Medicare Advantage Majority and Better Medicare Alliance are flooding the zone with attacks against bipartisan legislation aimed at curbing health insurers’ “upcoding” maneuver.

HEALTH CARE un-covered readers were the first to tip me off to television attack ads against the bipartisan No UPCODE Act, sponsored by Senators Bill Cassidy (R-LA) and ​​Jeff Merkley (D-OR). The ads in question, airing in the Washington D.C. media market, were paid for by Medicare Advantage Majority (MAM), which bills itself as a patient and provider coalition but has all the markings of a front group funded by the nation’s largest health insurers.

After a quick search through MAM’s YouTube channel, I think I found the ad I was tipped about. Titled “Voices,” the video features six seniors fawning over their Medicare Advantage plans – and it ends with a desperate plea to “oppose the No UPCODE Act” and “protect Medicare Advantage.”

MAM appears to have been propped up fairly recently – with their earliest ad (that I can find) from October 2024. All of their ads support Medicare Advantage. Some appear nonpartisan, while others are more overtly political, like the ad “Biden’s Playbook.” Here is a transcription of that ad:

“President Trump kept his promise to protect Medicare benefits for millions of American seniors. But now some in Congress want to take a page out of Joe Biden’s playbook and cut Medicare. These cuts threaten primary and preventative care that help keep millions of seniors healthy while also raising costs.

It’s a betrayal. It’s why people don’t trust Washington. Don’t let the politicians cut Medicare. Tell Congress to stand with President Trump and protect America’s seniors.”

None of MAM’s ads mention the expensive hidden fees, narrow networks of doctors and life-threatening prior-authorization hurdles often associated with private Medicare Advantage plans. Nor does it even hint at why Sen. Cassidy, a doctor and senior Republican leader and committee chair, introduced the No UPCODE Act in the first place: to reduce the tens of billions of dollars in overpayments to Medicare Advantage insurers and keep the Medicare Trust Fund solvent for years longer. Those overpayments – at least $84 billion this year alone – is a leading reason why the Medicare Trust Fund is being depleted.

But Medicare Advantage Majority is not the only insurance industry front group flooding the zone.

I kid you not, while I was writing this very article I got a text from a different Big Insurance-funded group fear-mongering the same “cuts” to Medicare Advantage. As I’m typing away on my laptop, my phone dings… The first words in the text read: “ATTENTION NEEDED:”. The message had all the hallmarks of a cookie-cutter political blast that was cooked up by some DNC-alum or K Street PR strategist.

When I followed the prompt and clicked on the link, it took me to one of the industry’s most trusted hands in the Medicare Advantage fight, the Better Medicare Alliance (BMA) – one of my former colleagues’ most essential propaganda shops these days.

BMA is a slickly branded PR and lobbying shop that presents itself as a coalition of “advocates” working to protect seniors’ care, but it’s heavily funded by private insurers in the MA business who reap billions in those overpayments from taxpayers each year. BMA’s board has been stacked with Humana and UnitedHealth representatives and allies tied to medical schools like Emory and Meharry Medical College. For years, they’ve spent millions lobbying and propagating to protect MA insurers’ profits. This includes rallying against the No UPCODE Act since July; opposing CMS’ risk adjustment model in 2024 (which should help reduce some of the overpayments); and objecting vigorously to any Medicare Advantage plan payment reductions, year in and year out.

In short, BMA and MAM are both 501(c)(4) “social welfare” nonprofits used by Big Insurance as part policy shop, part lobbying arm, and part attack dog. Together, they make up a strategy for insurers that want to keep their MA cash cows gorging on your money.

None of this is new, though. It’s the same PR crap I used to fling back in the old days when I was an industry executive and had to peddle Medicare Advantage plans. (Its deliciously ironic that MAM had the audacity to use the term “playbook” in one of its ads. In my old job I used to help write the industry’s playbook.) Each fall we’d work with AHIP (formerly America’s Health Insurance Plans) to host “Granny Fly-Ins” in Washington, D.C. Industry money (actually, taxpayer money) would cover the fly-in expenses, and the seniors would trot around Capitol Hill to extol the supposed benefits of Medicare Advantage plans and dare lawmakers to tamper with it. And that tactic worked for years. Of course, this was all before texting existed.

The squeal tells the story

For years, MA insurers have exaggerated how sick their patients are on paper (making them seem sicker so they can get a bigger taxpayer-funded handout). Hence the term “upcoding.” And the sick joke is – unfortunately – the same insurers who profit most from this upcoding scheme are using their taxpayer loot to stop this bill from gaining traction.

I think the industry’s squeal tells the story.

Let’s be real: Big Insurance wouldn’t be running this PR and lobbying blitz unless this legislation really would do some major good for Americans. The No UPCODE Act is a strong, bipartisan step toward ending wasteful, fraudulent practices that funnel taxpayer money into the pockets of industry executives and Wall Street shareholders. This one bill could save taxpayers as much as $124 billion over the next decade and keep the Medicare Trust Fund solvent for years longer.

You can be sure, though, that people on Capitol Hill and the administration already know ads like these are industry-funded. They see them for what they really are — part of a well-financed intimidation campaign. A game. Running ads like these is the industry’s way of flaunting its power and a reminder that big money can and will be spent in Congressional campaigns — and possibly (again) even during the Super Bowl — to mislead voters.

So remember, when you see an ad or get a text from an organization like MAM or BMA – know that these organizations have a lot to lose if legislation like the No UPCODE Act becomes law. And spending your premium and tax dollars on text blasts and TV spots are well worth the investment – to them, anyway.

https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2837518

Privately administered Medicare Advantage (MA) has long been the subject of policy debate. To some, the once-nascent source of Medicare coverage is an important mechanism for injecting competition and innovation into the government-sponsored insurance program. To others, it represents an expensive and unnecessary alternative to directly administered traditional Medicare (TM).

After years of rapid growth, MA accounted for most program enrollments (33.6 million) and federal spending ($494 billion) in 2024.¹ This has intensified some existing debates but also spurned increasing bipartisan agreements and interest in reforms. Politicians and policy experts who have historically supported MA, including some Republicans, have articulated greater openness to reforming the now-entrenched program.² In effect, the debate has shifted from whether the MA program should be reformed to how it should be reformed and, critically, what the government should do with any savings. This Viewpoint discusses notable areas of consensus (and lack thereof) and the prospect of reforms from the Trump administration.

Areas of Growing Consensus

Several observations about MA are generally agreed upon. First, MA plans can use utilization management tools, like prior authorization, to constrain costs in ways that TM generally cannot. This reduces MA plans’ costs of covering Part A (hospital) and B (physician) benefits compared with a scenario where they imposed few constraints on utilization, like in TM. Policymakers also increasingly recognize the administrative burdens imposed on clinicians and restraints on patient access due to these tools, which have generated growing interest in reforms.

Second, and perhaps paradoxically, the federal government would spend less if all MA enrollees instead chose TM. This reflects several factors. MA plans are paid benchmark rates that are set above the fee-for-service spending in many counties. Plan payments can increase further due to the quality-bonus program. MA plans also have higher coding intensity, meaning the same beneficiary has more diagnoses recorded if they are enrolled in MA rather than TM. This increases risk scores and payments from the government (whether this reflects more accurate coding vs fraudulent behavior remains a source of debate). In addition, MA plans experience advantageous selection, meaning they attract enrollees who are relatively cheaper to cover conditional on their observable characteristics.³ All told, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission estimates that the federal government spends 20% more (or an estimated $84 billion in 2025) than if all enrollees chose TM.¹ While the exact magnitude of difference is subject to debate, the basic conclusion is not.

Third, MA plans offer more generous benefits to enrollees, including lower out-of-pocket costs and coverage of additional benefits such as vision and dental services. This occurs because plans keep a portion of the difference between their bid and the benchmark rate. These rebates average $2255 annually per enrollee, which represents 17% of all spending on MA.¹

Where Disagreements Remain

While there is growing acknowledgment of the fiscal costs of the MA program, there is disagreement or uncertainty about several questions that inform an appropriate policy response. First, there is debate about how valuable some supplemental benefits are to enrollees. While it is relatively straightforward to value reductions in premiums or cost sharing in MA plans, there is limited information about how often enrollees use many of the supplemental benefits. Some research suggests that use of certain extra benefits may not be much higher in MA plans.⁴

Partly because of this, it is uncertain how much payment reductions to MA plans will reduce benefits and, in turn, how much that reduces enrollee welfare. Some research suggests the last dollar spent on MA plans results in much less than a dollar’s worth of additional benefits, particularly in markets with limited competition between plans.⁵ This suggests that reducing payments would initially lower plan profits but result in minimal welfare loss for enrollees. Even if true, it is not obvious when this tradeoff becomes more pronounced. Other research indicates the aggregate value of reduced cost sharing represents a large share of excess payments, suggesting reducing spending may quickly trigger benefit reductions.⁶ These effects may further depend on how policymakers chose to alter payments.

Finally, there remains significant disagreement about how to use any savings generated by program reforms. Democratic lawmakers often argue that savings should be used to increase TM benefits (eg, by adding dental benefits or imposing an out-of-pocket cap). Republicans are much more likely to pair spending reduction with policies that boost MA (eg, allowing MA plans to keep more of the savings if they bid below benchmarks). This predominantly reflects different preferences over the optimal structure of Medicare rather than empirical uncertainty.

Reform Possibilities From the Trump Administration

Many observers expect that the current administration will be relatively generous toward MA, as is typical of a Republican administration. This is particularly true given that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) administrator, Mehmet Oz, MD, has historically expressed support for MA plans. While major spending reductions may remain unlikely, early actions suggest the administration supports targeted reforms and is likely to test changes to the program’s design.

In his Senate confirmation, Oz was explicitly critical of strategic upcoding by insurers. Early policy decisions have been consistent with this view. The 2026 final payment notice for MA continues implementation of several policies that reduce MA payments. Notably, the Trump administration finalized implementation of an updated risk adjustment model that is designed to partly address coding intensity. For example, it eliminates approximately 2000 diagnosis codes that were judged to be most prone to upcoding. In conjunction with related changes, this is expected to decrease plan payment by 3.01%.⁷ CMS also announced the expansion of audits aimed at verifying the accuracy of diagnoses recorded by MA plans.⁸ This suggests the administration is willing to address strategic behavior by insurers, which they characterize as addressing waste, fraud, and abuse.⁸

However, the final payment notice also included higher payment increases for MA plans than was initially proposed by the Biden administration (5.06% vs 2.23%). After accounting for coding trends, realized payments are expected to increase by 7.16%. While consistent with an effort to boost MA enrollment, CMS noted that this change predominantly reflected the effects of higher-than-expected growth in per capita costs in TM, which mechanically increased payment updates. While CMS has some flexibility in payment updates, observers should use caution when using these upward revisions to infer the administration’s level of support for MA.

If the current administration is open to more novel and consequential reforms, they are likely to emerge from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). While CMMI demonstration projects have historically focused on TM, the office can test changes to key features of MA that would significantly alter spending and incentives. Notably, Abe Sutton, JD, the director of the CMMI, recently highlighted the possibility of testing changes to risk scores, benchmarks, and quality measures, suggesting they are interested in taking advantage of this authority.⁹

With its place in the Medicare program now firmly established, MA has begun to attract more consistent interest in reform, even among Republican policymakers. This may reflect political considerations, as an unwillingness to act may provide an opportunity (and a source of budgetary savings) for future lawmakers to pursue alternative policy goals. Early signals from the Trump administration suggest they support program reforms, especially those targeting strategic behavior by insurers. Given the slim margins in Congress, it will be interesting to see if and how the administration uses CMMI’s authority to pursue substantive program changes.