Optum a step ahead in vertical integration frenzy

https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/optum-unitedhealth-vertical-integration-walmart/520410/

Vertical integration is all the rage in healthcare these days, with Aetna, Cigna and Humana making notable plays. 

If the proposed CVS-AetnaCigna-Express Scripts and Humana-Kindred deals are cleared by regulators, the tie-ups will have to immediately face UnitedHealth Group’s Optum, which has been ahead of the curve for years and built out a robust pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) business already along with a care services unit, employing about 30,000 physicians and counting.

UnitedHealth formed Optum by combining existing pharmacy and care delivery services within the company in 2011. Michael Weissel, Group EVP at Optum, told Healthcare Dive the company began by focusing on three core trends in the industry: data analytics, value-based care and consumerism.

Since then, the company has been on an acquisition spree to position itself as a leader in integrated services.

“For the longest time, the market assumed that they were building the Optum business [to spin it out] and what is interesting in the evolution of the industry is that that combination has now set a trend,” Dave Windley, managing director at Jefferies, told Healthcare Dive.

“United has now set the industry standard or trend … to be more vertically integrated and it seems less likely now that United would spin this out … because many of their competitors are now mimicking their strategy by trying to buy into some of the same capabilities,” he said.

Weissel said Optum will continue to push on the three identified trends in the next three to five years, with plans to invest heavily in machine learning, AI and natural language processing.

The question will be whether and how the company can keep its edge.

What Optum is

Optum is a company within UnitedHealth Group, a parent of UnitedHealthcare. Optum’s sister company UnitedHealthcare is perhaps more well known within the industry and with consumers.

However, Optum, a venture that encompasses data analytics, a PBM and doctors, has been gradually building its clout at UnitedHealth Group.

In 2017, the unit accounted for 44% of UnitedHealth Group’s profits.

In 2011, UnitedHealth Group brought together three existing service lines under one master brand. Services are delivered through three main businesses within a business within a business:

  • OptumHealth – the care delivery and ambulatory care capabilities of OptumCare, as well as the care management, behavioral health, and consumer offerings of Optum;
  • OptumInsight – the data and analytics, technology services and health care operations business; and
  • OptumRx – its pharmacy benefit service.

The company focuses on five core capabilities, including data and analytics, pharmacy care services, population health, healthcare delivery and healthcare operations. Services include but are certainly not limited to OptumLabs (research), OptumIQ (data analytics), Optum360 (revenue cycle management), OptumBank (health savings account) and OptumCare (care delivery services).

The Eden Prairie, MN-headquartered company has recently expanded its care delivery services, with much of the growth coming from acquisitions. The past two years have seen Optum expand its footprint into surgical care (Surgical Care Affiliates), urgent care (MedExpress) and primary care (DaVita Medical Group).

It’s a wide pool, but the strategy affords UnitedHealth the opportunity to grab more revenue by expanding its market presence. For example, the DaVita acquisition, which is still pending, allows OptumCare to operate in 35 of 75 local care delivery markets the company has targeted for development, Andrew Hayek, OptumHealth CEO, said on an earnings call in January.

Optum’s strategy of meeting patients where they are and deploying more ambulatory, preventative care services works in concert with its sister company UnitedHealthcare’s goal of reducing high-cost, unnecessary care services, when applicable. If Optum succeeds in creating healthier populations that use lower levels of care more often, that benefits the parent company UnitedHealth Group as UnitedHealthcare spends less money and time on claims processing/payout.

The strategy has been paying off so far.

Three charts that show UnitedHealth’s financial health as it relates to Optum

Optum’s presence has grown as it has steadily increased its percentage of profits for UnitedHealth Group.

Credit: Healthcare Dive / Jeff Byers

In 2011, the first year Optum was configured as it looks today, the company contributed 14.8% of total earnings through operations to UnitedHealth Group with $1.26 billion. That’s about 29 percentage points lower than in 2017, when Optum brought in $6.7 billion in profits on $83.6 billion in revenue.

Broken down, it’s clear that pharmacy services make up the lion’s share of the company’s revenue. In 2017, OptumRx earned $63.8 billion in revenue, fulfilling 1.3 billion prescriptions. OptumRx’s contributions to the company took off in 2015 when Optum acquired pharmacy benefit manager Catamaran.

Credit: Healthcare Dive / Jeff Byers

In recent years, OptumHealth has grown due to expansion in care delivery services, including consumer engagement and behavioral and population health management. The care delivery arm served 91 million people last year, up from 60 million in 2011.

OptumInsight has grown largely due to an increase in revenue cycle management and operations services in recent years.

On Wall Street, UnitedHealth Group is performing well and has seen healthy growth since 2008. The stock peaked in January and took a dive when Amazon, J.P. Morgan and Berkshire Hathaway — industry outsiders yet financial giants — announced they would create a healthcare company.

Credit: Healthcare Dive / Jeff Byers

While these charts suggest a dominant force, the stock activity shows that investors believe there’s still more room for competition, if the new entrants play their cards right.

Where Optum could lock out and rivals could cut in on competition

UnitedHealth started down this strategic path many years ago and the rest of the industry just now seems to be catching up.

“Optum’s been the leader in showing how a managed care organization with an ambulatory care delivery platform and a pharmacy benefit manager all in house can lower or maintain and bend cost trend and then drive better market share gains in their health insurance business,” Ana Gupte, managing director of healthcare services at Leerink, told Healthcare Dive. “I think they have been the impetus in the large space for the Aetna-CVS deal.”

Because the company is multi-dimensional, Optum’s competition will be varied. If all the mergers making news — including the Walmart’s rumored buyout of Humana — close, here’s what competition could look like:

Perhaps oddly, its largest revenue contributor, OptumRx, seems to have the largest vulnerability for competition in the coming years.

Optum’s competitive advantage in the PBM space is driven largely by already realized integration. Merging data across IT systems is no easy task, and Optum has spent years harmonizing pharmacy data across platforms to assist care managers in OptumCare to see medical records for United members.

Anyone with experience implementing EHR systems can tell you such integration doesn’t happen over night.

If the Cigna-Express Scripts deal closes, the equity can compete with OptumRx, but the technology investment needed to harmonize data and embed Cigna’s service and pharmacy information into Express Scripts servers will take time, Windley said. Optum, on the other hand, has invested in the effort and integration for years.

Gupte says the encroaching organizations in the PBM space have the ability to realize the efficiencies and savings and the integrated medical that Optum has been realizing across OptumRx and the managed care organization.

Optum’s leg up in PBM space could last two to three years over the competition, she said.

On the care delivery side, OptumHealth has been purchasing large physician groups for a variety of services. There are only so many large physician groups putting themselves on the market, and Optum has been making bids for them.

There’s still a bit of white space to fill in its 75 target markets, but analysts note Optum may have the competition on lock in this space

Even if CVS-Aetna closes, OptumCare is a $12 billion business with many urgent and surgery care access points. If CVS-Aetna is finalized, the company will have about 1,100 MinuteClinics capable of realizing efficiencies with Aetna, but, as Windley notes, they likely won’t have primary care or surgery care elements.

There’s also a lot of time and capital needed for building out and retrofitting retail space to medical areas.

On the surgical care services, “I don’t see either Cigna, Aetna or Humana getting into that business,” Gupte said. “That will be one element of their footprint on care delivery that will be unique and differentiated for them.”

Urgent care has the potential for outsider competition, she added. However, Optum is using its MedExpress business to treat higher acuity conditions and have an ER doctor on staff in each center. Compared to the typical types of conditions treated in retail clinics or those that would be feasible over time, Gupte believes services that could be seen in CVS or Walmart would be lower acuity, chronic care management services.

“[Optum has] been so proactive and so strategic I don’t think there’s going to be a lot of reactive catchup they have to do,” Gupte said. “I think it’s going to be hard for the other entities to play catch up, outside of the PBM.”

One potential issue will be harmonizing the disparate businesses so patients can be effectively managed across the various organizations, Trevor Price, founder and CEO of Oxean Partners, told Healthcare Dive.

“I think the biggest challenge for Optum is operationalizing the combined platform,” Price said. “The biggest question is do they continue to operate as individual businesses or do they merge into one.”

What’s next?

Optum will continue to explore ground in the three core trends it has identified.

Out of the three, consumerism has the longest path to maturity in healthcare, Weissel said, adding he believes consumerism is going to change healthcare more than any other trend over the next decade.

“There is a wave coming, and this expectation that we will move there,” he said. “Increasingly, this aging of people who become very comfortable in a different modality is going to tip the balance with how people will want to interact with healthcare. I know there’s pent up demand already.”

That means the company is putting bets into the marketplace around consumer building and segmentation models as well as thinking about how to connect data to allow patients to schedule appointments, view health records, sign up for insurance, search for providers or renew prescriptions online.

Consumer-centric projects currently underway include digital weight loss programs — including streaming fitness classes — and maternity programs to track pregnancy. The company is also experimenting with remote patient monitoring to understand the impacts on those with heart disease or asthma and to search for service opportunities.

Optum will pursue investments as well as acquisitions to push into the consumer space.

“When it comes to acquisitions to Optum overall, we’re always in the marketplace looking to extend our capabilities, to extend our reach in the care management space to fill in holes or gaps that we have,” Weissel said. “That’s a constant process in our enterprise.”

 

 

 

 

Healthcare as a zero-sum game: 7 key points

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/healthcare-as-a-zero-sum-game-7-key-points.html?origin=cfoe&utm_source=cfoe

This article sets out seven thoughts on healthcare systems.

The article discusses:

  1. Types of Healthcare Systems
  2. Mergers and Key Questions to Assess Mergers
  3. Headwinds Facing Systems
  4. The Great Fear of Systems
  5. What has Worked the Last 10 Years
  6. What is Likely to Work the Next 10 Years
  7. A Few Other Issues

Before starting the core of the article, we note two thoughts. First, we view a core strategy of systems to spend a great percentage of their time on those things that currently work and bring in profits and revenues. As a general rule, we advise systems to spend 70 to 80 percent of their time doubling down on what works (i.e., their core strengths) and 20 to 30 percent of their time on new efforts.

Second, when we talk about healthcare as a zero-sum game, we mean the total increases in healthcare spend are slowing down and there are greater threats to the hospital portion of that spend. I.e., the pie is growing at a slower pace and profits in the hospital sector are decreasing.

I. Types of Healthcare Systems

We generally see six to eight types of healthcare systems. There is some overlap, with some organizations falling into several types.

1. Elite Systems. These systems generally make U.S. News & World Report’s annual “Best Hospitals” ranking. These are systems like Mayo Clinic, Cleveland Clinic, Johns Hopkins Hospital, NewYork-Presbyterian, Massachusetts General, UPMC and a number of others. These systems are often academic medical centers or teaching hospitals.

2. Regionally Dominant Systems. These systems are very strong in their geographic area. The core concept behind these systems has been to make them so good and so important that payers and patients can’t easily go around them. Generally, this market position allows systems to generate slightly higher prices, which are important to their longevity and profitability.

3. Kaiser Permanente. A third type of system is Oakland-based Kaiser Permanente itself. We view Kaiser as a type in and of itself since it is both so large and completely vertically integrated with Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and Permanente Medical Groups. Kaiser was established as a company looking to control healthcare costs for construction, shipyard and steel mill workers for the Kaiser industrial companies in the late 1930s and 1940s. As companies like Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway and JPMorgan Chase try to reduce costs, it is worth noting that they are copying Kaiser’s purpose but not building hospitals. However, they are after the same goal that Kaiser originally sought. Making Kaiser even more interesting is its ability to take advantage of remote and virtual care as a mechanism to lower costs and expand access to care.

4. Community Hospitals. Community hospitals is an umbrella term for smaller hospital systems or hospitals. They can be suburban, rural or urban. Community hospitals are often associated with rural or suburban markets, but large cities can contain community hospitals if they serve a market segment distinct from a major tertiary care center. Community hospitals are typically one- to three-hospital systems often characterized by relatively limited resources. For purposes of this article, community hospitals are not classified as teaching hospitals — meaning they have minimal intern- and resident-per-bed ratios and involvement in GME programs.

5. Safety-Net Hospitals. When we think of safety-net hospitals, we typically recall hospitals that truly function as safety nets in their communities by treating the most medically vulnerable populations, including Medicaid enrollees and the uninsured. These organizations receive a great percentage of revenue from Medicaid, supplemental government payments and self-paying patients. Overall, they have very little commercial business. Safety-net hospitals exist in different areas, urban or rural. Many of the other types of systems noted in this article may also be considered safety-net systems.

6. National Chains. We divide national chains largely based on how their market position has developed. National chains that have developed markets and are dominant in them tend to be more successful. Chains tend to be less successful when they are largely developed out of disparate health systems and don’t possess a lot of market clout in certain areas.

7. Specialty Hospitals. These are typically orthopedic hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, women’s hospitals, children’s hospital or other types of hospitals that specialize in a field of medicine or have a very specific purpose.

II. Mergers and Acquisitions

There have seen several large mergers over the last few years, including those of Aurora-Advocate, Baylor Scott & White-Memorial Hermann, CHI-Dignity and Mercy-Bon Secours, among others.

In evaluating a merger, the No. 1 question we ask is, “Is there a clear and compelling reason or purpose for the merger?” This is the quintessential discussion piece around a merger. The types of compelling reasons often come in one of several varieties. First: Is the merger intended to double down and create greater market strength? In other words, will the merger make a system regionally dominant or more dominant?

Second: Does the merger make the system better capitalized and able to make more investments that it otherwise could not make? For example, a large number of community hospitals don’t have the finances to invest in the health IT they need, the business and practices they need, the labor they need or other initiatives.

Third: Does the merger allow the amortization of central costs? Due to a variety of political reasons, many systems have a hard time taking advantage of the amortization of costs that would otherwise come from either reducing numbers of locations or reducing some of the administrative leadership.

Finally, fourth: Does the merger make the system less fragile?

Each of these four questions tie back to the core query: Does the merger have a compelling reason or not?

III. Headwinds

Hospitals face many different headwinds. This goes into the concept of healthcare as a zero-sum game. There is only so much pie to be shared, and the hospital slice of pie is being attacked or threatened in various areas. Certain headwinds include:

1. Pharma Costs. The increasing cost of pharmaceuticals and the inability to control this cost particularly in the non-generic area. Here, increasingly the one cost area that payers are trying to merge with relates to pharma/PBM the one cost that hospitals can’t seem to control is pharma costs. There is little wonder there is so much attention paid to pharma costs in D.C.

2. Labor Costs. Notwithstanding all the discussions of technology and saving healthcare through technology, healthcare is often a labor-intensive business. Human care, especially as the population ages, requires lots of people — and people are expensive.

3. Bricks and Mortar. Most systems have extensive real estate costs. Hospitals that have tried to win the competitive game by owning more sites on the map find it is very expensive to maintain lots of sites.

4. Slowing Rises in Reimbursement – Federal and Commercial. Increasingly, due to federal and state financial issues, governments (and interest by employers) have less ability to keep raising healthcare prices. Instead, there is greater movement toward softer increases or reduced reimbursement.

5. Lower Commercial Mix. Most hospitals and health systems do better when their payer mix contains a higher percentage of commercial business versus Medicare or Medicaid. In essence, the greater percentage of commercial business, the better a health system does. Hospital executives have traditionally talked about their commercial business subsidizing the Medicare/Medicaid business. As the population ages and as companies get more aggressive about managing their own healthcare costs, you see a shift — even if just a few percentage points — to a higher percentage of Medicare/Medicaid business. There is serious potential for this to impact the long-term profitability of hospitals and health systems. Big companies like JPMorgan, Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway and some other giants like Google and Apple are first and foremost seeking to control their own healthcare costs. This often means steering certain types of business toward narrow networks, which can translate to less commercial business for hospitals.

6. Cybersecurity and Health IT Costs. Most systems could spend their entire budgets on cybersecurity if they wanted to. That’s impossible, of course, but the potential costs of a security breach or incident loom large and there are only so many dollars to cover these costs.

7. The Loss of Ancillary Income. Health systems traditionally relied on a handful of key specialties —cardiology, orthopedics, spine and oncology, for example — and ancillaries like imaging, labs, radiation therapy and others to make a good deal of their profits. Now ancillaries are increasingly shifted away from systems toward for-profits and other providers. For example, Quest Diagnostics and Laboratory Corporation of America have aggressively expanded their market share in the diagnostic lab industry by acquiring labs from health systems or striking management partnerships for diagnostic services.

8. Payers Less Reliant on Systems. Payers have signaled less reliance on hospitals and health systems. This headwind is indicated in a couple of trends. One is payers increasingly buying outpatient providers and investing in many other types of providers. Another is payers looking to merge with pharmaceutical providers or pharmacy and benefit managers.

9. Supergroups. Increasingly in certain specialties and multispecialty groups, especially orthopedics and a couple other specialties, there is an effort to develop strong “super groups.” The idea of some of these super groups is to work toward managing the top line of costs, then dole out and subcontract the other costs. Again, this could potentially move hospitals further and further downstream as cost centers instead of leaders.

IV. The Great Fear

The great fear of health systems is really twofold. First: that more and more systems end up in bankruptcy because they just can’t make the margins they need. We usually see this unfold with smaller hospitals, but over the last 20 years, we have seen bankruptcies periodically affect big hospital systems as well. (Here are 14 hospitals that have filed for bankruptcy in 2018 to date. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, at least 26 nonprofit hospitals across the nation are already in default or distress.)

Second, and more likely, is that hospitals in general become more like mid-level safety net systems for certain types of care — with the best business moving away. I.e., as margins slide, hospitals will handle more and more of the essential types of care. This is problematic, in that many hospitals and health systems have infrastructures that were built to provide care for a wide range of patient needs. The counterpoint to these two great fears is that there is a massive need for healthcare and healthcare is expensive. In essence, there are 325,700,000 people in the United States, and it’s not easy to provide care for an aging population.

V. The Last 10 Years – What Worked

What has worked over the last five to 10 years is some mix of the following:

  1. Being an elite system has remained a recipe for financial success.
  1. Being regionally dominant has been a recipe for success.
  1. Being very special at something or being very great at something has been a recipe for success.
  1. Being great in high paying specialties like orthopedics, oncology, and spine has been a recipe for success.
  1. Systems have benefited where they provide extensive ancillaries to make great profits.

VI. The Next 10 Years

Over the next 10 years, we advise systems to consider the following.

  1. Double down on what works.
  1. Do not give up dominance where they have it. Although it may be politically unpopular and expensive to maintain, dominance remains important.
  1. Systems will need a new level of cost control. For years hospitals focused on expanding patient volume, expanding revenue and enlarging their footprint. Now cost control has surpassed revenue growth as the top priority for hospital and health system CEOs in 2018.
  1. Systems will have to be great at remote and virtual care. More and more patients want care where and when they want it.
  1. Because there will be so much change, systems must continue to have great leadership and great teams to adjust and remain successful.
  1. As systems become more consumer-centric, hospitals will have to lead with great patient experience and great patient navigation. These two competencies have to become systemwide strengths for organizations to excel over the next decade.

VII. Other Issues

Other issues we find fascinating today are as follows.

1. First, payers are more likely to look at pharma and pharma benefit companies as merger partners than health systems. We think this is a fascinating change that reflects a few things, including the role and costs of pharmaceuticals in our country, the slowly lessening importance of health systems, and payers’ disinterest in carrying the costs of hospitals.

2. Second, for many years everyone wanted to be Kaiser. What’s fascinating today is how Kaiser now worries about Amazon, Apple and other companies that are doing what Kaiser did 50 to 100 years ago. In essence, large companies’ strategies to design their own health systems, networks or clinics to reduce healthcare costs and provide better care is a force that once created legacy systems like Kaiser and now threatens those same systems.

3. Third, we find politicians are largely tone deaf. On one side of the table is a call for a national single payer system, which at least in other countries of large size has not been a great answer and is very expensive. On the other hand, you still have politicians on the right saying just “let the free market work.” This reminds me of people who held up posters saying, “Get the government out of my Medicare.” We seem to be past a true and pure free market in healthcare. There is some place between these two extremes that probably works, and there is probably a need for some sort of public option.

4. Fourth, care navigation in many elite systems is still a debacle. There is still a lot of room for improvement in this area, but unfortunately, it is not an area that payers directly tend to pay for.

5. Fifth, we periodically hear speakers say “this app is the answer” to every problem. I contrast that by watching care given to elderly patients, and I think the app is unlikely to solve that much. It is not that there is not room for lots of apps and changes in healthcare — because there is. However, healthcare remains as a great mix of technology and a labor- and care-intensive business.

 

Hospital mergers and acquisitions: They keep happening but let’s face it, the big ones rarely work

https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/hospital-mergers-and-acquisitions-they-keep-happening-lets-face-it-big-ones-rarely-work?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWlRsa05XRmlObVl4WVRReCIsInQiOiJ5bFRKWGVoSGdPZStLb3Y2TWc4NmNhRkwzaWo4UncxcUR2ZzUzQUpycWpOcTlDamxkRDFWano2YXI4bUlLVGRRWStZN1B6K21ZRTg3aENUaW02ZHVHak9SU3BYRnJDRXFWNFd3R05jaEY2R2FPMzdLWDIzRE1PYlRZVlcyOHJRMiJ9

 

The first installment of our two-part series looks at many of the things that can, and commonly do, go wrong.

Mergers and acquisitions have been a common occurrence in healthcare for years now, and of late, mega-mergers have become the norm — giant organizations that join forces, often in an attempt to leverage their newfound scale and keep dollars flowing in.

The problem is that these mega-mergers often don’t deliver on their promises. Organizations want more negotiating power when hashing out contracts with insurance companies, and they rarely get it. Credit ratings are being downgraded. Costs often rise, quality deteriorates, and some companies want out of these deals altogether six or seven years down the road.

Others work out just fine, of course, but for every healthcare entity that sees success in these deals, there’s another which just bet the farm and lost it.

The mission then becomes: How to avoid that fate?

HARD LOOK AT REALITY

RIta Numerof, PhD, president of healthcare consulting firm Numerof and Associates, expects a rocky road going forward. Mergers are difficult to do well under normal circumstances, but a mega-merger is rarely a normal circumstance — it’s more complex, and more challenging to do well given that the healthcare industry is going through a fairly big transition.

In most of these scenarios, said Numerof, the intent was honorable. They wanted to lower costs and improve quality and do better by the consumers who depend on them. That’s the message that’s expressed publicly, anyway, and the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have generally been willing to accept these sentiments.

Numerof said regulators should be taking a closer look at whether these deals are sound from a financial perspective, and in fact will deliver on that promise.

“I am very skeptical of this,” she said. “The reality is that around 40 percent of M&A in general, across industries, fail to deliver on the financial performance that the parents coming together in the first place wanted to achieve. The fact that there is so much evidence against the likelihood of success should be a data point the Department of Justice takes into account.”

A lot of the healthcare mergers that have taken place over the past five to eight years have been a response to the Affordable Care Act, said Numerof, and were intended as a bulwark against negotiations with insurance companies, essentially giving the buyers more negotiating clout when coming to the table as contract rates are being revisited.

It has also, she said, become a mechanism for these delivery systems to put more pressure on independent physicians, something of a dying breed in the industry.

The issue for these merging organizations is that, while they feel there’s safety in numbers, the deals add another layer of complexity into their business models.

CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS

Even under the best circumstances, M&A often fails to live up to the promise that was established.

“It’s because merger and acquisition integration, which would allow these mergers to realize the potential behind them, requires an enormous amount of work, and most organizations don’t take into account the time that’s required, the focus that’s required, and some of the cultural dynamics that are going to be at play,” said Numerof. “And many don’t take these considerations into account when they evaluate potential partners.”

When these deals are completed, there’s often a “glow” that follows, with a general sentiment that the decision will be good for business. Then reality sets in.

As an example, there’s one very successful pharmaceutical company that has a set of products centered around a speciality disease. The company was acquired for a significant chunk of change by one of the major pharma companies, which promised the smaller company that, due to its success, it would be allowed to operate as independently as possible.

Less than a year later, the company is being broken apart, and the components are being integrated into the infrastructure of the larger company. That has led to some bureaucratic overlay, and defections from people who don’t want to work for a larger company.

In some cases, mergers occur and then the participating parties want to jump ship.

“You have companies coming together, healthcare systems that came together with a lot of fanfare, and after about five to seven years they all agree this was not a good situation, and the company divests all of the assets and individual units,” said Numerof. “So this is very expensive, and not necessarily very good for the community.”

Size is almost never protective, she said. Bond ratings are going down. Some deals, like CVS-Aetna, which was recently approved by the DOJ, will have to do things very different than they have historically in order to be successful — and that will be a struggle in a challenging market environment.

PROPOSAL

In order to avoid risk, there are certain elements companies should consider.

“One of the first tenets is you’ve got to be very clear when defining the joined vision of the company, and articulate how the separate histories of these companies is going to come together to create a different whole,” said Numerof.

“One of the key points here is the strength of each of the companies. When two companies are weak, it’s like entering into a marriage. With two weak people, it doesn’t work. If you have strong companies coming together strategically because they both see opportunities for growth, where they can leverage each others’ trends, that puts them in a much better position.”

There are always opportunities for cost reduction, but they’ve got to have a new business model. That model has to take into account a new go-to-market strategy, and take into account what’s going to happen in terms of the portfolio — how customers are going to be taken care of, are what the infrastructure requirements are going to be.

An important consideration is redefining core roles and competencies, and sorting out which core values will endure in the combined entity. That will essentially be the glue that holds the enterprise together, and it will require communication; management structure will be crucially important in making the endeavor work long-term.

They’re all factors to consider, especially given that Numerof expects more mega-mergers in the future.

“I think we’re going to see more mega-mergers until the DOJ says,’This is not in the best interest of consumers, the economy, and the ability to compete,'” she said.

BETH ISRAEL, LAHEY HEALTH MERGER GETS FTC, MASSACHUSETTS AG’S APPROVAL

https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/beth-israel-lahey-health-merger-gets-ftc-massachusetts-ags-approval?utm_source=silverpop&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ENL_181130_LDR_BRIEFING%20(1)&spMailingID=14711589&spUserID=MTY3ODg4NTg1MzQ4S0&spJobID=1522364043&spReportId=MTUyMjM2NDA0MwS2

he condition-laden approval stipulates a seven-year price cap that guarantees that the merged health system’s price increases will be kept below the state’s healthcare cost growth benchmarks.


KEY TAKEAWAYS

The Federal Trade Commission calls the merger ‘a close call’ but defers to state regulators.

The merged health system will provide $71 million for care in underserved areas.

The merged, 13-hospital health system will be one of the largest in the Bay State.

The proposed merger of Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Lahey Health System cleared a huge hurdle today when Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey announced her conditional support.

The approval comes with what Healey called an “unprecedented” seven-year price cap that guarantees that the merged health system’s price increases will be kept below the state’s Health Care Cost Growth benchmark.

“Through this settlement, Beth Israel Lahey Health will cap its prices, strengthen safety net providers across the region, and invest in needed behavioral health services,” Healey said in a media release.

“These enforceable conditions, combined with rigorous monitoring and public reporting, create the right incentives to keep care in community settings and ensure all our residents can access the high-quality health care they deserve,” she said.

The deal also cleared a key federal hurdle when the Federal Trade Commission voted to close its investigation in light of Healey’s agreement.

“The assessment of whether to take enforcement action was a close call. However, based on Commission staff’s work and in light of the settlement obtained by the Massachusetts AG, we have decided to close this investigation,” the FTC said in a media release.

Kevin Tabb, MD, CEO of Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, who will serve as CEO of Beth Israel Lahey Health, called the state and federal approvals “an important step forward in making our vision a reality.”

“We appreciate the enormous effort that the Attorney General, her staff and the Federal Trade Commission have devoted to our proposal.  We share their commitment to health care innovation in Massachusetts, and we are eager to build on the strengths of our legacy organizations and deliver on our promise to our patients, their families and our communities,” Tabb said.

Massachusetts’ Health Care Cost Growth benchmark controls the annual growth of total medical spending in the state and is now set at 3.1%. Over the seven-year term, the cap will avoid more than $1 billion of the potential cost increases projected by the state’s Health Policy Commission.

When finalized, the merged, 13-hospital health system will be will one of the largest in the Bay State.

The merger push began in 2017, with Beth Israel and Lahey justifying the consolidation as a market-based attempt to address rising costs, price disparities, and healthcare access issues.

However, the deal has faced headwinds since its inception.

Even as late as this September, the Massachusetts Health Policy Commission noted that the merger would create a health system roughly the same size as Partner’s HealthCare System, the state’s largest health system, which would “increase substantially” market concentration in eastern Massachusetts.

“BILH’s enhanced bargaining leverage would enable it to substantially increase commercial prices that could increase total healthcare spending by an estimated $128.4 million to $170.8 million annually for inpatient, outpatient, and adult primary care services,” MHPC said.

In addition, the commission said spending on specialty physician services could increase by as much as $60 million annually if the merged health system obtains similar prices increases for those services.

“These would be in addition to the price increases the parties would have otherwise received,” the commission wrote. “These figures are likely to be conservative. The parties could obtain these projected price increases, significantly increasing healthcare spending, while remaining lower-priced than Partners.”

Those concerns appeared to have been alleviated on Thursday, when MHPC Commissioner Martin Cohen said “the investments required by the settlement will have a real impact on access to treatment for mental health and substance use disorders for patients across Eastern Massachusetts.”

Healey’s assurance of discontinuance also includes requirements that the merged Beth Israel Lahey Health pledge $71.6 million to support healthcare services for underserved areas.

The deal also requires BILH to strengthen its commitment to MassHealth; engage in business planning with its safety net hospital affiliates; enhance access to mental health and substance use disorder treatment; and retain a third-party monitor to ensure compliance with the terms.

The deal exempts affiliated safety net hospitals from the price-cap constraints. Lawrence General Hospital CEO Dianne J. Anderson said the exemption for her safety net will “ensure a commitment to joint, long-term planning for distribution of health care resources across the region.”

The $71.6 million that BILH will spend over eight years for underserved areas will include:

  • $41 million to fund affiliated community health centers and safety net hospitals, which guarantees support at the systems’ historic levels.
  • At least $8.8 million in additional financial support for affiliated community health centers and safety net hospitals.
  • At least $5 million in strategic investment to expand access to healthcare for low-income communities through community health centers.
  • At least $16.9 million to develop and expand behavioral health services across the BILH system.

“THROUGH THIS SETTLEMENT, BETH ISRAEL LAHEY HEALTH WILL CAP ITS PRICES, STRENGTHEN SAFETY NET PROVIDERS ACROSS THE REGION, AND INVEST IN NEEDED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES.”

 

When Hospitals Merge to Save Money, Patients Often Pay More

Image result for hospital mergers

 

 

Why Wealth Is Determined More by Power Than Productivity

Why Wealth Is Determined More by Power Than Productivity

According to a new OECD working paper, Britain is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. Net wealth is estimated to stand at around $500,000 per household – more than double the equivalent figure in Germany, and triple that in the Netherlands. Only Luxembourg and the USA are wealthier among OECD countries.

On one level, this isn’t too surprising – Britain has long been a wealthy country. But in recent decades Britain’s economic performance has been poor. Decades of economic mismanagement have left the UK lagging far behind other advanced economies. British workers are now 29% less productive than workers in France, and 35% less than in Germany. How can this discrepancy between high levels of wealth and low levels of productivity be explained?

The process of how wealth is accumulated has been subject of much debate throughout history. If you pick up an economics textbook today, you’ll probably encounter a narrative similar to the following: wealth is created when entrepreneurs combine the factors of production – land, labour and capital – to create something more valuable than the raw inputs. Some of this surplus may be saved, increasing the stock of wealth, while the rest is reinvested in the production process to create more wealth.

How the fruits of wealth creation should be divided between capital, land and labour has been subject of considerable debate throughout history. In 1817, the economist David Ricardo described this as “the principal problem in political economy”.

Nowadays, however, this debate attracts much less attention. That’s because modern economic theory has developed an answer to this problem, called ‘marginal productivity theory’. This theory, developed at the end of the 19th century by the American economist John Bates Clark, states that each factor of production is rewarded in line with its contribution to production. Marginal productivity theory describes a world where, so long as there is sufficient competition and free markets, all will receive their just rewards in relation to their true contribution to society. There is, in Milton Friedman’s famous terms, “no such thing as a free lunch”.

The aim was to develop a theory of distribution that was based on scientific ‘natural laws’, free from political or ethical considerations. As Bates Clark wrote in his seminal book, ‘The Distribution of Wealth’:

“[i]t is the purpose of this work to show that the distribution of income to society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked without friction, would give to every agent of production the amount of wealth which that agent creates”.

Seen in this light, wealth accumulation is a positive sum game – higher levels of wealth reflect superior productive capacity, and people generally get what they deserve. There is some truth to this, but it is only a very small part of the picture. When it comes to how wealth is created and distributed, many other forces are at work.

Wealth, property, and plunder

The measure of wealth used by the OECD is ‘mean net wealth per household’. This is the value of all of the assets in a country, minus all debts. Assets can be physical, such as buildings and machinery, financial, such as shares and bonds, or intangible, such as intellectual property rights.

But something can only become an asset once it has become property – something that can be alienated, priced, bought and sold. What is considered as property has varied across different jurisdictions and time periods, and is intimately bound up with the evolution of power and class relations.

For example, in 1770 wealth in the southern United States amounted to 600% of national income – more than double the equivalent figure in the northern United States. This stark difference in wealth can summed up by one word: slavery.

For white slave owners in the South, black slaves were physical property – commodities to be owned and traded. And just like any other type of asset, slaves had a market price. As the below chart shows, the appalling scale of slavery meant that enslaved people were the largest source of private wealth in the southern United States in 1770.

When the United States finally abolished slavery in 1865, people who had formerly been slaves ceased to be counted as private property. As a result, slaveowners lost what had previously been their prized possessions, and overnight over half of the wealth in the southern US essentially vanished. All of a sudden, the southern states were no longer “wealthier” than their northern neighbours.

But did the southern states really become any less wealthy in any meaningful sense? Obviously not – the amount of labour, capital and natural resources remained the same. What changed was the rights of certain individuals to exercise an exclusive claim over these resources.

But the wealth that had been generated by slave labour did not disappear, and it wasn’t only the USA that benefitted from this. Many of Britain’s major cities and ports were built with money that originated in the slave trade. Several major banks, including Barclays and HSBC, can trace their origins to the financing of the slave trade, or the plundering of other countries’ resources. Many of Britain’s great properties, which today make up a significant proportion of household wealth, were built on the back of slave wealth. Even today, many millionaires (including many politicians) can trace some of their wealth to the slave trade.

The lesson here is that aggregate wealth is not simply a reflection of the process of accumulation, as theory tends to imply. It is also a reflection of the boundaries of what can and cannot be alienated, priced, bought and sold, and the power dynamics that underpin them. This is not just a historical matter.

Today some goods and services are provided by private firms on a commodified basis, whereas others are provided socially as a collective good. This can often vary significantly between countries. Where a service is provided by private firms (for example, healthcare in the USA), shareholder claims over profits are reflected in the firm’s value – and these claims can be bought and sold, for example on the stock market. These claims are also recorded as financial wealth in the national accounts.

However, where a service is provided socially as a collective good (such as the NHS in the UK), there are no claims over profits to be owned and traded among investors. Instead, the claims over these sectors are socialised. Profits are foregone in favour of free, universal access. Because these benefits are non-monetary and accrue to everyone, they are not reflected in any asset prices and are not recorded as “wealth” in the national accounts.

A similar effect is observed with pension provision: while private pensions (funded through capital markets) are included as a component of financial wealth in the OECD’s figures, public pensions (funded from general taxation) are excluded. As a result, a country that provides generous universal public pensions will look less wealthy than a country that rely solely on private pensions, all else being equal. The way that we measure national wealth is therefore skewed towards commodification and privatisation, and against socialisation and universal provision.

Capital gains, labour losses

The amount of wealth does not just depend on the number of assets that are accumulated – it also depends on the value of these assets. The value of assets can go up and down over time, otherwise known as capital gains and losses. The price of an asset such as a share in a company or a physical property reflects the discounted value of the expected future returns. If the expected future return on an asset is high, then it will trade at a higher price today. If the expected future return on an asset falls for whatever reason, then its price will also fall.

Marginal productivity theory states that each factor of production will be rewarded in line with its true contribution to production. But although presented as an objective theory of distribution, marginal productivity theory has a strong normative element. It says nothing about the rules and laws that govern the ownership and use of the factors of production, which are essentially political variables. For example, rules that favour capitalists and landlords over workers and tenants, such as repressive trade union legislation and weak tenants’ rights, increase returns on capital and land. All else being equal, this will translate into higher stock and property prices, which will increased measured wealth. In contrast, rules that favour workers and tenants, such as minimum wage laws and rent controls, reduce returns on capital and land. This in turn will translate into lower stock and property prices, and lower paper wealth.

Importantly, in both scenarios the productive capacity of the economy is unchanged. The fact that wealth would be higher in the former case, and lower in the latter case, is a result of an asymmetry between how the claims of capitalists and landlords are recorded, and how the claims of workers and tenants are recorded. While future returns to capital and land get capitalised into stock and property prices, future returns to labour – wages – do not get capitalised into asset prices. This is because unlike physical and financial assets, people do not have an “asset price”. They cannot become property. As a result, it is possible for measured wealth to increase simply because the balance of power shifts in favour of capitalists and landowners, allowing them to claim a larger slice of the pie at the expense of workers and tenants.

To the early classical economists, this kind of wealth – attained by simply extracting value created by others ­­– was deemed to be unearned, and referred to it as ‘economic rent’. However, ever since neoclassical economics replaced classical economics as the dominant school of thinking in the late 19th century, economic rent has been increasingly marginalised from economic discourse. To the extent that it is acknowledged, it is usually viewed as being peripheral to the story of wealth accumulation, resulting from  ‘market frictions’, such as monopsony and asymmetric information, which give rise to certain instances of ‘market power’. For the most part, economists have tended to focus on the acts of saving and investment which drive the real production process. But on closer inspection, it is clear that economic rent is far from peripheral. Indeed, in many countries it has been the main story of changing wealth patterns.

To see why, let’s return to the OECD wealth statistics. Recall that net wealth per household in Britain is more than double what it is in Germany, even though Germany is far more productive than the UK. This can partly be explained by comparing the power dynamics associated with each factor of production.

Let’s start with land: Germany has among the strongest tenant protection laws in Europe, and many German cities also impose rent controls. This, along with a banking sector that favours real economy lending over property lending, means that Germany has not experienced the rampant house price inflation that the UK has. Remarkably, the house price-to-income ratio is lower in Germany today than it was in 1995, while in the UK it has nearly tripled over the same time period. The fact that houses are not lucrative financial assets, and renting is more secure and affordable, means that the majority of people choose to rent rather than own a home in Germany – and therefore do not own any property wealth.

In Britain, the story couldn’t be more different. Over the past five decades Britain has become a property owners’ paradise, as successive governments have sought to encourage people onto the property ladder. Taxes on land and property have been removed, and subsidies for homeownership introduced. The deregulation of the mortgage credit market in the 1980s meant that banks quickly became hooked on mortgage lending – unleashing a flood of new credit into the housing market. Rent controls were abolished, and the private rental market was deregulated. Today tenant protection is weaker than almost anywhere else in Europe. Meanwhile, the London property market has served as a laundromat for the world’s dirty money. As Donald Toon, head of the National Crime Agency, has described: “Prices are being artificially driven up by overseas criminals who want to sequester their assets here in the UK”.

The result has been an unprecedented house price boom. Since 1995, skyrocketing house prices have increased value of Britain’s housing stock by over £5 trillion – accounting for three quarters of all household wealth accumulated over the same period. While this has been great news for property owners, it has been disastrous for tenants. As I’ve written elsewhere, the driving force behind rising house prices has been rapidly escalating land prices, and we have known since the days of Adam Smith and David Ricardo that land is not a source of wealth, but of economic rent. The trillions of pounds of wealth amassed through the British housing market has mostly been gained at the expense of current and future generations who don’t own property, who will see more of their incomes eaten up by higher rents and larger mortgage payments.

So while German property owners have not benefited from skyrocketing house prices in the way that they have in Britain, the flipside is that German renters only spend 25% of their incomes on rent on average, while British renters spend 40%. The former is captured in the OECD’s measure of wealth, while the discounted value of the latter is not.

Now let’s look at capital. In the UK and the US, the goal of the firm has traditionally been to maximise shareholder value. In Germany however, firms are generally expected to have regard for a wider range of stakeholders, including workers. This has led to a different culture of corporate governance, and different power dynamics between capital and labour.

Large companies in Germany must have worker representatives of boards (referred to as ‘codetermination), and they are also required to allow ‘works councils’ to represent workers in day-to-day disputes over pay and conditions. The evidence indicates that this system has led to higher wages, less short-termism, greater productivity, even higher levels of income equality. The quid pro quo is that it also tends to result in lower capital returns for shareholders, as workers are able to claim more of the surplus. This in turn means that German firms tend to be valued less than their British counterparts on the stock market, which contributes to lower levels of financial wealth.

None of this means that Germany is poorer than Britain. Instead, it just reflects the fact that German capitalists and landowners have less bargaining power than they do in the UK, while workers and tenants have more power. While lower shareholder returns and house prices are reflected in the OECD’s measure of wealth, better pay and conditions and lower rents are not.

Conclusion

All statistics tell a story, but stories can be told from different perspectives. Embedded in the definitions of all economic statistics are value judgements about what is desirable and what is undesirable, which in turn shape the way we think about the economy. At the moment, the way we measure the wealth of nations mainly reflects the fortunes of capitalists and landowners rather than workers and tenants. Britain looks wealthier than Germany on paper, but this does not reflect the lived reality for most people. While it’s important not to overstate the extent to which statistics can influence the real world, this is important for at least three reasons.

Firstly, it illustrates how seemingly objective metrics often have ideological assumptions baked into them. While there is already a well-established literature on alternatives to GDP, many economic metrics are used in economic analysis and policy appraisal without any critical appraisal of their underlying ideological assumptions. This needs to change.

Second, it highlights how paper wealth has in many places become decoupled from productive capacity, and how conflating the two can be highly misleading. This is particularly the case where zero sum rentier activity is widespread, as in the case of Britain. Such discrepancies raise the question of whether the way that we currently measure wealth is really the most sensible.

But most importantly, it illustrates that the distribution of wealth has little to do with contribution or productivity, and everything to do with politics and power. As J.W. Mason states: “It’s bargaining power, it’s politics, all the way down.”

For economists who see their discipline as a ‘value free’ science which is separate from politics, this is uncomfortable territory. But if the aim is to understand the economy as it really exists, then analysing power beyond the narrow concept of ‘market power’ is essential. Among other things, this means grappling with the power dynamics that underpin ownership and property relations, as well as those that that drive inequalities between different social groups and identities.

It’s been 200 years since David Ricardo described the “principal problem” of political economy. Perhaps it’s time to revisit it.

 

 

 

US hospitals pay up to 6 times more for medical devices, study finds

https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/supply-chain/us-hospitals-pay-up-to-6-times-more-for-medical-devices-study-finds.html

Image result for medical device prices

 

U.S. hospitals spend more on prescription drugs than their peers in European countries, and the same is true for medical devices, a new study published in Health Affairs suggests. In some cases, hospitals in the U.S. paid six times more for a medical device than their European counterparts.

The study was conducted by two researchers from the London School of Economics and Political Science who looked at what hospitals in the U.S., U.K., France, Italy and Germany paid for various heart implants, such as stents and pacemakers. They used data from 2006 to 2014 from a large hospital panel survey consisting of 30,000 unique price points.

The researchers found that depending on the type of stent or pacemaker, U.S. hospitals paid anywhere from two to six times more than the country that paid the lowest prices. The country that often paid the lowest price was Germany.

One example provided was drug-eluting stent prices. The price of the device in the U.S. consistently exceeded the price in Germany by $1,000.
Prices between countries differed for various reasons, including the market power of medical device manufacturers and each country’s tech-based regulations.
The findings suggest “that manufacturers exploit varying levels of willingness to pay and bargaining power between buyers to charge different prices across hospitals and increase profits,” the researchers wrote.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

How hospitals protect high prices

https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-vitals-5af4f54b-8427-48c2-b638-933a1ae4883a.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosvitals&stream=top

Large hospital systems don’t command high prices just because patients like them, or just because they have strong market share. There’s also another big reason: their contracts with insurance companies actively prohibit the sort of competitive pressures a free market is supposed to support.

“The free market has been distorted in an unhealthy way,” health care consultant Stuart Piltch told the Wall Street Journal’s Anna Wilde Mathews for this deep dive into hospitals’ pricing practices.

How it works: Hospital systems are consolidating rapidly and buying up physicians’ practices (which charge higher prices once they’re part of a hospital).

On top of that, per WSJ: Hospitals’ deals with insurance companies “use an array of secret contract terms to protect their turf and block efforts to curb health-care costs.”

  • Some hospitals do not allow their prices to be posted on the comparison-shopping sites insurers provide to their customers.
  • They often require insurers to cover every facility or doctor the hospital owns, and prohibit insurers from offering incentives — like lower copays — for patients to use less expensive competitors.
  • When Walmart, the country’s biggest private employer, wanted to exclude the lowest-quality 5% of providers from its network, its insurers couldn’t do so because of their hospital contracts.

The other side: Hospital executives told the Journal that mergers don’t drive higher prices, and reiterated their position that hospitals have to collect higher payments from private insurance to make up for the lower rates they get from Medicare and Medicaid.

My thought bubble: High-deductible health plans are increasingly popular, in part, because of the idea that patients will use their purchasing power to drive a more efficient system overall.

  • But if Walmart doesn’t have enough market power to actually penalize low-quality providers, you and I definitely don’t, either — especially if we can’t find out what the prices are, and especially if we only have one hospital to choose from in the first place.

Go deeper: Think drug costs are bad? Try hospital prices

 

 

Creating Effective Health Care Markets

https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/creating-effective-health-care-markets?omnicid=EALERT1469225&mid=henrykotula@yahoo.com

Building a health care market

Disagreement about the role of markets lies at the root of many of our fiercest health care controversies. One side believes that unleashing market forces will rescue our health care system. From this viewpoint, government involvement is inherently destructive, except in rare circumstances. Many opponents of the Affordable Care Act share this opinion.

The other side believes that health care markets are deeply flawed and that government must play a major role in achieving a higher-performing health system. These people point out that markets make no claim to ensuring equity in the use of health care resources, only improved efficiency. Supporters of the ACA tend to hold this view.

Given this fundamental divide, it’s worth considering the conditions underlying the effective functioning of market economies, whether those conditions currently prevail in health care and, if not, what changes would be required to establish them.

Students learn in Economics 101 that several assumptions must hold for free markets to achieve their potential:

  • First, consumers and suppliers of goods and services have perfect — or at least sufficient — information. They know or can find out the price and quality of available products.
  • Second, consumers and producers are rational. They make reasoned decisions about what to purchase and supply. These decisions maximize their welfare as consumers and their profits as businesses.
  • Third, it is easy for producers to enter markets, thus assuring that monopolies don’t form, and that increased competition occurs where prices are excessive, reducing prices to efficient levels.
  • Fourth, in any market, there are large numbers of firms selling a homogeneous product.
  • Fifth, individual firms cannot affect market prices.

Practically speaking, these conditions rarely exist in pure form anywhere in our economy. In the case of health care, there are a variety of different types of markets. For example, employers purchase insurance, large hospital systems purchase medical supplies, and individuals purchase insurance plans. These markets may embody these conditions to varying degrees, but the most basic health care markets, in which consumers or patients directly buy health care services, depart from this ideal dramatically, as the following examples illustrate.

To begin with, health care consumers not only lack perfect information, but often any information at all.   At present, prices in the U.S. health care market are virtually unknowable. Quality data are scant, imperfect, and often confound even experts.  Further, medicine is a complex science-based service: even highly trained health professionals struggle to stay current. As a result of social media and the internet, consumers are better informed than ever before, but most depend on advice from health professionals to make informed health care purchases. This kind of imperfect information may help explain why consumers in high-deductible health plans are equally likely to reduce their use of high-value or low-value health care services. They are just as likely to forgo their blood pressure treatments as unnecessary back surgery.

Health care consumers also face unusual challenges to making rational decisions. In medicine there is a saying that any doctor who treats herself has a fool for a patient. Even the most informed individual can have difficulty acting rationally when confronting the emotional turmoil that accompanies their own illness or that of a loved one. Beyond this, there are clear situations where patients’ cognitive abilities are compromised, for example, in cases of stroke, dementia, intoxication, loss of consciousness, delirium, or mental illness.

Competent patients have the inherent right to make their own medical decisions, and many do so wisely and well. But market advocates also must recognize the special obstacles to rational decision-making that face health care consumers.

Consolidation among insurers and health care organizations has radically reduced the number of providers selling health care and health insurance in many U.S. health care markets. Recent work shows that providers in 90 percent of U.S. markets are highly or “super” concentrated.

This consolidation and resulting lack of competition has enabled individual providers to charge excessive prices in many markets. Similarly, government-granted patents create monopolies that enable drug manufacturers to set astounding prices for new drugs and raise them almost at will.

These and other departures from the conditions necessary for effective market functioning suggest the dangers of uncritical reliance on free markets to improve our health care system. At a minimum, advocates of market solutions would be wise to consider three interventions that could increase the probability that markets will function as desired.

  1. Develop better information on prices and quality. Consumers need information to make informed decisions. Publishing raw data on the prices of care — often referred to as price transparency — is insufficient because it rarely reflects the actual cost consumers face during an episode of care. The price of a chest x-ray that diagnoses pneumonia, for instance, is a poor indicator of the costs of a subsequent hospitalization, not to mention the downstream costs for any previously undetected lung disease. To make health care markets work, advocates must develop approaches to price transparency and quality measurement that are meaningful and understandable to consumers.
  2. Foster markets for health services that pose the smallest challenges to rational decision-making. Certain health services — often referred to as “shoppable” — involve tests or treatments that are either elective, relatively simple to understand, or nonurgent, which allows patients time to learn and think about them. Examples include screening tests for generally healthy individuals (e.g., colonoscopies, mammograms), elective surgeries (e.g., hip and knee replacement), or necessary but nonemergent care (e.g.,whether to add insulin to a diabetic regimen). Fostering competitive forces in these areas could improve the functioning of the health care market overall. But reformers should be aware that these services are likely to account for a minority of health care activities and, frequently, are not the most expensive ones.
  3. Promote competition. Unless government finds ways to restore competition among providers where it no longer exists, markets can’t succeed. This is true both for health care services generally and pharmaceuticals in particular.

Given our desperate need for health care reform, the appeal of market solutions is understandable. But it is naïve to assume that they will work in health care just like they do in other sectors. It is time for a frank, open, and nonideological discussion of the problems markets can address in health care and how we can create conditions that will enable markets to function as intended.

 

 

Health care mega-mergers may get green light from feds

https://www.axios.com/health-care-mega-mergers-justice-department-approval-a48cb213-ae0a-45da-9e99-dfb031957e55.html

The Department of Justice headquarters in Washington, D.C.

 

Antitrust regulators at the Department of Justice are expected to approve two major health care deals — CVS Health’s $69 billion buyout of Aetna and Cigna’s $67 billion deal for Express Scripts — within a matter of weeks, the Wall Street Journal reports.

Why it matters: The health insurance and pharmacy benefits industries would be even more heavily consolidated than they currently are, which has worried consumer advocates and providers. The WSJ reports the only required antitrust remedies would be for CVS and Aetna to divest overlapping assets in their Medicare prescription drug plans.