
Cartoon – Importance of Pain Management






El Camino Health severed ties with Anthem after pricing disputes forced the provider to kill its contract, making it the most recent in a cast of Bay Area systems to have troubles with the insurer, according to the Mountain View Voice.
Over the past decade, four systems, including Mountain View, Calif.-based El Camino, have had contract struggles with Anthem related to claims that the insurer is penny-pinching.
The result is a standoff, as Anthem has claimed in the past that regional healthcare costs are too high, explaining low service payment offers.
While Anthem provided annual payment increases, the rate El Camino requested would raise premiums and copays for businesses and families, the insurer told the Mountain View Voice. El Camino said Anthem’s terms are “well below” that of other insurers.
El Camino and Anthem are still negotiating, which could last up to between three and six months based on previous conflicts. Meanwhile, El Camino patients without critical healthcare needs are no longer in-network with Anthem.

Health insurer Humana quietly funded 40 of Iora Health’s 47 primary care clinics, according to a Securities and Exchange Commission registration statement obtained by Business Insider.
The filing also showed the Humana-funded clinics exclusively served Humana members until July 2020.
Humana CEO Bruce Broussard told Business Insider earlier this year that the company had begun investing in other startup healthcare companies to see which would succeed. He also said the payer sees better outcomes and lower costs among members who go to clinics focused on providing care to older populations.
Iora Health serves 38,000 patients in eight states, according to the article.

The largest union for registered nurses in the U.S. called on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to bring back recommendations for universal masking in public regardless of people’s vaccination status.
The National Nurses Union (NNU) in a Monday letter to CDC Director Rochelle Walensky requested that the agency reinstitute guidelines for all people to wear masks in public and in close proximity to those outside their household.
NNU Executive Director Bonnie Castillo pointed to a 16 percent uptick in U.S. COVID-19 cases from last week, according to CDC data, as well as rises in case counts in more than 40 states and hospitalizations in more than 25 states as reasons to return to previous, stricter guidelines.
“NNU strongly urges the CDC to reinstate universal masking, irrespective of vaccination status, to help reduce the spread of the virus, especially from infected individuals who do not have any symptoms,” Castillo wrote in the letter. “Our suggestions are based on science and the precautionary principle and are made in order to protect nurses, other essential workers, patients, and the public from Covid-19.”
The union also cited the World Health Organization’s (WHO) call for vaccinated people to continue wearing masks in public amid the spread of the highly transmissible delta variant. Several U.S. officials and experts have said the WHO’s guidance reflects the state of the pandemic worldwide, which overall has seen lower vaccination rates than the U.S.
Castillo acknowledged that COVID-19 vaccines are effective at preventing severe illness and death but noted “no vaccine is 100 percent effective, and the emergence and spread of variants of concern may reduce vaccine effectiveness.”
The NNU in its letter also appeals for the CDC to update its guidance to “fully recognize aerosol transmission,” mandate tracking and reporting of cases among health care and essential workers, and keep records of cases, including mild and asymptomatic infections, among fully vaccinated people to measure the shots’ effectiveness.
The CDC did not immediately return a request for comment on the letter, but officials have consistently defended the updated mask guidance, saying fully vaccinated individuals are protected against the virus.
The NNU vocally opposed the CDC’s current mask guidance updated in May to permit fully vaccinated individuals to go maskless in virtually all settings. The union has argued that the change in recommendations endangered patients, front-line workers and nurses as the pandemic continues.
In the Monday letter, the union wrote that the CDC’s relaxation of mask guidance “failed to account for” the possibility of fully vaccinated people contracting and spreading the virus. It also said the agency’s guidelines do not protect people, including children, who cannot get the vaccine.
The NNU sent the letter days after the CDC urged schools to reopen for full in-person learning in the fall, saying that fully vaccinated teachers and students do not need to wear masks.
It also comes after Los Angeles County and St. Louis County recommended their residents to wear masks in public indoors.

The average number of new daily COVID-19 cases has increased 94 percent over the past two weeks, according to data from The New York Times, as worries over outbreaks climb nationwide.
The U.S. recorded a seven-day average of more than 23,000 daily cases on Monday, almost doubling from the average two weeks ago, as less than half of the total population is fully vaccinated.
Monday’s count of 32,105 newly confirmed cases pushed the seven-day average up from its Sunday level of more than 19,000 new cases — a 60 percent increase from two weeks prior.
All but four states — West Virginia, Maine, South Dakota and Iowa — have seen increased daily averages in the past 14 days, and the average in 16 states at least doubled in that period.
This comes as the highly transmissible delta variant was declared the dominant strain in the U.S. last week.
At the same time, vaccinations have stalled, with the daily rate reaching its lowest point during President Biden’s tenure on Sunday at slightly more than 506,000. Monday saw a small uptick in the average rate to more than 527,000 per day, according to Our World in Data.
The rise in case counts comes as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says just 48 percent of the total population is fully vaccinated. Officials have said fully vaccinated people are protected from the virus, while unvaccinated people are at much higher risk for serious illness and death.
This leaves a majority of Americans still vulnerable to the virus, particularly children under 12 years old, who are not authorized to get the vaccine. More than 56 percent of the eligible population aged 12 and older is fully vaccinated.
The Biden administration has strived to boost vaccination numbers over the past few months and signaled a new strategy focused on grassroots campaigning to promote the vaccine last week. The country fell short of the president’s goal to get 70 percent of adults at least one dose by the Fourth of July.
Increases in COVID-19 cases have previously signaled during the pandemic an upcoming rise in hospitalizations and deaths. The Times data shows that average deaths are still decreasing, but average daily hospitalizations are climbing, with a 16 percent increase from two weeks ago.
Still, case counts are much lower than the devastating peak that hit the U.S. in January, and experts say the country will not reach that level of infection again, as vulnerable populations have gotten vaccinated. Seventy-nine percent of those aged 65 and older are considered fully vaccinated.

This is a guest post by Taylor J. Christensen, M.D. (@taylorjayc). Dr. Christensen is an internal medicine physician and health policy researcher with a background in business strategy and health services research.
Since any mystery in the healthcare system intrigues me, I’ve been working on understanding pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) lately.
Why did PBMs arise in the first place, and how did they come to have this somewhat strange role in the drug market? Let’s look at the evolution of PBMs, which I will categorize into three distinct phases.
Forewarning: There isn’t a lot of publicly available information on this stuff, so some of this is my best piecing together of things I’ve read plus supplemented by direct communications with people who work for insurers or PBMs.
Phase 1
Way back before PBMs, people used to pay for medications 100% up front out of pocket. They’d keep their receipts and then submit them all to their insurer later for partial reimbursement according to their insurance plan’s formulary.
That clearly had some downsides. If a patient couldn’t afford the full price up front, they would be stuck choosing which of their meds they’re not going to get, which is bad for both patients (nonadherence) and pharmacies (lost sales). Insurers also had to spend tons of time reconciling shoeboxes full of receipts.
If only there were a way to integrate an insurer’s formulary into the pharmacy’s computer system so that patients only pay their exact copay at the time they fill a prescription! Everyone would be a lot happier. Patients wouldn’t have to forego quite so many medications, pharmacies wouldn’t lose out on as many medication sales, and insurers wouldn’t have to deal with people sending in shoeboxes full of receipts. Win win win.
Enter the precursors to pharmacy benefit managers—they were essentially groups of software engineers tasked with working with pharmacies to get insurers’ formularies into the pharmacies’ computer systems. And they succeeded! After that, when a patient showed up to fill a prescription, the pharmacy would simply enter the patient’s insurance information into their system and the exact co-pay for that medicine would magically appear on the cash register’s screen. The patient paid their amount, and the transaction was then sent to the insurer to reimburse the rest.
But how did these precursor PBMs evolve into today’s PBMs that, among other things, “manage benefits”? My guess is that it went something like this . . .
Phase 2
These precursor PBMs got pretty good at integrating formularies into pharmacies’ systems, so they began to expand their customer base by helping lots of other insurers do the same thing.
Soon they became more familiar with all the complexities and intricacies of formularies than anyone else. And, as companies are wont to do, they leveraged that competency to make more money by offering a new service, which they maybe pitched to insurers like this: “Hey insurer, we already know all the details of your formulary. And we know where you could save money since formularies are kind of our thing. Why don’t you outsource your formulary-making efforts to us? We’ll make you a better formulary and charge less than it’s costing you to do it in-house right now. No-brainer, right?” And thus, not too long after their inception, PBMs officially started managing pharmacy benefits.
But that’s not where the story ends.
Phase 3 (dun dun dun)
Soon these PBMs found that they had amassed significant indirect control over which medicines patients get. Set a lower copay for a medicine and, sooner or later, more patients will end up taking it. And the one making the formulary is the one who sets the copays.
What did PBMs do with that power? They tried to leverage it to get better drug prices from manufacturers, which would allow them to offer an equivalent but cheaper formulary to their customers (insurers). But how, if they are not actually in the drug supply chain (that goes from drug manufacturers à drug wholesalers à pharmacies à patients) could they do that?
They cleverly reached out to the drug manufacturers directly and said something like this: “Hey drug manufacturer, we don’t actually have a direct financial relationship with you (yet). But we have significant control over how many sales you get because we set patients’ copays. How about we guarantee that your drug will, from now on, be the only one from its category in the lowest-copay tier? This will increase your sales quite a bit! And, in exchange for helping you get more sales, you can send us a “rebate” on every sale. So this is how it will work. We already keep track of every drug transaction, so every quarter we will send you the data to show how many patients using our formulary bought your drug, and you will send us a $10 rebate for each one.”
Contrary to popular belief, PBMs don’t keep all of this rebate money. Remember, their goal is to outbid other PBMs to offer the best formulary for the cheapest. And if the PBM market is competitive, they will have some degree of price competition that will force them to pass along some of those rebates on to their customers (insurers) in the form of lower fees.
I spoke with someone who works at an insurer and is in charge of contracting with their insurer’s PBM, and this person indicated that it is very possible for an insurer to get multiple bids from PBMs and identify which one is the best deal. Although, with the complexity involved, this process generally requires a specialist healthcare consultant who is an expert on navigating PBM contracts. I spoke with such a consultant, who had also worked for PBMs directly before becoming a consultant to insurers, and this person estimated that PBMs only keep about 20% of the rebates they receive from drug manufacturers. Other studies have been done on this topic, but attribution is tricky since PBMs are able to rename the monies they are receiving from drug manufacturers to fudge the numbers, which is probably why the Government Accountability Office reported in 2019 that PBMs only retain about 1% of rebates.
Well, there you have it. Phase 3 was the start of all the wheeling-dealing complexities that give PBMs their shady reputation.
I believe this is helpful background to have when you’re trying to improve the drug market (i.e., solve the problem of expensive drugs) because without understanding the incentives of the parties involved, you cannot get to the root of the problems with that system.
A Universal Health Services investor is suing several executives of the King of Prussia, Pa.-based system, alleging they unjustly enriched themselves through stock options amid the pandemic, according to Law360.
The lawsuit, filed in the Delaware Chancery Court and made public July 9, accuses UHS executives and directors of taking advantage of a pandemic-related temporary hit in the company’s stock price and argues taking the stock options was “grossly unfair to the company and its stockholders.”
“The controllers and other company insiders took advantage of the temporary drop in the company’s stock price to grant and receive options to buy the company’s stock at rock bottom prices, thereby showering themselves in excessive compensation,” the lawsuit claims.
In particular, the lawsuit claims that in just 12 days after the stock options were granted, defendants made over $30 million in gains.
Several top execs were named as defendants, including Alan Miller, UHS founder and chair and Marc Miller, CEO and president of UHS. Three other UHS execs were named, as well as Warren Nimetz, an administrative partner of law firm Norton Rose Fulbright’s New York office.
“UHS’s directors and officers deny any liability associated with the company’s routine and publicly disclosed options grant in March 2020,” attorney Matthew Madden of Robbins Russell Englert Orseck & Untereiner, representing UHS, its executives and Mr. Nimetz, told Law360. “The options grant was in line with the company’s compensation practices in prior years and took place at a board meeting scheduled months in advance.”
Mr. Madden added that UHS’ executives and officials “acted properly” and that the plaintiff’s claims are “baseless.”
“UHS is proud of its service to patients, and stewardship of investor capital, during these unprecedented times in the healthcare industry,” Mr. Madden told Law360.
The lawsuit was filed by Robin Knight.