Megamergers Take Center Stage in M&A Activity

https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/strategy/megamergers-take-center-stage-ma-activity

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Despite continued and sometimes unsettling M&A activity in the industry, the fundamental mission of healthcare has not changed.


KEY TAKEAWAYS

73% of healthcare executive respondents will be exploring potential M&A deals during the next 12–18 months, according to a new HealthLeaders survey.

The recent M&A movement toward vertical integration involving nontraditional partners suggests that the healthcare industry is undergoing a major transformation.

Merger, acquisition, and partnership (M&A) activity within the healthcare industry shows no sign of diminishing, with nearly all indicators pointing to continued consolidation, according to a 2019 HealthLeaders Mergers, Acquisitions, and Partnerships Survey. The fundamental need for greater scale, geographic coverage, and increased integration remains unchanged for providers, and this will sustain M&A activity for years to come.

Evidence of the M&A trend’s resiliency is found throughout the HealthLeaders survey. For example, 91% of respondents expect their organizations’ M&A activity to increase (68%) or remain the same (23%) within the next three years, an indication of the trend’s depth. Note that only 1% of respondents expect this activity to decrease.

Likewise, 38% of respondents say that their organization’s M&A plans for the next 12–18 months consist of exploring potential deals, up six percentage points over last year’s survey, and another 35% say that their M&A plans consist of both exploring potential deals and completing deals underway. This means that nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents will be exploring potential deals during this period.


Megamergers and industry impact

While steady healthcare industry M&A activity has been with us for some time, a series of new and rumored megamergers and partnerships is capturing the headlines these days. This recent M&A movement toward vertical integration involving nontraditional partners suggests that the healthcare industry is undergoing a major transformation, one that will likely alter the landscape in unanticipated ways.

The majority of respondents in our survey say that they expect significant industry impact from these megamergers, led by CVS Health’s merger with Aetna (68%), Walmart’s potential deal with Humana (57%), and Amazon’s partnership with JPMorgan Chase and Berkshire Hathaway (49%). While information regarding the latter two developments is still in short supply, respondents see the potential for large-scale impact.

Faced with such far-reaching and transformative new relationships, what are healthcare providers to do? As things currently stand, even the largest health systems lack the scale to negotiate on equal footing with most insurers, and these new hybrid organizations combine scale, technology, and innovative structures.

However, there is no need for providers to panic—these megamergers are still in the early stages of implementation, and the fundamental mission of healthcare has not changed.

“I don’t think people fully understand the real business purpose of this type of activity yet, or what these organizations are trying to get out of their connections,” says Kevin Brown, president and CEO of Piedmont Healthcare, a Georgia-based nonprofit health system with 11 hospitals and nearly 600 locations. “Time will tell regarding the impact they will have on the industry landscape and its different segments.”

“I haven’t spent a lot of time thinking or worrying about these new developments. Generally, I spend my time thinking about what we are doing on a day-to-day basis as an organization to fulfill our mission and take care of the communities we serve. I’m certainly aware of these developments, but it’s important not to get distracted from our core purpose,” Brown says.

 

 

California Appellate Decision Limits Hospital’s Options For Exclusive Contracts

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On February 4, 2019, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment awarding plaintiff, Dr. Kenneth Economy, substantial damages for his suspension and subsequent termination of his staff privileges at defendant Sutter East Bay Hospitals. The Court of Appeal held that, because Dr. Economy’s termination, even though done under the provisions of an exclusive contract, was based on “medical disciplinary cause or reason,” he was entitled to prior notice and a hearing in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 809 et seq. This decision flies in the face of the underlying premise for exclusive contracts: the ability for a hospital to enter into a contractual arrangement that allows it to set superior metrics in exchange for exclusive rights to provide services. Clinical issues have long been mandated to be within the purview of the medical staff but exclusive contracting gives hospitals the ability to contract for higher standards of quality of care. The severity of the Economy decision calls into question the accepted approach to exclusive contracts.

Background

Dr. Economy was an anesthesiologist who had practiced at Sutter East Bay Hospital for 20 years. The hospital operated a “closed” anesthesiology department pursuant to a contract with the East Bay Anesthesiology Medical Group (“East Bay Group”). Under the contract, East Bay Group exclusively provided administrative and coverage services to the hospital’s anesthesiology departments. Importantly, the parties’ contract authorized the hospital to require that East Bay Group immediately remove from the schedule any physician whose actions jeopardized the quality of care provided to the hospital’s patients. In July 2011, Dr. Economy was found responsible for numerous violations that jeopardized patient safety. Consequently, the hospital’s peer review committee recommended to East Bay Group that Dr. Economy complete a continuing education course through the Physician Assessment and Clinical Education (“PACE”) program. Dr. Economy completed the PACE program. Despite this additional training, he was once again found to have performance issues related to clinical care. The hospital then asked East Bay Group to remove Dr. Economy from its schedule pursuant to the parties’ contract. East Bay Group complied and later terminated his employment. Dr. Economy filed suit against the hospital alleging, among other things, a violation of his right to notice and a hearing under Business and California Professions Code section 8091 as well as his common law right to fair procedure.

Trial Court Finds in Favor of Dr. Economy

The trial court found that the hospital’s action of removing Dr. Economy from the anesthesia schedule was indisputably based on a medical disciplinary cause or reason, which ultimately constituted a summary suspension of his right to exercise his privileges and use the hospital’s facilities. The trial court found that the hospital’s failure to provide Dr. Economy with notice of the charges against him and an opportunity for hearing amounted to a violation of Section 809.5, as well as his common law right to fair procedure. Although the trial court awarded Dr. Economy approximately $4 million in damages, it denied his request for attorney’s fees and costs as a prevailing party under Section 809.9.

Court of Appeal Upholds Trial Court Decision

On appeal, the hospital argued that East Bay Group was not a “peer review body” within the meaning of Section 805 and therefore Dr. Economy’s suspension and termination did not trigger a duty to file a report with the state licensing board or to provide a hearing mandated by such reportable actions, which hearings are triggered by medical staff actions. The hospital also argued, to no avail, that Dr. Economy was not entitled to notice and hearing because he was terminated by his employer, East Bay Group, rather than the hospital. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded by the hospital’s arguments and held that the hospital’s request that Dr. Economy be removed from its anesthesiology schedules was tantamount to a decision to suspend and ultimately revoke his privileges. Because the hospital’s contractual terms with East Bay Group prohibited anesthesiologists from performing services at the hospital if not employed or scheduled by the group, the hospital’s decision effectively terminated his right to exercise clinical privileges at the hospital. Under the hospital’s medical staff bylaws, such a decision could be made only by its medical executive committee (“MEC”) after the provision of notice and an opportunity for hearing before the peer review committee. In Economy, it was undisputed that the hospital did not provide notice or a hearing, nor did the MEC review Dr. Economy’s disciplinary action. The Court also concluded the hospital did not delegate its peer review duties to East Bay Group under the terms of their contract. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the hospital’s medical staff bylaws did not require or authorize a closed department to conduct peer review in lieu of the procedures set forth in its bylaws. The Court further noted that there was no evidence that East Bay Group had any policies or procedures for the conduct of peer reviews. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the hospital was therefore the entity solely responsible for reviewing physician performance pursuant to the contractual relationship. Accordingly, its failure to provide Dr. Economy with notice and an opportunity for hearing was a violation of his statutory and common law rights to due process. The Court of Appeal held that the hospital’s request to remove Dr. Economy from East Bay Group’s anesthesia schedule ultimately constituted a summary suspension of his right to exercise his privileges—a deprivation which could only lawfully be undertaken by way of formal peer review in accordance with Sections 805 and 809.

The Court of Appeal further reasoned that if the hospital were permitted to contract with third-party employers such as East Bay Group, who could suspend and terminate a physician without complying with statutory due process requirements, then a hospital could essentially avoid compliance with such statutes altogether, which would be contrary to public policy. Although it found that Dr. Economy was entitled to notice and a hearing, the Court of Appeal denied his request for attorney’s fees and costs, finding that the hospital’s defense was not frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or asserted in bad faith.

Exclusive Contracting in the Wake of Economy

As the Court of Appeal acknowledged in footnote 3, “[h]ospitals often enter into closed or ‘exclusive contracts . . . with healthcare entity-based physicians such as pathologists, radiologists, and anesthesiologists, . . . for a variety of reasons including (1) improving the efficiency of the healthcare entity; (2) standardization of procedures; (3) securing greater patient satisfaction; (4) assuring the availability of specific services; (5) cost containment; and (6) improving the quality of care.’ (citing to Health Law Practice Guide (2018) Exclusive Contracts, § 2:24.)” However, the Court of Appeal in Economy clearly took issue with the means by which the hospital enforced the provisions of its contract with East Bay Group. It is unknown at this point whether this case will be appealed to the California Supreme Court. Certainly, there are numerous factual distinctions to be made when considering the ramifications of Economy and every situation would require a careful case by case analysis. However, if Economy stands, it will require careful analysis and should encourage hospitals to consider the parameters of their exclusive contract relationships, the terms of those contracts, and even reweigh the benefits of closed departments in connection with their specific circumstances. At the very least, it is apparent that in the wake of Economy a more conservative approach will be to defer clinical issues to the medical staff for any necessary determinations and action.

 

More on the employer health plan churn

https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-vitals-64abbaf8-c86f-4ac1-8561-525b0fd33c25.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosvitals&stream=top

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A lot of readers gave us feedback on yesterday’s lead item about how millions of working Americans lose or change their employer health plans every month, usually through quitting a job or getting fired/laid off.

One point that came up several times: Employees who don’t leave their jobs sometimes have to switch to new health plans, Bob reports.

  • Larry Levitt of the Kaiser Family Foundation reminded us that 61% of companies that offer health benefits shopped around for new employee plans in 2018, and a quarter of them changed insurers, according to KFF’s annual employer survey.
  • Changing or cutting health benefits for current employees is no small matter — doing so was the driving force behind teachers striking in West Virginia last year.

The bottom line: Employer coverage changes all the time, both when people leave their jobs and when companies decide to tinker with their benefits packages.

 

 

 

Wall Street is still selling off health care stocks

https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-vitals-64abbaf8-c86f-4ac1-8561-525b0fd33c25.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosvitals&stream=top

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Yesterday, UnitedHealth Group posted $3.5 billion of profit in the first quarter — its second-most profitable quarter ever — and collected more than $60 billion of revenue, Axios’ Bob Herman reports.

Yes, but: UnitedHealth’s stock price tanked by 4%, which consequently dragged down shares of the other major health insurers and hospital chains. Cigna’s stock price plummeted 8%, and Anthem and Humana were close behind. HCA tumbled 10%.

Driving the news: Wall Street remains fearful of “Medicare for All” becoming a reality, and UnitedHealth CEO Dave Wichmann tried to get ahead of the message by telling investors that single-payer would “jeopardize” people’s care.

  • Many investment bank analysts were perplexed by the sell-off, considering that UnitedHealth has more cash than it knows what to do with.
  • Steven Halper of Cantor Fitzgerald wrote to investors: “What more can you ask for? Take advantage of poor sentiment.”

The big picture: Medicare for All discussions matter far more to Wall Street right now, and that makes the industry’s Q1 financial reports a lot less important.

 

 

 

Red states’ Medicaid gamble: Paying more to cover fewer people

https://www.axios.com/republicans-medicaid-affordable-care-act-expensive-d7057a8e-0a55-4f0d-906e-e42aa3f00ba9.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosvitals&stream=top

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Red states are getting creative as they look for new ways to limit the growth of Medicaid. But in the process those states are taking legal, political and practical risks that could ultimately leave them paying far more, to cover far fewer people.

Why it matters: Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program cover more than 72 million Americans, thanks in part to the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. Rolling back the program is a high priority for the Trump administration, and it needs states’ help to get there.

The big picture: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, under the leadership of Administrator Seema Verma, has made clear that it wants to say “yes” to new limits on Medicaid eligibility, and has invited states to ask for those limits.

  • But CMS hasn’t actually said “yes” yet to some of the most significant limits states have asked for.
  • In the meantime, states are left either with vague ambitions they’re not sure how to implement, or with risky plans that put their own budgets on the line.

What we’re watching: State-level Republicans are waiting for CMS to resolve two related issues: how much federal funding their versions of Medicaid can receive, and the extent to which they’re able to cap enrollment in the program.

  • “These issues are going to continue to be intertwined,” said Joan Alker, the executive director of Georgetown University’s Center for Children and Families.

Verma has reportedly told state officials that she wants to use her regulatory power to convert Medicaid funding into a system of block grants — which would be an enormous rightward shift and probably a big cut in total funding.

  • CMS probably cannot do that on its own, experts said, but it could achieve something similar by approving caps on either enrollment or spending.

Where it stands: GOP lawmakers in a handful of states are looking to Utah, which has bet big on Verma’s authority, for signals about what’s possible.

  • Utah voters approved the full ACA expansion last year, but the state legislature overruled them to pass a more limited version.
  • By foregoing the full expansion, Utah passed up enhanced federal funding. It’s still asking for that extra money — a request CMS has never previously approved.
  • Utah will also ask CMS to impose a per-person cap on Medicaid spending — a steep cut that was part of congressional Republicans’ failed repeal-and-replace bill, and which may strain CMS’ legal authority.
  • If Utah doesn’t get those two requests, its backup plan is simply to adopt the full expansion.

What’s next: Utah is not the only red state leaning into Verma’s agenda, but it’s further out on a limb than any other.

  • Idaho, like Utah, overruled its voters to pass a narrower Medicaid bill. But it preserved an option for people to buy into the ACA’s expansion.
  • Alaska Gov. Mike Dunleavy has said he wants to take Verma up on her offer of block grants; so have legislators in Tennessee and Georgia. But in the absence of any detail about what that means, or what CMS will approve, that’s all pretty vague right now.

If CMS does move forward on any of this, it could face the same threat of lawsuits that have stymied its first big Medicaid overhaul — work requirements.

  • Those rules are on ice in two states because a judge said they contravene Medicaid’s statutory structure and goals. The same argument could await a partial expansion or tough spending caps.

“There’s a clear agenda here to get a handful of states to take up these waivers, which fundamentally undermine the central tenets of the Medicaid program — which [are] that it is a guarantee of coverage, and a guarantee of federal funding,” Alker said.

 

 

 

7 hospital construction projects costing $300M or more

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/facilities-management/7-hospital-construction-projects-costing-300m-or-more.html?origin=cfoe&utm_source=cfoe

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Below are seven hospitals or health systems that recently announced, started or completed construction projects worth more than $300 million in the last two months, reported by Becker’s Hospital Review.

1. MetroHealth breaks ground on 264-bed Cleveland hospital
MetroHealth System in Cleveland broke ground April 15 on an 11-story, 264-bed hospital, part of a $946 million revamp.

2. Mount Carmel to open $361M hospital April 28
Mount Carmel Health System in Columbus, Ohio, will open its $361 million, 210-bed replacement hospital April 28.

3. McLaren Health to close 2 hospitals, consolidate services at new $450M facility
McLaren Greater Lansing (Mich.) will shutter two hospitals in South Lansing when its new consolidated $450 million campus near Michigan State University opens.

4. UPMC starts constructing $400M rehab, vision facility
Pittsburgh-based UPMC Mercy broke ground March 14 on a nine-story rehabilitation and vision tower. It is expected to cost $400 million.

5. New York hospital plans $2B campus revamp
Northwell Health’s Lenox Hill Hospital in New York City is preparing a $2 billion revitalization that will include upgraded clinical areas and residential apartments.

6. Sutter opens 274-bed hospital in San Francisco
California Pacific Medical Center Van Ness Campus, an 11-story, 274-bed hospital owned by Sacramento, Calif.-based Sutter Health, opened in San Francisco March 2. The hospital project cost about $2.1 billion.

7. Penn Medicine alters design of $1.5B pavilion
The design team responsible for Philadelphia-based Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania’s $1.5 billion pavilion has changed its plans for the layout and shape of the building. It is expected to open in 2021.

 

 

Las Vegas hospital doesn’t contract with any payers

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/payer-issues/las-vegas-hospital-doesn-t-contract-with-any-payers.html?origin=cfoe&utm_source=cfoe

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Elite Medical Center, a Las Vegas-based acute care hospital that some experts say is operating similarly to a 24/7 freestanding emergency room, doesn’t contract with any payers, according to the Milbank News.

EMC is a state-licensed hospital. It is an unaccredited hospital that has no agreements with insurers, meaning patients have to pay out-of-network prices for care. Under state law, EMC isn’t required to be accredited by CMS or accept public or private insurance.

On EMC’s website, the medical center states, “This facility is not a participating provider in any health benefit plan provider network. However, under the [ACA], your health insurance company is required to process your emergency visit at in-network benefit levels. The physician providing medical care at this facility may bill separately from the facility for the medical care provided to you.”

While Nevada doesn’t provide licenses for freestanding ERs — though hospitals can open satellite ERs at other locations — EMC obtained a state license to operate as a hospital. As a result, it has to be able to admit patients for 48 hours.

Bill Welch, president and CEO of the Nevada Hospital Association, told Milbank News: “We think that Elite Medical Center, if they want to operate as a hospital in the state, that they should operate as a CMS-certified center and they should be accredited and Medicare participating. Without those things, we’re concerned.”

EMC CEO Butch Frazier defended the hospital in an emailed statement to the publication, saying it often has higher online patient ratings than University Medical Center in Las Vegas.

“EMC tries hard to make sure that the ultimate charges paid by the patients and by the insurers to EMC are in line with what they are paying for the same services at other hospitals in the area,” Mr. Frazier said. He added that EMC is seeking CMS accreditation.

 

8 hospitals closed so far this year — here’s why

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/8-hospitals-closed-so-far-this-year-here-s-why.html?origin=cfoe&utm_source=cfoe

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From reimbursement landscape challenges to dwindling patient volumes, many factors lead hospitals to close.

Here are the factors that led eight hospitals to close so far this year:

1. Belmont Community Hospital, a 99-bed hospital in Bellaire, Ohio, closed April 5. Hospital officials cited a decline in patient volume as the reason for the closure. “Utilization of BCH has continued to decline despite efforts to offer varying services at the facility,” the hospital said in a press release. “The decline has place[d] a financial strain on the BCH that cannot be sustained in the long term.”

2. Kentuckiana Medical Center in Clarksville, Ind., closed April 5. The hospital, which opened in 2009, faced financial losses for years and previously filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, according to the Louisville Courier Journal.

3. Horton (Kan.) Community Hospital closed March 12. The 25-bed critical access hospital, owned by Kansas City, Mo.-based EmpowerHMS, shut down after struggling to pay utilities and missing payroll for several weeks. The hospital entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 14.

4. Georgiana (Ala.) Medical Center closed March 8. Ivy Creek Healthcare in Georgiana, which owns the hospital, cited growing costs and cuts to reimbursement as the reasons for the closure.

5. Cumberland River Hospital in Celina, Tenn., closed March 1. In January, officials announcedthat the hospital was shutting down due to financial challenges. They said Cumberland River Hospital had experienced significant losses in recent years due to declining reimbursements and lower patient volumes.

6. Harrisburg, Pa.-based UPMC Pinnacle closed its hospital in Lancaster, Pa., on Feb. 28. The health system announced plans in December to close UPMC Pinnacle Lancaster and transition inpatient services to another one of its hospitals located about 7 miles away. In a Feb. 15 news release, UPMC Pinnacle President and CEO Philip Guarneschelli said consolidating inpatient services on one campus would make care more convenient for patients.

7. Oswego (Kan.) Community Hospital and its two affiliated clinics closed Feb. 14. A statement from the board announcing the closure said the hospital, owned by Kansas City, Mo.-based EmpowerHMS, wasn’t bringing in enough revenue to cover payroll and other expenses. After the abrupt closure, the hospital entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy on March 17.

8. Washington County Hospital in Plymouth, N.C., closed Feb. 14 after missing payroll on Feb. 8. The critical access hospital is now working its way through the Chapter 7 bankruptcy process. The hospital is one of several facilities owned by Kansas City, Mo.-based EmpowerHMS that has entered bankruptcy or closed in recent months. The Washington County Board of Commissioners is working with state and federal agencies to investigate the hospital’s financial and operational issues and working to restore medical services as the hospital, according to a Feb. 19 public service announcement on Washington County’s website.

 

 

Does Beneficiary Switching Create Adverse Selection For Hospital-Based ACOs?

https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190410.832542/full/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Beneficiary+Switching+And+Hospital-Based+ACOs%3B+Biologics+Are+Natural+Monopolies%3B+An+Average+Lifetime+Earnings+Standard+For+Drug+Prices&utm_campaign=HAT+4-15-19&

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Despite the many uncertainties in the current health care delivery environment, payers and providers continue to demonstrate considerable interest in alternative payment models, including Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) accountable care organizations (ACOs). At the same time, concerns persist about the ability of the MSSP to provide a sustainable pathway toward transformation for health care providers and to generate savings to the Medicare program, a key outcome measure. In fact, an August 2018 Health Affairs blog post by Seema Verma, director of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), concludes that the net financial impact of the program is negative to taxpayers, and that hospital-based ACOs tend to be the drivers of this overall negative performance.

This analysis has influenced recent changes to the MSSP under the “Pathways to Success” rule, with major policy implications for participants and the program’s long-term sustainability. In particular, CMS’s analysis describes physician-led ACOS as low revenue and hospital-based ACOs as high revenue, concluding that the former had net savings of $0.182 billion, while the latter had net losses of $0.231 billion. Similarly, J. Michael McWilliams and colleagues conclude that physician-group ACOs had significantly larger savings than hospital-integrated ACOs. It has been suggested that these differences are due to hospitals continuing to pursue the high-cost activities that physician-led ACOs do not pursue, due to differing reimbursement incentives (for example, hospital revenue is more dependent on admissions, and so care management activities that avoid admissions are less robust in hospital-based ACOs). This finding has influenced new program rules allowing physician-led ACOs to stay in a lower-risk track of the MSSP longer than hospital-based ACOs.

Our MSSP experience at University of Wisconsin (UW) Health—the academic health system partner of the University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health—leads us to believe that there is an alternative explanation for hospital-based ACOs’ seemingly poorer financial performance. Specifically, as Medicare beneficiaries develop new and more complex diseases, the increased utilization they require leads them to facilities that have more specialized care, which may more likely be part of a hospital-based ACO than a physician-led one. 

A Closer Look At The Research

Several recent analyses have countered that the CMS analysis, which assesses program financial performance by comparing ACO spending to a benchmark target below which the ACO may share in savings, does not use a valid counterfactual. A more valid counterfactual would instead compare ACO actual spending to what the same providers’ Medicare spending would have been had they not participated in the ACO program. Analyses using this counterfactual have found that the MSSP has in fact produced savings for the taxpayers overall, although some have also concluded, such as CMS, that hospital-based ACOs perform worse than physician-led ACOs.

More recently, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission analyzed spending at the individual beneficiary level, rather than the ACO level. The analysts found that individuals who were continuously attributed to the same ACO year after year had lower spending growth compared to those whose attribution was switched to a different, existing ACO from one year to the next. At UW Health, our experience as an MSSP ACO from 2013 through 2017 supports this finding and illustrates some of the potential pitfalls in the recent policy changes for MSSP ACOs. 

UW’s Analysis: Adverse Selection Among “Switchers”

UW Health participated in the MSSP Track 1 from 2013 through 2017, before switching to the Next Generation ACO program. We compared patient characteristics and use for the cohort of our attributed beneficiaries older than age 65 for whom we had 12 months of claims data in 2015 and who, in 2016, continued to be attributed to us, versus beneficiaries who were newly attributed to us in 2016 (Exhibit 1).

Exhibit 1: Spending And Use of Continuously And Newly Attributed Medicare Beneficiaries, UW Health ACO, 2015–16

Source: Authors’ analysis. Notes: HCC is Hierarchical Condition Category. PBPY is per beneficiary per year. aHCC scores are calculated to assess patient complexity and risk. A higher score is associated with increased complexity and increased expected cost. Under 2016 MSSP rules, PBPY costs are adjusted based on beneficiary HCC scores calculated from the prior year, adjusted up only for demographic changes. Therefore, the 2016 PBPY average costs in the exhibit reflect risk adjustment using 2015 HCC scores. 

While 96 percent of continuing beneficiaries in 2016 were attributed to us through services from a primary care provider, only 73 percent of those new to the ACO in 2016 received their attribution this way. In other words, more than one in four of the “switchers” were assigned to the ACO due to services from a specialty care provider. Costs for these two populations (calculated from data CMS provides to ACOs as part of program participation) were very different. The average per-beneficiary-per-year (PBPY) cost in 2015 for continuously attributed beneficiaries was $8,123, or $1,380 higher than the newly attributed population’s PBPY cost of $6,743. However, in 2016, the average PBPY cost for continuously attributed beneficiaries was $723 lower than the 2016 average PBPY cost for newly attributed beneficiaries, and costs for the newly attributed cohort rose by 49.3 percent, compared with 15.1 percent for the continuously attributed group. This suggests that the newly attributed beneficiaries experienced a significant change in their health status after being attributed to our ACO, resulting in a dramatic rise in use, and also potentially explaining their high degree of specialty care attribution.

Our findings suggest that adverse selection among individuals whose attribution “switched” into hospital-based ACOs may at least partly explain the differential financial performance of physician-based versus hospital-based ACOs. As noted previously, it is possible that the increased use these patients require leads them to facilities that have more specialized care, which may more likely be part of a hospital-based ACO than a physician-led one. For example, our ACO, made up of not only the faculty physician group but also the hospital and clinics and school of medicine and public health, includes a comprehensive cancer center. Beneficiaries newly attributed to our ACO in 2016 were almost twice as likely to have a new diagnosis of cancer in 2016 compared with continuously attributed beneficiaries (6.1 percent versus 3.3 percent—not shown).

Current MSSP Risk Adjustment May Not Adequately Address The High Complexity Of “Switchers”

Because many of the newly attributed beneficiaries were both high cost during the performance year and low cost during the prior year, they entered our program with low Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores, under the system used by CMS to adjust for risk. In fact, almost 10 percent of newly attributed beneficiaries in 2016 had no health care use at all in 2015 (Exhibit 1). Prior to the Pathways to Success program, negative health status changes for continuously enrolled beneficiaries were not included in risk adjustment. For continuously attributed beneficiaries, CMS adjusted risk scores down from the previous year if the HCC score decreased but used only demographic changes to adjust up. Those beneficiaries who were healthy with little to no health care use in 2015 but with a significant change in health status in 2016 had low HCC scores coming into 2016, despite both high risk and use during the 2016 performance year. As a result, a cohort of relatively high-cost beneficiaries in 2016 would not be accounted for in that year’s risk score, resulting in an unfavorable assessment of an ACO’s true financial performance.

New program rules attempt to address concerns about adequate risk adjustment in the MSSP, allowing for a one-time benchmark increase of up to 3 percent to account for unexpected higher use due to increased complexity and health care needs among all attributed beneficiaries. While this change is generally welcomed by the MSSP community, our experience suggests it may be inadequate to account for the added complexities of switchers. The average HCC score for newly attributed beneficiaries to our ACO was 1.01 (Exhibit 1). These scores are based on the group’s health care use in 2015, when the newly attributed cohort was still “healthy,” but they were used during the 2016 performance year. However, calculated scores from the actual experience of the patients during 2016 reveals an average HCC score of 1.34, again indicating that they experienced significant changes in health status. While the new policy of allowing for an increase helps account for these changes, 3 percent may not be adequate.

Prospective Attribution May Mitigate Some Of The Impact Of Adverse Selection

The methodology for attribution of Medicare beneficiaries to ACOs has been a topic of debate since the inception of the MSSP. Under the original model, individuals were assigned to an ACO based on retrospective attribution, meaning that they received a plurality of their services from primary care providers throughout the performance year. If they received no services from a primary care provider, they could be attributed based on services from a specialty care provider. Over the years, CMS has refined the process to increase the likelihood that attribution is based on services from a primary care provider. This results in an ACO not knowing until after the year is over who exactly are their ACO beneficiaries, making it possible for individuals who were in a different ACO the previous year (or not in an ACO at all) to become part of an ACO without that ACO becoming aware until after the fact.

Some of the newer ACO models, notably the Next Generation ACO program, use prospective attribution, whereby only those beneficiaries who received care from the ACO providers in the prior year can be included in the performance year. This method allows for removal of beneficiaries throughout the year but no additions. Under the previous regulations, beneficiaries in MSSP Track 1 were attributed retrospectively, potentially resulting in ACOs becoming responsible for previously healthy individuals who were not part of the ACO in the prior year but whose health status deteriorated during the performance year, thereby driving up average costs without the ACO having meaningful opportunity to intervene. Under the new MSSP regulations, ACOs annually choose whether beneficiaries are assigned through retrospective or prospective attribution, potentially mitigating some of the adverse selection concern.

Looking Ahead

Going forward, it will be important for policy makers and evaluators alike to consider unique program elements that may result in adverse selection or other untoward consequences that are beyond the control of an individual ACO. In the meantime, CMS and ACO leaders can make some choices that help ameliorate some of the unintended or undesirable consequences. CMS can continue to look for ways to evolve program rules, including consideration of additional risk-adjustment methodologies. ACO leaders can choose prospective attribution to avoid adverse selection, especially if their ACO includes hospitals or large specialty groups. CMS can also eliminate the disparities in the program rules between hospital-based and physician-led ACOs, at least until there is increased clarity around differential performance. Ultimately, continued evaluation and program refinement, allowing for successful participation by all different types of ACOs, will be necessary to ensure that all Medicare beneficiaries receive the highest-quality, affordable care and that the program is a good steward of taxpayer funds.