Category Archives: Value Proposition

What Kaiser’s Acquisition Of Geisinger Means For Us All

Posted on by • Posted in Affordability, Branding, Capitation, Consumerism, Fee for Service Reimbursement, Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Kaiser Permanente, Market Consolidation, Market Share, Market Trends, Mergers & Acquisitions, Quality of Care, Strategy, Value Proposition, Value-Based Contracting, Value-Based Healthcare • Leave a comment
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Healthcare’s most recent billion-dollar deal took the industry by surprise, leaving medical experts and hospital leaders grappling to comprehend its implications.

In case you missed it, California-based Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Hospitals, which make up the insurance and facilities half of Kaiser Permanente, announced the acquisition of Geisinger, a Pennsylvania-based health system once acknowledged by President Obama for delivering “high-quality care.”

Upon regulatory approval, Geisinger will become the first organization to join Risant Health, Kaiser Foundation’s newly created $5 billion subsidiary. According to Kaiser, the aim is to build “a portfolio of likeminded, nonprofit, value-oriented, community-based health systems anchored in their respective communities.” 

Having spent 18 years as CEO of The Permanente Medical Group, the half of Kaiser Permanente responsible for the delivery of medical care, I took great interest in the announcement. And I wasn’t alone. My phone rang off the hook for weeks with calls from reporters, policy experts and healthcare executives.

After hundreds of conversations, here are the three most common questions I received about the acquisition—and the implications for doctors, insurers, health-system competitors and patients all over the country.

Question 1: Why did Kaiser acquire Geisinger?

Most callers wanted to know about Kaiser’s motivation, figuring there must’ve been more to the acquisition than the press release indicated. Although I don’t have inside information, I believe they were right. Here’s why:

Kaiser Permanente has a long and ongoing reputation for delivering nation-leading care. The organization has consistently earned the highest quality and patient-satisfaction rankings from the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), Leapfrog Group, JD Power and Medicare.

And yet, despite a 78-year history, dozens of hospitals and 13 million members across eight states, Kaiser Permanente is still considered a coastal—not national—health system. It maintains a huge market share in California and a strong presence in the Mid-Atlantic states, yet the organization has failed repeatedly to replicate that success in other geographies.

With that context, I see two compelling reasons why the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Hospitals wish to become a national brand:

  1. Influence. Elected officials and regulatory bodies often turn to healthcare’s biggest players to set legislative agendas and carve out national policy. At that table, there are a limited number of seats. By shedding its reputation as a “local” health system, Kaiser could earn one.
  2. Survival. In recent years, companies like Amazon, CVS and Walmart have been scooping up organizations that provide primary care, telehealth, home health and specialty care services. These “retail giants” are spending up to $13 billion per acquisition. And they’re consuming already-successful healthcare companies like One Medical, Oak Street Health, Signify, Pill Pack and many others. Like an army preparing for war, these corporate behemoths are amassing the components needed to battle the traditional healthcare incumbents and ultimately oust them entirely.

The Geisinger deal expands Kaiser’s footprint, adding 600,000 patients, 10 hospitals and 100 specialty and primary care clinics. These assets lend gravitas, even though Geisinger also comes with a 2022 operating loss of $239 million.

The lesson to draw from this first question is clear: size matters. The days of solo physicians and stand-alone hospitals are over. Nostalgia for medicine’s folksy, home-spun past is understandable but futile. To survive, healthcare players must get bigger quickly or team up with someone who can. That insight leads to the next question and lesson.

Question 2: How much value will Kaiser give Geisinger?

Almost everyone I’ve spoken with understands Kaiser’s desire for greater national influence, but they’re less sure how this deal will affect Geisinger Health.

Geisinger’s Pennsylvania-based hospitals and clinics have been locked in territorial battles for years with surrounding health systems. More recently, the pandemic, combined with staffing shortages and national inflation, have challenged Geisinger’s clinical performance and eroded its bottom line.

Assuming Kaiser plans to invest roughly $1 billion in each of the four to five health systems it’s planning to acquire, that surge in cash inflow will provide Geisinger with temporary financial safety. But the bigger question is how will Kaiser improve Geisinger’s value-proposition enough to grow its market share?

In public comments, Kaiser leaders spoke of the acquisition as an opportunity for Risant to “improve the health of millions of people by increasing access to value-based care and coverage, and raising the bar for value-based approaches that prioritize patient quality outcomes.”

Many of the experts I spoke with understand Kaiser’s value intent. But they question how Kaiser can could deliver on that promise since The Permanente Medical Group (TPMG) wasn’t involved in the deal.

If, hypothetically, Kaiser and Permanente leaders were to strike a deal to collaborate in the future, TPMG’s physician leaders could bring tremendous knowledge, experience and expertise to the table. Otherwise, I agree with those who’ve expressed doubt that Kaiser, alone, will be able to significantly improve Geisinger’s clinical performance.

Health plans and insurance companies play an important role in financing medical care. They possess rich data on performance and can offer incentives that boost access to higher-quality care. But insurers don’t work directly with individual doctors to coordinate medical care or advance clinical solutions on behalf of patients. And without strong physician leadership, the pace of positive change slows to a crawl. As a example, research conducted within The Permanente Medical Group found that it takes only three years to turn a proven clinical advance into standard practice—that’s nearly six times faster than the national average.

For decades, the secret sauce for Kaiser Permanente has been the cohesive success of its three parts: Kaiser Health Plan, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and The Permanente Medical Group.

And KP’s results speak for themselves:

  • 90% control of hypertension for members (compared to 60% for the rest of the country)
  • 30% fewer deaths from heart attack and stroke (compared to the rest of the country)
  • 20% fewer deaths from colon cancer

The big lesson: insurance, by itself, doesn’t drive major improvements in medicine. It must be a combined effort between forward-looking insurers and innovative, high-performing clinicians.

But there’s another takeaway here for doctors everywhere: now is the time to join forces with other clinicians in your community. Together, you can collaborate to improve clinical quality. You can augment access and make care more affordable for patients. Simultaneously, this is the time for the insurers and the retail giants to figure out which medical groups can deliver the best care and make the best partners. Neither side will flourish alone. And this leads to a third question and lesson.

Question 3: Will the deal work?

Almost all of my conversations ended with this query. I say it’s too early to tell. But as I look years down the road, one part of the deal, in particular, gives me doubt.

Today, Geisinger uses a hybrid reimbursement model—blending both “value-based” care payments with traditional “fee-for-service” insurance plans. In addition to offering its own coverage, it contracts with a variety of other insurance companies. Rarely have I seen this scattered approach succeed.

Most healthcare observers understand the inherent flaw in the “fee for service” (FFS) model is also its greatest appeal to providers: the more you do the more you earn. FFS is how nearly all financial transactions take place in America (i.e., provide a service, earn a fee). In medicine, however, this financial model results in frequent over-testing and over-treatment with minimal if any improvement in clinical outcomes, according to researchers.

The “value-based” alternative to FFS involves prepaying for care—a model often referred to as “capitation.” In short, capitation involves a single fee, paid upfront for all the medical care provided to a defined population of patients for one year based on their age and health status. The better an organization at preventing disease and avoiding complications from chronic illness, the greater its success in both clinical quality and affordability.

Within the small world of capitated healthcare payments, there’s an important element that often gets overlooked. It makes a big difference who receives that lump-sum payment.

In the case of Kaiser Permanente, capitated payments are made directly to the medical group and the physicians who are responsible for providing care. In almost every other health system, an insurance company collects capitated payments but then pays the medical providers on a fee-for-service basis. Even though the arrangement is referred to as capitated, the incentives are overwhelmingly tied to the volume of care (not the value of that care).

In a mixed-payment model, doctors and hospitals invariably prioritize the higher paying FFS patients over the capitated ones. When I think about these conflicting incentives, I’m reminded of a prominent medical group in California. It had a main entrance for its fee-for-service patients and a second, smaller one off to the side for capitated patients.

I doubt the time spent with the patient—or the overall care provided—was equal for both groups. When income is based on quantity of care, not quality, clinicians focus more on treating the complications of chronic disease and medical errors rather than preventing them in the first place. Geisinger has walked this tightrope in the past, but as economic pressures mount, I fear doctors will find the two sets of incentives conflicting and difficult to navigate.

The big lesson: as financial pressures mount, the most effective approaches of the past will likely fail in the future. All healthcare organizations will need to make a decision: keep trying to drive volume and prices up through FFS or shift to capitation. Getting caught in the middle is a prescription for failure.

Examining the healthcare acquisitions made by Amazon and CVS, it’s clear these giants have decided to move aggressively toward a model more like Kaiser Permanente’s—one that brings insurance, pharmacy, physicians and sophisticated IT systems under one roof. These companies, along with Walmart, are aggressively marching down a path toward capitation, focusing on Medicare Advantage (the value-based option for Americans 65+) as an entry point.

So far, Geisinger has hedged its bets by maintaining a hybrid revenue stream. I doubt they can do so successfully in the future. That brings us to a final question.

The biggest question remaining  

Over the next decade, hospital systems, insurers and retailers will battle for healthcare supremacy. The most recent Kaiser-Geisinger deal reflects an industry that’s undergoing massive change as health systems face intensifying pressure to remain relevant.  

The most important issue to resolve is whether these shifts will ultimately help or harm patients. I’m optimistic for a positive outcome.

Whether or not the retail giants displace the incumbents, they will redefine what it takes to win. For all their faults, companies like Amazon and Walmart care a lot about meeting the needs of customers—a mindset rarely found in today’s healthcare world. As these companies grow ever larger, they’ll place consumer-oriented demands on doctors and hospitals. This will require care providers to deliver higher quality care at more affordable prices.

The retailers will only do deals with the best of the best. And they’ll kick the underachievers to the curb. They’ll use their sophisticated IT systems to better coordinate and innovate medical care. Insurers, hospitals and doctors who fail to keep up will be left behind.

Over time, patients will find themselves with far more choices and control than they have today. And I’m optimistic that will be good for the health of our nation.

United Healthcare: Anatomy of a Behemoth

Posted on by • Posted in Antitrust, Competition, Health Insurance Industry, Health Policy, Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Market Consolidation, Market Power, Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), Optum Health, Optum Insight, Optum Rx, Pharmacy Benefits Management, Profit Model, Profit Motive, UnitedHealth Group, UnitedHealthcare, Value Proposition, Value-Based Healthcare, Vertical Integration • Leave a comment

medium.com/@tcoyote/united-healthcare-anatomy-of-a-behemoth-63dc5f1b485a

In the mid-1980’s, managed care advocate Dr. Paul Ellwood predicted that eventually, US healthcare would be dominated by perhaps a dozen vast national firms he called SuperMeds that would combine managed care based health insurance with care delivery systems. Ellwood was a leader of the “managed competition” movement which advocated for a private sector alternative to a federal government-run National Health Insurance system. Ellwood and colleagues believed that Kaiser Foundation Health Plans and other HMOs would be able to stabilize health costs and thus affordably extend care to the uninsured.

The US political system and market dynamics would not co-operate with Ellwood and his Jackson Hole Group’s vision. In the ensuing thirty-five years, healthcare has remained both highly fragmented and regional in focus. However, unbeknownst to most, during the past decade, as a result of a major merger and relentless smaller acquisitions, two SuperMeds were born- CVS/Aetna and UnitedHealth Group, that whose combined revenues comprise 14% of total US health spending.

CVS/Aetna is slightly larger than United, by dint of grocery sales in its drugstores and its vast Caremark pharmacy benefits management business. However, CVS’s Aetna health insurance arm is one third the size of United’s, and though CVS is rapidly scaling up its care delivery apparatus through its in-store Health Hubs, it remains is a tiny fraction of United’s care footprint. Despite being slightly smaller at the top line, United’s market capitalization is more than 3.5 times that of CVS.

United’s vast scope is difficult to comprehend because much of it is not visible to the naked eye, and the most rapidly growing businesses are partly nested inside United’s health insurance business.

United employs over 300 thousand people. At $287.6 billion total revenues in 2021, United exceeded 7% of total US health spending (though $8.3 billion are from overseas operations).

In 2021, United was $100 billion larger than the British National Health Service. It is more than three times the size of Kaiser Permanente, and five times the size of HCA, the nation’s largest hospital chain. United is both larger and richer than energy giant Exxon Mobil. United has over $70 billion in cash and investments, and is generating about $2 billion a month in operating cash flow.

Its highly regulated health insurance business is the visible tip of a rapidly growing iceberg. Revenue from United’s core health insurance business grew at 11% in 2021, compared to 14% growth in United’s diversified Optum subsidiary. Optum generated $155.6 billion in 2021 (of which 60% were from INSIDE United’s health insurance business). You can see the relationship of Optum’s three major businesses to United’s health insurance operations in Exhibit I.

Optum is the Key to United’s Growth

Understanding the role of Optum is key to understanding United’s business. It is remarkable how few of my veteran health care colleagues have any idea what Optum is or what it does. Optum was once a sort of dumping ground for assorted United acquisitions without a seeming core purpose. A private equity colleague once derided Optum as “The Island of Lost Toys”. Now, however, Optum is driving United’s growth, and generates billions of dollars in unregulated profits both from inside the highly regulated core health insurance business and from external customers.

Optum consists of three parts: Optum Health, its care delivery enterprise ($54 billion revenues in 2021), Optum Rx, its pharmacy benefits management enterprise ($91 billion revenues in 2021) and Optum Insight, a diversified business services enterprise ($12.2 billion in 2021). Virtually all of United’s acquisitions join one of these three businesses.

Optum Health: The Third Largest Care Delivery Enterprise in the US

By itself, Optum Health is almost the size of HCA ($54 billion in 2021 vs HCA’s $58.7 billion) and consists of a vast national portfolio of care delivery entities: large physician groups, urgent care centers, surgicenters, imaging centers, and now by dint of the recently announced $5.7 billion acquisition of LHC, home health agencies. Optum Health has studiously avoided acquiring beds of any kind: hospitals, nursing homes, etc. and likely will continue to do so. Optum Health’s physician groups not only generate profits on their own, but also provide powerful leverage for United to control health costs for its own subscribers, pushing down United’s highly visible and regulated Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), and increasing health plan profits.

Optum Health began in 2007 when United acquired Nevada-based Sierra Health, and thus became the new owner of a small multispecialty physician group which Sierra owned. The group did not belong in United’s health insurance business and came to rest over in Optum. Over the past twelve years, Optum Health has acquired an impressive percentage of the major capitated medical groups in the US- Texas’ WellMed, California’s HealthCare Partners (from DaVita), as well as Monarch, AppleCare and North American Medical Management, Massachusetts’ Reliant (formerly Fallon Clinic) and Atrius in Massachusetts (pending) , Kelsey Seybold Clinic (also pending) in Houston, TX and Everett Clinic and PolyClinic in Seattle.

Optum Health claims over 60 thousand physicians, though many of these are actually independent physicians participating in “wrap around” risk contracting networks. By comparison, Kaiser Permanente’s Medical Groups employ about 23 thousand physicians. United’s management claims that Optum Health provides continuing care to about 20 million patients, of whom 3 million are covered by some form of so-called “value based” contracts. Perhaps half of this smaller number are covered by capitated (percentage of premium-PMPM) contracts.

Optum Health straddles fierce competitive relationships between United’s health insurance business and competing health plans in well more than a dozen metropolitan areas. Almost half (44%) of Optum Health’s revenues come from providing care for health plans other than United.

When Optum acquires a large physician group, it acquires those groups’ contracts with United’s health insurance competitors, some of which contracts have been in place for decades. Premium revenues from other health plans, presumably capitation or per member per month (PMPM) revenues, are one-quarter of Optum Health’s $54 billion total revenues. These “external” premium revenues have quadrupled since 2018, largely for Medicare Advantage subscribers. Optum Health contributes about $4.5 billion in operating profit to United. It is impossible to determine from United’s disclosures how much of this profit comes from Optum Health’s services provided to United’s insured lives and how much from its medical groups’ extensive contracts with competing health plans.

Optum Health’s surgicenters and urgent care centers provide affordable alternatives to using expensive hospital outpatient services and emergency departments, potentially further reducing United medical expense. This creates obvious tensions with United’s hospital networks, since Optum Health can use its large medical practices and virtual care offerings to divert patients from hospitals to its own services, or else render those services unnecessary.

Though some observers have termed Optum/United’s business model “vertical integration”-ownership of the suppliers to and distributors of a firm’s product– Optum Health has actually grown less vertical since 2018, with revenues from competing health plans growing from 36% of total revenues in 2018 to 44% in 2021. A 2018 analysis by ReCon Strategy found at best a sketchy matchup between United’s health plan enrollment by market and its Optum Health assets (https://reconstrategy.com/2018/04/uniteds-medicare-advantage-footprint-and-optumcare-network-do-not-overlap-much-so-far/.

Optum Rx: The Nation’s Third Largest Pharmacy Benefits Management Business

Optum’s largest business in revenues is its Optum Rx pharmaceutical benefits management (PBM) business, which generates $91 billion in revenues, and processes over a billion pharmacy claims not only for United but also many competing insurers and employer groups. Pharmaceutical costs are a rapidly growing piece of total medical expenses, and controlling them is yet another source of largely unregulated profits for United; Optum Rx generated over $4.1 billion of operating profit in 2021.

Optum Rx is the nation’s third largest PBM business after Caremark, owned by CVS/Aetna and Express Scripts, owned by CIGNA, and processes about 21% of all scripts written in the US. Pharmacy benefits management firms developed more than two decades ago to speed the conversion of patients from expensive branded drugs to generics on behalf of insurers and self-funded employers. They were given a big boost by George Bush’s 2004 Medicare Part D Prescription Drug benefit, as a “pro-competitive” private sector alternative to Medicare directly negotiating prices with pharmaceutical firms.

Reducing drug spending is one key to United’s profitability. Since generics represent almost 90% of all prescriptions written, Optum Rx now relies on fees generated by processing prescriptions and on rebates from pharmaceutical firms to promote their costly branded drugs as preferred drugs on Optum Rx’s formularies. These rebates are determined based on “list” prices for those drugs vs. the contracted price for the PBMs, and are actual cash payments from manufacturers to PBMs.

Drug rebates represent a significant fraction of operating profits for health insurers that own PBMs, particularly for their older Medicare Advantage patients that use a lot of expensive drugs. Unfortunately, PBMs have incentives to inflate the list price, because rebates are caculated based on the spread between list prices and the contract pricel Unfortunately, this increases subscribers’ cash outlays, because patient cost shares are based on list prices.

Optum Rx generates about 39% of its revenues (and an undeterminable percentage of its profits) serving other health insurers and self-funded employers. Many of those self-funded employers demand that Optum pass through the rebates directly to them (even if it means being charged higher administrative fees!).

Unlike the situation with Optum Health, the “verticality” of Optum’s PBM business-the percentage of Optum revenues derived from serving United subscribers- has increased in the last seven years, to more than 60% of Optum Rx’s total business. What happens to the billions of dollars in rebates generated by Optum Rx is impossible to determine from United’s disclosures. However, our best guess is that pharmaceutical rebates represent as much as a quarter of United’s total corporate profits.

Optum Insight: “Intelligent” Business Solutions

The fastest growing and by far the most profitable Optum business is its business intelligence/business services/consulting subsidiary. Optum Insight was generated $12.2 billion in revenues in 2021, but a 27.9% operating margin, five times that of United’s health insurance business. Optum Insight is strategically vital to enhancing the profitability of United’s health insurance activities, but also generates outside revenues selling services to United’s health insurance competitors and hospital networks.

The core of Optum Insight is a business intelligence enterprise formerly known as Ingenix, which provided “big data” to United and other insurers about hospital and pricing behavior and utilization-crucial both for benefits design and administration. In 2009, Ingenix was accused by New York State of under reporting prices for out of network health services for itself and its clients, which had the effect of reducing its own medical reimbursements, and increasing patient cost shares. United signed a consent decree to alter Ingenix business practices and settled a raft of lawsuits filed on behalf of patients, physicians and employers. Its name was subsequently changed to Optum Insight.

By dint of aggressive acquisitions, Optum Insight has dramatically increased its medical claims management business, consulting services and business process outsourcing activities. . Most of United’s investment in artificial intelligence can be found inside Optum Insight. Big data plays a crucial role in United’s overall strategy. Optum Insight’s claims management software uses vast medical claims data bases and artificial intelligence/machine learning software to spot and deny medical claims for which documentation is inadequate or where services are either “inappropriate” or else not covered by an individual’s health plan. Providers also claim that the same software rejects as many as 20% of their claims, often for problems as tiny as a mis-spelled word or a missing data field.

Optum Insight software plays a crucial role in helping United’s health insurance plans manage their medical expense. Traditional health plan profitability is generated by reducing medical expense relative to collected premiums to increase underwriting profit. These profits are regulated, with highly variable degrees of rigor by state health insurance commissioners, and also by provisions of ObamaCare enacted in 2010.

Though its acquisition of Equian in 2019 and the proposed $13 billion acquisition of health information technology conglomerate Change Healthcare in 2021, United came within an eyelash of a near monopoly on “intelligent” medical claims processing software. The Justice Department challenged this latter acquisition and United may agree to divest Change’s claims processing software business as a condition of closing the deal. Even without the Change acquisition, Optum Insight processes hundreds of millions of medical claims annually not only for United’s health insurance business but for many of United’s competitors.

However, Optum Insight’s claims management system can also be used to increase MLR if medical expense unexpectedly declines, exposing the firm to federal requirement that it rebate excessive ‘savings’ to subscribers. This happened in 2020, when the COVID pandemic dramatically and unexpectedly added billions to United’s earnings due to hospitals suspending elective care. The chart below shows United’s 2Q2020 earnings per share almost doubling due to the precipitous drop in its medical claims expenses!

Hospital finance colleagues reported an immediate and substantial drop in medical claims denials from United and other carriers in the summer and fall of 2020. United’s quarterly profits dutifully and steeply declined in the subsequent two quarters, because its medical expenses sharply rebounded. The rise in

United’s medical expenses helped the firm avoid premium rebates to patients required by provisions of the ObamaCare legislation passed in 2010. The firm did voluntarily rebate about $1.5 billion to many of its customers in June, 2020.

However the most rapidly growing part of Optum Insight is its Optum 360 business process outsourcing business, which helps hospitals manage their billing and collections revenue cycle, as well as information technology operations, supply chain (purchasing and materials management) and other services. Through Optum 360, Optum Insight has signed five long term master contracts in the past two years’ worth many billions of dollars with care providers in California, Missouri and other states to provide a broad range of business services.

With all these different businesses, it is theoretically possible for one piece of Optum to be reducing a hospital’s cash flow by denying medical claims for United subscribers, while United’s health insurance network managers bargain aggressively to reduce the hospital’s reimbursement rates while yet another piece of Optum runs the billing and collection services for the same hospital and its employed physicians, while yet another piece of Optum competes with the hospital’s physicians and ambulatory services, diverting patients from its ERs and clinics, reducing the hospital’s revenues.

It is not difficult to imagine a future in which Optum/United offers hospital systems an Optum 360 outsourcing contract that run most of the business operations of a hospital system in exchange for preferred United health plan rates, an AI-enabled EZ pass on its medical claims denials and inpatient referrals from Optum physician groups and urgent care centers, at the expense of competing hospitals.

Managing these potential conflicts will be an increasing challenge as these various businesses grow, placing intense pressure on United’s leadership to get the various pieces of United to work together. To many anxious hospital executives, United resembles nothing so much as the Kraken, rising up out of the sea, surrounding and engulfing them- a powerful friend perhaps or a fearsome foe. As you might expect, United’s growing market power and growth has generated a fierce backlash in the hospital management community.

What Business is United Healthcare In?

United Healthcare is the most successful business in the history of American healthcare. The rapid growth of Optum and continued health insurance enrollment growth from government programs like Medicaid and Medicare has created a cash engine which generates nearly $2 billion a month in free cash flow. Optum’s portfolio has given United an impressive array of tools, unequalled in the industry, to improve its profitability and to reach into every corner of the US health system. United Healthcare is managed care on steroids.

United’s diversified portfolio of businesses gives the firm what a finance-savvy colleague termed “optionality”- the ability to redirect capital and management attention to areas of growth and away from areas that have ceased to grow, in the US or overseas. With its substantial investable capital, it will have the pick of the litter of the 11 thousand digital health companies as the overextended digital health market consolidates. United will be able to use its vast resources to build state-of-the-art digital infrastructure to reach and retain patients and manage their care.

United’s main short term business risks seem to be running out of accretive transactions effectively to deploy its growing horde of capital and managing the firm’s rising political exposure. United has had tremendous business discipline and has shied away from speculative acquisitions that are not immediately accretive to earnings. If its earnings growth falters, however, it will also encounter pressure from the investment community to increase dividends (presently about 1.2%) or share buybacks to bolster its share price, or else divest some or all of Optum in order to “maximize shareholder value”.

Answering the question, “What Business is United In” is simple: just about everything in health but hospitals and nursing homes.

Answering the questions- who are its customers and what do they want? — is a great deal harder. The customers United serves are in a sort of cold war with one another. United’s original business was protecting employers from health cost growth , and tempering the influence of hospitals and doctors by reducing their rates and utilization. By fostering so-called Consumer Directed Health Plans that expose many of their subscribers to very high front-end copayments, United and its health insurance brethren, have also increased their out-of-pocket costs, whether they have the savings to pay them or not.

There are also some ironies in United’s development. Optum Insight’s suite of hospital business services are designed to reduce administrative costs created in major part by United and other insurers’ medical claims data requirements. Its PBM business, originally intended to reduce drug spending by bargaining aggressively with pharmaceutical manufacturers has ended up pushing up drug list prices and consumer cost shares.

While presumably everybody benefits if United can somehow help patients become and remain healthy, it is still far from obvious how to do this. Managing all these markedly divergent customer needs will be a tremendous management challenge for whoever succeeds United’s reclusive (and very effective) 70 year old Chairman Stephen Hemsley.

What Does Society Get from this Vast Enterprise?

However, as Peter Drucker told a different generation of business giants, businesses are not entities unto themselves, accountable only to shareholders and customers. They are organs of society, and are expected to create social value. Americans are suspicious of vast enterprises, as businesses from Standard Oil, US Steel and ATT to Microsoft and Facebook have learned. As businesses grow and become more successful, public suspicion grows.

Private health insurers already face strident opposition from progressive Democrats, who believe that health coverage ought to be a public good, a right of citizenship provided publicly; in other words, that private health insurers have no business being in business. And large insurers like United also face intense opposition from hospitals and many physicians because they reduce their incomes and impose major administrative burdens upon them.

In the age of Twitter and TikTok, United is highly vulnerable to “event risks” that confirm the hostile narratives of the firm’s detractors that United is mainly about maximizing its own profits, not about improving the health of its subscribers or the communities it serves. It is not clear how many the tens of millions of United subscribers have warm and fuzzy feelings about their giant health insurer. Memories of the HMO backlash of the 1990’s reside in the firm’s corporate memory.

United has grown to its present immense scale largely without public knowledge. United has within its reach the capability of constraining overall health cost growth across dozens of metropolitan areas and regions, not merely cost growth for its own beneficiaries (roughly one in seven US citizens already get their health insurance through United). With its expanding digital health operations, it can deploy state of the art tools for helping United’s 50 million subscribers avoid illness and live healthier lives.

United also has the ability to damage the financial operations of beloved local hospitals and deny coverage to families, raising their out of pocket expenses. How United frames and defends its social mission and how it manages all the delicate and increasingly fraught customer relationships will determine its future, and in important ways, ours as well.

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Questioning the value of the “medical mall”

Posted on by • Posted in Consumer Experience, Consumer Focus, Consumer Preferences, Consumerism, Medical Malls, Strategy, Value Proposition • Leave a comment

https://mailchi.mp/6f4bb5a2183a/the-weekly-gist-march-24-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

The concept of the “medical mall” is not new. Health systems and physician groups have long looked to build larger outpatient facilities that include several physician specialties, diagnostics, and outpatient procedure all under one roof—sometimes even converting defunct shopping malls. But recently some providers have questioned whether this “one stop shop” approach is delivering the value expected.

One CFO shared, the cost to build and operate these large facilities can be daunting: “we had two of these in our capital plan, but the real estate and construction costs are enormous. Given where margins are this year, we just couldn’t justify them.” 
 
Others have also questioned whether their medical malls provide the value they anticipated. Another leader noted that “it seemed to make sense to put 15 primary care docs under one roof, which let us co-locate a host of other services. But patients told us they’d rather have primary care close to home. And a more distributed ‘low-key’ footprint might have been cheaper.” He also mentioned their operations fell short of the vision: “just because we have primary care and CT under one roof, doesn’t mean we can get a patient on the scanner right after their appointment.”

A physician group with two medical malls found that while they expected the vision to appeal to busy, commercially-insured patients, “it turned out that people with transportation issues or a lot of chronic conditions were the ones who chose to go there…it ended up being primarily a public-pay population, and we can’t support the cost.”

Consumers have rejected shopping malls for more distributed and technology-driven retail options. Given the cost of the medical mall, it’s worth considering whether they’ll apply the same logic to healthcare. 

Questioning the value of the integrated delivery system

Posted on by • Posted in Business Model, Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Integrated Delivery System, Value Based Care Model, Value Journey, Value Proposition, Value-Based Healthcare • Leave a comment

https://mailchi.mp/175f8e6507d2/the-weekly-gist-march-3-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

During one of our regular check-ins with a health system CEO this week, the conversation took a turn for the existential. Lamenting the difficult economic situation in the industry, the continued shift of care to ambulatory disruptors, and the mounting pressure to dial back money-losing services, he shared that he was starting to question the fundamental business model. 

“Many years ago, we set out to become an integrated delivery system. But I’m not sure we’ve succeeded at any of those things: we’re not integrated enough, we don’t act like a system, and we don’t seem to be delivering the kind of care consumers want.” A stark admission, but one that could apply to many large health systems across the industry.

In theory, those three “legs of the stool” should create a virtuous flywheel: greater integration across the care continuum (perhaps in a risk-bearing model, but not necessarily) ought to allow systems to deliver quality care at the right place, right time. And a system-oriented approach ought to allow for efficiencies and cost-savings that enable care to be delivered at lower cost to patients.

Instead, the three components often create a vicious spiral: care that’s not coordinated across an integrated continuum, with little success at leveraging system-level efficiencies, resulting in unnecessary, duplicative, and variable-quality care delivery at excessive cost.

Capturing the value of integrated delivery systems will ultimately require hard work, and not just lip service, on all three pieces. Meanwhile, scaling a broken model will only exacerbate the problems of organizations that are neither integrated, nor systemic, nor delivering care that is high value.

JPMorgan wants to bring back 60-minute doctor’s appointments

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The demise of Haven — a coalition of three big employers aiming to lower the cost of healthcare for their workers — was met with a surprising reaction from Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase: “We want to do this again.” 

A Dec. 6 report from Bloomberg details some of the aftermath of Haven’s end and also the origins of Morgan Health, the bank’s second go at lowering healthcare costs that was rolled out in spring 2021. While still in its early stages, one tenet of its strategy is a return to basics, including appointments between clinicians and patients that take at least 30 minutes if not an hour.  

Haven was the healthcare partnership formed in 2018 by Amazon, JPMorgan Chase and Berkshire Hathaway with an aim to lower healthcare costs for their 1.2 million workers. It disbanded in 2021. As its end neared, Mr. Dimon set out to learn what had gone wrong. 

When he asked the question of Bill Wulf, MD, CEO of Central Ohio Primary Care, the internist told the businessman the initiative had moved too slowly. A virtual care program drew in only 150 people in Ohio, for example, before it was scrapped. 

Shortly after the debrief with Dr. Wulf, Mr. Dimon assigned a lieutenant to restart the work on lowering employer healthcare costs, this time focusing on JPMorgan Chase alone. That leader was Peter Scher, vice chairman with the bank, who had his doubts at first. “There are a lot of things we could be spending our time on,” he told Bloomberg. “I was perfectly prepared to go back to Jamie and the operating committee and say, ‘Listen, it was a good try.'” 

Mr. Scher stuck with it and brought on Dan Mendelson, founder and former CEO of healthcare advisory group Avalere Health, to lay the groundwork for JPMorgan’s second healthcare attempt. Mr. Mendelson, who had been a skeptic of Haven, spent three months crafting a strategy and playbook that recognized where Haven had fallen short and avoided repeated mistakes. He signed on to lead the group, dubbed Morgan Health. 

The group has made more headlines since its launch than its predecessor Haven, which premiered with much bravado but went nearly a year without releasing any news except for its name and a new website. In fall 2022, Morgan Health opened three advanced primary care centers in Ohio for a total of five and formed a healthcare venture capital team targeting early- to later-stage healthcare companies with innovations in areas like genetic medicine, autoimmune diseases, cardiometabolic diseases and rare disorders. It also hired Cheryl Pegus, MD, Walmart’s executive vice president of health and wellness, as a managing director.

Morgan Health’s strategy is marked by what appears to be common sense and a return to basics, including the placement of clinics in office building atriums — “a full-service practice where employees can develop long-term relationships with primary-care providers, wellness coaches, mental health providers and care coordinators.” 

All appointments are booked for at least 30 minutes with many going an hour, according to Bloomberg. Patients generally see the same practitioner for each visit to build long-term relationships. Clinicians’ payments are tied to goals like avoiding emergency room visits, providing cancer screenings and keeping high blood pressure in check. If it plays out as designed, JPMorgan says the investment in prevention and primary care will curb high-cost services and hospital stays, ultimately leading to meaningful savings.

The goal is to “​​identify high-risk patients and then bubble-wrap them,” Dr. Wulf told Ohio business leaders in an October meeting, Bloomberg reports. “How do we keep you out of the hospital?”

JPMorgan has opened five clinics in the area of Columbus, Ohio, which will also be open to other employers who want to sign on. The clinics and primary care centers are managed and staffed by Vera Whole Health and Central Ohio Primary Care. JPMorgan is seeking “like-minded” medical groups in markets like New York, Chicago and Dallas where it has hubs of workers, Bloomberg reports. 

In Defense of Value: A Response to Ken Kaufman

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In an Oct. 5, 2022, commentary, Ken Kaufman offers a full-throated and heartfelt defense of non-profit healthcare during a time of significant financial hardship. Ken describes 2022 as “the worst financial year for hospitals in memory.” His concern is legitimate. The foundations of the nonprofit healthcare business model appear to be collapsing. I’ve known and worked with Ken Kaufman for decades. He is the life force behind Kaufman Hall, a premier financial and strategic advisor to nonprofit hospitals and health systems. The American Hospital Association uses Kaufman Hall’s analysis of hospitals’ underlying financial trends to support its plea for Congressional funding. Beyond the red ink, Ken laments the “media free-for-all challenging the tax-exempt status, financial practices, and ostensible market power of not-for-profit hospitals and health systems.” He is referring to three recent investigative reports on nonprofits’ skimpy levels of charity care (Wall Street Journal), aggressive collection tactics (New York Times) and 340B drug purchasing program abuses (New York Times). Ken has never been timid about expressing his opinions. He’s passionate, partisan and proud. His defense of nonprofit healthcare chronicles their selfless care of critically ill patients, the 24/7 demands on their resources and their commitment to treating the uninsured. These “must have clinical services…don’t just magically appear.” Nonprofit healthcare needs “our support and validation in the face of extreme economic conditions and organizational headwinds. ”Given his personality, it’s not surprising that Ken’s strident rhetoric in defending nonprofit healthcare reminds me of the famous “You can’t handle the truth” exchange between Lieutenant Kaffee (Tom Cruise) and Colonel Jessup (Jack Nicholson) from the 1992 movie “A Few Good Men.” Kaffee presses Jessup on whether he ordered a “code red” that led to the death of a soldier under his command. When Kaffee declares he’s entitled to the truth, Jessup erupts,… I have neither the time nor the inclination to explain myself to a man that rises and sleeps under the blanket of the very freedom I provide and then questions the manner in which I provide it. I would rather you say, “thank you” and be on your way. Should American society just say “thank you” to nonprofit healthcare and provide the massive incremental funding required to sustain their current operations?
Truth and Consequences
(Download PDF here)The social theorist Thomas Sowell astutely observed, “If you want to help someone, tell them the truth. If you want to help yourself, tell them what they want to hear.” In this commentary, Ken Kaufman is telling nonprofit healthcare exactly what they want to hear. The truth is more nuanced, troubling and inconvenient. Healthcare now consumes 20 percent of the national economy and the American people are sicker than ever. Despite the high healthcare funding levels, the CDC recently reported in U.S. life expectancy dropped almost a full year in 2021. Other wealthy nations experienced increases in life expectancy. Combining 2020 and 2021, the 2.7-year drop in U.S. life expectancy is the largest since the early 1920s. During an interview regarding the September 28, 2022, White House Conference on Hunger, Nutrition and Health, Senator Cory Booker highlighted two facts that capture America’s healthcare dilemma. One in three government dollars funds healthcare expenditure. Half of Americans suffer from diabetes or pre-diabetes.As a nation, we’re chasing our tail by prioritizing treatment over prevention. Particularly in low-income rural and urban communities, there is a breathtaking lack of vital primary care, disease management and mental health services. Instead of preventing disease, our healthcare system has become adept at keeping sick people alive with a diminished life quality. There is plenty of money in the system to amputate a foot but little to manage the diabetes that necessitates the amputation. Despite mission statements to the contrary, nonprofit healthcare follows the money. The only meaningful difference between nonprofit and for-profit healthcare is tax status. Each seeks to maximize treatment revenues by manipulating complex payment formularies and using market leverage to negotiate higher commercial payment rates. According to Grandview Research, the market for revenue cycle management in 2022 is $140.4 billion and forecasted to grow at a 10% annual rate through 2030. By contrast, Ibis World forecasts the U.S. automobile market to grow 2.6% in 2022 to reach $100.9 billion. Unbelievably, in today’s America, processing medical claims is far more lucrative than manufacturing and selling cars and trucks. According to CMS’s National Expenditure Report for 2020, hospitals (31%) and physicians and clinical services (20%) accounted for over half of national healthcare expenditures. This included $175 billion allocated to providers through the CARES Act. Despite the massive waste embedded within healthcare delivery, the CARES Act funding gave providers the illusion that America would continue to fund its profligate and often ineffective operations. It’s not at all surprising that healthcare providers now want, even expect, more emergency funding. Change is hard. Not even during COVID did providers give up their insistence on volume-based payment. Providers did not embrace proven virtual care and hospital-at-home business practices until CMS guaranteed equivalent payment to existing in-hospital/clinic service provision. Even with parity payment and the massive CARES Act funding, there was uneven care access for COVID patients. Particularly in low-income communities, tens of thousands died because they did not receive appropriate care. More of the same approach to healthcare delivery will yield more of the same dismal results. Healthcare providers have had over a decade to advance value-based care (VBC). I define VBC as the right care at the right time in the right place at the right price. Instead of pursuing VBC, providers have doubled-down on volume-driven business models that attract higher-paying commercially-insured patients. Despite the relative ease of migrating service provision to lower-cost settings, providers insist on operating high-cost, centralized delivery models (think hospitals). They want society, writ large, to continue paying premium prices for routine care. It’s time to stop. As a country, we need less healthcare and more health.
A Fourth Question
(Download PDF here)

When I give speeches to healthcare audiences, I typically begin with three yes-or-no questions about U.S. healthcare to establish the foundation for my subsequent observations. Here they are. Question #1: The U.S. spends 20% of its economy on healthcare. The big country with the next highest percentage spend is France at 12%. How many believe we need to spend more than 20% of our economy to provide great healthcare to everyone in the country? No one ever raises their hand. Question #2: The CDC estimates that 90% of healthcare expenditure goes to treat individuals with chronic disease and mental health conditions. How many believe we’re winning the war against chronic disease and mental health conditions? No one ever raises their hand. Question #3: Given the answer to the previous two questions, how many believe the system needs to shift resources from acute and specialty care into health promotion, primary care, chronic disease management and behavioral health? Everyone raises their hands. This short exercise is quite revealing. It demonstrates that healthcare doesn’t have a funding problem. It has a distribution problem. It also demonstrates that providers aren’t adequately addressing our most critical healthcare challenge, exploding chronic disease and mental health conditions. Finally, the industry needs major restructuring.

The real questions about reforming healthcare are less about what to reform and more about how to undertake reform. The increasing media scrutiny that Ken Kaufman references as well as growing consumer frustrations with healthcare service provision, demonstrate that healthcare is losing the battle for America’s hearts and minds.

Markets are unforgiving. The operating losses most nonprofit providers are experiencing reflect a harsh reality. Their current business models are not sustainable. An economic reckoning is underway. The long arc of economics points toward value. As healthcare deconstructs, the nation’s acute care footprint will shrink, hospitals will close and value-based care delivery will advance. The process will be messy.

The devolving healthcare marketplace led me to ask a fourth question recently in Nashville during a keynote speech to the Council of Pharmacy Executives and Suppliers. Here it is. Question #4: As the healthcare system reforms, will that process be evolutionary (reflecting incremental change) or revolutionary (reflecting fundamental change). Two-thirds voted that the change would be revolutionary. That response is just one data point but it reflects why post-COVID healthcare reform is different than the reform efforts that have preceded it. The costs of maintaining status-quo healthcare are simply too high. From a policy perspective, either market-driven healthcare reforms will drive better outcomes at lower costs (that’s my hope) or America will shift to a government-managed healthcare system like those in Germany, France and Japan.

Like Ken Kaufman, I admire frontline healthcare workers and believe we need to make their vital work less burdensome. I also sympathize with health system executives who are struggling to overcome legacy business practices and massive operating deficits. Unfortunately, most are relying on revenue-maximizing playbooks rather than reconfiguring their operations to advance consumerism and value-based care delivery.

Unlike Ken Kaufman, I believe it’s time for some tough love with nonprofit healthcare providers. Payers must tie new incremental funding to concrete movement into value-based care delivery. This was the argument Zeke Emanuel, Merrill Goozner and I made in a two-part commentary (part 1; part 2) in Health Affairs earlier this year. It’s also why the HFMA, where I serve on the Board, has made “cost effectiveness of health (CEoH)” its new operating mantra.

While this truth may be hard, it also is liberating. Freeing nonprofit organizations from their attachment to perverse payment incentives can create the impetus to embrace consumerism and value. Kinder, smarter and affordable care for all Americans will follow.

Debating the best way to Chase Commercial Market Share

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Cross-subsidy economics are increasingly challenged for America’s hospitals. Aging Baby Boomers are moving from commercial insurance to Medicare, decreasing the share of patients with lucrative private coverage, and insurers are increasingly reticent to provide the rate increases providers need to make up for the worsening mix.

At a recent executive retreat, one health system debated the best strategies to increase their capture of commercial volume. Most of the conversation focused on traditional market-based tactics to increase access and awareness in fast-growing, higher income areas of their service region.

For instance, the system’s chief marketing officer was pushing to increase advertising in the rapidly expanding suburbs, and advocated building ambulatory surgery centers in a wealthy area of town with a boom of new home construction. 
 
The chief strategy officer shared a different perspective, supporting an employer-focused strategy. His logic: “In most businesses, the CEO and the janitor have the same benefit plans. If we only focus on the wealthy parts of town, we’re missing a big portion of the workers with good insurance.” He advocated for a new round of direct-to-employer contracting outreach, hoping to steer workers to high-value primary and specialty care solutions.

In reality, any system looking to move commercial share will need to do both—but even the best playbook for building commercial volume is unlikely to close the growing cross-subsidy gap. To maintain profitability in the long term, health systems must reduce costs for managing Medicare patients by delivering lower-cost care in lower-cost settings, with lower-cost staff.    

Bear Market for recent Digital Health IPOs cautions investors

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COVID fueled a record year for digital healthcare venture funding in 2021, which included 85 digital health startups achieving “unicorn” status with $1B+ valuations. But 2022 has been marked by cooling expectations amid inflation concerns and recession fears. 

In the graphic above, we’ve tracked the stock market performances of six recent healthcare IPOs across their opening, peak, and latest months. While not all of them are pure digital health plays, each of these companies promotes its digital solutions or tech-enabled patient platforms as key parts of their value propositions. 

Since going public, each company has lost between 50 and 90 percent of its initial value, more than double the S&P 500’s roughly 20 percent drop from its January 2022 peak to today’s level. The bear market has influenced the venture funding world as well, as H1 2022 fundraising totals for digital health have dropped from last year’s record-setting pace, though they may still surpass 2020 levels by year end. 

After the initial fervor, this market correction among “healthtech” companies is not surprising, and acquisitions—like Amazon’s purchase of One Medical—are likely to continue, as long as these market trends hold. 

The questions every investor should now be asking: does this start-up have a viable path to profitability in the US healthcare market, and does it deliver meaningful value to consumers? 

How other industry players are expanding their healthcare platforms  

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Last week, we introduced our framework for value delivery as a “healthcare platform”, in which an organization’s proximity to both the consumer and to the premium dollar determines how it competes as a “care supplier,” a “care ecosystem,” a “premium owner,” or a “population manager.” Traditionally, different healthcare companies have operated primarily in one of these four domains. However, as shown in the graphic below, we’ve recently seen many shift their business into one or more additional quadrants, as they seek to expand their value propositions. UnitedHealth Group is an obvious example: it has moved well beyond the traditional insurance business, via numerous provider and care delivery acquisitions across the continuum.

Other players have shifted from their own “pure play” positions toward more comprehensive “platform” strategies as well: One Medical adding Iora Health to enhance population health capabilities; Walmart moving beyond retail and pharmacy services, partnering with Oak Street Health to expand its ability to manage Medicare patients; Amazon getting into the employer health business. 

There’s a clear pattern emerging—value propositions are converging on a “strategic high ground” that encompasses all four dimensions of platform value, creating a comprehensive set of solutions to deliver accessible care, promote health, and grow consumer loyalty, with an aligned financial model centered on managing the total cost of care. Health systems looking to build platform strategies will find many of these competitors also vying for pride of place as the “platform of choice” for healthcare consumers and purchasers.