With a single ruling, the Federal Trade Commission removed the nation’s occupational handcuffs, freeing almost all U.S. workers from non-compete clauses. The medical profession will never be the same.
On April 23, the FTC issued a final rule, affecting not only new hires but also the 30 million Americans currently tethered to non-compete agreements. Scheduled to take effect in September—subject to the outcome of legal challenges by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business groups—the ruling will dismantle longstanding barriers that have kept healthcare professionals from changing jobs.
The FTC projects that eliminating these clauses will boost medical wages, foster greater competition, stimulate job creation and reduce health expenditures by $74 billion to $194 billion over the next decade. This comes at a crucial moment for American healthcare, an industry in which 60% of physicians report burnout and 100 million people (41% of U.S. adults) are saddled with medical bills they cannot afford.
Like all major rulings, this one creates clear winners and losers—outcomes that will reshape careers and, potentially, alter the very structure of U.S. healthcare.
Winners: Newly Trained Clinicians
Undoubtedly, the FTC’s ruling is a win for younger doctors and nurses, many of whom join hospitals and health systems with the promise of future salary increases and more autonomy. However, by agreeing to stringent non-compete clauses, these newly trained clinicians have little choice but to place their trust in employers that, shielded by air-tight agreements, have no fear of breaking their promises.
Most newly trained clinicians enter the medical job market in their late 20s and early 30s, carrying significant student-loan debt—nearly $200,000 for the average doctor. Eager for stable, well-paying positions, these young professionals quickly settle into their careers and communities, forming strong relationships with friends and patients. Many start families.
But when these clinicians realize their jobs are falling short of the promises made early on, they face a tough decision: either endure subpar working conditions or uproot their lives. Taking a new job 25 or 50 miles away or moving to a different state are often are only options to avoid breaching a non-compete clause.
In a 570-page supplement to its ruling, the FTC published testimonials from dozens of healthcare professionals whose lives and careers were harmed by these clauses.
“Healthcare providers feel trapped in their current employment situation, leading to significant burnout that can shorten their career longevity,” said one physician working in rural Appalachia.
By banning non-competes, the FTC’s rule will boost career mobility for all clinicians within their own communities. This change will likely spur competition among employers—leading to improved pay and benefits to attract and, equally important, retain top talent. And with the reassurance that they can easily switch jobs if their current employer falls short of expectations, clinicians will enjoy greater professional satisfaction and less burnout.
Winners: Patients In Competitive Markets
Benefits that accrue to doctors and nurses from the FTC’s ban will translate directly to improved outcomes for patients. For example, we know that physicians who report symptoms of burnout are twice as likely to commit a serious medical error. Studies have shown the inverse is true, as well: healthcare providers who are satisfied with their jobs tend to have lower burnout rates, which is positively correlated with improved patient outcomes.
Once freed from restrictive non-compete clauses, many clinicians will practice elsewhere within the community. To attract patients, they will have to offer greater access, lower prices and more personalized service. Others with the freedom to choose will join outpatient centers that offer convenient and efficient alternatives for diagnostic tests, surgery and urgent medical care, often at a fraction of the cost of traditional hospital services. In both cases, increased competition will give patients improved medical care and added value.
Losers: Large Health Systems
Large health systems, which encompass several hospitals in a geographic area, have traditionally relied on non-compete agreements to maintain their market dominance. By barring high-demand medical professionals such as radiologists and anesthesiologists from joining competitors or starting independent practices, these systems have been able to suppress competition and force insurers to pay more for services.
Currently, these systems can demand high reimbursement rates from insurers while also maintaining relatively low wages for staff, creating a highly profitable model. Yale economist Zack Cooper’s research shows the consequence of the status quo: prices go up and quality declines in highly concentrated hospital markets.
The FTC’s ruling challenges those conditions, potentially dismantling monopolistic market controls. As a result, insurers will no longer be forced to contend with a single, dominant provider. And with health systems pushed to offer better wages and benefits to retain their top talent, bottom lines will shrink.
While nonprofit hospitals and health systems are not currently under the FTC’s jurisdiction, the agency has pointed out that these facilities might be at “a self-inflicted disadvantage in their ability to recruit workers.” Moreover, as Congress intensifies scrutiny on the nonprofit status of U.S. health systems, hospitals that do not voluntarily align with the FTC’s guidelines may find themselves compelled to do so through legislative actions.
Losers: Hospital Administrators
Individual hospitals have faced a unique challenge over the past decade. Across the country, inpatient numbers are falling, which makes it harder for hospital administrators to fill beds overnight. This trend has been driven by advancements in medical technology and new practices that enable more outpatient procedures, along with changes in insurance reimbursements favoring less costly outpatient care. As a result, hospital administrators have been compelled to adapt their financial strategies.
Nowadays, outpatient services account for about half of all hospital revenue. These range from physician consultations to specialized procedures like radiological and cardiac diagnostics, chemotherapy and surgeries.
Medicare and other insurers typically pay hospitals more for these outpatient services than they pay local doctors and other facilities. Knowing this, hospitals are hiring community doctors and acquiring diagnostic and procedural facilities, then boosting profitability by charging the higher hospital rates for the same services.
Hospital administrators know that this strategy only works if the newly hired clinicians are prohibited from quitting and returning to practice within the same community. If they do, their patients are likely to go with them. This is why the non-compete clauses are so essential to a hospital’s financial success.
As expected, the American Hospital Association opposes the FTC’s rule, arguing that non-compete clauses protect proprietary information. In practice, most of the doctors affected by the ban are providing standard medical care and have no proprietary knowledge that requires protection.
Looking Ahead
Today’s hospital systems are starkly divided between haves and have-nots. Facilities in affluent areas often enjoy high reimbursement rates from private insurers, boosting financial success and administrator salaries. In contrast, rural hospitals grapple with low patient volumes while facilities in economically disadvantaged, high-population areas face greater financial difficulties.
The current model is not working. The old ways of doing things—enforcing non-competes, charging higher fees for identical services and promoting market consolidation to hike prices—are not sustainable solutions.
The abolition of non-compete agreements will produce both winners and losers. In the healthcare sector, the ultimate measure of a policy’s impact should be its effect on patients—and the overwhelming evidence suggests that eliminating these clauses will benefit them greatly.
Policymakers and the media have been increasingly attentive to mergers and acquisitions and other potentially anticompetitive practices of hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers.
Consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency and help some struggling providers to keep their doors open in relatively underserved areas, but it can also reduce market competition and ease pressure on providers to lower prices or invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear evidence of improvements in quality, which has implications for consumers and employers. As a result, some have proposed strengthening antitrust regulation—which aims to protect competitive markets—as a tool for tackling rising health care costs, increasing the affordability of care, and reducing the large number of adults with medical debt.
Federal and state antitrust agencies play a role in challenging anticompetitive practices of health care providers and other businesses. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for enforcing federal antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. State attorneys general (AG) offices also have the authority to bring action under federal antitrust law, as well as under state statutes, which sometimes expand upon federal law.
This issue brief explains the role of federal and state antitrust agencies in challenging anticompetitive practices among health care providers, including the legal authority of federal and state agencies, the role that they play in enforcing antitrust laws, and proposed options for strengthening their authority. The brief focuses on health care providers, though many of the principles discussed in this issue brief apply to the practices of other health care entities as well, such as health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) (which are currently being reviewed by the FTC). While the focus of this brief is on the role of government agencies, antitrust law also authorizes private parties, such as employer health plans, to challenge anticompetitive practices in the courts.
What types of anticompetitive practices do governments challenge and why?
Governments challenge anticompetitive practices to promote competitive markets, often for the benefit of consumers (e.g., patients and health plan enrollees).1 Governments seek to address a variety of anticompetitive practices that may lead to higher prices without commensurate improvements in quality of care. These include anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions (referred to as “mergers” in this brief), and other activities that hinder competition (referred to as “nonmerger anticompetitive practices” in this brief).
Provider consolidationcan be beneficial to consumers in some instances and detrimental in others. On the one hand, consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency, such as by allowing providers to purchase supplies in bulk at a discount or by facilitating the coordination of care across different providers. On the other hand, consolidation has the potential to lead to worse outcomes for consumers by increasing providers’ market power and decreasing competition, which enhances the ability of providers to negotiate for higher prices (increasing costs for consumers and employers) and reduces the pressure on providers to invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear indications of quality improvements, though the strength of this evidence varies based on the type of consolidation and provider.
There are three main types of mergers:
Horizontal mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer the same or similar services, such as when a health system acquires a hospital or when two physician practices that provide overlapping services merge. Horizontal mergers can raise concerns about competition because they, by definition, reduce competitiveness when occurring between providers in the same market, and because consolidated entities can take actions to increase and protect their market power.
Vertical mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer different services along the same supply chain, such as when a hospital acquires a physician practice. Vertical mergers can raise anticompetitive concerns, for example, if physicians refer patients to hospitals within their health system rather than to competing hospitals. Some mergers may entail both vertical and horizontal consolidation (e.g., if a health system acquires a physician group that provides services offered by the system’s existing physician group).
Cross-market mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that operate in different geographic markets.2 Cross-market mergers may raise concerns about competition, for example, if a health system with providers in different areas of a state is able to use its dominant position in one market to negotiate higher prices in another when contracting with a given health plan (e.g., a state employee plan with enrollees that reside in several markets).
Governments also challenge other types of anticompetitive practices, such as the use of anticompetitive clauses in contracts between providers and insurers or providers and workers. Anticompetitive contract clauses give dominant parties an unfair advantage over potential competitors and can lead to higher prices. For example, some health systems have highly regarded hospitals (also known as “must have” hospitals) that insurers need to include in their provider networks in order to attract enrollees, which gives these systems substantial bargaining leverage over insurers. These health care systems can in turn use this bargaining leverage to pressure insurers to contract with all providers in the system (through “all-or-nothing clauses”), shielding expensive or low-quality members from competition with more desirable providers. The textbox below provides definitions of various anticompetitive contract clauses.
All-or-nothing clauses require an insurer that wants to contract with a particular provider in a system (such as a must-have hospital) to contract with all providers in that system.
Anti-tiering/anti-steering clauses prevent an insurer from putting a given provider in a non-preferred provider network tier or from using other incentives or tools to steer patients to competing providers. This can incentivize patients to use that provider, even if a higher-value provider is also in-network.
Exclusive contracting clauses prohibit an insurer from including competing providers in their provider network, so that a given provider is the only in-network option in a given area.
Non-compete clauses prevent a worker employed with a given provider from taking a job with a competing provider or starting a new practice within a certain distance for some duration of time.
Most favored nation clauses require a provider to offer an insurer the lowest rates of all the insurers with which it has contracted. While the examples above create favorable terms for providers in their contracts with insurers, most favored nation clauses create favorable terms for insurers in their contracts with providers.4
What federal antitrust laws govern anticompetitive practices?
There are three primary federal antitrust laws—the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act—that prohibit anticompetitive mergers and other anticompetitive practices.
The Sherman Act (1890) broadly prohibits anticompetitive practices. It has been used to challenge various anticompetitive practices, such as mergers, wage suppression, agreements among competing businesses to fix prices, and anticompetitive contracting clauses.
The Clayton Act(1914) builds on the Sherman Act by explicitly prohibiting anticompetitive mergers as well as other types of anticompetitive practices that are not clearly addressed by the Sherman Act (such as by barring the same individual from serving on the board of directors for two competing health systems, with some exceptions). Additionally, as amended under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976, the law requires that merging entities report their plans in advance to federal regulators in certain cases where the transaction exceeds a specified value ($111.4 million in 2023), which gives regulators time to investigate and intervene if needed.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act(1914) created the FTC and prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The FTC Act encompasses the same types of violations that are covered by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, in addition to other anticompetitive practices, and grants the FTC regulatory authority. Unlike the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities.5
Some forms of business practices, such as almost all instances where competitors coordinate to raise prices, are inherently illegal under federal law. The legality of other types of business practices depends on the context. For instance, when government agencies challenge a merger, courts assess whether the merger would likely harm competition in a given market.
What is the FTC’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?
Two federal agencies—the FTC and DOJ—have overlapping, as well as distinct, authority to challenge anticompetitive practices under federal law. The FTC is the only entity that can enforce the FTC Act. Although this Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities, the FTC has the authority to enforce the Clayton Act against nonprofit entities (in addition to for-profit entities), such as by challenging anticompetitive mergers among nonprofits. The DOJ has the authority to enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts. States can also bring lawsuits under federal antitrust law, as can some private parties, such as competing providers.
The FTC focuses on “protecting the public from deceptive or unfair business practices and from unfair methods of competition.” This includes challenging activities such as misleading advertisements, violations of consumers’ data privacy, and efforts to accumulate market power through mergers and other anticompetitive practices. For instance, the FTC sued Facebook in 2020, alleging, in part, that the company had sought to maintain its monopoly power by buying up competitors, such as Instagram and WhatsApp.
The FTC plays a larger role than the DOJ in enforcing federal antitrust law in health care provider markets, though there are gaps in its authority. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in certain areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets (see more below). However, although the FTC has broad authority to challenge anticompetitive mergers, its authority to challenge other anticompetitive practices often excludes nonprofits. Nonprofit ownership is common in provider markets. For example, nonprofits account for about three-fifths (58%) of community hospitals in 2023. The DOJ may fill in for the FTC when the FTC does not have the authority to challenge nonprofit providers that are engaging in certain anticompetitive practices (see example of Atrium Health below).
The FTC has successfully challenged several hospital mergers over the past two decades. Beginning in the 1990s and for several years afterwards, the FTC had difficulty challenging hospital mergers in the courts, allowing rapid consolidation in the hospital sector to continue unabated.6 Since the late 2000s, the FTC has since been more successful in challenging hospital mergers, reflecting advances in both economics and the FTC’s new legal strategies.7 However, the FTC challenges only a fraction of hospital mergers, and it is difficult to know the extent to which mergers that go unchallenged have an adverse impact on consumers, in terms of costs and quality. For instance, in 2022, the FTC challenged 3 hospital mergers and, in each case, the hospitals abandoned their plans to merge, while one analysis documented 53 hospital merger announcements in that year. The same analysis identified more hospital merger announcements in the years prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., 92 in 2019).
Example: FTC & Advocate Health Care Network
In 2015, the FTC brought a legal challenge against a proposed merger of two Chicago-area health systems: Advocate Health Care Network and NorthShore University Health System. The FTC argued that the combined entity would control over half of the market for general acute care inpatient hospital services, compared to the next largest provider, which would have only controlled 15% of the market. The court placed a temporary block on the merger, and the systems ultimately abandoned their plans to merge before the case went to trial.
The FTC has played a smaller role in challenging physician mergers. A key challenge is that physician mergers tend to be smaller, and physician groups often grow slowly over time by acquiring small group practices and hiring new physicians. As a result, physician groups often do not need to report mergers to federal regulators as their transactions tend to fall below Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting thresholds (though regulators can still challenge mergers that they learn about in other ways). Additionally, because they tend to be small, any given merger may not have an appreciable effect on market power, even if the cumulative effect of these mergers leads to a large concentration of market power over time.
Vertical mergers in health care provider markets have largely escaped FTC enforcement and the FTC has never challenged a cross-market merger, though it has expressed interest in both practices. For instance, in 2021, the FTC announced that it would begin to study the effect of vertical mergers between health care facilities and physician groups. The FTC previously conducted studies of horizontal mergers in advance of successful litigation. The FTC has also investigated specific instances of cross-market mergers, although it has yet to bring a challenge.
Example: FTC & St. Luke’s Health System
In 2012, St. Luke’s Health System in Idaho attempted to acquire Saltzer Medical Group, a physician practice group. Although this proposed acquisition had elements of a vertical merger, the FTC challenged it as a horizontal merger, i.e., on the basis that St. Luke’s would obtain a dominant market share for adult primary care physician services. Courts ruled in favor of the FTC and ordered that St. Luke’s divest Saltzer Medical Group. This was the first time that the FTC received a court decision for a case challenging a hospital or health system’s acquisition of competing physician practices.
The FTC has not played a large role in overseeing nonmerger anticompetitive practices in nonprofit health care provider markets, such as the use of anticompetitive contract clauses. This may reflect the fact that the FTC’s authority to challenge and regulate nonmerger anticompetitive practices generally excludes nonprofit entities. Nonetheless, the FTC has brought legal challenges in some instances, such as cases where separate physician groups have coordinated with each other to raise prices. Relatedly, the FTC drew on its regulatory authority when it proposed a rule in 2023 that would ban non-compete clauses between employers and workers.
What is the DOJ’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?
The DOJ enforces a wide range of laws on behalf of the federal government, including—through its Antitrust Division—anticompetitive practices. For instance, in one landmark antitrust case in the 1990s, the DOJ sued Microsoft, alleging that the company had illegally sought to protect its monopoly power. The DOJ argued that the company had done so, in part, by requiring computer manufacturers that wanted to use Microsoft’s popular Windows operating system to also include Internet Explorer as a default.
Although the FTC typically oversees the conduct of health care providers, the DOJ has occasionally done so as well (see example below).
Example: DOJ & Atrium Health
In 2016, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Carolinas Healthcare System, also known as “Atrium Health.” The DOJ claimed that Atrium had violated federal antitrust law by, among other things, entering into contracts with insurers that contained anti-steering and anti-tiering clauses. Atrium Health system and the DOJ reached a settlement agreement before trial where the system agreed, in part, to stop using these contract clauses.
The DOJ typically takes the lead in promoting competition in health insurance markets. For instance, in 2017, the DOJ, along with some state governments, successfully prevented a proposed merger between Anthem and Cigna—which would have been the largest merger of health insurance companies on record—and a proposed merger between Aetna and Humana.
How do the FTC and DOJ work together on antitrust issues?
The FTC and DOJ have a clearance process to determine which agency will investigate and challenge a given merger. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in different areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets. The division of labor is formalized through a clearance process that determines which agency will investigate a proposed transaction based on its expertise and other factors, such as its capacity and ties to a given case.
The FTC and DOJ collaborate on guidelines that establish how they determine whether to challenge a given merger. This includes the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which, as the name suggests, outline the criteria that the FTC and DOJ consider when reviewing horizontal mergers. For instance, the guidelines indicate that the agencies evaluate the effects of a merger on market concentration based on a measure known as the “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” (HHI) (see textbox below). The guidelines also indicate that the agencies consider the possible benefits of a given merger, such as whether a merger might allow research to be conducted more effectively.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The HHI is calculated based on provider market shares for a given product—such as inpatient general acute care services or inpatient orthopedic surgical services—and geographic market. The HHI for a market can range from nearly 0 (a perfectly competitive market) to 10,000 (a market with a single provider). The Horizontal Merger Guidelines define the level of market concentration as follows:
Unconcentrated: HHI < 1,500
Moderately concentrated: HHI between 1,500 and 2,500
Highly concentrated: HHI > 2,500
Although markets for inpatient hospital services are now often highly concentrated, there is wide variation across the country. For instance, one study estimated that, in 2021, the New York City metro area had an HHI of 753 for inpatient hospital services, while the Wilmington, North Carolina metro area had an HHI of 7,600.
The FTC and DOJ have also released a set of Vertical Merger Guidelines, though the FTC withdrew from these guidelines in 2021. Some economists are more critical of the Vertical Merger Guidelines than the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, perhaps reflecting the fact that there is less consensus about the effects of vertical consolidation and the proper role of antitrust enforcement.
In July 2023, the FTC and DOJ released a draft version of their updated merger guidelines, which would apply to both horizontal and vertical mergers and which indicate that the agencies will be scrutinizing a broader range of mergers. Among other changes, the draft guidelines expand the definition of highly concentrated markets, rely on a lower threshold for identifying large changes in market concentration, consider the combined effect of a series of acquisitions (e.g., of a health system acquiring several small physician practices over time), and add an explicit discussion of the agencies’ views on how workers may be negatively impacted when their employers merge. These guidelines might also be used to challenge cross-market mergers, although this is not yet clear. The deadline for public comments on the draft guidelines is September 18, 2023.
In addition to working together on general merger guidelines, the DOJ and FTC have in the past collaborated on antitrust policy statements that are specific to health care, though both agencies withdrew from these statements in February 2023 and July 2023, respectively, arguing that the statements are outdated based on changes in health care markets.8
What is the role of states in enforcing antitrust law?
States can bring legal challenges under federal antitrust law. States may do so through their AG offices as either a purchaser of health care (for instance, through state employee health plans) or on behalf of their residents. States sometimes file lawsuits jointly with each other or with the federal government, which can help overcome resource constraints. States and the federal government may play complementary roles, with the federal government providing greater resources and general antitrust expertise and states providing more specialized knowledge of local market conditions.
Most states have passed laws that expand oversight of provider mergers, which may lead to additional legal challenges. Thirty-four states and DC require that at least some hospitals notify state AG offices of their plans to merge, expanding on federal reporting requirements. For instance, Rhode Island requires all hospitals to do so, regardless of the value of the transaction. Additionally, thirteen states and DC require that some or all types of providers receive approval from the government prior to merging, instead of requiring that the government file a lawsuit to challenge a merger. Eleven states require AG offices to consider relatively expansive criteria when reviewing health care mergers. For instance, California law requires the AG office to consider criteria such as the general public’s interest and the effect of a merger on access to care.
Some states have prohibited certain types of anticompetitive contract clauses. These laws either broadly prohibit a given type of clause or ban their use in only specific circumstances. Regarding contracts between insurers and dominant providers, two states (Massachusetts and Nevada) have laws restricting at least some all-or-nothing clauses and anti-tiering or anti-steering provisions, and five states (Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin) have laws restricting exclusive contracting. Additionally, 22 states restrict non-compete provisions—which dominant providers sometimes use in contracts with their workers—and 20 states restrict most favored nation clauses, which dominant insurers sometimes use in their contracts with providers.
Example: California & Sutter Health
In 2018, the California AG joined a lawsuit that had been initiated on behalf of some group health plans against Sutter Health, a large nonprofit health system in the state. The parties argued that Sutter had used anticompetitive contract clauses—such as all-or-nothing and anti-tiering provisions—to increase prices. In 2019, Sutter agreed to a settlement agreement that required the system to abandon the relevant contract clauses and to pay $575 million in damages, among other things.
Some states have enacted laws that have the potential to shield health care providers from antitrust scrutiny in certain instances. For example, 19 states have Certificate of Public Advantage (COPA) laws, which immunize a merger from antitrust challenges while directly regulating the merged entity for a period of time, such as by limiting price increases or prohibiting certain contracting practices. The intent of COPA laws is to facilitate mergers that are perceived as being beneficial overall while mitigating anticompetitive concerns through state oversight. However, the FTC and some researchers have been critical of these laws, arguing, for example, that states have not followed through in providing ongoing oversight following a given merger. Other state policies, such as Certificate of Need (CON) statutes—which attempt to reduce costs by restricting, for example, the construction of new facilities when they do not meet a community need—may also play a role in limiting competition or preventing antitrust scrutiny.
What are the potential remedies in antitrust enforcement?
Federal or state agencies challenging a merger can seek structural remedies or conduct remedies (also known as “behavioral remedies”).
Structural remedies mitigate consolidation by preventing a merger from moving forward, breaking up mergers that have already taken place, or requiring a merged entity to sell off a portion of its business.
Conduct remedies entail restrictions or requirements imposed on providers after a merger, such as by limiting the prices providers can charge, prohibiting providers from engaging in certain contracting practices, or requiring providers to spend a minimum amount on community benefits.
Conduct remediesmay be less effective than structural remedies in certain circumstances, as they tend to be time-limited and government agencies may not have the resources to monitor and enforce them. However, where markets are already concentrated and regulators are reluctant to break up merged entities, conduct remedies may be the only option.
When the government challenges proposed mergers before they occur, the recourse is typically to prevent the merger from moving forward. Antitrust enforcers have only infrequently attempted to unwind mergers that have already taken place, which the FTC describes as a “difficult and potentially ineffective” process.
There are other ways in which the government can be successful in challenging anticompetitive mergers. For example, the government and merging providers may avoid trial through a settlement agreement or consent decree. In this scenario, the government drops its legal challenge in exchange for structural or conduct remedies. Additionally, providers may abandon a merger after a lawsuit is announced or a court makes a preliminary ruling against the merger or may decide not to attempt to merge in the first place in anticipation that doing so would be successfully challenged in court.
Example: FTC & Phoebe Putney Health System
In 2011, Phoebe Putney Health System acquired a hospital from HCA in Albany, Georgia. The FTC challenged the merger and eventually reached a settlement agreement with the providers. The settlement agreement allowed the merger to persist but imposed conduct remedies, including that Phoebe Putney notify the FTC before acquiring other health care providers in the area.
The outcomes of successful legal challenges to nonmerger anticompetitive practices are similar, though the remedy would involve abandoning the relevant business practice (e.g., no longer using anticompetitive contract clauses).
What are some practical challenges facing antitrust enforcement?
There are at least a few challenges that may limit the ability of the federal government and states to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust enforcement:
It is difficult to break up mergers after they have already occurred, and many provider markets are already highly concentrated. For example, one study estimated that the vast majority (90%) of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) had highly concentrated hospital markets in 2016 (i.e., with an HHI above 2,500), most (65%) had highly concentrated specialist physician markets, and nearly two in five (39%) had highly concentrated markets for primary care physicians. Breaking up a merger after providers have already consolidated can be difficult. At the same time, regulating the behavior of merged providers—such as through restrictions on the prices they charge—may be difficult to do on an ongoing basis.
Some regions cannot support competitive provider markets. For instance, rural communities may not have enough residents to support several providers that offer the same service.
Antitrust litigation can be complex and expensive. Without adequate funding, it may be impractical to challenge a large number of provider business practices that raise anticompetitive concerns.
Antitrust agencies may have difficulty staying ahead of market trends. For example, it could take time for the government to develop strong guidelines for challenging vertical or cross-market mergers and to accumulate enough evidence to convince courts that these practices harm competition. In the meantime, these mergers will likely continue.
The benefits of competitive provider markets for individuals with health insurance will depend in part on the competitiveness of health insurance markets. The study referenced above also estimated that most MSAs (57%) had highly concentrated insurance markets in 2016. When insurance markets are not competitive, cost savings from competitive provider markets might not be fully passed along to consumers.
What policies have been proposed to strengthen antitrust law and enforcement?
Several federal and state policy proposals have been floated to help antitrust regulators more easily identify and challenge anticompetitive mergers and regulate markets that are already concentrated. One set of policies would make it easier for governments to enforce antitrust law, such as by requiring more providers to report any planned mergers, lowering the legal standards by which mergers are deemed anticompetitive, and mandating that providers receive approval from the government before merging. Another set of policies would increase the scope of antitrust law, such as by giving the FTC full authority to regulate nonprofit providers and outlawing certain anticompetitive contracting clauses. A third set of proposals would improve the infrastructure of antitrust enforcement, such as by increasing funding for antitrust agencies, creating agencies to monitor health care markets (as some states have done), and establishing specialized courts for antitrust cases.
Discussion
The FTC, DOJ, and states seek to promote competition in health care markets to encourage providers to lower costs for consumers and provide high quality medical care. Over the years, FTC, DOJ, and some states have challenged mergers as well as other anticompetitive practices. Nonetheless, there are inherent challenges to an approach that relies solely on efforts to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust regulation, particularly given the already high level of market concentration of providers across the country.
Several policy ideas have been floated at the federal and state level that are intended to strengthen antitrust regulation. However, given the challenges facing antitrust regulation and pro-competition policies, some policymakers have proposed a more direct regulatory approach, such as by capping prices or price growth or by establishing global budgets for hospitals. Someproponents of these approaches have highlighted that antitrust efforts and regulatory approaches could play complimentary roles. For instance, caps on health care prices could serve as a backstop in concentrated markets where at least some providers would not otherwise offer competitive rates or in small markets that are unable to support competition. Antitrust regulation may also play a useful role under price regulation, for example, by encouraging providers to compete for patients by offering higher quality care.
Last Tuesday (April 23), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a 570-page final rule in a partisan 3-2 vote prohibiting employers from binding most American workers to post-employment non-competition agreements (the “Final Rule”):
“Pursuant to sections 5 and 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) is issuing the Non-Compete Clause Rule (“the final rule”). The final rule provides that it is an unfair method of competition—and therefore a violation of section 5—for persons to, among other things, enter into non-compete clauses (“non-competes”) with workers on or after the final rule’s effective date. With respect to existing non-competes—i.e., non-competes entered into before the effective date—the final rule adopts a different approach for senior executives than for other workers. For senior executives (in policy setting/executive positions who earned more than $151,164 last year), existing non-competes can remain in force, while existing non-competes with other workers are not enforceable after the effective date.” (p.1)
“Concerns about non-competes have increased substantially in recent years in light of empirical research showing that they tend to harm competitive conditions in labor, product, and service markets. … When a company interferes with free competition for one of its former employee’s services, the market’s ability to achieve the most economically efficient allocation of labor is impaired. Moreover, employee-noncompetition clauses can tie up industry expertise and experience and thereby forestall new entry… competes by employers tends to negatively affect competition in labor markets, suppressing earnings for workers across the labor force—including even workers not subject to noncompete. This research has also shown that non-competes tend to negatively affect competition in product and service markets, suppressing new business formation and innovation… Yet despite the mounting empirical and qualitative evidence confirming these harms and the efforts of many States to ban them, non-competes remain prevalent in the U.S. economy. Based on the available evidence, the Commission estimates that approximately one in five American workers—or approximately 30 million workers—is subject to a non-compete. The evidence also indicates that employers frequently use non-competes even when they are unenforceable under State law.” (p.6)
On its home page, the FTC says “with a comprehensive ban on new non-competes, Americans could see an increase in wages, new business formation, reduced health care costs and more.”(www.ftc.gov)
The rule takes effect 120 days following its publication in the Federal Register and is applicable to every employer including specified operations in not-for-profit organizations (which represents the majority of hospitals, nursing homes and others). The agency noted it received 26,000 comment letters since the proposed rule was published January 19, 2023 including significant reaction from healthcare organizations. By the end of last week, two lawsuits were filed: one by the Chamber of Commerce in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas and the second by a global tax services and software company in the Northern District of Texas – each challenging the Final Rule and arguing that the FTC lacked the authority. Others are likely to follow and its implementation will be delayed as arguments about its merits and the FTC’s standing to make the rule find their way thru the courts.
Special attention to hospitals and physicians in the rule
Notably, the use of non-competes in healthcare is a central theme in the rule, particularly in tax-exempt hospital and medical practice settings. Noting that one in 5 workers (30 million) and up to 45% of physicians work under non-compete agreements today, the Commissioners illustrated the need for the rule by inserting vignettes from 14 workers in their introduction: 4 of these were healthcare workers– 2 physicians and employees of a hospital and electronic health record provider (p.11-13). Throughout its exhaustive commentary, the Commissioners took issue with assertions by healthcare organizations about the potential negative consequences of the rule citing lack of empirical evidence to justify opposition claims. References to tax-exempt hospitals, their for-profit activities and their employment arrangements with physicians are frequent in the commentary justifying the application of the rule as follows:
“Many commenters representing healthcare organizations and industry trade associations stated that the Commission should exclude some or all of the healthcare industry from the rule because they believe it is uniquely situated in various ways. The Commission declines to adopt an exception specifically for the healthcare industry. The Commission is not persuaded that the healthcare industry is uniquely situated in a way that justifies an exemption from the final rule. The Commission finds use of non-competes to be an unfair method of competition that tends to negatively affect labor and product and services markets, including in this vital industry; the Commission also specifically finds that non-competes increase healthcare costs. Moreover, the Commission is unconvinced that prohibiting the use of non-competes in the healthcare industry will have the claimed negative effects.” (p.303)
Not surprisingly rule, responses from the hospital trade groups were swift, direct and harshly critical:
American Hospital Association (www.aha.org):” The FTC’s final rule banning non-compete agreements for all employees across all sectors of the economy is bad law, bad policy, and a clear sign of an agency run amok. The agency’s stubborn insistence on issuing this sweeping rule — despite mountains of contrary legal precedent and evidence about its adverse impacts on the health care markets — is further proof that the agency has little regard for its place in our constitutional order. Three unelected officials should not be permitted to regulate the entire United States economy and stretch their authority far beyond what Congress granted it–including by claiming the power to regulate certain tax-exempt, non-profit organizations. The only saving grace is that this rule will likely be short-lived, with courts almost certain to stop it before it can do damage to hospitals’ ability to care for their patients and communities.”
Federation of American Hospitals (www.fah.org):“This final rule is a double whammy. In n a time of constant health care workforce shortages, the FTC’s vote today threatens access to high-quality care for millions of patients.”
By contrast, the American Medical Association (www.ama-assn.org) response was positive, linking its support for the rule to AMA’s ethical principles of physician independence and clinical autonomy.
Four implicit messages to healthcare are evident in the rule
It is unlikely the rule will become law in its current form. Opposing trade groups, employers dependent on non-competes for protections of trade secrets and business relationships and many others will actively pursue its demise in courts actions. But a review of the text makes clear the FTC is intensely focused on competition and consumer protections in healthcare akin to its ongoing challenges to hospital consolidation.
Four messages emerge from the text of the rule:
1-‘The healthcare industry is a business which needs more regulation to protect consumers and its workforce by lowering costs and stimulating competition. ‘
“Many commenters representing healthcare organizations and industry trade associations stated that the Commission should exclude some or all of the healthcare industry from the rule because they believe it is uniquely situated in various ways. The Commission declines to adopt an exception specifically for the healthcare industry. The Commission is not persuaded that the healthcare industry is uniquely situated in a way that justifies an exemption from the final rule. The Commission finds use of non-competes to be an unfair method of competition that tends to negatively affect labor and product and services markets, including in this vital industry; the Commission also specifically finds that non-competes increase healthcare costs. Moreover, the Commission is unconvinced that prohibiting the use of non-competes in the healthcare industry will have the claimed negative effects.” (p.373)
2-‘Physicians play a unique role in healthcare and deserve protection.’
“Some healthcare businesses and trade organizations opposing the rule argued that, without non-competes, physician shortages would increase physicians’ wages beyond what the commenters view as fair. The commenters provided no empirical evidence to support these assertions, and the Commission is unaware of any such evidence. Contrary to commenters’ claim that the rule would increase physicians’ earnings beyond a “fair” level, the weight of the evidence indicates that the final rule will lead to fairer wages by prohibiting a practice that suppresses workers’ earnings by preventing competition; that is, the final rule will simply help ensure that wages are determined via fair competition. The Commission also notes that it received a large number of comments from physicians and other healthcare workers stating that non-competes exacerbate physician shortages.” (p.157)
“Hundreds of physicians and other commenters in the healthcare industry stated that non-competes negatively affect physicians’ ability to provide quality care and limit patient access to care, including emergency care. Many of these commenters stated that non-competes restrict physicians from leaving practices and increase the risk of retaliation if physicians object to the practices’ operations, poor care or services, workload demands, or corporate interference with their clinical judgment. Other commenters from the healthcare industry said that, like other industries, non-competes bar competitors from the market and prevent providers from moving to or starting competing firms, thus limiting access to care and patient choice. Physicians and physician organizations said non-competes contribute to burnout and job dissatisfaction, and said burnout negatively impacts patient care.” (p.202)
“…the Commission notes that while the study finds that non-competes make physicians more likely to refer patients to other physicians within their practice—increasing revenue for the practice—it makes no findings on the impact on the quality of patient care. The Commission further notes that pecuniary benefits to a firm cannot justify an unfair method of competition.” (p.206)
3.’Tax exempt hospitals that operate like for-profit entities deserve special scrutiny from regulators and are thus subject to the rule’s provisions.’
“Merely claiming tax-exempt status in tax filings is not dispositive. At the same time, if the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) concludes that an entity does not qualify for tax-exempt status, such a finding would be meaningful to the Commission’s analysis of whether the same entity is a corporation under the FTC Act.” (p.53)
“As stated in Part II.E, entities claiming tax exempt status are not categorically beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, but the Commission recognizes that not all entities in the healthcare industry fall under its jurisdiction. “(p.374)
“While the Commission shares commenters’ concerns about consolidation in healthcare, it disagrees with commenters’ contention that the purported competitive disadvantage to for-profit entities stemming from the final rule would exacerbate this problem. As some commenters stated, the Commission notes that hospitals claiming tax-exempt status as nonprofits are under increasing public scrutiny. Public and private studies and reports reveal that some such hospitals are operating to maximize profits, paying multi-million-dollar salaries to executives, deploying aggressive collection tactics with low-income patients, and spending less on community benefits than they receive in tax exemptions.943 Economic studies by FTC staff demonstrate that these hospitals can and do exercise market power and raise prices similar to for-profit hospitals.944 Thus, as courts have recognized, the tax-exempt status as nonprofits of merging hospitals does not mitigate the potential for harm to competitive conditions.” (p.383)
“Conversely, many commenters vociferously opposed exempting entities that claim tax exempt status as nonprofits from coverage under the final rule. Several commenters contended that, in practice, many entities that claim tax-exempt status as nonprofits are in fact “organized to carry on business for [their] own profit or that of [their] members” such that they are “corporations” under the FTC Act. These commenters cited reports by investigative journalists to contend that some hospitals claiming tax-exempt status as nonprofits have excess revenue and operate like for-profit entities. A few commenters stated that consolidation in the healthcare industry is largely driven by entities that claim tax-exempt status as nonprofits as opposed to their for-profit competitors, which are sometimes forced to consolidate to compete with the larger hospital groups that claim tax-exempt status as nonprofits. Commenters also contended that many hospitals claiming tax-exempt status as nonprofits use self-serving interpretations of the IRS’s “community benefit” standard to fulfill requirements for tax exemption, suggesting that the best way to address unfairness and consolidation in the healthcare industry is to strictly enforce the IRS’s standards and to remove the tax-exempt status of organizations that do not comply. An academic commenter argued that the distinction between for-profit hospitals and nonprofit hospitals has become less clear over time, and that the Commission should presumptively treat hospitals claiming nonprofit tax-exempt status as operating for profit unless they can establish that they fall outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction.” (p.377-378)
“After carefully considering commenters’ arguments, the Commission declines to exempt for-profit healthcare employers or to exempt the healthcare industry altogether.” (p.380)
4. ‘The net impact of non-compete agreements is harmful to the workforce and the public. ‘
“The Commission finds that with respect to these workers, these practices are unfair methods of competition in several independent ways:
The use of non-competes is restrictive and exclusionary conduct that tends to negatively affect competitive conditions in labor markets.
The use of non-competes is restrictive and exclusionary conduct that tends to negatively affect competitive conditions in product and service markets.
The use of non-competes is exploitative and coercive conduct that tends to negatively affect competitive conditions in labor markets.
The use of non-competes is exploitative and coercive conduct that tends to negatively affect competitive conditions in product and service markets.” (p.105)
“The Commission notes that the vast majority of comments from physicians and other stakeholders in the healthcare industry assert that non-competes result in worse patient care. The Commission further notes that the American Medical Association discourages the use of non-competes because they “can disrupt continuity of care, and may limit access to care.” In addition, there are alternatives for improving patient choice and quality of care, and for retaining physicians, that burden competition to a much less significant degree than non-competes…commenters asserted that a ban on non-competes would upend healthcare labor markets, thereby exacerbating healthcare workforce shortages, especially in rural and underserved areas. A medical society argued that non-competes can allow groups to meet contractual obligations to hospitals, as physicians leaving can prevent the group from ensuring safe care. As the Commission notes, there are not reliable empirical studies of these effects, and these commenters do not provide any. However, the Commission notes that the rule will increase labor mobility generally, which makes it easier for firms to hire qualified workers.” (p.208)
“The Commission also noted that in three States—California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma—employers generally cannot enforce non-competes, so they must protect their investments using one or more of these less restrictive alternatives…Commenters provide no empirical evidence, and the Commission is unaware of any such evidence, to support the theory that prohibiting non-competes would increase consolidation or raise prices. “384
The bottom line:
Odds are this rule will not become law anytime soon allowing healthcare organizations to consider alternatives to the non-competes they use. Work-arounds for protection of intellectual property, talent acquisition, employment agreements are likely as HR professionals, benefits and compensation consultancies huddle to consider what’s next.
Those that operate in 3 states (CA, ND, OK) already face state reg’s limiting non-competes and more states are adding measures. As noted in the rule, the health systems in these states have not been debilitated by non-compete limitations nor empirical evidence of public/worker harm produced, so no harm no foul.
The bigger takeaways from this rule for healthcare—especially hospitals—are 2:
The rule may fuel already growing antipathy between the workforce and senior management. Physicians are frustrated and burned out. Mid-level clinicians, techs and nurses are not happy. The hourly workforce is insecure. The hospital workplace—its clinics, programs and services—is not a happy place these days. The rule might fuel increased union organizing activity among some work groups at a critical time when demand is high, utilization is increasing, resources are stretched, reimbursement is shrinking and conditions for solvency and sustainability in question for rural, safety net and community hospitals in areas of declining population. And employed physicians will push-back harder against pressure from their hospital and private equity partners to work harder and produce more. The rule gives physicians a moral premise on which to oppose employer demands, whether the rule is implemented in its current form or not.
And the second equally notable takeaway is the rule’s specific attention to tax-exempt hospitals that operate as “for-profit” organizations. The FTC Commissioners question their tax exemptions and their investor-owned competitors are happy they noticed. They’re joined by investigations in 5 Committee’s of Congress with Bipartisan support for a fresh look at their bona fide eligibility despite strong pushback by the American Hospital Association and others.
This rule was introduced as a proposed rule last year with a comment period of 90 days allowed. Fifteen months and 26,000 comments later, it’s the latest reminder that the future of healthcare is everyone’s business and hospitals and physicians see that future state differently.
In its summation, the FTC estimates that this final rule will lead to new business formation growing by 2.7% per year, create 8,500 additional new businesses annually, produce 17,000-29,000 patents for innovation, increase earnings for workers and lower health care costs by up to $194 billion over the next decade. Maybe.
What’s clear is that the FTC and regulators in DC and many states are watching the industry closely and many aren’t buying what we’re selling.
On January 1st, 2024 #AB1076 and #SB699, two draconian noncompete laws go into effect. It could put many #employedphysicians in a new position to walk away from #employeeremorse.
AB1076 voids non-compete contracts and require the employer to give written notice by February 14th, 2024 that their contract is void.
Is this a good or bad thing? It depends.
If the contract offers more protections and less risk to the employed physician, and the contract is void – does that mean the whole contract is void? Or is the non-compete voidable?
But for the hospital administrator or practice administrator, we’re about to witness the golden handcuffs come off and administrators will have to compete to retain talent that could be lured away more easily than in the past. But the effect of the non-compete is far more worrisome for an administrator because of the following:
The physicians many freely and fairly compete against the former employer by calling upon, soliciting, accepting, engaging in, servicing or performing business with former patients, business connections, and prospective patients of their former employer.
It could also give rise to tumult in executive positions and management and high value employees like managed care and revenue cycle experts who may have signed noncompete contracts.
If the employer does not follow through with the written notice by February 14th, the action or failure to notify will be “deemed by the statute to be an act of unfair competition that could give rise to other private litigation that is provided for in SB699.
The second law, SB699, provides a right of private action, permitting the former employees subject to SB699 the right to sue for injunctive relief, recovery of actual damages, and attorneys fees. It also makes it a civil violation to enter into or enforce a noncompete agreement. It further applies to employees who were hired outside California but now work in or through a California office.
What else goes away?
Employed physicians can immediately go to work for a competitor and any notice requirement or waiting period (time and distance provisions) are eliminated by the laws. So an administrator could be receiving “adios” messages on January 2nd, and watch market share slip through their fingers like a sieve starting January 3rd.
And what about the appointment book? Typically, appointments are set months in advance, especially for surgeons – along with surgery bookings, surgery block times, and follow up visits.
Hospitals may be forced to reckon with ASCs where the surgeons could not book cases under their non-compete terms and conditions. They could up and move their cases as quickly as they can be credentialed and privileged and their PECOS and NPPES files updated and a new 855R acknowledged as received.
Will your key physicians, surgeons and APPs leave on short notice?
APPs such as PAs and NPs could also walk off and bottleneck appointment schedules, surgical assists, and many office-based procedures that were assigned to them. They could also walk to a new practice or a different hospitals and also freely and fairly compete against the former employer by calling upon, soliciting, accepting, engaging in, servicing or performing business with former patients, business connections, and prospective patients of their former employer.
Next, let’s talk about nurses and CRNAs. If they walk off and are lured away to a nearby ASC or hospital, or home health agency, that will disrupt many touchpoints of the current employer.
Consultants’ contracts are another matter to be reckoned with. In all my California (and other) contracts, contained within them are anti-poaching provisions that state that I may not offer employment to one of their managed care, revenue cycle, credentialing, or business development superstars. Poof! Gone!
The time to conduct a risk assessment is right now! But many of the people who would be assigned this assessment are on holiday vacation and won’t be back until after January 1st. But then again, they too could be lured away or poached.
What else will be affected?
Credentialing and privileging experts should be ready for an onslaught of applications that have to be processed right away. They will not only be hit with new applications, but also verification of past employment for the departing medical staff.
Billing and Collections staff will need to mount appeals and defenses of denied claims without easy access they formerly had with departing employed physicians.
Medical Records staff will need to get all signature and missing documentation cleared up without easy access they formerly had with departing employed physicians.
Managed Care Network Development experts at health plans and PPOs and TPAs will be recredentialing and amending Tax IDs on profiles of former employed physicians who stand up their own practice or become employed or affiliated with another hospital or group practice. This comes at an already hectic time where federal regulations require accurate network provider directories.
The health plans will need to act swiftly on these modifications because NCQA-accredited health plans must offer network adequacy and formerly employed physicians who depart one group but cannot bill for patient visits and surgeries until the contracting mess is cleared up does not fall under “force majeure” exceptions. If patients can’t get appointments within the stated NCQA time frames, the health plan is liable for network inadequacy. I see that as “leverage” because the physician leaving and going “someplace else” (on their own, to a new group or hospital) can push negotiations on a “who needs whom the most?” basis. Raising a fee schedule a few notches is a paltry concern when weight against loss of NCQA accreditation (the Holy Grail of employer requirements when purchasing health plan benefits from a HMO) and state regulator-imposed fines. All it takes to attract the attention of regulators and NCQA are a few plan member complaints that they could not get appointments timely.
Health plans who operate staff model and network model plans that employ physicians, PAs and NPs (e.g., Kaiser and others who employ the participating practitioners and own the brick and mortar clinics where they work) are in for risk of losing the medical staff to “other opportunities.” These employment arrangements are at a huge risk of disruption across the state.
Workers Compensation Clinics that dot the state of California and already have wait times measured in hours as well as Freestanding ERs and Freestanding Urgent Care Clinics could witness a mass exodus of practitioners that disrupt operations and make their walk in model inoperative and unsustainable in a matter of a week.
FQHCs that employ physicians, psychotherapists, nurse practitioners and physician assistants could find themselves inadequately staffed to continue their mission and operations. Could this lead to claims of patient abandonment? Failed Duty of Care? Who would be liable? The departing physician or their employer?
And then, there are people like me – consultants who help stand up new independent and group practices, build new brands, rebrand the physicians under their own professional brands, launch new service lines like regenerative medicine and robotics, cardiac and vascular service lines, analyze managed care agreements, physician, CRNA, psychotherapist, and APP employment agreements. There aren’t many consultants with expertise in these niches. There are even fewer who are trained as paralegals, and have practical experience as advisors or former hospital and group practice administrators (I’ve done both) who are freelancers. I expect I will become very much in demand because of the scarcity and the experience. I am one of very few experts who are internationally-published and peer-reviewed on employment contracts for physicians.
We recently spoke with a health system COO who wanted help playing out scenarios regarding the relationship between specialist physicians and their private equity (PE) partners. The system is located in one of the markets referenced in a recent study that has some of the highest levels of private equity ownership in the country. One physician group, whose doctors provide almost all the system’s coverage for a key specialty, has worked with PE partners for five years, and the relationship is not going well. “We’re hearing that many of the younger doctors want to leave. And many of the others are close to retirement,” he shared.
“We’re really concerned about what could happen if the group implodes.” The key issue: the doctors signed very restrictive noncompete agreements when they sold their practice, which could prohibit them from working in the market.
The health system would consider bringing some of the doctors into their employed medical group, but executives are worried this might be impossible for the duration of the noncompete agreements. “If these doctors can’t stay locally, we might have to rebuild that specialty from scratch. And I can’t imagine how disruptive that would be,” he worried.
When the FTC announced a proposed rule earlier this year that would ban employers from imposing noncompete agreements, many health systems reacted with alarm, fearing the that the freedom to move would lead to frequent bidding wars, ultimately driving up the cost of physician talent in the market.
But the situation shows how perspectives would change depending on who holds the noncompete.
Mid-sized markets like this one, where coverage for several specialties may come from single groups, are particularly vulnerable. Regardless, this situation highlights the need to diversify physician relationships to guard against getting caught in a “coverage crisis”.
Last Thursday, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released a proposed rule that would ban employers from imposing noncompete agreements on their employees. Noncompetes affect roughly 20 percent of the American workforce, and healthcare providers would be particularly impacted by this change, as far greater shares of physicians—at least 45 percent of primary care physicians, according to one oft-cited study—are bound by such agreements.
The rulemaking process is expected to be contentious, as the US Chamber of Commerce has declared the proposal “blatantly unlawful”. While it is unclear whether the rule would apply to not-for-profit entities, the American Hospital Association has released a statement siding with the Chamber of Commerce and urging that the issue continue to be left to states to determine.
The Gist: Should this sweeping rule go into effect, it would significantly shift bargaining power in the healthcare sector in favor of doctors, allowing them the opportunity to move away from their current employers while retaining local patient relationships.
The competitive landscape for physician talent would change dramatically, particularly for revenue-driving specialists, who would have far greater flexibility to move from one organization to another, and to push aggressively for higher compensation and other benefits.
Given that the FTC cited suppressed competition in healthcare as an outcome of current noncomplete agreements, the burden will be on organizations that employ physicians—including health systems and insurers, as well as private equity-backed corporate entities—to prove that physician noncompetes areessential to their operations and do not raise prices, as the FTC has suggested.
HENRY KOTULA 