Tag Archives: Insurance

Cigna’s $3.5 Billion Bet Tightens Its Grip on Specialty Drugs

Posted on by • Posted in Uncategorized • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/cignas-35-billion-bet-tightens-its?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=172880641&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

Evernorth’s new latest investment in Shields Health Solutions ties its parent company, Cigna, even closer to hospitals and the fast-growing specialty drug market.

Regular readers will know that we’ve harped on UnitedHealth Group’s vertical integration into care delivery, pharmacy benefits and nearly every other corner of the health care landscape. But UnitedHealth isn’t the only company guilty of vertical integration: Cigna is playing the same game.

This week, Cigna’s health services arm, Evernorth, announced a $3.5 billion investment into Shields Health Solutions, a fast-growing specialty pharmacy company.

Shields partners with more than 80 health systems and over 1,000 hospitals and clinics across nearly all 50 states. That reach gives Cigna another way to weave itself into the daily operations of hospitals – and the lives of millions of patients.

From insurer to health services conglomerate

When I was an executive at Cigna, the company was primarily what’s known as a third-party administrator. We sold some health and group life policies as an insurer, but our bread-and-butter was administering health benefits for large employers. Our “value proposition” back then was keeping costs under control — at least as we defined them. Evernorth didn’t exist. At the time, to me, the idea that Cigna would one day be pouring billions into specialty pharmacies and drug distributors would have seemed far-fetched.    

In 2018, though, Cigna bought the huge pharmacy benefit manager Express Scripts. And soon after that, it created Evernorth to oversee its non-insurance health services operations, not only its PBM but also specialty pharmacies, and now investments like Shields. Cigna is no longer just deciding what care to cover, but it’s increasingly involved in how drugs are dispensed and priced. In fact, the company now gets the great majority of its revenues from the pharmacy business. Of the $195 billion in revenues Cigna took in last year, $154 billion came from Evernorth. 

The same old consolidation story

According to Reuters, Evernorth’s investment in Shields was structured as preferred stock and, according to the company, won’t affect its 2025 profit forecast. But make no mistake: This is part of the same playbook we’ve seen before from companies Americans have been led to believe are primarily insurers.

UnitedHealth buys physician practices, rehab centers, and home health companies. CVS Health owns Aetna, the PBM Caremark, and a sprawling pharmacy business. Cigna, for its part, is also planting stakes across the drug supply chain. In addition to Express Scripts, it also owns Accredo, one of the nation’s largest specialty pharmacies, and now Shields.

Cigna CEO David Cordani, who I once worked with during my time at Cigna, framed the deal as a way to “deliver exceptional care across healthcare settings – from home to physician’s office or clinic, to hospital”. In a statement on Evernoth’s website, Cordani said: 

“Demand for specialty medications continues to grow at an accelerated pace, and Evernorth is uniquely positioned to serve the rapidly expanding number of individuals living with complex and chronic conditions and the doctors who care for them.”

Specialty medications, as Cordani mentioned, are among the fastest-growing and most expensive parts of the pharmaceutical market and include medications for cancer, multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis and other complex and chronic conditions. Research indicates that spending on specialty drugs will make up more than half of all U.S. drug spending in the coming years.

That’s why Evernorth already owns Accredo. Now, by getting into bed with Shields, Evernorth is tying itself even closer to the hospitals and health systems that rely on specialty pharmacies to serve patients.

What can be done about it?

When insurers buy into the businesses that are supposed to compete for contracts (like pharmacies and physician practices) it gives the insurer almost all the cards because they are able to both set the rules of the game and profit from it. Competition suffers, and costs for patients and employers can rise.

Fortunately, Washington is starting to wise up to these tactics. The Patients Over Profits Act, soon to be introduced by Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Oregon) and Rep. Val Hoyle (D-Oregon), would prevent insurers from owning most doctors offices and medical providers. In addition, The Patients Before Monopolies Act, introduced by Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Massachusetts) and Josh Hawley (R-Missouri), prevents pharmacy benefit managers and/or health insurers from owning pharmacies. Given a divided Congress, these bills wont be easy to pass, but seeing strange bedfellows like Warren and Hawley taking the lead brings me great hope. 

I saw firsthand during my years inside Cigna how Wall Street’s pressure for constant growth drives these decisions. Insurers and their shareholders aren’t satisfied with premiums alone. They want to control the entire pipeline — from the doctor’s prescription pad to patients’ wallets.

So the next time you hear about vertical integration in health care, don’t just think about UnitedHealth Group. Remember that Cigna is moving just as aggressively. With this latest $3.5 billion bet, it’s clear that the insurer I once worked for has transformed into something much larger — and far concerning — than the insurance company most folks believe it to be.

Is Health Insurer Criticism Justified?

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, ACA, ACA Premiums, Access & Quality of Healthcare, Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Insurance Denial, Health Insurance Industry, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, Medicare Advantage, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Model, Profit Motive, Underinsured, Uninsured • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
Is Health Insurer Criticism Justified?

Since the murder of UnitedHealth executive Brian Thompson in New York City December 4, 2024, attention to health insurers has heightened. National media coverage has been brutal. Polls have chronicled the public’s disdain for rising premiums and increased denials. Hospitals and physicians have amped-up campaigns against prior authorization and inadequate reimbursement. For many health insurers, no news is a good news day. Here’s ChatGPT’s reply to how insurers are depicted:

“Media coverage of US health insurers focuses heavily on the challenges consumers face due to high costs, coverage denials, and complicated policies, often portraying insurers as profit-driven entities that hinder care access. Investigations reveal insurers using technology to deny claims and push for denials during prior authorization, while other reports highlight market concentration and the increasing influence of large companies like UnitedHealth Group and Centene. Media also covers the marketing efforts of insurers, particularly for Medicare Advantage plans, and public frustration with the industry. “

In some ways, it’s understandable. Insurance, by definition, is a bet, especially in healthcare. Private policyholders—individuals and employers– bet the premiums they pay pooled with others will cover the cost of a condition or accident that requires medical care. In the 1960’s, federal and state government made the same bet on behalf of seniors (Medicare) and lower-income or disabled kids and adults (Medicaid). But they’re bets.

But the rub is this: what healthcare products and services costs and their prices are hard to predict and closely-guarded secrets in an industry that declares itself the world’s best. Claims data—one source of tracking utilization—is nearly impossible to access even for employers who cover the majority of U.S. population (56%).

Spending for U.S. healthcare is forecast to increase 54% through 2033 from $5.6 trillion to $8.6 trillion— the result of higher costs for prescription drugs and hospital stays, medical inflation, technology, increased utilization (demand) and administrative costs (overhead). Insurers negotiate rates for these, add their margin and pass them thru to their customers—individuals, employers and government agencies. It’s all done behind the scenes.

The public’s working knowledge of how the health system operates, how it performs and what key players in the ecosystem do is negligible. For most, personal experience with the system is their context. We understand our personal healthiness if so inclined or fortunate to have a continuous primary care relationship. We understand our medications if they solve a problem or don’t. We understand our hospitals if we or a family member use them or occasionally visit, and we understand our insurance when we enroll choosing from affordable options that include the doctors and hospitals we like and when we’re denied services or billed for what insurance doesn’t cover.

Today, corporate names like UnitedHealth Group, Humana, Cigna, Elevance, CVS Aetna and Centene are the health insurance industry’s big brands, corralling more than 60% of the industry’s private and government enrollment with the rest divided among 1,149 smaller players. Today, the public’s perception of health insurers is negative: most consider insurance a necessary evil with data showing it’s no guarantee against financial ruin. Today, it’s an expensive employee benefit for employers who are looking for alternative options for workforce stability. And only 56% of enrollees trust their health insurer to do what’s best for them.

Ours is a flawed system that’s not sustainable: insurers are part of that problem.  It’s premised on dependence: patients depend on providers to define their diagnosis and deliver the treatments/therapeutics and enrollees depend on insurers to handle the logistics of how much they get paid and when. At the point of service, patients pay co-pays and after the fact, get an “explanation of benefits” along with additional out of pocket obligations. Hospitals and physicians fight insurers about what’s reasonable and customary compensation, and patients unable to out-of-pocket obligations are handed off to “revenue cycle specialists” for collection. Wow. Great system! Mark it up, pass it thru and let the chips fall where they may—all under the presumed oversight of state insurance commissioners who are tasked to protect the public’s interests.

Do insurers deserve the animosity they’re facing from employers, hospitals, physicians and their enrollees?  Yes, but certainly some more than others. Facts are facts:

  • Since 2020, health insurance premium costs have increased 2-4 times faster than household necessities and wages for the average household. Affordability is an issue.
  • Denials have increased.
  • Enrollee trust and satisfaction with insurers has plummeted.
  • And industry profits since 2023 have taken a hit due to post-pandemic pent-up demand, pricey drugs including in-demand GLP-1’s for obesity and increased negotiation leverage by consolidated health systems.

Most Americans think not having health insurance is a bigger risk than going without. But most also think healthcare is fundamental right and the government should guarantee access through universal coverage.

Having private insurance is not the issue: having insurance that ensures access to doctors and hospitals when needed reliably and affordably is their unmet need.

In the weeks ahead, employers will update their employee health benefits options for next year while facing 9-15% higher costs for their coverage. States will decide how they’ll implement work requirements in their Medicaid programs and assess the extent of lost coverage for millions. Insurers who sponsor market place plans suspended by the Big Beautiful Bill will raise their individual premiums hikes 20-70% for the 16 million who are losing their subsidies.

Medicare Advantage (Medicare Part C) insurers will skinny-down the supplements in their offerings and raise premiums alongside Part D increases, And, every insurer will inventory markets served and product portfolio profitability to determine investment opportunities or exit strategies. That’s the calculus every insurer applies every year, adjusting as conditions dictate.

Most private insurers pay little attention to the 8% of Americans who have no coverage; those inclined tend to be smaller community-based plans often associated with hospitals or provider organizations.

Most are concerned about continuity of care for their enrollees: they know 12% had a lapse in their coverage last year, 23% are under-insured and 43% missed a scheduled appointment or treatment due to out-of-pocket costs involved.

And all are concerned about the long-term financial viability of the entire health insurance sector: margins have plummeted since 2020 from 3.1% to 0.8%%, medical loss ratio’s have increased from 98.2% in 2023 to 100.1% last year, premiums increase grew 5.9% while hospital and medical expenses grew $8.9% and so on. The bigger players have residual capital to diversify and grow; others don’t.

Criticism of the health insurance industry is justified for the most part but the rest of the story is key. The U.S. system is broken and everyone knows it. But health insurers are not alone in bearing responsibility for its failure though their role is significant.

The urgent need is for a roadmap to a system of health where the healthiness and well-being of the entire population is true north to its ambition. It’s a system that’s comprehensive, connected, cost-effective and affordable. Protecting turf between sectors, blame and shame rhetoric and perpetuation of public ignorance are non-starters.

PS: Two important events last week weigh heavily on U.S. healthcare’s future:

In Verona, WI, the Epic User Group Meeting showcased the company’s plans for AI featuring 3 new generative AI tools — Emmie for patients, Art for clinicians and Penny for revenue cycle management. Per KLAS, the private company grew its market share to 42% of acute care hospitals and 55% of acute care beds at the end of 2024.

In Jackson Hole, WY, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s annual economic symposium where Fed Chair Jay Powell signaled a likely interest rate cut in its September 16-17 meeting and changes to how the central bank will assess employment status going forward.

Healthcare is labor intense, capital intense and 26% of federal spending in the FY 2026 proposed budget. The Fed through its monetary policies has the power and obligation to foster economic stability. Epic is one of a handful of companies that has the potential to transform the U.S. health system.  Transformation of the health system is essential to its sustainability and necessary to the U.S. economic stability since healthcare is 18% of the country’s GDP and its biggest private employer.

Medicare Advantage plans pay physicians less than original Medicare

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, Medicare Advantage, Medicare Reimbursement, Physician Compensation, Physician Fee Schedule • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment

https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/medicare-advantage-plans-pay-physicians-less-original-medicare

MA pays 10% to 15% less than what is paid by the government in original Medicare, report says.

A new study confirms what the American Medical Association and other medical groups have long been saying about physician pay: Medicare reimbursement is not keeping up with inflation.

In original Medicare, doctors are paid one-third less than a decade ago, the report said. Medicare reimbursement rates for outpatient procedures have decreased every year since 2016, for an overall decline of 10%.

Over the same period, inflation has risen by almost 30%, according to the report.

The report also sheds light on Medicare Advantage reimbursement. Medicare Advantage plans pay physicians an estimated 10% to 15% less than what is paid by the government in traditional Medicare, according to the 2025 Omniscient Health Physician Medicare Income Report. 

This can create negative margins for physicians considering MA plans take roughly twice as long to reimburse providers compared to original Medicare along with factoring in prior authorization and denials, the report said. 

An estimated 54% of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in a MA plan.

WHY THIS MATTERS

The MA reimbursement gap is driving shifts in network participation. A 2024 survey by the Healthcare Financial Management Association found that 19% of health systems have stopped accepting at least one MA plan, with another 61% planning to do so or actively considering it, according to the Omniscient report.

“Despite the rising demand for care from an aging U.S. population, the financial strain is forcing physicians to rethink whether they will continue serving Medicare patients,” said Meade Monger, CEO of Omniscient Health, a healthcare data science company. “High-volume Medicare practices, especially those in primary care and rural areas, are increasingly unable to sustain operations under current revenue structures.”

The federal government’s push toward streamlining and speeding up the prior authorization process and requiring an electronic process over paper represents improvement, the report said. Some insurers have announced plans to decrease the number of procedures that require prior auth.

But payment rates need to change, said Omniscient, which recommends policymakers index Medicare reimbursement rates to inflation and set payment standards for MA plans. 

THE LARGER TREND

On Tuesday, the American Medical Association released what it called flawed proposals in the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ physician payment rule released in July.

Despite getting a 3.6% payment boost after five consecutive years of cuts, physician pay, after adjusting for practice-cost inflation, has plummeted since 2001, the AMA said.

The proposed 2026 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule includes a 2.5% cut in work relative-value units (RVUs, which measure a physician’s time, technical skill, mental effort, decision-making and stress) and physician intraservice time for most services, the AMA said. This reduction would affect 95% of the services that doctors provide. 

The cut is based on an assumption of greater efficiency and less time involved for each service, an assumption that is not grounded in new data or physician input, the AMA said. 

CMS also proposes a reduction in practice-expense RVUs, which are the costs of running a practice, such as staff, equipment, supplies, utilities and overhead.

The bottom line, the AMA said, is that physician payment for services performed in a facility will drop overall by 7%.

CMS is accepting comments on its proposed rule until Sept. 12.

The ACA Subsidy Expiration Will Hit Millions Hard

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, ACA, ACA Premiums, Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, Underinsured, Uninsured • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/the-aca-subsidy-expiration-will-hit?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=170756440&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

When Congress passed pandemic-era enhancements to Affordable Care Act (ACA) premium subsidies in 2021, it wasn’t just a policy tweak — it was a lifeline. But unless lawmakers act, those subsidies will vanish on January 1, 2026.

According to KFF, the average ACA enrollee could see premiums spike 75% overnight. For many, that will mean a choice between things like their health coverage and rent or food. The Congressional Budget Office estimates more than 4.2 million people could lose coverage over the next decade as a result. Below is where the expired subsidies will hurt the hardest:

1. Young adults… and their parents’ wallets

Young people who’ve aged out of their parents’ plans and buy coverage through the ACA marketplaces will see some of the steepest jumps. 

If they decide to forgo coverage, as KFF Health News warns: The so-called “‘insurance cliff’ at age 26 can send young adults tumbling into being uninsured.” 

The parents and families of these young adults could be left scrambling to cover unexpected medical bills — the kind that can derail a family’s finances for years.

2. Main street entrepreneurs

The ACA is the only real option for many small-business owners, freelancers and gig workers. These are the folks that conservatives say we should encourage to build and grow their own businesses who make up the backbone of Main Street. Losing the enhanced subsidies means many will face premiums hundreds of dollars higher per month. Some will be forced to close shop and turn to jobs at out-of-town corporations flush enough to afford to offer subsidized coverage to their workers, a direct hit to local economies.

3. States already in crisis

States aren’t in a position to plug the gap. Politico reports that California, Colorado, Maryland, Washington, and others are scrambling to soften the blow, but even the most ambitious state-level plans can’t replace hundreds of millions in lost federal funding.

And this comes right after Medicaid cuts in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act that will hit hospitals, clinics and low-income communities. In Washington state alone, officials expect premiums to jump 75% when the subsidies expire, with one in four marketplace enrollees dropping coverage. That means more uninsured patients showing up in ERs, less preventive care, and more strain on already struggling rural hospitals.

4. (Already) disappearing alternatives to Big Insurance

The ACA marketplaces aren’t just a safety net for individuals but also home to smaller non-profit and regional health plans that give Americans an alternative to the “Big 7” Wall Street-run insurance conglomerates. These community-rooted plans are already facing financial headwinds from shrinking enrollment and Medicaid funding cuts. When premiums spike in 2026, many could lose enough members to be forced out of the market entirely.

And here’s the real danger: The Big 7 can weather this storm. Their huge market capitalizations, government contracts, pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) divisions and sprawling care delivery businesses give them insulation from ACA marketplace losses. In fact, they may see this as an opportunity to buy up the smaller competitors that fail, which would further consolidate their dominance over our health care system. Or they could just decide to flee the ACA marketplace entirely because the population will skewer sicker and older, creating a death spiral that the big insurers will not want to touch. What little consumer choice exists outside the big corporate insurers could vanish, and even that could disappear.

5. <65 year olds

Perhaps the most vulnerable group will be Americans in their 50s and early 60s who lose their jobs or retire early (often not by choice) and find themselves too young for Medicare but facing incredibly high premiums on the individual market. Under ACA rules, insurers can charge older enrollees up to three times more than younger adults for the same coverage. The enhanced subsidies have been the only thing keeping many of these premiums within reach.

Take those subsidies away, and a 60-year-old who loses employer coverage could see their monthly premium shoot into four figures. For those living off severance, savings or reduced income, choosing to gamble with their health and wait it out until 65 may be the only option.

Congress knows the stakes. Will they act?

Making the subsidies permanent would cost $383 billion over 10 years, which would be a political hurdle for a Congress intent on deep budget cuts. But the cost of inaction is far higher, both in human and economic terms. These subsidies have kept coverage affordable for millions, fueled small business growth, and stabilized state health systems during one of the most turbulent economic periods in recent memory. Without them, the hit to many folks could be a Frazier-level K.O.

But let’s face it — what I’m advocating for isn’t perfect either. The prospect of extending these subsidies raises a question: Should taxpayers be footing the bill for health insurance premiums when insurance corporations are reporting tens of billions in annual profits and paying hefty dividends to shareholders?

The short answer, for now, unfortunately, is yes. Because this is the deck we’ve been dealt and we can’t let Americans fall into medical debt, lose their homes – or their lives. Extending the ACA subsidies is not pretty. But for Americans, it’s just a bob and weave.

Self-dealing: Illegal in Most Industries, Rampant in Health Insurance

Posted on by • Posted in Health Insurance Industry, Monopoly, Monopoly Behavior, Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), Profit Margin, Profit Model, Profit Motive, Self Dealing • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/self-dealing-illegal-in-most-industries?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=171376851&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

Self-dealing is illegal in banks, real estate, and investment firms, but in health insurance, it’s not only legal, it’s widespread. Large insurers have spent decades consolidating the U.S. health care system, acquiring medical practices, pharmacies, and pharmacy benefit managers, all while sidestepping rules meant to protect patients and taxpayers.

For example, UnitedHealth Group has 2,694 subsidiaries, as documented in the Center for Health and Democracy’s Sunlight Report on UnitedHealth Group. Within this conglomerate, there are 589 clinician practice locations across 32 states acquired between 2007 and 2023. UnitedHealth Group also has 24 subsidiary pharmacy benefit managers and over 30 subsidiary pharmacies. Data and insider accounts suggest that UnitedHealth Group and other vertically integrated insurers engage in self-dealing to increase profits. The ways these subsidiaries interact closely resembles self-dealing practices that are prohibited by law in other industries, such as banking, real estate, and investment firms.

As Dr. Seth Glickman and I have explained in earlier pieces, when a health insurer owns or controls medical practices, pharmacy benefit managers, or pharmacies, it can circumvent medical loss ratio (MLR) regulations. MLR rules require insurance companies to spend 80–85% of premium dollars on medical costs, leaving the remainder for administrative fees and profits. Unitedhealth Group, for instance, reportedly pays its own subsidiary providers above-market rates for medical services. These payments count as “medical costs” under MLR rules, yet the subsidiaries retain the excess as profit. Similarly, when a patient uses Optum Rx, a UnitedHealth Group subsidiary, or a subsidiary pharmacy, the fees added by the PBM are counted as medical costs, even though they are retained as profit by the parent company.

In banking, such actions are expressly prohibited. Consider a bank CEO who owns a real estate development company and seeks a loan for a risky project. If the bank lends to the CEO’s company at a below-market interest rate, the loan violates federal law and could trigger millions in fines as well as civil and criminal charges for both the CEO and the bank. This scenario parallels UnitedHealth Group’s current operations. In both cases, customer money (depositor funds in a bank; premium dollars in insurance) is used to funnel profit to insiders or affiliates, bypassing the market discipline that governs arm’s-length transactions.

Real estate law similarly prohibits self-dealing. Imagine a real estate agent hired to sell a client’s home who secretly buys the property through an affiliate at a lower price than the market reflects. By underrepresenting the home’s value, the agent enriches themselves at the client’s expense. This violates state real estate laws and common law fiduciary duties. The parallel in Insurance is clear: insurers pay inflated prices to their owned practices, driving up care costs and premiums. In both cases, the fiduciary is using client assets (property or premium dollars) to generate hidden profits for themselves or their affiliates, avoiding fair-market competition.

Investment advisers are also prohibited from similar practices. If you hire a broker to get the best price for a stock trade, the broker cannot quietly route the trade to an affiliate at a worse price so the affiliate profits. Even small losses per trade scale into substantial gains for the broker’s affiliate, all at the client’s expense. These actions violate the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC rules when proper disclosure or consent is not obtained. Similarly, insurers use premium dollars to channel profits to subsidiaries instead of relying on competitive market pricing.

The stark parallels between self-dealing in banks, real estate, and investment brokerages, which Congress regulated decades ago, and health insurance are damning. Health insurance conglomerates have built empires on paying themselves to the detriment of patients and taxpayers. Congress must act to regulate this type of self-dealing in insurance as it does in other industries.

Moreover, the depth of insurer control over the patient care system necessitates regulations to prevent vertical monopolies, where insurers dominate every stage of care delivery.

As Americans Struggled, Health Insurers Made a Record-Breaking $71.3 Billion in Profits

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, Health Insurance Industry, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, High Premiums, High Prices, Monopoly, Monopoly Behavior, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Model, Profit Motive • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/as-americans-struggled-health-insurers?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=170288533&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

Ahead of my Congressional testimony last week before the Senate HELP committee, I compiled data on the profits, revenues and CEO compensations of big health insurers in 2024. The curiosity from senators on both sides of the aisle signaled, to me, that lawmakers are as interested as I’ve ever seen in the industry’s rampant profiteering.

What I found was that the seven biggest publicly traded health insurance companies collectively made $71.3 billion in profits, up more than half a billion dollars from 2023. All while millions of Americans continued to skip their medications, rationed insulin and delayed care due to insurers’ out-of-pocket demands.

Let’s break it down.

You won’t be surprised to learn that shareholders are not the only ones benefiting from the care-restricting barriers insurers have erected to boost profits. The CEOs of those seven companies took home a combined $146.1 million in 2024 compensation. That’s enough to cover annual premiums for thousands of American families.

Here’s what the top brass made:

Meanwhile, patients across the country report increasing out-of-pocket costs, more aggressive prior authorizations and narrower provider networks. But for these executives, the real measure of success is how high they can push their stock prices and not how many people can afford to see a doctor.

So, What’s Driving the Revenue Surge?

One word: Gouging.

Insurers continued to jack up premiums for their commercial customers and overcharge the government. Despite watchdog warnings, Uncle Sam continues to pour money into private Medicare Advantage plans even as audits and investigations uncover widespread fraud and upcoding. And Medicaid managed care is a gold mine, too. These insurers now dominate state Medicaid contracts and can quietly extract billions through behind-the-scenes ownership of pharmacies, PBMs and providers.

It’s not just health insurance anymore — it’s a monopolized empire.

All that said, to the dismay of shareholders, the big seven insurers have had to admit that so far in 2025, they’ve paid more medical claims than they had expected, which means their profits were down somewhat during the first months of the year. I’ll shed more light on that in a future post. No need for you to shed any tears for them, though, because we’re still talking billions and billions in profits.

So if you’re wondering why your premiums, deductibles and costs at the pharmacy counter keep going up — just look at those 2024 numbers. We all paid more for health insurance and got less for the hard-earned money we had to shovel out for our “coverage.” 

And expect even more financial pain (and difficulty getting the care you need) as these companies do all they can to get their profit margins back to where Wall Street wants them.

July 2025 Actions are the Turning Point for U.S. Healthcare

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, Medicaid Cuts, Medicaid Funding, Medicare Cuts, State of the Union, Turning Point • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
July 2025 Actions are the Turning Point for U.S. Healthcare

July 2025 will be the month U.S. healthcare leaders recognize as the industry’s modern turning point. Consider…

  • On July 4, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act was signed into law setting in motion $960 billion in Medicaid cuts over the decade and massive uncertainty among those most adversely impacted—low income and under-served populations dependent on public programs, 8 to 11 million who used now-suspended marketplace subsidies to buy insurance coverage, and hundreds of state and local health agencies left in funding limbo.
  • On July 15, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported the June Consumer Price Index rose .3% bumping the LTM to 2.7% (lower than LTM of 3.4% for medical services). Prices have edged up.
  • On July 31, President Trump issued an Executive Order to 17 drug companies ordering them to reduce prices on their drugs by September 29 or else. And CMS issued final rules for FY2026 Medicare payments to hospitals, rehab and other providers reflecting increases ranging from 2.5-3.3% effective October 1.
  • And on the same day, the Bureau of Labor issued its July 2025 jobs report that showed a disappointing net gain of 73,000 jobs plus downward revisions for May and June of 258,000 sparking Wall Street anxiety and President Trump to call the results “rigged” before firing BLS head Erika McEntarfer. Note: healthcare added 55,000 in July—the biggest of any sector and more than its 42,000 average monthly increase.

Collectively, these actions reflect rejection of the health industry by the GOP-led Congress.

It follows 15 years of support vis a vis the Affordable Care Act (2010) and pandemic recovery emergency funding (2020-2021). In that 15-year period, the bigger players got bigger in each sector, investment of private equity in each sector became more prevalent, costs increased, affordability for consumers and employers decreased, and the public’s overall satisfaction with the health system declined precipitously.

For the four major players in the system, the passage of the “big, beautiful bill” was a disappointment. Their primary concerns were not addressed:

  • Physicians wanted relief from annual payment cuts by Medicare preferring reimbursement tied directly to medical inflation. And insurer’ prior authorization and provider reimbursement was a top issue. Status: Not much has changed though adjustments are promised.
  • Hospitals wanted continuation of federal Medicaid funding, protection of the 340B drug purchasing program, rejection of site-neutral payment policies, higher Medicare reimbursement and relief from insurer prior authorization frustrations. Status: Medicaid funding is being cut forcing the issue for states. CMS payment increases for 2026 are lower than operating cost increases. Insurers have promised prior-auth relief but details about how and when are unknown. And Congress posture toward hospitals seems harsh: price transparency compliance, safety event reporting, and cost concerns are bipartisan issues.
  • Insurers wanted sustained funding for state Medicaid and Medicare Advantage programs and federal pushback against drug prices and hospital consolidation. Status: Congress appears sympathetic to enrollee complaints and anxious to address insurer “waste, fraud and abuse” including overpayments in Medicare Advantage.
  • Drug companies oppose “Most Favored Nation” pricing and want protections of their patents and limits on how much insurers, pharmacy benefits managers, wholesalers, online distributors and other “middlemen” earn at their expense. Status: to date, little action despite sympathetic rhetoric by lawmakers. Status: to date, Congress has taken nominal action beyond the Inflation Reduction Act (2022) though 23 states have passed legislation requiring PBMs, insurers and manufacturers to disclose drug prices and 12 states have established Prescription Drug Affordability Boards to monitor prices.

My take:

The landscape for U.S. healthcare is fundamentally changed as a result of the July actions noted above. It is compounded by public anxiety about the economy at home and global tensions abroad.

These July actions were a turning point for the industry: responding appropriately will require fresh ideas and statesmanship. Transparency about prices, costs, incentives and performance is table stakes. Leaders dedicated to the greater good will be the difference.

Inside the Midyear Panic at UnitedHealth

Posted on by • Posted in 2026 Mid Term Election Issues, 2028 Election Issues, Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Insurance Denial, Health Insurance Industry, Health Insurance Pre Authorization, Health Insurance Premiums, Health Policy, Healthcare Reform, High Premiums, Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), Medicare Advantage, Medicare Advantage Denials, Medicare Advantage Overpayments, Out of Network, Out of Pocket Expenses, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Model, Profit Motive, UnitedHealth Group, UnitedHealthcare • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment

https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/inside-the-midyear-panic-at-unitedhealth

Imagine you’re facing your midyear performance review with your boss. You dread it, even though you’ve done all you thought possible and legal to help the company meet Wall Street’s profit expectations, because shareholders haven’t been pleased with your employer’s performance lately.

Now let’s imagine your employer is a health insurance conglomerate like, say, UnitedHealth Group. You’ve watched as the stock price has been sliding, sometimes a little and on some days crashing through lows not seen in years, like last Friday (down almost 5% in a single day, to $237.77, which is down a stunning 62% since a mid-November high of $630 and change).

You know what your boss is going to say. We all have to do more to meet the Street’s expectations. Something has changed from the days when the government and employers were overly generous, not questioning our value proposition, always willing to pick up the tab and pay many hidden tips, and we could pull our many levers to make it harder for people to get the care they need. 

Despite government and media reports for years that the federal government has been overpaying Medicare Advantage plans like UnitedHealth’s – at least $84 billion this year alone – Congress has pretended not to notice. There is evidence that might be changing, with Republicans and Democrats alike making noises about cracking down on MA plans. 

Employers have complained for ages about constantly rising premiums, but they’ve sucked it up, knowing they could pass much of the increase onto their workers – and make them pay thousands of dollars out of their own pockets before their coverage kicks in. Now, at least some of them are realizing they don’t have to work with the giant conglomerates anymore.

Doctors and hospitals have complained, too, about burdensome paperwork and not getting paid right and on time, but they’ve largely been ignored as the big conglomerates get bigger and are now even competing with them.

UnitedHealth is the biggest employer of doctors in the country. But doctors and hospitals are beginning to push back, too. 

Since last fall, UnitedHealth and its smaller but still enormous competitors have found that “headwinds” are making it harder for them to maintain the profit margins investors demand. That is mainly because, despite the many barriers patients have to overcome to get the care they need, many of them are nevertheless using health care, often in the most expensive setting – the emergency room. They put off seeing a doctor so long because of insurers’ penny-wise-pound-foolishness that they had some kind of event that scared them enough to head straight to the ER. 

It’s not just you who is dreading your midyear review. Everybody, regardless of their position on the corporate ladder, and even the poorly paid folks in customer service, are in the same boat. And so is your boss. Nobody will put the details of what has to be done in writing. They don’t have to. Your boss will remind you that you have to do your part to help the company achieve the “profitable growth” Wall Street demands, quarter after quarter after quarter. It never, ever ends. You know this because you and most other employees watch what happens after the company releases quarterly financials. You also watch your 401K balance and you see the financial consequences of a company that Wall Street isn’t happy with. And Wall Street is especially unhappy with UnitedHealth these days.

And when things are as bad as they are now at UnitedHealth’s headquarters in Minnesota, you know that a big consulting firm like McKinsey & Company has been called in, and that those suits will recommend some kind of “restructuring” and changes in leadership to get the ship back on course. You know the drill. Everybody already is subject to forced ranking, meaning that at the end of the year, some of your colleagues, regardless of job title, will fall below a line that means automatic termination. You pedal as fast as you can to stay above that line, often doing things you worry are not in the best interest of millions of people and might not even be lawful. But you know that if you have any chance of staying employed, much less getting a raise or bonus, you have to convince your superiors you are motivated and “engaged to win.” No one is safe. Look what happened to Sir Andrew Witty, whose departure as CEO to spend more time with his family (in London) was announced days after shareholders turned thumbs down on the company’s promises to return to an acceptable level of profitability. 

If you are at UnitedHealth, you listened to what the once and again CEO, Stephen Hemsley, and CFO John Rex, who got shuffled to a lesser role of “advisor” to the CEO last week, laid out a new action plan to their bosses – big institutional investors who have been losing their shirts for months now. You know that what the C-Suite promised on their July 29 call will mean that you will have to “execute” to enable the company to deliver on those promises. And you know that you and your colleagues will have to inflict a lot more pain on everybody who is not a big shareholder – patients, taxpayers, employers, doctors, hospital administrators. That is your job. And you will try to do it because you have a mortgage, kids in college and maxed-out credit cards.  

Here’s what Hemsley and his leadership team said, out loud in a public forum, although admittedly one that few people know about or can take an hour-and-a-half to listen to:

  • Even though UnitedHealth took in billions more in revenue, its margins shrank a little because it had to pay more medical claims than expected.
  • Still, the company made $14.3 billion in profits during the second quarter. That’s a lot but not as much as the $15.8 billion in 2Q 2024, and that made shareholders unhappy.
  • Enrollment in its commercial (individual and employer) plans increased just 1%, but enrollment in its Medicare Advantage plans increased nearly 8%. That’s normally just fine, but something happened that the company’s beancounters couldn’t stop.
  • Those seniors figured out how to get at least some care despite the company’s high barriers to care (aggressive use of prior authorization, “narrow” networks of providers, etc.)

To fix all of this, Hemsley and team promised:

  • To dump 600,000 or so enrollees who might need care next year
  • To raise premiums “in the double digits” – way above the “medical trend” that PriceWaterhouseCoopers predicts to be 8.5% (high but not double-digit high)
  • Boot more providers it doesn’t already own out of network
  • Reduce benefits

Throughout the call with investors (actually with a couple dozen Wall Street financial analysts, the only people who can ask questions), Hemsley and team went on and on about the “value-based care” the company theoretically delivers, without providing specifics. But here is what you need to know: If you are enrolled in a UnitedHealth plan of any nature – commercial, Medicare or Medicaid or VA (yes, VA, too) – expect the value of your coverage to diminish, just as it has year after year after year.  

The term for this in industry jargon is “benefit buydown.”

That means that even as your premiums go up by double digits, you will soon have fewer providers to choose from, you likely will spend more out-of-pocket before your coverage kicks in, you might have to switch to a medication made by a drug company UnitedHealth will get bigger kickbacks from, and you might even be among the 600,000 policyholders who will get “purged” (another industry term) at the end of the year.

Why do we and our employers and Uncle Sam keep putting up with this?

Yes, we pay more for new cars and iPhones, but we at least can count on some improvements in gas mileage and battery life and maybe even better-placed cup holders. You can now buy a massive high-def TV for a fraction of what it cost a couple of years ago. Health insurance? Just the opposite. 

As I will explain in a future post, all of the big for-profit insurers are facing those same headwinds UnitedHealth is facing. You will not be spared regardless of the name on your insurance card. If you still have one come January 1. Pain is on the way. Once again. 

How Health Insurance Monopolies Affect Your Care

Posted on by • Posted in Competition, Competition on Price, Competitive Bidding, Health Insurance Denial, Health Insurance Industry, Health Insurance Pre Authorization, Market Consolidation, Market Failure, Market Power, Market Share, Monopoly, Monopoly Behavior, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Model, Profit Motive • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
https://time.com/7302346/health-insurance-monopolies-patient-care/?utm_source=beehiiv&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter-health-matters&_bhlid=b8ef51635479257a1d1d099c9581345a28c94b91

Not long ago, Dr. Richard Menger, a neurosurgeon, was ready to operate on a 16-year-old with complex scoliosis. A team of doctors had spent months preparing for the surgery, consulting orthopedists and cardiologists, even printing a 3D model of the teen’s spine.

The surgery was scheduled for a Friday when Menger got the news: the teen’s insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, had denied coverage of the surgery. 

It wasn’t particularly surprising to Menger, who has been practicing in Alabama since 2019. Alabama essentially has one private insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, which has a whopping 94% of the market of large-group insurance plans, according to the health policy nonprofit KFF. That dominance allows the insurer to consistently deny claims, many doctors say, charge people more for coverage, and pay lower rates to doctors and hospitals than they would in other states.

“It makes the natural problems for insurance that much more magnified because there’s no market competition or choice,” says Menger, who in 2023 wrote an op-ed in 1819 News, a local news site, arguing that ending Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama’s health insurance monopoly would make people in the state healthier.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama also has the largest share of individual insurance plans in the state, according to data from the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services. Perhaps not coincidentally, Alabama also had the highest denial rates for in-network claims by insurers on the individual marketplace in 2023, according to a KFF analysis: 34%. Neighboring Mississippi, where the majority insurer has less of the market share at 81%, has an average denial rate of 15%.

Alabama is an extreme case, but people in many other states face health insurance monopolies, too. One insurer, Premera Blue Cross Group, has a 94% share of the large-group market in Alaska, and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming has a 91% market share in that state. In 18 states, one insurer has 75% or more of the large-group health insurance marketplace, according to KFF data.

These monopolies drive up costs, says Leemore Dafny, a professor at Harvard Business School and Harvard Kennedy School who has long studied competition among health insurance companies and providers.

“More competitors tend to drive lower premiums and more generous benefits for consumers,” she says. “There’s a lot of concern from analysts like myself about concentration in a range of sectors, including health insurance.”

Bruce A. Scott, the immediate past president of the American Medical Association, has said that when the dominant insurer in his state of Kentucky was renegotiating its contract with his medical group, it offered lower rates than it had paid six years before. “This same type of financial squeeze play is found nationwide, and its frequency has been exacerbated by health insurance industry consolidation,” he wrote in The Hill in 2023.

What happened to competition? There used to be a lot more regional health insurers, Dafny says. But as costs started to rise, they didn’t have enough leverage to negotiate prices down with providers and stay profitable. As a result, many were happy to be acquired by larger companies. Then hospitals and doctor’s offices merged to get more leverage against the bigger insurers. Now, there’s a lot of concentration among both provider groups and insurers.

“None of this had anything to do with taking better care of patients,” she says. “It had to do with trying to get the upper hand.” 

In a statement to TIME, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama said that it was working to make the prior authorization process more transparent and reverse the requirement of prior authorization for certain in-network medical services. It will attempt to answer at least 80% of requests for prior authorization in near real-time by 2027, it says. (A coalition of major health insurers recently vowed to fix their prior authorization processes under pressure from the federal government.)

The insurer also says it welcomes competition. “We know Alabamians have a choice when it comes to choosing their health insurance carrier and we don’t take that for granted,” a spokesperson said in the statement. In the commercial and underwritten market—which represents the bulk of its business—Blue Cross Blue Shield Alabama competes with four other companies that sell individual, family, and group plans, the company says, and it competes with 68 companies who sell Medicare plans in Alabama. Its success in the state is partly because it sells policies in every county in Alabama, the insurer says, while others do not. 

Other casualties of such a concentrated health-insurance marketplace are rural hospitals and providers. Small rural hospitals are often independent and have not merged with other systems like many of their large urban counterparts, so they have an even harder time negotiating with the one big insurer in the state, says Harold Miller, president and CEO of the Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform, a national policy center that studies health-care costs. That means big insurers will often refuse to cover procedures or pay lower prices for services.

“I’ve had rural hospitals tell me they can’t even get the health plan on the phone,” Miller says.

In the past decade, the Department of Justice has stopped some mergers, but has not been very aggressive at stopping consolidation in the health-care industry, Dafny says. That may be in part because the courts require a high standard of evidence to block a transaction, and the government might have been worried it would have lost whatever cases it brought.

A few factors prevent insurers with a monopoly from driving costs too high, says Benjamin Handel, an economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley who studies health care. One is a regulation called minimum loss ratio that essentially requires insurers to spend a certain share of what they earn from premiums on medical care. Another is that an insurer with a monopoly that angers consumers might attract attention from regulators, he says.

Of course, there’s not a whole lot regulators can do to make a marketplace more competitive. A state could try to incentivize more insurers to enter their states with tax breaks or other sweeteners, but it’s very hard to enter a market and offer low rates right away. The establishment of the health-care marketplaces in the Affordable Care Act allowed new entrants, Dafny says, but many of them did not survive.

Menger, the Alabama doctor, says that he and his colleagues—and therefore their patients—are basically stuck. His staff has to spend 10-15 hours a week negotiating with the insurer to get prior authorizations that sometimes don’t come, even while patients pay higher premiums. 

The teenage boy eventually got approved for the scoliosis surgery, but not after the family went through a lot of stress with postponements and uncertainty. “I think it’s pretty clear that the more competition, the better things are,” Menger says. “This prior authorization nonsense is really hurting patients.”

From Nonprofit Blues to Wall Street Blues: Elevance’s Stock Points Down

Posted on by • Posted in Health Insurance Denial, Health Insurance Industry, Prior Authorization, Profit, Profit Margin, Profit Model, Profit Motive, Shareholder Expectations, Wall Street • Tagged , , , , • Leave a comment
https://healthcareuncovered.substack.com/p/from-nonprofit-blues-to-wall-street?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=255152&post_id=168648259&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=59t65&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

Elevance, which owns Blue Cross plans, is now reeling from Wall Street losses thanks to its Medicare Advantage business.

The company now known as Elevance, which owns Blue Cross plans in 14 states, took a drubbing on Wall Street yesterday after executives told shareholders that it had to pay out way more in medical claims during the second quarter than expected, especially in its Medicare Advantage business. As a reminder, Wall Street hates to hear such news, so much so that investors rushed to sell their shares in the company, sending the stock price to $296.39 – a 52-week low – before closing at $302.45 yesterday afternoon. That’s down 47% from the all-time high of $567.36 it reached last September.

The news was so distressing for people who still have investments in for-profit health insurers that many of them finally bailed, getting the message that the entire sector is likely not the best place to make money these days. All seven of the companies (Centene, Cigna, CVS/Aetna, Elevance, Humana, Molina and UnitedHealth) saw big drops in their stock price with two others (Centene and Molina) also falling to 52-week lows. The companies’ stock is continuing to tank today as I write this.

When Denial Becomes a Liability

UnitedHealth has historically been the first of the companies to release quarterly earnings, but it stepped back as leader of the pack this quarter after that giant’s recent troubles on Wall Street. UnitedHealth missed financial analysts’ profit expectations last quarter and withdrew its profit guidance for the year, an unprecedented move for that company, which terrified its shareholders. UnitedHealth’s stock price has lost nearly 55% of its value since reaching a high of $630.73 last November.

Like UnitedHealth, Elevance had been a Wall Street darling until a business practice common in the health insurance game – refusing to pay for patients’ medically necessary care – finally caught up with it.

I’m talking about prior authorization, the benign sounding term that covers a number of ways a health insurer banks money by saying no to a doctor’s plea to cover a patient’s treatment or medications. The fundamental problem is that by refusing to pay for care a patient needs, that patient likely will get sicker and wind up needing even more expensive care down the road. Insurance company beancounters know that can happen, but they also know there is a decent chance that that potentially high-cost patients will not even be enrolled in one of the company’s health plans when the day finally arrives that they have to go to the hospital, which, of course, might have been avoided if the initial treatment had been approved in the first place.

We’re not just talking about a stay in the hospital. One permutation of prior auth is called step therapy in which an insurer demands that a patient try other medications on the insurer’s list of preferred drugs (its “formulary”) before approving the drug a doctor believes will work best. Sometimes it’s called “fail first.” In other words, a patient must endure pain and suffering for weeks or months taking an ineffective drug on an insurer’s formulary – the price of which the insurer has negotiated to its financial advantage with a drug maker – before the insurer will agree to cover the medication the doctor believes will be more effective. The doctor will then have to persuade the insurer that the insurer’s preferred drug failed. We’ll dive deeper into that insurer-induced nightmare in a future post, but know for now that it is a big and expensive time-suck that doctors have to endure while insurers can keep unused premium dollars in their investment accounts.

The Conversion That Changed Everything

But let’s go back to Elevance, which until recently was called Anthem and before that WellPoint. Many of its subsidiaries still use the term Anthem in its branding, like the biggest under its corporate umbrella, Anthem Blue Cross of California. All of those Blues plans operated on a nonprofit basis until a savvy executive named Leonard Schaeffer, who was CEO of Anthem of California back when it was still a nonprofit, pulled off a deal that would put him on the path to considerable fame and fortune, a first-of-its-kind “conversion” that would prove to be a major reason why the U.S. has the most complex, expensive and inefficient health care system on the planet.

According to his official bio on the website of the Leonard D. Schaffer Fellows in Government Service, which is affiliated with some of the country’s most prestigious universities, Schaeffer was recruited as CEO of Blue Cross of California in 1986 when, we are told, it was near bankruptcy. We’re also told that Schaeffer “managed the turnaround of Blue Cross of California and the IPO (initial public offering, i.e., converting it to for-profit status) creating WellPoint in 1993. During his tenure, WellPoint made 17 acquisitions and endowed four charitable foundations with assets of over $6 billion. Under Schaeffer’s leadership, WellPoint’s value grew from $11 million to over $49 billion.”

One might think from reading that last sentence that Schaeffer himself wrote big personal checks to endow those foundations, but establishing those nonprofit foundations (which includes the California Endowment, the California Health Care Foundation and the California Wellness Foundation) was demanded by California regulators as a condition of their approval of the IPO. The money was referred to as a conversion fund (converting from nonprofit to for-profit status), and it came from the proceeds of the IPO.

But Schaffer did indeed make a ton of money from the deal and WellPoint’s subsequent acquisition by a rival company that also owned recently converted Blues plans, Anthem, in 2004.

One of the organizations that opposed the WellPoint-Anthem deal, Consumer Watchdog, wrote at the time that:

Payments to WellPoint executives after the company’s buyout by Anthem Inc. could top $600 million if regulators and shareholders do not modify the acquisition terms, according to documents received from California regulators by the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer rights under a Public Records Act Request late Tuesday.

The documents detail potential payments in excess of those estimated by the company to shareholders at $200 million in a recent proxy. Executives will receive cash bonuses worth between $146 million and $365 million under the proposed terms of the company buyout by Anthem, in addition to over $251 million in stock options. WellPoint CEO Leonard Schaeffer has already begun exercising his stock options as of June 1st at sweetheart prices – earning him $16 million on that one day alone and increasing the size of his shares by hundreds of thousands.

When we look back at the history of health insurance in this country, we can thank this one man for the rapid shifting of Americans out of what historically had been nonprofit health insurance plans that initially were community-rated, meaning they charged everybody the same premium, regardless of gender, health status, occupation or address, and did not use gimmicks like prior authorization to boost profits. Being nonprofits, they couldn’t even book profits, although many of them did amass millions more in “reserves” than regulators required for solvency reasons.

I was working at Cigna when WellPoint joined the club of big for-profit insurers in 1993, along with Aetna, Humana (where I also previously worked), UnitedHealth, which was a relatively small player back then, and giant “multiline” insurers like MetLife, Prudential and Travelers. All of those last three decided to sell their health insurance operations to UnitedHealth and Aetna, putting those companies on the path to becoming the behemoths they are today.

And Schaeffer would wind up being one of America’s richest men, and, to his credit, he has been personally philanthropic. We know that because his name shows up all over the place in U.S. health care think-tank world. Indeed, his name is now associated far more with groups and institutions engaged in public policy than the “platinum parachute,” to use Consumer Watchdog’s term, he got when he and a few colleagues engineered the sale of WellPoint to Anthem. As his bio notes:

In 2009, Schaeffer established the Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics at the University of Southern California, which emphasizes the interdisciplinary approach to research and analysis to support evidence-based health policy. In 2015, he established the Schaeffer Fellows in Government Service program which has supported 418 undergraduates to date in high-level, summer government internships. In 2004, he established the Schaeffer Institute for Public Policy & Government Service. He has also endowed chairs in health care financing and policy at the Brookings Institution, Harvard Medical School, the National Academy of Medicine, UC Berkeley and USC.

If Schaeffer still owns shares in Elevance, he is a bit poorer today than he was yesterday morning, but he’s probably still doing OK. Shares of Elevance’s stock have increased 1731% in value since they started trading on the New York Stock Exchange in October 2001, even with the company’s very bad Thursday on the Street.