UHG closed its $13B acquisition of data analytics company Change in early October, just weeks after the Justice Department failed in its bid to block the sale on antitrust grounds. In court proceedings, UHG denied it intended to use Change data to give its insurance arm, UnitedHealthcare, a competitive advantage against the rival insurers who use Change as an electronic data interchange clearinghouse.
But a new ProPublica report highlights how communications between UHG and consulting firm McKinsey & Co. point to this potential data advantage as one of the clear upsides from acquiring Change. The McKinsey report was explicitly dismissed by the US District Court judge who, in his ruling in UHG’s favor, was persuaded by testimony from senior executives and evidence of UHG’s history of maintaining internal data firewalls.
The Gist: UHG has a longstanding business interest in maintaining the trust of rival insurers that use its data analytics unit, OptumInsight. Voluntary and internally imposed firewalls between the UHG’s insurance arm and its other businesses are key to maintaining this trust. Although Justice Department lawyers could not provide convincing evidence that UHG has or intends to breach its firewalls, there is still reason to monitor any such activity closely.
The failure of the McKinsey report to sway the court against the deal illustrates how difficult it is for the Justice Department to challenge vertical mergers, even when there is compelling evidence that such deals may impact competition.
Private equity groups have invested about $1 trillion into nearly 8,000 healthcare transactions in the past decade, and some experts are pushing for more scrutiny of its increasing influence on the industry amid concern it may be causing higher medical bills and diminished quality of care, a Nov. 14 Kaiser Health News report said.
Because such investment groups typically invest less than $101 million, such transactions do not attract automatic antitrust reviews at the federal level, the report continued. That represents more than 90 percent of private equity investments in the industry.
Nevertheless, companies owned or managed by private equity groups have agreed to pay fines of more than $500 million since 2014 in over 30 lawsuits under the False Claims Act, which deals with false billing submissions, KHN’s investigation found.
The problem may be most acute in certain specialist fields and in certain metropolitan areas. While private equity, for example, plays a role in just 14 percent of gastroenterology practices nationwide, it controls about 75 percent of that market in at least five metropolitan areas across five states, including Texas and North Carolina, according to research from UC Berkeley’s Nicholas C. Petris Center.
And private equity pockets may be getting deeper. In 2021 alone, over $206 billion was invested by such groups in healthcare, and there is plenty of “dry powder” around for more, KHN reported. The Healthcare Private Equity Association, for example, which boasts about 100 investment companies as members, says the firms have $3 trillion in assets awaiting allocation.
Private equity, like everything else, may have some poor performers but it doesn’t help to generalize as groups “vary tremendously” in how they operate their healthcare investments, Robert Homchick, a Seattle attorney, told KHN.
“Private equity has some bad actors, but so does the rest of the [healthcare] industry,” he said. “I think it’s wrong to paint them all with the same brush.”
Concerns remain, however, that, at least in some cases, private equity involvement is simply a vehicle for maximizing returns, often at the expense of patients. In addition to the $500 million fines, there is also evidence of some private equity groups pushing through additional testing and mandated patient numbers to boost returns, often in medically questionable scenarios, the report said, citing the example of National Spine and Pain Centers previously owned by private equity group Sentinel Partners.
In that case, National Spine paid $3.3 million in a whistleblower case related to allegations of unnecessary treatment and testing, KHN said.
The scope of such private equity dominance in some markets worries many industry observers, and much more needs to be done to help reel in such potential abuses, they say.
“We’re still at the stage of understanding the scope of the problem,” said Laura Alexander, former vice president of policy at the nonprofit American Antitrust Institute, which collaborated on the Petris Center research. “One thing is clear: Much more transparency and scrutiny of these deals is needed.”
The Illinois Health Facilities and Services Review Board unanimously approved a plan to change ownership for 10 Advocate Aurora facilities in the state covered by the system’s plan to merge with Charlotte, N.C.-based Atrium Health, the Chicago Tribune reported Nov. 14.
Atrium and Advocate Aurora, dually headquartered in Milwaukee and Downers Grove, Ill., announced plans to merge into a 67-hospital system with upward of $27 billion in revenue in May. The merger would create one of the largest health systems in the country, with more than 1,000 sites of care across Illinois, Wisconsin, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama, according to the report.
The approval comes after the board voted in September to delay the approval. Board members’ concerns stemmed from the availability of information and their understanding about the deal.
Since that meeting, Advocate Aurora has answered many of the board’s questions, such as the reasons for the combination and the proposed governance structure, according to the report. Some board members said they still wanted more information, but the board is required by law to approve certain types of applications as long as they are complete.
The board’s approval was needed for the merger because the affiliation is considered a change of 50 percent or more of the voting members of a nonprofit corporation’s board of directors that controls a healthcare facility’s operation, license, certification or physical plant and assets. The board of directors of Advocate Health — the combined system’s new name — will be made up of an equal number of members from Advocate Aurora and Atrium Health.
Advocate Aurora shared the following statement with Becker’s on the board’s approval:
“Securing the Illinois Health Facilities and Services Review Board’s approval brings us one step closer to coming together with Atrium Health, which will allow us to improve the lives of our patients, the health of our communities and the opportunities for our team members. We look forward to closing, which we anticipate before the end of the year.”
Atrium shared the following statement with Becker’s:
“We are pleased to see that the process continues to move forward and remain optimistic our combination with Advocate Aurora Health will be finalized before the end of the year.”
South Dakota-based Sanford Health and Minnesota-based Fairview Health Services unveiled plans Tuesday to merge and form a 58-hospital juggernaut serving rural and urban patients across the Midwest.
The nonprofits have signed a nonbinding letter of intent as they proceed with due diligence and regulatory antitrust reviews, they said in a press release. Each would maintain their own regional presence, leadership and regional boards but operate as a single integrated system under Sanford Health’s banner.
The organizations said they anticipate closing their deal sometime next year.
“Our organizations are united by a shared commitment to advance the health and well-being of our communities,” Sanford Health President and CEO Bill Gassen said in the release. “As a combined system, we can do more to expand access to complex and highly specialized care, utilize innovative technology and provide a broader range of virtual services, unlock greater research capabilities and transform the care delivery experience to ensure every patient receives the best care no matter where they live.”
Gassen is teed up to serve as the president and CEO of the new entity should the merger go through, while Fairview CEO James Hereford would serve as co-CEO for one year following the deal’s close.
Headquarted in Sioux Falls, Sanford Health describes itself as the country’s largest rural health system with nearly 48,000 employees, 47 medical centers, 224 clinics and hundreds of other facilities. It serves over 1 million patients and 220,000 health plan members, according to its website, and each year logs 5.2 million outpatient or clinic visits, nearly 83,000 admissions, about 128,000 surgeries and procedures and roughly 195,000 emergency department visits.
Minneapolis-based Fairview Health Services employs 31,000 people across 11 hospitals as well as dozens of clinics, pharmacies and other facilities. It boasts a network of over 5,000 doctors after merging a few years back with fellow Twin Cities system HealthEast and due to partnerships with University of Minnesota Health specialists.
The two systems said their planned merger will improve care quality, outcomes, patient experience and health equity across their patient populations. New efficiencies will also help the systems offer more affordable care, they noted, while their workforces will benefit from stronger recruitment and advancement opportunities.
“With Sanford Health, Fairview Health Services has found a partner that shares our Midwestern values and our commitment to affordable, accessible and equitable care delivery,” Hereford said in the release. “Our complementary capabilities mean that together, we are uniquely positioned to improve clinical outcomes, develop new care delivery models, expand opportunities for employees and clinicians across our broader operational footprint, and apply our combined resources to positively impact the well-being of our patients and communities today and for decades to come.”
Sanford and Fairview’s news lands about six months after Advocate Aurora Health and Atrium Health announced their own nonprofit megamerger. That deal continues to move through the necessary regulatory hurdles and, if closed, would yield a 67-hospital with strong presences in the nearby Chicago and Milwaukee markets.
In its Q3 earnings call, Oscar Health CEO Mario Schlosser revealed that the “insurtech” has pulled out of the MA market in Texas and New York, leaving it with only one Florida-based plan. Oscar entered the MA business with high hopes in 2020, but counted fewer than 5K MA members in Q3 2022.
Although its Affordable Care Act exchange enrollment has nearly doubled since last year, now covering more than 1M lives, Oscar is still struggling with high medical loss ratios, which have kept it from turning a profit. The company’s stock price is at an all-time low, having declined over 90 percent from its peak, shortly after its 2021 IPO.
The Gist: Like Bright HealthCare before them, Oscar pulling out of MA is another sign that the chance of meaningful disruption from “insurtechs” has nearly vanished. While still privately held, Oscar achieved fame in the early 2010s through catchy marketing that targeted a young, tech-savvy client base, and its move into MA before the pandemic signaled broader ambitions.
Oscar’s travails illustrate just how hard it is to start an insurance company from scratch, even with an intriguing and comprehensive technology platform. The company proved unable to overcome its lack of market power in negotiations with providers, and faced difficulty managing a small, unstable risk pool.
Now that more traditional insurers are improving their mobile tech interfaces and telehealth offerings, the differentiated value Oscar offers to its members has clearly diminished.
In a recent STAT News article, reporters Tara Bannow and Bob Herman took an in-depth look at private-equity firm Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe, examining the performance of four of its healthcare portfolio companies. They show how the firm’s A-list partners, clients, and board members have promoted controversial business practices—often at the expense of publicly funded healthcare programs—that conflict with its well-curated public image.
The Gist: This article emphasizes how the complex and opaque regulatory structure of American healthcare allows motivated parties like PE firms to find technically legal, though ethically suspect, business models, which can easily tip over into outright illegality.
It highlights the “revolving door” flow of executives between industry and government, which allows investment firms to play a long game by actively shaping the regulatory landscape and lobbying to create business opportunities where none previously existed. Justified backlash at “gotcha” business models and profit-seeking at the expense of vulnerable patients may swamp any positive contribution that PE investment and rollups may make to the business of healthcare.
The FTC is investigating US Anesthesia Providers (USAP), a private equity (PE)-backed group with 4.5K physicians working in nine states, over concerns of monopoly power in certain markets. The inquiry is focused on USAP’s acquisition history, which has followed the PE “playbook” of rolling up small anesthesiology groups into a single entity large enough to exert leverage in contract negotiations. USAP’s presence in Texas and Colorado is likely to be of particular interest, as it controls at least 30 percent of the anesthesiology market in both states.
The Gist:Like many other PE-backed physician groups, USAP achieved market power mostly through myriad acquisitions too small to warrant regulatory attention on their own. The probe is in line with recent government scrutiny of private equity influence in the healthcare sector, and will no doubt be closely watched by investors and PE-backed groups.
If USAP is forced to divest from certain markets, the precedent could prove especially damaging to other rapidly growing investor-backed physician groups, particularly those staffing hospital functions, who are already being rocked by ramifications of the No Surprises Act.
On Monday, a federal judge denied the Department of Justice (DOJ)’s attempt to block UHG’s $13B purchase of Change Healthcare, a technology firm specializing in claims processing and data analytics.
The DOJ sought to block the purchase on antitrust grounds, arguing that UHG would have access to technologies that its rivals use to compete, but the judge, writing in a sealed ruling, found the DOJ’s case inadequate. It is unclear at this point whether the DOJ will appeal.
Change will now join UHG’s OptumInsight division, though in response to anticompetitive concerns, the ruling ordered UHG to sell part of Change’s claims payment and editing business, as it had already planned to do.
The Gist: Antitrust regulators have had much greater success at challenging horizontal healthcare mergers but have struggled to find solid footing to fight vertical deals.
The UHG-Change case was closely watched in part because of the precedent it would have set in terms of holding “platform” aggregators in check. As UHG and other healthcare titans continue to acquire assets up and down the value chain (physician practices, ambulatory surgery centers, clinics, telehealth capabilities, risk products), it’s increasingly clear that the government will face an uphill climb to question the competitive effects of these vertical M&A activities.
A spokesperson for RWJBarnabas Health said the case is “yet another in a series of baseless complaints filed by … an organization whose leadership apparently prefers to assign blame to others rather than accept responsibility for the unsatisfactory results of their own poor business decisions and actions over the years.”
A lawsuit filed last week accuses RWJBarnabas Health of “a years-long systemic effort” to hamper competition and monopolize acute care hospital services in northern New Jersey.
The case brought by CarePoint Health to a U.S. District Court accuses the state’s largest integrated healthcare delivery system of “aiming to destroy the three hospitals operated by CarePoint as independent competitors” with the support of healthcare real estate investors and Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield, the state’s largest health insurer.
CarePoint Health includes the 349-bed Christ Hospital, 224-bed Bayonne Medical and 348-bed Hoboken University Medical Center (HUMC).
The group said RWJBarnabas intended to force the first two hospitals to shut down but acquire the third due to its more profitable payer mix.
“RWJBarnabas Health’s] goal explicitly disregarded the needs of the poor, underinsured and charity care patients which CarePoint serves in its role as the safety net hospital system in Jersey City and surrounding areas,” CarePoint wrote in the lawsuit.
The slew of alleged tactics listed in the lawsuit largely surround RWJBarnabas Health’s “serial acquisitions” of hospitals, providers and real estate that “has gone unchecked by the state and [New Jersey Department of Health],” CarePoint wrote.
This included an alleged bad faith proposal to acquire Christ Hospital and HUMC, the true intent of which CarePoint said was to “gain market knowledge and gather competitive intelligence, and use this newly-acquired information to freeze programmatic growth and any significant hiring or construction at Christ Hospital.” The process had a negative impact on CarePoint’s employee retention and staffing, according to the suit.
The plaintiff also alleged that RWJBarnabas used its political connections to influence whether state departments granted CarePoint Certificates of Need for multiple revenue-generating projects as well as COVID-19 relief funding.
Further, CarePoint accused RWJBarnabas of strategically adjusting its service offerings in competitive markets to drive uninsured or underinsured patients to CarePoint facilities while using its relationships with Horizon and ambulance operators to drive emergency room traffic and well-insured patients, respectively, to competing locations.
These collective actions constitute violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act as well as the New Jersey Antitrust Act, CarePoint wrote.
“The idea that [RWJBarnabas Health] would use its influence to jeopardize the health of that community and the care providers of a competing hospital not only directly contradicts its own vision, but clearly demonstrates that [RWJBarnabas Health] is far more interested in anti-competitive and predatory business activities than serving the New Jersey community,” CarePoint wrote.
RWJBarnabas Health discounted the allegations in an email statement.
“This is yet another in a series of baseless complaints filed by CarePoint, an organization whose leadership apparently prefers to assign blame to others rather than accept responsibility for the unsatisfactory results of their own poor business decisions and actions over the years,” a spokesperson for the system told Fierce Healthcare. “RWJBarnabas Health has a longstanding commitment to serve the residents of Hudson County, and is proud of the significant investments we have made in technology, facilities and clinical teams as we advance our mission.”
RWJBarnabas Health treats over 3 million patients per year and employs 37,000 people. The academic healthcare system runs 12 acute care hospitals and four specialty hospitals alongside other locations and services. It disclosed more than $6.6 billion in total operating revenues across 2021.
The system’s merger and acquisition activity placed it in the federal spotlight this past year after the Federal Trade Commission moved to block its planned integration of New Brunswick-based Saint Peter’s Healthcare System. The deal was called off in June.
A recent JAMA study of 578 US dermatology, gastroenterology, and ophthalmology practices acquired by PE firms from 2016 to 2020 found a steady rise in spending in the two years after acquisition, indicating that the average charge per commercial claim increased 20 percent, and the average allowed amount per claim rose 11 percent. It also found that, compared to a large control group with similar patient risk scores, PE-acquired practices saw new patient visits increase by 38 percent and total visit volume increase by 16 percent.
The Gist: While the study’s authors note that these findings could be explained by changes in practice operations or management, they point out they could also be caused by an overutilization of profitable services not tied to an increase in value or benefit to the patient.
We think the latter is likely the case here, and that this study provides evidence of PE-induced overutilization aimed at meeting aggressive growth targets.
But this is just the latest wave of ownership-induced overutilization: 20 years ago the same spotlight was on physician-owned imaging, cardiac, and other outpatient diagnostics, with several studies then documenting higher utilization in these facilities. Nonetheless, this latest trend is an important one to document and quantify, as the number of physicians working in PE-backed organizations continues to rise.
HENRY KOTULA 