Listening and Learning

Something I have been writing about and speaking about recently is how difficult it is to operate a hospital in post-Covid America.

The line-up of management and governing obstacles includes both old and new healthcare issues:

  • Financial instability
  • Ongoing labor disruption
  • Remnants of significant healthcare inflation
  • Payer chaos
  • A continuing pivot from inpatient to outpatient services
  • The endless introduction of alternative care options (CVS, Walgreens, Walmart, Amazon, and now Costco)

It takes considerable hard thinking within executive suites to figure out the best way forward; to find the best roadmap through—at a minimum—the six obstacles outlined above. And as I have noted in my recent speaking engagements, a solution to one of these obstacles might actually make others of these obstacles more difficult to solve.

I have in recent weeks been looking for a “thought platform” that can assist hospital C-suite executives in resetting managerial expectations and operational initiatives—expectations and initiatives that can more effectively cope with the current and distressingly difficult environment.

Moving the hospital organizational thought platform from its 2019 managerial themes to a more relevant platform that better suits the challenges of 2023 is a managerial problem all of its own. Simply telling a large and very complex healthcare organization to stop thinking in pre-Covid terms is not likely to accomplish much. Before you can establish the organizational thought platform that best guides your hospital forward, you will need a leadership team that is committed to creating a “listening and learning” healthcare company.

A good tool for making your way to a listening and learning organization and eventually to a new and more relevant thought platform is the book The First 90 Days: Proven Strategies for Getting Up to Speed Faster and Smarter, by Michael D. Watkins.

Mr. Watkins is a co-founder of Genesis Advisers and a professor at the IMD Business School in Lausanne, Switzerland. The First 90 Days was originally published in 2003 as a guide to business executives moving into new senior positions of major responsibility. But the book also contains general management advice which is relevant not only to new jobs, but also to executives struggling with fast-changing and especially difficult market conditions.

One of the most compelling chapters in The First 90 Days is a chapter that focuses on the absolute importance of executive learning and the need to accelerate that learning.

While Professor Watkins was making a general business point, I would suggest that the need to accelerate executive learning and listening was never more important than in the “right now” post-Covid healthcare environment. Professor Watkins posed a series of critical leadership learning questions that I have modified to reflect the complex operating conditions of the 2023 hospital.

From that perspective, here are six critical learning questions for the hospital leadership team:

  1. How effective are you as a hospital leader at learning about your current job and how that current job is changing?
  2. What is your learning agenda for your current assignment? Have your day-to-day responsibilities changed so dramatically that you no longer know what you need to know?
  3. Given questions one and two, how should you go about gaining better insight?
  4. What is the best structure for being a top-flight learner within your organization? Note that this is a question that has both individual and organizational implications.
  5. What support is there within your organization for ongoing day-to-day learning? Note this should not be viewed as “training.” This is how executives “learn” through constant interaction with their changing jobs and changing market conditions. We are headed here not toward “skillsets” but toward “learned strategies and insights.” The difference is material.
  6. Professor Watkins suggests creating a learning agenda that relates directly to an ongoing learning plan. What don’t you know right now and how are you going to learn what you don’t know? And, importantly, how has the healthcare macroeconomy made your job more difficult and why?

One of my last blogs focused on the importance of vision and strategy in the post-Covid hospital recovery process; the importance of reinventing the hospital of the future that best fits into a rapidly changing marketplace. This marketplace requires entirely new skillsets and functions on top of changing shared experiences and perceived social values. Finding the right going-forward strategy and vision is the first imperative.

But without executive learning and listening that leads directly to organizational-wide learning and listening, the chances of finding your way to that highest and best and most effective vision and strategy will be greatly diminished.

“Culture Eats Strategy for Breakfast” But Probably Not Right Now

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2022 and 2023 have been particularly difficult operating years for hospital providers. The financial challenges stand out but as we concluded in the August 7, 2023, blog, strategic planning and vision issues may be more compelling over the long term.

We previously identified two strategic issues that need to be reckoned with:

  1. Strategic Relevance. Has everything changed organizationally post-Covid or does it just feel that way? If your strategy still seems dynamic and relevant, how do you capitalize on that? If your strategy feels entirely lost, how do you recapture organizational excitement and enthusiasm?
  2. Vision. How important is organizational vision right now? You know the old saying, “a camel is a horse designed by a committee.” And many vision statements wind up looking more like that camel than like that desired horse. But be that as it may: Covid has been so disruptive to the organizational momentum of hospitals that finding a relevant and executable vision should be top of mind right now.

Given circumstances, one obvious conclusion is that any strategic exercise undertaken in the current moment needs to be well accomplished. Executive teams, clinicians, and Boards are simply too distracted or too tired to spend time on planning processes that are not well thought out and highly directed. This immediate observation next demands a discussion that outlines post-Covid strategic principles, definitions, and the creation of a vision that relates immediately to actionable strategy. It would be an understatement to note that for hospitals there is no “strategic time” to waste.

Start the post-Covid planning process with four very clear strategic definitions:

  1. Vision: A time-bounded view of the future destination of your business.
  2. Strategic Workstreams: The ways you devise to achieve the strategic vision.
  3. Goals: Goals are the lag outcomes that you seek to achieve for your customers.
  4. Metrics: Metrics measure the progress toward the goals.

Working from these definitions then allows you to move toward an organizationally appropriate vision and an actionable strategy that efficiently supports that vision as follows:

  1. The vision should drive growth. Many hospital organizations have stopped growing organically. No growth is harmful financially, clinically, intellectually, and creatively.
  2. The vision should differentiate the business from that of competitors. Everybody and everything competes with hospitals these days: other hospitals, pharmacy companies, insurers, private equity. It has no end.
  3. The vision should endeavor to solve a basic customer problem or problems. The problem list is pretty apparent. The list of helpful solutions has been harder to come by.
  4. The vision should be either incremental or transformational. In all candor, most hospitals’ post-Covid vision is going to be incremental. It takes considerable financial and capital capacity to move toward a transformational vision. That kind of capacity is available at only a small minority of hospitals nationwide.
  5. Recognize that a transformational vision will require active management of culture and stakeholders. If you pivot to a transformational vision, you are likely to upset certain stakeholders and your existing culture may need to also adjust to the transformation.
  6. Be prepared to modify or improve upon the vision, workstreams, and/or goals as you get ongoing feedback during the planning and execution process. Under any circumstances you need to be open to learning all along the way. For this to happen, your organization needs to be a listening organization and a learning organization. Not all hospitals and health systems are.

Does all this sound hard? It should sound hard because it is hard. Leading the hospital back to financial stability while finding a relevant post-Covid vison that proves to be competitive and, at the same time, energizes your team to find renewed purpose in your hospital’s work; that is unforgivably hard.

As Piet Hein, the Danish mathematician, profoundly said, “Problems worthy of attack prove their worth by fighting back.” And fighting back is the hospital job of the moment.

Note: “Culture eats strategy for breakfast” is a quote attributed to management consultant and writer Peter Drucker.

How to convince the board that it’s time to merge

https://mailchi.mp/27e58978fc54/the-weekly-gist-august-11-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

This week we had a conversation with a health system executive who has been wondering how to make the case to his board for expansion beyond the existing markets where the organization operates.

Like many, he’s confronting declining margin performance, and feeling pressure to combine with another system—joining the wave of cross-market consolidation that’s been dominating discussion among system CEOs recently.

His concern was that his locally governed board may be putting an artificial brake on growth, not seeing value of expansion beyond their market for the community they serve.

That’s a valid point—how does it help a Busytown resident if the local health system expands to operate in Pleasantville? Shouldn’t Busytown Health System just focus its resources and time on improving performance at home, and wouldn’t it represent a loss to Busytown if Pleasantville got investment dollars that could have been spent locally?

That’s a question raised by the “super-regional” or national strategies being pursued by many large systems today, and one worth thinking about. 

Whenever a system grows outside its geography, there should be a solid argument that additional scale will reap returns for its existing operations, from better efficiency, better access to innovation and talent, better access to capital, or the like.

Those are legitimate reasons for out-of-market growth and consolidation, as long as the systems involved are diligent in pursuing them.

But local boards are right to hold executives accountable for making the case for growth, and ensuring that growth creates value for local patients and purchasers.

The Four Issues that will Impact Healthcare Services Providers and Insurers Most in the Last Half of 2023 and First Half of 2024

As first half 2023 financial results are reported and many prepare for a busy last half, strategic planning for healthcare services providers and insurers point to 4 issues requiring attention in every boardroom and C suite:

Private equity maturity wall: 

The last half of 2023 (and into 2024) is a buyer’s market for global PE investments in healthcare services: 40% of PE investments in hospitals, medical groups and insurtech will hit their maturity wall in the next 12 months. Valuations of companies in these portfolios are below their targeted range; limited partner’ investing in PE funds is down 28% from pre-pandemic peak while fund raising by large, publicly traded, global funds dominate fund raising lifting PE dry powder to a record $3.7 trillion going into the last half of 2023.

In the U.S. healthcare services market, conditions favor well-capitalized big players—global private equity funds and large cap aggregators (i.e., Optum, CVS, Goldman Sachs, Blackstone et al) who have $1 trillion to invest in deals that enhance their platforms. Deals done via special purpose acquisition corporations (SPACS) and smaller PE funds in physicians, hospitals, ambulatory services and others are especially vulnerable. (see Bain and Pitchbook citations below). Addressing the growing role of large-cap PE and strategic investors as partners, collaborators, competitors or disruptors is table stakes for most organizations recognizing they have the wind at their backs.

Consolidation muscle by DOJ and FTC: 

Healthcare is in the crosshair of the FTC and DOJ, especially hospitals and health insurers.  Hospital markets have become increasingly concentrated: only 12% of the 306 Hospital Referral Regions is considered unconcentrated vs. 23% in 2008. In the 384 insurance markets, 23% are unconcentrated, down from 35% in 2020. Wages for healthcare workers are lower, prices for consumers are higher and choices fewer in concentrated markets prompting stricter guidelines announced last week by the oversight agencies. Big hospitals and big insurers are vulnerable to intensified scrutiny. (See Regulatory Action section below).

Defamatory attacks on nonprofit health systems: 

In the past 3 years, private, not-for-profit multi-hospital systems have been targeted for excess profits, inadequate charity care and executive compensation.  Labor unions (i.e., SEIU) and privately funded foundations (i.e., West, Arnold Venture, Lown Institute) have joined national health insurers in claims that NFP systems are price gaugers undeserving of the federal, state and local tax exemptions they enjoy. It comes at a time when faith in the U.S. health system is at a modern-day low (Gallup), healthcare access and affordability concerns among consumers are growing and hospital price transparency still lagging (36% are fully compliant with the 2021 Executive Order).

Notably, over the last 20 years, NFP hospitals have become less dominant as a share of all hospitals (61% in 2002 vs. 58% last year) while investor-owned hospitals have shown dramatic growth (from 15% in 2002 to 24% last year). Thus, the majority of local NFP hospitals have joined systems creating prominent brands and market dominance in most regions. But polling indicates many of these brands is more closely associated with “big business” than “not-for-profit health” so they’re soft targets for critics. It is likely unflattering attention to large, NFP systems will increase in the next 12 months prompting state and federal regulatory actions and erosion of public support.  (See New England Journal citation in Quotables below)

Campaign 2024 healthcare rhetoric: 

Republican candidates will claim healthcare is not affordable and blame Democrats. Democrats will counter that the Affordable Care Act’s expanded coverage and the Biden administration’s attack on drug prices (vis a vis the Inflation Reduction Act) illustrate their active attention to healthcare in contrast to the GOP’s less specific posturing.

Campaigns in both parties will call for increased regulation of hospitals, prescription drug manufacturers, health insurers and PBMs. All will cast the health industry as a cesspool for greed and corruption, decry its performance on equitable access, affordability, price transparency and improvements in the public’s health and herald its frontline workers (nurses, physicians et al) as innocent victims of a system run amuck.

To date, 16 candidates (12 R, 3 D, 1 I) have announced they’re candidates for the White House while campaigns for state and local office are also ramping up in 46 states where local, state and national elections are synced. Healthcare will figure prominently in all. In campaign season, healthcare is especially vulnerable to misinformation and hyper-attention to its bad actors. Until November 5, 2024, that’s reality.

My take:

These issues frame the near-term context for strategic planning in every sector of U.S. healthcare. They do not define the long-term destination of the system nor roles key sectors and organizations will play. That’s unknown.

  • What’s known for sure is that AI will modify up to 70% of the tasks in health delivery and financing and disrupt its workforce.
  • Black Swans like the pandemic will prompt attention to gaps in service delivery and inequities in access.
  • People will be sick, injured, die and be born.
  • And the economics of healthcare will force uncomfortable discussions about its value and performance.

In the U.S. system, attention to regulatory issues is a necessary investment by organizations in every state and at the federal level. Details about these efforts is readily accessible on websites for each organization’s trade group. They’re the rule changes, laws and administrative actions to which all are attentive. They’re today’s issues.

Less attention is given the long-term. That focus is often more academic than practical—much the same as Robert Oppenheimer’s early musings about the future of nuclear fusion. But the Manhattan Project produced two bombs (Little Boy and Fat Man) that detonated above the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, triggering the end of World War II.

The four issues above should be treated as near and present dangers to the U.S. health system requiring attention in every organization. But responses to these do not define the future of the U.S. system. That’s the Manhattan Project that’s urgently needed in our system.

When Financial Performance Matters

https://www.kaufmanhall.com/insights/thoughts-ken-kaufman/when-financial-performance-matters

The Sunk Cost Fallacy

In behavioral economics, the sunk cost fallacy describes the tendency to carry on with a project or investment past the point where cold logic would suggest it is not working out. Given human nature, the existence of the sunk cost fallacy is not surprising. The more resources—time, money, emotions—we devote to an effort, the more we want it to succeed, especially when the cause is an important one.

Under normal circumstances, the sunk cost fallacy might qualify as an interesting but not especially important economic theory. But at the moment, given that 2022 will likely be the worst financial year for hospitals since 2008 and given that the hospital revenue/expense relationship seems to be entirely broken, there is little that is theoretical about the sunk cost fallacy. Instead, the sunk cost fallacy becomes one of the most important action ideas in the hospital industry’s absolutely necessary financial recovery.

Historically, cases of the sunk cost fallacy can be relatively easy to spot. However, in real time, cases can be hard to identify and even harder to act on. For hospital organizations that are subsidizing underperforming assets, identifying and acting on these cases is now essential to the financial health of most hospital enterprises.

For example, perhaps the asset that is underperforming is a hospital acquired by a health system. (Although this same concept could apply to a service line or a related service such as a skilled nursing facility, ambulatory surgery center, or imaging center.) The costs associated with integrating an acquired hospital into a health system are typically significant. And chances are, if the hospital was struggling prior to the acquisition, the purchaser made substantial capital investments to improve the performance.

As time goes on, if the financial performance of the entity in question continues to fall short, hospital executives may be reluctant to divest the asset because of their heavy investment in it.

This understandable tendency can lead the acquiring organization to throw good money after bad. After all, even when an asset is underperforming, it can’t be allowed to deteriorate. In the case of hospitals, that’s not just a matter of keeping weeds from sprouting in the parking lot. The health system often winds up supporting an underperforming hospital with both working capital and physical capital, which compounds the losses.

And the costs don’t stop there, because other assets in the system are supporting the underperforming asset. This de facto cross-subsidy has been commonplace in hospital organizations for decades. Such a cross subsidy was probably never sustainable, but it is even less so in the current challenging financial environment.

This is a transformative period in American healthcare, when hospital organizations are faced with the need to fundamentally reinvent themselves both financially and clinically. The opportunity costs of supporting assets that don’t have an appropriate return are uniquely high in such an environment. This is true whether the underperforming asset is a hospital in a smaller system, multiple hospitals in a larger system, or a service line within a hospital.

The money that is being funneled off to support underperforming assets may be better directed, for example, toward realigning the organization’s portfolio away from inpatient care and toward growth strategies. In some cases, the resources may be needed for more immediate purposes, such as improving cash flow to support mission priorities and avoiding downgrades of the organization’s credit rating.

The underlying principle is straightforward:

When a hospital supports too many low-performing assets, the capital allocation process becomes inefficient. Directing working capital and capital capacity toward assets that are dilutive to long-term financial success means that assets that are historically or potentially accretive don’t receive the resources they need to grow and thrive. The underlying principle is a clear lose-lose.

In the highly challenging current environment, it is especially important for boards and management to recognize the sunk cost fallacy and determine the right size of their hospital organizations—both clinically and financially.

Some leadership teams may determine that their organizations are too big, or too big in the wrong places, and need to be smaller in order to maximize clinical and balance-sheet strength. Other leadership teams may determine that their organizations are not large enough to compete effectively in their fast-changing markets or in a fast-changing economy.

Organizational scale is a strategy that must be carefully managed. A properly sized organization maximizes its chances of financial success in this very difficult inflationary period. Such an organization invests consistently in its best performing assets and reduces cross-subsidies to services and products that have outlived their opportunity for clinical or financial success.

Executives may see academic economic theory as arcane and not especially relevant. However, we have clearly entered a financial moment when paying attention to the sunk cost fallacy will be central to maintaining, or recovering, the financial, clinical, and mission strength of America’s hospitals.

The Five Most Important Questions Hospitals must Answer in Planning for the Future

As hospital leaders convene in Seattle this weekend for the American Hospital Association Leadership Summit, their future is uncertain.

Last week’s court decision in favor of hospitals shortchanged by the 340B drug program and 1st half 2023 improvement in operating margins notwithstanding, the deck is stacked against hospitals—some more than others. And they’re not alone: nursing homes and physician practices face the same storm clouds:

  • Decreased reimbursement from government payers (Medicare and Medicaid) coupled with heightened tension with national health insurers seeking bigger discounts and direct control of hospital patient care.
  • Persistent medical-inflation driving costs for facilities, supplies, wages, technologies, prescription drugs and professional services (legal, accounting, marketing, et al) higher than reimbursement increases by payers.
  • Increased competition across the delivery spectrum from strategic aggregators, private equity and health insurers diversifying into outpatient, physician services et al.
  • Increased discontent and burnout among doctors, nurses and care teams who feel unappreciated, underpaid and overworked.
  • Escalating media criticism of not-for-profit hospitals/health system profitability, debt collection policies, lack of price transparency, consolidation, executive compensation, charity care, community benefits and more.
  • Declining trust in the system across the board.

Most hospitals soldier on: they’re aware of these and responding as best they can. But most are necessarily focused only on the near-term: bed needs, workforce recruitment and staffing, procurement costs for drugs and supplies and so on.  Some operate in markets less problematic than others, but the trends hold true directionally in every one of America’s 290 HRR markets.

Planning for the long-term is paralyzed by the tyranny of the urgent:

survival and sustainability in 2023 and making guarded bets about 2024 dominate today’s plans. That’s reality.  Though the healthcare pie is forecast to get bigger, it’s being carved up by upstarts pursuing profitable niches and mega-players with deep pockets and a take-no-prisoners approach to their growth strategies. The result is an industry nearing meltdown.

Each traditional sector thinks it’s moral virtue more honorable than others. Each blames the other for avoidable waste and inaction in weeding out its bad actors. Each is pays lip service to “value-based care” and “system transformation” while doubling-down on making sure changes are incremental and painless for the near-term. And each believes the long-term destination of the system will be different than the past but no two agree on what that is.

Hospitals control 31% of the spend directly and as much as 43% with their employed physicians included. So, they’re a logical focus of attention from outsiders. Whether not for profit, public or investor owned, all are thought to be expensive and non-transparent and increasingly many are seen as ‘Big Business’ with excessive profits. Complaints about heavy-handed insurer reimbursement and price-gauging by drug companies fall on death ears in most communities. That’s why most are focused on near-term survival and few have the luxury or tools to plan for the future.

As a start, answers to the questions below in the 3-5 (mid-term) and 8–10-year (long-term) time frames is imperative for every hospital leadership team and Board:

  • Is the status quo sustainable? With annual spending projected to increase at 5.4%/year through 2031– well above population and economic growth rates overall– will employers remain content to pay 224% of Medicare rates to produce profits for hospitals, doctors, drug and device makers and insurers? Will they continue to pass these costs through to their customers and employees while protecting their tax exemptions or will alternative strategies prompt activism? Might employers drive system transformation by addressing affordability, effectiveness, consumer self-care and systemness et al. with impunity toward discomfort created for insiders? Or, might voters reject the status quo in subsequent state/federal elections in favor of alternatives with promised improvement? And who will the winners and losers be?
  • Are social determinants a core strategy or distraction? 70% of costs in the health system are directly attributable to social needs unmet—food insecurity. loneliness et al. But in most communities, programs addressing SDOH and public health programs that serve less-privileged populations are step-children to better funded hospitals and retail services targeted to populations that can afford them. Is the destination incremental bridges built between local providers and public health programs to satisfy vocal special interest groups OR comprehensive integration of SDOH in every domain of operation? Private investors are wading into SDOH if they’re attached to a risk-based insurance programs like Medicare Advantage and others, but sparingly in other settings. Does the future necessitate re-definition of “community benefits” or new regulations prompting providers, drug companies and payers to fair-share performance. Is the future modest improvement in the “Health or Human Services” status quo OR is system of “Health and Social Services” that’s fully integrated? And might interoperability and connectivity in the entire population become “true north” for tech giants and EHR juggernauts seeking to evade anti-trust constraint and demonstrate their commitment to the greater good? There’s no debate that SDOH is central to community health and wellbeing but in most communities, it’s more talk than walk. Yesterday, SDOH was about risk factors; today, it’s about low-income populations who lack insurance; tomorrow, it’s everyone.
  • How should the health system of the future be funded? The current system of funding is a mess: In 2021, the federal government and households accounted for the largest shares of national health spending (34 % and 27%, respectively), followed by private businesses (17%), state and local governments (15%), and other private revenues (7%). It will spend $4.66 trillion, employ 19 million and impact every citizen (and non-citizen) directly.  But 4 of 10 households have unpaid medical bills. Big employers in certain industries provide rich benefits while half of small businesses provide none. Medicare depends on employer payroll taxes for the lion’s share of its Part A (Hospital) funding exposing the “trust fund” to a shortfall in 2028 and insolvency fears…and so on. Increased public funding via taxes is problematic and debt is more costly as interest rates go up and the municipal bond market tightens. Voters and private employers don’t seem inclined to pay higher taxes for healthcare–:is it worth $13,998 per capita today? $20,426 in 2031? Will high-cost inpatient care and specialty drugs become regulated public utilities in which access and pricing is tightly controlled and directly funded by government? Will private investors and strategic aggregators be required to take invest in community benefits to offset the disproportionate costs borne by hospitals, public health clinics and others? Is there a better formula for funding U.S. healthcare? Other systems of the world spend more on social services and preventive health and less on specialty care. They spend a third less and get comparable if not better outcomes though each is stretched to deal with medical inflation. And in most, government funding is higher, private funding lower and privileged populations have access to private services they pay for directly.  Where do we start, and who demands the question be answered?
  • How will innovations in therapeutics and information technology change how individuals engage with the system? Artificial intelligence will directly impact 60% of the traditional health delivery workforce, negating jobs for many/most. Non-allopathic therapies, technology-enabled self-care, precision medicines, non-invasive and minimally invasive surgical techniques are changing change how care is delivered, by whom and where. Thus, lag indicators based on visits, procedures, admissions and volume are increasingly useless. How will demand be defined in the future? Who will own the data and how will it be accessed? And how will the rights of patients (consumers) be protected in courts and in communities? In the future, information-driven healthcare will be much more than encounter data from medical records and claims-based analyses from payers. It will be sourced globally, housed centrally and accessed by innovators and consumers to know more about their health now and next. Within 10 years, generative AI coupled with therapeutic innovation will fundamentally change roles, payments and performance measurement in every domain of healthcare. Proficiency in leveraging the two will anchor system reputations and facilitate significant market share shifts to high value, high outcome, lower cost alternatives…whether local or not.
  • How will regulators and court decisions enact fair competition, consumer choices and antitrust protections? The current political environment is united around reforms that encourage price transparency and affordability. FTC and DOJ leaders are aligned on healthcare oversight with a decided bent toward heightened enforcement and tighter scrutiny of proposed deals (both vertical and horizontal integration). But their leaders’ terms are subject to political appointments and elections: that’s an unknown. And while recent rulings of the conservative leaning Supreme Court are problematic to many in healthcare, their rulings are perhaps more predictable than policies, rules and regulations directly impacted by election results.

For hospital leaders gathering in Seattle this week, and in local board meetings nationwide, necessary attention is being given the near-term issues all face. But longer-term issues lurk: the future does not appear a modernized version of the past for anyone in U.S. healthcare, especially hospitals. And among hospitals, fundamental precepts—like tax exemptions for “not-for-profit” hospitals, community benefits and charity care in exchange for tax exemption, EMTALA et al. regulations that require access without pre-condition are among many that will re-surface as the long-term view of the health system is re-considered.

To that end, the questions above deserve urgent discussion in every hospital board room and C suite. Trade-offs aren’t clear, potential future state hospital scenarios are not discreet and winners and losers unknown. But a fact-driven process recognizing a widening array of players with deep pockets and fresh approaches is necessary.

The Hospital Makeover—Part 2

America’s hospitals have a $104 billion problem.

That’s the amount you arrive at if you multiply the number of physicians employed by hospitals and health systems (approximately 341,200 as of January 2022, according to data from the Physicians Advocacy Institute and Avalere) by the median $306,362 subsidy—or loss—reported in our Q1 2023 Physician Flash Report.

Subsidizing physician employment has been around for a long time and such subsidies were historically justified as a loss leader for improved clinical services, the potential for increased market share, and the strengthening of traditionally profitable services.

But I am pretty sure the industry did not have $104 billion in losses in mind when the physician employment model first became a key strategic element in the hospital operating model. However, the upward reset in expenses brought on by the pandemic and post-pandemic inflation has made many downstream hospital services that historically operated at a profit now operate at breakeven or even at a loss. The loss leader physician employment model obviously no longer works when it mostly leads to more losses.

This model is clearly broken and in demand of a near-term fix. Perhaps the critical question then is how to begin? How to reconsider physician employment within the hospital operating plan?

Out of the box, rethink the physician productivity model. Our most recent Physician Flash Report data shows that for surgical specialties, there was a median $77 net patient revenue per provider wRVU. For the same specialties, there was a median $80 provider paid compensation per provider wRVU. In other words, before any other expenses are factored in, these specialties are losing $3 per wRVU on paid compensation alone. Getting providers to produce more wRVUs only makes the loss bigger.

It’s the classic business school 101 problem.

If a factory is losing $5 on every widget it produces, the answer is not to produce more widgets. Rather, expenses need to come down, whether that is through a readjustment of compensation, new compensation models that reward efficiency, or the more effective use of advanced practice providers.

Second, a number of hospital CEOs have suggested to me that the current employed physician model is quite past its prime. That model was built for a system of care that included generally higher revenues, more inpatient care, and a greater proportion of surgical vs. medical admissions. But overall, these trends were changing and then were accelerated by the Covid pandemic. Inpatient revenue has been flat to down. More clinical work continues to shift to the outpatient setting and, at least for the time being, medical admissions have been more prominent than before the pandemic.

Taking all this into account suggests that in many places the employed physician organizational and operating model is entirely out of balance. One would offer the calculated guess that there are too many coaches on the team and not enough players on the field. This administrative overhead was seemingly justified in a different loss leader environment but now it is a major contributor to that $104 billion industry-wide loss previously calculated.

Finally, perhaps the very idea of physician employment needs to be rethought.

My colleagues Matthew Bates and John Anderson have commented that the “owner” model is more appealing to physicians who remain independent then the “renter” model. The current employment model offers physicians stability of practice and income but appears to come at the cost of both a loss of enthusiasm and lost entrepreneurship. The massive losses currently experienced strongly suggest that new models are essential to reclaim physician interest and establish physician incentives that result in lower practice expenses, higher practice revenues, and steadily reduced overall subsidies.

Please see this blog as an extension of my last blog, “America’s Hospitals Need a Makeover.” It should be obvious that by analogy we are not talking about a coat of paint here or even new appliances in the kitchen.

The financial performance of America’s hospitals has exposed real structural flaws in the healthcare house. A makeover of this magnitude is going to require a few prerequisites:

  1. Don’t start designing the renovation unless you know specifically where profitability has changed within your service lines and by explicitly how much. Right now is the time to know how big the problem is, where those problems are located, and what is the total magnitude of the fix.
  2. The Board must be brought into the discussion of the nature of the physician employment problem and the depth of its proposed solutions. Physicians are not just “any employees.” They are often the engine that runs the hospital and must be afforded a level of communication that is equal to the size of the financial problem. All of this will demand the Board’s knowledge and participation as solutions to the physician employment dilemma are proposed, considered, and eventually acted upon.

The basic rule of home renovation applies here as well: the longer the fix to this problem is delayed the harder and more expensive the project becomes. The losses set out here certainly suggest that physician employment is a significant contributing factor to hospitals’ current financial problems overall. It would be an understatement to say that the time to get after all of this is right now.

Bringing younger voices into the boardroom

https://mailchi.mp/7f59f737680b/the-weekly-gist-june-30-2023?e=d1e747d2d8

At a recent board meeting, the discussion turned to what Millennial consumers want from healthcare. The system COO put the administrative coordinator, the sole Millennial in the room, on the spot to speak for the preferences of an entire generation.

Nearly every health system we work with is debating how to engage Millennial consumers or understand Millennial (and now Gen Z) employees—perhaps an even more pressing need, given that Millennials now outnumber Baby Boomers in the healthcare workforce. But having a real, live Millennial participating in a health system board meeting is a rarity. 

Most often we rely on secondhand information, either from studies analyzing their behavior, or Boomer board members’ personal experiences as the parents of Millennials. When we suggested that systems are at a disadvantage in not having Millennial board members, the system CEO agreed, and said they had tried—and failed—to recruit younger members. 

It was largely a question of availability. Family commitments were one challenge, but the greatest obstacle was committing to days away from work. Younger executives and community leaders are in the “high-growth” stage of their careers, and rarely in control of their own schedules, making the commitment to a (typically unpaid) board seat difficult. 

As boards push for more diversity among members, recruiting younger directors is a critical component. Even if systems aren’t ready to reshape the director role for Millennials, they must find a way to directly engage younger leaders and integrate them into decision-making at all levels of the organization.

Is the Traditional Hospital Strategy Aging Out?

https://www.kaufmanhall.com/insights/thoughts-ken-kaufman/traditional-hospital-strategy-aging-out

On October 1, 1908, Ford produced the first Model T automobile. More than 60 years later, this affordable, mass produced, gasoline-powered car was still the top-selling automobile of all time. The Model T was geared to the broadest possible market, produced with the most efficient methods, and used the most modern technology—core elements of Ford’s business strategy and corporate DNA.

On April 25, 2018, almost 100 years later, Ford announced that it would stop making all U.S. internal-combustion sedans except the Mustang.

The world had changed. The Taurus, Fusion, and Fiesta were hardly exciting the imaginations of car-buyers. Ford no longer produced its U.S. cars efficiently enough to return a suitable profit. And the internal combustion technology was far from modern, with electronic vehicles widely seen as the future of automobiles.

Ford’s core strategy, and many of its accompanying products, had aged out. But not all was doom and gloom; Ford was doing big and profitable business in its line of pickups, SUVs, and -utility vehicles, led by the popular F-150.

It’s hard to imagine the level of strategic soul-searching and cultural angst that went into making the decision to stop producing the cars that had been the basis of Ford’s history. Yet, change was necessary for survival. At the time, Ford’s then-CEO Jim Hackett said, “We’re going to feed the healthy parts of our business and deal decisively with the areas that destroy value.”

So Ford took several bold steps designed to update—and in many ways upend—its strategy. The company got rid of large chunks of the portfolio that would not be relevant going forward, particularly internal combustion sedans. Ford also reorganized the company into separate divisions for electric and internal combustion vehicles. And Ford pivoted to the future by electrifying its fleet.

Ford did not fully abandon its existing strategies. Rather, it took what was relevant and successful, and added that to the future-focused pivot, placing the F-150 as the lead vehicle in its new electric fleet.

This need for strategic change happens to all large organizations. All organizations, including America’s hospitals and health systems, need to confront the fact that no strategic plan lasts forever.

Over the past 25-30 years, America’s hospitals and health systems based their strategies on the provision of a high-quality clinical care, largely in inpatient settings. Over time, physicians and clinics were brought into the fold to strengthen referral channels, but the strategic focus remained on driving volume to higher-acuity services.

More recently, the longstanding traditional patient-physician-referral relationship began to change. A smarter, internet-savvy, and self-interested patient population was looking for different aspects of service in different situations. In some cases, patients’ priority was convenience. In other cases, their priority was affordability. In other cases, patients began going to great lengths to find the best doctors for high-end care regardless of geographic location. In other cases, patients wanted care as close as their phone.

Around the country, hospitals and health systems have seen these environmental changes and adjusted their strategies, but for the most part only incrementally. The strategic focus remains centered on clinical quality delivered on campus, while convenience, access, value, affordability, efficiency, and many virtual innovations remain on the strategic periphery.

Health system leaders need to ask themselves whether their long-time, traditional strategy is beginning to age out. And if so, what is the “Ford strategy” for America’s health systems?

The questions asked and answered by Ford in the past five years are highly relevant to health system strategic planning at a time of changing demand, economic and clinical uncertainty, and rapid innovation. For example, as you view your organization in its entirety, what must be preserved from the existing structure and operations, and what operations, costs, and strategies must leave? And which competencies and capabilities must be woven into a going-forward structure?

America’s hospitals and health systems have an extremely long history—in some cases, longer than Ford’s. With that history comes a natural tendency to stick with deeply entrenched strategies. Now is the time for health systems to ask themselves, what is our Ford F150? And how do we “electrify” our strategic plan going forward?

Headwinds facing Not for Profit Hospital Systems are Mounting: What’s Next?

Correction: An earlier version incorrectly referenced a Texas deal between Houston Methodist and Baylor Scott and White.  News about deals is sensitive and unnecessarily disruptive to reputable organizations like these. I sourced this news from a reputable deal advisor: it was inaccurate. My apology!

Congressional Republicans and the White House spared Main Street USA the pain of defaulting on the national debt last week. No surprise.

Also not surprising: another not-for-profit-mega deal was announced:

  • St. Louis, MO-based BJC HealthCare and Kansas City, MO-based Saint Luke’s Health System announced their plan to form a $9.5B revenue, 28-hospital system with facilities in Missouri, Kansas, and Illinois.

This follows recent announcements by four other NFP systems seeking the benefits of larger scale:

  • Gundersen Health System & Bellin Health (Nov 2022): 11 hospitals, combined ’22 revenue of $2.425B
  • Froedtert Health & ThedaCare (Apr 2023 LOI): 18 hospitals, combined ’22 revenues of $4.6B

And all these moves are happening in an increasingly dicey environment for large, not-for-profit hospital system operators:

  • Increased negative media attention to not-for-profit business practices that, to critics, appear inconsistent with a “NFP” organization’s mission and an inadequate trade for tax exemptions each receives.
  • Decreased demand for inpatient services—the core business for most NFP hospital operations. Though respected sources (Strata, Kaufman Hall, Deloitte, IBIS et al) disagree somewhat on the magnitude and pace of the decline, all forecast decreased demand for traditional hospital inpatient services even after accounting for an increasingly aging population, a declining birthrate, higher acuity in certain inpatient populations (i.e. behavioral health, ortho-neuro et al) and hospital-at-home services.
  • Increased hostility between national insurers and hospitals over price transparency and operating costs.
  • Increased employer, regulator and consumer concern about the inadequacy of hospital responsiveness to affordability in healthcare.
  • And heightened antitrust scrutiny by the FTC which has targeted hospital consolidation as a root cause of higher health costs and fewer choices for consumers. This view is shared by the majorities of both parties in the House of Representatives.

In response, Boards and management in these organizations assert…

  • Health Insurers—especially investor-owned national plans—enjoy unfettered access to capital to fund opportunistic encroachment into the delivery of care vis a vis employment of physicians, expansion of outpatient services and more.
  • Private equity funds enjoy unfettered opportunities to invest for short-term profits for their limited partners while planning exits from local communities in 6 years or less.
  • The payment system for hospitals is fundamentally flawed: it allows for underpayments by Medicaid and Medicare to be offset by secret deals between health insurers and hospitals. It perpetuates firewalls between social services and care delivery systems, physical and behavioral health and others despite evidence of value otherwise. It requires hospitals to be the social safety net in every community regardless of local, state or federal funding to offset these costs.

These reactions are understandable. But self-reflection is also necessary. To those outside the hospital world, lack of hospital price transparency is an excuse. Every hospital bill is a surprise medical bill. Supporting the community safety net is an insignificant but manageable obligation for those with tax exemption status.  Advocacy efforts to protect against 340B cuts and site-neutral payment policies are about grabbing/keeping extra revenue for the hospital. What is means to be a “not-for-profit” anything in healthcare is misleading since moneyball is what all seem to play. And short of government-run hospitals, many think price controls might be the answer.

My take:

The headwinds facing large not-for-profit hospitals systems are strong. They cannot be countered by contrarian messaging alone.

What’s next for most is a new wave of operating cost reductions even as pre-pandemic volumes are restored because the future is not a repeat of the past. Being bigger without operating smarter and differently is a recipe for failure.

What’s necessary is a reset for the entire US health system in which not-for-profit systems play a vital role. That discussion should be led by leaders of the largest NFP systems with the full endorsements of their boards and support of large employers, physicians and public health leaders in their communities.

Everything must be on the table: funding, community benefits, tax exemption, executive compensation, governance, administrative costs, affordability, social services, coverage et al. And mechanisms for inaction and delays disallowed.

It’s a unique opportunity for not-for-profit hospitals. It can’t wait.