Runaway inpatient spending in particular caused CVS’ insurance costs to snowball after returning “to patterns we have not seen since the start of the pandemic,” its CFO said.
Dive Brief:
CVS had a significantly worse first quarter than the healthcare giant — or Wall Street — expected, after its insurance arm failed to adequately prepare for seniors’ high use of medical care, especially in inpatient facilities.
The Rhode Island-based company’s health services segment — usually a reliable driver of growth — also saw its revenue and income fall in the quarter as its pharmacy benefit manager adjusted to the loss of a major contract with insurer Centene.
CVS slashed its earnings expectations for 2024 on Wednesday following the results. It’s the second time the company has lowered financial expectations this calendar year. “Clearly this is a disappointing result for us,” CFO Tom Cowhey said on a Wednesday call with investors, after which CVS’ stock fell more than 19%.
Dive Insight:
CVS brought in revenue of $88.4 billion in the quarter, up 4% year over year but significantly below analysts’ expectations. Net income was slashed by almost half compared to the prior-year quarter, to $1.1 billion.
The quarter was “burdened by utilization pressures in Medicare Advantage,” CEO Karen Lynch said on the call.
Starting last year, MA seniors began using higher levels of medical services after a long dry spell during the COVID-19 pandemic. The trend has continued into this year, leaving private insurers that manage the plans scrambling to contain costs.
CVS assumed utilization would moderate somewhat coming into the first quarter, but instead it was “notably above” expectations, according to Lynch.
Outpatient services, like mental health and medical pharmacy, along with supplemental benefits like dental continued to be elevated in the first quarter. However, inpatient utilization was particularly to blame for runaway spending.
Inpatient admissions per thousand in the quarter were up “high-single digits” compared to the same time last year, Cowhey said. A small portion of the growth was expected due to implementation of the CMS’ two-midnight rule that’s resulted in insurers having to cover more inpatient admissions. But overall, admissions “meaningfully exceeded” expectations for the quarter, according to the CFO.
“Inpatient seasonality returned to patterns we have not seen since the start of the pandemic,” Cowhey said.
Executives stressed that some of those costs appear to be seasonal and shouldn’t carry into the rest of the year. Inpatient utilization patterns are similar to what CVS’ insurance arm Aetna sawin normal years before the COVID-19 pandemic, and appear to be moderating in April, according to Lynch.
Still, the higher utilization caused the insurer’s medical loss ratio — a marker of spending on patient care — to soar to 90.4% in the first quarter, compared to 84.6% during the same time last year.
Overall, medical costs in the quarter were about $900 million higher than CVS expected, Cowhey said.
CVS’ results suggest the insurer “severely underestimated utilization of new members,” TD Cowen analyst Charles Rhyee wrote in a Wednesday morning note. “Investors already had lowered expectations for MA, but actual results and impact to guidance is likely way worse than expected.”
CVS added more MA members coming into 2024 than any other U.S. health insurer, according to an analysis by consultancy Chartis. That growth caused CVS’ membership to grow 1.1 million members in the first quarter compared to the end of 2023, to 26.8 million individuals.
Revenue in CVS’ health benefits segment, which houses its insurer Aetna, subsequently inflated to $32.2 billion, up 21% compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.
Despite the boom, higher medical costs slashed the segment’s operating income, as did the impact of lower quality ratings in MA.
Lower quality or “star” ratings for 2024 cut steeply into CVS’ reimbursement. Aetna’s largest contract fell from 4.5 stars to 3.5 stars for 2024, causing the payer to lose out on about $800 million in revenue.
As a result of the pressures, “we think [MA] will lose a significant amount of money this year,” Cowhey said.
Following the quarter, CVS lowered its full-year financial expectations for earnings per share on a GAAP and adjusted basis, and for cash flow from operations.
CVS expects to notch an MLR of 89.8% in 2024, up 2.1 percentage points from its previous guidance, because of continued medical utilization pressures, Cowhey said.
Moving into 2025, CVS does expect to recover most of what it lost this year from the star ratings changes. But the insurer faces another setback: MA payment rates recently finalized for 2025 that insurers are slamming as a cut, despite only a modest decrease in base rates.
On the call, Lynch maligned the rates as “insufficient” and a “significant added disruption” in the program.
Like its other peers with major MA footprints, CVS plans to focus on improving profits at the potential expense of members. That includes hiking premiums and exiting counties where Aetna thinks it can’t improve profits in the near term. Aetna could lose members as a result, but the size of eventual losses will in large part depend on what the insurer’s competitors do, according to CVS executives.
Other major MA payers have said they will take similar steps to hike profits.
CVS also dealt with lower visibility into its claims in the quarter because of the massive cyberattack on claims clearinghouse Change Healthcare earlier this year. Change took its systems offline as a result, hamstringing providers’ payments across the U.S. and making it harder for insurers to predict how much they might have to spend on their members’ medical costs.
CVS established a reserve of nearly $500 million for claims it estimates were lodged in the quarter but it has yet to receive. Cowhey said the insurer is “confident” about the adequacy of its reserves.
In the rapidly evolving landscape of U.S. healthcare, the tug-of-war between payers and providers is continually intensifying, raising the stakes on the strategic maneuvers that shape the industry’s financial and operational dynamics.
The crux of the issue lies in the increasingly sophisticated strategies employed by insurance companies to deny claims: a move that ostensibly aims to safeguard their bottom lines, often at the expense of provider sustainability and patient access.
The rise in denial rates is more than a mere statistic; it’s a symptom of a broader systemic challenge that calls for strategic foresight and robust expertise. In this intricate environment, providers face numerous administrative challenges, working to balance clinical decisions with financial sustainability.
Drawn from in-depth proprietary analytics, clinical regulatory expertise and decades of experience, CorroHealth addresses what is needed to successfully combat payer denial tactics. Broader industry trends, such as the shift towards value-based care and the increasing emphasis on patient-centric models, will continue to disrupt the historic provider business model. CorroHealth’s insights offer a beacon for steering through these turbulent waters. Their strategic recommendations, from optimizing contract negotiations to leveraging data analytics to managing payer denials, to formalizing escalation paths, reflect a comprehensive approach to mitigating the adverse effects of ever-shifting payer denial tactics.
Delving deeper into the anatomy of payer denials reveals a long-term pattern of deliberate complexity designed to wear down provider resilience. By dissecting the layers of denial management, from initial claim submission to final resolution, CorroHealth uncovers pivotal areas where targeted interventions dramatically shift outcomes in favor of healthcare providers.
This process involves a granular analysis of denial codes, predictive analytics to pre-empt possible denials and rigorous training staff to maneuver through the intricate appeals process effectively.
Taking a proactive stance towards payer contract management, their approach emphasizes the importance of scrutinizing the fine print and negotiating terms that anticipate and mitigate denial strategies. CorroHealth advocates on the providers’ behalf for clearer definitions of medical necessity, timely filing limits and transparent appeal processes. By equipping providers with negotiation tactics grounded in comprehensive data analysis and a deep understanding of payer methodologies, their contracts become a tool for protection against denials, rather than a source of vulnerability.
Woven throughout this work is CorroHealth’s commitment to advancing the dialogue between payers and providers toward a more equitable healthcare system. Through forums, partnerships and collaborative initiatives, CorroHealth bridges the gap between these two entities, fostering an environment where mutual understanding and respect pave the way for innovative solutions to longstanding challenges.
Hospitals and health systems require an experienced partner to navigate the complexities of the healthcare landscape, balancing financial sustainability with top-tier patient care. CorroHealth offers a comprehensive suite of solutions to address challenges associated with payer denials, enabling providers to recover lost revenues and uphold the fundamental goal of accessible, high-quality patient care. Beyond financial strategies and operational adjustments, the narrative calls for a more productive and transparent dialogue between payers and providers. This aims to encourage an ecosystem where financial sustainability and high-quality patient care are complementary facets of holistic healthcare delivery.
Facing these challenges, the importance of strategic partnerships becomes increasingly vital for healthcare providers. Such alliances are indispensable in maneuvering through the complex healthcare landscape and are strengthened by CorroHealth’s comprehensive understanding of the payer-provider dynamic and dedication to fostering innovation. A collaborative approach is essential for progressing towards a healthcare system characterized by greater equity and efficiency.
The industry stands at an existential crossroads. The insights and strategies shared by CorroHealth serve as a testament to the company’s expertise and its dedication to shaping a future where healthcare is accessible, affordable and effective for all.
Walgreens’ decision to slash VillageMD’s clinical footprint has reverberated to the financial accounts of the primary care chain’s minority owner — Cigna.
Dive Brief:
Cigna has written off more than half of its multibillion-dollar investment in VillageMD amid the declining value of the primary care chain.
Cigna invested $2.5 billion into VillageMD in late 2022, with the goal of accelerating value-based care arrangements for employer clients by tying VillageMD’s physician network with Cigna’s health services business, Evernorth — hopefully reaping profits from shared savings as a result.
But on Thursday, Cigna wrote off $1.8 billion of that investment, citing VillageMD’s lackluster growth after its majority owner Walgreens elected to close underperforming clinics. The writedown drove Cigna’s shareholder earnings down to a net loss of almost $300 million, compared to profit of $1.3 billion in the same time last year.
Dive Insight:
Overall, Cigna’s first-quarter performance was solid, especially amid the mixed results of its insurer peers, analysts said. The Connecticut-based payer grew its revenue 23% year over year to $57.3 billion.
Yet Cigna’s bet on VillageMD is a new thorn in its side, as the investment’s value becomes increasingly bogged down by Walgreens’ operational decisions, along with broader challenges in the primary care sector.
Walgreens began closing underperforming VillageMD centers last year in a bid to force the segment to profitability, and quickly blew past its initial goal of 60 closures. Now, the retailer expects to close 160 clinics overall, majorly downsizing VillageMD’s footprint.
That decision is reverberating to the financial accounts of VillageMD’s minority owner — Cigna.
“The writedown was largely driven by some broader market dislocation that is hitting the space … as well as Village determining that they are going to pull in supply lines and constrain some of the growth in some of the new clinics that they were establishing,” CEO David Cordani told investors on a Thursday morning call.
However Cigna’s priorities for VillageMD remain unchanged, management said. Cigna is still aiming to link VillageMD’s primary care centers to its own clinical assets to build a high-quality provider network that can serve its own patients, and those of health plan and employer clients.
The partnership has already launched in four markets, and the companies plan to continue scaling, according to Cordani.
“At the macro level our strategic direction in terms of what we are seeking to innovate with Village has not changed despite the writedown of the asset,” Cordani said, though “no one likes a writedown of the asset.”
In the quarter, Cigna’s health benefits segment emerged unscathed by headwinds that buffeted other major payers: notably, spending and regulatory pressure in Medicare Advantage.
Yet the majority of Cigna’s business is with employer clients, which served as a “well-underwritten shelter from the MA storms,” TD Cowen analyst Gary Taylor wrote in a Thursday morning note.
Cigna is planning on getting out of Medicare coverage altogether, having agreed in January to sell its Medicare business to Chicago-based insurer Health Care Service Corporation. That deal remains on track, executives said, after a key waiting period for antitrust regulators to challenge the deal came and went in mid-April. The divestiture is expected to close in early 2025.
Cigna’s medical loss ratio — a marker of how much in premiums insurers spend on patient care — was 79.9% in the quarter, better than analysts had expected. Cigna did see higher utilization in areas like inpatient care for employer-sponsored members in the quarter, but the payer’s pricing decisions for its plans covered the trend, executives said.
Cigna cut its MLR guidance for 2024, along with raising earnings expectations. The insurer now expects an MLR between 81.7% and 82.5% this year, suggesting management is confident in their ability to control medical costs, J.P. Morgan analyst Lisa Gill wrote in a Thursday note.
CVS, which previously held the contract, cited its loss as a factor in declining revenue and income for its pharmacy benefit management business on Wednesday.
Cordani specifically called out specialty pharmacy — which already represents a major portion of Evernorth’s revenue — as an “accelerated growth opportunity” for the business.
Roughly a week ago, Evernorth announced it will have an interchangeable Humira biosimilar for $0 out-of-pocket cost for eligible patients of its specialty pharmacy arm, Accredo.
Currently, 100,000 Accredo patients use Humira or a biosimilar for the frequently prescribed immune disease drug, which has long been the top-selling drug for its manufacturer AbbVie. In addition, all of its PBM clients and patients will have access to the biosimilars, according to Cordani.
Evernorth has also taken steps to ramp up coverage of GLP-1s, expensive diabetes drugs that have soared in popularity for weight loss. In March, the company announced cost-sharing agreement for GLP-1s covered in a condition management program, to insulate health plan and employer clients from the soaring costs of the medication.
The program has seen “strong interest,” and Evernorth has enrolled more than 1 million people in it to date, Cordani said.
Sometimes a health policy story comes along that should be shouted from the rafters — well at least reported by media that cover the subject. Brett Arends’ story for Dow Jones’ MarketWatch is one of those stories.
The revelations about overpayments come from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, MedPAC for short, some of whose recommendations over the years have resulted in high rate increases for Advantage plan sellers that helped make it possible for them to offer groceries, bits of dental care, and other goodies seniors have snapped up. The media’s role in revealing and dissecting those overpayments is long overdue.
The last several months news outlets have been paying more attention to the downsides of Medicare Advantage plans.
Arends’ story focused on one thread in the story: MedPAC’s latest report to Congress that revealed something health policy wonks — but not the public — have known for a long time. Medicare Advantage plans are taking advantage of the federal gravy train.
“The private insurers who now run more than half of all Medicare plans are overcharging the taxpayers by a staggering $83 billion a year,” Arends wrote. “They are charging us taxpayers 22% more than it would cost us to provide the same health insurance to seniors directly if we just cut out the private insurance companies as middlemen.”
MedPAC was set up by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, “back when people in Washington were actually doing their jobs,” Arends points out. The commission’s job is to advise Congress on issues involving Medicare. MedPAC reports discuss the financial situation of the Medicare trust funds, and over the years those reports often revealed that the private health plans have been overpaid. Until recently, there has been little to no pushback from the government or most of the media, in effect leaving the insurance industry a clear path to sell Medicare Advantage plans to more than half of the Medicare market. The media have recently begun to ask why.
Arends calls the Medicare Advantage arrangement “a rip-off, pure and simple,” noting that what sellers of the plan are paid “is more than twice as much as it would cost simply to provide free dental, hearing and vision care to all traditional Medicare beneficiaries, not just those in private ‘Medicare Advantage’ plans.”
I have covered Medicare for decades now and have often asked the experts why there couldn’t be a level playing field that would allow beneficiaries in the traditional program to receive vision and dental benefits. The answer was always, “We can’t afford that.”
Arends debunks that thinking by directly quoting the MedPAC report:
“It reads: ‘We estimate that Medicare spends approximately 22 percent more for MA enrollees than it would spend if those beneficiaries were enrolled in FFS (fee for service or traditional) Medicare, a difference that translates into a projected $83 billion in 2024.’ MedPAC reported that its review of private plan payments suggests that over the 39-year history with private plans, they “have never yielded aggregate savings for the Medicare program. Throughout the history of Medicare managed care, the program (Medicare Advantage) has paid more than it would have paid if beneficiaries had been in FFS (fee for service) Medicare.”
I checked in with Fred Schulte, who now writes for KFF Health News, and who over his career has written many prize-winning stories documenting the shenanigans insurers have used to enhance their reimbursements from Medicare, such as upcoding. That’s the practice of billing Medicare for ailments that are more serious than what patients actually have. “For example, instead of reporting a patient has diabetes, the insurers would say diabetes with neuropathy or eye problems and receive higher reimbursement,” he explained.
“It took a very long time for the government and the Justice Department to understand what was going on here with this coding,” Schulte said. “The codes just kept getting higher and higher, and profits kept going up and up.”
A year ago, Paul Ginsburg, a senior fellow at the University of Southern California’s Schaffer Center, said, “The current Medicare Advantage structure results in overpayments, markedly higher than previously understood.”
Even Michael Chernow, who heads the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission authorized by Congress in 1997, recently admitted on Twitter that Medicare Advantage “has never saved Medicare money.” But he added, “that doesn’t mean Medicare Advantage isn’t a key pillar of Medicare sustainability. At its best it can provide better care at lower cost.”
Arends’ story doesn’t sound hopeful about the direction of Medicare. He concludes, “Medicare Advantage isn’t making the rest of Medicare better. It is putting the rest of Medicare out of business. And not by being more efficient, but by being less efficient. It is driving up the overall cost of Medicare by 22%. And not by being more efficient but by being less efficient.
The logical outcome is that traditional Medicare ceases to exist and that Medicare dollars pass through the hands of private insurance companies at 122 cents on the dollar.”
Arends’ prediction may well come true, but perhaps not without a fight. David Lipschutz, associate director at the Center for Medicare Advocacy, says a “confluence of factors have come together to make it harder to ignore the problems of Medicare Advantage by the press and policymakers.”
Hospitals’ business models are being upended by fundamental changes within the health care system, including one that presents a pretty existential challenge: People have far more options to get their care elsewhere these days.
Why it matters:
Health systems’ responses to major demographic, social and technological change have been controversial among policymakers and economists concerned about the impact on costs and competition.
Communities depend on having at least some emergency services available, making the survival of hospitals’ core services crucial.
But without adaptation — which is already underway in some cases — hospitals may be facing deep red balance sheets in the not-too-distant future, leading to facility closures and shutteredservices.
The big picture:
Many hospitals have recovered from the sector’s post-pandemic financial slump, which was driven primarily by staffing costs and inflation. But systemic, long-term trends will continue to challenge their traditional business model.
Many of the services that are shifting toward outpatient settings — like oncology, diagnostics and orthopedic care — are the ones that typically make hospitals the most money and effectively subsidize less profitable departments.
When hospitals lose these higher-margin services, “you’re starving the system that needs profits to provide services that we all might need, but particularly uninsured or underinsured people might need,” said UCLA professor Jill Horwitz.
And hospitals have long claimed that much higher commercial insurance rates make up for what they say are inadequate government rates.
But as the population ages and moves out of employer-sponsored health plans, fewer people will have commercial insurance, forcing hospitals to either cut costs or find new sources of revenue.
By the numbers:
Consulting firms are projecting a bleak decade for health systems.
Oliver Wyman recently predicted that under the status quo, hospitals will need to reduce their expenses by 15-20% by 2030 “to stay viable.”
Boston Consulting Group last year projected that health systems’ annual financial shortfall will total more than $200 billion by 2027, and their operating margins will have dropped by 10 percentage points.
To break even in 2027, a “typical” health system would need payment rate increases of between 5-8% annually — twice the rate growth over the last decade, according to BCG. If the load is borne solely by private insurers, hospitals will need a 10-16% year-over-year increase.
Between the lines:
This is the lens through which to view health systems’ spree of mergers and acquisitions, which have increasingly drawn criticism from policymakers, regulators and economists as being anticompetitive.
For better orworse, when hospitals have a larger market share, they are in a better position to negotiate and bring in more patients, and they can dilute some of the financial pain of poorer-performing facilities.
And when they acquire physician practices or other outpatient clinics, they’re still getting paid for delivering care even when patients aren’t receiving it in a traditional hospital setting.
“I think the hospitals have sort of said … ‘We can keep doing things the same way and we can just merge and get higher markups,'” said Yale economist Zack Cooper. “That push to consolidate is saying, ‘Let’s not move forward, let’s dig in.'”
Yes, but:
A big bonus of outpatient care is that it’s supposed to be cheaper. But when hospitals charge more for care than an independent physician’s office would have, or they tack on facility fees, costs don’t go down.
“They’ve protected their portfolio, and that’s added to the cost of health care,” said Johns Hopkins professor Gerard Anderson.
The other side:
Hospitals are typically on the losing end of negotiations with insurers right now, thanks to how large insurers have become, and are “in an extremely difficult competitive position,” said Ken Kaufman, co-founder of consulting agency Kaufman Hall.
Criticizing their mergers and acquisitions as anticompetitive is a “complete misunderstanding of the situation,” he said, and moving toward a new care model will take “an incredible amount of resources.”
Reality check:
Hospitals account for 30% of the country’s massive health spending tab, and they’ll have to be at the forefront of any real efforts to contain costs.
They’re also anchors in their communities and are powerful lobbyists, which helps explain why Congress has struggled to modestly reduce what Medicare pays hospital outpatient departments.
After covering the Medicare privatization crisis for over two years, an investigative reporter takes a step back and examines what’s at stake.
Medicare, the country’s largest and arguably most successful health care program, is under duress, weakened by decades of relentless efforts by insurance companies to privatize it.
A rapidly growing Medicare Advantage market — now 52% of Medicare beneficiaries, up from 37% in 2018 — controlled by some of the largest and most powerful corporations in the world, threatens to both drain the trust fund and eliminate Medicare’s most important and controversial component: its ability to set prices.
It is not an overstatement to call it a heist of historic proportions, endangering the health not only of the more than 65 million seniors and people with disabilities who depend on Medicare but all Americans who benefit from the powerful role that Medicare has historically played in reining in health care costs.
The giant corporations that dominate Medicare Advantage have rigged the system to maximize payments from our government to the point that they are now being overpaid between $88 billion and $140 billion a year. The overpayments could soar to new heights if the insurers get their way and eliminate traditional Medicare.
All of America’s seniors and disabled people who depend on Medicare could soon be moved to a managed care model of ever-tightening networks, relentless prior authorization requirements and limited drug formularies. The promise of a humane health care system for all would be sacrificed at the altar of the almighty insurer dollar.
The Medicare Payments Advisory Commission (MedPAC), the independent congressional agency tasked with overseeing Medicare, last month released a searing report which found that Medicare spends 22% more per beneficiary in Medicare Advantage plans than if those beneficiaries had been enrolled in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. That’s up from a 6% estimate in the prior year.
A similar cost trend exists for diagnosis coding.
Medicare Advantage plans and their affiliated providers increasingly upcoded diagnoses to get higher reimbursements. In 2024, overpayments due to upcoding could total $50 billion, according to MedPAC, up from $23 billion in 2023. These enormous overpayments drive up the cost of premiums — MedPAC’s conservative estimate is that the premiums paid to Medicare out of seniors’ Social Security checks will be $13 billion higher in 2024 because of those overpayments.
There is evidence that Americans and lawmakers are starting to wake up.
Medicare Advantage enrollment growth slowed considerably in 2023. Support within the Democratic Party for Medicare Advantage is cratering. In 2022, 147 House Democrats signed an industry-backed letter supporting Medicare Advantage. This year, just 24 House Democrats signed the letter. Earlier this month, the Biden administration cut Medicare Advantage base payments for the second year in a row(while still increasing payments overall), over the fierce opposition of the insurance lobby. The investment bank Stephens called Biden’s decision a “highly adverse” outcome for insurers. Wall Street has taken note, punishing the stock price of the largest Medicare Advantage insurers, with Barron’s noting that Wall Street’s “love affair” with Humana is “ending in tears.” The cargo ship is turning. It is up to us to determine if that will be enough.
We can’t attack a problem if we don’t know how to diagnose it. I spoke with some of the most knowledgeable critics of Medicare Advantage about the danger the rapid expansion of Medicare privatization presents to the American public.
Rick Gilfillan is a medical doctor who in 2010 became the first director of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). He would go on to serve as CEO of Trinity Health from 2013 to 2019. In 2021 he launched an effort to halt the involuntary privatization of Medicare benefits.
“Right now, all investigations are finding tremendous overpayments,” Gilfillan said. “The overpayments are based on medical diagnoses that may or may not be meaningful from a patient care standpoint. Insurers are using chart reviews, nurse home visits and AI software to find as many diagnoses as possible and thereby inflate the health risks of the patients and the premium they get from Medicare. The overpayments are just outrageous,” he said.
The problem could get worse if the Supreme Court curtails the powers of regulatory agencies, as it may do this year. “It would make a huge difference in what CMS would be able to do,” Gilfillan said.
The logic behind Medicare privatization is that seniors and people with disabilities use too much care, egged on by their doctors. If true, a solution could have been to enforce the Stark Law, which bans physicians from having financial relationships with providers they refer to, or other anti-kickback statutes. States could also enforce laws 33 of them have enacted that prohibit the “corporate practice of medicine.”
Instead, health insurers were invited and incentivized by previous administrations to compete with the original Medicare program and “manage” beneficiaries’ care. Under this model— set in its modern form in 2003 — Medicare Advantage insurers are paid a rate based on a complex risk modeling process and estimated costs.
But Medicare Advantage plans have never been cheaper than traditional Medicare, as MedPAC has repeatedly pointed out.
This is a far more complex approach than the fee-for-service model in which CMS sets prices in health care in a public and transparent manner, Gilfillan notes. The prices negotiated by Medicare Advantage companies, by contrast, are not disclosed.
“With fee-for-service, a patient is provided a service, treatment or medication. The physician who provides the service charges a specific amount for that service,” Gilfillan said. “And then Medicare pays whatever it decided it was worth for that service. The benefit is you pay for what you get.”
Some Medicare Advantage plans use a “capitated” approach in paying primary care physicians. The amount is based on the premium they receive for the patient. The more codes submitted, the higher the capitation, the greater the profit. That approach is having far-reaching economic impacts on health care, said Hayden Rooke-Ley, an Oregon-based lawyer and health care consultant who co-authored a recent New England Journal of Medicine article on the corporatization of primary care. It is the capitation model, he says, that drives the rampant upcoding among Medicare Advantage plans.
From Horizontal to Vertical
“An undercovered aspect of Medicare Advantage is the way it is fueling vertical consolidation” in the insurance business, Rooke-Ley added, noting that until recent years, insurers bulked up by buying smaller competitors (known as horizontal integration). “With so much government money, we’re seeing insurance companies restructuring themselves as vertically integrated conglomerates [through the acquisition of physician practices, clinics and pharmacy operations] to become even more profitable, especially in Medicare Advantage.”
“A key part of this strategy is to own primary care practices,” he said, citing Humana’s partnership with the private-equity firm Welsh Carson to become the largest owner of Medicare-based primary care, CVS/Aetna’s acquisition of Oak Street, and UnitedHealth’s roll up of doctors practices across the country.
As Rooke-Ley explained, control of primary care allows insurance companies to more easily manipulate “risk scores” to increase payments from the government by claiming patients are in worse health than they really are.
“The easiest way to increase risk scores, short of simply fabricating diagnosis codes, is to control the behavior of physicians and other clinicians,” he said.
“When an insurance company owns the physician practice, it can configure workflows, technology, and incentives to drive risk coding.
UnitedHealth, for example, can preferentially schedule Medicare Advantage patients – and it can choose to reach out to health plan enrollees it identifies with its data as having high ‘coding opportunities.’ It can require its doctors to go to risk-code training, and it can prohibit doctors from closing their notes before they address all the ‘suggested’ diagnosis codes.”
“While Medicare Advantage insurance companies tout all their provider acquisitions as investments in value-based care, the concern is that it’s really just looking like a game of financialization,” Rooke-Ley said. “MA was supposed to save Medicare money, but the exact opposite has happened.
According to MedPAC, the government will over-subsidize MA to the tune of $88 billion this year, with $54 billion of that due to excess risk coding relative to what we see in traditional Medicare. That’s a staggering amount of money that could go directly to patients and clinicians by strengthening traditional Medicare.”
Two Possible Futures
There are two options for the future of Medicare, said Dr. Ed Weisbart, former chief medical officer of the pharmacy benefit manager Express Scripts, which Cigna bought in 2018, who now leads the Missouri chapter of Physicians for a National Health Program.
In one future, he said, “We will change the trajectory and get rid of the profiteers, and manage to divert the funds that are being profiteered to patient care.”
In another future, the business practices of Medicare Advantage plans “will be unfettered and more damaging and harmful than they are today,” he said. “If we continue on this course we’ll find an increasingly polarized health care system that caters increasingly to the wealthy and privileged. The barriers to care will be worse.”
The Affordable Care Act turned 14 on March 23. It has done a lot of good for a lot of people, but big changes in the law are urgently needed to address some very big misses and consequences I don’t believe most proponents of the law intended or expected.
At the top of the list of needed reforms: restraining the power and influence of the rapidly growing corporations that are siphoning more and more money from federal and state governments – and our personal bank accounts – to enrich their executives and shareholders.
I was among many advocates who supported the ACA’s passage, despite the law’s ultimate shortcomings. It broadened access to health insurance, both through government subsidies to help people pay their premiums and by banning prevalent industry practices that had made it impossible for millions of American families to buy coverage at any price. It’s important to remember that before the ACA, insurers routinely refused to sell policies to a third or more applicants because of a long list of “preexisting conditions” – from acne and heart disease to simply being overweight – and frequently rescinded coverage when policyholders were diagnosed with cancer and other diseases.
While insurance company executives were publicly critical of the law, they quickly took advantage of loopholes (many of which their lobbyists created) that would allow them to reap windfall profits in the years ahead – and they have, as you’ll see below.
I wrote and spoke frequently as an industry whistleblower about what I thought Congress should know and do, perhaps most memorably in an interview with Bill Moyers. During my Congressional testimony in the months leading up to the final passage of the bill in 2010, I told lawmakers that if they passed it without a public option and acquiesced to industry demands, they might as well call it “The Health Insurance Industry Profit Protection and Enhancement Act.”
A health plan similar to Medicare that could have been a more affordable option for many of us almost happened, but at the last minute, the Senate was forced to strip the public option out of the bill at the insistence of Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Connecticut), who died on March 27, 2024. The Senate did not have a single vote to spare as the final debate on the bill was approaching, and insurance industry lobbyists knew they could kill the public option if they could get just one of the bill’s supporters to oppose it. So they turned to Lieberman, a former Democrat who was Vice President Al Gore’s running mate in 2000 and who continued to caucus with Democrats. It worked. Lieberman wouldn’t even allow a vote on the bill if it created a public option. Among Lieberman’s constituents and campaign funders were insurance company executives who lived in or around Hartford, the insurance capital of the world. Lieberman would go on to be the founding chair of a political group called No Labels, which is trying to find someone to run as a third-party presidential candidate this year.
The work of Big Insurance and its army of lobbyists paid off as insurers had hoped. The demise of the public option was a driving force behind the record profits – and CEO pay – that we see in the industry today.
The good effects of the ACA:
Nearly 49 million U.S. residents (or 16%) were uninsured in 2010. The law has helped bring that down to 25.4 million, or 8.3% (although a large and growing number of Americans are now “functionally uninsured” because of unaffordable out-of-pocket requirements, which President Biden pledged to address in his recent State of the Union speech).
The ACA also made it illegal for insurers to refuse to sell coverage to people with preexisting conditions, which even included birth defects, or charge anyone more for their coverage based on their health status; it expanded Medicaid (in all but 10 states that still refuse to cover more low-income individuals and families); it allowed young people to stay on their families’ policies until they turn 26; and it required insurers to spend at least 80% of our premiums on the health care goods and services our doctors say we need (a well-intended provision of the law that insurers have figured out how to game).
The not-so-good effects of the ACA:
As taxpayers and health care consumers, we have paid a high price in many ways as health insurance companies have transformed themselves into massive money-making machines with tentacles reaching deep into health care delivery and taxpayers’ pockets.
To make policies affordable in the individual market, for example, the government agreed to subsidize premiums for the vast majority of people seeking coverage there, meaning billions of new dollars started flowing to private insurance companies. (It also allowed insurers to charge older Americans three times as much as they charge younger people for the same coverage.) Even more tax dollars have been sent to insurers as part of the Medicaid expansion. That’s because private insurers over the years have persuaded most states to turn their Medicaid programs over to them to administer.
We invite you to take a look at how the ascendency of health insurers over the past several years has made a few shareholders and executives much richer while the rest of us struggle despite – and in some cases because of – the Affordable Care Act.
BY THE NUMBERS
In 2010, we as a nation spent $2.6 trillion on health care. This year we will spend almost twice as much – an estimated $4.9 trillion, much of it out of our own pockets even with insurance.
In 2010, the average cost of a family health insurance policy through an employer was $13,710. Last year, the average was nearly $24,000, a 75% increase.
The ACA, to its credit, set an annual maximum on how much those of us with insurance have to pay before our coverage kicks in, but, at the insurance industry’s insistence, it goes up every year. When that limit went into effect in 2014, it was $12,700 for a family. This year, it has increased by 48%, to $18,900. That means insurers can get away with paying fewer claims than they once did, and many families have to empty their bank accounts when a family member gets sick or injured. Most people don’t reach that limit, but even a few hundred dollars is more than many families have on hand to cover deductibles and other out-of-pocket requirements.
Now 100 million Americans – nearly one of every three of us – are mired in medical debt, even though almost 92% of us are presumably “covered.” The coverage just isn’t as adequate as it used to be or needs to be.
Meanwhile, insurance companies had a gangbuster 2023. The seven big for-profit U.S. health insurers’ revenues reached $1.39 trillion, and profits totaled a whopping $70.7 billion last year.
SWEEPING CHANGE, CONSOLIDATION–AND HUGE PROFITS FOR INVESTORS
Insurance company shareholders and executives have become much wealthier as the stock prices of the seven big for-profit corporations that control the health insurance market have skyrocketed.
NOTE: The Dow Jones Industrial Average is listed on this chart as a reference because it is a leading stock market index that tracks 30 of the largest publicly traded companies in the United States.
REVENUES collected by those seven companies have more than tripled (up 346%), increasing by more than $1 trillion in just the past ten years.
PROFITS (earnings from operations) have more than doubled (up 211%), increasing by more than $48 billion.
The CEOs of these companies are among the highest paid in the country. In 2022, the most recent year the companies have reported executive compensation, they collectively made $136.5 million.
U.S. HEALTH PLAN ENROLLMENT
Enrollment in the companies’ health plans is a mix of “commercial” policies they sell to individuals and families and that they manage for “plan sponsors” – primarily employers and unions – and government/enrollee-financed plans (Medicare, Medicaid, Tricare for military personnel and their dependents and the Federal Employee Health Benefits program).
Enrollment in their commercial plans grew by just 7.65% over the 10 years and declined significantly at UnitedHealth, CVS/Aetna and Humana. Centene and Molina picked up commercial enrollees through their participation in several ACA (Obamacare) markets in which most enrollees qualify for federal premium subsidies paid directly to insurers.
While not growing substantially, commercial plans remain very profitable because insurers charge considerably more in premiums now than a decade ago.
(1) The 2013 total for CVS/Aetna was reported by Aetna before its 2018 acquisition by CVS. (2) Humana announced last year it is exiting the commercial health insurance business. (3) Enrollment in the ACA’s marketplace plans account for all of Molina’s commercial business.
By contrast, enrollment in the government-financed Medicaid and Medicare Advantage programs has increased 197% and 167%, respectively, over the past 10 years.
(1) The 2013 total for CVS/Aetna was reported by Aetna before its 2018 acquisition by CVS.
Of the 65.9 million people eligible for Medicare at the beginning of 2024, 33 million, slightly more than half, enrolled in a private Medicare Advantage plan operated by either a nonprofit or for-profit health insurer, but, increasingly, three of the big for-profits grabbed most new enrollees. Of the 1.7 million new Medicare Advantage enrollees this year, 86% were captured by UnitedHealth, Humana and Aetna. Those three companies are the leaders in the Medicare Advantage business among the for-profit companies, and, according to the health care consulting firm Chartis, are taking over the program “at breakneck speed.”
(1) The 2013 total for CVS/Aetna was reported by Aetna before its 2018 acquisition by CVS. (2,3) Centene’s and Molina’s totals include Medicare Supplement; they do not break out enrollment in the two Medicare categories separately.
It is worth noting that although four companies saw growth in their Medicare Supplement enrollment over the decade, enrollment in Medicare Supplement policies has been declining in more recent years as insurers have attracted more seniors and disabled people into their Medicare Advantage plans.
OTHER FEDERAL PROGRAMS
In addition to the above categories, Humana and Centene have significant enrollment in Tricare, the government-financed program for the military. Humana reported 6 million military enrollees in 2023, up from 3.1 million in 2013. Centene reported 2.8 million in 2023. It did not report any military enrollment in 2013.
Elevance reported having 1.6 million enrollees in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program in 2023, up from 1.5 million in 2013. That total is included in the commercial enrollment category above.
At Cigna, Express Scripts’ pharmacy operations now contribute more than 70% to the company’s total revenues. Caremark’s pharmacy operations contribute 33% to CVS/Aetna’s total revenues, and Optum Rx contributes 31% to UnitedHealth’s total revenues.
WHAT TO DO AND WHERE TO START
The official name of the ACA is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The law did indeed implement many important patient protections, and it made coverage more affordable for many Americans. But there is much more Congress and regulators must do to close the loopholes and dismantle the barriers erected by big insurers that enable them to pad their bottom lines and reward shareholders while making health care increasingly unaffordable and inaccessible for many of us.
Several bipartisan bills have been introduced in Congress to change how big insurers do business.
And as noted above, President Biden has asked Congress to broaden the recently enacted $2,000-a-year cap on prescription drugs to apply to people with private insurance, not just Medicare beneficiaries. That one policy change could save an untold number of lives and help keep millions of families out of medical debt. (A coalition of more than 70 organizations and businesses, which I lead, supports that, although we’re also calling on Congress to reduce the current overall annual out-of-pocket maximum to no more than $5,000.)
I encourage you to tell your members of Congress and the Biden administration that you support these reforms as well as improving, strengthening and expanding traditional Medicare. You can be certain the insurance industry and its allies are trying to keep any reforms that might shrink profit margins from becoming law.
HENRY KOTULA 