Category Archives: Profit Margin

The Perfect Storm has Hit U.S. Healthcare

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Insurance Industry, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, Lobbyist, Medicaid, Medicaid Cuts, Perfect Storm, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Motive • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
The Perfect Storm has Hit U.S. Healthcare

The perfect storm has hit U.S. healthcare:

  • The “Big Beautiful Budget Bill” appears headed for passage with cuts to Medicaid and potentially Medicare likely elements.
  • The economy is slowing, with a mild recession a possibility as consumer confidence drops, the housing market slows and uncertainty about tariffs mounts.
  • And partisan brinksmanship in state and federal politics has made political hostages of public and rural health safety net programs as demand increases for their services.

Last Wednesday, amidst mounting anxiety about the aftermath of U.S. bunker-bombing in Iran and escalating conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released its report on healthcare spending in 2024 and forecast for 2025-2033:

“National health expenditures are projected to have grown 8.2% in 2024 and to increase 7.1% in 2025, reflecting continued strong growth in the use of health care services and goods.

During the period 2026–27, health spending growth is expected to average 5.6%, partly because of a decrease in the share of the population with health insurance (related to the expiration of temporarily enhanced Marketplace premium tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022) and partly because of an anticipated slowdown in utilization growth from recent highs. Each year for the full 2024–33 projection period, national health care expenditure growth (averaging 5.8%) is expected to outpace that for the gross domestic product (GDP; averaging 4.3%) and to result in a health share of GDP that reaches 20.3% by 2033 (up from 17.6% in 2023) …

Although the projections presented here reflect current law, future legislative and regulatory health policy changes could have a significant impact on the projections of health insurance coverage, health spending trends, and related cost-sharing requirements, and they thus could ultimately affect the health share of GDP by 2033.”

As has been the case for 20 years, spending for healthcare grew faster than the overall economy in 2024. And it is forecast to continue through 2033:

 2024Baseline2033Forecast% Nominal Chg.2024-2033
National Health Spending$5,263B$8,585B+63.1%
US Population337,2M354.8M+5.2%
Per capita personal health spending$13,227$20,559+55.7%
Per capita disposable personal income$21,626$31,486+45.6%
NHE as % of US GDP18.0%20.3%+12.8%

In its defense, industry insiders call attention to the uniqueness of the business of healthcare:

  • ‘Healthcare is a fundamental need: the health system serves everyone.’
  • ‘Our aging population, chronic disease prevalence and socioeconomic disparities are drive increased demand for the system’s products and services.’
  • ‘The public expects cutting edge technologies, modern facilities, effective medications and the best caregivers and they’re expensive.’
  • ‘Burdensome regulatory compliance costs contribute to unnecessary spending and costs.’

And they’re right.

Critics argue the U.S. health system is the world’s most expensive but its results (outcomes) don’t justify its costs.  They acknowledge the complexity of the industry but believe “waste, fraud and abuse” are pervasive flaws routinely ignored. And they remind lawmakers that the health economy is profitable to most of its corporate players (investor-owned and not-for-profits) and its executive handsomely compensated.

Healthcare has been hit by a perfect storm at a time when a majority of the public associates it more with corporatization and consolidation than caring. This coalition includes Gen Z adults who can’t afford housing, small employers who’ve cut employee coverage due to costs and large, self-insured employers who trying to navigate around the 10-20% employee health cost increase this year, state and local governments grappling with health costs for their public programs and many more. They’re tired of excuses and think the health system takes advantage of them.

As a percentage of the nation’s GDP and household discretionary spending, healthcare will continue to be disproportionately higher and increasingly concerning.  Spending will grow faster than other industries until lawmakers impose price controls and other mechanisms like at least 8 states have begun already.

Most insiders are taking cover and waiting ‘til the storm passes. Some are content to cry foul and blame others. Others will emerge with new vision and purpose centered on reality.

Storm damage is rarely predictable but always consequential. It cannot be ignored. The Perfect has Hit U.S. healthcare. Its impact is not yet known but is certain to be a game changer.

Health Insurance Industry Promises Reforms After $476 Million PR and Lobbying Campaign

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, Health Insurance Denial, Health Insurance Industry, Health Insurance Premiums, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, Lobbyist, Pharmacy Benefits Management, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Motive • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/health-insurance-industry-promises?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=166816548&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

Health insurers and their lobbying arms have spent $476.5 million since 2020 to block reform, protect profits, and mislead the public — and it’s coming straight from our premiums and tax dollars.

AHIP, the big PR and lobbying outfit for most health insurers, undoubtedly believes the praise it got from Trump administration officials and some members of Congress this week – when it announced changes insurers presumably will make voluntarily to alleviate the burden of prior authorization demands on patients and health care providers – has taken the heat off insurers. AHIP’s message to Washington politicos: You don’t need to pass any new laws to make us do the right thing. You can trust us, despite our decades of engaging in untrustworthy behavior to maximize profits.

As former health insurance executive Seth Glickman, M.D., explained yesterday, nobody should believe this hen-house guarding fox.

After all, AHIP is nothing more than a PR and lobbying shop with millions of our dollars to play with. It has zero ability to force insurers to do what AHIP claims they will do. I know this because I worked closely with AHIP during my 20 years in the industry and represented Cigna on its strategic communications committee.

From Fox to “Fixer”?

AHIP pulled off its big show on Monday – and got plenty of generally fawning press coverage – because of all the money it and affiliated insurers throw around Washington every year to protect what has become an incredibly profitable status quo.

Collectively, the seven biggest for-profit insurers reported $70 billion in profits last year.

(Beleauered UnitedHealth alone reported $34.4 million in operating earnings.) And that’s just seven among dozens. One way they make that kind of dough, for their shareholders and top executives, is by using prior authorization to avoid paying for patients’ medically necessary care. Many people die as a result, while investors get richer. It’s that simple and that cold.

So just how much money does AHIP and the insurance industry spend to bamboozle members of Congress and the White House every year? We’re talking stupid money. And orders of magnitude more than nonprofits that advocate for reforms that would benefit patients instead of shareholders.

Nearly Half a Billion Ways They Tip the Scale

To find out just how much, I turned to OpenSecrets and did some math. OpenSecrets, as a reminder, is the well-named organization that keeps tabs on campaign contributions and lobbying expenses.

What I discovered is that AHIP has spent almost $65 million lobbying Congress and the Biden and Trump administrations since 2020. Its cousin, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, has spent even more. More than twice as much more.

And that, folks, is just the tip of the iceberg, and it doesn’t even include the tens of millions the industry spends on massive advertising campaigns inside the DC beltway that it’s not required to report. Or the dark money ads and advocacy the industry bankrolls.

But just the lobbying totals are mind-blowing. When you factor in the money spent by the big seven insurers and the other PR and lobbying groups that insurers funnel money to, the total grows to almost $500 million. You read that right: nearly half a billion dollars.

Most of that spending was during the Biden administration, but the industry is on track to break spending records during the first year of the current Trump administration. They are lobbying not only to beat back new laws and regulations that could constrain their prior authorization practices but also to protect their biggest cash cows: Medicare Advantage and their pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).

Three PBMs – owned by Cigna, CVS/Aetna and UnitedHealth –control 80% of the pharmacy benefit market and determine which drugs we’ll have access to and how much we have to pay out of pocket even with insurance.

The Big Number

$476.5 million – That’s the amount of money health insurance corporations and four of their PR and lobbying groups – AHIP, BCBSA (which includes contributions from Elevance/Anthem as well as numerous other BCBS companies), the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association and the Better Medicare Alliance – have collectively spent on lobbying Congress and federal regulators between January 1, 2020, and March 31, 2025.

The Breakdown

Lobby dollars spent by AHIP; BCBSA; BMA; PCMA; Centene; Cigna; CVS/Aetna; Humana; Molina; and UnitedHealth between January 1, 2020, and March 31, 2025.

Keep in mind that that money is not coming out of executives’ paychecks. It’s coming out of our pockets. Insurers skim money from our premiums and taxes to finance their propaganda and lobbying efforts to keep the gravy train rolling. And it’s in addition to all the campaign cash they dole out every year, which I tabulated recently.

This is not to say that reform is impossible. Scrappy advocacy groups with a tiny fraction of that total have scored important victories over the years. But it is why progress is so slow and setbacks are so frequent.

But just imagine how all that money could be put to better use to ensure that all Americans, including those with insurance, are able to get the care they need when they need it. It’s clear that in addition to reforming our health care system, we need political reforms that make it more difficult for big corporations and their trade groups to influence elections and public policy.

For a Wall Street Lifeline, UnitedHealth Is Throwing Brokers Overboard

Posted on by • Posted in Health Insurance Industry, Investor Expectations, Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), Medicare Advantage, Profit Margin, Profit Motive, UnitedHealthcare, Utilization Trends, Wall Street • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/for-a-wall-street-lifeline-unitedhealth?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=166322427&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

In a concession to Wall Street investors, starting this summer, UnitedHealth will stop paying commissions to agents and brokers for some new enrollees in nearly 200 UnitedHealthcare Medicare Advantage plans across 39 markets.

And it’s happening not because UnitedHealth can’t afford to pay. As we’ve published previously, the company reported $9.1 billion in profits during the first quarter of 2025 — up from $7.9 billion the year before. But that wasn’t enough to satisfy Wall Street, which punished UnitedHealth with the steepest one-day stock drop in 26 years — a $110 billion free fall in market value — after the company revised its full-year profit guidance downward.

Why the drop? 

Because UnitedHealth admitted it may not squeeze quite as much profit from taxpayers this year as expected — mainly due to unexpectedly high care utilization from some of the new Medicare Advantage enrollees it brought on during the last open enrollment period. Particularly enrollees who, as then-CEO Andrew Witty described, came from other insurers exiting the market and hadn’t been properly coded. Yawn.

For Now, Brokers Are UNH’s Patsy

This recent commission cut is less about operational efficiency and more about damage control. UnitedHealth is signaling to investors that it’s willing to shrink its Medicare Advantage footprint — at least temporarily — if that helps preserve profit margins. And Wall Street analysts are eating it up, seeing it as a way to slow the flow of high-cost members and stabilize earnings, according to BarChart.

Off Wall Street, the move has already come under fire. As the National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals put it, UnitedHealth is “cutting off the very people best equipped to help” seniors — especially low-income and rural enrollees who depend on brokers to explain their options.

While we would warn seniors against enrolling in a Medicare Advantage plan in the first place – without brokers, many beneficiaries will be left to fend for themselves in a system that’s already infamously confusing, expensive and deadly.

A Strategic Retreat Disguised as a Cost-Containment Strategy

The problem is the perverse incentive structure UnitedHealth and other insurers helped build — one that rewards risk-coding gamesmanship more than it rewards delivering care. For years, the company thrived by maximizing revenue through “coding intensity” and by acquiring everything from doctors’ offices to behavioral health firms to control more of the health care ecosystem.

Now, UnitedHealth is responding the way Wall Street expects: by slashing anything that isn’t bolted down – including brokers.

So here we are: 

UnitedHealth is still wildly profitable, still drawing billions from taxpayer-funded programs like Medicare and Medicaid — and now it’s cutting out the professionals who presumably help seniors navigate a convoluted health care system. All this, mind you, to appease jittery investors. And despite UnitedHealth’s current wobbly share price, analysts expect it to rebound, especially with a continuation of share buybacks on the horizon.

During the first quarter of this year alone, the company bought back $3 billion worth of its own shares. Over the past year, buybacks totaled more than $12 billion. When you factor in dividends, the company said it “returned” more than $16 billion to shareholders in 2024. That’s how you keep investors at least partially satisfied.

They Cut Medicaid, Not the Waste: Congress Protects Big Insurance While Slashing Care

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Insurance Industry, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, Lobbyist, Medicaid, Medicaid Cuts, Medicare, Medicare Advantage, MedPAC, Political Action Committees (PAC), Political Lobbying, Pre-Authorization, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Motive, Super PAC, Upcoding • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/they-cut-medicaid-not-the-waste-congress?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=163510896&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

The House of Representatives’ reconciliation bill, passed by the powerful Energy and Commerce Committee today, cuts just about everything when it comes to health care – except the actual waste, fraud and abuse. Now the bill heads to the floor for a vote of the full House of Representatives before it must also be passed by the Senate to become law. 

I know what you’re thinking: not another story about Medicaid. With the flood of articles detailing the devastating Medicaid cuts proposed by House Republicans —cuts that could strip 8.7 million people of their health coverage — there’s an important fact being overlooked: Members of Congress chose to sidestep policies aimed at reining in Big Insurance abuses and, instead, opted to cut Medicaid.

And the real irony of it all is they could have saved a ton of money if they would just address the elephant in the room. 

Abuses by Big Insurance companies have been going on for decades but have only recently come under scrutiny. Insurance companies figured out how to take advantage of the structure of the Medicare Advantage program to receive higher payments from the government.

They do this in two ways:

  1. They make their enrollees seem sicker than they are through a strategy called “upcoding” and;
  2. They use care obstacles such as prior authorization and inadequate provider networks that eventually drive sicker people to drop their plans and leave them with healthier enrollees, referred to as “favorable selection.” 

According to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) these tactics lead the government to overpay insurance corporations running MA plans by $84 billion a year. This number is expected to grow, and estimates show that overpayments will cost the government more than a $1 trillion from 2025-2034. That is $1 trillion dollars in potential savings Republicans could have included in their bill instead of cutting Medicaid spending that provides care for vulnerable communities. 

These overpayments do not lead to better care in MA plans; in fact, research has shown that care quality and outcomes are often worse in MA compared to traditional Medicare. Even worse, these overpayments are tax dollars meant for health care that end up in the pockets of shareholders of big insurance corporations, which spend billions of taxpayer dollars on things like stock buybacks and executive bonuses. 

One of the most frustrating parts of the lawmaker’s choice to target Medicaid rather than Big Insurance abuses is that there are multiple policies supported by both Republicans and Democrats to stop these abuses. Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana), along with Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Oregon), have introduced the NO UPCODE Act, which would cut down on the practice of upcoding explained above. President Trump’s Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Dr. Mehmet Oz, said during his confirmation hearing that he supports efforts to crack down on practices used by insurers to upcode. And Rep. Mark Green (R-Tennessee) introduced a bipartisan bill to decrease improper prior authorization denials in MA. 

In a somewhat cruel twist, the only mention of Medicare fraud in the Republican reconciliation bill proposals is a section claiming to crack down on improper payments in Medicare Parts A and B (which make up traditional Medicare) by using artificial intelligence.

The total improper payments in TM represent just over one-third of the overpayments going to MA plans each year, and many of the payments flagged as improper in TM are flagged due to missing documentation rather than questionable tactics that MA insurers use. 

In reflecting on why Republicans in Congress ignored potential savings from Big Insurance reforms and instead pursued cuts to care for people depending on Medicaid, which do not save as much, my biggest question was, why?

Why would lawmakers swerve around a populist policy right in front of them to stop Big Insurance from profiting off of the federal government to instead propose a regressive policy that targets millions of working Americans and leaves health insurance corporations that make billions in profits each year untouched?

Unfortunately, the answer likely lies in money. Although people enrolled in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) make up roughly one-third of the U.S. population, they account for just 0.5% of all political campaign contributions — about $60 million annually. This disparity is likely driven by financial constraints: Many of these individuals are rightly focused on covering basic needs such as housing, food, and childcare, especially as wages have not kept pace with the rising cost of living.

In contrast, the health care sector — which includes major players like big insurance, pharmaceutical and hospital companies—contributed $357 million during the 2020 election cycle, including $97 million to outside groups such as Super PACs. These outside spending groups are largely funded by corporations and wealthy individuals, who represent less than 1% of the population but wield significant political influence.

Super PACs spent more than $2 billion during the 2020 election cycle, amplifying the voices of industry-aligned donors. This stark imbalance in political spending may help explain why congressional proposals targeted Medicaid recipients while leaving the powerful health insurance industry largely untouched.

It is not only Republicans who have failed to stop Big Insurance from taking advantage of federal health programs, Democrats declined to take action when negotiating their health care legislation during President Biden’s term. Rather, it seems to be a failure of policymakers of both parties to pass legislation that makes it clear to Big Insurance that our health care is not an investment opportunity for Wall Street, and the dollars we pay in taxes to support Medicare are not pocket change for executives to use for stock buybacks.

The failure to include MA reform represents a missed opportunity to prioritize patient care over corporate profits. However, the growing strength and voices of patients across the nation will ultimately make it impossible for lawmakers to ignore this issue much longer. With continued momentum, the fight to put patients over Big Insurance profits will succeed.

Big Shifts: CVS Is Pulling the Plug on ACA Coverage — And 1 Million Americans Will Pay the Price

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, Abandon, ACA, Commitment, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Insurance Industry, High Deductible Health Plans, Out of Pocket Expenses, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Motive, Underinsured, Uninsured, Vertical Consolidation, Vertical Integration, Wall Street • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/big-shifts-cvs-is-pulling-the-plug?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=163399094&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

In what’s becoming an all-too-familiar pattern, CVS Health announced it will pull Aetna out of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplace in 2026, leaving about a million people across 17 states searching for new health coverage — and in some cases, fighting to afford any at all.

This marks yet another retreat by a major for-profit insurer from a program designed to provide affordable health coverage to Americans who don’t get it through work. CVS made the announcement while simultaneously celebrating a 60% increase in quarterly profit and revealing a new deal to boost sales of the pricey weight-loss drug Wegovy through its pharmacy and pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) arms.

Let me repeat that: Aetna is exiting the ACA because it claims it can’t make enough money on people enrolled in those plans, on the same day its parent company posted nearly $1.8 billion in profits in just the first three months of this year. 

This is the same company, by the way, that dumped hundreds of thousands of seniors and disabled people at the end of 2024 because some of them were using more medical care than Wall Street found acceptable. If this doesn’t tell you everything you need to know about who the health insurance industry is really working for, I don’t know what will.

From “Commitment” to Abandonment

Aetna first bailed on the ACA exchanges in 2018, then re-entered in 2022 when insurers could see more clearly how they could make significant profits on that book of business. Now, after just a few years of moderate participation, it’s heading for the exits again. CVS Health executives blamed “regulatory uncertainty” and “highly variable economic factors,” according to a statement to The Columbus Dispatch.

But make no mistake—this was a cold business calculation. Uncertainties and economic variabilities are constants in the insurance game.

CVS’ CEO David Joyner told investors:

“We are disappointed by the continued underperformance from our individual exchange products … this is not a decision we made lightly.”

That’s corporate-speak for “our Wall Street friends weren’t impressed.”

Aetna’s ACA exchange business, covering roughly 1 million people, is just a sliver of CVS’ overall medical membership of 27.1 million. But even though the profits weren’t massive, the people depending on this coverage — many of them self-employed, working multiple part-time jobs, or recently uninsured — will now be thrown into chaos.

And it’s happening at a time when health insurance for many Americans hangs by a thread. Unless Congress acts in the coming months, the ACA’s enhanced tax subsidies—first implemented under the American Rescue Plan—are set to expire at the end of this year. Without them, premiums could spike by 50% to 100% depending on income and geography.

The Congressional Budget Office projects that the lapse in subsidies could leave 3.8 million more Americans uninsured — and now, 1 million more will be forced to find new plans as CVS/Aetna walks away.

Same Song: Prioritizing Profit, Not Patients

Let’s be clear about what CVS is doing here: It’s ditching an essential safety net for millions in order to chase higher profits elsewhere—most notably, in the exploding market for GLP-1 drugs like Wegovy. On the same day it abandoned the ACA, CVS announced a new deal to give Wegovy preferred placement on its PBM formulary, displacing Eli Lilly’s Zepbound. This will help CVS dominate the obesity drug market—and rake in profits through its Caremark PBM and nearly 9,000 retail pharmacies.

It’s a powerful example of vertical integration in action.

CVS owns the insurer (Aetna), the PBM (Caremark), and the pharmacy (CVS retail stores). When it walks away from lower-margin business like ACA plans and doubles down on high-dollar drug deals, we see its true priorities: selling expensive drugs, saddling individuals, families and employers with the costs, and keeping Wall Street happy.

Even worse, the decision is taking place against a troubling political backdrop. The Trump administration has already taken steps to undermine ACA infrastructure and expressed skepticism toward core public health programs. Cuts to navigator funding, changes to vaccine guidelines, and looming uncertainty around tax credits are all part of a slow-motion sabotage of the ACA. This is not to say that the ACA doesn’t have its flaws that need to be addressed.

But instead of penalizing hard-working Americans and their families, lawmakers and the Trump administration should focus instead on lowering the ridiculously high out-of-pocket maximum that the ACA established (and that keeps going up every year) and fixing the medical loss ratio provision that has fueled the vertical integration in the insurance industry.

Gaming the System: Medical Loss Ratios and How Insurers Manipulate Them

Posted on by • Posted in ACA, Cost Shifting, Cost Transparency, Health Insurance Industry, Manipulative, Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), Profit Margin, Profit Motive, Quality Incentives • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/gaming-the-system-medical-loss-ratios?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=157970302&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

Last week, I made my once a decade trek to a dealership to buy a new car. I did my research in advance (and even negotiated the price) so I was hoping for a stress-free experience. 

It was – up until the point where I got locked in the finance manager’s office for “the talk”. You know, the one where you are made to feel like a neglectful parent unless you pony up for all the fixin’s – everything from nitrogen filled tires to paint protection (just in case I encounter a flock of migratory geese on the drive home).  I shook my head no about ten times before we got to the pre-paid maintenance plan options. I decided to be polite and listen (plus I was curious since I was purchasing a car from a manufacturer notorious for costly repairs). As compelling as it was to pay nearly $5,000 to what ultimately would amount to a few tire rotations for my electric vehicle, I held firm. The finance manager angrily handed me my signed documents and whisked me out of his office.

I guess I can’t blame car dealers for applying massive mark-ups for services that are inexpensive to provide. Except similar financial chicanery is currently playing out in our health insurance system. If you swap out the finance manager for a health insurer and replace me with the average everyday consumer, the dealer’s tactics are analogous to how insurers game medical loss ratio (MLR) requirements (except as a health care consumer, you can’t say “no”). 

A bit of background is in order to understand why I thought about health insurance and car dealers in the same breath.

Insurance companies are required to spend a certain percentage of money they get from premiums on medical costs and quality improvement (QI); this is known as the medical loss ratio (MLR). If companies do not meet this ratio (usually 80-85%, depending on the product), they must refund the difference in the form of a rebate, or reduction in future premiums, to consumers.

Like any for-profit corporation in America today, a health insurer wants to avoid giving money back to consumers. Therefore, insurers have become adept at manipulating their MLRs through various accounting and financial engineering techniques. This manipulation optimizes their ability to meet MLR thresholds and avoid paying rebates, which runs afoul of its intended purpose: to ensure that patients receive the appropriate level of care.  

So how do insurers game the system, and what evidence exists for this activity?

The current MLR formula is:

Health insurers do not control taxes and fees, but they can easily engineer the other variables. Below, I’ll explain how.

Step 1: Quality Improvement (QI) Expenses

The definition of allowable QI expenses is broad and includes activities to improve outcomes, patient safety, and reduce mortality (mom and apple pie stuff). Insurers played a big role in writing the MLR regulations after Congress enacted legislation and made sure they’d have wide latitude in what expenses are classified as QI (akin to the car dealer “option” list) and what product segments they assign them to. 

Looking at reported QI expenses sheds light on this practice. QI expenses vary between insurers.  But they also vary widely for the same insurer from year to year (even after controlling for geography and product segment). In large part, this is attributable to financial engineering. QI costs can be effectively “transferred” on the income statement from one product segment to another, by adjusting the pro rata weightings). This enables them to optimize MLR performance across their insurance portfolio (i.e. by taking from a bucket with excess medical costs and putting it in another with insufficient costs) in a way that maximizes benefit to the insurer and is camouflaged from regulators and consumers. This is language from a recent UnitedHealth Group filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission: “Assets and liabilities jointly used are assigned to each reportable segment using estimates of pro-rata usage.”

Annual QI expenses across four insurers in Florida in the small group market.

Although these QI percentages are small, the associated dollar amounts are large. In 2022, UnitedHealth, Humana, and Aetna reported $494 million, $550 million, and $395 million respectively in allowable QI expenses for their national plans. While there is some legitimate QI activity at insurers (e.g., pharmacists who identify high risk medications in the elderly), the reality is that much of the QI work is already heavily resourced within provider organizations, where it is more effective. Insurers also can (and do) count “wellness and health promotion activities” despite limited evidence these programs improve health outcomes and are more often used by insurers as marketing tools.

Step 2. Health Care Claims

The other variable that insurers can manipulate is claims costs. The more an insurer is vertically integrated, the easier it is. The prime example is UnitedHealth, which has an insurance arm (UnitedHealthcare) and a big division that encompasses medical services, among many other things (Optum), as well as various other subsidiaries. Optum Health and Optum Rx receive a significant portion of their revenue from UnitedHealthcare for providing services like care and pharmacy benefit management to people enrolled in its health plans. In fact, the amount of UnitedHealth’s corporate “eliminations,” (meaning inter-company revenue that is reported on their consolidated financial statement) has more than doubled over the past five years (from $58.5 billion to $136.4 billion). The proportion of revenue Optum derives from UnitedHealthcare versus unaffiliated entities has increased by nearly 50% over the same period.  A similar trend is playing out at every major insurer.

Take the example of the insurance company Aetna, the PBM CVS Caremark, and CVS Pharmacy, which are all vertically integrated and owned by CVS Health. If a patient goes to a CVS store to fill a prescription for Imatinib, a generic chemotherapy drug, the total cost the patient and insurance company pay is $17,710.21 for a 30-day supply. The same drug is sold by Cost Plus Drugs for $72.20 (the cost is calculated by adding the wholesale price and a 15% fee). When the patient fills the prescription at a CVS retail pharmacy, CVS Health can record that the patient paid a medical claim cost of $17,710.21 (even though the cost to acquire the drug is $70) and the remaining $17,640 can be retained as profits disguised as medical costs. 

Insurers’ extensive acquisition of physician practices also facilitates gamification of the MLR via its ability to pay capitation (a set amount per person) to a risk-bearing provider organization (RBO) it owns, such as a medical group. This enables the insurer to lock in a set amount of premium as “medical expense” (usually around 85%) with the downstream provider group “managing” those costs.  There’s a loophole, however. While the insurer has technically met its MLR requirement, the downstream RBO is subject to far fewer regulations on how it spends the money, which makes it easier to generate profits by skimping on care.  

The regulations on RBOs vary by state. In many cases, while RBOs need to meet minimum capital requirements, they are not subject to the same MLR provisions as insurers. For a vertically integrated insurer that gets a huge amount of revenue from taxpayer-supported programs like Medicare Advantage and Medicaid, this essentially means that (1) the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services puts the money into the insurer’s right pocket, (2) the insurer moves it to the left pocket, and (3) CMS checks the right pocket – and just the right pocket – at the end of the year to make sure it’s mostly empty (without regard to the fact that the left one may be busting at the seams).

The good news is there are ways to address these issues, both through updating the MLR provisions in the Affordable Care Act (which are long in the tooth) and more rigorous and comprehensive reporting requirements and regulation of vertically integrated insurers.  

Just like I don’t want car dealers pushing unnecessary add-ons to increase their profit margins, consumers deserve that the required portion of their hard spent premium dollar actually goes toward their health care instead of further enriching huge corporations, executives, and Wall Street shareholders.

How UnitedHealth’s Diagnosis Game Rakes in Billions from Medicare

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An investigative piece in the Wall Street Journal, written by Mark Maremont, Danny Dougherty, and Anna Wilde Mathews, gives an eye-popping look at how UnitedHealth Group is turning diagnosis-driven billing into a high-stakes game in the conglomerate’s Medicare Advantage business. 

As The Journal reported, UnitedHealth has taken a unique approach to Medicare Advantage:

directly employing thousands of doctors and arming them with software that generates diagnosis checklists before they even see patients. Former UnitedHealth physicians described how these suggested diagnoses — often obscure or irrelevant — weren’t optional. To move on to their next patient, doctors were forced to confirm, deny, or defer each proposed diagnosis.

One Oregon physician, Dr. Nicholas Jones, said UnitedHealth frequently pushed conditions so rare – like secondary hyperaldosteronism – he had to Google them. And this wasn’t limited to minor conditions.

Sickness scores for UnitedHealth’s Medicare Advantage patients jumped an average of 55% in their first year of enrollment in one of the company’s health plans compared to a mere 7% rise for patients who stayed in traditional Medicare. As the Journal noted, that’s the kind of jump you’d expect if everyone suddenly developed HIV and breast cancer.

The implications? More diagnoses mean higher “sickness scores,” which translate to billions in extra payments from Medicare. The Journal found that UnitedHealth’s practices generated an additional $4.6 billion from 2019 to 2022 compared to what it would have received if those scores had matched industry averages.

Citing fewer hospitalizations, UnitedHealth insists these practices improve patient outcomes and disease management, but the incentives to inflate diagnoses raise serious questions.

In the piece, you’ll meet Chris Henretta, a UnitedHealth Medicare Advantage “member” who lives in Florida. His doctor diagnosed him as morbidly obese, even though he’s a lifelong weightlifter and doesn’t meet the BMI threshold. “I began to suspect my doctor may have a financial incentive to portray people as higher risk,” Henretta said. The article pointed out that such a diagnosis can trigger an extra $2,400 in Medicare payments annually.

UnitedHealth’s system isn’t just about inflating diagnoses — it’s about turning them into profit centers.

The Journal reported that internal documents revealed that doctors could earn bonuses of up to $30,000 annually for engaging with the diagnosis system. Nurses tasked with “finding” new diagnoses were paid $250 per patient visit.

UnitedHealth has countered by saying these practices reflect its commitment to diagnosing and treating diseases early. But the Journal said many doctors felt pressure to play along.

Dr. Emilie Scott, a former UnitedHealth physician, called the system a money machine: “It’s not about taking care of the patient. It’s about how you get the money to flow.”

For patients and taxpayers, this system poses tough questions. Traditional Medicare patients treated by UnitedHealth doctors didn’t see the same inflation in sickness scores, which underscores how Medicare Advantage’s payment system incentivizes diagnose gaming.

What’s clear is that Medicare Advantage — and UnitedHealth’s dominant role in it — needs much closer scrutiny.

As The Journal reporters wrote, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services is studying these relationships. But real change will require policymakers and the public to confront the deeper flaws in how Medicare Advantage is structured.

Be sure to dive into the original Wall Street Journal article for the full story. The fantastic graphs and photography alone are worth your time, and the detailed reporting provides invaluable insights into how one company’s profit strategies impact us all.

The Humana Wall Street/Medicare Advantage Love Story Seems to Be Ending

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Back in February, Dr. Philip Verhoef and I wrote an op-ed for STAT News warning both patients and investors to steer clear of the health insurance industry’s private version of Medicare, which the government continues to allow insurers to market as Medicare Advantage. 

As we enter the open enrollment period in which America’s seniors and disabled people are able to choose between the traditional Medicare program and a bewildering array of private plans, it’s a good time to remind you why you need to steer clear of Medicare Advantage. 

Millions of people enrolled in those private plans are now getting notices from their insurers that their plans will not be available in 2025 because

three of the biggest insurance corporations (Humana, CVS/Aetna and Cigna) – and probably several smaller insurers – have decided to stop selling MA plans in hundreds of communities across the country, which means that MA enrollees in all those places are going to have to go through the agonizing chore of finding a replacement. 

Why? Because Wall Street, which until this year was head-over-heels in love with Medicare Advantage, is now filing for divorce.

Investors have been running for the exits since they began seeing danger signs in for-profit insurers’ earnings reports in the last quarter of 2023. For at least two of the biggest players in MA – Humana and CVS – that exodus has in recent weeks turned into a stampede. The stock prices of those two companies have been in steep decline all year, and you can be certain the top executives of those companies are now in panic mode. 

People who’ve been following my work since I blew the whistle on the health insurance racket know I’ve been trying to educate seniors – and policymakers – for at least a dozen years, going back to my time at the Center for Public Integrity, about the many shortcomings of what I’ve often called Medicare Disadvantage. I’ve also called Medicare Advantage the biggest heist of taxpayers’ dollars in American history. It’s truly epic.

As Phil and I wrote for STAT: 

The truth is that MA has been a broken system since the beginning, especially for patients. The business worked only as long as insurers were able to extract inappropriately large payments from the Medicare fund through methods like upcoding, where plans list false or exaggerated diagnoses on patient charts to get more money while providing no additional care.

In fact, the MA model relies on providing as little care as possible in general, with insurers putting care approval behind a wall of delays and denials to save money and leaving patients suffering without necessary treatment. 

We wrote that op-ed just as the government began taking long-overdue steps to rein in some of those abuses and, to Wall Street’s shock, announced at the end of February that it would not be giving MA plans as much money going forward as the industry had expected. That announcement, coupled with the reins-tightening, really spooked investors.

But that wasn’t all that soured them on Medicare Advantage. The big MA insurers had to admit to Wall Street when they released quarterly earnings that despite their best efforts to delay and deny as much care as possible, seniors nevertheless were using more health care than before.

The insurers’ medical loss ratios were ticking up, meaning they were having to use more of their customers’ premiums (and Medicare fund money) paying claims than they had anticipated. And folks, Wall Street HATES it when insurers do that. 

Phil and I wrote that:

Before, investors had assumed MA plans could keep the business humming along, that private insurers would always be able to keep their enrollees’ use of medical goods and services in check, and that policymakers would always look the other way as the government doled out billions in overpayments annually. They now see that these assumptions are failing, and many have sold their holdings in these companies as a result. 

The selling has continued apace throughout 2024, and the biggest loser on Wall Street has been Humana, which currently has an 18% share of the MA market, second behind UnitedHealth’s 29%. CVS/Aetna’s shares have also been dropping like a rock.  

Humana got another kick to the stomach from investors this week when it admitted that it likely will lose billions of dollars in payments in the future because far fewer of its MA enrollees will be in so-called four-star rated MA plans – 25% in 2025 compared to 94% in 2024. The feds give four-star rated MA plans a lot more money than lower-rated plans. 

When the New York Stock Exchange closed yesterday, Humana’s share price had fallen to $241.37. That’s down more than 54% since the 52-week high of $530.54 it reached in October 2023. But get this: on Wednesday the share price reached a 52-week low of $213.31 before inching back up later in the day as some investors apparently saw a way to make money at some point down the road by buying at that low price. 

And folks, that was not just a 52-week low. The last time Humana’s share price was in that territory was on April 25, 2017, when the low for the day was $214.51. 

All this turmoil has led Bank of America Securities to downgrade the stock to “underperform,” another word for sell. Piper Sandler also downgraded the company yesterday. Those downgrades – and possibly more to come –  could cause the stock price to sink even further.

Having worked closely with Humana’s C-suite and investor relations people when I headed corporation communications there before going to Cigna, I can assure you the company’s top brass are grasping at any levers they can get their hands on to stop the freefall. I would not want to be one of them, and I certainly would not want to be one of their customers or investors. 

As I mentioned, Humana, UnitedHealth and CVS/Aetna are by far the biggest players in the MA game. Earlier this year, those three companies captured 86% of the 1.7 million new MA enrollees, thanks to spending untold millions of federal dollars on deceptive TV ads and other marketing schemes.

Humana is now dumping hundreds of thousands of its MA enrollees because they somehow managed to get the care they needed. The company is doing that for one single reason: to try to get back into Wall Street’s good graces. 

Next week we’ll look at how the other two big players in Medicare Advantage, UnitedHealthcare and CVS/Aetna, are faring on Wall Street. It is a tale of two cities, as you’ll see.

UnitedHealth Group Has Made $24.5 Billion in Profits This Year (So Far) But Still Takes Beating on Wall Street

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UnitedHealth Group has taken a beating on Wall Street this week after admitting that its Medicare Advantage plans had to pay out more in medical claims in the third quarter of this year than investors had expected. As I’ve noted many times, Wall Street can’t stand it and gets very spiteful when Big Insurance uses more of our premium dollars paying for patients’ care because that means there’s less money left over to enrich shareholders. 

At the end of trading at the New York Stock Exchange Tuesday, UnitedHealth’s share price was down 8.11% — almost $50 a share — falling like a rock from $605.40 to $556.29 as soon as the market opened. It had reached a 52-week high just the day before but fell off a cliff Tuesday morning. This despite the fact that the company still made $8.7 billion in operating profits during the third quarter.

What investors didn’t like at all was the fact that UnitedHealthcare’s medical loss ratio (MLR) climbed to 85.2% from 82.3% for the same period last year.

By other measures, the company did just fine, especially when you look at how much money it made during the first nine months of this year: a whopping $24.5 billion in profits.

Enrollment in both the company’s commercial and Medicare Advantage plans increased, but it posted a significant decline in the number of people enrolled in the Medicaid plans its administers for several states. That’s because of the Medicaid “unwinding” that has been going on since the official end of the pandemic.  

And here is another couple of numbers of note from the third quarter:

UnitedHealth’s Optum division, which encompasses its massive pharmacy benefit manager, Optum Rx, made more money for the parent company than the health plan division: $4.5 billion in profits vs. $4.2 billion for UnitedHealthcare.

PBMs have become even more of a cash cow for Big Insurance than Medicare Advantage, which despite the higher MLRs of late is still a reliable money-gushing ATM for the industry. 

Corporate Takeover Has Not Been Good for Healthcare

Posted on by • Posted in Health Insurance Industry, Healthcare Sector, Market Consolidation, Market Power, Pharmaceutical Industry, Private Equity, Profit Margin, Profit Motive, Value-Based Healthcare • Leave a comment

Click to access 4sightHealth.Ken-Terry-PE-Healthcare-8.13.24-1.pdf

Four decades ago, Paul Starr noted in his landmark history of U.S. healthcare, “The Social Transformation of American Medicine,” that the industry had taken a decisive turn toward corporate ownership. “Medical care in America now appears to be in the early stages of a major transformation in its institutional structure,” he wrote. “Corporations have begun to integrate a hitherto decentralized hospital system, enter a variety of other health care businesses, and consolidate ownership and control in what may eventually become an industry dominated by huge healthcare conglomerates.”

Forty years later, Starr’s prediction has come true. The vast majority of hospitals (other than critical access facilities) are now part of health systems, and some of those belong to giant for-profit or not-for-profit corporations. Nearly 80% of physicians are now employed by hospitals or private companies, including health insurers like United Healthcare. Most community pharmacies have been displaced by enormous chains like CVS, Walgreens and Walmart. Nursing home chains have taken over two-thirds of skilled nursing facilities. A handful of huge firms dominate health insurance, and a dozen drug manufacturers produce and set the prices of the most common prescription medicines.

Private equity (PE) investors focus like a laser beam on generating profits. There can be an amoral quality to PE investing, seeking returns whether or not they create value for customers in the marketplace.

Steward Healthcare, a large hospital chain initially created with PE investment has become, whether fair or not, a poster child for what can go wrong with private investment in healthcare. Steward went bankrupt after aggressively expanding into new markets beyond Massachusetts with funding generated from sales-leaseback arrangements with Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).

But many of the PE firms that now own over 200 acute care hospitals take a similar approach. According to a recent study of PE-owned hospitals, two years after they were purchased, 61% of them had reduced capital assets, compared to 15.5% of control hospitals. Assets decreased by a mean of 15% for acquired hospitals and increased by 9.2% for controls during that period.

Corporate Goals Vs. Value-Based Care
The consolidation of the industry by large corporate entities has received a fair amount of media attention. What has been less noticed is the incompatibility between corporate goals and value-based care. One reason for this is that many big healthcare systems pretend to be interested in population health management. For example, they may operate accountable care organizations (ACOs) that seek to improve the quality of care and reduce costs through better prevention and care coordination. They may also try to reduce readmissions, which helps them avoid Medicare penalties.

Don’t be fooled. There are exceptions — including the few integrated systems like Kaiser and Geisinger that take financial responsibility for care — but most healthcare systems have no intention of turning their business model upside down by using population health management to decrease admissions and empty their beds. When for-profit chains deliver reports to stock analysts, or not-for-profits seek to sell bonds, the metric they most often use to show their financial health is their occupancy rate, not their success in value-based care.

Meanwhile, the healthcare behemoths are continuing to grow larger. While the Department of Justice has ramped up its antitrust activity under the Biden Administration and has discouraged some mergers, this has had relatively little impact on healthcare consolidation. Academic medical centers are acquiring more community hospitals as referral sources, and some large systems like Risant Health, a nonprofit entity created by Kaiser Permanente, are doing interstate deals that help them escape the oversight of state laws.

Physicians have been largely a football in the matches between giant healthcare systems and equally massive insurers. Many independent practices have been forced to sell out to hospitals because Medicare pays hospital outpatient departments more than independent practices for the same services. (That this remains the case nearly 10 years after Congress passed its first “site-neutral” payment law is a testament to the power of regulatory capture.) While there are some sizable independent groups and physician-led ACOs, it is difficult for doctors to determine their own destinies today. And, because of how their corporate overlords affect the practice of medicine, many employed physicians are unhappy with their working conditions and its impact on patients. We’re even starting to see the beginnings of unionization in some systems.

Saving Primary Care
A variety of reforms have been tried to shore up primary care, the cornerstone of value-based care. For example, some primary-care-driven ACOs with value-based contracts generate significant savings that they have shared with their doctors. But the percentage of all payments made in these kinds of arrangements is still fairly small. The risk-taking portion of the healthcare business will not grow substantially as long as hospitals and specialists continue to make good money doing the same old fee-for-service thing.

Insurers have also taken the lead in some efforts to fortify primary care. United, which employs about 10% of the nation’s physicians, has been training them to practice evidence-based medicine and reduce waste. Elevance Health recently struck a deal with PE firm Clayton, Dubilier & Rice to create a new primary care model in Elevance’s Millenium Physician Group and Carelon Health. This “whole-person health” model will emphasize the patient-doctor relationship, along with care coordination, referral management and health coaching within “value-based care” financial arrangements.

This is all to the good. But health insurers don’t make their profits by encouraging primary care doctors to take better care of patients. They use provider networks, prior authorization, high deductibles and other tools to limit access and the cost of services. In Medicare Advantage, carriers like United and Humana have used diagnostic coding to inflate their Medicare payments by an estimated $88 billion just this year. Efforts to infuse value-based care into healthcare delivery have not been a major priority for insurance companies.

Drug Company Profits
Whole books have been written about how the pharmaceutical industry has ripped off the American consumer. Following notorious, out-of-whack price increases over the years for drugs like insulin, Humira and Truvada, in 2022 net prices jumped 6.2% for Darzalex, 6% for Prolia, 7.2% for Xgeva, 6% for Perjeta, and 8.9% for Adcetris, among others. These price hikes, which were unsupported by new clinical evidence of the drugs’ effectiveness, netted from $63 million to $248 million in additional revenue for their manufacturers. Drug companies can get away with it because nothing in U.S. law prevents them from raising prices for patented medications by however much they want to. How they price their drugs can also have a strong impact on health costs as a whole, especially when a lot of people take a particular medication. Current examples include Wegovy, Ozempic and the other high-priced GLP-1 weight-loss drugs, which eventually could cost the health system as much as $1 trillion a year — five times as much as could be saved in lower costs for other conditions — if prescribed to all obese Americans.

The kicker is that we spend nearly three times as much per person on prescription medicines as other leading countries do, because their governments bargain with pharmaceutical companies and ours doesn’t. Yet the drug makers complain that any limitations on their U.S. profits will make it impossible for them to develop more lifesaving medicines.

Overall, it’s clear that the corporatization of our healthcare system is not good for our health. In Portugal, for example, health spending per capita is one-fifth that of the U.S., yet life expectancy there is six years longer, on average, than in our country. The difference is largely rooted in the fact that Portugal has a national health service that guarantees access to healthcare, regardless of ability to pay. In other words, health takes precedence over profits in Portugal.

If we really want good healthcare at an affordable cost — the definition of value-based care — we have to move away from our profit-driven, corporatized healthcare model. As long as corporations are allowed to profit from healthcare, they will maximize those profits, regardless of the impact on consumers. It doesn’t matter how much we talk about value-based care or reforms that merely nip at corporate profits. Until Americans demand the same kind of healthcare that every Portuguese has, and insist that our government rein in the corporate owners of healthcare entities, we will get poorer healthcare and die sooner than citizens of other advanced countries.
Outcomes Matter. Customers Count. Value Rules.