Hospitals declare War on Corporate Insurance: Handicapping the Players

At the Annual Meeting of the American Hospital Association in DC last week, its all-out attack on “corporate insurance” was a prominent theme. In the meeting recap, AHA CEO Rick Pollack made the influential organization’s case:

“This year, there was special focus on educating policymakers that our health care system is suffering from multiple chronic conditions. These include continued government underpayment, cyberattacks, workforce shortages, broken supply chains, access to behavioral health, and irresponsible behavior by corporate commercial health insurance companies, among others — that put access to services in serious jeopardy.”

The AHA’s declaration of war came on the heels of last week’s Congressional investigation of Change Healthcare’ (UnitedHealth Group subsidiary) cybersecurity breech and the widely-noticed earnings release by Elevance (aka Anthem) that featured prominently its plans to build a $4 billion business unit focused on primary care and chronic care management. Per company CEO Gail Boudreaux:

“This will help us continue through having a focus on advanced primary care; it’s still very much focused on our chronic patients and complex patients. We are still building specialty care enablement, which is another very important component of what we’re trying to prime through… In time, Elevance Health will have full ownership of what we expect will be a leading platform for value-based care delivery and physician enablement at scale.”

To industry watchers, the war is no surprise.

It’s been simmering for years but most recently inflamed as operating margins for most hospitals eroded while profits among corporate insurers led by Big 6 (UnitedHealth, Humana, CVS-Aetna, Elevance, Cigna, Centene) swelled at double-digit rates.

To outsiders, it’s not quite so clear.

Big names (Brands) are prominent in both. Corporatization seems embedded in the business models for both. And both appear complicit in well-documented beliefs that the health system is failing as unnecessary higher costs make it less accessible, affordable and effective.

As the War intensifies, each combatant is inclined to make their cases aggressively contrasting “us” against “them.” Here’s where things stand today:

ConsiderationHospitalsCorporate InsurersAdvantage
Public StandingHospitals enjoy relatively strong public support but growing discontent about their costs, prices and household affordability. Hospitals blame insurers & drug companies for increasing health costs.Increased attention to affordability, value and low prices is a threat.Insurers enjoy reasonably high support among middle & high-income consumers who think it necessary to their financial security. Insurers blame drug companies, hospitals and unhealthy consumer behaviors for increased health costs.It’s a tossup. Though polls show trust in hospitals is higher than insurers, both are declining especially among younger, urban and low-middle income consumers
Regulatory positioningScrutiny of business practices & the impact of consolidation on consumer prices, workforce wage compression, competition et al is significant and increasing in 5 Congressional Committees and 3 Federal agencies. Hospitals also face state and local regulatory challenges around pricing, community benefits, et al.Compliance with plan transparency rules, prior authorization requirements, Medicare Advantage marketing & coverage, and antitrust are targets. Levels of Congressional attention to business practices are relatively low. Insurers are primarily overseen by states, so the regulatory landscape varies widely except.Insurers enjoy regulatory advantages today not withstanding current attention to UnitedHealth Group.  Hospitals are “soft targets” for state legislatures, Congress and investigators in state and federal agencies.
Confidence of capital markets in their core businesses: Hospitals: inpatient, outpatient careInsurers: group & individual coverage, claims data commercializationThe acute sector, especially rural & systems operating in low-growth markets, face insurmountable headwinds due to reimbursement cuts, value-based purchasing initiatives by Medicare and private insurers and clinical innovations that drive demand away from inpatient care. Hospital Outpatient services are profitable for the near term despite growing competition from privately investors.  The consolidation of power, financial strength & influence among the corporate insurers is assuring to lenders & investors who value their performance and support their vertical integration expansion role.  Lenders and investors favor “corporate insurers” over others. The potential (likelihood) that hospitals will lose on high profile revenue-enhancer issues (facility fees, site neutral payments, et al) and restrict tax exemptions for NFP hospital operators is concerning to the capital markets.  
Relationships with Physicians Hospitals employ 58% of physicians directly & relate to all. Regulations (i.e. Stark Laws, et al), capital deployment for hospital programs and administrative overhead are factors of high importance to physicians seeking clinical autonomy & financial security.  Hospitals are a viable option to physicians seeking income security though not without concern.Insurers employment of physicians plus contractual relationships with network physicians are transactional. Physicians inclined toward business relationships with “corporate insurers” believe their role in healthcare’s future is more stable than that of hospitals based on the belief hospitals are wasteful and non-responsive to physician input.Hospitals enjoy a relationship advantage with most physicians. Corporate insurers enjoy a transactional relationship with physicians that’s premised on shared views about the future of the system vs. hospitals that focus on protecting the past. Hospitals enjoy a near-term advantage but the long-term is uncertain.
Unity of voiceRelatively strong around “chronic ailments” of the system but unclear about long-term destination and limited to universal hospital concerns (i.e. 340B) vs. cohort issues (tax exemptions for not for profits). The delineations between not-for-profit, investor-owned and public/government restricts the strength of hospital voice overall as each seeks unique recognition and regulatory protections.Corporate insurers have corporate boards, broader membership, stronger balance sheets and scale. Their messaging is customized to their key customers and influencers and aligned with but not controlled by their trade groups. And they direct considerable resources to their proprietary messaging strategies.Corporate insurers have fewer constraints in their messaging and enjoy an advantage in opining to issues that resonate with consumers (prices, quality, value).
Long-term Vision for the U.S. Health SystemA private connected system of health in which hospitals coordinate and provide services for patients across the continuum of their care: preventive, chronic, acute and long-term.A private system of comprehensive, customized products and services that operates efficiently, effectively and in the interests of all consumers.The public and Congress aren’t sure which is better positioned to develop a “new” system of health.

This war has been simmering. It’s now a blaze. The outcome is uncertain despite the considerable resources both will spend to win.

Stay tuned.

Paul

P.S. Last week, I participated in Scottsdale Institute’s Annual Leadership Summit in Arizona. It’s 62 institutional members and corporate partners include most of the major not-for-profit health systems and the biggest names in healthcare information technology solutions.

I left with two strong impressions I’ll share:

1-How GenAI and HCIT influence the future of healthcare services delivery is very much speculative but no-less certain. It’s a work in process for everyone.

2- To navigate its evolution, knowledge sharing (and mistake sharing) among those in the trenches is essential. SI afforded a great venue for both, and also a platform for those of us who are easily overwhelmed by all this to ask honest questions and get candid answers.

Check it out. http://www.scottsdaleinstitute.org.

The Five Most Interesting Transactions Announced in 2023

Earlier this month, we released our year-end report on hospital and health system M&A activity in 2023. As a follow-up to that report, here are our thoughts on the five most interesting transactions announced in the past year.[1]

  1. The creation of Risant Health and its planned acquisition of Geisinger Health. This was the transaction that created the most buzz in 2023, promising the formation of a platform—supported by Kaiser Permanente—dedicated to the advancement of value-based care. Risant Health will be created by the Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and will acquire Geisinger as its first member. It will seek to add additional systems to the platform once the acquisition of Geisinger has been finalized.
  2. Novant Health’s acquisition of three hospitals from Tenet Healthcare. This transaction represented several of the 2023 M&A trends highlighted in our year-end report. It offers an example of for-profit health system portfolio realignmentTenet announced that the proceeds of the sale—a pre-tax book gain of approximately $1.6 billion—will be used primarily for debt retirement. It also offers an example of regional market development, as Novant continues to expand its network in North and South Carolina. And with a valuation of the deal at 16 times adjusted EBITDA—based on the $2.4 billion sale price and $150 million adjusted EBITDA reported in the press release—this transaction reflects the value of investing in high-growth markets: in this case, coastal South Carolina.
  3. Henry Ford Health System’s joint venture with Ascension. Offering another example of regional market development, this transaction, when finalized, would also provide an example of how secular and faith-based organizations can work together in partnership. The press release announcing the transaction noted that both organizations “are committed to working to maintain the Catholic identity of the Ascension Michigan facilities included in the transaction.”
  4. The combination of BJC Health System and Saint Luke’s Health System. This transaction, announced in May 2023, closed on January 1, 2024, and provides an example of the cross-market transactions that have emerged as a significant trend in hospital and health system M&A. Also—given the relatively close geographic alignment of the two systems—it provides another example of regional market development. It is the largest of the regional development transactions called out in our year-end report: others included the Novant/Tenet transaction described above, as well as the combination of Froedtert Health and ThedaCare in eastern Wisconsin and Vandalia Health’s development of a statewide network in West Virginia.[2]
  5. Centura Health’s acquisition of Steward Health’s Utah care sites. In another example of a for-profit system divesting its interest in a geographic market, Steward Health announced the sale of its Utah care sites—including five hospitals and more than 35 medical group clinics—to Centura Health, which is part of CommonSpirit Health. CommonSpirit will own the assets, which will be managed by Centura Health. For Centura, the transaction offers an opportunity to enter the growing Utah market, which has demographics similar to its home base in Colorado.

We are early in the year, but 2024 has started with a bang: the announced acquisition of Summa Health, based in Akron, Ohio, by General Catalyst’s Healthcare Assurance Transformation Corporation (HATCo).[3]  The acquisition, when completed, would launch HATCo on its path to fulfill one of the three goals set forth during the October 2023 announcement of its formation: “acquiring and operating a health system for the long term where we can demonstrate the blueprint of [healthcare] transformation for the rest of the industry.”

Nurse sues UPMC over alleged labor abuses

The lawsuit filed in federal court seeks to represent thousands of other UPMC employees.

Dive Brief:

  • A nurse is suing the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center for allegedly leveraging its monopoly control over the employment market in Pennsylvania to keep wages down and prevent workers from leaving for competitors, all while increasing their workload.
  • The lawsuit, filed late last week in a federal court, seeks class action status to represent other staff at the nonprofit health system. Plaintiff Victoria Ross, who worked as a nurse at UPMC Hamot in Erie, Pennsylvania, seeks damages and is asking the judge to enjoin UPMC from continuing its unfair business practices.
  • If granted class action status, the lawsuit could represent thousands of current and former UPMC workers, including registered nurses, medical assistants and orderlies. UPMC has denied the allegations in statements to other outlets but did not respond to a request for comment by time of publication.

Dive Insight:

UPMC has grown steadily over the past few decades into the largest private employer in Pennsylvania, employing 95,000 workers overall.

From 1996 to 2018, the system acquired 28 competing healthcare providers, greatly expanding its market power, according to the lawsuit. The acquisitions also shrunk the availability of healthcare services. Over the same period, UPMC closed four hospitals and downsized operations in three other facilities, eliminating 1,800 full- and part-time jobs, the lawsuit said.

UPMC relied on “draconian” mobility restrictions and labor law violations to lock employees into lower pay and subcompetitive working conditions, according to the 44-page complaint.

Specifically, the system enacted restraints like noncompete clauses and “do-not-rehire blacklists” to stop workers from leaving. Meanwhile, UPMC allegedly suppressed workers’ labor law rights to prevent them from unionizing.

“Each of these restraints alone is anticompetitive, but combined, their effects are magnified. UPMC wielded these restraints together as a systemic strategy to suppress worker bargaining power and wages,” the lawsuit said. “As a result, UPMC’s skilled healthcare workers were required to do more while earning less — while they were also subjected to increasingly unfair and coercive workplace conditions.”

According to the complaint, UPMC has faced 133 unfair labor practice charges since 2012, and 159 separate allegations. Roughly 74% of the violations were related to workers’ efforts to unionize, the lawsuit said.

Meanwhile, UPMC workers’ wages have fallen at a rate of 30 to 57 cents per hour on average compared to other hospital workers for every 10% increase in UPMC’s market share, said the lawsuit, citing a consultant’s economic analysis.

The lawsuit also noted that UPMC’s staffing ratios have been decreasing, even as staffing ratios on average have increased at other Pennsylvania hospitals.

The alleged labor abuses and UPMC’s market power are linked, according to the complaint.

“Had UPMC been subject to competitive market forces, it would have had to raise wages to attract more workers and provide higher staffing levels in order to avoid degrading the care it provided to its patients, and in order to prevent losing patients to competitors who could provide better quality care,” the lawsuit said.

UPMC is facing similar labor allegations. In May, two unions filed a complaint asking the Department of Justice to investigate labor abuses at the nonprofit.

Hospitals were plagued by staffing shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many facilities still bemoan the difficulty of hiring and retaining full-time workers, and point to shortages (of nurses in particular) as the reason for overworked employees and poor staffing ratios.

Yet some studies suggest that’s not the case. One recent analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data found employment in hospitals — including registered nurses — is now slightly higher than it was at the start of the pandemic.

Despite the controversy, UPMC — which now operates 40 hospitals with annual revenue of $26 billion — continues to try and expand its market share. Late last year, the system signed a definitive agreement to acquire Washington Health Care Services, a Pennsylvania system with more than 2,000 employees and two hospitals. The deal faces pushback from local unions.

Will health system M&A soar or dive?

The health system deal market heated up in 2023.

Big, industry-shaking acquisitions including Oakland, Calif.-based Kaiser Permanente’s purchase of Danville, Pa.-based Geisinger, could redefine healthcare delivery with an eye toward value. Regional deals, such as Detroit-based Henry Ford Health’s planned joint venture with Ascension Michigan and St. Louis-based BJC HealthCare’s plan to acquire Saint Luke’s Health System to create a $10 billion organization, have also made waves.

There were 18 hospital and health system transactions announced in the third quarter, up from 10 transactions over the same time period in 2022, according to Kaufman Hall’s third quarter M&A report. Financial pressures with inflation catapulting staffing and supply costs, and reimbursement rates growing much more slowly, have forced some systems to look for a buyer while others aim to increase market share.

Academic health systems are also seeking community partners at a higher rate than in the past, according to the Kaufman Hall report.

But not all announced deals have gone according to plan.

The Federal Trade Commission is scrutinizing deals more closely than ever before to ensure costs don’t increase after an acquisition in some cases. In other cases, the two partners aren’t able to agree upon the details after announcing their plans. The dissolved merger between Sioux Falls, S.D.-based Sanford Health and Minneapolis-based Fairview Health Services fell apart amid contention in Minnesota, and West Des Moines, Iowa-based UnityPoint Health’s plans to merge with Presbyterian Healthcare Services in Albuquerque, N.M., was halted without a publicly stated reason.

Will there be more or fewer health system deals in the next three years?

Seth Ciabotti, CEO of MSU Health Care at Michigan State University in East Lansing, thinks so, at least when it comes to academic medical centers.

“There will be more consolidation to mitigate risk,” he told Becker’s. “I believe we are heading down a path of having only a dozen or so non-academic medical centers/health systems being left in the near future in the U.S.”

Mark Behl, president and CEO of NorthBay Health in Fairfield, Calif., has a similar outlook for the next three years.

“I suspect we will see more mergers and acquisitions with a continued desire to grow larger and remain relevant,” he told Becker’s. “Independent regional health systems will fight for relevance, and sometimes survival.”

And health systems won’t be the only buyers. Private equity, health insurers and non-traditional owners are on the hunt for health systems. General Catalyst has strengthened its healthcare presence recently and announced it plans to acquire a system in the near future.

“I believe that over the next three years, the landscape of acquisitions, divestitures and joint ventures will continue to reshape the healthcare industry,” said Dennis Sunderman, system director of HR M&A, non-employee and provider services at CommonSpirit Health, told Becker’s. “Current and proposed legislation, the continued evolution of ownership groups, nonprofit, for profit, and private equity, and the drive to hire and retain exceptionally talented teams, will lead to new innovations and an enhanced focus on the associates affected by the transaction.”

Health systems will need to optimize their operations to expand their value-based care efforts and digital transformation, including telehealth and remote patient monitoring services. Not all systems have the expertise and resources to fully make this transition, but with the right partners and strategic alignments, they can accelerate care transformation.

“There will likely be more collaborations and partnerships to expand services and increase access versus brick and mortar acquisitions,” said Cliff Megerian, MD, CEO of University Hospitals in Cleveland. “Innovative thinking is critical for success and quite frankly survival in our industry, so health systems should already be investing in growing in-house expertise dedicated to ideating new models of care, but in three years, these efforts should be producing tangible results.”

Michelle Fortune, BSN, CEO of Atrium St. Luke’s Hospital in Columbus, N.C., pointed to recent collaborations between Mercy, Microsoft and Mayo Clinic as examples of how health systems can partner on important initiatives such as improved data sharing, generative AI, digital transformation and more.

“I expect to see an increase in collaborations and connections between health systems to a degree that has never existed before as part of the focus on bringing the right care to people across the full continuum, when and where they need it,” she said.

Kaufman Hall sees more minority ownership deals ahead, which allows the smaller system to maintain near-autonomy while benefiting from the resources of a larger system.

“Health systems are also engaging in creative transaction structures that allow partners to maintain their independence while building strategic alliances that enhance access to care,” the report notes. “Announced transactions in Q3 included [Charlottesville, Va.-based] UVA Health’s acquisition of 5% ownership interest in [Newport News, Va.-based] Riverside Health System as part of a strategic alliance design ‘to expand patient access to innovative care for complex medical conditions, transplantation, and the latest clinical trials.'”

Jefferson, Lehigh Valley Health plan to merge into 30-hospital system

Pennsylvania health systems Jefferson and Lehigh Valley Health Network have signed a non-binding letter of intent to combine.

Philadelphia-based Jefferson and Allentown, Pa.-based LVHN announced the letter Dec. 19 in a news release, with expectations to close the transaction in 2024. Combined, Jefferson and LVHN would form a system with 30 hospitals, more than 700 sites of care and more than 62,000 employees. 

Jefferson CEO Joseph Cacchione, MD, will serve as CEO of the expanded system — dubbed for now as Jefferson Enterprise — and LVHN President and CEO Brian Nester, DO, will serve as its executive vice president and COO. Dr. Nester will also serve as president of the legacy LVHN, reporting directly to Dr. Cacchione. An integrated board of trustees and leadership team will be made up of members from both systems, specifics of which are expected in the definitive agreement.

“The healthcare landscape and our communities’ needs are changing; it is critical leading systems evolve and make investments in the future of care and wellness — growing and protecting access to enhanced, affordable, high-quality and innovative care, particularly for historically underserved patients,” Dr. Cacchione said in the release. 

The merger is another development out of Jefferson, which has seen a year of change. Dr. Cacchione assumed the CEO post in September 2022, and the system has since welcomed a new president, CFO, and dean of its medical school and physicians group. Earlier this year, Jefferson rolled out a reorganization plan to operate as three divisions instead of five, which involved layoffs affecting executives and a later workforce reduction of about 400 positions.  

Cost-cutting has been in effect at LVHN, too. The 13-hospital system, which includes nearly 3,000 physicians and advanced practice clinicians, eliminated approximately 240 positions as part of restructuring this fall. 

“In Jefferson, we have found an ideal partner that shares our culture and commitment to excellence in clinical care and a learning environment, and that has done a fabulous job in establishing a highly successful health plan with a sharp focus on the well-being of Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries,” Dr. Nester said. “The expertise derived from these operations is becoming a crucial competency for health systems to deliver on their mission, and Jefferson Health Plans will help drive improvements in health outcomes, especially in vulnerable populations. We are also very excited about the opportunity to expand academic and talent development programs that will further bolster our provider pipeline and enhance our ability to attract and retain top talent to the benefit of the communities we both serve.”

Providers threaten to leave MA networks amid contentious negotiations  

https://mailchi.mp/79ecc69aca80/the-weekly-gist-december-15-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

This week’s graphic highlights increasing tensions between health systems and Medicare Advantage (MA) plans as they battle over what providers see as unsatisfactory payment rates and insurer business practices.

On paper, many providers have negotiated rates with MA plans that are similar to traditional fee-for-service Medicare, but find MA patients are subject to more prior authorizations and denials, as well as delayed discharges to postacute care, which increases inpatient length of stay and hospital costs. 

A number of health system leaders have reported their revenue capture for MA patients dropped to roughly 80 percent of fee-for-service Medicare rates due to an increase in the mean length of stay for MA patients, caused by carriers narrowing postacute provider networks.

As a result, a growing number of health systems and medical groups have either already exited, or plan to exit, MA networks due to what they see as insufficient reimbursement. 

Health systems with a strong regional presence may be able to leverage their market share to get MA payers to play ball. But for health systems in more competitive markets, these hardline negotiation tactics run the risk of payers merely directing their patients elsewhere. 

Regardless of market dynamics, providers exiting insurance plans is extremely disruptive for patients, who won’t understand the dynamics of payer-provider negotiations—but will feel frustrated when they can’t see their preferred physicians.

Cigna and Humana reportedly engaged in merger talks

https://mailchi.mp/9b1afd2b4afb/the-weekly-gist-december-1-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

According to a Wall Street Journal exclusive published this Wednesday, Bloomfield, CT-based Cigna and Louisville, KY-based Humana, two of the nation’s largest health insurers, are exploring a merger that could close as soon as the end of this year.

With Cigna valued at around $83B and Humana at roughly $62B, their potential combination would be the largest domestic merger of the year, not just in healthcare, but across all industries.

According to anonymous insiders, the companies are discussing a cash-and-stock deal, but nothing has been finalized. Should an agreement be reached, the merger is expected to receive close attention from antitrust authorities. Both Humana and Cigna have attempted to merge with rival insurers over the past decade, only to see the deals blocked on antitrust grounds.

The Gist: This would be a blockbuster deal, putting the combined entity on par with CVS Health and UnitedHealth Group

Though Cigna and Humana have relatively little direct overlap in their health insurance businesses—Humana recently announced it will exit the commercial group business to focus on its more successful Medicare Advantage (MA) offerings and Cigna, mostly a commercial insurer, is reportedly shopping its much smaller MA business—their respective pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) may be an antitrust sticking point. (By market share, Cigna’s Express Scripts is the second-largest PBM, while Humana’s CenterWell Pharmacy is fourth.)

Given the Biden administration’s focus on targeting potentially anticompetitive healthcare mergers, as well as rising Congressional scrutiny around PBMs, this potential merger is sure to face many hurdles prior to closing.

What Kaiser’s Acquisition Of Geisinger Means For Us All

Healthcare’s most recent billion-dollar deal took the industry by surprise, leaving medical experts and hospital leaders grappling to comprehend its implications.

In case you missed it, California-based Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Hospitals, which make up the insurance and facilities half of Kaiser Permanente, announced the acquisition of Geisinger, a Pennsylvania-based health system once acknowledged by President Obama for delivering “high-quality care.”

Upon regulatory approval, Geisinger will become the first organization to join Risant Health, Kaiser Foundation’s newly created $5 billion subsidiary. According to Kaiser, the aim is to build “a portfolio of likeminded, nonprofit, value-oriented, community-based health systems anchored in their respective communities.” 

Having spent 18 years as CEO of The Permanente Medical Group, the half of Kaiser Permanente responsible for the delivery of medical care, I took great interest in the announcement. And I wasn’t alone. My phone rang off the hook for weeks with calls from reporters, policy experts and healthcare executives.

After hundreds of conversations, here are the three most common questions I received about the acquisition—and the implications for doctors, insurers, health-system competitors and patients all over the country.

Question 1: Why did Kaiser acquire Geisinger?

Most callers wanted to know about Kaiser’s motivation, figuring there must’ve been more to the acquisition than the press release indicated. Although I don’t have inside information, I believe they were right. Here’s why:

Kaiser Permanente has a long and ongoing reputation for delivering nation-leading care. The organization has consistently earned the highest quality and patient-satisfaction rankings from the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), Leapfrog Group, JD Power and Medicare.

And yet, despite a 78-year history, dozens of hospitals and 13 million members across eight states, Kaiser Permanente is still considered a coastal—not national—health system. It maintains a huge market share in California and a strong presence in the Mid-Atlantic states, yet the organization has failed repeatedly to replicate that success in other geographies.

With that context, I see two compelling reasons why the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Hospitals wish to become a national brand:

  1. Influence. Elected officials and regulatory bodies often turn to healthcare’s biggest players to set legislative agendas and carve out national policy. At that table, there are a limited number of seats. By shedding its reputation as a “local” health system, Kaiser could earn one.
  2. Survival. In recent years, companies like Amazon, CVS and Walmart have been scooping up organizations that provide primary care, telehealth, home health and specialty care services. These “retail giants” are spending up to $13 billion per acquisition. And they’re consuming already-successful healthcare companies like One Medical, Oak Street Health, Signify, Pill Pack and many others. Like an army preparing for war, these corporate behemoths are amassing the components needed to battle the traditional healthcare incumbents and ultimately oust them entirely.

The Geisinger deal expands Kaiser’s footprint, adding 600,000 patients, 10 hospitals and 100 specialty and primary care clinics. These assets lend gravitas, even though Geisinger also comes with a 2022 operating loss of $239 million.

The lesson to draw from this first question is clear: size matters. The days of solo physicians and stand-alone hospitals are over. Nostalgia for medicine’s folksy, home-spun past is understandable but futile. To survive, healthcare players must get bigger quickly or team up with someone who can. That insight leads to the next question and lesson.

Question 2: How much value will Kaiser give Geisinger?

Almost everyone I’ve spoken with understands Kaiser’s desire for greater national influence, but they’re less sure how this deal will affect Geisinger Health.

Geisinger’s Pennsylvania-based hospitals and clinics have been locked in territorial battles for years with surrounding health systems. More recently, the pandemic, combined with staffing shortages and national inflation, have challenged Geisinger’s clinical performance and eroded its bottom line.

Assuming Kaiser plans to invest roughly $1 billion in each of the four to five health systems it’s planning to acquire, that surge in cash inflow will provide Geisinger with temporary financial safety. But the bigger question is how will Kaiser improve Geisinger’s value-proposition enough to grow its market share?

In public comments, Kaiser leaders spoke of the acquisition as an opportunity for Risant to “improve the health of millions of people by increasing access to value-based care and coverage, and raising the bar for value-based approaches that prioritize patient quality outcomes.”

Many of the experts I spoke with understand Kaiser’s value intent. But they question how Kaiser can could deliver on that promise since The Permanente Medical Group (TPMG) wasn’t involved in the deal.

If, hypothetically, Kaiser and Permanente leaders were to strike a deal to collaborate in the future, TPMG’s physician leaders could bring tremendous knowledge, experience and expertise to the table. Otherwise, I agree with those who’ve expressed doubt that Kaiser, alone, will be able to significantly improve Geisinger’s clinical performance.

Health plans and insurance companies play an important role in financing medical care. They possess rich data on performance and can offer incentives that boost access to higher-quality care. But insurers don’t work directly with individual doctors to coordinate medical care or advance clinical solutions on behalf of patients. And without strong physician leadership, the pace of positive change slows to a crawl. As a example, research conducted within The Permanente Medical Group found that it takes only three years to turn a proven clinical advance into standard practice—that’s nearly six times faster than the national average.

For decades, the secret sauce for Kaiser Permanente has been the cohesive success of its three parts: Kaiser Health Plan, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and The Permanente Medical Group.

And KP’s results speak for themselves:

  • 90% control of hypertension for members (compared to 60% for the rest of the country)
  • 30% fewer deaths from heart attack and stroke (compared to the rest of the country)
  • 20% fewer deaths from colon cancer

The big lesson: insurance, by itself, doesn’t drive major improvements in medicine. It must be a combined effort between forward-looking insurers and innovative, high-performing clinicians.

But there’s another takeaway here for doctors everywhere: now is the time to join forces with other clinicians in your community. Together, you can collaborate to improve clinical quality. You can augment access and make care more affordable for patients. Simultaneously, this is the time for the insurers and the retail giants to figure out which medical groups can deliver the best care and make the best partners. Neither side will flourish alone. And this leads to a third question and lesson.

Question 3: Will the deal work?

Almost all of my conversations ended with this query. I say it’s too early to tell. But as I look years down the road, one part of the deal, in particular, gives me doubt.

Today, Geisinger uses a hybrid reimbursement model—blending both “value-based” care payments with traditional “fee-for-service” insurance plans. In addition to offering its own coverage, it contracts with a variety of other insurance companies. Rarely have I seen this scattered approach succeed.

Most healthcare observers understand the inherent flaw in the “fee for service” (FFS) model is also its greatest appeal to providers: the more you do the more you earn. FFS is how nearly all financial transactions take place in America (i.e., provide a service, earn a fee). In medicine, however, this financial model results in frequent over-testing and over-treatment with minimal if any improvement in clinical outcomes, according to researchers.

The “value-based” alternative to FFS involves prepaying for care—a model often referred to as “capitation.” In short, capitation involves a single fee, paid upfront for all the medical care provided to a defined population of patients for one year based on their age and health status. The better an organization at preventing disease and avoiding complications from chronic illness, the greater its success in both clinical quality and affordability.

Within the small world of capitated healthcare payments, there’s an important element that often gets overlooked. It makes a big difference who receives that lump-sum payment.

In the case of Kaiser Permanente, capitated payments are made directly to the medical group and the physicians who are responsible for providing care. In almost every other health system, an insurance company collects capitated payments but then pays the medical providers on a fee-for-service basis. Even though the arrangement is referred to as capitated, the incentives are overwhelmingly tied to the volume of care (not the value of that care).

In a mixed-payment model, doctors and hospitals invariably prioritize the higher paying FFS patients over the capitated ones. When I think about these conflicting incentives, I’m reminded of a prominent medical group in California. It had a main entrance for its fee-for-service patients and a second, smaller one off to the side for capitated patients.

I doubt the time spent with the patient—or the overall care provided—was equal for both groups. When income is based on quantity of care, not quality, clinicians focus more on treating the complications of chronic disease and medical errors rather than preventing them in the first place. Geisinger has walked this tightrope in the past, but as economic pressures mount, I fear doctors will find the two sets of incentives conflicting and difficult to navigate.

The big lesson: as financial pressures mount, the most effective approaches of the past will likely fail in the future. All healthcare organizations will need to make a decision: keep trying to drive volume and prices up through FFS or shift to capitation. Getting caught in the middle is a prescription for failure.

Examining the healthcare acquisitions made by Amazon and CVS, it’s clear these giants have decided to move aggressively toward a model more like Kaiser Permanente’s—one that brings insurance, pharmacy, physicians and sophisticated IT systems under one roof. These companies, along with Walmart, are aggressively marching down a path toward capitation, focusing on Medicare Advantage (the value-based option for Americans 65+) as an entry point.

So far, Geisinger has hedged its bets by maintaining a hybrid revenue stream. I doubt they can do so successfully in the future. That brings us to a final question.

The biggest question remaining  

Over the next decade, hospital systems, insurers and retailers will battle for healthcare supremacy. The most recent Kaiser-Geisinger deal reflects an industry that’s undergoing massive change as health systems face intensifying pressure to remain relevant.  

The most important issue to resolve is whether these shifts will ultimately help or harm patients. I’m optimistic for a positive outcome.

Whether or not the retail giants displace the incumbents, they will redefine what it takes to win. For all their faults, companies like Amazon and Walmart care a lot about meeting the needs of customers—a mindset rarely found in today’s healthcare world. As these companies grow ever larger, they’ll place consumer-oriented demands on doctors and hospitals. This will require care providers to deliver higher quality care at more affordable prices.

The retailers will only do deals with the best of the best. And they’ll kick the underachievers to the curb. They’ll use their sophisticated IT systems to better coordinate and innovate medical care. Insurers, hospitals and doctors who fail to keep up will be left behind.

Over time, patients will find themselves with far more choices and control than they have today. And I’m optimistic that will be good for the health of our nation.

National ASC chains look to dominate growing market

https://mailchi.mp/73102bc1514d/the-weekly-gist-may-19-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

As care continues to shift to lower cost ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), the graphic above looks at recent growth and consolidation in the ASC market. 

From 2012 to 2022, the five largest operators increased their collective ownership of ASC facilities from 17 to 21 percent, and were responsible for over 50 percent of total facility growth in that period. 

While physicians still fully own over half of the nation’s ASCs, the national chains tend to run larger, multispecialty facilities responsible for an outsized proportion of procedures and revenue. 

The likes of Tenet, Optum, and HCA are betting big on ASCs, banking on projections that the market will grow by over 60 percent in the next seven years. 

(Though AmSurg’s parent company, Envision Healthcare, filed for bankruptcy, AmSurg is buying Envision’s remaining ASCs to retain its significant foothold in the market.)

While many high-revenue specialties, notably orthopedics and gastroenterology, have already seen a significant shift to ASCs, cardiology is one of the most promising service lines for ASC growth, with some predicting that a third of cardiology procedures will be performed in ambulatory settings in the next few years. 

The shift of surgeries from hospitals to ASCs is daunting for health systems, who stand to lose half or more of the revenue from each case—if they’re able keep the procedure within the system. 

In the meantime, low-cost ASC operators will continue to add new facilities that deliver high margins to fuel their growth.

UnitedHealth Group (UHG) quietly acquired Crystal Run Healthcare

https://mailchi.mp/5e9ec8ef967c/the-weekly-gist-april-14-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

 In late February, Crystal Run Healthcare, a Middletown, NY-based physician group with nearly 400 providers, became part of UHG’s Optum division. 

A local paper broke the news after obtaining an email from Crystal Run’s CEO, as neither company issued a press release, though UHG has since confirmed the acquisition. In addition to pandemic-related financial difficulties, Crystal Run recently shuttered its health plan after large losses, and its Medicare accountable care organization failed to earn savings in 2021.

Crystal Run expands Optum’s footprint in the Hudson Valley region north of New York City, following the acquisition of Mount Kisco, NY-based Caremount Medical in 2022. The company’s broader New York metro area footprint includes Connecticut-based ProHEALTH and New Jersey-based Riverside Medical Group, the three of which Optum has since integrated into a single tri-state medical group. 

The Gist: Optum continues to secure its place as the country’s largest aggregator of physicians, now employing or aligning with over 70,000 doctors nationwide. 

Not only does every new deal by UHG bolster its vertical integration strategy, but they also shine a light on gaps in federal antitrust regulations. UHG must only disclose deals that comprise a “significant” portion of its business, a threshold that excludes physician groups as large as Crystal Run—making it difficult to fully examine transactions that are subscale according to regulations, but may be significant for healthcare delivery in a local market. 

Some state governments, including New York, are exploring ways to increase state antitrust scrutiny of provider acquisitions. But in multi-state markets where only the federal government has the authority for full oversight, UHG’s acquisition strategies are proving difficult to even monitor, much less intervene.