On Sunday, Miami, FL-based Cano Health, a Medicare Advantage (MA)-focused primary care clinic operator, filed for bankruptcy protection to reorganize and convert around $1B of secured debt into new debt.
The company, which went public in 2020 via a SPAC deal worth over $4B, has now been delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. After posting a $270M loss in Q2 of 2023, Cano began laying off employees, divesting assets, and seeking a buyer. As of Q3 2023, it managed the care of over 300K members, including nearly 200K in Medicare capitation arrangements, at its 126 medical centers.
The Gist:
Like Babylon Health before it, another “tech-enabled” member of the early-COVID healthcare SPAC wave is facing hard times. While the low interest rate-fueled trend of splashy public offerings was not limitedto healthcare, several prominent primary care innovators and “insurtechs” from this wave have struggled, adding further evidence to the adages that healthcare is both hard and difficult to disrupt.
Given that Cano sold its senior-focused clinics in Texas and Nevada to Humana’s CenterWell last fall, Cano may draw interest from other organizations looking to expand their MA footprints.
The physician-led healthcare network formed to save hospitals from financial distress. Now, hospitals in its own portfolio need bailing out after years of alleged mismanagement.
Steward Health Care formed over a decade ago when a private equity firm and a CEO looking to disrupt a regional healthcare environment teamed up to save six Boston-based hospitals from the brink of financial collapse. Since that time, Steward has expanded from a handful of facilities to become the largest physician-led for-profit healthcare network in the country, operating 33 community hospitals in eight states, according to its own corporate site.
However, Steward has also found itself once again on the precipice of failure.
Steward’s ongoing issues in Massachusetts have played out in regional media outlets in recent weeks. Massachusetts Gov. Maura Healey warned there would be no bailout for Steward in an interview on WBUR’s Radio Boston.
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health said it is investigating concerns raised about Steward facilities and began conducting daily site inspections at some Steward sites to ensure patient safety beginning Jan. 31.
However, the tide may have begun to change. Steward executives said on Feb. 2 they had secured a deal to stabilize operations and keep Massachusetts hospitals open — for now. Steward will receive bridge financing under the deal and consider transferring ownership of one or more hospitals to other companies, a Steward spokesperson confirmed to Healthcare Dive on Feb. 7.
While politicians welcomed the news, some say Steward’s long term outlook in the state is uncertain. Other politicians sought answers for how a prominent system could seemingly implode overnight.
“I am cautiously optimistic at this point that [Steward] will be able to remain open, because it’s really critical they do,” said Brockton City Councilor Phil Griffin. “But they owe a lot of people a lot of money, so we’ll see.”
However, the business model wasn’t immediately a financial success. Steward didn’t turn a profit between 2011 and 2014, according to a 2015 monitoring report from the Massachusetts attorney general. Instead, Steward’s debt increased from $326 million in 2011 to $413 million at the end of the 2014 fiscal year, while total liabilities ballooned to $1.4 billion in the same period as Steward engaged in real estate sale and leaseback plays.
Under the 2010 deal, Steward agreed to assume Caritas’ debt and carry out $400 million in capital expenditures over four years to upgrade the hospitals’ infrastructure. However, that capital expenditure could come in part from financial engineering, such as monetizing Steward’s own assets, according to Zirui Song, associate professor of health care policy and medicine at the Harvard Medical School who has studied private equity’s impact on healthcare since 2019.
Cerberus did not contribute equity into Steward after making its initial investment of $245.9 million, according to the December 2015 monitoring report. Meanwhile, according to reporting at the time, de la Torre wanted to expand Steward. Steward was on its own to raise funds.
Such deals are typically short-sighted, Song explained. When hospitals sell their property, they voluntarily forfeit their most valuable assets and tend to be saddled with high rent payments.
Healthcare Dive spoke with four workers across Steward’s portfolio who said Steward’s emphasis on the bottom line negatively impacted the company’s operations for years.
Terra Ciurro worked in the emergency department at Steward Health Care-owned Odessa Regional Medical Center in January 2022 as a travel nurse. She recalled researching Steward and being attracted to the fact the company was physician owned.
“I remember thinking, ‘That’s all I need to know. Surely, doctors will have their heart in the right place,’” Ciurro said. “But yeah — that’s not the experience I had at all.”
The emergency department was “shabby, rundown and ill-equipped,” and management didn’t fix broken equipment that could have been hazardous, she said. Nine weeks into her 13-week contract and three hours before Ciurro was scheduled to work, Ciurro said her staffing agency called to cut her contract unceremoniously short. Steward hadn’t paid its bills in six months, and the agency was pulling its nurses, she said she was told.
In Massachusetts, Katie Murphy, president of the Massachusetts Nurses Association, which represents more than 3,000 registered nurses and healthcare professionals who work in eight Steward hospitals, said there were “signals” that Steward facilities had been on the brink of collapse for “well over a year.”
Steward hospitals are often “significantly” short staffed and lack supplies from the basics, like dressings, to advanced operating room equipment, said Murphy. While most hospitals in the region got a handle on staffing and supply shortages in the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, at Steward hospitals shortages “continued to accelerate,” Murphy said.
A review of Steward’s finances by BDO USA, a tax and advisory firm contracted last summer by the health system itself to demonstrate it was solvent enough to construct a new hospital in Massachusetts, showed Steward had a liquidity problem. The health system had few reserves on hand last year to pay down its debts owed to vendors, possibly contributing to the shortages. The operator carried only 10.2 days of cash on hand in 2023. In comparison, most healthy nonprofit hospital systems carried 150 days of cash on hand or more in 2022, according to KFF.
One former finance employee, who worked for Steward beginning around 2018, said that the books were routinely left unbalanced during her tenure. Each month, she made a list of outstanding bills to determine who must be paid and who “we can get away with holding off” and paying later.
Food, pharmaceuticals and staff were always paid, while all other vendors were placed on an “escalation list,” she said. Her team prioritized paying vendors that had placed Steward on a credit hold.
The worker permanently soured on Steward when she said operating room staff had to “make do” without a piece of a crash cart — which is used in the event of a heart attack, stroke or trauma.
She stopped referring friends to Steward facilities, telling them “Don’t go — if you can go anywhere else, don’t go [to Steward], because there’s no telling if they’ll have the supplies needed to treat you.”
Away from regulatory review
Massachusetts officials maintain that it hasn’t been easy to see what was happening inside Steward.
Steward is legally required to submit financial data to the MA Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA) and to the Massachusetts Registration of Provider Organizations Program (MA-RPO Program), according to a spokesperson from the Health Policy Commission, which analyzes the reported data. Under the latter requirement, Steward is supposed to provide “a comprehensive financial statement, including information on parent entities and corporate affiliates as applicable.”
However, Steward fought the requirements. During Stuart Altman’s tenure as the chair of the Commission from 2012 to 2022, Altman told Healthcare Dive that the for-profit never submitted documents, despite CHIA levying fines against Steward for non-compliance. Steward even sued CHIA and HPC for relief against the reporting obligations.
Steward is currently appealing a superior court decision and order from June 2023 that required it to comply with the financial reporting requirements and produce audited financial reports that cover the full health system, Mickey O’Neill, communications director for the HPC told Healthcare Dive. As of Feb. 6, Steward’s non-compliance remained ongoing, O’Neill said.
Without direct insight into Steward’s finances, the state was operating at a disadvantage, said John McDonough, professor of the practice of public health at The Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. He added that some regulators saw a crisis coming generally, “but the timing was hard to predict.”
Altman gives his team even more of a pass for not spotting the Steward problem.
“There was no indication while I was there that Steward was in deep trouble,” Altman said. Although Steward was the only hospital system that failed to report financial data to the HPC, that alone had not raised red flags for him. “[CEO] Ralph [de la Torre] was just a very contrarian guy. He didn’t do a lot of things.”
Song and his co-author, Sneha Kannan, a clinical research fellow at Harvard Medical School, are hopeful that in the future, regulatory agencies can make better use of the data they collect annually to track changes in healthcare performance over time. They can potentially identify problem operators before they become crises.
“State legislators, even national legislators, are not in the habit of comparing hospitals’ performances on [quality] measures to themselves over time — they compare to hospitals’ regional partners,” Kannan said. “Legislators, Medicare, [and] CMS has access to that information.”
However, although there’s interest from regulators in scrutinizing healthcare quality more closely — particularly when private equity gets involved — a streamlined approach to analyzing such data is still a “ways off,” according to the pair. For now, all parties interviewed for this piece agreed that the best way to avoid being caught off guard by a failing system was to know how such implosions could occur.
“If there’s a lesson from [Steward],” McDonough ventured, “it is that the entire state health system and state government need to be much more wary of all for-profits.”
Issue: Medical debt negatively affects many Americans, especially people of color, women, and low-income families. Federal and state governments have set some standards to protect patients from medical debt.
Goal: To evaluate the current landscape of medical debt protections at the federal and state levels and identify where they fall short.
Methods: Analysis of federal and state laws, as well as discussions with state experts in medical debt law and policy. We focus on laws and regulations governing hospitals and debt collectors.
Key Findings and Conclusion: Federal medical debt protection standards are vague and rarely enforced. Patient protections at the state level help address key gaps in federal protections. Twenty states have their own financial assistance standards, and 27 have community benefit standards. However, the strength of these standards varies widely. Relatively few states regulate billing and collections practices or limit the legal remedies available to creditors. Only five states have reporting requirements that are robust enough to identify noncompliance with state law and trends of discriminatory practices. Future patient protections could improve access to financial assistance, ensure that nonprofit hospitals are earning their tax exemption, and limit aggressive billing and collections practices.
Introduction
Medical debt, or personal debt incurred from unpaid medical bills, is a leading cause of bankruptcy in the United States. As many as 40 percent of U.S. adults, or about 100 million people, are currently in debt because of medical or dental bills. This debt can take many forms, including:
past-due payments directly owed to a health care provider
ongoing payment plans
money owed to a bank or collections agency that has been assigned or sold the medical debt
credit card debt from medical bills
money borrowed from family or friends to pay for medical bills.
This report discusses findings from our review of federal and state laws that regulate hospitals and debt collectors to protect patients from medical debt and its negative consequences. First, we briefly discuss the impact and causes of medical debt. Then, we present federal medical debt protections and discuss gaps in standards as well as enforcement. Then, we provide an overview of what states are doing to:
strengthen requirements for financial assistance and community benefits
regulate hospitals’ and debt collectors’ billing and collections activities
limit home liens, foreclosures, and wage garnishment
develop reporting systems to ensure all hospitals are adhering to standards and not disproportionately targeting people of color and low-income communities.
(See the appendix for an overview of medical debt protections in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.)
Impact of Medical Debt
More than half of people in medical and dental debt owe less than $2,500, but because most Americans cannot cover even minor emergency expenses, this debt disrupts their lives in serious ways. Fear of incurring medical debt also deters many Americans from seeking medical care. About 60 percent of adults who have incurred medical debt say they have had to cut back on basic necessities like food or clothing, and more than half the adults from low-income households (less than $40,000) report that they have used up their savings to pay for their medical debt.
A significant amount of medical debt is either sold or assigned to third-party debt-collecting agencies, who often engage in aggressive efforts to collect on the debt, creating stress for patients. Both hospitals and debt collectors have won judgments against patients, allowing them to take money directly from a patient’s paycheck or place liens on a patient’s home. In some cases, patients have also lost their homes. Medical debt can also have a negative impact on a patient’s credit score.
Key Terms Related to Medical Debt
Financial assistance policy: A hospital’s policy to provide free or discounted care to certain eligible patients. Eligibility for financial assistance can depend on income, insurance status, and/or residency status. A hospital may be required by law to have a financial assistance policy, or it may choose to implement one voluntarily. Financial assistance is frequently referred to as “charity care.”
Bad debt: Patient bills that a hospital has tried to collect on and failed. Typically, hospitals are not supposed to pursue collections for bills that qualify for financial assistance or charity care, so bad debt refers to debt owed by patients ineligible for financial assistance.
Community benefit requirements: Nonprofit hospitals are required by federal law and some state laws to provide community benefits, such as financial assistance and other investments targeting community need, in exchange for a tax exemption.
Debt collectors or collections agencies: Entities whose business model primarily relies on collecting unpaid debt. They can either collect on behalf of a hospital (while the hospital still technically holds the debt) or buy the debt from a hospital.
Sale of medical debt: Hospitals sometimes sell the debt patients owe them to third-party debt buyers, who can be aggressive in seeking repayment of the debt.
Creditor: A party that is owed the medical debt and often wants to collect on the medical debt. This can be a hospital, a debt collector acting on behalf of a hospital, or a third-party debt buyer.
Debtor: A patient who owes medical debt over unpaid medical bills.
Wage garnishment: The ability of a creditor to get a court order that would allow them to deduct a portion of a debtor-patient’s paycheck before it reaches the patient. Federal law limits how much can be withheld from a debtor’s paycheck, and some states exceed this federal protection.
Placing a lien: A legal claim that a creditor can place on a patient’s home, prohibiting the patient from selling, transferring, or refinancing their home without first paying off the creditor. Most states require creditors to get a court order before placing a lien on a home.
Foreclosure or forced sale: A creditor can repossess and sell a patient’s home to pay off their medical debt. Often, creditors are required to obtain a court order to do so.
Perhaps what is most troubling is that the burden of medical debt is not borne equally: Black and Hispanic/Latino adults and women are much more likely to incur medical debt. Black adults also tend to be sued more often as a result. Uninsured patients, those from low-income households, adults with disabilities, and young families with children are all at a heightened risk of being saddled with medical debt.
Causes of Medical Debt
Most people — 72 percent, according to one estimate — attribute their medical debt to bills from acute care, such as a single hospital stay or treatment for an accident. Nearly 30 percent of adults who owe medical debt owe it entirely for hospital bills.
Although uninsured patients are more likely to owe medical debt than insured patients, having insurance does not fully shield patients from medical debt and all its consequences. More than 40 percent of insured adults report incurring medical debt, likely because they either had a gap in their coverage or were enrolled in insurance with inadequate coverage. High deductibles and cost sharing can leave many exposed to unexpected medical expenses.
The problem of medical debt is further exacerbated by hospitals charging increasingly high prices for medical care and failing to provide adequate financial assistance to uninsured and underinsured patients with low income.
Key Findings
Federal Medical Debt Protections Have Many Gaps
At the federal level, the tax code, enforced by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), requires nonprofit hospitals to broadly address medical debt. However, these requirements do not extend to for-profit hospitals (which make up about a quarter of U.S. hospitals) and have other limitations.
Further, the IRS does not have a strong track record of enforcing these requirements. In the past 10 years, the IRS has not revoked any hospital’s nonprofit status for noncompliance with these standards.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission have additional oversight authority over credit reporting and debt collectors. The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates credit reporting agencies and those that provide information to them (debt collectors and hospitals). Consumers have the right to dispute any incomplete or inaccurate information and remove any outdated, negative information. In some cases, patients can directly sue hospitals or debt collectors for inaccurately reporting medical debt to credit reporting agencies. In addition, the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act limits how aggressive debt collectors can be by restricting the ways and times in which they can contact debtors, requiring certain disclosures and notifications, and prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices. Patients can directly sue debt collectors in violation of the law. This law, however, does not limit or prohibit the use of certain legal remedies, like wage garnishment or foreclosure, to collect on a debt.
Many states have taken steps to fill the gaps in federal standards. Within a state, several agencies may play a role in enforcing medical debt protections. Generally speaking:
state departments of health are the primary regulators of hospitals and set standards for them
state departments of taxation are responsible for ensuring nonprofit hospitals are earning their exemption from state taxes
state attorneys general protect consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices by hospitals and debt collectors.
Fewer Than Half of States Exceed Federal Requirements for Financial Assistance, Protections Vary Widely
Federal law requires nonprofit hospitals to establish and publicize a written financial assistance policy, but these standards leave out for-profit hospitals and lack any minimum eligibility requirements. As the primary regulators of hospitals, states have the ability to fill these gaps and require hospitals to provide financial assistance to low-income residents. Twenty states require hospitals to provide financial assistance and set certain minimum standards that exceed the federal standard.
All but three of these 20 states extend their financial assistance requirements to for-profit hospitals. Of these 20 states, four states — Connecticut, Georgia, Nevada, and New York — apply their financial assistance requirements only to certain types of hospitals.
Policies also vary among the 31 states that do not have statutory or regulatory financial assistance requirements for hospitals. For example, the Minnesota attorney general has an agreement in place with nearly every hospital in the state to adhere to certain patient protections, though it falls short of requiring hospitals to provide financial assistance. Massachusetts operates a state-run financial assistance program partly funded through hospital assessments. Other states use far less prescriptive mechanisms to try to ensure that patients have access to financial assistance, such as placing the onus of treating low-income patients on individual counties or requiring hospitals to have a plan for treating low-income and/or uninsured patients without setting any specific requirements.
Enforcement of state financial assistance standards.
The only way to enforce the federal financial assistance requirement is to threaten a hospital’s nonprofit status, and the IRS has been reluctant to use this authority. Among the 20 states that have their own state financial assistance standards, 10 require compliance as a condition of licensure or as a legal mandate. These mandates are often coupled with administrative penalties, but some states have established additional consequences. For example, Maine allows patients to sue noncompliant hospitals.
Six states make compliance with their financial assistance standards a condition of receiving funding from the state. Two other states use their certificate-of-need process (which requires hospitals to seek the state’s approval before establishing new facilities or expanding an existing facility’s services) to impose their financial assistance mandates.
Setting eligibility requirements for financial assistance.
The federal financial assistance standard sets no minimum eligibility requirements for hospitals to follow. However, the 20 states with financial assistance standards define which residents are eligible for aid.
One way for states to ensure that financial assistance is available to those most in need is to prevent hospitals from discriminating against undocumented immigrants. Four states explicitly prohibit such discrimination in statute and regulation. Most states, however, are less explicit. Thirteen states define eligibility broadly, basing it most frequently on income, insurance status, and state residency. However, it is unclear how hospitals are interpreting this requirement when it comes to patients’ immigration status. In contrast, three states explicitly exclude undocumented immigrants from eligibility.
States also vary widely in terms of which income brackets are eligible for financial assistance and how much financial assistance they may receive.
At least three of the 20 states with financial assistance standards allow certain patients with heavy out-of-pocket medical expenses from catastrophic illness or prior medical debt to access financial assistance. Many states also require hospitals to consider a patient’s insurance status when making financial assistance determinations. At least six states make financial assistance available for uninsured patients only, while at least eight others also make financial assistance available to underinsured patients.
Standardizing the application process.
Cumbersome applications can discourage many patients from applying for financial assistance. Five states have developed a uniform application form, while three others have set minimum standards for financial assistance applications. Eleven states require hospitals to give patients the right to appeal a denial of financial assistance.
States Split in Requiring Nonprofit Hospitals to Invest in Community Benefits
Federal and state policymakers also can require nonprofit hospitals to invest in community benefits in return for tax exemptions. Federal law requires nonprofit hospitals to produce a community health needs assessment every three years and have an implementation strategy. Almost all states exempt nonprofit hospitals from a host of state taxes, including income, property, and/or sales taxes. However, only 27 impose community benefit requirements on nonprofit hospitals.
Community benefits frequently include financial assistance but also investments that address issues like lack of access to food and housing. In the long run, these investments can reduce medical debt burden by improving population health and the financial stability of a community. Most states that require nonprofit hospitals to provide community benefits allow nonprofit hospitals to choose how they invest their community benefit dollars. This hands-off approach has given rise to concerns about the lack of transparency in community benefit spending as well as questions about whether hospitals are investing this money in ways that are most helpful to the community, such as in providing financial assistance.
Applicability of community benefit standards.
Nineteen states impose community benefit requirements on all nonprofit hospitals in the state, but three states further limit these requirements to hospitals of a certain size. At least six states have extended these requirements to for-profit hospitals as well. Of these six, the District of Columbia, South Carolina, and Virginia have incorporated community benefit requirements into their certificate-of-need laws instead of their tax laws. As a result, any hospital seeking to expand in these states becomes subject to their community benefit requirement.
Interaction between financial assistance and community benefits.
The federal standard allows nonprofit hospitals to report financial assistance as part of their community benefit spending. Most states with community benefit requirements also allow hospitals to do this. However, only seven states require hospitals to provide financial assistance to satisfy their community benefit obligations.
Setting quantitative standards for community benefit spending.
Only seven states set minimum spending thresholds that hospitals must meet or exceed to satisfy state community benefit standards. For example, Illinois and Utah require nonprofit hospitals’ community benefit contributions to equal what their property tax liability would have been. Unique among states, Pennsylvania gives taxing districts the right to sue nonprofit hospitals for not holding up their end of the bargain, which has proven to be a strong enforcement mechanism.
Fewer Than Half the States Exceed Federal Standards for Billing and Collections
Hospital billing and collections practices can significantly increase the burden of medical debt on patients. However, the current federal standard does not regulate these practices beyond imposing waiting periods and prior notification requirements for certain extraordinary collections actions (ECAs), such as garnishing wages or selling the debt to a third party.
Requiring hospitals to provide payment plans.
Federal standards do not require hospitals to make payment plans available. However, a few states do require hospitals to offer payment plans, particularly for low-income and/or uninsured patients. For example, Colorado requires hospitals to provide a payment plan and limit monthly payments to 4 percent of a patient’s monthly gross income and to discharge the debt once the patient has made 36 payments.
Limiting interest on medical debt.
Federal law does not limit the amount of interest that can be charged on medical debt. However, eight states have laws prohibiting or limiting interest for medical debt. Some states like Arizona have set a ceiling for interest on all medical debt. Others like Connecticut further prohibit charging interest to patients who are at or below 250 percent of the federal poverty level and are ineligible for public insurance programs.
Though many states do not have specific laws prohibiting or limiting interest that hospitals or debt collectors can charge on medical debt, all states do have usury laws, which limit the amount of interest than can be charged on any oral or written agreement. Usury limits are set state-by-state and can range anywhere from 5 percent to more than 20 percent, but most limits fall well below the average interest rate for a credit card (around 24%). At least one state, Minnesota, has sued a health system for charging interest rates on medical debt that exceeded the allowed limit in the state’s usury laws.
Interactions between hospitals, third-party debt collectors, and patients.
Unlike hospitals, debt collectors do not have a relationship with patients and can be more aggressive when collecting on the debt. Federal law neither limits when a hospital can send a bill to collections, nor does it require hospitals to oversee the debt collectors it uses. Most states (37) also do not regulate when a hospital can send a bill to collections, although some states have developed more protective approaches.
For example, Connecticut prohibits hospitals from sending the bills of certain low-income patients to collections, and Illinois requires hospitals to offer a reasonable payment plan first. Additionally, five states require hospitals to oversee their debt collectors.
Sale of medical debt to third-party debt buyers.
Hospitals sometimes sell old unpaid debt to third-party debt buyers for pennies on the dollar. Debt buyers can be aggressive in their efforts to collect, and sometimes even try to collect on debt that was never owed. Federal law considers the sale of medical debt an ECA and requires nonprofit hospitals to follow certain notice and waiting requirements before initiating the sale. Most states (44) do not exceed this federal standard.
Only three states prohibit the sale of medical debt. Two other states — California and Colorado — regulate debt buyers instead. For example, California prohibits debt buyers from charging interest or fees, and Colorado prohibits them from foreclosing on a patient’s home.
Reporting medical debt to credit reporting agencies.
Federal law considers reporting medical debt to a credit reporting agency to be an ECA and requires nonprofit hospitals to follow certain notice and waiting requirements beforehand. Most states (41) do not exceed this federal standard.
Of the 10 states that do go beyond the federal standard, a few like Minnesota fully prohibit hospitals from reporting medical debt. Most others require hospitals, debt collectors, and/or debt buyers to wait a certain amount of time before reporting the debt to credit agencies (Exhibit 8). Two states directly regulate credit agencies: Colorado prohibits them from reporting on any medical debt under $726,200, while Maine requires them to wait at least 180 days from the date of first delinquency before reporting that debt.
States Vary Widely on Patient Protections from Medical Debt Lawsuits
Federal law considers initiating legal action to collect on unpaid medical bills to be an extraordinary collections action and also limits how much of a debtor’s paycheck can be garnished to pay a debt.
In most states, hospitals and debt buyers can sue patients to collect on unpaid medical bills. Three states limit when hospitals and/or collections agencies can initiate legal action. Illinois prohibits lawsuits against uninsured patients who demonstrate an inability to pay. Minnesota prohibits hospitals from giving “blanket approval” to collections agencies to pursue legal action, and Idaho prohibits the initiation of lawsuits until 90 days after the insurer adjudicates the claim, all appeals are exhausted, and the patient receives notice of the outstanding balance.
Liens and foreclosures.
Most states (32) do not limit hospitals, collections agencies, or debt buyers from placing a lien or foreclosing on a patient’s home to recover on unpaid medical bills. However, almost all states provide a homestead exemption, which protects some equity in a debtor’s home from being seized by creditors during bankruptcy. The amount of homestead exemption available to debtors varies from state to state, ranging from just $5,000 to the entire value of the home. Seven states have unlimited homestead exemptions, allowing debtors to fully shield their primary homes from creditors during bankruptcy. Additionally, Louisiana offers an unlimited homestead exemption for certain uninsured, low-income patients with at least $10,000 in medical bills.
Ten states prohibit or set limits on liens or foreclosures for medical debt. For example, New York and Maryland fully prohibit both liens and foreclosures because of medical debt, while California and New Mexico only prohibit them for certain low-income populations.
Wage garnishment.
Under federal law, the amount of wages garnished weekly may not exceed the lesser of: 25 percent of the employee’s disposable earnings, or the amount by which an employee’s disposable earnings are greater than 30 times the federal minimum wage. Twenty-one states exceed the federal ceiling for wage garnishment. Only a few states go further to prohibit wage garnishment for all or some patients. For example, New York fully prohibits wage garnishment to recover on medical debt for all patients, yet California only extends this protection for certain low-income populations. While New Hampshire does not prohibit wage garnishment, it requires the creditor to keep going back to court every pay period to garnish wages, which significantly limits creditors’ ability to garnish wages in practice.
Many States Have Hospital Reporting Requirements, But Few Are Robust
Federal law requires all nonprofit hospitals to submit an annual tax form including total dollar amounts spent on financial assistance and written off as bad debt. However, these reporting requirements do not extend to for-profit hospitals and lack granularity. States, as the primary regulators of hospitals, would likely benefit from more robust data collection processes to better understand the impact of medical debt and guide their oversight and enforcement efforts.
Currently, 32 states collect some of the following:
financial data, including the total dollar amounts spent on financial assistance and/or bad debt
financial assistance program data, including the numbers of applications received, approved, denied, and appealed
demographic data on the populations most affected by medical debt
information on the number of lawsuits and types of judgments sought by hospitals against patients.
Fifteen states explicitly require hospitals to report total dollar amounts spent on financial assistance and/or bad debt, while 11 states also require hospitals to report certain data related to their financial assistance programs. Most of these 11 states limit the data they collect to the numbers of applications received, approved, denied, and appealed. However, a handful of them go further and ask hospitals to report on the amount of financial assistance provided per patient, number of financial assistance applicants approved and denied by zip code, number of payment plans created and completed, and number of accounts sent to collections.
Five states require hospitals to further break down their financial assistance data by race, ethnicity, gender, and/or preferred or primary language. For example, Maryland requires hospitals to break down the following data by race, ethnicity, and gender: the bills hospitals write off as bad debt and the number of patients against whom the hospital or the debt collector has filed a lawsuit.
Only Oregon asks hospitals to report on the number of patient accounts they refer for collections and extraordinary collections actions.
Discussion and Policy Implications
In 2022, the federal government announced administrative measures targeting the medical debt problem, which included launching a study of hospital billing practices and prohibiting federal government lenders from considering medical debt when making decisions on loan and mortgage applications. Although these measures will help some, only federal legislation and enhanced oversight will likely address current gaps in federal standards.
States can also fill the gaps in federal patient protections by improving access to financial assistance, ensuring that nonprofit hospitals are earning their tax exemption, and protecting patients against aggressive billing and collections practices. States also can leverage underutilized usury laws to protect their residents from medical debt.
Finding the most effective ways to enforce these standards at the state level could also protect patients. Absent oversight and enforcement, patients from underserved communities continue to face harm from medical debt, even when states require hospitals to provide financial assistance and prohibit them from engaging in aggressive collections practices. Bolstering reporting requirements alone would not likely ensure compliance, but states could protect patients by strengthening their penalties, providing patients with the right to sue noncompliant hospitals, and devoting funding to increase oversight by state agency officials.
To develop a comprehensive medical debt protection framework, states could also bring together state agencies like their departments of health, insurance, and taxation, as well as their state attorney general’s office. Creating an interagency office dedicated to medical debt protection would allow for greater efficiency and help the state build expertise to take on the well-resourced debt collection and hospital industries.
Still, these measures only address the symptoms of the bigger problem: the unaffordability of health care in the United States. Federal and state policymakers who want to have a meaningful impact on the medical debt problem could consider the protections discussed in this report as part of a broader plan to reduce health care costs and improve coverage.
The beleaguered digital health company announced on Monday that its previously proposed arrangement to go private via a deal with Swiss-based neurotechnology company MindMaze will not happen, offering no further details. That deal was arranged by AlbaCore Capital Group, which had secured a loan for Babylon in May to implement the transaction.
Babylon said that it will now exit its core US businesses, which consist mostly of value-based agreements with health plans, and will continue to seek a buyer for its Meritage Medical Network, a California-based independent practice association (IPA) comprised of approximately 1,800 physicians.
Babylon said it may have to file for bankruptcy if it can’t secure additional funding or reach another deal to divest.
The Gist:Babylon isone of the starkest digital health “boom-and-bust” stories thus far. Despite the fact that the company overpromised and under-delivered in both the US and abroad, it was able to raise—and then lose—billions of dollars in just a few short years after going public in October 2021 via a special purpose acquisition corporation (SPAC) merger. It remains to be seen who will buy Babylon’s attractive IPA asset. Presumablyinsurers, retailers, health systems and other players are evaluating a purchase, either to enter or expand their provider footprint into Northern and Central California.
Physician staffing firm Envision Healthcare filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy this week, but will “continue operating its business as usual” so that the company can “provide patients with the high-quality care they require.”
Envision Healthcare files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
On Monday, Envision Healthcare filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. Following the filing, all of the company’s debt — except for a revolving credit facility for working capital — will be cancelled, totaling around $5.6 billion.
In a news release, Envision said several events have placed significant pressure on its finances since it was acquired by private equity (PE) firm KKR for $10 billion in 2018.
“The lingering impacts from COVID-19 on volume and labor costs, the delays resulting from tactics and recalcitrance by Envision’s largest insurance payors, and the ongoing regulatory uncertainty caused by the flawed implementation of the No Surprises Act have proven too much,” said Paul Keglevic, Envision’s chief restructuring officer.
Throughout the pandemic, healthcare staffing firms struggled to find enough workers to meet patient demand, especially in the highly competitive contract labor market, Modern Healthcare reports.
While Envision said it filed for bankruptcy because it is not generating enough revenue to cover its expenses and debt, it currently has $665 million of cash in the bank. According to the filing, the company expects those funds to help it exit bankruptcy faster.
“The decision to file these chapter 11 cases now, while the debtors have ample cash on hand, will ensure that the company can continue to provide patients with the high-quality care they require,” Keglevic said in the filings.
The company has entered a Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA), with plans to operate normally during the restructuring. Pending court approval, Envision said it will tap into cash collateral from ongoing operations to cover costs, “including supplier obligations and employee wages, salaries, and benefits during the restructuring process.”
“This will enable the company to continue operating its business as usual throughout the process and provide support to critical partners, including clinicians, hospitals, vendors and suppliers,” the company said.
Under the RSA, the company will divide its primary businesses, AMSURG and Envision Physician Services, which will be owned by their respective lenders.
Does Envision’s bankruptcy spell trouble for other PE investments?
Envision isn’t like other medical group PE investments
As we discussed in a previous expert insight, PE investments in physician practices aren’t a monolith. Many different types of medical groups receive investments, and PE firms have a range of healthcare sector experience and business practices.
Envision is an example of an outlier in all of these areas. First, their physician services are all hospital-based, with a heavy emphasis on emergency medicine — this contrasts with the predominant wave of physician practice investment in ambulatory practices. KKR only has one other physician practice investment, and their healthcare portfolio is rather limited.
Most importantly, Envision’s business model was reliant on exploiting questionable business practices and loopholes, which were heavily impacted by the No Surprises Act.
So, this bankruptcy isn’t an indictment of PE investment in physician groups. It just shows that healthcare organizations are not immune to being caught on their bad business practices — though PE, which is already struggling in the court of public opinion, won’t be helped by Envision’s demise.
What Envision’s bankruptcy means
Envision’s bankruptcy shines a light on trends we’ve been watching with hospital-based medicine that make financial solvency challenging: the strain of uninsured patients on revenue, workforce shortages driving up labor costs, and COVID-related volume impacts, to name a few.
What’s different with the average health system compared to Envision? While clearly rife with inefficiencies, health systems have mechanisms to self-correct.
Envision’s business model was not an innovation on care design or delivery.
It was a model taking advantage of pricing distortions and patients who are not in a position to shop for emergency care. That model inherently has limited running room.
On the physician practice front, Envision’s bankruptcy highlights the challenging business environment PE firms choose to enter when they invest in physician practices. Medical groups are a low-margin business, and the running room on cost savings has a low ceiling.
While many of the highest profile PE investments in physician groups come from firms with a long track record in the physician space, it remains to be seen whether the return on their investments will be high enough to satisfy investors.
The spotlight on large, heavily resourced healthcare organizations is not going away anytime soon. In fact, as consolidation continues, new investors enter the forefront, and organizations diversify the type of assets they acquire, that spotlight is only getting brighter.
this article traces how the once-darling Babylon Health became an “unmitigated disaster”, for which the UK’s National Health Services (NHS) has paid a significant price.
Babylon used its vision for a privatized NHS with slashed wait times and AI-powered treatment to boost its public offering, via a special-purpose acquisition company, with a $4.2B valuation in June 2021. Many of its promises have been revealed to be overly ambitious, if not doomed from the start, with its AI-powered diagnostics and funding model proving especially flawed.
A pivot to managed care in the US failed to stem a tide of mounting losses, and the company announced plans to go private last week.
The Gist: There are myriad lessons from the demise of Babylon, a marquis example of a “digital-first” healthcare startup that burned through capital and crashed with the end of the era of cheap money:
virtual care isn’t a magic wand to reduce wait times, and healthcare startups (and their investors) should think as much about the path to profitability as they do about rapid growth.
While Babylon did have its finger on the pulse of promising technologies, it applied them irresponsibly: for patients, inaccurate AI diagnoses could be worse than no care at all.
Amid the current AI frenzy, healthcare would benefit from more “slow AI”, developed with clinical and scientific collaboration and rigorous academic study design and testing, over “fast AI”, with pressure to generate returns for private investors pushing entrepreneurs to rapidly develop and deploy technology.
Embattled insurtech Bright Health will fully ax its insurance business as a potential bankruptcy looms, the company announced Friday.
The company secured an extension to its credit facility through June 30, giving it a few extra months to avoid going belly-up. To ensure it qualifies for the extension, the company must find a buyer for its California-based Medicare Advantage (MA) business by the end of May, according to a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Bright Health revealed March 1 that it had overdrawn its credit and would need to secure $300 million by the end of April to stay afloat.
The MA business includes nearly 125,000 California seniors across its Brand New Day and Central Health Plan brands. In the announcement, Bright said the sale would “substantially bolster” its finances.
“Since our founding, Bright Health has worked to make healthcare simpler, more personal and affordable for consumers,” CEO Mike Mikan said in the announcement. “As our markets evolve, we are taking steps to adapt and ensure our businesses are best positioned for long-term success.”
Manny Kadre, lead independent director of Bright Health’s board of directors, said in the announcement that the company has “received inbound interest” about the California MA business as it explores its options.
With the full divestiture of its insurance business, that means Bright Health will be all-in on its NeueHealth care delivery services. Mikan said in the announcement that the segment performed well in the first quarter and has grown to serve about 375,000 value-based care customers.
As Bright shops for a buyer for its MA plans, it’s also continuing to unwind the ACA business, a process that hit a snag as it was hit with a lawsuit from Oklahoma-based health system SSM Health, which alleged that the insurer owed it more than $13 million in unpaid claims.
Bright Health is also under the gun to boost its stock price, as the New York Stock Exchange has threatened to delist its shares. Shares in the company were trading at 17 cents on Friday afternoon.
Cindy Powers was driven into bankruptcy by 19 life-saving abdominal operations. Medical debt started stacking up for Lindsey Vance after she crashed her skateboard and had to get nine stitches in her chin. And for Misty Castaneda, open heart surgery for a disease she’d had since birth saddled her with $200,000 in bills.
These are three of an estimated 100 million Americans who have amassed nearly $200 billion in collective medical debt — almost the size of Greece’s economy — according to the Kaiser Family Foundation.
Now lawmakers in at least a dozen states and the U.S. Congress have pushed legislation to curtail the financial burden that’s pushed many into untenable situations: forgoing needed care for fear of added debt, taking a second mortgage to pay for cancer treatment or slashing grocery budgets to keep up with payments.
Some of the bills would create medical debt relief programs or protect personal property from collections, while others would lower interest rates, keep medical debt from tanking credit scores or require greater transparency in the costs of care.
In Colorado, House lawmakers approved a measure Wednesday that would lower the maximum interest rate for medical debt to 3%, require greater transparency in costs of treatment and prohibit debt collection during an appeals process.
If it became law, Colorado would join Arizona in having one of the lowest medical debt interest rates in the country. North Carolina lawmakers have also started mulling a 5% interest ceiling.
But there are opponents. Colorado Republican state Sen. Janice Rich said she worried that the proposal could “constrain hospitals’ debt collecting ability and hurt their cash flow.”
For patients, medical debt has become a leading cause of personal bankruptcy, with an estimated $88 billion of that debt in collections nationwide, according to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Roughly 530,000 people reported falling into bankruptcy annually due partly to medical bills and time away from work, according to a 2019 study from the American Journal of Public Health.
Powers’ family ended up owing $250,000 for the 19 life-saving abdominal surgeries. They declared bankruptcy in 2009, then the bank foreclosed on their home.
“Only recently have we begun to pick up the pieces,” said James Powers, Cindy’s husband, during his February testimony in favor of Colorado’s bill.
In Pennsylvania and Arizona, lawmakers are considering medical debt relief programs that would use state funds to help eradicate debt for residents. A New Jersey proposal would use federal funds from the American Rescue Plan Act to achieve the same end.
Bills in Florida and Massachusetts would protect some personal property — such as a car that is needed for work — from medical debt collections and force providers to be more transparent about costs. Florida’s legislation received unanimous approval in House and Senate committees on its way to votes in both chambers.
In Colorado, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Massachusetts and the U.S. Congress lawmakers are contemplating bills that would bar medical debt from being included on consumer reports, thereby protecting debtors’ credit scores.
Castaneda, who was born with a congenital heart defect, found herself $200,000 in debt when she was 23 and had to have surgery. The debt tanked her credit score and, she said, forced her to rely on her emotionally abusive husband’s credit.
For over a decade Castaneda wanted out of the relationship, but everything they owned was in her husband’s name, making it nearly impossible to break away. She finally divorced her husband in 2017.
“I’m trying to play catch-up for the last 20 years,” said Castaneda, 45, a hairstylist from Grand Junction on Colorado’s Western Slope.
Medical debt isn’t a strong indicator of people’s credit-worthiness, said Isabel Cruz, policy director at the Colorado Consumer Health Initiative.
While buying a car beyond your means or overspending on vacation can partly be chalked up to poor decision making, medical debt often comes from short, acute-care treatments that are unexpected — leaving patients with hefty bills that exceed their budgets.
For both Colorado bills — to limit interest rates and remove medical debt from consumer reports — a spokesperson for Democratic Gov. Jared Polis said the governor will “review these policies with a lens towards saving people money on health care.”
While neither bill garnered stiff political opposition, a spokesperson for the Colorado Hospital Association said the organization is working with sponsors to amend the interest rate bill “to align the legislation with the multitude of existing protections.”
The association did not provide further details.
To Vance, protecting her credit score early could have had a major impact. Vance’s medical debt began at age 19 from the skateboard crash, and then was compounded when she broke her arm soon after. Now 39, she has never been able to qualify for a credit card or car loan. Her in-laws cosigned for her Colorado apartment.
“My credit identity was medical debt,” she said, “and that set the tone for my life.”
Segundo, Calif.-based Pipeline Health, now a five-hospital system, exited bankruptcy Feb. 7
Former CFO Robert Allen has replaced Andrei Soran as CEO. Mr. Allen previously served as group CEO for CHA Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles. He also held CFO positions at San Francisco-based Dignity Health and Keck Medical Center of USC, Valley Presbyterian Hospital and Sherman Oaks Hospital and Health Center, all in Los Angeles.
Four other leaders have also been appointed to executive positions:
Steve Blake has been promoted to CFO
Vince Green, MD, has returned to Pipeline as chief medical officer
Patrick Rafferty assumed a new role as COO for Pipeline’s Los Angeles market while also serving as CEO for Coast Plaza Hospital in Norwalk, Calif.
Elaine Stephenson has been promoted to vice president for human resources
Pipeline filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Oct. 2, and its plan to emerge was confirmed Jan. 13. Over the last few months, the system has worked through a restructuring process that included selling two Chicago hospitals, evaluating vendor contracts, creating a business plan with realistic financial goals and securing financial agreements with key stakeholders. It now owns four hospitals in the Los Anegeles area and one in Dallas.
In a memo sent Feb. 7 to employees and affiliated physicians, Mr. Allen wrote, “Hospitals across the country face similar financial challenges. You should take great pride in knowing that our company stands on solid footing now with a clear path forward. And I am proud — and grateful — that our employees and physicians have stayed with us, keeping their focus on delivering quality patient care throughout this period of uncertainty.”
Pipeline’s path forward includes a renewed commitment to quality care and an improved workforce strategy, according to Mr. Allen.
“That means providing the right care in the right place at the right time to every patient who comes to us and ensuring timely patient discharges,” he said in a Feb. 7 news release. “We also will focus on enhanced workforce management to care for the patients we serve and to enhance our critical relationships with our employees.”
HENRY KOTULA 