Category Archives: Public Health

New unemployment insurance claims rise for the first time since March

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Coronavirus, Crisis, Crisis Management, Economic Crisis, Economic Recovery, Economy Reopening, Employee Benefits, Employee Furlough, Employee Hiring Freeze, Employee Layoffs, Employee Pay Cuts, Employer-Based Health Insurance, Evidence-based Leadership, Evidence-Based Plan, Evidence-Based Policy, Health Insurance Coverage Adequacy, Health Policy, Infection Control, Infection Control Plan, Infectious Virus, Job, Job Loss, Job Market, Job Search, Job Security, Leadership Decentralized, Mortality, National Strategy, Pandemic, Public Health, Public Safety, Quarantine, Social Distancing, Underinsured, Unemployment, Unemployment Insurance, Uninsured • Leave a comment

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/23/another-14-million-workers-filed-unemployment-benefits-last-week-pandemic-continues-weigh-labor-market/

 

Some 1.4 million workers filed for unemployment last week, the first increase in months, as the pandemic continues to weigh on the labor market

The number of new unemployment claims rose for the first time in months last week, to 1.4 million — a troubling sign for the labor market that’s weathering a new round of closures as the pandemic spreads.

For the week ending July 18, about 109,000 more jobless claims were filed compared to the week prior, according to the Department of Labor.

“What you’re seeing is that, as the economy slows, the pace of claims picks back up — which really puts at risk the monthly jobs report over the next few months,” said Joseph Brusuelas, the chief economist at RSM. “The July numbers are going to be tenuous, but it’s August that I’m worried about.”

The number of workers continually claiming unemployment insurance went down, however, a statistic that lags by a week, to 16.1 million workers for the week ending July 11, from 17.4 million for the week ending July 4.

In addition to the 1.4 million seeking unemployment nationwide last week, another 980,000 new Pandemic Unemployment Assistance claims were filed, the benefits offered to self-employed and gig workers.

The numbers come as millions of unemployed workers are about to exhaust stimulus payments from two federal benefits programs whose expiration economists have warned could have dire effects on the economy.

Brusuelas said the numbers are a sign that the burst of economic activity that marked the country’s reopening has waned, and that shrinking consumer demand remained a significant risk for businesses and the workers they employ across the country.

“We are going to see a much slower pace of growth the reset of the year,” he said. “While we still are retaining our call for a swoosh-shaped recovery, one has to acknowledge a w-shaped recovery is possible.”

The extra $600 a week in unemployment benefits that the federal government has offered to supplement more modest state unemployment benefits will end this week, as lawmakers wrangle over legislation that could extend it.

Including the new benefits available to gig workers and the self-employed, more than 53 million applications have been filed for some form of unemployment insurance during the pandemic.

 

 

5 COVID-19 myths politicians have repeated that just aren’t true

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), Coronavirus, Evidence-based Leadership, Evidence-Based Plan, Evidence-Based Policy, False Hope, False Narrative, Herd Immunity, Misinformation, Misinterpret, Mislead, Misleading, Mistrust, Mixed Message, Pandemic, Partisanship, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), Public Health, Public Safety, Quarantine, Social Distancing, Transparency, Trust, Truth, Wishful Thinking • Leave a comment

https://theconversation.com/5-covid-19-myths-politicians-have-repeated-that-just-arent-true-141972

5 COVID-19 myths politicians have repeated that just aren't true ...

The number of new COVID-19 cases in the U.S. has jumped to around 50,000 a day, and the virus has killed more than 130,000 Americans. Yet, I still hear myths about the infection that has created the worst public health crisis in America in a century.

The purveyors of these myths, including politicians who have been soft peddling the impact of the coronavirus, aren’t doing the country any favors.

Here are five myths I hear as director of health policy at the University of Southern California’s Schaeffer Center that I would like to put to rest.

Myth: COVID-19 is not much worse than the flu

President Donald Trump and plenty of pundits predicted early on that COVID-19 would prove no more lethal than a bad flu. Some used that claim to argue that stay-at-home orders and government-imposed lockdowns were un-American and a gross overreaction that would cost more lives than they saved.

By the end of June, however, the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced that national antibody testing indicated 5% to 8% of Americans had already been infected with the virus. With over 130,000 confirmed COVID-19-related deaths – and that’s likely an undercount – the case fatality rate is around 0.49% to 0.78% or about four to eight times that of the flu.

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who also downplayed COVID-19 as the death toll grew, calling it a “little flu,” announced on July 7 that he had tested positive for the coronavirus.

5 COVID-19 myths politicians have repeated that just aren't true

 

Myth: Cases are increasing because testing is increasing

At one point, the idea that COVID-19 case numbers were high because of an increase in testing made intuitive sense, especially in the early stages of the pandemic when people showing up for tests were overwhelmingly showing symptoms of possible infection. More testing meant health officials were aware of more illnesses that would have otherwise gone under the radar. And testing predominately sick and symptomatic people can result in an overestimate of its virulence.

Now, with millions of tests conducted and fewer than 10% coming back positive, the U.S. knows what it is facing. Testing today is essential to finding the people who are infected and getting them isolated.

Unfortunately, Trump has been a leading purveyor of the myth that we test too much. Fortunately, his medical advisers disagree.

Myth: Lockdowns were unnecessary

Given the current spike in infections after reopening the economy, more people are arguing that the lockdowns were unsuccessful in crushing the virus and shouldn’t have been implemented at all. But what would the country look like today if state governments had tried to build herd immunity by letting the disease spread rather than promoting social distancing, prohibiting large gatherings and telling the elderly to stay home?

Most epidemiologists who study pandemics believe that reaching herd immunity could only be achieved at enormous cost in terms of illness and death. About 60% or 70% of Americans would have to become infected before the spread of the virus diminished. That would result in 1 to 2 million U.S. deaths and 5 to 10 million hospitalizations.

These are horrific, yet conservative estimates, given that mortality rates would surely rise if that many people were infected and hospitals were overrun.

5 COVID-19 myths politicians have repeated that just aren't true

Myth: The epidemiological models are always wrong

It is not surprising that many people are confused by the proliferation of predictions about the course of the virus. How many people become infected depends on how individuals, governments and institutions respond, which is hard to predict.

Faced with the warning early in the pandemic that 1 to 2 million Americans could die if the U.S. simply let the coronavirus run its course, federal and state governments imposed restrictions to constrain the spread of the virus. Then, they relaxed those restrictions as new cases ebbed and pressure mounted to reopen the economy.

Now, they must consider reimposing some of those restrictions as infection rates rise in a majority of states, including Texas, Arizona, Florida and California. The models were based on data and assumptions at that time, and likely influenced responses which in turn changed underlying conditions. For example, new cases of COVID-19 are rising in the U.S., while fatalities are falling. This reflects a shift in infection rates toward younger populations, as well as improved treatment as providers learn more about the virus.

Just like an investment disclaimer that past returns do not guarantee future performance, modeling a pandemic should be seen as suggestive of what might happen given current information and not a law of nature.

Myth: It’s a second wave

Sadly, the myth here is that we have contained the virus enough to buy time to prepare for a second wave. In fact, the first wave just keeps getting bigger.

A second wave would require a trough in the first wave, but there is little evidence of that from either an epidemiologic or economic perspective.

5 COVID-19 myths politicians have repeated that just aren't true

During the 1918-1919 flu pandemic, the weekly UK death toll from influenza and pneumonia, shown here, reflected three clear waves. Taubenberger JK, Morens DM. 1918 Influenza: the Mother of All Pandemics. Emerg Infect Dis. 2006;12(1)

The U.S. recorded a record number of new cases during the first week of July, exceeding 50,000 per day for four straight days. The rising number of cases led several states to halt or roll back their reopening plans in hopes of stemming the spread of the virus.

Meanwhile, most consumers are reticent to return to “normal” economic activity: Fewer than one-third of adults surveyed by Morning Consult in early July were comfortable going to a shopping mall. Only 35% were comfortable going out to eat, and 18% were comfortable going to the gym. For almost half of the population, an effective treatment or vaccine may be the only way they will feel comfortable returning to “normal” economic activity.

COVID-19 is an immediate threat that requires a unified, science-based response from governments and citizens to be successful. But it is also an opportunity to rethink how we prepare for future pandemics. Some misinformation is inevitable as a new virus emerges, but perpetuating myths for political or other reasons ultimately costs lives.

 

 

Coronavirus’s painful side effect is deep budget cuts for state and local government services

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Budget, Capital Budget, Capital Expenditure, Coronavirus, Coronavirus Side Effects, Employee Benefits, Employee Furlough, Employee Hazard Pay, Employee Layoffs, Employee Pay Cuts, Financial Pressure, Financial Viability, Financially Distressed, Governance, Government, Health Policy, Health System, Hospital, Hospital Industry, Job, Job Loss, Job Market, Job Search, Job Security, Labor Spend Management, Operating Expenses, Operating Revenue, Public Health, Public Safety, Recession • Leave a comment

https://theconversation.com/coronaviruss-painful-side-effect-is-deep-budget-cuts-for-state-and-local-government-services-141105

Coronavirus's painful side effect is deep budget cuts for state ...

Nationwide, state and local government leaders are warning of major budget cuts as a result of the pandemic. One state – New York – even referred to the magnitude of its cuts as having “no precedent in modern times.”

Declining revenue combined with unexpected expenditures and requirements to balance budgets means state and local governments need to cut spending and possibly raise taxes or dip into reserve funds to cover the hundreds of billions of dollars lost by state and local government over the next two to three years because of the pandemic.

Without more federal aid or access to other sources of money (like reserve funds or borrowing), government officials have made it clear: Budget cuts will be happening in the coming years.

And while specifics are not yet available in all cases, those cuts have already included reducing the number of state and local jobs – from firefighters to garbage collectors to librarians – and slashing spending for education, social services and roads and bridges.

In some states, agencies have been directed to cut their budget as much as 15% or 20% – a tough challenge as most states prepared budgets for a new fiscal year that began July 1.

As a scholar of public administration who researches how governments spend money, here are the ways state and local governments have reduced spending to close the budget gap.

Cutting jobs

State and local governments laid off or furloughed 1.5 million workers in April and May.

They are also reducing spending on employees. According to surveys, government workers are feeling personal financial strain as many state and local governments have cut merit raises and regular salary increases, frozen hiring, reduced salaries and cut seasonal employees.

Washington state, for example, cut both merit raises and instituted furloughs.

A survey from the National League of Cities shows 32% of cities will have to furlough or lay off employees and 41% have hiring freezes in place or planned as a result of the pandemic.

Employment reductions have met some resistance. In Nevada, for example, a state worker union filed a complaint against the governor to the state’s labor relations board for violating a collective bargaining statute by not negotiating on furloughs and salary freezes.

Most of the employee cuts have been made in education. Teachers, classroom aids, administrators, staff, maintenance crews, bus drivers and other school employees have seen salary cuts and layoffs.

The job loss has hurt public employees beyond education, too: librarians, garbage collectors, counselors, social workers, police officers, firefighters, doctors, nurses, health aides, park rangers, maintenance crews, administrative assistants and others have been affected.

Residents also face the consequences of these cuts: They can’t get ahold of staff in the city’s water and sewer departments to talk about their bill; they can’t use the internet at the library to look for jobs; their children can’t get needed services in school.

Most of these cuts have been labeled temporary, but with the extensions to stay-at-home orders and a mostly closed economy, it will be some time before these employees are back to work.

Suspending road, bridges, building and water system projects

As another way to reduce costs quickly, a National League of Cities survey shows 65% of the municipalities surveyed are stopping temporarily, or completely, capital expenditure and infrastructure projects like roads, bridges, buildings, water systems or parking garages.

In New York City, there is a US$2.3 billion proposed cut to the capital budget, a fund that supports large, multiyear investments from sidewalk and road maintenance, school buildings, senior centers, fire trucks, sewers, playgrounds, to park upkeep. There are potentially serious consequences for residents. For example, New York housing advocates are concerned that these cuts will hurt plans for 21,000 affordable homes.

Suspending these big money projects will save the government money in the short term. But it will potentially harm the struggling economy, since both public and private sectors benefit from better roads, bridges, schools and water systems and the jobs these projects create.

Delaying maintenance also has consequences for the deteriorating infrastructure in the U.S. The costs of unaddressed repairs could increase future costs. It can cost more to replace a crumbling building than it does to fix one in better repair.

Cities and towns hit

In many states, the new budgets severely cut their aid to local governments, which will lead to large local cuts in education – both K-12 and higher education – as well as social programs, transportation, health care and other areas.

New York state’s budget proposes that part of its fiscal year 2021 budget shortfall will be balanced by $8.2 billion in reductions in aid to localities. This is the state where the cuts were referred to in the budget as “not seen in modern times.” This money is normally spent on many important services that residents need everyday –mass transit, adult and elderly care, mental health support, substance abuse programs, school programs like special education, children’s health insurance and more. Lacking any of these support services can be devastating to a person, especially in this difficult time.

Fewer workers, less money

As teachers and administrators figure out how to teach both online and in person, they and their schools will need more money – not less – to meet students’ needs.

Libraries, which provide services to many communities, from free computer use to after-school programs for children, will have to cut back. They may have fewer workers, be open for fewer hours and not offer as many programs to the public.

Parks may not be maintained, broken playground equipment may stay that way, and workers may not repave paths and mow lawns. Completely separate from activists’ calls to shift police funding to other priorities, police departments’ budgets may be slashed just for lack of cash to pay the officers. Similar cuts to firefighters and ambulance workers may mean poorly equipped responders take longer to arrive on a scene and have less training to deal with the emergency.

To keep with developing public safety standards, more maintenance staff and materials will be needed to clean and sanitize schools, courtrooms, auditoriums, correctional facilities, metro stations, buses and other public spaces. Strained budgets and employees will make it harder to complete these new essential tasks throughout the day.

To avoid deeper cuts, state and local government officials are trying a host of strategies including borrowing money, using rainy day funds, increasing revenue by raising tax rates or creating new taxes or fees, ending tax exemptions and using federal aid as legally allowed.

Colorado was able to hold its budget to only a 3% reduction, relying largely on one-time emergency reserve funds. Delaware managed to maintain its budget and avoided layoffs largely through using money set aside in a reserve account.

Nobody knows how long the pandemic, or its economic effects, will last.

In the worst-case scenario, budget officials are prepared to make steeper cuts in the coming months if more assistance does not come from the federal government or the economy does not recover quickly enough to restore the flow of money that governments need to operate.

 

 

 

The Constitution doesn’t have a problem with mask mandates

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Asymptomatic Transmission, Common Good, Coronavirus, Free Speech, Freedom, Freedom of the Press, Fundamental Rights, Infection Control, Infection Control Plan, Infectious Virus, Mortality, Pandemic, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), Police Power, Public Good, Public Health, Public Safety, Public Welfare, Quarantine, Social Distancing, Supreme Court, Vaccination • Leave a comment

https://theconversation.com/the-constitution-doesnt-have-a-problem-with-mask-mandates-142335?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20July%2022%202020%20-%201684316250&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20July%2022%202020%20-%201684316250+Version+A+CID_3a4842bdc1542ab5ad1725fad090f099&utm_source=campaign_monitor_us&utm_term=The%20Constitution%20doesnt%20have%20a%20problem%20with%20mask%20mandates

The Constitution doesn't have a problem with mask mandates

Many public health professionals and politicians are urging or requiring citizens to wear face masks to help slow the spread of the COVID-19 virus.

Some Americans have refused, wrongly claiming mask decrees violate the Constitution. An internet search turns up dozens of examples.

“Costco Karen,” for instance, staged a sit-in in a Costco entrance in Hillsboro, Oregon after she refused to wear a mask, yelling “I am an American … I have rights.”

A group called Health Freedom Idaho organized a protest against a Boise, Idaho, mask mandate. One protester said, “I’m afraid where this country is headed if we just all roll over and abide by control that goes against our constitutional rights.”

As one protester said, “The coronavirus doesn’t override the Constitution.”

Speaking as a constitutional law scholar, these objections are nonsense.

The objections

It is not always clear why anti-maskers think government orders requiring face coverings in public spaces or those put in place by private businesses violate their constitutional rights, much less what they think those rights are. But most of the mistaken objections fall into two categories:

Mandatory masks violate the First Amendment right to speech, assembly, and especially association and mandatory masks violate a person’s constitutional right to liberty and to make decisions about how to their own health and bodily integrity.

They’re not mutually exclusive claims: A lawsuit filed by four Florida residents against Palm Beach County, for example, argues that mask mandates “interfere with … personal liberty and constitutional rights,” such as freedom of speech, right to privacy, due process, and the “constitutionally protected right to enjoy and defend life and liberty.” The lawsuit asks the court to issue a permanent injunction against the county’s mask mandate.

Responding to a reporter who asked why President Donald Trump appeared unconcerned about the absence of masks and social distancing at a campaign rally in Tulsa, Vice President Mike Pence said: “I want to remind you again freedom of speech and the right to peaceably assemble is in the Constitution of the U.S. Even in a health crisis, the American people don’t forfeit our constitutional rights.”

What the First Amendment does – and doesn’t – do

The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, press, petition, assembly and religion.

There are two reasons why mask mandates don’t violate the First Amendment.

First, a mask doesn’t keep you from expressing yourself. At most, it limits where and how you can speak. Constitutional law scholars and judges call these “time, place, and manner” restrictions. If they do not discriminate on the basis of the content of the speech, such restrictions do not violate the First Amendment. An example of a valid time, place and manner restriction would be a law that limits political campaigning within a certain distance of a voting booth.

Additionally, the First Amendment, like all liberties ensured by the Constitution, is not absolute.

All constitutional rights are subject to the goverment’s authority to protect the health, safety and welfare of the community. This authority is called the “police power.” The Supreme Court has long held that protecting public health is sufficient reason to institute measures that might otherwise violate the First Amendment or other provisions in the Bill of Rights. In 1944, in the case of Prince v. Massachusetts, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a law that prohibited parents from using their children to distribute religious pamphlets on public streets.

The right to liberty

Some anti-maskers object that masks violate the right to liberty.

The right to liberty, including the right to make choices about one’s health and body, is essentially a constitutional principle of individual autonomy, neatly summarized as “My body, my choice.”

The 1905 case of Jacobsen v. Massachusetts shows why mask mandates don’t violate any constitutional right to privacy or health or bodily integrity. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a smallpox vaccination requirement in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The court said that the vaccination requirement did not violate Jacobsen’s right to liberty or “the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best.”

As the court wrote, “There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members.” In a 1995 New York case, a state court held that an individual with active tuberculosis could be forcibly detained in a hospital for appropriate medical treatment.

Even if you assume that mask mandates infringe upon what the Supreme Court calls “fundamental rights,” or rights that the court has called the “very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” it has consistently ruled states can act if the restrictions advance a compelling state interest and do so in the least restrictive manner.

Rights are conditional

As the Jacobsen ruling and the doctrine of time, place and manner make clear, the protection of all constitutional liberties rides upon certain necessary – but rarely examined – assumptions about communal and public life.

One is that is constitutional rights – whether to liberty, speech, assembly, freedom of movement or autonomy – are held on several conditions. The most basic and important of these conditions is that our exercise of rights must not endanger others (and in so doing violate their rights) or the public welfare. This is simply another version of the police power doctrine.

Unfortunately, a global pandemic in which a serious and deadly communicable disease can be transmitted by asymptomatic carriers upsets that background and justifies a wide range of reasonable restrictions on our liberties. Believing otherwise makes the Constitution a suicide pact – and not just metaphorically.

 

 

 

 

Coronavirus numbers confusing you? Here’s how to make sense of them

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Clinical Testing, Contact Tracing, Coronavirus, Crisis, Crisis Management, Economic Crisis, Economy Reopening, Infection Control, Infection Control Plan, Infectious Virus, Leadership Decentralized, Mortality, National Strategy, Pandemic, Public Health, Public Safety, Quarantine, Social Distancing • Leave a comment

https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-numbers-confusing-you-heres-how-to-make-sense-of-them-142624?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20July%2021%202020%20-%201683216237&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20July%2021%202020%20-%201683216237+Version+A+CID_b109e0db9fc0132f981f087222693bc8&utm_source=campaign_monitor_us&utm_term=Coronavirus%20numbers%20confusing%20you%20Heres%20how%20to%20make%20sense%20of%20them

Coronavirus numbers confusing you? Here's how to make sense of them

Turn on the TV news, or look at a news website, and you’ll see charts, graphics, and dashboards that supposedly indicate the latest with COVID-19 – statistics revealing the number of tests, cases, hospitalizations and deaths, along with where they happened and whether they are rising or falling.

Different stories are told depending on the dashboard. But one thing is certain: These indicators lag behind the actions we take, or don’t take, on COVID-19. As researchers who focus on public health, we can tell you that a fully accurate, real-time snapshot of the progress of the virus isn’t possible.

Some don’t get tested

There are many reasons for this. Here’s one: diagnostic testing data are incomplete. Someone infected with COVID-19 must first come in contact with the virus either through the air or (less likely) environmental surfaces. Symptoms show between two and 14 days later. But at least 40% of those infected will never manifest symptoms, or show such mild ones they don’t even suspect they have COVID-19. So they may never get tested, which means they won’t show up in the total number of tests, or the total number of cases.

Another example: because of the lack of testing availability – a widespread problem in the U.S. since the start of the pandemic – not everyone who should be tested gets a test.

And another: the tests themselves are not perfect. Up to one-third who get a negative result may actually be infected. This happens because they are tested before they have a viral load sufficient enough for detection. Or maybe the sampling is not adequate. Or perhaps the test itself simply failed.

In Florida, people wait outside a COVID-19 testing station.

Case numbers don’t tell the full story

This is why problems arise when we use case numbers to determine disease levels in a community. Case counts actually reflect what was happening in a community weeks earlier. Four weeks, for instance, could elapse between the time a person is exposed to the virus and when they are reported as a case. Even the best testing results often take a week to report to public health authorities, and longer to appear on dashboards. Some testing results, seriously delayed, may take ten days or more.

Other factors impact the metrics. Laboratory results, often released in batches, may introduce artificial variation in case numbers. Someone who tested two days ago, then got a result back immediately, might be added on the same day as someone who was sick two weeks ago, but whose test results were delayed. To smooth out these variations, it helps to look at a rolling seven-day case average.

Hospitalization is a clearer metric for assessing the level of community disease. Those who are seriously ill, in most cases, will be hospitalized whether previously tested or not. Data suggests roughly one in five infected persons are hospitalized. Individuals seem to do okay for the first week, with more life-threatening symptoms showing in the second. That means hospitalizations represent exposures that happened three or four weeks earlier.

Again, a seven-day rolling average evens out artificial variations. There is one caveat for this: Though hospitalization is a useful metric, only about 20% of infected people need it. That means hospitalization numbers alone underestimate the number of people infected and what age groups they represent.

States vary on cause of death

The death numbers are not a reliable indicator either. In some states, to count as a COVID-19 death, the deceased must have had a test reporting positive. In other states, probable cases are reported.

As clinicians learn how to better treat COVID-19, fatality rates are dropping. Deaths, the longest lagging indicator, reflect people who were infected six or eight weeks earlier. When comparing one region to another, deaths are best expressed as rates – a ratio of deaths to population.

Another issue: News reports do not always clearly distinguish between diagnostic testing, which shows if you currently have COVID-19, and antibody testing, which shows if you had it in the past, and now harbor antibodies that can fight it. So far, however, antibody testing has not provided a useful picture of who has been infected and who has not. Once that happens, it could provide researchers and clinicians with some indicators on how widely the virus has spread.

Though the dashboards are ubiquitous on television, none of these frequently used indicators they feature is perfect. Still, taken together, they provide a reasonable approximation of COVID-19 transmission in communities. But as authorities make decisions, they should take into account the numbers are weeks old.

What does this mean to you? Understanding these limitations may help you understand your risk. We are still in the midst of a pandemic that is not under control. Being educated will help all of us from becoming a part of tomorrow’s lagging indicators.

 

 

 

 

Former Fed Chairs Bernanke and Yellen testified on COVID-19 and response to economic crisis

Posted on by • Posted in Cash, Cash Reserves, Coronavirus, Crisis, Crisis Management, Economic Crisis, Economic Recovery, Economic Stimulus, Economy, Infection Control, Infection Control Plan, Infectious Virus, National Strategy, Pandemic, Public Health, Public Safety, Recession, Uncertainty • Leave a comment

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/17/former-fed-chairs-bernanke-and-yellen-testified-on-covid-19-and-response-to-economic-crisis/?utm_campaign=Economic%20Studies&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email

Former Fed Chairs Bernanke and Yellen testified on COVID-19 and ...

In many respects this recession is unique. Most recessions result from developments inside the economy, but an external shock—the public health crisis—caused this one. To avoid getting sick, people have curtailed working, shopping, and attending school. Whatever the cause, the coronavirus recession, like all recessions, is imposing heavy costs. Many workers have lost jobs and income, and many business owners’ financial survival is at risk. The economy’s extraordinarily rapid decline earlier this year—as well as the sharp but incomplete rebound following the first steps toward reopening—reflect this recession’s unusual source. In addition, the sectors suffering most differ from past recessions. The heaviest blows have fallen on service industries that involve close personal contact (including retail trade, leisure and hospitality, and transportation) rather than, as is more typical, on the housing, capital investment, and durable goods sectors. Lower-paid workers, as well as women and minorities, are over-represented in the most-affected sectors, and thus have borne a disproportionate share of the job and income losses. And, the virus has affected almost every country, with potentially devastating consequences for trade and international investment.

Because this recession is unprecedented in so many ways, forecasting the recovery is difficult. The course of the pandemic itself is by far the most important factor. As long as people fear catching a potentially deadly illness from other people, they will be cautious about resuming normal activities, even after state and local governments lift lockdowns. Thus, controlling the spread of the virus must be the first priority for restoring more-normal levels of economic activity—but, more importantly, for saving possibly tens of thousands of lives. Members of Congress, local leaders, and other policymakers need to do all they can to support testing and contact tracing, medical research, and sufficient hospital capacity, and they must work to ensure that businesses, schools, and public transportation have what they need to operate safely. Both authors of this testimony are serving on state re-opening commissions, which has provided us insight into the substantial challenges to safe re-opening.

If the pandemic comes under better control, economic recovery should follow. However, the pace of the recovery could be slow and uneven, for several reasons. First, in the face of ongoing uncertainty, households and businesses may remain cautious for a time. They may increase saving and reduce spending, hiring, and capital investment. The longer the recession lasts, the greater the damage it will inflict on household and business balance sheets and the longer it will take to repair the damage. Second, the depth of the recession may leave scars—business closures and the deterioration of unemployed workers’ skills—that will affect growth for several years. Third, depending on the course of the virus, some restructuring of the economy may be needed. For example, people and resources will need to be redeployed out of the sectors most damaged by the pandemic, and business operations will need to be reorganized to protect workers and customers. All of that will take time and money. Fiscal and monetary policies must aim to speed the recovery and minimize the recession’s lasting effects.

ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE

The Federal Reserve has moved swiftly and forcefully in this crisis. It eased monetary policy in March by lowering the federal funds rate, the overnight interest rate on loans between banks, nearly to zero and indicating that it plans to keep rates low for several years. Low interest rates probably had limited economic benefits in the spring. Lockdowns prevented people from spending or working more. However, we expect low rates will spur spending in sectors like housing as the economy reopens. And the Fed may well do more in coming months as re-opening proceeds and as the outlook for inflation, jobs, and growth becomes somewhat clearer. In particular, to maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) likely will provide forward guidance about the economic conditions it would need to see before it considers raising its overnight target rate.  And it likely will clarify its plans for further securities purchases (quantitative easing). It is possible, though not certain, that the FOMC will also implement yield-curve control by targeting medium-term interest rates. It could, for example, target two-year rates by announcing its willingness to buy two-year Treasury notes at a fixed yield. The completion of the Fed’s internal review of its tools and framework in coming months will help guide these decisions.

The Fed also has been active beyond monetary policy.

First, the Fed has served as market maker of last resort by acting to stabilize critical financial markets when capital or other regulatory constraints have interfered with normal market-making or arbitrage. The Fed has served this role for repurchase agreements (repos) since September, when intermittent liquidity shortages led to spikes in repo rates. Banks did not provide liquidity to offset these spikes, as they normally would, citing balance sheet limits and other constraints. Because repo markets are critical to the functioning of broader financial and credit markets, as well as for the transmission of monetary policy, the Fed has restored more-normal function in repo markets by conducting large-scale repo operations and by steadily increasing the quantity of reserves in the banking system.

An even larger shock occurred in March, when uncertainty about the pandemic led hedge funds and others to scramble to raise cash by selling longer-term securities. The upsurge in the supply of longer-term securities, including Treasuries, was more than dealers and other market-makers could handle. Key financial markets, including for Treasury securities, experienced substantial volatility. To stabilize these markets, which like the repo market play a critical role in our financial system, the Fed purchased large quantities of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities, again serving as market maker of last resort. It also set up a new repo facility to allow foreign official institutions to borrow dollars, using their Treasury reserves as collateral, thus avoiding the need to sell those Treasuries. Although risk and liquidity premiums in these key markets have returned closer to normal, at some point the Fed and the Treasury will need to review why the market-making facilities in place before the pandemic hit did not work more efficiently.

Second, the Fed has served as lender of last resort to the financial system, a classic function of central banks. Banks and other financial intermediaries typically borrow short and lend long—that is, they rely heavily on short-term funding to finance long-term loans and investments. If they lose their short-term funding—because their funders lose confidence or for other reasons—they can be forced to sell their assets in fire sales, restrict credit to customers, and, in extreme cases, become insolvent. Central banks can short-circuit that dangerous dynamic by lending to financial institutions against good collateral, replacing the lost liquidity. In the 2007-2009 crisis, which centered on the financial system and included a global financial panic, the Fed as lender of last resort took many actions to provide liquidity to financial institutions, with the goal of stabilizing the system and preserving the flow of credit to the economy.

Fortunately, the financial system is in much better shape today than in was during the financial crisis. Banks in particular are strong, with much higher levels of capital and liquidity. The Fed nevertheless has once again taken steps to ensure that the financial system has sufficient liquidity. Largely replicating our playbook from the crisis era, the Fed has eased terms on the discount window (which provides short-term loans to banks); re-established the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (which lends to broker-dealers); and established a facility that lends indirectly to money market mutual funds, ensuring that the funds can meet depositor withdrawals. In a novel step, the Fed also created a facility that lends to banks, without recourse, against Payroll Protection Program loans, ensuring that banks have sufficient funds to make those loans.

Under the heading of lender of last resort to the financial system, establishing currency swap lines with fourteen foreign central banks was one of the most important actions the Fed took in the 2007-2009 crisis. The Fed has revived this program. Currency swap lines allow foreign central banks (who assume all the credit risk) to lend dollars to banks in their jurisdictions. The broad availability of dollar liquidity is essential because most global banks do substantial borrowing and lending in dollars, including lending within the United States. The swap lines sustain the flow of dollar credit and reduce volatility in dollar-based markets, to the benefit of the U.S. economy.

Third, the Federal Reserve, with the support of the Congress and the Treasury, has also served during the current crisis as a lender of last resort to the non-financial sector, backstopping key credit markets facing the prospect of severe disruption from the pandemic. To take on this role, the Fed invoked its emergency lending powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. Since those powers require that the Fed’s lending be well secured, it has had to rely on funds appropriated by the Congress and allocated by the Treasury to cover possible losses. Using these authorities, the Fed revived financial crisis-era facilities to stabilize commercial paper and asset-backed securities markets. Going beyond the financial crisis playbook, the Fed has also added new facilities to lend to corporations and state and local governments and to buy outstanding corporate bonds.

These programs have not extended much credit, so far, but that does not mean they have not succeeded. By establishing the programs, the Fed gave private investors the confidence to re-engage by reassuring them that the government would not allow these critical markets to become dysfunctional. Indeed, the corporate and municipal bond markets largely stabilized after the announcements, before any loans were made. Of course, if these markets seize up again, the Fed’s programs can extend credit.

The Fed also established the Main Street Lending Program to lend (through banks) to medium-sized companies. It is too soon, however, to judge its performance. This program is very different from anything the Fed has attempted before and poses difficult technical challenges. Although the Fed took many public comments while setting up the program, and made substantial changes, questions remain about how many banks and borrowers will participate. The Fed and Treasury may have to further ease terms for borrowers and increase incentives for banks for this program to have the desired effect. Or, the Fed and Treasury could add a new facility, along the lines of funding-for-lending programs run by the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, that simply subsidize banks for making additional loans to qualifying borrowers (for example, businesses below a certain size). That approach leaves the underwriting decision completely with the banks, while the size of the subsidy can be adjusted as needed to achieve the desired level of lending.

Finally, the Fed has also taken actions as a bank regulator—for example, encouraging banks to work with borrowers hobbled by the pandemic. It decided recently, based on stress test results, to bar stock buybacks by banks and to limit—but not eliminate—their dividends.  Based on our experience in the global financial crisis, we think the Fed may find it needs to go further. Although banks are currently strong, it is possible the pandemic will so damage the economy that credit losses mount rapidly. For a successful recovery, the banking system must remain strong and able to lend.

Is there more the Fed could do? As we noted, the Fed likely will provide more clarity about its monetary policy plans, and it may need to adjust the terms or borrower eligibility requirements of its various lending facilities. Broadly speaking, though, the Fed’s response has been forceful, forward-looking, and comprehensive. But, as Chair Powell often notes, the Fed’s authorities allow it to lend, not spend. Some households and firms will need subsidies or grants, rather than loans, and spending is, of course, the province of the Congress.

WHAT FISCAL POLICY MIGHT DO

The fiscal response to the pandemic has thus far been quite effective. Enhanced unemployment insurance and the Paycheck Protection Program have helped unemployed workers and their families, together with many businesses, survive the spring shutdowns. The fiscal support for the Fed’s lending programs likely will help preserve credit availability, possibly with only a portion of the allocated funds being spent.

However, some programs authorized by the Congress are ending, and new actions are necessary. Our recommendations for further fiscal action are:

First, Congress should develop a comprehensive plan to support medical research; increase testing, contact tracing and hospital capacity; make available critical supplies; and support state and local efforts to safely open businesses, schools, and public transportation.

Nothing is more important for restoring economic growth than improving public health. Investments in this area are likely to pay off many times over.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Trump said more Covid-19 testing ‘creates more cases.’ We did the math

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), Clinical Testing, Contact Tracing, Coronavirus, Crisis, Crisis Management, Evidence-based Leadership, Evidence-Based Plan, Evidence-Based Policy, False Hope, False Narrative, Mistake, Mistrust, Mixed Message, Mortality, Pandemic, Public Health, Public Safety, Quarantine, Scientists, Social Distancing, Trust, Truth • Leave a comment

Trump said more Covid-19 testing ‘creates more cases.’ We did the math

Testing silhouette

The counter-narrative began almost instantly. After the U.S. count of Covid-19 cases began an inexorable rise in June, the White House sought to assure Americans that the increase was, basically, an illusion, created by an increase in testing for the novel coronavirus.

In a June 15 tweet, President Trump said testing “makes us look bad.” At his campaign rally in Tulsa five days later, he said he had asked his “people” to “slow the testing down, please.” At a White House press conference last week, he told reporters, “When you test, you create cases.”

And in an interview with Fox News that aired Sunday, Trump could not have been clearer: “Cases are up because we have the best testing in the world and we have the most testing.” Basically, the president was arguing that the U.S. had just as many new cases in June and July as it did in May but, with fewer tests being done in May, they weren’t being detected; with more testing now, they are.

A new STAT analysis of testing data for all 50 states and the District of Columbia, however, shows with simple-to-understand numbers why Trump’s claim is wrong. In only seven states was the rise in reported cases from mid-May to mid-July driven primarily by increased testing. In the other 26 states — among the 33 that saw cases increase during that period — the case count rose because there was actually more disease.

May had brought signs of hope that the U.S. had gotten its Covid-19 outbreak under control, with about 20,000 new cases reported per day after April highs closer to 30,000. But by late June, the daily count climbed to about 40,000, and now it’s at about 70,000. The STAT analysis shows that spread of the virus, far more than testing, explains that increase.

Epidemiologists and infectious disease experts have disputed the White House claims for weeks, citing rising hospitalization numbers and deaths. It’s hard to argue that extremely sick people, let alone dead people, had been obscured by low levels of testing but suddenly revealed by higher levels.

Without a doubt, many cases of Covid-19 in March, April, and May weren’t picked up. In late June, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Director Robert Redfield told reporters that as many as 90% of cases had been missed; that is, although there were 2.3 million confirmed cases in the U.S. then, some 20 million people had probably been infected. But that reasoning applies today, too: Despite months of government claims to the contrary, not everyone who wants, or should have, a test is getting one.

Simple math belies the “it’s just because of more testing” claim — with some fascinating exceptions.

Using data from Covid Tracking, STAT looked at the number of people tested and the number who tested positive for the disease (cases) in every state and Washington, D.C. We did that for three dates: in mid-May, mid-June, and mid-July. (Due to reporting anomalies, the dates selected sometimes differed by a day or two between states.)

For each date, we calculated the number of cases found per 1,000 tests — a measure of the disease’s prevalence. For example, in Florida on May 13, that rate was 32. On June 13 it was 75. On July 13 it was 193. On May 13, Florida tested 15,159 people; on July 13, it tested 65,567. So indeed, the number of tests has increased.

But the number of cases per thousand, which is independent of the number of tests, has skyrocketed. On May 13, Florida recorded 479 cases; on July 13, it found 12,624. If the prevalence of Covid-19 were the same in July as in May, Florida would have found only 2,098 cases. In other words, 10,526 of the July 13 cases are not due to increased testing, but, instead, to the increased prevalence of disease.

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, however, echoes Trump’s explanation, telling a Saturday press briefing that his state’s soaring caseload is largely the result of more testing of people with no or minimal symptoms. “We’re now capturing a lot of those folks,” he said.

In fact, Florida has seen a sevenfold increase in cases in the past month, said Youyang Gu, who developed a well-respected, machine-learning-based model of Covid-19 whose projections have been quite accurate. “In the same time span, the number of tests only increased by a factor of two,” he said. “Obviously, if you double the testing but the number of cases increased sevenfold, then the virus is clearly spreading.”

Testing/cases graphic

The complete data for all 50 states can be found here.

 

Other states with soaring cases tell the same story as Florida.

In Arizona, the case-finding rate rose from 90 in May to 140 in June to 208 in July. Of its 2,537 cases on July 12, 1,441 were due to increased prevalence.

South Carolina has also experienced a steep rise in prevalence as its case count quintupled: Of the 2,280 cases on July 9, 1,869 were due to rising prevalence, not more testing. Texas and Georgia are similar: rising case counts well beyond increases in testing. In all, 26 states that did more testing in July than in May found more cases because Covid-19 was more prevalent. In 15 of them, the number of cases per 1,000 people tested had more than doubled.

Seven states (Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin) meet the three criteria needed to support Trump’s claim that we’re seeing more cases only, or mostly, because we’re doing more testing. The criteria are doing more tests in July than in May, finding more cases on a typical day in July than May, but seeing the number of cases per 1,000 tests decline or remain unchanged from May to July.

Take Missouri. It’s reporting more cases, but not because the virus is exploding there (despite those crowded holiday scenes at Lake of the Ozarks). Its case finding rate has been pretty stable or even declining, from 48 in mid-May to 44 in mid-July. By tripling its number of daily tests, Missouri is finding roughly triple the number of cases.

California comes close to meeting the three criteria, but doesn’t quite. Its number of daily tests more than quadrupled from May to July, from roughly 32,000 to 137,000. But the rate of cases being found has risen, though only about 10%, from 55 to 61 per 1,000 tests. So a big reason — but not the main reason, as in Missouri — more cases are being found is that more testing is being done. Washington is similar: more testing, more cases, but also slightly greater prevalence of disease in mid-July compared to mid-May; its worsening situation is real.

New York tells the opposite story: more testing found fewer cases. The state nearly doubled its daily tests from May 13 (33,794) to July 12 (62,418). But its cases fell from 2,176 to 557. If the case rate had not dropped (by 86 %), New York’s expanded testing would have found 3,995 cases on July 12.

In fact, 16 states plus the District of Columbia are like New York. They tested much more, but found fewer cases in July than May — in most, not only “fewer” in the sense of fewer cases per 1,000 but fewer in absolute terms. New Jersey reported 10,246 tests and 1,144 cases on May 14, and 20,846 tests with a mere 393 new cases on July 14. Again, the virus hasn’t disappeared, but the expansion of testing, far from “creating” cases, has brought good news: In these states, it’s much less prevalent than it was two months ago.

 

 

Axios-Ipsos poll: The skeptics are growing

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Clinical Testing, Contact Tracing, Coronavirus, Crisis, Crisis Management, Infection Control, Infection Control Plan, Infectious Virus, Leadership Decentralized, Misinformation, Misinterpret, Mislead, Misleading, Mistrust, Mixed Message, Mortality, National Strategy, Pandemic, Partisanship, Public Health, Public Safety, Quarantine, Scientists, Social Distancing, Trust, Truth • Leave a comment

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Axios-Ipsos poll: The skeptics are growing - Axios

A rising number of Americans — now nearly one in three — don’t believe the virus’ death toll is as high as the official count, despite surging new infections and hospitalizations, per this week’s installment of the Axios-Ipsos Coronavirus Index.

Between the lines: Republicans, Fox News watchers and people who say they have no main source of news are driving this trend.

Why it matters: It shows President Trump’s enduring influence on his base, even as Americans overall say they are increasingly dissatisfied with his handling of the virus and political support is shifting toward Joe Biden.

What they’re saying: “We live in highly tribal and partisan times, and people are more likely to believe cues and signals from their political leaders than the scientists or the experts,” says Cliff Young, president of Ipsos U.S. Public Affairs.

  • “And that’s just the purest form of populism, the demonization of experts to further political ends. But to what end? Fantasy is meeting reality head-on right now.”
  • “People can see the world around them, they know it’s different, but they still can think that the media and politicos are using it to go after Trump.”

By the numbers: Overall, 31% of Americans say they believe the number of Americans dying is lower than the number reported, up sizably from 23% when we asked the same question in May.

Here’s what’s driving the shift in Week 17 of our national survey:

  • Republicans who say the death count is overinflated rose from 40% to 59%.
  • Among independents, that share rose from 24% to 32%.
  • The small share of Democrats with that view was effectively flat, ticking up from 7% to 9%.
  • Most Americans still believe the actual number of deaths is either higher (37%) or on par with (31%) the official count.

Where you get your news has a strong correlation to your faith in the numbers.

  • Fox News watchers who say deaths are being over-counted shot up from 44% to 62%, even higher than Republicans overall.
  • Other big gains came from those who say they have no primary news source, from 32% to 48%; and those whose primary sources include local news, from 30% to 44%.
  • There was a smaller increase among people whose primary news source is one of the networks or major U.S. newspapers, while views of those who primarily watch CNN and MSNBC remained about the same.

The big picture: The survey shows most Americans are digging in for a long fight against the virus, even if they have conflicting views about what to believe.

  • 72% say they’re prepared to maintain social distancing or self-quarantining for as long as it takes — up from 49% in May — as people realize the end is more than a couple of months off.

This survey finds the highest overall use of face masks since the pandemic began — with 99% of Democrats and 75% of Republicans now saying they’re wearing a mask sometimes or all of the time when they go out.

  • But there’s enough inconsistency in people’s precautions to undercut much of the gains.
  • Only 40% say they wore masks sometimes or all the time when visiting family and friends. And parents are less likely to make their children wear masks outside the home than to do so themselves.

1 big finger wag: Most Americans blame someone other than themselves for the crisis.

  • Three-fourths of respondents say most other Americans are behaving in ways that are making the country’s recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic worse, while one-fourth said they’re making it better.
  • Democrats were more likely (83%) than other groups to say others are making things worse.

 

 

 

 

Op-Ed: We Still Don’t Know the Risk Posed by COVID-19

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Clinical Research, Clinical Research Funding, Clinical Testing, Clinical Trials, Coronavirus, Crisis, Crisis Management, Economic Crisis, Economic Recovery, Evidence-based Leadership, Evidence-Based Plan, Evidence-Based Policy, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Infection Control, Infection Control Plan, Infectious Virus, Leadership Decentralized, Misinformation, Misinterpret, Mislead, Misleading, Mistrust, Mixed Message, Mortality, National Strategy, Pandemic, Public Health, Public Safety, Quarantine, Scientists, Social Distancing, Uncertainty • Leave a comment

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Op-Ed: We Still Don't Know the Risk Posed by COVID-19 | MedPage Today

The need for a coordinated national research strategy

Confused about the risks of dying from the coronavirus or of catching it from someone who seems healthy? We all are, and the dizzying differences in scientific opinion are now linked to political perspectives. Progressives cite evidence that loosening restrictions would cost lives and offer little benefit to the economy, while conservatives embrace evidence that the risks are low. We offer a guide to help navigate the tangle of numbers and suggest a way forward.

Google and many others display the number of cases and deaths (3.6 million and 138,840, respectively, by July 17). This invites a simple calculation for understanding the risk: divide the number who have died by the number who have been diagnosed. So, the chance of dying if infected is about 3.9%. Right? Well, not so fast. Six months into the pandemic, neither the number of deaths nor the number of people infected is known.

Some argue that deaths have been overemphasized since people who die of COVID are mostly older and sicker. Others suggest deaths have been overcounted since if a patient tests positive for COVID-19, it will likely be listed as the cause of death even if the person succumbs to another illness or, in some jurisdictions, dies due to an accident or suicide. Others argue that deaths have been undercounted.

Missing from the tally on any given day are those who died before testing was available, those who died shortly before or after but whose death has not yet been reported, or who died as an indirect result of the epidemic such as failing to seek medical care for fear of going to the hospital.

One carefully designed recent analysis compared deaths this year to the number of people who die during a “normal” year. The analysis concluded that through May, almost 100,000 people died from COVID-19 in addition to 30,000 who died from other causes related to the pandemic.

In short, uncertainty remains about the number of deaths due to COVID-19, which is supposed to be the easy part.

Estimating the number of people who have been infected is harder still. Most infected people are never formally diagnosed and never become one of the “cases” in the news. The limitations of the tests and the difficulty of attracting a representative population to be tested make it hard to estimate the true number of infections. The preferred test (reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction-based tests) uses RNA technology to see if the virus is present in nasal or oral swabs. It is a good test, but still may miss infections in up to 30% of cases.

A second type of test uses blood samples to look for an antibody called immunoglobulin (Ig)G that implies the person was previously infected. Based on IgG test results, the CDC assumes that 5% to 8% of the population has been infected. That would mean 24 million Americans have already had COVID-19 or a very similar illness. That is more than 10 times the number of confirmed cases.

The number is consequential: a higher infection rate for the same number of deaths implies that the virus is less deadly. A review by a prominent epidemiologist considered 23 population studies with sample sizes of at least 500 people and found the percentage who have positive antibodies ranged from 0.1% to 48% — a 480-fold difference. Although the study was robustly criticized and at odds with highly cited, peer-reviewed research, it has appeared in over 30 news outlets, and the range of estimates allows people to pick a number that justifies their political position.

Contributing to this uncertainty is the FDA decision to, in a hurry to catch up for lost time, temporarily relax its standards for approving tests. Among over 300 antibody tests currently on the market, data on only a handful are publicly available, and some are being recalled.

The other number we need to know is how many people are spreading the infection without knowing it. Estimates are all over the place. Some major employers, including Stanford Healthcare, have systematically tested all of their employees and found very few infected people who do not have symptoms. In contrast, a CDC study of young, healthy adults working on an aircraft carrier found that 20% of those infected reported no symptoms.

So here we are, months into the epidemic without consensus on the basic information about how many people are infected, the risk of death for those infected, or the risk of asymptomatic transmission. In contrast to official agencies that use transparent methods to report the weather or the unemployment rate, trust in our official health statistics agencies has broken down as reports continue to emerge form myriad sources with conflicting methodologies and motivations.

The time has come to activate impartial groups, like the National Academy of Medicine, to build consensus on how to monitor the epidemic. We know the risks are serious. As cases have started to rise, whether or not the number of U.S. deaths is higher or lower than 130,000, the risk of inaction is too high.

We are staying near home, wearing masks, and treating COVID-19 as a serious threat to public health.

 

 

How deadly is COVID-19? A biostatistician explores the question

Posted on by • Posted in 2020 Election Issues, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), Coronavirus, Crisis, Crisis Management, Data Analytics, Data Control, Data Governance, Data Integrity, Data Interpretation, Data Management, Disease Surveillance, Evidence-based Leadership, Evidence-Based Plan, Evidence-Based Policy, Leadership Decentralized, Mortality, National Strategy, Pandemic, Public Health, Public Safety, Quarantine, Scientists, Social Distancing • Leave a comment

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How deadly is COVID-19? A biostatistician explores the question

The latest statistics, as of July 10, show COVID-19-related deaths in U.S. are just under 1,000 per day nationally, which is down from a peak average of about 2,000 deaths per day in April. However, cases are once again rising very substantially, which is worrisome as it may indicate that substantial increases in COVID-19 deaths could follow. How do these numbers compare to deaths of other causes? Ron Fricker, statistician and disease surveillance expert from Virginia Tech, explains how to understand the magnitude of deaths from COVID-19.

As a disease surveillance expert, what are some of the tools you have to understand the deaths caused by a disease?

Disease surveillance is the process by which we try to understand the incidence and prevalence of diseases across the country, often with the particular goal of looking for increases in disease incidence. The challenge is separating signal from noise, by which I mean trying to discern an increase in disease incidence (the signal) from the day-to-day fluctuations in that disease (the noise). The hope is to identify any increase as quickly as possible so that medical and public health professionals can intervene and try to mitigate the disease’s effects on the population.

A critical tool in this effort is data. Often disease data is collected and aggregated by local and state public health departments and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from data that is reported by doctors and medical facilities. Surveillance systems then use this data and a variety of algorithms to attempt to find a signal amidst the noise.

Early on, many people pointed out that the flu has tens of thousands of deaths a year, and so COVID-19 didn’t seem so bad. What’s wrong with that comparison?

The CDC estimates the average number of flu-related deaths since 2010-11 is around 36,000 per year. This varies from a low of 12,000 deaths in 2011-12 to a high of 61,000 deaths in 2017-18. Thus, the number of COVID-19 deaths to date is three to four times greater than the annual average number of flu-related deaths over the past decade; it is 10 times larger when compared to the 2010-11 flu season but only about twice as large compared to 2017-18.

To make this a fair comparison, note that seasonal influenza mostly occurs over a few months, usually in late fall or early winter. So, the time periods are roughly comparable, with most of the COVID-19-related deaths occurring since late March. However, COVID-19 does not appear to be seasonal, and fatalities are a lagging measure because the time from infection to death is weeks if not months in duration, so the multiples in the previous paragraph will be greater by the end of the year.

Furthermore, while death rates have been coming down from a peak of more than 2,700 on April 21, 2020, the United States is now averaging just under 1,000 deaths per day as of July 10, and given the dramatic increase in cases of late, we should expect the fatality rate to further rise. For example, the University of Washington’s IHME model currently predicts slightly more than 208,000 COVID-19-related deaths by November 1.

So, by any comparison, the COVID-19 death rate is significantly higher than the seasonal influenza death rate.

What are some comparisons that could provide some context in understanding the scale of deaths caused by COVID-19?

As of this writing, more than 130,000 people have died of COVID-19, and that total could grow to 200,000 or more by fall. Those numbers are so big, they’re hard to grasp.

Michigan Stadium in Ann Arbor is the largest football stadium in the United States. It holds 107,420 people, so no football stadium in the country is large enough to hold everyone who has died from COVID-19 thus far. By the time bowl season comes along, assuming we have a football season this year, the number of COVID-19 fatalities will likely exceed the capacity of the Rose and Cotton bowl stadiums combined.

The state of Wyoming has a population of slightly less than 600,000 people, so it’s the equivalent of one out of every five people in that state dying in the last four months. By this fall, the COVID-19 death total will be the equivalent of fully one-third of the people in Wyoming dying.

The populations of Grand Rapids, Michigan; Huntsville, Alabama; and Salt Lake City, Utah are each just over 200,000 people. Imagine if everyone in one of those cities died over the course of six months. That’s what COVID-19 may look like by fall.

How do COVID-19 deaths compare to chronic diseases like cancer or heart disease?

Today, COVID-19 ranks as the sixth leading cause of death in the United States, following heart disease, cancer, accidents, lower chronic respiratory diseases and stroke. Heart disease is the leading cause, with just over 647,000 Americans dying from it each year. Alzheimer’s disease, formerly the sixth largest cause of death, kills just over 121,000 people per year. If the University of Washington IHME model’s current prediction of COVID-19-related deaths comes to pass, COVID-19 will be the third leading cause of death in the United States by the end of the year.

The American Cancer Society estimates that in 2020 there will be an estimated 1.8 million new cancer cases diagnosed and 606,520 cancer deaths in the United States. Lung cancer is estimated to kill about 135,000 people in the US in 2020, so the number of COVID-19 deaths is currently equivalent and will exceed it soon. Of course, it is important to note that the COVID-19 deaths have occurred in about the past four months while the number of lung cancer deaths is for a year. So, COVID-19 deaths are occurring at roughly three times the rate of lung cancer deaths.

What are some historical comparisons that you think are useful in understanding the scale of deaths from COVID-19?

The 1918 influenza pandemic was similar in some ways to the current pandemic and different in other ways. One key difference is the age distribution of deaths, where COVID-19 is concentrated among older adults while the the 1918 pandemic affected all ages. In my state of Virginia, only 8% of the people who died in the 1918 pandemic were more than 50 years old, compared to more than 97% for COVID-19.

The CDC estimates that the 1918 pandemic resulted in about 675,000 deaths in the United States, so slightly more than five times the current number of COVID-19 deaths. In October of 1918, the worst month for the influenza pandemic, about 195,000 people died – well more than all who have died so far from COVID-19.

As with any historical comparison, there are important qualifiers. In this case, the influenza pandemic started in early 1918 and continued well into 1919, whereas COVID-19 deaths are for about one-third of a year (March through June). However, today the United States’ population is about three times the size of the population in 1918. These two factors roughly “cancel out,” and so it is reasonable to think about the 1918 epidemic being about five times worse than COVID-19, at least thus far.

In comparison to past wars, the U.S. has now had more deaths from COVID-19 than all the combat-related deaths in all the wars since the Korean War, including the Vietnam War and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In World War II there were 291,557 combat casualties. So the number of people who have died from COVID-19 thus far is about 45% of the WWII combat casualties. By the fall, it could be more than 70%.

Finally, note that the number of confirmed and probable deaths from COVID-19 in New York City (23,247 on July 10, 2020) is more than eight times the number who died in the 9/11 attack (2,753).