Medicare Advantage aggressive coding or fraud

https://www.balloon-juice.com/category/mayhew-on-insurance/

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The New York Times has a good story from the 15th on a False Claims Act lawsuit filed by a former United Healthcare employee.  It alleges UHC systemically defrauded the US government of billions from up-coding its Medicare Advantage claims to get bigger risk adjustment payments.  This is a big deal.  Medicare knows that the incentive in Medicare Advantage is to make the patients look as sick as possible to maximize upcoding. A recent estimate has coding differentials leading to a $20 billion dollar a year payment differential between Medicare Advantage and Fee for Service Medicare for intrinsically similar patients.

At the heart of the dispute: The government pays insurers extra to enroll people with more serious medical problems, to discourage them from cherry-picking healthy people for their Medicare Advantage plans. The higher payments are determined by a complicated risk scoring system, which has nothing to do with the treatments people get from their doctors; rather, it is all about diagnoses.

Diabetes, for example, can raise risk scores by varying amounts, depending on a patient’s complications. So UnitedHealth gave people with diabetes intensive scrutiny, to see if they had any other conditions that the diabetes might have caused.

As Mr. Poehling’s lawyer, Mary Inman, described it, the government would pay UnitedHealth $9,580 a year for enrolling a 76-year-old woman with diabetes and kidney failure, for instance, but if the company claimed that her diabetes had actually caused her kidney failure, the payment rose to $12,902 — an additional $3,322. Ms. Inman is with the law firm of Constantine Cannon in San Francisco.

We need to differentiate between aggressive coding and fraud.  The key question in this example is not whether or not UHC got a doctor to say that the kidney failure was caused by diabetes but whether or not the evidence in the chart supports that assertion.

If it is medically supported from the chart, history and corroborating results, this is not fraud.  It is aggressive coding designed to maximize revenue.  If it is not supportable, then it is either fraud or abuse.  That will be the key area of argument.  Does the evidence show that the diagnosis codes that UHC is chasing are supportable by medical evidence?

Betsy Nicoletti is a coding specialist who shared her coding book with me.  I want to highlight a legitimate example of what happens at every health plan that has risk adjusted plans.  The example is about diabetes:

Post-acute care: Medicare Advantage vs. Traditional Medicare

Post-acute care: Medicare Advantage vs. traditional Medicare

From a public spending point of view, post-acute care is particularly problematic. Most of Medicare’s geographic spending variation is due to this type of care. Part of the story is that Medicare pays for post-acute care in several different ways, with different implications for efficiency.

For example, traditional Medicare (TM) — which spends ten percent of its total on post-acute care — pays skilled nursing facilities per diem rates but inpatient rehabilitation facilities a single payment per discharge. Post-acute care is also available through Medicare Advantage (MA), which operates under a global, per-enrollee, payment. Unlike TM, MA plans establish networks, may require prior authorization for post-acute care, and can charge more in cost-sharing for post-acute care than TM does.

These different payment models offer different incentives that may affect who receives care, in what setting, and for how long. In Health Affairs, Peter Huckfeldt, José Escarce, Brendan Rabideau, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Neeraj Sood assessed some of the consequences of those incentives. Focusing on hospital discharges for lower extremity joint replacement, stroke, and heart failure patients between January 2011 and June 2013, they examined subsequent admissions to skilled nursing and inpatient rehabilitation facilities, comparing admission rates, lengths of stays, hospital readmission rates, time spent in the community, and mortality for MA and TM enrollees. To do so, they used CMS data on post-acute patient assessments for patients with discharges from hospitals that received disproportionate share or medical education payments from Medicare.

CMS Checklist For State 1332 Waivers Focuses On High-Risk Pools, Reinsurance

http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/05/12/cms-checklist-for-state-1332-waivers-focuses-on-high-risk-pools-reinsurance/

On May 11, 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Department of the Treasury released a checklist for state 1332 innovation waiver applications. Following up on Health and Human Services Secretary Price’s letter to state governors of March 13, 2017, the checklist specifically focuses on state 1332 proposals to support high-risk pools or reinsurance programs.

Indeed, the checklist begins by stating:

The Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Treasury (the Departments) are interested in working with states on Section 1332 waivers that would lower premiums for consumers, improve market stability, and increase consumer choice. In particular we welcome the opportunity to work with states to pursue Section 1332 waivers incorporating a high-risk pool/state-operated reinsurance program. State-operated reinsurance programs have a demonstrated ability to help lower premiums, and if the state shows a reduction in federal spending on premium tax credits a state could receive Federal pass-through funding to help fund the state’s reinsurance program.

The checklist restates the procedural requirements that states must meet under the current 1332 rules, such as posting a notice of the waiver proposal and accepting comments for at least 30 days, holding two public hearings, and consulting with Indian tribes where relevant.

Most elements in the checklist, however, describe specifically what information states must submit with applications for a 1332 waiver involving a reinsurance or high-risk pool program. While states must generally document state legislative authority to operate a 1332 waiver program, a state seeking a waiver to operate a high-risk pool or reinsurance program must establish that the legislation makes the program contingent on 1332 waiver approval or that the program will only become operational if the waiver is approved. Otherwise, the state would not be able to establish that federal 1332 waiver pass-through funding was necessary for the program.

A state must specify the provisions of the ACA it proposes to waive, which might, a footnote explains, include the ACA’s single-risk pool requirement for a reinsurance or high-risk pool proposal. State 1332 waiver proposals must include economic and actuarial data and analyses documenting the effect of the proposal on coverage and on comprehensiveness and affordability of coverage. A reinsurance/high-risk pool proposal would have to describe a baseline of premiums and coverage without the waiver and then compare this to projections of coverage and premiums under the waiver.

Proposals for 1332 waivers must explain how they would affect federal budget neutrality. A state seeking a reinsurance or high-risk pool waiver must establish a baseline of federal expenditures without the waiver and then show how federal expenditures or revenues for premium tax credits, shared responsibility payments, exchange user fees, and health insurance provider fees would change if the proposal is implemented.

States must further submit a timeline for implementation. They must describe whether they would use a condition-based list for a reinsurance program or an attachment-point-based model and the incentives they would offer providers, insurers, and enrollees to manage health care costs and utilization. They must describe how the program would affect other provisions of the Affordable Care Act and how it would provide out-of-state coverage for those who need it. States must report the actual second-lowest-cost silver benchmark plan premium annually, as well as an estimate of what it would have been without the program. The checklist further states, “For comprehensiveness, if there is no change to the provision of the ten Essential Health Benefits (EHB) identified in the benchmark plan, the state can indicate that it will report on any modifications from federal or state law on an annual basis.”

In sum, the checklist provides a roadmap for states that want to pursue high-risk pool or reinsurance 1332 waiver proposals, indicating again the priority that the Trump administration places on this approach for increasing the affordability of health insurance coverage.

Medicare’s Bundled Payment Programs Suffer From Fatal Flaws, But There Is A Logical Alternative

http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/05/09/medicares-bundled-payment-programs-suffer-from-fatal-flaws-but-there-is-a-logical-alternative/

Several authors from the Brookings Institution recently argued in favor of making Medicare’s Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative mandatory. While the principles guiding their recommendations are sound, the recommendations themselves fail to acknowledge five fatal methodological flaws within the BPCI program. Their analysis also overlooks the most logical and reasonable alternative: a physician-focused episode-of-care payment model.

The ‘Medicaidization’ Of The Health Insurance Marketplaces: A Necessary Trend

http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/05/08/the-medicaidization-of-the-health-insurance-marketplaces-a-necessary-trend/

A woman helps someone sign up for health insurance at healthcare.gov

When stripped of emotion and hyperbole, the debate about repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is fundamentally about how to stretch limited funds to offer health care to two populations in need: the poor, who receive health care through Medicaid, and the “near-poor,” who were frequently without coverage prior to the ACA’s enactment. While millions of the near-poor remain uninsured today, six out of 10 limited-income individuals who purchased health care through the ACA’s health insurance Marketplaces were uninsured prior to the ACA. It is this near-poor and recently insured population, and how to cost-effectively provide health care for them, that is the focus of this post.

Many insurers have ably managed their sicker- and poorer-than-expected Marketplace membership by borrowing from the playbook of the most similar market, Medicaid. In short, we believe that the “Medicaidization” of the Marketplaces is a necessary and positive trend, and we remind policy makers that regardless of legislation or regulatory change, health plans must employ the Medicaidization playbook to well-serve a population that both parties believe needs coverage.

Health insurance Marketplaces—the centerpiece of the ACA—provide health insurance in government-refereed individual and small-group markets. However, health plans offering coverage through Marketplaces have been confronted with challenges. Enrollment is roughly 12 million, far behind original Congressional Budget Office projections of 21 million by 2016. This is largely because fewer employers than expected dropped employee coverage after the law passed and because many younger and healthier people have chosen to remain uninsured or covered by their parents’ insurance. As a whole, Marketplace enrollees are sicker and more costly than expected, and more than 80 percent receive means-tested subsidies to buy down some of their insurance costs. Furthermore, lawsuits and congressional actions have hobbled the ACA’s risk mitigation programs and threaten its subsidies. As a result, several health plans left the Marketplaces in 2017 in many states, and at least one—Humana—will exit entirely in 2018.

While the struggles of the ACA-reformed markets and the insurers that operate within those markets are well-documented, there have also been some success stories. Medicaid-focused health plans, as well as commercial plans that adopted tactics common in the Medicaid market, have performed at near break-even or better while serving the near-poor population in the Marketplaces. The relative success of Medicaid-focused plans in the Marketplaces contrasts with the struggles of national for-profit insurers and has led to the Medicaidization of the Marketplaces.

The term “Medicaidization” is not new to this post. It has been used by others, sometimes with a negative connotation. So it is helpful to define the term more precisely. Medicaidization, as used here, describes a set of practices—from sensitivity to sociocultural issues to utilization management—that have evolved to serve the Medicaid population. Because of socioeconomic disadvantage and poor health, this population responds to its health care needs very differently than other populations. However, the term “Medicaidization” belies the fact that health plans beyond those that focus on Medicaid are capable of deploying these same practices—such as several Blues and provider-owned plans—as described below.

6 Ways Leaders Should Be Like Mothers

6 Ways Leaders Should Be Like Mothers

6 Ways Leaders Should Be Like Mothers

rosie the riveterMother’s Day 2017

Dear Leaders,

Today is a time we set aside to celebrate our mothers. Motherhood is often a thankless and tiring endeavor. It’s easy to take for granted the hard work, sacrifice, and love that moms contribute to our lives. So today we pause to appreciate the countless ways our mothers have positively influenced us and shaped us into the people we are today.

In many ways, moms are the ultimate picture of servant leadership in action. They always have the best interests of their children in mind and will go to great lengths to help them grow, develop, and succeed in life. They are able to harmonize the polarities of unconditional love and tough love, and do so in such a way that their children always know that mom has their back. Mothers are simply amazing leaders.

Using the acronym MOTHER, here are six ways leaders can improve their effectiveness by embodying the characteristics and behaviors of great mothers: