2015 (Exhibit 2, Appendix A). In contrast during the same period, operating margins for safety-net hospitals in nonexpansion states declined from 2.3 percent to 2.0 percent. Largely accounting for this difference were increased Medicaid revenues and reduced uncompensated care costs. Even after expansion, safety-net hospitals’ operating margins in Medicaid expansion states were lower than those in nonexpansion states.
    • Medicaid inpatient days. From 2012 to 2015, safety-net hospitals in Medicaid expansion states experienced larger growth in Medicaid utilization than those in nonexpansion states (Exhibit 3). During the study period, Medicaid inpatient days in expansion states rose 13.5 percent. In comparison, Medicaid inpatient days in nonexpansion states fell slightly, by 0.9 percent.
    • Medicaid revenues and costs.7 The rise in use of safety-net hospitals in Medicaid expansion states resulted in these hospitals’ increased Medicaid revenue and costs compared to a slight decline in nonexpansion states (Exhibit 4). From 2012 to 2015, safety-net hospitals’ Medicaid revenues as a share of net patient revenues rose 12.7 percent in Medicaid expansion states. In contrast, during the same period, safety-net hospitals’ Medicaid revenues as a share of net patient revenues declined 1.8 percent in nonexpansion states. However, safety-net hospitals’ profit margins on Medicaid patients fell from 6.8 percent to 0.7 percent in expansion states, suggesting that the revenues received for newly eligible patients did not keep pace with the higher cost of treating these patients.
    • Uncompensated care costs.8 In 2012, safety-net hospitals’ uncompensated care costs as a percent of total hospital operating costs equaled 6.7 percent in expansion states compared to 5.7 percent in nonexpansion states (Exhibit 5). By 2015, however, the safety-net hospitals’ share of uncompensated care declined to 3.5 percent in expansion states, or a reduction of 47.4 percent. By comparison, in nonexpansion states that year, uncompensated care costs as a share of total hospital operating costs fell to 5.3 percent, a 7.8 percent reduction.

Discussion

These data suggest that the Medicaid expansion created by the ACA had a significant positive financial impact on safety-net hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid eligibility relative to those in states that did not expand. Safety-net hospitals in expansion states saw larger increases in Medicaid patient volume and revenue, reduced uncompensated care, and improved financial margins compared to safety-net hospitals in nonexpansion states. Although our study’s results are specific to safety-net hospitals, other studies have found similar trends across all hospitals in expansion and nonexpansion states.9

The improved financial stability of safety-net hospitals could allow these hospitals to continue expanding outpatient capacity, invest in strategies to improve care coordination, hire new staff, and develop better infrastructure to monitor costs.10 Such investments can also help prepare hospitals for new payment arrangements that may require them to assume more financial risk for patient care and outcomes. Improvements not only benefit the institutions and Medicaid patients but the communities these hospitals serve.

Current attempts to repeal the ACA aim to eliminate the Medicaid expansions over time and curtail Medicaid spending by more than $800 billion over 10 years. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that about 14 million people could lose their Medicaid coverage by 2026, which would have an adverse effect on safety-net hospitals in those states. Specifically, safety-net hospitals’ gains in reduced uncompensated care and improved overall financial margins could be lost in the future.

 

The Senate Tax Bill Threatens Access to Health Care

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https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2017/11/16/442906/senate-tax-bill-threatens-access-health-care/

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This week, Senate Republicans announced that they plan to pay for their tax cuts for large corporations and millionaires not only by imposing tax increases on the middle-class but also by undermining people’s access to health care. Specifically, they have proposed eliminating the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) individual mandate, which helps keep premium costs affordable by ensuring that both healthy and sick people have health insurance.

Repealing the mandate would drive up premiums by 10 percent in 2019 and lead to 13 million fewer people having health insurance by 2025. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report also revealed that the similar House version of the tax bill would result in $25 billion in cuts to Medicare in fiscal year 2018 and hundreds of billions of dollars of cuts to the program overall. Taken as a whole, the tax bill would not only increase taxes for millions of middle-class families but would also have disastrous effects on people’s health care.

A typical middle-class family buying individual market insurance would see premiums increase nearly $2,000

The Senate tax bill would substantially increase premiums in the individual market for health insurance, and middle-class families would bear the brunt of the price hike. The bill would eliminate the individual mandate—the requirement that people maintain health coverage or pay a penalty. Without the mandate, people would only purchase coverage when they needed it, resulting in adverse selection that would drive up premiums. The CBO estimates that premiums would increase about 10 percent as a result of this adverse selection.

The Center for American Progress estimates that this premium increase translates to an extra $1,990 for benchmark plan coverage for an unsubsidized middle-class family of four. Families with incomes above 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL)—more than $98,400 for a family of four in the lower 48 states—are not eligible for premium tax creditsto reduce the cost of marketplace coverage. The 10 percent increase would be an even greater financial burden for families in states with higher premium levels, increasing costs by $2,900 in Alaska, $2,350 in Maine, and $2,060 in Arizona.

13 million more people would be uninsured by 2025

The CBO estimates that repeal of the mandate would result in 4 million fewer people having coverage in 2019 and 13 million fewer with coverage by 2025. As a result, about 16 percent of the nonelderly population would not have health insurance by 2025, compared with about 10 percent currently.

The individual mandate is necessary because of the consumer protections put in place by the ACA. The ACA banned discrimination by insurance companies against people with pre-existing conditions, required that people be charged the same amount regardless of health status, and eliminated annual and lifetime limits on coverage. But these protections would also make it easy for people to game the system by only buying health insurance once they needed it. To address this concern, the ACA coupled these reforms with an individual shared responsibility provision, also known as the individual mandate, which requires that everyone maintain health insurance coverage so that the overall insurance risk pool is healthy and premium rates are kept in check.

Repeal of the mandate would have two effects on the individual market. First, people who expect to be healthy would avoid purchasing coverage until they need it. As a result, the remaining enrollees in the individual market would be sicker on average, and insurance companies would need to raise rates to cover the increased average cost. Second, the resulting higher premiums would discourage additional people from purchasing coverage through the individual market. Those who become uninsured would no longer have financial protection against catastrophic medical costs, and hospitals and other providers would be forced to provide more uncompensated care.

Medicare would be cut by $25 billion in 2018

In addition to its frontal assault on health care for the middle class, the Senate bill would also secretly cut Medicare. Because the tax cuts for the wealthy in the proposed bill are not fully paid for, they would increase the deficit by more than $1.4 trillion over 10 years. But the little-known Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 requires that any deficit-increasing legislation be offset with cuts to other mandatory programs, including Medicare. The CBO has estimated that the offsetting spending reductions for the similar House version of the tax bill would cut Medicare by about $25 billion in fiscal year 2018. Given that similar cuts would be required in subsequent years, the total cost imposed on the Medicare program would be hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade. This would have a particularly harmful effect on rural hospitals with thin margins, which could be at risk of closure as a result.

Asking millions of middle-class families to pay more in taxes so that corporations and the wealthy few can pay less in bad enough. But to use those cuts to also undermine health care for middle-class families is unconscionable. Once again, the congressional majority seems to be doing everything in its power to make life harder for everyday Americans, just so it can provide giveaways to the wealthy few.

Methodology

Our estimated reduction in coverage in 2025 due to repeal of the mandate is based on national projections by the CBO. The CBO estimates that 13 million fewer people will have coverage in 2025, including 5 million fewer people with Medicaid, 5 million fewer people with individual market coverage, and 3 million fewer people with employer-sponsored insurance. We used data from the 2016 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample (ACS PUMS), available from the IPUMS-USA to tabulate the number of nonelderly people in each state by primary coverage type using a coverage hierarchy. We then assumed that each state’s reduction in coverage was proportional to its share of the national total for each of those three coverage types. For more on the IPUMS-USA data set, see Steven Ruggles and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0” (Minneapolis: Minnesota Population Center, 2010).

We made two adjustments to our ACS PUMS tabulations to account for potential effects of Medicaid expansion in Maine, given voters’ recent approval of expansion. We increased the number of Medicaid enrollees in Maine by 51,000 based on projections by the Urban Institute. We also decreased the number of people with coverage through Maine’s individual market by 20 percent to account for the fact that some enrollees will lose access to marketplace premium subsidies when they become Medicaid eligible under expansion. Enrollment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) show that 27 percent of 2017 marketplace plan selections were by people with family incomes between 100 and 150 percent of the federal poverty level.

Our estimates of 2019 premium increases are based on the CBO projection that mandate repeal will increase individual market premiums 10 percent. We used the HealthCare.govplan information to calculate the 2018 average marketplace benchmark—second-lowest cost silver—plan in each state, weighting by the geographic distribution of current marketplace enrollment. We then inflated that premium to 2019 levels according to National Health Expenditure projections for per-enrollee cost growth. To calculate the 2019 average benchmark premium specific to a typical family of four, we borrowed the example family composition that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services uses in its reports: 40-year-old and 38-year-old parents and two children. We estimated that the family would pay an additional 10 percent of that 2019 benchmark due to mandate repeal. Premium data were not available for all states.

Finally, our estimates of state-level cuts to Medicare in fiscal year 2018 divided the $25 billion total Medicare funding reduction projected by the CBO proportional to each state’s share of national Medicare spending as of 2014, the most recent year for which CMS National Health Expenditure data is available, using data published by the Kaiser Family Foundation.

Virginia’s Electoral Changes Boost Medicaid Expansion Odds

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https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/11/09/us/ap-us-medicaid-expansion.html?_r=0&utm_campaign=KHN%3A%20First%20Edition&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=58310492&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8FETd55dWOAkXIqN9VEtDM5B0mIguwSbSdPof0YgErwa4jr8wshN4WOfBp1I5pAQyyzUMjVyOy3fpdQpPQ1XKv3bg5rQ&_hsmi=58310492

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This week’s groundswell of political change in Virginia has improved the odds of Medicaid expansion becoming law there. The long-stalled liberal priority gained new life after Democrats nearly wiped out Republicans’ overwhelming majority in the House of Delegates.

For years Medicaid expansion, a key part of former President Barack Obama’s health care law, has been a non-starter in the Old Dominion. Republicans, who controlled two-thirds of Virginia’s House seats, have fiercely rejected expansion. Democrats have only made perfunctory pushes on the issue since 2014, when they lost a months-long showdown with the GOP.

That all changed Tuesday as Democrats won at least 15 House seats. Control of the chamber is still up in the air as a couple of close races have yet to be called — an outcome few but the most optimistic Democrats were expecting.

Democratic House Leader David Toscano said the election has “totally changed the dynamic” on Medicaid expansion, shifting it from a lost cause to something with serious momentum.

“It’s not dead on arrival anymore,” he said.

Toscano said expansion is by no means guaranteed but he believes Democrats could swing the needed handful of Republicans even if the GOP maintained slight control of the House.

Democratic Gov.-elect Ralph Northam, who made Medicaid expansion a part of his campaign platform, said Wednesday he’s eager to work with GOP lawmakers to get it approved. Republican state Sen. Emmett Hanger has previously expressed support for expansion. That theoretically provides enough votes to get it passed in the narrowly spilt state Senate.

But Republican leaders in both chambers said Thursday the election has not changed their opposition to the expansion. They say it would be fiscally irresponsible, even with the federal government promising to cover most of the new costs.

“Free and guaranteed money from Washington is neither free nor guaranteed,” said Parker Slaybaugh, a spokesman for Republican House Leader Kirk Cox.

Supporters of Medicaid expansion, including the state’s hospitals and much of the medical community, say it will boost the state’s economy in addition to helping poor people. Julian Walker, spokesman for the Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association, said his group “stands ready to work” with lawmakers “to enhance coverage and alleviate the impact of uncompensated care of the state.”

The issue is gaining traction outside of Virginia.

In a public referendum Tuesday, Maine voters defied their state’s Republican governor and decided they wanted to expand Medicaid to some 70,000 citizens. Maine would join 31 other states in expanding the program. Similar referendum campaigns are planned in at least three other states.

At the federal level, Republicans have had little success trying to undo Medicaid expansion, despite President Donald Trump’s campaign promises to “repeal and replace” his predecessor’s law. GOP bills that would have repealed Medicaid expansion and limited future federal financing for the entire Medicaid program failed to pass Congress and drew opposition from some Republican governors.

Overall, about 11 million people in the country have gotten health coverage through the expansion of Medicaid.

Medicaid Is Great, but Rural Maine Needs Hospitals, Too

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This week Maine voted to become the 32nd state to expand Medicaid despite opposition by Gov. Paul LePage, who had vetoed five previous expansion bills passed by the state legislature and has now threatened to block the results of the ballot initiative. Unless Mr. LePage succeeds, about 80,000 more Mainers will be eligible for coverage, a victory in an unsettling year for health care in America.

With the Affordable Care Act under constant threat from the Trump administration and out-of-pocket costs rising faster than wages, health care topped the list of the most important issues facing Americans this year.

However, Maine and other rural states face a health care crisis that Medicaid expansion can’t fix on its own. It’s not about affordable coverage; it’s about access: For too many rural areas, doctors and hospitals are scarce.

In the postwar era, America made hospital construction and modernization a priority. On Aug. 13, 1946, Harry Truman signed the Hill-Burton Act,giving communities grants and loans for hospital construction. By 1975, almost one-third of American hospitals owed their creation to the law. Financing for Hill-Burton health care construction ended in 1997, but one rule from the original bill still applied: These hospitals had to give free or reduced care to people who couldn’t afford services. As rural areas aged and the population shrank because of manufacturing’s decline and the rise of a technology-driven economy centered on urban areas, hospitals struggled to stay in operation.

Under the Affordable Care Act, hospitals started shutting down at worrisome rates because of an increase in financial penalties for noncompliance with A.C.A. mandates, the cost of tighter reporting standards and smaller reimbursements for certain procedures. Since the A.C.A. became law in 2010, over 80 rural hospitals have closed nationwide. Maine alone has lost three hospitals in that time, about 10 percent of its rural total.

If closings continue at this rate, 25 percent of America’s rural hospitals will have disappeared in the decade after Obamacare’s passage. This does not take into account facility deterioration, doctor departures or department closures.

This is a big problem for Maine, which has the highest percentage of rural residents in the country, according to the most recent census data. Calais Regional Hospital in Down East Maine recently oversaw its last childbirth. The obstetrics department closed in late summer, forcing women in labor to drive 50 minutes to deliver their babies. Despite an opioid crisis that increases the chance of high-risk pregnancies, this same privately owned hospital shut down its pediatrics wing and intensive care unit in recent years, because of financial pressure from the management company halfway across the country in Tennessee.

This was hardly an isolated example in Maine. The town of Jackman closed its 24-hour emergency room in September, and Boothbay lost its only hospital in 2013. Rangeley, where my wife’s family lives, is an hour away from the nearest hospital and has no doctor in town.

Meanwhile, Maine Med in Portland, Maine’s largest city, is about to break ground for a $512 million addition just a few years after it finished a $40 million renovation. While rural Maine’s hospitals and departments are closing because of large losses, Maine Med had, for 2016, a $61 million surplus.

Medicaid expansion is a welcome source of new revenue to rural hospitals in Maine because more insured patients mean fewer uncompensated treatments. Still, it comes nowhere close to fixing the problem or, politically, putting any meaningful points on the Democratic scoreboard.

In 2016, Donald Trump won Maine’s rural congressional district by a 10-point margin and rural counties in America at large by a 26-point marginon a message of repealing and replacing Obamacare. As Maggie Elehwany of the National Rural Health Association said in an NPR interview this year, rural Americans voted for Mr. Trump in part because of health care. “They see their hospitals closing,” she noted. “And one hospital C.E.O. described it as a three-pronged stool. It’s the churches, the hospitals and the schools. If you lose one of those legs of that stool, the whole community collapses.”

Since President Trump hasn’t been able to deliver on any meaningful legislation to support rural voters, it is the Democrats’ time to deliver. One good step is a bill sponsored by the Democratic senators Tim Kaine of Virginia and Michael Bennet of Colorado called Medicare-X. It would give a public option to Americans in rural counties where limited competition has yielded higher-priced health insurance options.

It still doesn’t solve the heart of the rural problem. Democrats can’t just lower premiums and expand Medicaid. We must strengthen rural communities by making access to high-quality health care services a priority of any proposal. In any future legislation, we should demand grants for new hospitals, funds to modernize crumbling ones and financial incentives for top doctors to work in these areas. This will not only make rural communities healthier, but also more welcoming for growth and new business.

No person suffering from a heart attack should die because a hospital is too far. No pregnant mother should have to risk the health of her baby because she can’t make it to a delivery room in time. As Democrats, we believe that health care is a right. It would be a big mistake to expand health care insurance but offer no place to use it.

Trump and the Essential Health Benefits

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Trump and the Essential Health Benefits

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On Friday, HHS released a proposed rule that would make a number of adjustments to the rules governing insurance exchanges for 2019. The rule is long and detailed; there’s a lot to digest. Among the most noteworthy changes, however, are those relating to the essential health benefits. They’re significant, and I’m not convinced they’re legal.

By way of background, the ACA requires all health plans in the individual and small-group markets to cover a baseline roster of services, including services falling into ten broad categories (e.g., maternity care, prescription drugs, mental health services). Taken as a whole, the essential health benefits must be “equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary.”

The ACA’s drafters anticipated that HHS would establish a national, uniform slate of essential health benefits. Instead, the Obama administration opted to allow the states to select a “benchmark plan” from among existing plans in the small group market (or from plans for state employees). The benefits covered under the benchmark were then considered “essential” within the state.

At the time, Helen Levy and I concluded that HHS’s approach brushed up against the limits of what the law allowed. We noted, among other things, that the ACA tells HHS to establish the essential health benefits—not the states. And it’s black-letter administrative law that an agency can’t subdelegate its powers to outside entities, states included.

At the end of the day, however, Helen and I concluded that the Obama-era regulation passed muster. Our rationale bears repeating:

Although a federal agency cannot delegate its powers to the states, it “may turn to an outside entity for advice and policy recommendations, provided the agency makes the final decisions itself.” Here, the secretary gave the states a constrained set of options (e.g., choose a benchmark plan from among the three largest small-group plans in the state) and retained the authority to select a benchmark for any state that either does not pick a benchmark or chooses an inappropriate one. As such, the secretary remains firmly in control. Nothing in the ACA prevents her from deferring to states that select benchmark plans from among the few options she has provided. That choice to defer is itself an exercise of her delegated powers.

The Trump administration’s proposed rule would vastly enlarge this Obama-era subdelegation. For starters, the rule would allow a state to adopt another state’s benchmark, or part of a state’s benchmark, as its own. Michigan, for example, could borrow Alabama’s benchmark plan wholesale, or it could incorporate Alabama’s benchmark for mental health and substance use disorder treatment. More significantly, the rule would allow a state to “selec[t] a set of benefits that would become the State’s EHB-benchmark plan.”

You read that right: if the rule is adopted, each state can pick whatever essential health benefits it likes. No longer will it be choosing from a preselected menu; it’ll be picking the essential benefits out of a hat. In so doing, the proposed rule looks like it would unlawfully cede to the states the power to establish the essential benefits.

This extraordinary subdelegation of regulatory authority is subject only to the loosest of constraints: benefits can’t be “unduly weighted” toward any one benefit category or another, and the benchmark must “[p]rovide benefits for diverse segments of the population, including women, children, persons with disabilities, and other groups.” The selected benefits also can’t be more generous than the state’s 2017 benchmark (or any of the plans the state could have selected as its benchmark), but that’s a ceiling, not a floor, so states have lots of room to pare back.

The only meaningful constraint is that the benefits covered by the state’s benchmark must be “equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical employer plan.” But another portion of the proposed rule would hollow out that requirement:

[W]e propose to define a typical employer plan as an employer plan within a product (as these terms are defined in §144.103 of this subchapter) with substantial enrollment in the product of at least 5,000 enrollees sold in the small group or large group market, in one or more States, or a self-insured group health plan with substantial enrollment of at least 5,000 enrollees in one or more States.

In other words, HHS is saying it will treat as “typical” any employer plan, in any state, that covers more than 5,000 people.

This looks like an innocuous change. It’s not. If the rule is adopted, it means that a single outlier plan can now count as typical, even if it’s way stingier than any other plan in the market. It also makes me wonder if HHS already has in mind some large employer with an unusually narrow health plan—maybe some hospital-based “administrative services only” plan, as Dave Anderson speculates. If so, voilá, the states can all ratchet down their essential benefits to that plan’s level.

I don’t think that’s legal. To know if a slate of health benefits is typical, you have to know something about how many health plans cover those benefits and how many don’t. The proposed rule eschews that comparative inquiry, and instead defines typicality with reference to the number of people who are covered by a single plan. Some random self-insured plan that excludes appendectomies could be treated as typical, even if it’s the only plan in the nation that does so.

In other words, HHS wants to define a “typical employer plan” to include atypical plans—which the agency emphatically cannot do. Yes, plans that enroll 5,000+ people are less likely to be outliers than smaller ones. But in a country as big and complicated as ours, there are bound to be some idiosyncratic quirks even in large plans. Those quirks would all be considered typical under HHS’s rule.

This definitional change, combined with the choose-your-own-adventure option to devise a benchmark, means that states will have wide authority to water down the essential health benefits requirement. Whether that’s good or bad is hard to say. Requiring plans to cover lots of services assures comprehensive coverage, but it also raises the cost of insurance. Because there’s no single “best” way to strike the balance, I think there’s a lot to be said for giving states the freedom to choose for themselves.

Wise or not, however, I’m skeptical that the Trump administration’s effort to hollow out the rule governing essential health benefits is legal. If HHS presses ahead with the rule, it could face tough sledding in the courts.

CMS to allow states to define essential health benefits

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http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20171027/NEWS/171029872/cms-to-allow-states-to-define-essential-health-benefits

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The CMS proposed a rule late Friday aimed at giving states more flexibility in stabilizing the Affordable Care Act exchanges and in interpreting the law’s essential health benefits as a way to lower the cost of individual and small group health plans.

In the 365-page proposed rule issued late Friday, the agency said the purpose is to give states more flexibility and reduce burdens on stakeholders in order to stabilize the individual and small-group insurance markets and improve healthcare affordability.

The CMS said the rule would give states greater flexibility in defining the ACA’s minimum essential benefits to increase affordability of coverage. States would play a larger role in the certification of qualified health plans offered on the federal insurance exchange. And they would have more leeway in setting medical loss ratios for individual-market plans.

“Consumers who have specific health needs may be impacted by the proposed policy,” the agency said. “In the individual and small group markets, depending on the selection made by the state in which the consumer lives, consumers with less comprehensive plans may no longer have coverage for certain services. In other states, again depending on state choices, consumers may gain coverage for some services.”

However, the CMS acknowledged it’s unclear how much money the new state flexibility will save. States are not required to make any changes under the policy.

The CMS urged states to consider the so-called spillover effects if they choose to pick their own benefits. These include increased use of other services, such as increased used of emergency services or increased use of public services provided by the state or other government entities.

The agency in 2017 proposed standardized health plan options as a way to simplify shopping for consumers on the federally run marketplaces. The CMS said it would eliminate standardized options for 2019 to maximize innovation. “We believe that encouraging innovation is especially important now, given the stresses faced by the individual market,” the proposed rule states.

The CMS proposes to let states relax the ACA requirement that at least 80% of premium revenue received by individual-market plans be spent on members’ medical care. It said states would be allowed to lower the 80% medical loss ratio standard if they demonstrate that a lower MLR could help stabilize their individual insurance market.

The CMS also said it intended to consider proposals in future rulemaking that would help cut prescription drug costs and promote drug price transparency.

The Trump administration hopes to relax the ACA’s requirements and provide as much state flexibility as possible through administrative action, following the collapse of congressional Republican efforts this year to make those changes legislatively.

The proposed rule comes after months of calls from health insurers and provider groups for the federal administration to help stabilize the struggling individual insurance market. The fifth ACA open enrollment is slated to begin Nov. 1, and experts have predicted fewer sign-ups in the wake of a series of actions by the Trump administration to undercut the exchanges.

In the proposed rule, the CMS also proposes to exempt student health insurance from rate reviews for policies beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2019. The CMS said student health insurance coverage is written and sold more like group coverage, which is already exempt from rate review, and said the change would reduce regulatory burden on states and insurance companies.

The ACA requires that insurers planning to increase premiums by 10% or more submit their rates to regulators for review. The CMS proposed to increase the rate review threshold to 15% “in recognition of significant rate increases in the past number of years.”

The rule also tweaks a requirement that enrollees need to have prior coverage before attempting to get coverage via special enrollment after moving to a new area. Under the proposal, a person who lived in an area with no exchange qualified health plans will be able to obtain coverage.