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Moody’s assigns ‘Aa3’ to University of Pennsylvania Health System
Moody’s Investors Service assigned its “Aa3” rating to Philadelphia-based University of Pennsylvania Health System’s proposed $200 million series 2017 taxable bonds as well as its proposed $400 million series A of 2017 revenue bonds.
At the same time, Moody’s affirmed the “Aa3” rating on UPHS’ outstanding bonds.
The affirmation is a result of several factors, including the health system’s strong market position, favorable reputation, close affiliation with the University of Pennsylvania and healthy liquidity. Moody’s also acknowledged UPHS’ limited debt burden and effective management of capital spending.
The outlook is stable, reflecting Moody’s expectation that UPHS will maintain solid operating margins to absorb some of the decline in liquidity as construction projects progress.
Fitch revises Prime Healthcare Foundation’s outlook to negative
Fitch Ratings assigned its “BB-” rating to Ontario, Calif.-based Prime Healthcare Foundation’s proposed $123 million series 2017A and $127 million series 2017B.
The assignment was a result of PHF’s strong liquidity metrics relative to its debt burden and its experienced senior management team.
The outlook was revised to negative from stable, reflecting PHF’s unexpected decline in profitability and an increased debt burden.
Is a Medicare option for all the only practical means to solve the healthcare insurance crisis?
From a healthcare consumer perspective, it increasingly strikes one that the healthcare insurance market is a story of haves and have-nots.
The haves include those that work for companies of a certain size, at which the companies can access insurance at very expensive but somewhat rationalized costs (think $16,000 to $20,000 per family per year, with employees contributing roughly $5,500), people on Medicare, and — crazily enough — people on Medicaid. (Again, the concept of a “have” here solely relates to the availability of healthcare coverage. It is by no means meant to understate the challenge of being in such poverty to be eligible for Medicaid.)
The have-nots include a vast number of people trying to buy insurance directly from insurance companies. Here, one increasingly hears that whether one is rich or poor, the costs are horrendous. Family costs for PPO plans seem to fall in the $20,000 to $25,000 range for many families, and even higher for those with preexisting conditions.
From a provider perspective, Medicare is a mixed bag depending on the type of provider. From a hospital’s perspective, it seems to be fine overall. From a physician’s perspective, many seem to find it woefully inadequate.
One of the great challenges of the ACA is it set up an additional healthcare system of subsidies around insurance markets, mandates and so forth. It added complexity and costs, but also helped provide an additional basket of coverage for a good deal of uninsured Americans.
Regardless of political perspectives, rather than building another healthcare finance system, it seems that a simple approach would be to build on an existing system that, while imperfect, seems to work fairly well.
As an ardent capitalist at heart, the idea over the years of expanding a government program of any sort, including Medicare, has always led me to a negative conclusion. I.e., would it cause the kind of regression in our healthcare system that exists in systems in England or Canada, where care is famously inadequate or requires waiting months for certain types of care?
In contrast, at some point, does the cost of healthcare for those who don’t work for a large company and aren’t eligible for Medicare or Medicaid make the system so expensive that there is good reason to offer a Medicare option for such people? This demographic makes up a large part of the population, and it seems that the private insurance market is offering them only very expensive choices for health plans.
Much of my sense of the cost of private healthcare insurance comes anecdotally — from listening to diverse family and extended family around the Thanksgiving table, for instance. That stated, I do sense the cost of insurance for a family has moved from quite expensive to extremely and back-breakingly expensive. Sadly, I’m losing confidence that the core free market can fix it.
Senate GOP Tax Cut Bill Heads To Full Senate With Individual Mandate Repeal
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171117.748105/full/
November 19 Update: Distributional Effects Of Individual Mandate Repeal
Late in the day of November 17, 2017, the Congressional Budget Office released a letter it had sent to Senator Ron Wyden, ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, on the Distributional Effects of Changes in Spending Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act as of November 15, 2017 as they are affected by repeal of the Affordable Care Act’s Individual Responsibility Provision. The letter updated the analysis the JCT had released on November 15 of the distributional effects of the Tax Act that had focused solely on the effects of the legislation on revenues and refundable tax credits. The update also addressed changes the repeal of the mandate would cause in other federal expenditures, including cuts in Medicaid, cost-sharing reductions (which CBO sees as mandatory spending and thus includes in its analysis), and Basic Health Program spending, as well as increases in Medicare disproportionate share hospital payments.
The analysis concludes that under the Tax Bill, federal spending allocated to people with incomes below $50,000 a year would be lower than it would otherwise have been over the next decade. For example, CBO projects federal spending for people with incomes under $10,000 will be $9.7 billion less in 2027 than it otherwise would have been, spending on people with incomes from $10,000 to $20,000 will be $9.8 billion less; spending on people with incomes from $20,000 to $30,000 will be $8.7 billion less, spending on people with incomes from $30,000 to $40,000 will $3 billion less; and spending on people with incomes from $40,000 to $50,000 will be $1.2 billion less. The CBO calculated these figures by calculating the number of people who are projected to drop Medicaid enrollment in each income category and their average Medicaid cost considering age, income, disability status, and whether they gained coverage under the ACA.
More controversially, the CBO determined that individuals with incomes above $50,000 would benefit from the repeal. People with incomes between $100,000 and $200,000 would receive $1.7 billion more and people with incomes over $1 million would receive $440 million more. These increases are due to the increased expenditures on Medicare that will result from the bill, half of which the CBO distributed evenly across the population and half of which it allocated in proportion to each tax filing unit’s share of total income. As the increased Medicare disproportionate share payments are in fact paid directly to providers to cover their costs for serving the uninsured, who will predominantly be low-income, this seems to be an odd way to allocate these expenditures, although it is apparently standard CBO cost allocation practice, and ensuring that hospitals are not overwhelmed by bad debt does benefit people from all income categories.
The CBO specifies that it only considered the cost of the spending or spending reduction to the government, not the value placed on that spending by the recipients of the coverage it would purchase. A person who fails to enroll in Medicaid because the mandate is dropped is unlikely to value it at its full cost. Moreover, and importantly, the CBO did not take into account the cost of the mandate repeal to those who will feel it most acutely—individuals who are purchasing coverage in the individual market without subsidies who will face much higher premiums if the mandate is repealed.
The CBO also failed to consider the medical costs that will be incurred by individuals who drop health insurance coverage or the costs to society generally of a dramatic increase in the number of the uninsured.
Original Post
On November 16, 2017, the Senate Finance Committee approved by a party-line 14-to-12 vote a tax cut bill that will now be sent to the full Senate. The bill includes a repeal of the penalty attached to the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s individual responsibility provision. This provision requires individuals who do not qualify for an exemption to obtain minimum essential coverage or pay the penalty.
A “Twofer” For Republicans: Additional Continuing Revenue And Elimination Of The ACA’s Least Popular Provision
The repeal of the individual mandate was included in the tax bill for two reasons. First, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) scored the repeal as reducing the deficit by $318 billion over ten years. This repeal would provide enough savings, including continuing savings in years beyond 2027, to allow Republicans to permanently reduce the corporate tax rate without increasing the deficit by more than $1.5 trillion or otherwise violating budget reconciliation requirements. Second, it would allow Republicans to get rid of the least popular provision of the ACA, making up in part for their failing to repeal the ACA despite a summer of efforts.
The savings that will supposedly result from the repeal of the individual mandate come entirely from individuals losing health coverage which the federal government would otherwise help finance. A cost estimate released by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on November 8, 2017 projected that repeal of the mandate would cause 13 million individuals to lose coverage by 2017, including five million individual market enrollees, five million Medicaid recipients, and two to 3 million individuals with employer coverage.
The CBO estimated that this loss of coverage would result in reductions over ten years of $185 billion in premium tax credits and $179 billion in Medicaid expenditures and a change in other revenues and outlays of about $62 billion, primarily attributable to increased taxes imposed on people who would lose employer coverage. (The increases would be offset by $43 billion in lost individual mandate penalty payments and a $44 billion increase in Medicare disproportionate share hospital payments to hospitals that bore the burden of caring for more uninsured patients.)
The total reduction in the federal deficit, in the opinion of the CBO, would be $338 billion over ten years. (The difference between the $318 billion in savings in the JCT tax bill score and the $338 billion in the earlier CBO/JCT individual mandate repeal cost estimate is presumably due to the fact that the Finance bill would only repeal the mandate penalty, not the mandate itself, and some individuals would presumably continue to comply with the mandate even without the penalty because it is legally required.) The JCT also projects that the repeal of the mandate will effectively result in a tax increase for individuals with incomes below $30,000 a year because of the loss of tax credits that will accompany the loss of coverage, further tipping the benefits of the tax cut bill toward the wealthy.
Behind The Coverage Loss Estimate
At first glance, the estimate that 13 million would lose coverage from the repeal of the mandate, including five million who would give up essentially free Medicaid, seems improbable. Moreover, supporters of the tax bill contend that no one would be forced to give up coverage—coverage losses would all be voluntary. And, the argument continues, most of the people who are now paying the mandate penalty earn less than $50,000 a year, so repeal of the mandate will in fact be beneficial to lower-income individuals.
In fact, the CBO’s estimates of coverage losses (and budget savings) may be too high. The November 8 CBO estimates were lower than earlier estimates, and the CBO admits that it is continuing to evaluate is methodology for estimating the effect of the individual mandate. There is substantial confusion regarding the mandate requirement. A fifth of the uninsured, according to a recent poll, believe that the individual market is no longer in effect while another fifth do not know whether it is or not. Compliance with the mandate may already be slipping—the Treasury Inspector General reported in April that filings including penalty payments were as of March 31 down by a third from 2015. Part of the potential effect of repeal is already being felt.
Although the mandate repeal would not go into effect until 2019, media coverage will surely cause even further confusion and even more people to drop coverage, likely dampening enrollment for 2018 in the open enrollment period currently underway.
S&P Global released a report on November 16 estimating that only three to five million individuals would lose coverage from the mandate repeal. Coverage losses of this magnitude, however, would only result in savings of $50 to $80 billion over the ten-year budget window, meaning the tax bill would add another $240 to $270 billion to the deficit and put it in violation of the budget reconciliation rules.
Whatever the level of loss of coverage under a mandate repeal, it is reasonable to believe that it would be extensive. The CBO estimated that repeal of the mandate would drive up premiums in the individual market by 10 percent. Without the mandate, healthy individuals would drop out, pushing up premiums for those remaining in the market. Unlike the increases caused by the termination of cost-sharing reduction payments, this increase would likely be loaded onto premiums for plans of all metal levels and onto premiums for enrollees across the individual market, including off-exchange enrollees. Moreover, repeal of the mandate would likely cause another round of insurer withdrawals from the individual market as insurers concluded that the market was just too risky. Insurers left as the lone participant in particular markets without competition to drive down premiums would likely raise their premiums well above 10 percent.
Who Would Have The Most To Lose From A Mandate Repeal?
The biggest losers from a mandate repeal would be individuals who earn more than 400 percent of the federal poverty level and thus bear the full cost of coverage themselves. These are the farmers, ranchers, and self-employed small business people who have traditionally bought coverage in the individual market. They are also include gig-economy workers and entrepreneurs who have been liberated by the ACA from dead-end jobs with health benefits to pursue their dreams. Their increased premiums might well offset any tax cut they receive under the bill.
If members of these groups are healthy, they might be able to find cheap coverage through short-term policies which the Trump Administration has promised to allow to last longer than the current three month limit and to be renewable. But those policies will not cover individuals with preexisting conditions. And if healthy individuals are allowed to purchase full-year “short-term” coverage without having to pay an individual mandate penalty, even more healthy people will leave the individual market, driving premiums up even higher as the individual market becomes a high risk pool for individuals not eligible for premium tax credits. As premiums increased, so would premium tax credits, driving up the cost for the federal government.
The CBO estimate that five million will lose Medicaid coverage seems questionable, as Medicaid coverage is essentially free for most beneficiaries. But, particularly in Medicaid expansion states, there is a thin line between individual market and Medicaid eligibility, and many people who apply for individual market coverage find out that they are in fact eligible for Medicaid. Without the mandate, fewer are likely to apply at all. Moreover, Medicaid does not have open enrolment periods—people can literally apply for Medicaid in the emergency room, and many do. Without the mandate many will likely forgo the hassle of applying (or more likely reapplying) for Medicaid and only get covered when they need expensive hospital care. But they will thereby forgo preventive and primary care that could have obviated an emergency room visit or hospitalization.
Finally, in many families, parents are insured in the individual market but children are on Medicaid or CHIP. Without the mandate, the parents may forgo coverage, causing the children to lose coverage as well—and with it access to preventive and primary care.
The Involuntary Impact From ‘Voluntary’ Coverage Losses
Even if these coverage losses are “voluntary,” they will affect many who continue to want coverage. As already noted, as healthy people leave insurance markets, costs will go up for those who remain behind. Some of these will be people who really want, indeed need, coverage but will no longer find it affordable, and who will thus involuntarily lose coverage. Indeed, this effect may extend beyond the individual market. As healthy individuals drop employer coverage, costs may go up for those employees left behind.
Moreover, the voluntarily uninsured will inevitably have auto accidents or heart attacks or find out that they have cancer. Many will end up receiving uncompensated care, undermining the financial stability of health care providers saddled with ever higher bad debt, and driving up the cost of care for the rest of us.
Republican repeal bills offered earlier this year included other approaches to encouraging continuous enrollment—imposing health status underwriting or late enrollment penalties on those who failed to maintain continuous coverage, for example. The tax bill includes no such alternatives, nor could it. It may be possible that states could step into the gap. Massachusetts, for example, had an individual mandate penalty even before the ACA; it was the model for the ACA. The District of Columbia Exchange Board has recommended that D.C. impose its own individual mandate tax if the federal mandate ceases to be enforced. Perhaps other states will step into the gap. But I am not counting on many doing so.
The individual mandate is there for a reason. It is intended to drive healthy as well as unhealthy individuals into the individual market and thus make coverage of people with preexisting conditions possible. It has been a significant contributor to the record reductions in the number of the uninsured brought about by the ACA. Without the individual mandate, the number of the uninsured would once again rise. Maybe not by 13 million, but nonetheless significantly.
Beyond Showmanship And Spite: Toward A Health Care “Grand Bargain”
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171116.24714/full/
Is a deal on health care possible? Conventional wisdom says no. “Repeal and Replace” is dead, and Republicans have moved on. So have many Democrats, toward pursuit of a single-payer plan that’s going nowhere on Capitol Hill but energizes the party’s core. Last month, President Donald Trump said he’ll “dismantle” the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on his own—and backed this up with executive orders that risk the stability of the insurance exchanges.
Democrats are angry that Trump and congressional Republicans want to repeal the ACA and roll back its expansion of health insurance coverage. Republicans are angry that Democrats pushed “Obamacare” through Congress on a party-line basis, and they see the ACA as big government running amok. Both parties are positioning themselves for primaries, and neither shows much interest in the risky work of compromise.
We’re alarmed. One of us is a Cato Institute-friendly “free-market”eer who wrote a book arguing (tongue in cheek) that Medicare is the work of the Devil. The other helped to develop President Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign health plan and believes that failure to ensure everyone’s access to health care is an assault on human decency. But we’ve come together because we believe that failure to resolve the present impasse will have hugely destructive consequences for millions of Americans’ access to health care—and for our national confidence in our political system’s capacity to function.
Designing A Deal
President Trump has cut off cost-sharing reduction subsidies to insurers and issued a directive to allow coverage options less comprehensive than the ACA requires—measures that threaten to unravel the individual and small-group markets by incentivizing younger and healthier people to exit. Meanwhile, the uncertainty that besets federal funding under the ACA for Medicaid expansion poses huge fiscal risks for states, as does Congress’s failure, so far, to renew funding for the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). And over the longer term, soaring private and public spending on medical services that deliver doubtful value erodes US productivity and well-being.
We think a bipartisan “grand bargain” to stabilize the US health care system is feasible—if key decision makers can move beyond showmanship and spite. To this end, we outline a deal that: honors but balances the competing values at stake, steadies both market and public mechanisms of medical care financing, and puts the nation on a path toward sustainability in health spending.
Our grand bargain builds on federalism. Vastly different values, priorities, and interests stand in the way of nationwide health policy uniformity. Allowing states to sort out controversial matters within broader limits than the ACA now imposes would permit creative policy alternatives to unfold and encourage local buy-in. We needn’t and shouldn’t mandate definitive answers to bitterly contested questions that can be reasonably negotiated at the state or local level. Instead, we should open political and market pathways for the emergence of answers to these questions over time.
Moving to this long game will require all sides to pass on their pursuit of a quick political win. Doing so is the key to moving from cycles of backlash and volatility to a system that builds confidence and delivers high-quality, compassionate health care to all.
The Long Game: Seven Steps Toward a Compromise that Can Work And Endure
With these basic principles in mind, we propose the following seven steps:
Moving Beyond Maximalism—Medicaid Rollback And “Medicare for All”
Republicans should end their campaign to roll back the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, and Democrats should stand down on their quest for single payer. Both pursuits inspire true believers but will go nowhere on Capitol Hill for the imaginable future.
State Flexibility
Give states more flexibility to design their Medicaid programs and to govern their insurance exchanges. One approach would be to simply allow states complete flexibility to design their own coverage rules. Alternatively, we could give states more flexibility but ensure, via federal law, that Medicaid and plans sold on the exchanges provide affordable access to effective preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic services. States could also be allowed but not required to offer a public option through their exchanges. Instead of an all-or-none answer to the public plan question, the nation would have a framework for market-driven, state-by-state resolution. Similarly, states should be allowed to decide whether to prohibit, permit, or require enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries in private plans. Finally, when it comes to care that serves culturally contested purposes—including, but not limited to, gender reassignment or confirmation and late termination of pregnancies for nontherapeutic reasons—states should be given autonomy to go their own ways. More federalism will achieve greater stability than would temporary nationwide imposition of one or another approach by whichever party happens to hold the electoral upper hand.
Health Savings Accounts That Appeal To Everyone
An expanded role for tax-protected health savings should have bipartisan appeal. We propose that every lawful US resident be auto-enrolled in a health savings account (HSA), funded through a refundable tax credit, scaled to income and family size. People could opt out but would lose this credit if they did. Few would do so, enabling HSAs to become a means for pursuing both market discipline and social equity.
Repeal The Individual Mandate
Sacrilege, you’re surely thinking, if you’re a Democrat who’s spent seven-plus years defending the mandate, the ACA’s most disliked element. But the mandate isn’t needed to keep healthy people in community-rated risk pools—it’s the intensity of the incentives, whether framed as penalties or subsidies, that matters. Even the mandate’s most outspoken economist-defender, Jonathan Gruber, concedes that high-enough subsidies for the purchase of insurance can substitute for it.
Such subsidies could be supplied in conservative-friendly fashion by allowing all who buy coverage on the exchanges to put HSA funds (including the tax credit we urge) toward their premiums. Sign-up for coverage could also be made more user-friendly through auto-enrollment, subject to opt-out, in “silver” plans (for tax filers who aren’t otherwise covered and aren’t Medicaid eligible). A more robust approach might condition the refundable HSA tax credit on tax filers’ purchasing insurance (or not opting out of auto-enrollment).
Congressional Authorization Of Funding For Both The ACA’s Cost-Sharing Reductions And CHIP
There is bipartisan support for restoring the ACA’s cost-sharing reduction subsidies and extending CHIP. Although annual appropriations are the norm, Congress should guarantee funding for the cost-sharing reductions for a two-year period, with automatic renewal for an additional two years if per capita subsidies rise by no more than the Consumer Price Index (CPI) during the prior two years. By so doing, Congress can reaffirm its authority over appropriations while helping to stabilize markets for individual coverage. Likewise, Congress should renew CHIP’s funding for several years—we urge three as a compromise—to both stabilize state budgets and secure health care for the millions of children who depend on this program.
The “Long Game”—Reining In Medical Spending
A long-term effort to contain spending growth is essential for US fiscal stability and consumer well-being. The ACA created a framework for doing this. The Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) can limit Medicare spending, subject to congressional veto, if growth exceeds target rates. And the 40 percent “Cadillac tax” on high-cost private health plans will cover a rising share of the private market as medical costs increase. Together, these policies have the potential to contain clinical spending by capping demand. But there’s bipartisan opposition to both. The IPAB, which hasn’t yet been established, and the Cadillac tax, now delayed until 2020, are fiercely opposed by stakeholders with lots to lose, and they’re at high risk of repeal.
A grand bargain should follow through on both of these strategies, plus add similar restraints on Medicaid spending and on the amounts spent to subsidize coverage through the exchanges. Most other nations employ global budgeting to control health spending. For reasons of federalism, public philosophy, and market structure, global budgeting isn’t an option for the US. But a coordinated scheme of restraint, based on the best available behavioral and economic modeling, could apply similar braking power to our entire health economy. There’s plenty of room for argument about design details (that is, should per capita growth targets be based on the CPI? The CPI plus 1 percent?) and methods of restraint (that is, the IPAB approach? Spending caps for public programs? The Cadillac tax versus caps on tax deductibility of insurance premiums?). Continued bipartisan evasion will only make the problem worse.
Pursuing Therapeutic Value
Much more must be done to use health care resources wisely as constraints tighten. Tying financial rewards closely to clinical value via paymentpractices, market exclusivity policies, and other incentives will be critical—and will require the clearing of legal and regulatory obstacles. Voluntary action must also play a role: The grand bargain we’ve sketched here creates myriad opportunities for providers, patients, and insurers to gain by insisting on value from a sector of the economy that too often fails to deliver it.
To be sure, politics could foil all efforts to forge compromise. But there is a way forward. Our proposals achieve much that is important to both the ACA’s fiercest critics and staunchest defenders. They work in concert to address the political and market crises that immediately threaten our health care system, while laying the foundation for a long-term approach to control medical spending’s unsustainable growth.
HENRY KOTULA 