The Press Is Beginning to Take Notice of How Health Insurers Are Raiding The Medicare Trust Fund

Sometimes a health policy story comes along that should be shouted from the rafters — well at least reported by media that cover the subject. Brett Arends’ story for Dow Jones’ MarketWatch is one of those stories. 

In “Medicare Advantage is overbilling Medicare by 22%,” Arends introduces readers to a government agency that in its latest report exposed Medicare Advantage plans to light.

The revelations about overpayments come from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, MedPAC for short, some of whose recommendations over the years have resulted in high rate increases for Advantage plan sellers that helped make it possible for them to offer groceries, bits of dental care, and other goodies seniors have snapped up. The media’s role in revealing and dissecting those overpayments is long overdue.

The last several months news outlets have been paying more attention to the downsides of Medicare Advantage plans.

Arends’ story focused on one thread in the story: MedPAC’s latest report to Congress that revealed something health policy wonks — but not the public — have known for a long time. Medicare Advantage plans are taking advantage of the federal gravy train.

“The private insurers who now run more than half of all Medicare plans are overcharging the taxpayers by a staggering $83 billion a year,” Arends wrote. “They are charging us taxpayers 22% more than it would cost us to provide the same health insurance to seniors directly if we just cut out the private insurance companies as middlemen.”

MedPAC was set up by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, “back when people in Washington were actually doing their jobs,” Arends points out. The commission’s job is to advise Congress on issues involving Medicare. MedPAC reports discuss the financial situation of the Medicare trust funds, and over the years those reports often revealed that the private health plans have been overpaid. Until recently, there has been little to no pushback from the government or most of the media, in effect leaving the insurance industry a clear path to sell Medicare Advantage plans to more than half of the Medicare market. The media have recently begun to ask why. 

Arends calls the Medicare Advantage arrangement “a rip-off, pure and simple,” noting that what sellers of the plan are paid “is more than twice as much as it would cost simply to provide free dental, hearing and vision care to all traditional Medicare beneficiaries, not just those in private ‘Medicare Advantage’ plans.”

I have covered Medicare for decades now and have often asked the experts why there couldn’t be a level playing field that would allow beneficiaries in the traditional program to receive vision and dental benefits. The answer was always, “We can’t afford that.” 

Arends debunks that thinking by directly quoting the MedPAC report:

“It reads: ‘We estimate that Medicare spends approximately 22 percent more for MA enrollees than it would spend if those beneficiaries were enrolled in FFS (fee for service or traditional) Medicare, a difference that translates into a projected $83 billion in 2024.’ MedPAC reported that its review of private plan payments suggests that over the 39-year history with private plans, they “have never yielded aggregate savings for the Medicare program. Throughout the history of Medicare managed care, the program (Medicare Advantage) has paid more than it would have paid if beneficiaries had been in FFS (fee for service) Medicare.”

I checked in with Fred Schulte, who now writes for KFF Health News, and who over his career has written many prize-winning stories documenting the shenanigans insurers have used to enhance their reimbursements from Medicare, such as upcoding. That’s the practice of billing Medicare for ailments that are more serious than what patients actually have. “For example, instead of reporting a patient has diabetes, the insurers would say diabetes with neuropathy or eye problems and receive higher reimbursement,” he explained.

“It took a very long time for the government and the Justice Department to understand what was going on here with this coding,” Schulte said. “The codes just kept getting higher and higher, and profits kept going up and up.”

A year ago, Paul Ginsburg, a senior fellow at the University of Southern California’s Schaffer Center, said, “The current Medicare Advantage structure results in overpayments, markedly higher than previously understood.” 

Even Michael Chernow, who heads the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission authorized by Congress in 1997, recently admitted on Twitter that Medicare Advantage “has never saved Medicare money.” But he added, “that doesn’t mean Medicare Advantage isn’t a key pillar of Medicare sustainability. At its best it can provide better care at lower cost.” 

Arends’ story doesn’t sound hopeful about the direction of Medicare. He concludes, “Medicare Advantage isn’t making the rest of Medicare better. It is putting the rest of Medicare out of business. And not by being more efficient, but by being less efficient. It is driving up the overall cost of Medicare by 22%. And not by being more efficient but by being less efficient. 

The logical outcome is that traditional Medicare ceases to exist and that Medicare dollars pass through the hands of private insurance companies at 122 cents on the dollar.”

Arends’ prediction may well come true, but perhaps not without a fight. David Lipschutz, associate director at the Center for Medicare Advocacy, says a “confluence of factors have come together to make it harder to ignore the problems of Medicare Advantage by the press and policymakers.”

For Healthcare, the Debt Limit and Possible Shutdown Further a Shift away from its Status Quo

This week, all eyes will be on the U.S. Congress as the clock ticks toward a potential government shutdown. Whether lawmakers reach agreement on a continuing resolution to extend funding for30 to 60 days or the government shuts down at midnight this Saturday, it will have direct negative impact on consumer activities and spending in healthcare.

Background:

A shutdown alone is not apocalyptic for consumers: they’ve weathered 20 shutdowns averaging 8 days each since 1976 and recovered productivity shortfalls within 3-6 months. What’s complicating and most problematic for healthcare is its concurrence with equally threatening events and trends inside and outside healthcare:

  • The resumption of Student Loan debt payments starting in October 1 impacting 900,000 Americans– 90% say they can’t!
  • The probability the Federal Reserve will increase its federal borrowing rate by 25 basis points to 5.50 thus increasing interest costs and consumer prices.
  • The slowdown in GDP growth and increase in fuel costs projected by economists and regulators.
  • Increased workforce-management tension resulting in strikes, walkouts and slowdowns in labor-intense settings like auto manufacturing, nursing homes and hospitals.
  • Medical inflation: technological advancements, increased demand, rising drug prices, expensive medical equipment, and increased administrative costs are contributors. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, prices for medical care are 5,274.47% higher in 2023 vs. 1935 (a $52,744.67 difference in value). Between 1935 and 2023, medical care experienced an average inflation rate of 4.63% per year, but in that period, working-age consumers who are privately insured paid a disproportionate and growing share projected to exceed 10% in 2023.

The health system’s economics are partially protected from shutdowns since funding for the Medicare and Medicaid is somewhat protected. That’s the status quo.

But the confluence of growing bipartisan Congressional antipathy toward the industry vis a vis regulatory reforms (i.e. price transparency, site neutral payments, DOJ-FTC consolidation constraints et al), high profile congressional investigations (i.e. PBMs and drug prices, role of private equity ownership), administrative orders from the White House and Governors (i.e.medical debt, value initiatives, organ procurement et al) and negative publicity challenging community benefits, CEO compensation and fraudulent activities erode the industry’s good will and expose it to unprecedented consumer risks.

Evidence in support of this assessment is substantial as illustrated in the sections that follow. There are no easy solutions. The U.S. health industry status quo is a B2B2P2C (business to business to physician to consumer) industry in which most decisions impacting what consumers ultimately spend for healthcare products and services are made for them, not by them. The direct costs associated with supply chain, technologies, facilities and R&D are closely guarded secrets. Indirect costs, administrative overhead, off balance sheet activities, partnerships and alliances even more.

What’s clear is that every sector in healthcare will be subject to scrutiny through an uncomfortable lens—the consumer. Prices matter. Service matters. Integrity matters. Transparency matters. Ownership matters. Purpose matters. And whether accurate or not, fair or not, comfortable or not, information accessible to consumers is readily accessible.

The shutdown over the debt limit might happen or be diverted. What will not be diverted is growing discontent with the medical system that the majority of consumers believe wasteful, expensive and self-serving.  How the status quo is impacted is anyone’s guess, but it’s a good bet its future is not a cut-and-paste version of its past.

The Hospital Makeover—Part 2

America’s hospitals have a $104 billion problem.

That’s the amount you arrive at if you multiply the number of physicians employed by hospitals and health systems (approximately 341,200 as of January 2022, according to data from the Physicians Advocacy Institute and Avalere) by the median $306,362 subsidy—or loss—reported in our Q1 2023 Physician Flash Report.

Subsidizing physician employment has been around for a long time and such subsidies were historically justified as a loss leader for improved clinical services, the potential for increased market share, and the strengthening of traditionally profitable services.

But I am pretty sure the industry did not have $104 billion in losses in mind when the physician employment model first became a key strategic element in the hospital operating model. However, the upward reset in expenses brought on by the pandemic and post-pandemic inflation has made many downstream hospital services that historically operated at a profit now operate at breakeven or even at a loss. The loss leader physician employment model obviously no longer works when it mostly leads to more losses.

This model is clearly broken and in demand of a near-term fix. Perhaps the critical question then is how to begin? How to reconsider physician employment within the hospital operating plan?

Out of the box, rethink the physician productivity model. Our most recent Physician Flash Report data shows that for surgical specialties, there was a median $77 net patient revenue per provider wRVU. For the same specialties, there was a median $80 provider paid compensation per provider wRVU. In other words, before any other expenses are factored in, these specialties are losing $3 per wRVU on paid compensation alone. Getting providers to produce more wRVUs only makes the loss bigger.

It’s the classic business school 101 problem.

If a factory is losing $5 on every widget it produces, the answer is not to produce more widgets. Rather, expenses need to come down, whether that is through a readjustment of compensation, new compensation models that reward efficiency, or the more effective use of advanced practice providers.

Second, a number of hospital CEOs have suggested to me that the current employed physician model is quite past its prime. That model was built for a system of care that included generally higher revenues, more inpatient care, and a greater proportion of surgical vs. medical admissions. But overall, these trends were changing and then were accelerated by the Covid pandemic. Inpatient revenue has been flat to down. More clinical work continues to shift to the outpatient setting and, at least for the time being, medical admissions have been more prominent than before the pandemic.

Taking all this into account suggests that in many places the employed physician organizational and operating model is entirely out of balance. One would offer the calculated guess that there are too many coaches on the team and not enough players on the field. This administrative overhead was seemingly justified in a different loss leader environment but now it is a major contributor to that $104 billion industry-wide loss previously calculated.

Finally, perhaps the very idea of physician employment needs to be rethought.

My colleagues Matthew Bates and John Anderson have commented that the “owner” model is more appealing to physicians who remain independent then the “renter” model. The current employment model offers physicians stability of practice and income but appears to come at the cost of both a loss of enthusiasm and lost entrepreneurship. The massive losses currently experienced strongly suggest that new models are essential to reclaim physician interest and establish physician incentives that result in lower practice expenses, higher practice revenues, and steadily reduced overall subsidies.

Please see this blog as an extension of my last blog, “America’s Hospitals Need a Makeover.” It should be obvious that by analogy we are not talking about a coat of paint here or even new appliances in the kitchen.

The financial performance of America’s hospitals has exposed real structural flaws in the healthcare house. A makeover of this magnitude is going to require a few prerequisites:

  1. Don’t start designing the renovation unless you know specifically where profitability has changed within your service lines and by explicitly how much. Right now is the time to know how big the problem is, where those problems are located, and what is the total magnitude of the fix.
  2. The Board must be brought into the discussion of the nature of the physician employment problem and the depth of its proposed solutions. Physicians are not just “any employees.” They are often the engine that runs the hospital and must be afforded a level of communication that is equal to the size of the financial problem. All of this will demand the Board’s knowledge and participation as solutions to the physician employment dilemma are proposed, considered, and eventually acted upon.

The basic rule of home renovation applies here as well: the longer the fix to this problem is delayed the harder and more expensive the project becomes. The losses set out here certainly suggest that physician employment is a significant contributing factor to hospitals’ current financial problems overall. It would be an understatement to say that the time to get after all of this is right now.