Here are the Five Areas the New DOJ Task Force on Monopolies in Health Care Should Focus On

Posted on by • Posted in Antitrust, Competition, Denial, Denial Rates, Dept of Justice (DOJ), Health Insurance Denial, Health Insurance Industry, High Deductible Health Plans, Market Consolidation, Market Power, Market Share, Mergers & Acquisitions, Monopoly, Monopoly Behavior, Out of Pocket Expenses, Out-of-Network, Pharmacy Benefits Management, Prior Authorization, Surprise Bills, Underinsured, Vertical Consolidation, Vertical Integration, Vertical Merger, Vertical Mergers • Leave a comment
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Abuses by payers are myriad, but these five areas could bear the most fruit for federal antitrust investigators.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Department of Justice announced it has haunched an investigation into “issues regarding payer-provider consolidation” along with other problems associated with mergers and acquisitions in health care. This is significant. For years Washington has trained its oversight authority on pharmaceutical manufacturers, private equity investments in health care and, more recently, pharmacy benefits managers controlled by big insurers. This has held bad actors like Martin Skhreli and Steward Healthcare accountable. But, it has also let insurers grow ever larger, under the radar. 

No longer. 

This task force will specifically evaluate the following, as an example: “A health insurance company buys several medical practices that compete with each other. It also prohibits its medical practices from contracting with rival health insurance companies.” The government will also dig into “anticompetitive uses of health care data,” “preventing transparency,” “price fixing,” and other areas that could drag nefarious activities of insurers into the spotlight. 

I applaud the Department of Justice’s continued focus on these issues, building on the Department’s action announced in February to begin an antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth Group. (If you haven’t read the piece we published in February on UnitedHealth’s self-dealing that helped lead DOJ to open that antitrust inquiry, you can do so here.) The following are a few areas of low-hanging fruit that I hope the task force will focus on as they consider the impact insurers’ ongoing vertical integration has had on the overall health care system.

1. Insurers purchasing physician practices

Once a low-profile issue, Congress and the Biden administration alike have increasingly turned their focus to insurance companies – often referred to as payers – that now own and operate physician practices and clinics – those being paid. Even for someone without a law degree, it is easy to see the conflict this creates, particularly at scale. 

There is the oft-cited statistic that UnitedHealth has said that through its Optum division, the company employs or otherwise controls about 10 percent of doctors in the U.S. – around 130,000 physicians and other practitioners in 16 states. This prompted me to take a closer look at publicly available information on the number of doctors employed by other insurers to get a better handle on how much control of physician practices payers now have. 

It is difficult to put a percentage on physicians employed by each insurer, but it is clear that the others are following UnitedHealth’s lead. CVS/Aetna purchased Signify Health in 2023, adding 10,000 clinicians to its portfolio. The company says it supports “more than 40,000 physicians, pharmacists, nurses and nurse practitioners.” 

Clearly taking a page out of UnitedHealth’s playbook, Elevance (formerly Anthem), which owns Blue Cross Blue Shield plans in 14 states announced last month a “strategic partnership” with 900 providers across several states. Elevance did not disclose the terms of the deal except to say it, “will primarily be through a combination of cash and our equity interest in certain care delivery and enablement assets of Carelon Health.” 

As insurers have acquired physician practices, they also have created a rinse-and-repeat strategy associated with kicking physicians they don’t own out of network, and in some cases targeting those same practices for acquisition. Aetna and Humana recently told investors they will be reviewing their networks of physicians, signaling they’ll soon be further narrowing their networks. A good question for this task force: when insurers review those contracts with doctors, do they ever kick the doctors they employ out of network? (Doubtful.) This could specifically draw attention from the task force’s focus on “health care contract language and other practices that restrict competition,” such as contract provisions that require or encourage patients to seek care from doctors directly employed or closely controlled by patients’ insurers.

Additionally, UnitedHealth CEO Andrew Witty recently told analysts, “As I think you see some of the funding changes play out across the — across the next few years, I suspect that may also create new opportunities for us as different companies assess their positions.” My translation: UnitedHealth’s burdensome business practices and the way it shortchanges doctors (those “funding changes” he referenced) contribute to the financial distress that is forcing many health care providers to “assess their positions.”

As the task force continues to consider the impact of private equity in health care monopolies, transactions like this one should receive equal consideration for their lack of transparency and overall impact on market consolidation.

2. Co-mingling of middlemen

I have watched with interest for over the past year as both Democrats and Republicans in Washington increasingly trained their fire on pharmacy benefit managers. The natural next area of focus in that space, which this new task force could advance, should be around how the

three PBMs that control 80 percent of market share are all combined with health insurance companies – namely CVS/Aetna (Caremark), UnitedHealth (Optum Rx), and Cigna (Express Scripts). 

An important, and politically popular, area where this consolidation has played out is in the squeeze placed on small, independent pharmacists across the country. More than 300 community pharmacies have closed in the past year alone, out of an inability to operate or push back on unfair margins pushed by these PBM-insurer monopolies. As we have written here, the fees these PBMs charge have increased more than 100,000 percent over the past decade, and are quietly contributing significantly to the profits of the largest health insurers. 

We still have little insight into how these business lines interact with each other, and the ultimate impact that has on patients. Given the enormous influence just three insurance companies have over what prescriptions Americans can receive, and how much should be paid for each prescription, the task force would do well to focus on what insurers and PBMs are doing behind the scenes to maximize profits and limit patient access to prescription drugs. It’s already gaining traction on Capitol Hill, with one Congressman recently saying, “I’ll continue to bust this up … this vertical integration in health care.”

3. Prior authorization requests

CVS/Aetna shares were hammered after the company reported a significant increase in payment of Medicare Advantage claims during the first three month is of this year. Expect all insurers to notice. And as they have seen their forecasts fall short of Wall Street’s expectations – particularly because of increasing scrutiny in Washington of Medicare Advantage – these corporations will look to increase their already aggressive use of prior authorization to limit claims payments.

It is not as though insurers make seeking the care you need easy. Far from it. Prior authorization has become “medical injustice disguised as paperwork,” as the New York Times said in a recent, excellent video detailing the widespread nature of this profiteering practice. 

While not a stated direct focus of this task force, the increased impact of prior authorization in care delivery is a direct outgrowth of a few large health insurers effectively controlling the marketplace. As insurers directly employ more doctors and enroll more Americans in their plans, they can use prior authorization to increasingly determine whether a patient can get care, period. 

Scrutiny in this space could add momentum to increasing activity in state legislatures and Washington to rein in excessive prior authorization. As of early March, nine states and the District of Columbia had passed bills to limit how far insurers could go with prior authorization. And earlier this year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid released a final rule that is expected to save physicians $15 billion over the next decade by putting limits on insurer prior authorization tactics. 

4. Rising out-of-pocket costs

Regular readers of this newsletter know one of my crusades is to ensure folks who pay good money for health insurance – out of their paychecks or through their tax dollars – can use it when they need it. It was a big win earlier this year for the Lower Out of Pockets Now coalition (which I lead) when President Biden called for a cap on prescription drug out-of-pocket costs of $2,000 annually for everybody, not just Medicare beneficiaries. 

If there was true competition and real consumer choice in health insurance, payers wouldn’t be able to get away with increasingly shifting patients into high-deductible plans. But the fact that a few big players control the health insurance market has allowed the oligopoly of payers to do just that, with ever-rising deductibles alongside ever-rising premiums. 

The task force’s focus on price fixing, collusion, and transparency in health care costs will, I hope, include some focus on how insurers use their size and clout to drive up out-of-pocket costs and premiums simultaneously – with little recourse to employers or their employees.

5. Implementing crystal clear laws and rules in health care

You know you’re a monopoly or close to it when you can pretty much do whatever you want and get away with it. Look no further than America’s health insurance companies and implementation of the No Surprises Act. 

As I wrote earlier this year, Congress and CMS have been clear about how out-of-network hospital bills should be negotiated between insurers and physicians. Yet in case after case, including many that have become the basis of lawsuits, insurers are clearly flouting the Act passed by Congress and the rules promulgated by CMS. Payers are doing this, doctors have said, simply because of their size and ability to weather criticism from physicians, regulators, and the courts – while doctors struggle to pay their bills with significant payments still owed pending out-of-network negotiations with insurers. 

One would hope, at a minimum, this task force, focused on rooting out the ills of monopolies, would document how insurers are well aware of how they are supposed to implement legislation like the No Surprises Act, but flout it anyway.

A Different Way of Thinking About Hospital Closures

Posted on by • Posted in Business Model, Community, Financial Viability, Financial Vital Signs, Financially Distressed, Health System, Health Villages, Hospital, Hospital Closure, Hospital Industry, Inpatient Care, Rural Health, Rural Hospital • Leave a comment

https://www.kaufmanhall.com/insights/thoughts-ken-kaufman/different-way-thinking-about-hospital-closures

For several decades, the economics, demographics, and technology of healthcare have been fueling a trend toward closure of inpatient hospitals.

In the past ten years, from 2014 through 2023, 229 hospitals closed without being converted into other facilities, while only 118 new hospitals opened, according to data provided by MedPAC in its March 2020 and March 2024 reports to Congress.

Rural closures have generated significant concern—justifiably so due to the risk of reduced access to care. Of the 229 hospitals that closed in the past decade, 68 were rural, with an additional 48 closing and converting into other types of care facilities, according to the Sheps Center for Health Services Research at the University of North Carolina. Although the number of rural closures is high, the numbers also show that the issue is by no means confined to rural areas.

Continued closures appear to be inevitable.

Kaufman Hall’s research shows that a significant number of hospitals have signs of financial distress, with 40 percent losing money from operations and many more with unsustainably low margins. In 2023, almost one-third of announced hospital transactions involved a distressed party—the highest percentage in the past five years.

The circumstances leading to hospital closures are as serious as they are familiar: rising operating expenses, labor shortages, shifts from inpatient to outpatient care, high-cost technology, flattening reimbursement, an aging population, and population migration.

At the same time these forces are driving some hospitals toward financial distress, they can also create clinical and even safety concerns—including inpatient volume that is reduced to the point where quality may be compromised and an inability to maintain aging physical plants.

These forces are inexorable. Attempting to maintain the status quo is simply not a viable strategy. Unfortunately, a desire to protect the status quo is often what health systems encounter when attempting to close a hospital. This impulse toward protectionism is understandable. Community groups are concerned about losing access to care. Labor groups are worried about losing jobs. Political leaders are concerned about both, and about the continued economic strength of their localities.

In too many cases, these understandable concerns have the unintended consequence of keeping open a hospital that no longer effectively serves its community. In other cases, they make the process of necessary change unnecessarily painful and protracted.

The challenge for healthcare executives and community leaders alike is to figure out a new path forward—one that creates a clinically, operationally, and economically viable approach to providing needed access to high quality care but offers an alternative to complete hospital closure or to a facility continuing to exist in a state of distress.

Recently, we came across a man named Scott Keller, who has spent the past 28 years shaping and implementing what looks to me like a creative and workable path forward for many communities facing hospital closures.

The intellectual underpinning of Scott’s approach is to combine community health, economic development, and neighborhood planning. Through that lens, Scott and his team at Dynamis look to transform hospitals that are no longer viable into community hubs that he calls “Healthy Villages®.”

These hubs address a range of community needs that include some traditional healthcare services, but also social and other community services. They bring these services together—under one roof and extending into the neighborhood—into a careful system that creates an opportunity to develop new care models built on the foundation of value-based, population-based care, prioritizing health, prevention, and elimination of disparities and barriers to care. The aim is to treat the whole person in a walkable, thriving community.

At a macro level, Scott’s approach involves consolidating treatment services into a fraction of the square footage of the existing facility and leasing the remaining space to partners focused on social determinants of health, much like a successful multifaceted retail environment creates an excellent consumer experience.

From there, the hub integrates with other neighborhood partners such as senior housing providers, financial institutions for social-impact financing, and education providers to support workforce training.

Scott explained to us that the approach can be applied in settings from challenged urban neighborhoods to rural towns, at scales from neighborhoods to full towns, and in concert with initiatives such as a health system’s service-line planning. In addition, some of these hubs have unique sources of funding that support the community, funding not typically available to a traditional hospital.

Perhaps the most attractive quality of Scott’s approach is to shift the conversation about a distressed hospital from the binary close-or-don’t close to a thoughtful consideration of what it means to deliver healthcare in a setting that has difficulty supporting a particular hospital.

In doing so, Scott helps us focus on the true issue at hand. America’s economic, demographic, and technological forces are aligned in certain markets to challenge the adequacy of the traditional hospital. The question is not whether this group of hospitals will change, but how they will change.

In too many instances and too many locations, that hospital change becomes an enemy to be fought against, resulting in a transformation that is protractedly painful and that often ends poorly for all concerned. Scott’s approach is a welcome example of how organizations and communities, rather than clinging to the status quo, can apply creative thinking, broad participation, and systematic planning to shape a future that may turn out to be not an enemy, but a real and lasting improvement.

Financial Literacy: A Leadership Prerequisite

Posted on by • Posted in Accessible Liquidity, Board, Board Purpose, Debt Levels, Debt Service, Debt Service Coverage Ratio, Financial Literacy, Financial Vital Signs, Leadership, Leadership Continuity, Leadership Learning, Operating Expenses, Operating Income, Operating Margin, Operating Margin Drivers, Operating Metrics, Operating Revenue, Revenue Diversification, Revenue Growth, Unrestricted Cash • Leave a comment

https://www.kaufmanhall.com/insights/blog/financial-literacy-leadership-prerequisite

In last month’s blog, we discussed the importance of financial planning, both for internal audiences—including the leadership team and the board of trustees—and for external audiences—including prospective students and their families, rating agencies, alumni and other stakeholders. This month, in the first of a series of blogs focused on key finance-related issues, we’re turning our attention to a broader and deeper internal audience, asking the question, “What is your institution’s financial literacy?”

The terms described in this blog will be very familiar to members of college and university finance teams and to many institutional leaders as well.

The point is that these terms should be familiar to as many individuals as possible throughout the institution: they form the foundation of a basic financial literacy that every college and university should foster across its faculty and staff.

What is financial literacy?

Financial literacy is the ability to understand where an institution stands at any given time with respect to key elements of its balance sheet and income statement. To state it simply, financial literacy means an understanding of the vital signs that describe the financial health of the institution. In medicine, the basic vital signs are body temperature, pulse rate, respiration rate, and blood pressure. In finance, the vital signs include measures of unrestricted cash, revenue, expenses, debt, and risk.

In medicine, there are professionals whose job is to dig deeper if any of the body’s vital signs are deteriorating. Similarly in finance, it is the job of the CFO and finance team to monitor the vital signs of the institution’s financial health and to seek causes and solutions of current troubles or to use changes in the vital signs to address potential future issues. For most of us—in medicine or finance—the goal should be a basic understanding of what the vital signs measure and whether they point to good health.

There are some key considerations for each financial vital sign:

  • Unrestricted Cash. The critical question related to unrestricted cash (also termed liquidity) is whether the institution has enough accessible liquidity to meet its daily expenses if its cash flow was unexpectedly interrupted. Days cash on hand is a balance sheet metric that is typically used to assess this issue: days cash on hand literally measures how long unrestricted cash reserves could cover the institution’s operating costs if its cash flow suddenly stopped. 

    The emphasis on “accessible liquidity” is an important element of this financial vital sign: it speaks to the ability to distinguish between institutional wealth versus liquidity. In higher education, an endowment can be an important source of the institution’s wealth, but many of the funds within an endowment cannot be easily accessed—they are, by and large, not liquid funds or are highly restricted as to their use. Readily available, unrestricted cash reserves are what an institution must rely on to meet its day-to-day expenses should cash flow be interrupted or reduced.
     
  • Revenue. Because an institution needs to maintain or grow its cash reserves and allocate them sparingly, the amount of revenue coming in—from tuition and fees and from other sources of additional income (see below)—is also an important vital sign. An institution should obviously be taking in enough revenue to cover its expenses without drawing on its cash reserves. 

    Additionally, however, given continued growth in expenses, revenue growth (through enrollment growth, student mix, and/or program mix) is a significant measure of ongoing vitality.

    Financial health is also enhanced if an institution does not rely too heavily on a single revenue source. For schools with an endowment, for example, the amount of income the endowment can generate to support operations is an important source of additional income. More generally, additional income can come from such auxiliary revenue sources as residential fees, fundraising, special events, concessions, and a host of other sources. These additional revenue sources, while potentially small on an individual basis, can be material on a cumulative basis.
     
  • Expenses. How much does it cost to produce the education that a college or university provides to its students? If that cost is approaching—or worse, surpassing—the net tuition revenue and additional income that the institution brings in, what is being done—or could be done—to reduce those costs? Expenses are perhaps most similar to body temperature in medical vital signs; if they get too high, they must be brought down before the health of the institution begins to decline. And the measure of expenses should be viewed overall for the institution as well as on a per student basis to communicate the “value” of different student types to the organization.
     
  • Debt. Debt is an essential component of the funding of significant capital projects that colleges and universities must undertake to maintain updated and competitive facilities. Just as most people need to take out a mortgage to afford a home purchase—spreading the cost of the home over a multiyear payment period—so too do institutions often need debt to finance large capital expenditures. But the amount of debt (also termed “leverage”) can also be an indicator of the institution’s financial health. That health begins to decline if the amount of debt relative to an institution’s assets or annual income grows too large, or if the amount required to pay for the debt (i.e., to meet the scheduled principal and interest payments—the debt service) puts too much of a burden on the cash flow generated from the institution’s day-to-day operations. If the debt service becomes too high relative to cash flow, the institution may face onerous legal requirements, or even default, which may severely constrain its ability to provide the range of programs desired and expected by its student population.
     
  • Risk. Risk is an indicator that identifies potential weaknesses in any of the preceding indicators that could jeopardize the institution’s financial health. For basic financial literacy, only the most significant risks need to be identified: over-reliance on tuition revenue in a market with declining enrollments, for example, or over-reliance on endowment income in the event of market instability. Once an institution consistently measures its risks, it can begin to determine what level of risk is appropriate and address strategies to manage that risk.

Why does financial literacy matter?

Promoting financial literacy throughout an institution cultivates a common understanding of financial health that provides context for leadership’s decisions and a common language to address issues. If tuition revenue is declining, for example, financially literate faculty members should better understand the need to prioritize academic programs that not only meet the academic needs of their students, but also can draw more students or produce healthier margins. If cost-cutting measures are required to reduce expenses, financially literate staff should understand the genesis of the need for reductions and why the institution cannot simply draw on its endowment to close the gap. Furthermore, acknowledging and describing the most significant risks an institution faces using a common language makes clear the need for action if one or more of those risks begins to materialize.

Financial literacy is also an important tool for cultivating the next generation of faculty leaders. When faculty members rise to leadership positions, it is essential that they understand that academic growth and strategic initiatives cannot succeed without sufficient resources to support them, or if they cannot generate the revenue needed to cover—or exceed—their costs.

By promoting financial literacy across the institution, the institution can help ensure that future leaders are acquiring the foundation needed for them to grow into informed decision-makers who understand the need to maintain the institution’s financial health.

The state of state physician noncompete bans

Posted on by • Posted in Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Noncompete Agreements, Physician, Physician Contracts, Tax Exempt Status • Leave a comment

https://www.kaufmanhall.com/insights/blog/gist-weekly-may-17-2024

With the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issuing a final rule last month that bans noncompete agreements nationwide, the graphic above is our attempt to categorize the current status of complex state noncompete laws that affect physicians. 

Except in the event of a business sale, five states—California, North Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oklahoma—ban all noncompete agreements for all employees, and at least 19 states either ban them for physicians or place varying limits on them for physicians. 

Examples of these limits include a narrow law in Florida that allows noncompetes to be voided if there is only one employer of a physician specialty in a county, and a Tennessee law that only permits physician noncompetes that bar a physician from practicing at facilities where their former employer provides services. 

As a noncompete agreement can restrict a physician’s ability to practice near a former employer for years, bans on physician noncompete agreements have been shown to improve community access to care. One study found that, compared to places that allow them, places that banned noncompetes for physicians saw increased physician employment, the opening of more physician practices, and a lower likelihood of practice closures. 

Should the new FTC ban survive the mounting legal challenges it faces, its effect on the physician labor market may be limited, as not-for-profit organizations fall outside the FTC’s traditional enforcement jurisdiction. However, the agency has indicated a willingness to reevaluate an entity’s not-for-profit status and stated that “some portion” of tax-exempt hospitals could fall under the final rule’s purview.

Days Cash on Hand Does Not Tell the Full Liquidity Story

Posted on by • Posted in Cash to Debt Ratio, Credit Quality, Credit Rating Committee, Credit Rating Process, Credit Ratings, Days Cash on Hand, Financial Ratios, Financial Reserves, Financial Stewardship, Financial Strength, Financial Viability, Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Liquidity, Strategic Resource Allocation • Leave a comment

https://www.kaufmanhall.com/insights/blog/days-cash-hand-does-not-tell-full-liquidity-story

Days cash on hand is one of the most important metrics in hospital credit analysis. The ratio calculates an organization’s unrestricted cash and investments relative to daily operating expenses.

Here’s a computation commonly used to calculate days cash on hand:

[Unrestricted cash and investments*365 days] / [Annual operating expenses – non-cash expenses]

Math aside, let’s unpack what days cash on hand really tells us. Days cash on hand gives an indication of a hospital’s flexibility and financial health. Essentially, it tells us how long a hospital could continue to operate if cash flow were to stop. From a ratings perspective, the higher the days cash, the better, to create a cushion or rainy-day fund for unexpected events.

While the sheer abatement of cash flow feels like a doomsday scenario, we don’t have to look far back to see examples. The shutdown in the early days of Covid and the recent Change Healthcare cyberattack are examples of events that can materially impact cash flow. While these may be considered extreme, there are plenty of more common events that can disrupt cash flow, including a delay in supplemental funding, an IT installation, a change in Medicare fiscal intermediary, an escalation in construction costs, or the bankruptcy of a payer.

Size and diversified business enterprises can impact days cash on hand. For example, small hospitals with outsized cash positions relative to operations often report a dizzying level of days cash on hand. Health systems with wholly owned health plans often show lower days cash when compared to like-sized peers without health plans. Analysts will also review a hospital’s cash-to-debt ratio, which is an indication of leverage and compares absolute unrestricted cash to long-term obligations. Cash-to-debt creates a more comparable ratio across the portfolio.

In the years leading up to the pandemic, the days cash on hand median increased steadily as the industry went through a period of stable financial performance and steady equity market returns. Hospitals took advantage of an attractive debt market to fund large capital projects or reimburse for prior capital spending. The median crested over 200 days. As discussed during our March 20, 2024, rating agency webinar, days cash median for 2023 is expected to decline or remain flat at best, not because of an increase in capital spending or deficit operations, but because daily expenses (mainly driven by labor) will grow faster than absolute cash. Expenses will outrun the bear, so to speak.

Days cash on hand will remain a pillar liquidity ratio for the industry, but equally important is the concept of liquidity. Days cash on hand doesn’t tell the whole story regarding liquidity. A hospital may compute that it has, say, 200 days cash on hand, but that calculation is based on total unrestricted cash and investments, which usually includes long-term investment pools. A sizable portion of that 200 days may not be accessible on a daily basis.

Recall that during the 2008 liquidity crisis, many hospitals had large portions of their unrestricted investment pools tied up in illiquid investments. When you needed it the most, you couldn’t get it. 2008 was a watershed moment that starkly showed the difference between wealth and liquidity and the growing importance of the latter. Days cash on hand didn’t necessarily mean “on hand.” Many hospitals scrambled for liquidity, which came in the form of expensive bank lines because liquidating equity investments in a down market would come at a huge cost.

Nearly overnight, daily liquidity became a fundamental part of credit analysis.

While the events were different, Covid and Change Healthcare followed the same fact pattern: crisis occurred, cash flow abated, and hospitals scrambled for liquidity, drawing on lines of credit to fund operating needs. Within a quick minute healthcare went “back to the future,” and undoubtedly, there will be another liquidity crisis ahead.

Rating reports now include information on investment allocation and diversification within those investments, and report new ratios such as monthly liquidity to total cash and investments. A hospital with below average days cash on hand or cash-to-debt may receive more attention in the rating report regarding immediately accessible funds.

Irrespective of a high or low cash position or rating category, providing rating analysts with a schedule highlighting where management would turn to when liquidity is needed would be well received. For example, do you draw on lines of credit, hit depository accounts, pause capital, extend payables, or liquidate investments, and in what order? Some health systems are taking this a step further with an in-depth sophisticated analysis to quantify their operating risks and size their liquidity needs accordingly, which we call Strategic Resource Allocation. This analysis would boost an analyst’s confidence in management’s preparedness for the next crisis with the segmenting of true cash “on hand.” It would also help ensure that, when the next crisis arrives, management will know where to turn to maintain liquidity and meet daily cash needs.