Hospitals’ business models are being upended by fundamental changes within the health care system, including one that presents a pretty existential challenge: People have far more options to get their care elsewhere these days.
Why it matters:
Health systems’ responses to major demographic, social and technological change have been controversial among policymakers and economists concerned about the impact on costs and competition.
Communities depend on having at least some emergency services available, making the survival of hospitals’ core services crucial.
But without adaptation — which is already underway in some cases — hospitals may be facing deep red balance sheets in the not-too-distant future, leading to facility closures and shutteredservices.
The big picture:
Many hospitals have recovered from the sector’s post-pandemic financial slump, which was driven primarily by staffing costs and inflation. But systemic, long-term trends will continue to challenge their traditional business model.
Many of the services that are shifting toward outpatient settings — like oncology, diagnostics and orthopedic care — are the ones that typically make hospitals the most money and effectively subsidize less profitable departments.
When hospitals lose these higher-margin services, “you’re starving the system that needs profits to provide services that we all might need, but particularly uninsured or underinsured people might need,” said UCLA professor Jill Horwitz.
And hospitals have long claimed that much higher commercial insurance rates make up for what they say are inadequate government rates.
But as the population ages and moves out of employer-sponsored health plans, fewer people will have commercial insurance, forcing hospitals to either cut costs or find new sources of revenue.
By the numbers:
Consulting firms are projecting a bleak decade for health systems.
Oliver Wyman recently predicted that under the status quo, hospitals will need to reduce their expenses by 15-20% by 2030 “to stay viable.”
Boston Consulting Group last year projected that health systems’ annual financial shortfall will total more than $200 billion by 2027, and their operating margins will have dropped by 10 percentage points.
To break even in 2027, a “typical” health system would need payment rate increases of between 5-8% annually — twice the rate growth over the last decade, according to BCG. If the load is borne solely by private insurers, hospitals will need a 10-16% year-over-year increase.
Between the lines:
This is the lens through which to view health systems’ spree of mergers and acquisitions, which have increasingly drawn criticism from policymakers, regulators and economists as being anticompetitive.
For better orworse, when hospitals have a larger market share, they are in a better position to negotiate and bring in more patients, and they can dilute some of the financial pain of poorer-performing facilities.
And when they acquire physician practices or other outpatient clinics, they’re still getting paid for delivering care even when patients aren’t receiving it in a traditional hospital setting.
“I think the hospitals have sort of said … ‘We can keep doing things the same way and we can just merge and get higher markups,'” said Yale economist Zack Cooper. “That push to consolidate is saying, ‘Let’s not move forward, let’s dig in.'”
Yes, but:
A big bonus of outpatient care is that it’s supposed to be cheaper. But when hospitals charge more for care than an independent physician’s office would have, or they tack on facility fees, costs don’t go down.
“They’ve protected their portfolio, and that’s added to the cost of health care,” said Johns Hopkins professor Gerard Anderson.
The other side:
Hospitals are typically on the losing end of negotiations with insurers right now, thanks to how large insurers have become, and are “in an extremely difficult competitive position,” said Ken Kaufman, co-founder of consulting agency Kaufman Hall.
Criticizing their mergers and acquisitions as anticompetitive is a “complete misunderstanding of the situation,” he said, and moving toward a new care model will take “an incredible amount of resources.”
Reality check:
Hospitals account for 30% of the country’s massive health spending tab, and they’ll have to be at the forefront of any real efforts to contain costs.
They’re also anchors in their communities and are powerful lobbyists, which helps explain why Congress has struggled to modestly reduce what Medicare pays hospital outpatient departments.
UPMC is laying off about 1,000 employees in a “realignment” the nonprofit said will help it face “the realities of a still-evolving, post-pandemic marketplace.”
The layoffs reflect about 1% of UPMC’s total workforce of over 100,000 people and are primarily among nonclinical and administrative staff, Vice President and Chief Communications Officer Paul Wood said in an emailed statement. He said the system will be offering those impacted “enhanced severance pay and benefits coverage.”
The “limited reductions” will also involve the closing of open positions, the elimination of redundancies and “other actions,” Wood said.
“This realignment will not alter UPMC’s investments in our communities, facilities, commitment to clinical care and research, strategic growth or to offering those throughout our workforce industry-leading benefits,” Wood wrote in the statement.
Pittsburgh-based UPMC is an integrated health system and one of Pennsylvania’s largest employers. Its provider, insurance and other business arms logged $27.7 billion of revenue across 2023 as volumes rose and insurance membership grew.
However, the nonprofit reported a $198.3 million operating loss (-0.7% operating margin) last year as insurance claims expenses jumped 13.6% and labor costs rose 6.4%. It had posted a $162 million operating gain (0.6% operating margin) the year before.
The system did narrow its 2023 bottom line loss to $31 million thanks to its investment returns, though it had logged roughly a billion in net losses during the 2022 fiscal year.
In its year-end financial report, UPMC’s management wrote that “even with increased expenses to deliver high-quality care as a result of various economic factors, in 2023 UPMC continued to forge ahead with investments to grow access to world-class clinical care … advance healthcare excellence through quality and innovation, care for our communities, grow our insurance services and invest in our future workforce.”
Long-term debt has long been a staple in healthcare, but many hospitals and health systems are responding to the increasing cost of debt and debt service in the rising rates environment.
Highly levered health systems are looking to sell hospitals, facilities or business lines to reduce their debt leverage and secure long-term sustainability, which creates significant growth opportunities for systems with balance sheets on a more solid financial footing.
Forty-three health systems ranked by their long-term debt:
Note: This is not an exhaustive list. The following long-term debt figures are taken from each health system’s most recent financial report.
The Federal Trade Commission banned noncompete agreements for most U.S. workers Tuesday with a new rule that will bar employers from enforcing clauses that restrict workers from switching employers within their industry, which the agency said suppresses wages and gums up labor markets.
The FTC voted 3 to 2 Tuesday to issue the rule it proposed more than a year ago. The new rule makes it illegal for employers to include the agreements in employment contracts and requires companies with active noncompete agreements to inform workers that they are void. The agency received more than 26,000 comments about the rule after it was proposed some 16 months ago. The rule will take effect after 180 days, although business groups have promised to challenge it in court, which could delay implementation.
Scholars cite a body of research that shows the agreements suppress worker pay and entrepreneurship while also imposing costs on firms wanting to hire workers bound by the agreements. A Labor Department study published in June 2022 estimated that 18 percent of Americans are bound by noncompete agreements, while other research suggests it could be closer to 5o percent. They are used in a wide range of industries, including technology, hairstyling, medicine and even dance instruction, while imposing restrictions on both high- and low-wage earners.
The FTC estimates that banning noncompete agreements could create jobs for 30 million Americans and raise wages by nearly $300 billion per year.
“I think the FTC has done a real public service here by compiling all this evidence, making a really strong case for a complete ban and establishing a new gold standard for policymaking in this area,” said Sandeep Vaheesan, legal director at the Open Markets Institute, which proposed a noncompete ban to the agency in 2019. “No employee or professional should be made to sign one of these contracts.”
Business groups opposed to the rule, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, have said that the contracts are necessary to protect proprietary information and training, and justify investing in workers who might otherwise immediately jump to a competitor. The Chamber has argued the rule represents a “radical expansion” of the FTC’s authority and has vowed the challenge the rule in court.
Noncompete agreements have been prohibited in three states — California, North Dakota and Oklahoma — for more than a century. In recent years, 11 states and Washington, D.C., have passed laws that prohibit the agreements for hourly wage workers or those who fall below a salary threshold.
But the patchwork nature of the legal landscape has made bans difficult to enforce. Some legal experts said that companies include noncompete clauses in employee contracts regardless of state prohibitions, knowing workers and competitors will be wary of litigation.
Some observers fear that employers will also find workarounds to the FTC rule, but Vaheesan said that a federal rule will provide legal clarity and send a strong message.
“It establishes, in the place of this mushy standard that exists in most states, a bright line,” he said. “So everyone will know these contracts are illegal.”
After covering the Medicare privatization crisis for over two years, an investigative reporter takes a step back and examines what’s at stake.
Medicare, the country’s largest and arguably most successful health care program, is under duress, weakened by decades of relentless efforts by insurance companies to privatize it.
A rapidly growing Medicare Advantage market — now 52% of Medicare beneficiaries, up from 37% in 2018 — controlled by some of the largest and most powerful corporations in the world, threatens to both drain the trust fund and eliminate Medicare’s most important and controversial component: its ability to set prices.
It is not an overstatement to call it a heist of historic proportions, endangering the health not only of the more than 65 million seniors and people with disabilities who depend on Medicare but all Americans who benefit from the powerful role that Medicare has historically played in reining in health care costs.
The giant corporations that dominate Medicare Advantage have rigged the system to maximize payments from our government to the point that they are now being overpaid between $88 billion and $140 billion a year. The overpayments could soar to new heights if the insurers get their way and eliminate traditional Medicare.
All of America’s seniors and disabled people who depend on Medicare could soon be moved to a managed care model of ever-tightening networks, relentless prior authorization requirements and limited drug formularies. The promise of a humane health care system for all would be sacrificed at the altar of the almighty insurer dollar.
The Medicare Payments Advisory Commission (MedPAC), the independent congressional agency tasked with overseeing Medicare, last month released a searing report which found that Medicare spends 22% more per beneficiary in Medicare Advantage plans than if those beneficiaries had been enrolled in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. That’s up from a 6% estimate in the prior year.
A similar cost trend exists for diagnosis coding.
Medicare Advantage plans and their affiliated providers increasingly upcoded diagnoses to get higher reimbursements. In 2024, overpayments due to upcoding could total $50 billion, according to MedPAC, up from $23 billion in 2023. These enormous overpayments drive up the cost of premiums — MedPAC’s conservative estimate is that the premiums paid to Medicare out of seniors’ Social Security checks will be $13 billion higher in 2024 because of those overpayments.
There is evidence that Americans and lawmakers are starting to wake up.
Medicare Advantage enrollment growth slowed considerably in 2023. Support within the Democratic Party for Medicare Advantage is cratering. In 2022, 147 House Democrats signed an industry-backed letter supporting Medicare Advantage. This year, just 24 House Democrats signed the letter. Earlier this month, the Biden administration cut Medicare Advantage base payments for the second year in a row(while still increasing payments overall), over the fierce opposition of the insurance lobby. The investment bank Stephens called Biden’s decision a “highly adverse” outcome for insurers. Wall Street has taken note, punishing the stock price of the largest Medicare Advantage insurers, with Barron’s noting that Wall Street’s “love affair” with Humana is “ending in tears.” The cargo ship is turning. It is up to us to determine if that will be enough.
We can’t attack a problem if we don’t know how to diagnose it. I spoke with some of the most knowledgeable critics of Medicare Advantage about the danger the rapid expansion of Medicare privatization presents to the American public.
Rick Gilfillan is a medical doctor who in 2010 became the first director of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). He would go on to serve as CEO of Trinity Health from 2013 to 2019. In 2021 he launched an effort to halt the involuntary privatization of Medicare benefits.
“Right now, all investigations are finding tremendous overpayments,” Gilfillan said. “The overpayments are based on medical diagnoses that may or may not be meaningful from a patient care standpoint. Insurers are using chart reviews, nurse home visits and AI software to find as many diagnoses as possible and thereby inflate the health risks of the patients and the premium they get from Medicare. The overpayments are just outrageous,” he said.
The problem could get worse if the Supreme Court curtails the powers of regulatory agencies, as it may do this year. “It would make a huge difference in what CMS would be able to do,” Gilfillan said.
The logic behind Medicare privatization is that seniors and people with disabilities use too much care, egged on by their doctors. If true, a solution could have been to enforce the Stark Law, which bans physicians from having financial relationships with providers they refer to, or other anti-kickback statutes. States could also enforce laws 33 of them have enacted that prohibit the “corporate practice of medicine.”
Instead, health insurers were invited and incentivized by previous administrations to compete with the original Medicare program and “manage” beneficiaries’ care. Under this model— set in its modern form in 2003 — Medicare Advantage insurers are paid a rate based on a complex risk modeling process and estimated costs.
But Medicare Advantage plans have never been cheaper than traditional Medicare, as MedPAC has repeatedly pointed out.
This is a far more complex approach than the fee-for-service model in which CMS sets prices in health care in a public and transparent manner, Gilfillan notes. The prices negotiated by Medicare Advantage companies, by contrast, are not disclosed.
“With fee-for-service, a patient is provided a service, treatment or medication. The physician who provides the service charges a specific amount for that service,” Gilfillan said. “And then Medicare pays whatever it decided it was worth for that service. The benefit is you pay for what you get.”
Some Medicare Advantage plans use a “capitated” approach in paying primary care physicians. The amount is based on the premium they receive for the patient. The more codes submitted, the higher the capitation, the greater the profit. That approach is having far-reaching economic impacts on health care, said Hayden Rooke-Ley, an Oregon-based lawyer and health care consultant who co-authored a recent New England Journal of Medicine article on the corporatization of primary care. It is the capitation model, he says, that drives the rampant upcoding among Medicare Advantage plans.
From Horizontal to Vertical
“An undercovered aspect of Medicare Advantage is the way it is fueling vertical consolidation” in the insurance business, Rooke-Ley added, noting that until recent years, insurers bulked up by buying smaller competitors (known as horizontal integration). “With so much government money, we’re seeing insurance companies restructuring themselves as vertically integrated conglomerates [through the acquisition of physician practices, clinics and pharmacy operations] to become even more profitable, especially in Medicare Advantage.”
“A key part of this strategy is to own primary care practices,” he said, citing Humana’s partnership with the private-equity firm Welsh Carson to become the largest owner of Medicare-based primary care, CVS/Aetna’s acquisition of Oak Street, and UnitedHealth’s roll up of doctors practices across the country.
As Rooke-Ley explained, control of primary care allows insurance companies to more easily manipulate “risk scores” to increase payments from the government by claiming patients are in worse health than they really are.
“The easiest way to increase risk scores, short of simply fabricating diagnosis codes, is to control the behavior of physicians and other clinicians,” he said.
“When an insurance company owns the physician practice, it can configure workflows, technology, and incentives to drive risk coding.
UnitedHealth, for example, can preferentially schedule Medicare Advantage patients – and it can choose to reach out to health plan enrollees it identifies with its data as having high ‘coding opportunities.’ It can require its doctors to go to risk-code training, and it can prohibit doctors from closing their notes before they address all the ‘suggested’ diagnosis codes.”
“While Medicare Advantage insurance companies tout all their provider acquisitions as investments in value-based care, the concern is that it’s really just looking like a game of financialization,” Rooke-Ley said. “MA was supposed to save Medicare money, but the exact opposite has happened.
According to MedPAC, the government will over-subsidize MA to the tune of $88 billion this year, with $54 billion of that due to excess risk coding relative to what we see in traditional Medicare. That’s a staggering amount of money that could go directly to patients and clinicians by strengthening traditional Medicare.”
Two Possible Futures
There are two options for the future of Medicare, said Dr. Ed Weisbart, former chief medical officer of the pharmacy benefit manager Express Scripts, which Cigna bought in 2018, who now leads the Missouri chapter of Physicians for a National Health Program.
In one future, he said, “We will change the trajectory and get rid of the profiteers, and manage to divert the funds that are being profiteered to patient care.”
In another future, the business practices of Medicare Advantage plans “will be unfettered and more damaging and harmful than they are today,” he said. “If we continue on this course we’ll find an increasingly polarized health care system that caters increasingly to the wealthy and privileged. The barriers to care will be worse.”
The Affordable Care Act turned 14 on March 23. It has done a lot of good for a lot of people, but big changes in the law are urgently needed to address some very big misses and consequences I don’t believe most proponents of the law intended or expected.
At the top of the list of needed reforms: restraining the power and influence of the rapidly growing corporations that are siphoning more and more money from federal and state governments – and our personal bank accounts – to enrich their executives and shareholders.
I was among many advocates who supported the ACA’s passage, despite the law’s ultimate shortcomings. It broadened access to health insurance, both through government subsidies to help people pay their premiums and by banning prevalent industry practices that had made it impossible for millions of American families to buy coverage at any price. It’s important to remember that before the ACA, insurers routinely refused to sell policies to a third or more applicants because of a long list of “preexisting conditions” – from acne and heart disease to simply being overweight – and frequently rescinded coverage when policyholders were diagnosed with cancer and other diseases.
While insurance company executives were publicly critical of the law, they quickly took advantage of loopholes (many of which their lobbyists created) that would allow them to reap windfall profits in the years ahead – and they have, as you’ll see below.
I wrote and spoke frequently as an industry whistleblower about what I thought Congress should know and do, perhaps most memorably in an interview with Bill Moyers. During my Congressional testimony in the months leading up to the final passage of the bill in 2010, I told lawmakers that if they passed it without a public option and acquiesced to industry demands, they might as well call it “The Health Insurance Industry Profit Protection and Enhancement Act.”
A health plan similar to Medicare that could have been a more affordable option for many of us almost happened, but at the last minute, the Senate was forced to strip the public option out of the bill at the insistence of Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Connecticut), who died on March 27, 2024. The Senate did not have a single vote to spare as the final debate on the bill was approaching, and insurance industry lobbyists knew they could kill the public option if they could get just one of the bill’s supporters to oppose it. So they turned to Lieberman, a former Democrat who was Vice President Al Gore’s running mate in 2000 and who continued to caucus with Democrats. It worked. Lieberman wouldn’t even allow a vote on the bill if it created a public option. Among Lieberman’s constituents and campaign funders were insurance company executives who lived in or around Hartford, the insurance capital of the world. Lieberman would go on to be the founding chair of a political group called No Labels, which is trying to find someone to run as a third-party presidential candidate this year.
The work of Big Insurance and its army of lobbyists paid off as insurers had hoped. The demise of the public option was a driving force behind the record profits – and CEO pay – that we see in the industry today.
The good effects of the ACA:
Nearly 49 million U.S. residents (or 16%) were uninsured in 2010. The law has helped bring that down to 25.4 million, or 8.3% (although a large and growing number of Americans are now “functionally uninsured” because of unaffordable out-of-pocket requirements, which President Biden pledged to address in his recent State of the Union speech).
The ACA also made it illegal for insurers to refuse to sell coverage to people with preexisting conditions, which even included birth defects, or charge anyone more for their coverage based on their health status; it expanded Medicaid (in all but 10 states that still refuse to cover more low-income individuals and families); it allowed young people to stay on their families’ policies until they turn 26; and it required insurers to spend at least 80% of our premiums on the health care goods and services our doctors say we need (a well-intended provision of the law that insurers have figured out how to game).
The not-so-good effects of the ACA:
As taxpayers and health care consumers, we have paid a high price in many ways as health insurance companies have transformed themselves into massive money-making machines with tentacles reaching deep into health care delivery and taxpayers’ pockets.
To make policies affordable in the individual market, for example, the government agreed to subsidize premiums for the vast majority of people seeking coverage there, meaning billions of new dollars started flowing to private insurance companies. (It also allowed insurers to charge older Americans three times as much as they charge younger people for the same coverage.) Even more tax dollars have been sent to insurers as part of the Medicaid expansion. That’s because private insurers over the years have persuaded most states to turn their Medicaid programs over to them to administer.
We invite you to take a look at how the ascendency of health insurers over the past several years has made a few shareholders and executives much richer while the rest of us struggle despite – and in some cases because of – the Affordable Care Act.
BY THE NUMBERS
In 2010, we as a nation spent $2.6 trillion on health care. This year we will spend almost twice as much – an estimated $4.9 trillion, much of it out of our own pockets even with insurance.
In 2010, the average cost of a family health insurance policy through an employer was $13,710. Last year, the average was nearly $24,000, a 75% increase.
The ACA, to its credit, set an annual maximum on how much those of us with insurance have to pay before our coverage kicks in, but, at the insurance industry’s insistence, it goes up every year. When that limit went into effect in 2014, it was $12,700 for a family. This year, it has increased by 48%, to $18,900. That means insurers can get away with paying fewer claims than they once did, and many families have to empty their bank accounts when a family member gets sick or injured. Most people don’t reach that limit, but even a few hundred dollars is more than many families have on hand to cover deductibles and other out-of-pocket requirements.
Now 100 million Americans – nearly one of every three of us – are mired in medical debt, even though almost 92% of us are presumably “covered.” The coverage just isn’t as adequate as it used to be or needs to be.
Meanwhile, insurance companies had a gangbuster 2023. The seven big for-profit U.S. health insurers’ revenues reached $1.39 trillion, and profits totaled a whopping $70.7 billion last year.
SWEEPING CHANGE, CONSOLIDATION–AND HUGE PROFITS FOR INVESTORS
Insurance company shareholders and executives have become much wealthier as the stock prices of the seven big for-profit corporations that control the health insurance market have skyrocketed.
NOTE: The Dow Jones Industrial Average is listed on this chart as a reference because it is a leading stock market index that tracks 30 of the largest publicly traded companies in the United States.
REVENUES collected by those seven companies have more than tripled (up 346%), increasing by more than $1 trillion in just the past ten years.
PROFITS (earnings from operations) have more than doubled (up 211%), increasing by more than $48 billion.
The CEOs of these companies are among the highest paid in the country. In 2022, the most recent year the companies have reported executive compensation, they collectively made $136.5 million.
U.S. HEALTH PLAN ENROLLMENT
Enrollment in the companies’ health plans is a mix of “commercial” policies they sell to individuals and families and that they manage for “plan sponsors” – primarily employers and unions – and government/enrollee-financed plans (Medicare, Medicaid, Tricare for military personnel and their dependents and the Federal Employee Health Benefits program).
Enrollment in their commercial plans grew by just 7.65% over the 10 years and declined significantly at UnitedHealth, CVS/Aetna and Humana. Centene and Molina picked up commercial enrollees through their participation in several ACA (Obamacare) markets in which most enrollees qualify for federal premium subsidies paid directly to insurers.
While not growing substantially, commercial plans remain very profitable because insurers charge considerably more in premiums now than a decade ago.
(1) The 2013 total for CVS/Aetna was reported by Aetna before its 2018 acquisition by CVS. (2) Humana announced last year it is exiting the commercial health insurance business. (3) Enrollment in the ACA’s marketplace plans account for all of Molina’s commercial business.
By contrast, enrollment in the government-financed Medicaid and Medicare Advantage programs has increased 197% and 167%, respectively, over the past 10 years.
(1) The 2013 total for CVS/Aetna was reported by Aetna before its 2018 acquisition by CVS.
Of the 65.9 million people eligible for Medicare at the beginning of 2024, 33 million, slightly more than half, enrolled in a private Medicare Advantage plan operated by either a nonprofit or for-profit health insurer, but, increasingly, three of the big for-profits grabbed most new enrollees. Of the 1.7 million new Medicare Advantage enrollees this year, 86% were captured by UnitedHealth, Humana and Aetna. Those three companies are the leaders in the Medicare Advantage business among the for-profit companies, and, according to the health care consulting firm Chartis, are taking over the program “at breakneck speed.”
(1) The 2013 total for CVS/Aetna was reported by Aetna before its 2018 acquisition by CVS. (2,3) Centene’s and Molina’s totals include Medicare Supplement; they do not break out enrollment in the two Medicare categories separately.
It is worth noting that although four companies saw growth in their Medicare Supplement enrollment over the decade, enrollment in Medicare Supplement policies has been declining in more recent years as insurers have attracted more seniors and disabled people into their Medicare Advantage plans.
OTHER FEDERAL PROGRAMS
In addition to the above categories, Humana and Centene have significant enrollment in Tricare, the government-financed program for the military. Humana reported 6 million military enrollees in 2023, up from 3.1 million in 2013. Centene reported 2.8 million in 2023. It did not report any military enrollment in 2013.
Elevance reported having 1.6 million enrollees in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program in 2023, up from 1.5 million in 2013. That total is included in the commercial enrollment category above.
At Cigna, Express Scripts’ pharmacy operations now contribute more than 70% to the company’s total revenues. Caremark’s pharmacy operations contribute 33% to CVS/Aetna’s total revenues, and Optum Rx contributes 31% to UnitedHealth’s total revenues.
WHAT TO DO AND WHERE TO START
The official name of the ACA is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The law did indeed implement many important patient protections, and it made coverage more affordable for many Americans. But there is much more Congress and regulators must do to close the loopholes and dismantle the barriers erected by big insurers that enable them to pad their bottom lines and reward shareholders while making health care increasingly unaffordable and inaccessible for many of us.
Several bipartisan bills have been introduced in Congress to change how big insurers do business.
And as noted above, President Biden has asked Congress to broaden the recently enacted $2,000-a-year cap on prescription drugs to apply to people with private insurance, not just Medicare beneficiaries. That one policy change could save an untold number of lives and help keep millions of families out of medical debt. (A coalition of more than 70 organizations and businesses, which I lead, supports that, although we’re also calling on Congress to reduce the current overall annual out-of-pocket maximum to no more than $5,000.)
I encourage you to tell your members of Congress and the Biden administration that you support these reforms as well as improving, strengthening and expanding traditional Medicare. You can be certain the insurance industry and its allies are trying to keep any reforms that might shrink profit margins from becoming law.
