Healthcare is big business. That’s why JP Morgan Chase is hosting its 42nd Healthcare Conference in San Francisco starting today– the same week Congress reconvenes in DC with the business of healthcare on its agenda as well. The predispositions of the two toward the health industry could not be more different.
Context: the U.S. Health System in the Global Economy
Though the U.S. population is only 4% of the world total, our spending for healthcare products and services represents 45% of global healthcare market. Healthcare is 17.4% of U.S. GDP vs. an average of 9.6% for the economies in the 37 other high-income economies of the world. It is the U.S.’ biggest private employer (17.2 million) accounting for 24% of total U.S. job growth last year (BLS). And it’s a growth industry: annual health spending growth is forecast to exceed 4%/year for the foreseeable future and almost 5% globally—well above inflation and GDP growth. That’s why private investments in healthcare have averaged at least 15% of total private investing for 20+ years. That’s why the industry’s stability is central to the economy of the world.
The developed health systems of the world have much in common: each has three major sets of players:
Service Providers: organizations/entities that provide hands-on services to individuals in need (hospitals, physicians, long-term care facilities, public health programs/facilities, alternative health providers, clinics, et al). In developed systems of the world, 50-60% of spending is in these sectors.
Innovators: organizations/entities that develop products and services used by service providers to prevent/treat health problems: drug and device manufacturers, HIT, retail health, self-diagnostics, OTC products et al. In developed systems of the world, 20-30% is spend in these.
Administrators, Watchdogs & Regulators: Organizations that influence and establish regulations, oversee funding and adjudicate relationships between service providers and innovators that operate in their systems: elected officials including Congress, regulators, government agencies, trade groups, think tanks et al. In the developed systems of the world, administration, which includes insurance, involves 5-10% of its spending (though it is close to 20% in the U.S. system due to the fragmentation of our insurance programs).
In the developed systems of the world, including the U.S., the role individual consumers play is secondary to the roles health professionals play in diagnosing and treating health problems. Governments (provincial/federal) play bigger roles in budgeting and funding their systems and consumer out-of-pocket spending as a percentage of total health spending is higher than the U.S. All developed and developing health systems of the world include similar sectors and all vary in how their governments regulate interactions between them. All fund their systems through a combination of taxes and out-of-pocket payments by consumers. All depend on private capital to fund innovators and some service providers. And all are heavily regulated.
In essence, that makes the U.S. system unique are (1) the higher unit costs and prices for prescription drugs and specialty services, (2) higher administrative overhead costs, (3) higher prevalence of social health issues involving substance abuse, mental health, gun violence, obesity, et al (4) the lack of integration of our social services/public health and health delivery in communities and (5) lack of a central planning process linked to caps on spending, standardization of care based on evidence et al.
So, despite difference in structure and spending, developed systems of the world, like the U.S. look similar:
The Current Climate for the U.S. Health Industry
The global market for healthcare is attractive to investors and innovators; it is less attractive to most service providers since their business models are less scalable. Both innovator and service provider sectors require capital to expand and grow but their sources vary: innovators are primarily funded by private investors vs. service providers who depend more on public funding. Both are impacted by the monetary policies, laws and political realities in the markets where they operate and both are pivoting to post-pandemic new normalcy. But the outlook of investors in the current climate is dramatically different than the predisposition of the U.S. Congress toward healthcare:
Healthcare innovators and their investors are cautiously optimistic about the future. The dramatic turnaround in the biotech market in 4Q last year coupled with investor enthusiasm for generative AI and weight loss drugs and lower interest rates for debt buoy optimism about prospects at home and abroad. The FDA approved 57 new drugs last year—the most since 2018. Big tech is partnering with established payers and providers to democratize science, enable self-care and increase therapeutic efficacy. That’s why innovators garner the lion’s share of attention at JPM. Their strategies are longer-term focused: affordability, generative AI, cost-reduction, alternative channels, self-care et al are central themes and the welcoming roles of disruptors hardwired in investment bets. That’s the JPM climate in San Franciso.
By contrast, service providers, especially the hospital and long-term care sectors, are worried. In DC, Congress is focused on low-hanging fruit where bipartisan support is strongest and political risks lowest i.e.: price transparency, funding cuts, waste reduction, consumer protections, heightened scrutiny of fraud and (thru the FTC and DOJ) constraints on horizontal consolidation to protect competition. And Congress’ efforts to rein in private equity investments to protect consumer choice wins votes and worries investors. Thus, strategies in most service provider sectors are defensive and transactional; longer-term bets are dependent on partnerships with private equity and corporate partners. That’s the crowd trying to change Congress’ mind about cuts and constraints.
The big question facing JPM attendees this week and in Congress over the next few months is the same: is the U.S. healthcare system status quo sustainable given the needs in other areas at home and abroad?
Investors and organizations at JPM think the answer is no and are making bets with their money on “better, faster, cheaper” at home and abroad. Congress agrees, but the political risks associated with transformative changes at home are too many and too complex for their majority.
For healthcare investors and operators, the distance between San Fran and DC is further and more treacherous than the 2808 miles on the map.
The JPM crowd sees a global healthcare future that welcomes change and needs capital; Congress sees a domestic money pit that’s too dicey to handle head-on–two views that are wildly divergent.
This week, Express Scripts, the nation’s second-largest pharmacy benefit manager (PBM), which is owned by health insurer Cigna, announced a new pricing model.
It is giving employers and health plans the option to pay pharmacies up to 15 percent over acquisition costs, plus a dispensing fee, for covered drugs. This payment structure was popularized by the Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drugs Company, founded by the billionaire businessman in reaction to the opaque pricing and complicated discounts and rebates common among PBMs.
While Cigna is not promising that this new pricing model will result in lower prices, it says it will improve transparency and should benefit retail pharmacies, who will split the markup with Express Scripts.
Cigna projects that only some employers will lower their healthcare spending through the cost-plus model, and that patient cost-sharing should be similar under both approaches.
The Gist:Between disruptive competitors like Cuban’s venture and increasing scrutiny from Congress, PBMs are facing new pressures to improve transparency and account for their role in rising drug costs.
This move by Cigna is an attempt to address at least one of those concerns, possibly intended to preempt regulatory and legislative action.
After years of complaints surrounding their business practices, it appears that the Congressional tide may be turning toward PBM industry reform. However,patients—who by and large are unaware of what PBMs are or do—won’t be satisfied till they see their out-of-pocket prescription drug costs go down.
Next up on this front: seeing which provisions targeting PBMs, many which have bipartisan support, make it into the Senate’s broad healthcare legislation planned for the end of this year, and in what form that bill ultimately passes.
Blue Shield of California announced a plan to diversify its pharmacy benefit management (PBM) contracts in a bid to improve transparency and reduce costs.
Instead of relying on Woonsocket, RI-based CVS Health’s Caremark as its sole PBM, the health plan and its 4.8M members will be served by five companies, including Amazon Pharmacy for at-home deliveries, Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drugs Company (MCCPDC) for a transparent pricing model, and Prime Therapeutics for negotiations with pharmaceutical companies.
Caremark will remain responsible for Blue Shield’s specialty pharmacy needs, which CVS noted in an investor filing represents over 50 percent of nationwide pharmacy benefit spending.
Blue Shield intends to implement this new system by 2025, and is targeting savings of $500M annually, which translates to 10 to 15 percent of its current spending.
The Gist: Whether Blue Shield saves money with this initiative depends on the whether the benefit of competition in its PBM contracts outweighs the costs of more complex coordination between vendors.
Keeping half of its business tied up with CVS through specialty pharmacy will further limit the potential impact. Nonetheless, it’s noteworthy that pharmacy disruptors like Amazon and MCCPDC have found a major health plan willing to work with them.
Consumers, employers, payers without PBMs, and members of Congress are increasingly dissatisfied with the current pharmacy benefit market structure, and Blue Shield’s move could serve as a catalyst for future shakeups.
In the mid-1980’s, managed care advocate Dr. Paul Ellwood predicted that eventually, US healthcare would be dominated by perhaps a dozen vast national firms he called SuperMeds that would combine managed care based health insurance with care delivery systems. Ellwood was a leader of the “managed competition” movement which advocated for a private sector alternative to a federal government-run National Health Insurance system. Ellwood and colleagues believed that Kaiser Foundation Health Plans and other HMOs would be able to stabilize health costs and thus affordably extend care to the uninsured.
The US political system and market dynamics would not co-operate with Ellwood and his Jackson Hole Group’s vision. In the ensuing thirty-five years, healthcare has remained both highly fragmented and regional in focus. However, unbeknownst to most, during the past decade, as a result of a major merger and relentless smaller acquisitions, two SuperMeds were born- CVS/Aetna and UnitedHealth Group, that whose combined revenues comprise 14% of total US health spending.
CVS/Aetna is slightly larger than United, by dint of grocery sales in its drugstores and its vast Caremark pharmacy benefits management business. However, CVS’s Aetna health insurance arm is one third the size of United’s, and though CVS is rapidly scaling up its care delivery apparatus through its in-store Health Hubs, it remains is a tiny fraction of United’s care footprint. Despite being slightly smaller at the top line, United’s market capitalization is more than 3.5 times that of CVS.
United’s vast scope is difficult to comprehend because much of it is not visible to the naked eye, and the most rapidly growing businesses are partly nested inside United’s health insurance business.
United employs over 300 thousand people. At $287.6 billion total revenues in 2021, United exceeded 7% of total US health spending (though $8.3 billion are from overseas operations).
In 2021, United was $100 billion larger than the British National Health Service. It is more than three times the size of Kaiser Permanente, and five times the size of HCA, the nation’s largest hospital chain. United is both larger and richer than energy giant Exxon Mobil. United has over $70 billion in cash and investments, and is generating about $2 billion a month in operating cash flow.
Its highly regulated health insurance business is the visible tip of a rapidly growing iceberg. Revenue from United’s core health insurance business grew at 11% in 2021, compared to 14% growth in United’s diversified Optum subsidiary. Optum generated $155.6 billion in 2021 (of which 60% were from INSIDE United’s health insurance business). You can see the relationship of Optum’s three major businesses to United’s health insurance operations in Exhibit I.
Optum is the Key to United’s Growth
Understanding the role of Optum is key to understanding United’s business. It is remarkable how few of my veteran health care colleagues have any idea what Optum is or what it does. Optum was once a sort of dumping ground for assorted United acquisitions without a seeming core purpose. A private equity colleague once derided Optum as “The Island of Lost Toys”. Now, however, Optum is driving United’s growth, and generates billions of dollars in unregulated profits both from inside the highly regulated core health insurance business and from external customers.
Optum consists of three parts:Optum Health, its care delivery enterprise ($54 billion revenues in 2021), Optum Rx, its pharmacy benefits management enterprise ($91 billion revenues in 2021) and Optum Insight, a diversified business services enterprise ($12.2 billion in 2021). Virtually all of United’s acquisitions join one of these three businesses.
Optum Health: The Third Largest Care Delivery Enterprise in the US
By itself, Optum Health is almost the size of HCA ($54 billion in 2021 vs HCA’s $58.7 billion) and consists of a vast national portfolio of care delivery entities: large physician groups, urgent care centers, surgicenters, imaging centers, and now by dint of the recently announced $5.7 billion acquisition of LHC, home health agencies. Optum Health has studiously avoided acquiring beds of any kind: hospitals, nursing homes, etc. and likely will continue to do so. Optum Health’s physician groups not only generate profits on their own, but also provide powerful leverage for United to control health costs for its own subscribers, pushing down United’s highly visible and regulated Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), and increasing health plan profits.
Optum Health began in 2007 when United acquired Nevada-based Sierra Health, and thus became the new owner of a small multispecialty physician group which Sierra owned. The group did not belong in United’s health insurance business and came to rest over in Optum. Over the past twelve years, Optum Health has acquired an impressive percentage of the major capitated medical groups in the US- Texas’ WellMed, California’s HealthCare Partners (from DaVita), as well as Monarch, AppleCare and North American Medical Management, Massachusetts’ Reliant (formerly Fallon Clinic) and Atrius in Massachusetts (pending) , Kelsey Seybold Clinic (also pending) in Houston, TX and Everett Clinic and PolyClinic in Seattle.
Optum Health claims over 60 thousand physicians, though many of these are actually independent physicians participating in “wrap around” risk contracting networks. By comparison, Kaiser Permanente’s Medical Groups employ about 23 thousand physicians. United’s management claims that Optum Health provides continuing care to about 20 million patients, of whom 3 million are covered by some form of so-called “value based” contracts. Perhaps half of this smaller number are covered by capitated (percentage of premium-PMPM) contracts.
Optum Health straddles fierce competitive relationships between United’s health insurance business and competing health plans in well more than a dozen metropolitan areas. Almost half (44%) of Optum Health’s revenues come from providing care for health plans other than United.
When Optum acquires a large physician group, it acquires those groups’ contracts with United’s health insurance competitors, some of which contracts have been in place for decades. Premium revenues from other health plans, presumably capitation or per member per month (PMPM) revenues, are one-quarter of Optum Health’s $54 billion total revenues. These “external” premium revenues have quadrupled since 2018, largely for Medicare Advantage subscribers. Optum Health contributes about $4.5 billion in operating profit to United. It is impossible to determine from United’s disclosures how much of this profit comes from Optum Health’s services provided to United’s insured lives and how much from its medical groups’ extensive contracts with competing health plans.
Optum Health’s surgicenters and urgent care centers provide affordable alternatives to using expensive hospital outpatient services and emergency departments, potentially further reducing United medical expense. This creates obvious tensions with United’s hospital networks, since Optum Health can use its large medical practices and virtual care offerings to divert patients from hospitals to its own services, or else render those services unnecessary.
Though some observers have termed Optum/United’s business model “vertical integration”-ownership of the suppliers to and distributors of a firm’s product– Optum Health has actually grown less vertical since 2018, with revenues from competing health plans growing from 36% of total revenues in 2018 to 44% in 2021. A 2018 analysis by ReCon Strategy found at best a sketchy matchup between United’s health plan enrollment by market and its Optum Health assets (https://reconstrategy.com/2018/04/uniteds-medicare-advantage-footprint-and-optumcare-network-do-not-overlap-much-so-far/.
Optum Rx: The Nation’s Third Largest Pharmacy Benefits Management Business
Optum’s largest business in revenues is its Optum Rx pharmaceutical benefits management (PBM) business, which generates $91 billion in revenues, and processes over a billion pharmacy claims not only for United but also many competing insurers and employer groups. Pharmaceutical costs are a rapidly growing piece of total medical expenses, and controlling them is yet another source of largely unregulated profits for United; Optum Rx generated over $4.1 billion of operating profit in 2021.
Optum Rx is the nation’s third largest PBM business after Caremark, owned by CVS/Aetna and Express Scripts, owned by CIGNA, and processes about 21% of all scripts written in the US. Pharmacy benefits management firms developed more than two decades ago to speed the conversion of patients from expensive branded drugs to generics on behalf of insurers and self-funded employers. They were given a big boost by George Bush’s 2004 Medicare Part D Prescription Drug benefit, as a “pro-competitive” private sector alternative to Medicare directly negotiating prices with pharmaceutical firms.
Reducing drug spending is one key to United’s profitability. Since generics represent almost 90% of all prescriptions written, Optum Rx now relies on fees generated by processing prescriptions and on rebates from pharmaceutical firms to promote their costly branded drugs as preferred drugs on Optum Rx’s formularies. These rebates are determined based on “list” prices for those drugs vs. the contracted price for the PBMs, and are actual cash payments from manufacturers to PBMs.
Drug rebates represent a significant fraction of operating profits for health insurers that own PBMs, particularly for their older Medicare Advantage patients that use a lot of expensive drugs. Unfortunately, PBMs have incentives to inflate the list price, because rebates are caculated based on the spread between list prices and the contract pricel Unfortunately, this increases subscribers’ cash outlays, because patient cost shares are based on list prices.
Optum Rx generates about 39% of its revenues (and an undeterminable percentage of its profits) serving other health insurers and self-funded employers. Many of those self-funded employers demand that Optum pass through the rebates directly to them (even if it means being charged higher administrative fees!).
Unlike the situation with Optum Health, the “verticality” of Optum’s PBM business-the percentage of Optum revenues derived from serving United subscribers- has increased in the last seven years, to more than 60% of Optum Rx’s total business. What happens to the billions of dollars in rebates generated by Optum Rx is impossible to determine from United’s disclosures. However, our best guess is that pharmaceutical rebates represent as much as a quarter of United’s total corporate profits.
Optum Insight: “Intelligent” Business Solutions
The fastest growing and by far the most profitable Optum business is its business intelligence/business services/consulting subsidiary. Optum Insight was generated $12.2 billion in revenues in 2021, but a 27.9% operating margin, five times that of United’s health insurance business. Optum Insight is strategically vital to enhancing the profitability of United’s health insurance activities, but also generates outside revenues selling services to United’s health insurance competitors and hospital networks.
The core of Optum Insight is a business intelligence enterprise formerly known as Ingenix, which provided “big data” to United and other insurers about hospital and pricing behavior and utilization-crucial both for benefits design and administration. In 2009, Ingenix was accused by New York State of under reporting prices for out of network health services for itself and its clients, which had the effect of reducing its own medical reimbursements, and increasing patient cost shares. United signed a consent decree to alter Ingenix business practices and settled a raft of lawsuits filed on behalf of patients, physicians and employers. Its name was subsequently changed to Optum Insight.
By dint of aggressive acquisitions, Optum Insight has dramatically increased its medical claims management business, consulting services and business process outsourcing activities. . Most of United’s investment in artificial intelligence can be found inside Optum Insight. Big data plays a crucial role in United’s overall strategy. Optum Insight’s claims management software uses vast medical claims data bases and artificial intelligence/machine learning software to spot and deny medical claims for which documentation is inadequate or where services are either “inappropriate” or else not covered by an individual’s health plan. Providers also claim that the same software rejects as many as 20% of their claims, often for problems as tiny as a mis-spelled word or a missing data field.
Optum Insight software plays a crucial role in helping United’s health insurance plans manage their medical expense. Traditional health plan profitability is generated by reducing medical expense relative to collected premiums to increase underwriting profit. These profits are regulated, with highly variable degrees of rigor by state health insurance commissioners, and also by provisions of ObamaCare enacted in 2010.
Though its acquisition of Equian in 2019 and the proposed $13 billion acquisition of health information technology conglomerate Change Healthcare in 2021, United came within an eyelash of a near monopoly on “intelligent” medical claims processing software. The Justice Department challenged this latter acquisition and United may agree to divest Change’s claims processing software business as a condition of closing the deal. Even without the Change acquisition, Optum Insight processes hundreds of millions of medical claims annually not only for United’s health insurance business but for many of United’s competitors.
However, Optum Insight’s claims management system can also be used to increase MLR if medical expense unexpectedly declines, exposing the firm to federal requirement that it rebate excessive ‘savings’ to subscribers. This happened in 2020, when the COVID pandemic dramatically and unexpectedly added billions to United’s earnings due to hospitals suspending elective care. The chart below shows United’s 2Q2020 earnings per share almost doubling due to the precipitous drop in its medical claims expenses!
Hospital finance colleagues reported an immediate and substantial drop in medical claims denials from United and other carriers in the summer and fall of 2020. United’s quarterly profits dutifully and steeply declined in the subsequent two quarters, because its medical expenses sharply rebounded. The rise in
United’s medical expenses helped the firm avoid premium rebates to patients required by provisions of the ObamaCare legislation passed in 2010. The firm did voluntarily rebate about $1.5 billion to many of its customers in June, 2020.
However the most rapidly growing part of Optum Insight is its Optum 360 business process outsourcing business, which helps hospitals manage their billing and collections revenue cycle, as well as information technology operations, supply chain (purchasing and materials management) and other services. Through Optum 360, Optum Insight has signed five long term master contracts in the past two years’ worth many billions of dollars with care providers in California, Missouri and other states to provide a broad range of business services.
With all these different businesses, it is theoretically possible for one piece of Optum to be reducing a hospital’s cash flow by denying medical claims for United subscribers, while United’s health insurance network managers bargain aggressively to reduce the hospital’s reimbursement rates while yet another piece of Optum runs the billing and collection services for the same hospital and its employed physicians, while yet another piece of Optum competes with the hospital’s physicians and ambulatory services, diverting patients from its ERs and clinics, reducing the hospital’s revenues.
It is not difficult to imagine a future in which Optum/United offers hospital systems an Optum 360 outsourcing contract that run most of the business operations of a hospital system in exchange for preferred United health plan rates, an AI-enabled EZ pass on its medical claims denials and inpatient referrals from Optum physician groups and urgent care centers, at the expense of competing hospitals.
Managing these potential conflicts will be an increasing challenge as these various businesses grow, placing intense pressure on United’s leadership to get the various pieces of United to work together. To many anxious hospital executives, United resembles nothing so much as the Kraken, rising up out of the sea, surrounding and engulfing them- a powerful friend perhaps or a fearsome foe. As you might expect, United’s growing market power and growth has generated a fierce backlash in the hospital management community.
What Business is United Healthcare In?
United Healthcare is the most successful business in the history of American healthcare. The rapid growth of Optum and continued health insurance enrollment growth from government programs like Medicaid and Medicare has created a cash engine which generates nearly $2 billion a month in free cash flow. Optum’s portfolio has given United an impressive array of tools, unequalled in the industry, to improve its profitability and to reach into every corner of the US health system. United Healthcare is managed care on steroids.
United’s diversified portfolio of businesses gives the firm what a finance-savvy colleague termed “optionality”- the ability to redirect capital and management attention to areas of growth and away from areas that have ceased to grow, in the US or overseas. With its substantial investable capital, it will have the pick of the litter of the 11 thousand digital health companies as the overextended digital health market consolidates. United will be able to use its vast resources to build state-of-the-art digital infrastructure to reach and retain patients and manage their care.
United’s main short term business risks seem to be running out of accretive transactions effectively to deploy its growing horde of capital and managing the firm’s rising political exposure. United has had tremendous business discipline and has shied away from speculative acquisitions that are not immediately accretive to earnings. If its earnings growth falters, however, it will also encounter pressure from the investment community to increase dividends (presently about 1.2%) or share buybacks to bolster its share price, or else divest some or all of Optum in order to “maximize shareholder value”.
Answering the question, “What Business is United In” is simple: just about everything in health but hospitals and nursing homes.
Answering the questions- who are its customers and what do they want? — is a great deal harder. The customers United serves are in a sort of cold war with one another. United’s original business was protecting employers from health cost growth , and tempering the influence of hospitals and doctors by reducing their rates and utilization. By fostering so-called Consumer Directed Health Plans that expose many of their subscribers to very high front-end copayments, United and its health insurance brethren, have also increased their out-of-pocket costs, whether they have the savings to pay them or not.
There are also some ironies in United’s development. Optum Insight’s suite of hospital business services are designed to reduce administrative costs created in major part by United and other insurers’ medical claims data requirements. Its PBM business, originally intended to reduce drug spending by bargaining aggressively with pharmaceutical manufacturers has ended up pushing up drug list prices and consumer cost shares.
While presumably everybody benefits if United can somehow help patients become and remain healthy, it is still far from obvious how to do this. Managing all these markedly divergent customer needs will be a tremendous management challenge for whoever succeeds United’s reclusive (and very effective) 70 year old Chairman Stephen Hemsley.
What Does Society Get from this Vast Enterprise?
However, as Peter Drucker told a different generation of business giants, businesses are not entities unto themselves, accountable only to shareholders and customers. They are organs of society, and are expected to create social value. Americans are suspicious of vast enterprises, as businesses from Standard Oil, US Steel and ATT to Microsoft and Facebook have learned. As businesses grow and become more successful, public suspicion grows.
Private health insurers already face strident opposition from progressive Democrats, who believe that health coverage ought to be a public good, a right of citizenship provided publicly; in other words, that private health insurers have no business being in business. And large insurers like United also face intense opposition from hospitals and many physicians because they reduce their incomes and impose major administrative burdens upon them.
In the age of Twitter and TikTok, United is highly vulnerable to “event risks” that confirm the hostile narratives of the firm’s detractors that United is mainly about maximizing its own profits, not about improving the health of its subscribers or the communities it serves. It is not clear how many the tens of millions of United subscribers have warm and fuzzy feelings about their giant health insurer. Memories of the HMO backlash of the 1990’s reside in the firm’s corporate memory.
United has grown to its present immense scale largely without public knowledge. United has within its reach the capability of constraining overall health cost growth across dozens of metropolitan areas and regions, not merely cost growth for its own beneficiaries (roughly one in seven US citizens already get their health insurance through United). With its expanding digital health operations, it can deploy state of the art tools for helping United’s 50 million subscribers avoid illness and live healthier lives.
United also has the ability to damage the financial operations of beloved local hospitals and deny coverage to families, raising their out of pocket expenses. How United frames and defends its social mission and how it manages all the delicate and increasingly fraught customer relationships will determine its future, and in important ways, ours as well.
On Monday, the Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drugs Company (MCCPDC) announced via Twitter that it will begin to offer two branded diabetes drugs, Invokana and Invokamet, produced by Janssen, a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary. A month’s supply of these drugs, the first non-generics it has offered, will cost patients around $244, over 60 percent less than average retail prices. Prescriptions for these diabetes drugs fell from nearly 2M in 2020 to under 1M in 2022, and a key Invokama patent will expire next year, both factors that may have influenced Janssen’s decision to partner with MCCPDC.
The Gist: MCCPDC estimates that as many as 1M people who use these or similar drugs could benefit from the lower prices—not only the uninsured but also those considered “underinsured” due to high deductibles.
Even though the deal is for two drugs with declining revenues, selling brand-name drugs from a pharmaceutical heavyweight is a notable step for the company.
As Congress continues to investigate PBMs for driving up drug spending through their pricing tactics, MCCPDC’s move offers a path to PBM disruption through direct competition. By cutting out the rebates retained by health plans and PBMs, MCCDPC can potentially offerbetter net payments to pharmaceutical companies, as well as reduced cost-sharing for patients—an arrangement that benefits both parties at the expense of traditional PBMs.
Constrained by the Affordable Care Act’s medical loss ratio (MLR) requirement that health insurers must spend 80-85 percent of their revenue on medical services, payers have been pivoting to providing care, managing pharmacy benefits, and supporting other healthcare services, in order to fuel earnings growth. The graphic above shows why UnitedHealth Group (UHG) is seen as the health insurance industry’s most noteworthy model of this vertical integration strategy, thanks to its flourishing Optum division.
Optum is now as big a profit driver for UHG as its UnitedHealthcare insurance arm, with each bringing in $14B of net earnings in 2022.
Optum’s 7.7 percent operating margin is almost two points higher than UnitedHealthcare’s, which owes much of its revenue and earnings growth to its expanding Medicare Advantage (MA) business. As both sides of UHG’s business have grown, so too have intercompany eliminations, which have increased by over 80 percent in five years, reaching $108 billion in 2022. These payments from one division of UHG to another—mostly from the insurance business to the provider arm—allow the company to shift profit-capped insurance revenues into other divisions, driving increased profitability for the overall enterprise.
It will be worth watching the trend in intercompany eliminations at other vertically integrated insurance companies, with an eye for whether integration truly results in lower cost of care for patients or just higher margins for the insurers.
Amazon rolled out the tools on Alexa in 2019, offering applications with a collection of hospitals, as well as telehealth company Teladoc Health and pharmacy benefits management company Express Scripts.
The application allowed users to check the status of prescription refills, ask about their last blood-sugar reading, or even book a telemedicine appointment. Amazon has said all data will be deleted by the end of next week, per Modern Healthcare.
Be smart: Amazon isn’t going anywhere when it comes to health care, but it is making some strategic cuts as it maneuvers the current economic environment, as evidenced by its acquisition of One Medical followed by its shuttering of Amazon Care.
An analysis published in the Annals of Internal Medicine finds that if Medicare had purchased 77 common generic drugs from Mark Cuban’s Cost-Plus Pharmacy in 2020, it would have saved $3.6B dollars. That translates to more than a third of the $9.6B Medicare spent on generic drugs that year.
In January, Dallas Mavericks owner and billionaire Cuban launched the generic drug company as a transparency play, cutting out pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), negotiating directly with manufacturers, and selling drugs at a flat 15 percent markup.
The Gist:This isn’t the first study to find that Medicare overpays for generic drugs, as it’s unable to negotiate drug prices under current law. Another recent analysis found that Costco can offer consumers lower prices than Medicare drug plans for half of the most common generic drugs.
The fact that both Costco’s and Cuban’s pharmacies, neither of which accepts health insurance, can offer consumers cheaper generics is another indication of how PBMs’ perverse incentives and opaque pricing and rebate models lead to consumers being steered to higher priced drugs. We’re hopeful that the FTC’s new investigation into PBMs will shed light on their pricing practices, and create a path for lawmakers to finally address unsustainably high prescription drug prices.
The Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drug Co. launched its online pharmacy in January, offering low-cost versions of high-cost generic drugs. And it all started with a cold email.
Alex Oshmyansky, MD, PhD, fired off an email to Mr. Cuban with a simple subject line: “Cold pitch.” The then 33-year-old radiologist told Mr. Cuban about work he was doing in Denver with a compounding pharmacy and the business plan behind a company he founded in 2018, Osh’s Affordable Pharmaceuticals.
“I asked him a simple question, because this was when the whole pharma bro thing was going down,” Mr. Cuban said on NPR podcast The Limits, referring to convicted felon Martin Shkreli. “I was like, ‘Look, if this guy can jack up the prices 750 percent for lifesaving medicines, can we go the opposite direction? Can we cut the pricing? Are there inefficiencies in this industry that really allow us to do it and really make a difference?'”
Dr. Oshmyansky answered yes. Their weekly email correspondence continued for months. The Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drug Co. was quietly founded in May 2020, and Dr. Oshmyansky now serves as its CEO. The company is organized as a public-benefit corporation, meaning it is for-profit but claims its social mission of improving public health is just as important as the bottom line.
“We basically created a vertically integrated manufacturing company that will start with generic drugs,” Mr. Cuban told NPR. A major component of the strategy is to bypass pharmacy benefit managers, which Mr. Cuban likens to bouncers at a club.
“They’re the ones who say, ‘Hey, I’m controlling access to all the big insurance companies. If you want this insurance company to sell your drug, you’ve got to pay the cover charge. All these drugs pay the cover charge to these PBMs through rebates, and because they’re paying the cover charges, the prices are jacked up,” Mr. Cuban told NPR. “We said we’re going to create our own PBM, we’re going to work directly with the manufacturers, and we’re not going to charge the cover charge.”
The Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drug Co. marks the prices of its drugs up 15 percent, charges a $3 pharmacy fee to pay the pharmacists it works with, and a fee for shipping. “That’s it,” Mr. Cuban said on NPR. “There’s no other added costs. The manufacturers love what we’re doing for that reason.”
Others have set out before to disrupt pharma the way Mr. Cuban and Dr. Oshmyansky intend, but their downfall is cooperating or giving in to the PBMs, the entrepreneur noted.
“People always ask, well why didn’t somebody do this before? The reality is there’s so much money there, it’s hard not to be greedy,” Mr. Cuban said on the podcast. “If you get to any scale at all, those PBMs will start throwing money at you and saying, ‘Look, just play the game.’”
Mr. Cuban has indicated he has no intention to play the game.
“I could make a fortune from this,” Mr. Cuban told Texas Monthlylast fall. “But I won’t. I’ve got enough money. I’d rather f— up the drug industry in every way possible.”
The second year of the pandemic did not dampen UnitedHealth Group’s finances, and the company actually surpassed its initial 2021 revenue and profit projections, Bob writes.
The big picture: UnitedHealth’s revenue has tripled from 2010 to 2021, and profit has almost quadrupled. The company continues to make more of its money from owning doctor groups and controlling pharmacy benefits instead of relying on health insurance.
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HENRY KOTULA 