UnitedHealth subsidiary Optum signed a definitive agreement to acquire Atrius Health, a 715-physician group based in Newton, Mass., according to The Boston Globe.
Optum said March 2 the agreement was signed the evening of March 1 after UnitedHealth’s board approved the transaction. Atrius’ board also unanimously approved the deal.
The deal will need approval from Massachusetts’ Health Policy Commission, the Department of Public Health and the Federal Trade Commission.
If the deal is approved, it would expand Optum’s presence in Massachusetts. The organization had previously acquired Worcester, Mass.-based Reliant Medical Group in April 2018.
Optum reportedly had been interested in purchasing Atrius, which has 30 locations in Massachusetts, for a few years and submitted a bid for it in 2019 when the medical group was looking for a partner. In 2019, Atrius decided to remain independent. However, Atrius said it decided to reignite potential partnership talks again due to the pressures of the pandemic.
“We looked at many alternatives and chose [Optum] because of cultural alignment, the benefit we could provide for patients, the stability it could provide for our practice, and the help we can provide to the commonwealth as it pertains to managing medical spend,” Atrius President and CEO Steven Strongwater, MD, told the Boston Business Journal.
The FTC wants to figure out how hospitals’ acquisitions of physician practices has affected competition.
The agency sent orders to some of the nation’s largest insurance companies, including UnitedHealthcare, Anthem, Aetna, Cigna, Florida Blue and Health Care Service Corporation.
This action is part of a larger effort underway at the agency to consider new questions and areas of study to help it understand the ultimate impact of mergers. The hope is that those studies will yield evidence to better equip the agency to legally challenge mergers in the future.
Health economists cheered the news online following the FTC’s Thursday’s announcement about studying physician practice buy-ups.
Martin Gaynor, former director of FTC’s Bureau of Economics, tweeted: “This is a big deal – a huge # of physician practices are now owned by hospitals.” Gaynor is a health economist at Carnegie Mellon.
In the orders, the FTC asks the insurers for data such as the total billed charges of all health providers, total deductibles, copays and coinsurance paid by the patient. It also asks for data tied to each inpatient admission and outpatient and physician episodes during the time period in question, which will likely result in a barrage of data for the agency to review.
“The study results should aid the FTC’s enforcement mission by providing much more detailed information than is currently available about how physician practice mergers and healthcare facility mergers affect competition,” the agency said in a statement.
This area of study expands the agency’s current work. One area already of interest within this broader retrospective merger review program is the scrutiny of labor markets.
One area of concern for the FTC is states’ willingness to greenlight COPAs, or certificates of public advantage (COPAs), which essentially shield mergers from federal antitrust regulators in exchange for prolonged state oversight.
Sitting in the dark before 6 am in my Los Angeles house with my face lit up by yet another Zoom screen, wearing a stylish combination of sweatpants, dress shirt and last year’s JPM conference badge dangling around my neck for old times’ sake, I wonder at the fact that it’s J.P. Morgan Annual Healthcare Conference week again and we are where we are. Quite a year for all of us – the pandemic, the healthcare system’s response to the public health emergency, the ongoing fight for racial justice, the elections, the storming of the Capital – and the subject of healthcare winds its way through all of it – public health, our healthcare system’s stability, strengths and weaknesses, the highly noticeable healthcare inequities, the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid and vaccines, healthcare politics and what the new administration will bring as healthcare initiatives.
I will miss seeing you all in person this year at the J.P. Morgan Annual Healthcare Conference and our annual Sheppard Mullin reception – previously referred to as “standing room only” events and now as “possible superspreader events.” What a difference a year makes. I admit that I will miss the feeling of excitement in the rooms and hallways of the Westin St. Francis and all of the many hotel lobbies and meeting rooms surrounding it. Somehow the virtual conference this year lacks that je ne sais quoi of being stampeded by rushing New York-style street traffic while in an antiquated San Francisco hotel hallway and watching the words spoken on stage transform immediately into sharp stock price increases and drops. There also is the excitement of sitting in the room listening to paradigm shifting ideas (teaser – read the last paragraph of this post for something truly fascinating). Perhaps next year, depending on the vaccine…
So, let’s start there. Today was vaccine day at the JPM Conference, with BioNTech, Moderna, Novovax and Johnson & Johnson all presenting. Lots of progress reported by all of the companies working on vaccines, but the best news of the day was the comment from BioNTech that the UK and South Africa coronavirus variants likely are still covered by the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine. BioNTech’s CEO, Prof. Uğur Şahin, M.D., promised more data and analysis to be published shortly on that.
We also saw continued excitement for mRNA vaccines, not only for COVID-19 but also for other diseases. There is a growing focus (following COVID-19 of course) on vaccines for cancer through use of neoantigen targets, and for a long list of infectious disease targets.For cancer, though, there continues to be a growing debate over whether the best focus is on “personalized” vaccines or “off the shelf” vaccines – personalized vaccines can take longer to make and have much, much higher costs and infrastructure requirements. We expect, however, to see very exciting news on the use of mRNA and other novel technologies in the next year or two that, when approved and put into commercialization, could radically change the game, not only as to mortality, but also by eliminating or significantly reducing the cost of care with chronic conditions (which some cancers have become, thanks to technological advancement). We are fortunate to be in that gap now between “care” and “cure,” where we have been able with modern medical advances to convert many more disease states into manageable chronic care conditions. Together with today’s longer lifespans, that, however, carries a much higher price tag for our healthcare system. Now, with some of these recent announcements, we look forward to moving from “care” to “cure” and substantially dropping the cost of care to our healthcare system.
Continuing consolidation also was a steady drumbeat underlying the multiple presentations today on the healthcare services side of the conference – health plans, health systems, physician organizations, home health. The drive to scale continues, as we have seen from the accelerated pace of mergers and acquisitions in the second half of 2020, which continues unabated in January 2021. There was today’s announcement of the acquisition by Amerisource Bergen of Walgreens Boots Alliance’s Alliance Healthcare wholesale business (making Walgreens Boots Alliance the largest single shareholder of Amerisource Bergen at nearly 30% ownership), following the announcement last week of Centene’s acquisition of Magellan Health (coming fast on the heels of Molina Healthcare’s purchase of Magellan’s Complete Care line of business).
On the mental health side – a core focus area for Magellan Health – Centene’s Chief Executive Officer, Michael Neidorff, expressed the common theme that we have been seeing in the past year that mental health care should be integrated and coordinated with primary and specialty care. He also saw value in Magellan’s strong provider network, as access to mental health providers can be a challenge in some markets and populations. The behavioral/mental health sector likely will see increased attention and consolidation in the coming year, especially given its critical role during the COVID-19 crisis and also with the growing Medicaid and Medicare populations.There are not a lot of large assets left independent in the mental health sector (aside from inpatient providers, autism/developmental disorder treatment programs, and substance abuse residential and outpatient centers), so we may see more roll-up focus (such as we have seen recently with the autism/ABA therapy sector) and technology-focused solutions (text-based or virtual therapy).
There was strong agreement among the presenting health plans and capitated providers (Humana, Centene, Oak Street and multiple health systems) today that we will continue to see movement toward value-based care (VBC) and risk-based reimbursement systems, such as Medicare Advantage, Medicare direct contracting and other CMS Innovation Center (CMMI) programs and managed Medicaid. Humana’s Chief Executive Officer, Bruce Broussard, said that the size of the MA program has grown so much since 2010 that it now represents an important voting bloc and one of the few ways in which the federal government currently is addressing healthcare inequities – e.g., through Over-the-Counter (OTC) pharmacy benefits, benefits focused on social determinants of health (SDOH), and healthcare quality improvements driven by the STARS rating program. Broussard also didn’t think Medicare Advantage would be a negative target for the Biden administration and expected more foreseeable and ordinary-course regulatory adjustments, rather than wholesale legislative change for Medicare Advantage.
There also was agreement on the exciting possibility of direct contracting for Medicare lives at risk under the CMMI direct contracting initiative. Humana expressed possible interest in both this year’s DCE program models and in the GEO regional risk-based Medicare program model that will be rolling out in the next year. Humana sees this as both a learning experience and as a way to apply their chronic care management skills and proprietary groups and systems to a broader range of applicable populations and markets. There is, however, a need for greater clarity and transparency from CMMI on program details which can substantially affect success and profitability of these initiatives.
Humana, Centene and Oak Street all sang the praises of capitated medical groups for Medicare Advantage and, per Michael Neidorff, the possibility of utilizing traditional capitated provider models for Medicaid membership as well. The problem, as noted by the speakers, is that there is a scarcity of independent capitated medical groups and a lack of physician familiarity and training. We may see a more committed effort by health plans to move their network provider groups more effectively into VBC and risk, much like we have seen Optum do with their acquired fee for service groups. Privia Health also presented today and noted that, while the market focus and high valuations today are accorded to Medicare lives, attention needs to be paid to the “age in” pipeline, as commercial patients who enroll in original Medicare and Medicare Advantage still would like to keep their doctors who saw them under commercial insurance. Privia’s thesis in part is to align with patients early on and retain them and their physicians, so as to create a “farm system” for accelerated Medicare population growth. Privia’s Chief Executive Officer, Shawn Morris, also touted Privia’s rapid growth, in part attributable to partnering with health systems.
As written in our notes from prior JPM healthcare conferences, health systems are continuing to look outside to third parties to gain knowledge base, infrastructure and management skills for physician VBC and risk arrangements. Privia cited their recent opening of their Central Florida market in partnership with Health First and rapid growth in providers by more than 25% in their first year of operations.
That being said, the real market sizzle remains with Medicare Advantage and capitation, percent of premium arrangements and global risk. The problem for many buyers, though, is that there are very few assets of size in this line of business. The HealthCare Partners/DaVita Medical Group acquisition by Optum removed that from the market, creating a high level of strategic and private equity demand and a low level of supply for physician organizations with that expertise. That created a focus on groups growing rapidly in this risk paradigm and afforded them strong valuation, like with Oak Street Health this past year as it completed its August 2020 initial public offering. Oak Street takes on both professional and institutional (hospital) risk and receives a percent of premium from its contracting health plans. As Oak Street’s CEO Mike Pykosz noted, only about 3% of Medicare dollars are spent on primary care, while approximately two-thirds are spent on hospital services. If more intensive management occurs at the primary care level and, as a result, hospitalizations can be prevented or reduced, that’s an easy win that’s good for the patient and the entire healthcare system (other than a fee for service based hospital).Pykosz touted his model of building out new centers from scratch as allowing greater conformity, control and efficacy than buying existing groups and trying to conform them both physically and through practice approaches to the Oak Street model. He doesn’t rule out some acquisitions, but he noted as an example that Oak Street was able to swiftly role out COVID-19 protocols rapidly and effectively throughout his centers because they all have the same physical configuration, the same staffing ratio and the same staffing profiles. Think of it as a “franchise” model where each Subway store, for example, will have generally the same look, feel, size and staffing. He also noted that while telehealth was very helpful during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 and will continue as long as the doctors and patients wish, Oak Street believes that an in-person care management model is much more effective and telehealth is better for quick follow-ups or when in-person visits can’t occur.
Oak Street also spoke to the topic of Medicare Advantage member acquisition, which has been one of the more difficult areas to master for many health plans and groups, resulting in many cases with mergers and acquisitions becoming a favored growth vehicle due to the difficulties of organic membership growth. Interestingly, both Oak Street and Humana reported improvements in membership acquisition during the COVID-19 crisis. Oak Street credited digital marketing and direct response television, among other factors. Humana found that online direct-to-consumer brokers became an effective pathway during the COVID-19 crisis and focused its energy on enhancing those relationships and improving hand-offs during the membership enrollment process. Humana also noted the importance of brand in Medicare Advantage membership marketing.
Staying with Medicare Advantage, there is an expectation of a decrease in Medicare risk adjustment revenue in 2021, in large part due to the lower healthcare utilization during the COVID crisis and the lesser number of in-person visits during which HCC-RAF Medicare risk adjustment coding typically occurs. That revenue drop however likely will not significantly decrease Medicare Advantage profitability though, given the concomitant drop in healthcare expenses due to lower utilization, and per conference reports, is supposed to return to normal trend in 2022 (unless we see utilization numbers fall back below 90% again). Other interesting economic notes from several presentations, when taken together, suggest that while many health systems have lost out on elective surgery revenue in 2020, their case mix index (CMI) in many cases has been much higher due to the COVID patient cases. We also saw a number of health systems with much lower cash days on hand numbers than other larger health systems (both in gross and after adjusting for federal one-time stimulus cash payments), as a direct result of COVID. This supports the thesis we are hearing that, with the second wave of COVID being higher than expected, in the absence of further federal government financial support to hospitals, we likely will see an acceleration of partnering and acquisition transactions in the hospital sector.
Zoetis, one of the largest animal health companies, gave an interesting presentation today on its products and service lines. In addition to some exciting developments re: monoclonal antibody treatments coming on line for dogs with pain from arthritis, Zoetis also discussed its growing laboratory and diagnostics line of business. The animal health market, sometime overshadowed by the human healthcare market, is seeing some interesting developments as new revenue opportunities and chronic care management paradigms (such as for renal care) are shifting in the animal health sector. This is definitely a sector worth watching.
We also saw continuing interest, even in the face of Congressional focus this past year, on growing pharmacy benefit management (PBM) companies, which are designed to help manage the pharmacy spend. Humana listed growth of its PBM and specialty pharmacy lines of business as a focus for 2021, along with at-home care. In its presentation today, SSM Health, a health system in Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Illinois, and Missouri, spotlighted Navitus, its PBM, which services 7 million covered lives in 50 states.
One of the most different, interesting and unexpected presentations of the day came from Paul Markovich, Chief Executive Officer of Blue Shield of California. He put forth the thesis that we need to address the flat or negative productivity in healthcare today in order to both reduce total cost of care, improve outcomes and to help physicians, as well as to rescue the United States from the overbearing economic burden of the current healthcare spending. Likening the transformation in healthcare to that which occurred in the last two decades with financial services (remember before ATMs and banking apps, there were banker’s hours and travelers cheques – remember those?), he described exciting pilot projects that reimagine healthcare today. One project is a real-time claims adjudication and payment program that uses smart watches to record physician/patient interactions, natural language processing (NLP) to populate the electronic medical record, transform the information concurrently into a claim, adjudicate it and authorize payment. That would massively speed up cash flow to physician practices, reduce paperwork and many hours of physician EMR and billing time and reduce the billing and collection overhead and burden. It also could substantially reduce healthcare fraud.
Paul Markovich also spoke to the need for real-time quality information that can result in real-time feedback and incentivization to physicians and other providers, rather than the costly and slow HEDIS pursuits we see today. One health plan noted that it spends about $500 million a year going into physician offices looking at medical records for HEDIS pursuits, but the information is totally “in the rearview mirror” as it is too old when finally received and digested to allow for real-time treatment changes, improvement or planning. Markovich suggested four initiatives (including the above, pay for value and shared decision making through better, more open data access) that he thought could save $100 billion per year for the country.Markovich stressed that all of these four initiatives required a digital ecosystem and asked for help and partnership in creating one. He also noted that the State of California is close to creating a digital mandate and statewide health information exchange that could be the launching point for this exciting vision of data sharing and a digital ecosystem where the electronic health record is the beginning, but not the end of the healthcare data journey.
As the coronavirus sickens tens of thousands of Americans while pressuring the bottom lines of medical providers, analysts worry the pandemic could also hit pause on the decades-long march toward value-based care, as hospitals and doctors look to recoup revenue in the short-term instead of putting more dollars at risk.
Massive health systems and independent physician offices alike are diverting funds to shore up resources like personal protective equipment, ventilators and staff to prepare for an expected influx of COVID-19 patients or to cope with those already there. Expenses are skyrocketing as providers halt non-essential visits including lucrative elective procedures like joint replacements, winnowing down a major source of revenue.
Clinicians in value-based payment arrangements face higher levels of financial risk than their fee-for-service counterparts. Money spent preparing for the coronavirus and treating COVID-19 patients will be a sunk cost and they could be dinged financially again at the end of the year when their spending and performance is evaluated.
Already, the coronavirus is leading providers to think about exiting the models.
A survey published this week of more than 220 accountable care organizations nationwide found almost 60% are likely to drop out of their risk-based model to avoid financial losses. Some 77% are “very concerned” about the coronavirus’ impact on their 2020 performance.
“The value-based movement is at a critical juncture,” wrote National Association of ACOs CEO Clif Gaus in a letter to CMS Administrator Seema Verma last month.
Fee-for-service still dominates — roughly 40% of healthcare payments made in 2018 were under fee-for-service, according to the Health Care Payment Learning & Action Network (LAN) — but it’s been on the downswing. One in three healthcare payments currently flows through some sort of alternative payment model, and that has been projected to grow.
Among the four main types of value-based arrangements — shared risk, global capitation, bundled care and shared savings — most require an upfront financial commitment. And providers are unlikely to put more capital at risk given the current economic situation, analysts told Healthcare Dive, instead focusing on making up the losses they sustained during the outbreak by ramping up capacity.
Doctor’s offices and hospitals will reschedule delayed procedures and even operate on weekends to recapture as much revenue as possible before they’re likely to consider taking on more risk.
“Even if you’re not in the hotspots, you are preparing right now. This puts on hold a lot of the initiatives that have been on the value-based side of things,” Jefferies senior healthcare analyst Brian Tanquilut told Healthcare Dive. “I don’t think the value-based discussion goes away, but I think it will take a recovery of the hospital system before it can go there.”
Pleas for loss waivers
The National Association of ACOs told CMS in mid-March that ACOs in Medicare’s flagship ACO program the Shared Savings Program, along with other shared risk models like the Next Generation ACO model and the upcoming Direct Contracting initiative, could face losses beyond their control because of the pandemic.
CMS did pause some reporting requirements for value-based initiatives late last month. The agency pushed back the deadline for groups participating in the Medicare ACO program, Merit-based Incentive Payment System and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program to report quality data, or waived reporting entirely for the fourth quarter of 2019. The relaxation was framed as a way to help value-based organizations free up time and resources amid the pandemic.
But provider groups including NAACOS and the American Hospital Association have lobbied aggressively for the Trump administration to forgive all ACO losses for 2020. CMS is reviewing their request.
But all normal rules have gone out the window, experts say, and it’s almost impossible to move the needle toward value in the future when providers are facing a tsunami of patients now.
“This is not about managing a population. This is about doing everything you can to keep these people alive,” Dean Ungar, vice president of Moody’s Investors Service, told Healthcare Dive. “Coronavirus is really a five-alarm fire. But if your building’s on fire, that doesn’t really tell you how to maintain your business in normal circumstances.”
Some, however, are more optimistic that the unique financial challenges brought on by the pandemic highlight the problems with the traditional fee-for-service model and could even nudge providers toward value-based arrangements down the line.
“If all of your revenue is based on patients walking in the door, when they can’t walk in the door anymore, you’re kind of up the creek without a paddle,” Dan Bowles, SVP of growth and network operations at accountable care organization Aledade told Healthcare Dive. “You need to find a way to create non-visit-based revenue.”
Some hope the pandemic could help the value-based movement in the long term as practices look for ways to uncouple revenue from patient volume. And, as medical costs continue to rise, accounting for 19% of the country’s GDP, any pause in the shift to value-based care due to the coronavirus is likely to be a short detour, not a complete derailment.
“Maybe some providers are going to see it in a different light when their business kind of dries up — see that there’s a benefit to it,” Ungar said. “Ultimately, it’s a trend of where things are going, but it’s a big ship and it’s moving slowly.”
And value-based care arrangements were built predominantly for the populations being hit hardest by the coronavirus: those with serious underlying medical conditions like chronic lung disease or severe obesity.
If those vulnerable patients were being treated in value-based arrangements, it’s possible more COVID-19 cases could have been caught earlier before they became life-threatening, Moody’s analyst Stefan Kahandaliyanage told Healthcare Dive. That could renew industry’s focus on managing the health of those most at-risk from novel infectious diseases in the future.
“Costs are very high and there’s been a pandemic,” Kahandaliyanage said. “Let’s get more healthy before the next pandemic comes.”
It turns out it’s not just the kids who aren’t getting snow days this year. This week, we spoke with an executive at a health system hit hard by Wednesday’s Nor’easter, and asked how the system was faring with the expected 18 inches of snowfall. He replied that the medical group was as busy as usual.
With all the work this spring to expand telemedicine capabilities, clinic staff were able to reach out to patients the day before the storm, and proactively convert a majority of scheduled in-person clinic visits to telemedicine. “Normally we would’ve been closed, and most appointments rescheduled for weeks down the road,” he told us. Instead, they were able to keep most of those visits in their scheduled time slot.
“Now that we have a systemwide process for telemedicine, I don’t think we’ll have a reason for the clinic to take a snow day again.” It’s a clear win-win for the system and patients: patient care seamlessly goes on. It’s easy to see the many use cases for the ability to toggle between in-person and virtual visits. A parent is stuck at home with a sick kid, and can’t make her endocrinologist appointment? Moved to virtual! A patient has an unexpected business trip taking him out of town? Don’t cancel, let’s do that follow-up visit via telemedicine.
We’ve been worried about the slowdown in progress made on telemedicine as patients switched back to in-person visits across the summer and fall. The ability to continue patient care during a record-breaking snowstorm is a perfect illustration of why it’s critical not to “backslide” with virtual care: meeting patients where they are, regardless of circumstances, is an essential part of building long-term loyalty and care continuity.
A quick stop at the local Whole Foods Market recently yielded surprising insights into the dilemma faced by physician practices in the COVID-era telemedicine boom.
The store location opened just last year, part of a brand-new residential and shopping complex designed for busy professionals. It’s larger than the old-style, pre-Amazon era stores, and was designed to integrate Amazon’s online grocery operations into the bricks-and-mortar retail setting. There’s a portion of the store set aside for Amazon “shoppers” to receive and pack online orders for pickup and delivery, along with an expanded array of convenience-food offerings for the app-powered consumer to scan and purchase.
But when COVID hit, the volume of online orders went through the roof, and the store hired a small army of Amazon shoppers (including one of our own adult children who’s on a “gap year”) to keep up with demand. The result has been barely controlled chaos—easily 70 percent of the shoppers in the aisles last weekend were young Amazon employees “shopping” on behalf of online customers. They’re all held to an Amazon-level productivity standard, which makes the pace of their cart-pushing somewhat frantic and erratic. And the discreet area at the front of the store for managing the Amazon orders has become a noisy hub, making entering and exiting the store problematic. Even the “regular” store employees at Whole Foods have begun to complain about the disruption caused by the Amazon fulfillment operation.
It’s acautionary tale for traditional physician practices and other care delivery organizations looking to “integrate” telemedicine into normal operations. Integration sounds great in theory, but in practice raises important questions:
1)What physical space should be set aside for delivering virtual care?
2)Should telemedicine work be done in a separate, centralized location, or in existing clinic space?
3) How does the staffing of clinics need to change to meet the demand for virtual care?
4) How can we flex staffing up and down based on demand for telemedicine?
5)If new staff are required, how will they be incorporated into the existing team—or should they be managed separately?
6)What operational metrics will they be held accountable for, and what impact will those metrics have on other operational goals?
If Amazon, a worldwide leader online, renowned for running tight, precision, productivity-driven operations, is having trouble figuring out physical-virtual integration at the front end of their business, imagine how difficult these challenges will be for healthcare providers. The sooner we start to dig into these issues and find sustainable solutions, the better.
The Medicare Shared Savings Program saved the agency $1.19 billion in 2019, according to CMS performance results of 541 accountable care organizations released Monday.
This marks the third year of savings for the value-based care program and its largest yet, CMS Administrator Seema Verma wrote in a Health Affairs blog post Monday. ACOs taking on more risk continued to outperform those that didn’t, Verma wrote, including those under its Pathways to Success rule rolled out in December 2018.
ACOs in the Pathways to Success program generated net per-beneficiary savings of $169 compared to $106 for legacy track ACOs, Verma said, suggesting the policies are incentivizing ACOs to deliver more coordinated and efficient care.
ACOs are groups of doctors, hospitals and other providers with payments tied to the cost and quality of care they provide beneficiaries. According to Verma’s post, the number of ACOs taking on downside financial risk has nearly doubled since the Pathways to Success program launched for those in the Medicare Shared Savings Program.
New participation options under the rule require accountability for spending increases, generally after two years for new ACOs, and close evaluation of care quality. The new benchmarks and speed at which ACOs would need to take on downside risk was initially shot down by ACOs.
But CMS also created an option for “low-revenue” ACOs, generally run by physician practices rather than hospitals, allowing them an additional year before taking on downside risk for cost increases.
According to the blog post, physician-led ACOs performed better than hospital-led ACOs.
“To get program growth back on track, Congress needs to take a close look at the Value in Health Care Act, which makes several improvements to the Medicare ACO program and better incentivizes Advanced Alternative Payment Models,” trade group CEO Clif Gaus said in a statement.
Farzad Mostashari, CEO of the Aledade, pointed to physician-led ACOs out-performing hospital ACOs in a statement on the results. “What we need now is to help more practices participate in these models of care,” he said.
Low-revenue ACOs, typically physician-led, had per beneficiary savings of $201 compared to $80 per beneficiary for high-revenue ACOs. Low-revenue ACOs in the Pathways to Success program saved $189 per beneficiary while high-revenue ACOs in the program saved $155 per beneficiary, according to the 2019 performance results.
Several factors will shape the financial performance of physician- and hospital-led organizations under total cost of care payment models.
Broad consensus has long existed among public- and private-sector leaders in US healthcare that improvements in healthcare affordability will require, among other changes, a shift away from fee-for-service (FFS) payments to alternative payment models that reward quality and efficiency. The alternative payment model that has gained broadest adoption over the past ten years is the accountable care organization (ACO), in which physicians and/or hospitals assume responsibility for the total cost of care for a population of patients.
Launched by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Innovation Center in 2012, Pioneer ACO was the first such model design to generate savings for Medicare. In this incarnation, Medicare set a benchmark for total cost of care per attributed ACO beneficiary: If total cost of care was kept below the benchmark, ACOs were eligible to share in the implied savings, as long as they also met established targets for quality of care. If total cost of care exceeded the benchmark, ACOs were required to repay the government for a portion of total cost of care above the benchmark.
Payment models similar to the one adopted by Pioneer ACOs also have been extended to other Medicare ACO programs, with important technical differences in estimates for savings and rules for the distribution of savings or losses as well as some models offering gain sharing without potential for penalties for costs exceeding the benchmark. State Medicaid programs as well as private payers (across Commercial, Medicare Advantage, and Medicaid Managed Care) also have adopted ACO-like models with similar goals and payment model structures. Of the roughly 33 million lives covered by an ACO in 2018, more than 50 percent were commercially insured and approximately 10 percent were Medicaid lives.2
On the whole, ACOs in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) have delivered high-quality care, with an average composite score of 93.4 percent for quality metrics. However, cost savings achieved by the program have been limited: ACOs that entered MSSP during the period from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014, were estimated to have reduced cumulative Medicare FFS spending by $704M by 2015; after bonuses were accounted for, net savings to the Medicare program were estimated to be $144M.3 Put another way, in aggregate, savings from Medicare ACOs in 2015 represented only 0.02 percent of total Medicare spending. The savings achieved were largely concentrated among physician-led ACOs (rather than hospital-led ACOs). In fact, after accounting for bonuses, hospital-led ACOs actually had higher total Medicare spending by $112M on average over three years.4
While savings from MSSP have been relatively limited, in aggregate, numerous examples exist of ACOs that have achieved meaningful savings—in some cases in excess of 5 percent of total cost of care—with significant rewards to both themselves as well as sponsoring payers (for example, Millennium, Palm Beach, BCBSMA AQC).567 The wide disparity of performance among ACOs (and across Medicare, Medicaid, and Commercial ACO programs) raises the question of whether certain provider organizations are better suited than others to succeed under total cost of care arrangements, and whether success is dictated more by ACO model design or by structural characteristics of participating providers.
In the pages that follow, we examine these questions in two ways. First, we analyze “the math of ACOs” by isolating four factors that contribute to overall ACO profitability: bonus payments, “demand destruction,” market share gains, and operating expenses. Following these factors, we illustrate the math of ACOs through modeling of the performance of five different archetypes: physician-led ACOs; hospital-led ACOs with low ACO penetration and low leakage reduction; hospital-led ACOs with high ACO penetration; hospital-led ACOs with high leakage reduction; and hospital-led ACOs with high penetration and leakage reduction.
The Math of ACOs
In the pages that follow, we break down “the math of ACOs” into several key parameters, each of which hospital and physician group leaders could consider evaluating when deciding whether to participate in an ACO arrangement with one or more payers. Specifically, we measure the total economic value to ACO-participating providers as the sum of four factors: bonus payments, less “demand destruction,” plus market share gains, less operating costs for the ACO (Exhibit 1).
In the discussion that follows, we examine each of these factors and understand their importance to the overall profitability of ACOs, using both academic research as well as McKinsey’s experience advising and supporting payers and providers participating in ACO models.
1. Bonus payments
The premise of ACOs rests on the opportunity for payers and participating providers to share in cost savings arising from curbing unnecessary utilization and more efficient population health management, thus aligning incentives to control total cost of care. Because ACOs are designed to reduce utilization, the bonus—or share of estimated savings received by an ACO—is one factor that significantly influences ACO profitability and has garnered the greatest attention both in academic research and in private sector negotiations and deliberations over ACO participation. Bonus payments made to ACOs are themselves based on several key design elements:
The baseline and benchmark for total costs, against which savings are estimated8 ;
The shared savings rate and minimum savings/loss rates;
Risk corridors, based on caps on gains/losses and/or “haircuts” to benchmarks; and,
Frequency of rebasing, with implications for benchmark and shared savings.
1a. Baseline and benchmark
Most ACO models are grounded in a historical baseline for total cost of care, typically on the population attributed to providers participating in the ACO. Most ACO models apply an annual trend rate to the historical baseline, in order to develop a benchmark for total cost of care for the performance period. This benchmark is then used as the point of reference to which actual costs are compared for purposes of determining the bonus to be paid.
Historical baselines may be based either on one year or averaged over multiple years in order to mitigate the potential for a single-year fluctuation in total cost of care that could create an artificially high or low point of comparison in the future. Trend factors may be based on historically observed growth rates in per capita costs, or forward-looking projections, which may depart from historical trends due to changes in policy, fee schedules, or anticipated differences between past and future population health. Trend factors may be based on national projections, more market-specific projections, or even ACO-specific projections. For these and other reasons, a pre-determined benchmark may not be a good estimate of what total cost of care would have been in the absence of the ACO. As a result, estimated savings, and hence bonuses, may not reflect the true savings generated by ACOs if compared to a rigorous assessment of what otherwise would have occurred.
Recent research suggests that an ACO’s benchmark should be set using trend data from providers in similar geographic areas and/or with similar populations instead of using a national market average trend factor.9 It has been observed in Medicare (and other) populations that regions (and therefore possibly ACOs) that start at a lower-than-average cost base tend to have a higher-than-average growth trend. For example, Medicare FFS spending in low-cost regions grew at a rate 1.2 percentage points faster than the national average (2.8 percent and 1.6 percent from 2013 to 2017 compound annual growth rate, respectively). This finding is particularly relevant in low-cost rural communities, where healthcare spending grows faster than the national average.10 Based on this research, some ACO models, such as MSSP and the Next Generation Medicare ACO model, have developed benchmarks based on blending ACO-specific baselines with market-wide baselines. This approach is intended to account for the differences in “status quo” trend, which sponsoring payers may project in the absence of ACO arrangements or associated improvements in care patterns. Some model architects have advocated for this provider-market blended approach to benchmark development because they believe such an approach balances the need to reward providers who improve their own performance with a principle tenet of this model: That ACOs within a market should be held accountable to the same targets (at least in the long term).
The shared savings rate is the percentage of any estimated savings (compared with benchmark) that is paid to the ACO, subject to meeting any requirements for quality performance. For example, an ACO with a savings rate of 50 percent that outperforms its benchmark by 3 percent would keep 1.5 percent of benchmark spend. Under the array of Medicare ACO models, the shared savings rate percentage ranges anywhere from 40 percent to 100 percent.11
In some ACO models, particularly one-sided gain sharing models that do not introduce downside risk, payers impose a minimum savings rate (MSR), which is the savings threshold for an ACO to receive a payout, typically 2 percent, but can be higher or lower.12 For example, assume ACO Alpha has a savings rate of 60 percent and MSR of 1.5 percent. If Alpha overperforms the benchmark by 1 percent, there would be no bonus payout, because the total savings do not meet or exceed the MSR. If, however, Alpha overperforms the benchmark by 3 percent, Alpha would receive a bonus of 1.8 percent of benchmark (60 percent of 3 percent). An MSR is common in one-sided risk agreements to protect the payer from paying out the ACO if modest savings are a result of random variations. ACOs in two-sided risk arrangements may often choose whether to have an MSR.
Both factors impact the payout an ACO receives. Between 2012 and 2018, average earned shared savings for MSSP ACOs were between $1.0M and $1.6M per ACO (between $10 and $100 per beneficiary).13 However, while nearly two out of three MSSP ACOs in 2018 were under benchmark, only about half of them (37 percent of all MSSP ACOs) received a payout due to the MSR.14
1c. Risk corridors
In certain arrangements, payers include clauses that limit an ACO’s gains or losses to protect against extreme situations. Caps depend on the risk-sharing agreement (for example, one-sided or two-sided) as well as the shared savings/loss rate. For example, MSSP Track 1 ACOs (one-sided risk sharing) cap shared savings at the ACO’s share of 10 percent variance to the benchmark, while Track 3 ACOs (two-sided risk sharing) cap shared savings at the ACO’s share of 20 percent variance to the benchmark and cap shared losses at 15 percent variance to the benchmark.15 In contrast with these Medicare models, many Commercial and Medicaid ACO models have applied narrower risk corridors, with common ranges of 3 to 5 percent. In our experience, payers have elected to offer narrower risk corridors. Their choice is based on their desire to mitigate risk as well as the interest of some payers (and state Medicaid programs) to share in extraordinary savings that may be attributable in part to policy changes or other interventions undertaken by the payers themselves, whether in coordination with ACOs or independent of their efforts.
Payers also may vary the level of shared savings (and/or risk), between that which applies to the first dollar of savings (versus benchmark) compared with more significant savings. For example, by applying a 1 percent adjustment or “haircut” to the benchmark, a payer might keep 100 percent of the first 1 percent of savings and share any incremental savings with the ACO at a negotiated shared savings rate. Depending on what higher shared savings rate may be offered in trade for the “haircut,” such a structure has the potential to increase the incentive for ACOs to significantly outperform the benchmark. For example, an ACO that beats the benchmark by 4 percentage points and earns 100 percent of savings after 1 percentage point would net 75 percent of total estimated savings. However, under the same risk model, if the ACO were to beat the benchmark by 2 percentage points, they would only earn 50 percent of total savings. Such a structure could therefore be either more favorable or less favorable than 60 percent shared savings without a “haircut,” depending on the ACO’s anticipated performance.
1d. Frequency of rebasing
In most ACO models (including those adopted by CMS for the Medicare FFS program), the ACO’s benchmark is reset for each performance period based (at least in part) on the ACO’s performance in the immediate prior year. This approach is commonly referred to as “rebasing.” The main criticism of this approach toward ACO model design—which is also evident in capitation rate setting for Managed Care Organizations—is that ACOs become “victims of their own success”: Improvements made by the ACO in one year lead to a benchmark that is even harder to beat in the following year. The corollary is also true: An ACO with “excessive” costs in Year 1 may be setting themselves up for significant shared savings in Year 2 simply by bringing their performance back to “normal” levels.
Even in situations where ACOs show steady improvements in management of total cost of care over several years, the “ratchet” effect of rebasing can have significant implications for the share of estimated savings that flow to the ACO. Exhibit 2 illustrates the shared savings that would be captured by an ACO, if it were to mitigate trend by 2 percentage points consistently for 5 years (assumes linear growth), under a model that provides 50 percent shared savings against a benchmark that is set with annual rebasing. In this scenario, although the ACO would earn 50 percent of the savings estimated in any one year (against benchmark), the ACO would derive only 16 percent of total savings achieved relative to a “status quo” trend.
Some ACO model designs (including MSSP) have mitigated this “ratchet” effect, to some extent, by using multi-year baselines, whereby the benchmark for a given performance year is based not on the ACO’s baseline performance in the immediate prior year but over multiple prior years. This approach smooths out the effect of one-year fluctuations in performance on the benchmark for subsequent years; by implication, improvements made by an ACO in Year 1 and sustained in Year 2 create shared savings in both years. Under a three-year baseline, weighted toward the most recent year 60/30/10 percent (as applies to new contracts under the MSSP), the ACO in Exhibit 2 would capture 22 percent of total estimated savings over 5 years. If the model were instead to adopt an evenly weighted three-year baseline, that same ACO would capture 28 percent over 5 years.
In select cases, particularly in the Commercial market, payers and ACOs have agreed to multi-year prospective benchmarks. Under this approach, the benchmark for performance Years 1 to 5 (for example) are set prospectively in Year 0; the benchmarks for Years 2 and 3, for example, are not impacted by the ACO’s performance in Year 1. If this approach were to be applied to the ACO depicted in Exhibit 2, they would earn fully 50 percent of the total savings, assuming that the prospectively established 5-year benchmark was set at the “status quo” trend line. While prospective multi-year benchmarks may be more favorable to ACOs, they also increase the sensitivity of ACO performance to both the original baseline as well as the reasonableness of the prospectively applied trend rate.
While in many cases healthcare organizations are highly focused on the percent of shared savings they will receive (shared savings rate), in our experience, the financial sustainability of ACO arrangements may be equally or more greatly affected by several other design parameters outlined here, among them: the inclusion of an MSR or a “haircut” to benchmark, either of which may dampen the incentive to perform; benchmark definitions including the use of provider-specific, market-specific, and/or national baseline and trend factors; and the frequency of rebasing, as implied by the use of a single-year or multi-year baseline, or the adoption of prospectively determined multi-year benchmarks.
2. Demand destruction
Although shared savings arrangements are meant to align providers’ incentives with curbing unnecessary utilization, the calculation of bonus payments based on avoided claims costs (as described in Section 1) does not account for the foregone provider revenue (and margins) attached to reductions in patient volume. The economic impact of this reduction in patient volume, sometimes referred to as “demand destruction,” is described in this section, which we address in two parts:
Foregone economic contribution based on reduced utilization in the ACO population; and,
Spillover effects from reduced utilization in the non-ACO population, based on clinical and operational changes that “spillover” from the ACO population to the non-ACO population.
2a. Foregone economic contribution
Claims paid to hospital systems for inpatient, outpatient, and post-acute facility utilization typically comprise 40 to 70 percent of total cost of care, with hospital systems that own a greater share of outpatient diagnostic lab and/or imaging and/or skilled nursing beds falling at the upper end of this range. These same categories of facility utilization may comprise 60 to 80 percent of reductions in utilization arising from improvements in population health management by an ACO. Given the high fixed costs (and correspondingly high gross margins) associated with inpatient, outpatient, and post-acute facilities, foregone facility volume could come at an opportunity cost of 30 to 70 percent of foregone revenue—that opportunity cost being the gross contribution margin associated with incremental patient volume, calculated as revenue less variable costs: Commercially insured ACO populations are more likely to fall into the upper end of this range and Medicaid populations into the lower end. This is the reason savings rates tend to be higher in the Commercial market, to offset the larger (negative) financial impact of “demand destruction.”
For example, a hospital-led ACO that mitigates total cost of care by 3 percent (or $300 based on a benchmark of $10,000 per capita) might forego $180 to $240 of revenue per patient (assuming 60 to 80 percent of savings derived from hospital services), which may represent $90 to $120 in foregone economic contribution, assuming 50 percent gross margins. As this example shows, this foregone economic contribution may represent a significant offset to any bonus paid under shared savings arrangements, unless the shared savings percentage is significantly greater than the gross margin percentage for foregone patient revenue.
For some hospitals that are capacity constrained, the lost patient volume may be replaced (that is, backfilled) with additional patient volume that may be more or less profitable depending on the payer (for example, an ACO that backfills with more profitable Commercial patients). However, the vast majority of hospitals are not traditionally capacity constrained and therefore must look to other methods (for example, growing market share) to be financially sustainable.
In contrast, physician-led ACOs have comparatively little need to consider the financial impact of “demand destruction,” given that they never benefitted from hospitalizations and thus do not lose profits from forgone care. Furthermore, primary care practices may actually experience an increase, rather than decrease, in patient revenue, based on more effective population health management. Even for multi-specialty physician practices that sponsor ACO formation, any reductions in patient volume arising from the ACO may have only modest impact on practice profitability due to narrow contribution margins attached to incremental patient volume. Physician-led ACOs may need to be concerned with “demand destruction” only to the extent that a disproportionate share of savings is derived from reductions in practice-owned diagnostics or other high-margin services; however, the savings derived from such sources are typically smaller than reductions in utilization for emergency department, inpatient, and post-acute facility utilization.
2b. Spillover effects
Though ACOs are not explicitly incentivized to reduce total cost of care of their non-ACO populations (including FFS), organizations often see increased efficiency across their full patient population after becoming an ACO. For example, research over the last decade has found reductions in spend for non-ACO lives between 1 and 3 percent (Exhibit 3).
The impact of spillover effects on an ACO’s profitability depends on the proportion of ACO and non-ACO lives that comprise a provider’s patient panel. Further, impact also depends on the ACO’s ability to implement differentiated processes for ACO and non-ACO lives to limit the spillover of the efficiencies. Although conventional wisdom implies that physicians will not discriminate their clinical practice patterns based on the type of payer (or payment), nonetheless many examples exist of hospitals and other providers with the ability to differentiate processes based on payer or payment type. For example, many hospitals deploy greater resources to discharge planning or initiate the process earlier for patients reimbursed under a Diagnosis Related Group (case rate) than for those reimbursed on a per diem or percent of charges model. Moreover, ACOs and other risk-bearing entities routinely direct care management activities disproportionately or exclusively toward patients for whom they have greater financial accountability for quality and/or efficiency. For physician-led ACOs, differentiating resource deployment between ACO- and non-ACO populations may be necessary to achieve a return on investment for new care management or other population health management activities. For hospital sponsors of ACOs that continue to derive the majority of their revenue from FFS populations outside the ACO, differentiating population health management efforts across ACO and FFS populations are of paramount importance to overall financial sustainability. To the extent that hospital-led ACOs are unable to do so, they may find total cost of care financial arrangements to be financially sustainable only if extended to the substantial majority of their patient populations in order to reduce the severity of any spillover effects.
The adverse impact of “demand destruction” is what most distinguishes the math of hospital-led ACOs from that of physician-led ACOs. The structure of ACO-sponsoring hospitals—whether they own post-acute assets, for example—further shapes the severity of demand destruction, which then provides a point of reference for determining what shared savings percentage may be necessary to overcome the impact of demand destruction. Though in the long term, hospitals may be able to right size capacity, in the near term when deciding to become an ACO, there is often limited ability to alter the fixed-cost base. Finally, the extent of “spillover effects” from the ACO to the non-ACO population further impacts the financial sustainability of hospital-led ACOs. Hospital-led ACOs can seek to minimize the impact through 1) differentiating processes between the two populations, and/or 2) transitioning the substantial majority of their patient population into ACO arrangements.
3. Market share gains
Providers can further improve profitability through market share gains, specifically:
Reduced system leakage through improved alignment of referring physicians across both ACO and non-ACO patients; and,
Improved network status as an ACO.
3a. Reduced system leakage
ACOs can grow market share by coordinating patients within the system (that is, reduce leakage) to better manage total cost of care and quality. This coordination is often accomplished by improving the provider’s alignment with the referring physician; for example, ACOs can establish a comprehensive governance structure and process around network integrity, standardize the referral process between physicians and practices, and improve physician relationships within, and with awareness of, the network. Furthermore, ACOs can develop a process to ensure that a patient schedules follow-up appointments before leaving the physician’s office, optimizing the scheduling system and call center.
Stark Laws (anti-kickback regulations) have historically prevented systems from giving physicians financial incentives to reduce leakage. While maintaining high-quality standards, ACOs are given a waiver to this law and therefore are allowed to pursue initiatives that improve network integrity to better coordinate care for patients. In our experience, hospitals generally experience 30 to 50 percent leakage (Exhibit 4), but ACOs can improve leakage by 10 to 30 percent.
3b. Improved network status
In some instances for Commercial payers, an ACO may receive preferential status within a network by entering into a total cost of care arrangement with a payer. As a result, the ACO would see greater utilization, which will improve profitability. For example, in 2012, the Cooley Dickinson Hospital (CDH) and Cooley Dickinson Physician Hospital Organization, a health system in western Massachusetts with 66 primary care providers and 160 specialists, joined Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts’ (BCBSMA) Alternative Quality Contract (AQC), which established a per-patient global budget to cover all services and expenses for its Commercial population. As a result of joining the AQC, reducing the prices charged for services, and providing high quality of care, CDH was “designated as a high-value option in the Western Mass. Region,” which meant BCBSMA members with certain plans “[paid] less out-of-pocket when they [sought] care” at CDH.16 Other payers have also established similar mutually beneficial offerings to providers who assume more accountability for care.1718 An ACO can benefit from these arrangements up until most or all other provider systems in the same market join.
These factors to improve market share (at lower cost and better quality) can help an ACO compensate for any lost profits from “demand destruction” (foregone profits and spillover effects) and increased operating costs. The opportunity from this factor, which requires initiatives that focus on reducing leakage, can be the difference between a net-neutral hospital-led ACO and a significantly profitable ACO. An example initiative would be performance management systems that analyze physician referral patterns.
4. Operating costs
Finally, profitability is impacted by operating costs or any additional expenses associated with running an ACO. These costs generally are lower for physician-led ACOs than for hospital-led ACOs (and also depend on buy-versus-build decisions). In our experience, operating costs to run an ACO vary widely depending on the provider’s operating model, cost structure (for example, existing personnel, IT capabilities), and ACO patient population (for example, number and percent of ACO lives). However, we will focus on three specific types of costs:
Care management costs, often variable, or a marginal expense for every life;
Data and analytics operating costs, which can vary widely depending on whether the ACO builds or buys this capability; and
Additional administrative costs, which are fixed or independent of the number of lives.
4a. Care management costs
In our experience, care management costs to operate an ACO range from 0.5 to 2.0 percent of total cost of care for a given ACO population. These care management costs include ensuring patients with chronic conditions are continuously managing those conditions and coordinating with physician teams to improve efficacy and efficiency of care. A core lever of success involves reducing use of unnecessary care. ACOs that spend closer to 2 percent and/or those whose efforts focus on expanding care coordination for high-risk patients struggle to achieve enough economic contribution to break even. This is because care coordination (devoting more resources to testing and treating patients with chronic disease) often does not have a positive return on investment.19 ACOs that do this effectively and ultimately spend less on care management (around 0.5 percent of the total cost of care) tend to create value primarily through curbing unnecessary utilization and steering patients toward more efficient facilities rather than managing chronic conditions. This value creation is particularly true for Commercial ACO contracts, where there is greater price variation across providers compared with Medicare and Medicaid contracts, where pricing is standardized.
4b. Data and analytics operating costs
Data and analytics operating costs are critical to supporting ACO effectiveness. For example, high-performing ACOs prioritize data interoperability across physicians and hospitals and constantly analyze electronic health records and claims data to identify opportunities to better manage patient care and reduce system leakage. ACOs can either build or license data and analytics tools, a decision that often depends on the number of ACO lives. In our experience, an ACO that decides to build its own data and analytics solutions in-house will on average invest around $24M for upfront development, amortized over 8 years for $3M per year, plus $6M in annual costs (for example, using data scientists and analysts to generate insights from the data), for a total of $9M per year. Alternatively, ACOs can license analytics software on a per-patient basis, typically costing 0.5 to 1.5 percent of the total cost of care. Thus, we find the breakeven point at around 100,000 covered ACO lives; therefore, it often makes financial sense for ACOs with more than 100,000 lives to build in-house.
4c. Additional administrative costs
Organizations must also invest in personnel to operate an ACO, typically including an executive director, head of real estate, head of care management, and lawyers and actuaries. The ACO leadership team’s responsibilities often include setting the ACO’s strategy (for example, target markets, lines of business, services offered, through which physicians and hospitals) and developing, managing, and communicating with the physician network to support continuity of care.
Operating costs to run an ACO are significant. Ability to find ways to invest in fixed costs that are more transformational in nature may result in lower near-term profitability but can provide a greater return on investment in the long term both for the ACO and the rest of the system. The decision to make these investments is dependent on the number of lives covered by an individual ACO.
Drawing on the analysis outlined above, we conducted scenario modeling of “the math of ACOs” using five different ACO archetypes, which vary in structure and performance under a common set of rules. These five archetypes include:
Typical physician-led ACO
Hospital-led ACO with low ACO penetration and low leakage reduction
Hospital-led ACO with high ACO penetration
Hospital-led ACO with high leakage reduction
Hospital-led ACO with high leakage reduction and high ACO penetration
Subsequently, taking an ACO’s structure as a given, we describe for each ACO archetype the key model design parameters and other strategic and operational choices that ACOs might make to maximize their performance.
Comparision of archetypes based on scenario modeling
Summarizing the four factors, the profitability of each archetype reveals certain insights (Exhibit 5).
[Readers’ Note: This is the first of two articles on the Future of Hospitals in Post-COVID America. This article
examines how market forces are consolidating, rationalizing and redistributing acute care assets within the
broader industry movement to value-based care delivery. The second article, which will publish next month,
examines gaps in care delivery and the related public policy challenges of providing appropriate, accessible
and affordable healthcare services in medically-underserved communities.]
In her insightful 2016 book, The Gray Rhino: How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious Dangers We Ignore,
Michelle Wucker coins the term “Gray Rhinos” and contrasts them with “Black Swans.” That distinction is
highly relevant to the future of American hospitals.
Black Swans are high impact events that are highly improbable and difficult to predict. By contrast, Gray Rhinos are foreseeable, high-impact events that we choose to ignore because they’re complex, inconvenient and/or fortified by perverse incentives that encourage the status quo. Climate change is a powerful example
of a charging Gray Rhino.
In U.S. healthcare, we are now seeing what happens when a Gray Rhino and a Black Swan collide.
Arguably, the nation’s public health defenses should anticipate global pandemics and apply resources
systematically to limit disease spread. This did not happen with the coronavirus pandemic.
Instead, COVID-19 hit the public healthcare infrastructure suddenly and hard. This forced hospitals and health systems to dramatically reduce elective surgeries, lay off thousands and significantly change care delivery with the adoption of new practices and services like telemedicine.
In comparison, many see the current American hospital business model as a Gray Rhino that has been charging toward unsustainability for years with ever-building momentum.
Even with massive and increasing revenue flows, hospitals have long struggled with razor-thin margins, stagnant payment rates and costly technology adoptions. Changing utilization patterns, new and disruptive competitors, pro-market regulatory rules and consumerism make their traditional business models increasingly vulnerable and, perhaps, unsustainable.
Despite this intensifying pressure, many hospitals and health systems maintain business-as-usual practices because transformation is so difficult and costly. COVID-19 has made the imperative of change harder to ignore or delay addressing.
For a decade, the transition to value-based care has dominated debate within U.S. healthcare and absorbed massive strategic, operational and financial resources with little progress toward improved care outcomes, lower costs and better customer service. The hospital-based delivery system remains largely oriented around Fee-for-Service reimbursement.
Hospitals’ collective response to COVID-19, driven by practical necessity and financial survival, may accelerate the shift to value-based care delivery. Time will tell.
This series explores the repositioning of hospitals during the next five years as the industry rationalizes an excess supply of acute care capacity and adapts to greater societal demands for more appropriate, accessible and affordable healthcare services.
It starts by exploring the role of the marketplace in driving hospital consolidation and the compelling need to transition to value-based care delivery and payment models.
COVID’s DUAL SHOCKS TO PATIENT VOLUME
Many American hospitals faced severe financial and operational challenges before COVID-19. The sector has struggled to manage ballooning costs, declining margins and waves of policy changes. A record 18 rural hospitals closed in 2019. Overall, hospitals saw a 21% decline in operating margins in 2018-2019.
COVID intensified those challenges by administering two shocks to the system that decreased the volume of hospital-based activities and decimated operating margins.
The first shock was immediate. To prepare for potential surges in COVID care, hospitals emptied beds and cancelled most clinic visits, outpatient treatments and elective surgeries. Simultaneously, they incurred heavy costs for COVID-related equipment (e.g. ventilators,PPE) and staffing. Overall, the sector experienced over $200 billion in financial losses between March and June 20204.
The second, extended shock has been a decrease in needed but not necessary care. Initially, many patients delayed seeking necessary care because of perceived infection risk. For example, Emergency Department visits declined 42% during the early phase of the pandemic.
Increasingly, patients are also delaying care because of affordability concerns and/or the loss of health insurance. Already, 5.4 million people have lost their employer-sponsored health insurance. This will reduce incremental revenues associated with higher-paying commercial insurance claims across the industry. Additionally, avoided care reduces patient volumes and hospital revenues today even as it increases the risk and cost of future acute illness.
The infusion of emergency funding through the CARES Act helped offset some operating losses but it’s unclear when and even whether utilization patterns and revenues will return to normal pre-COVID levels. Shifts in consumer behavior, reductions in insurance coverage, and the emergence of new competitors ranging from Walmart to enhanced primary care providers will likely challenge the sector for years to come.
The disruption of COVID-19 will serve as a forcing function, driving meaningful changes to traditional hospital business models and the competitive landscape. Frankly, this is long past due. Since 1965, Fee-for-Service (FFS) payment has dominated U.S. healthcare and created pervasive economic incentives that can serve to discourage provider responsiveness in transitioning to value-based care delivery, even when aligned to market demand.
Telemedicine typifies this phenomenon. Before COVID, CMS and most health insurers paid very low rates for virtual care visits or did not cover them at all. This discouraged adoption of an efficient, high-value care modality until COVID.
Unable to conduct in-person clinical visits, providers embraced virtual care visits and accelerated its mass adoption. CMS and
commercial health insurers did their part by paying for virtual care visits at rates equivalent to in-person clinic visits. Accelerated innovation in care delivery resulted.
THE COMPLICATED TRANSITION TO VALUE
Broadly speaking, health systems and physician groups that rely almost exclusively on activity-based payment revenues have struggled the most during this pandemic. Vertically integrated providers that offer health insurance and those receiving capitated payments in risk-based contracts have better withstood volume losses.
Modern Healthcare notes that while provider data is not yet available, organizations such as Virginia Care Partners, an integrated network and commercial ACO; Optum Health (with two-thirds of its revenue risk-based); and MediSys Health Network, a New Yorkbased NFP system with 148,000 capitated and 15,000 shared risk patients, are among those navigating the turbulence successfully. As the article observes,
…providers paid for value have had an easier time weathering the storm…. helped by a steady source of
income amid the chaos. Investments they made previously in care management, technology and social
determinants programs equipped them to pivot to new ways of providing care.
They were able to flip the switch on telehealth, use data and analytics to pinpoint patients at risk for
COVID-19 infection, and deploy care managers to meet the medical and nonclinical needs of patients even
when access to an office visit was limited.
Supporting this post-COVID push for value-based care delivery, six former leaders from CMS wrote to Congress in
June 2020 calling for providers, commercial insurers and states to expand their use of value-based payment models to
encourage stability and flexibility in care delivery.
If value-based payment models are the answer, however, adoption to date has been slow, limited and difficult. Ten
years after the Affordable Care Act, Fee-for-Service payment still dominates the payer landscape. The percentage of overall provider revenue in risk-based capitated contracts has not exceeded 20%
Despite improvements in care quality and reductions in utilization rates, cost savings have been modest or negligible. Accountable Care Organizations have only managed at best to save a “few percent of Medicare spending, [but] the
amount varies by program design.”
While most health systems accept some forms of risk-based payments, only 5% of providers expect to have a majority (over 80%) of their patients in risk-based arrangements within 5 years.
The shift to value is challenging for numerous reasons. Commercial payers often have limited appetite or capacity for
risk-based contracting with providers. Concurrently, providers often have difficulty accessing the claims data they need
from payers to manage the care for targeted populations.
The current allocation of cost-savings between buyers (including government, employers and consumers), payers
(health insurance companies) and providers discourages the shift to value-based care delivery. Providers would
advance value-based models if they could capture a larger percentage of the savings generated from more effective
care management and delivery. Those financial benefits today flow disproportionately to buyers and payers.
This disconnection of payment from value creation slows industry transformation. Ultimately, U.S. healthcare will not
change the way it delivers care until it changes the way it pays for care. Fortunately, payment models are evolving to
incentivize value-based care delivery.
As payment reform unfolds, however, operational challenges pose significant challenges to hospitals and health
systems. They must adopt value-oriented new business models even as they continue to receive FFS payments. New
and old models of care delivery clash.
COVID makes this transition even more formidable as many health systems now lack the operating stamina and balance sheet strength to make the financial, operational and cultural investments necessary to deliver better outcomes, lower costs and enhanced customer service.
MARKET-DRIVEN CONSOLIDATION AND TRANSFORMATION
Full-risk payment models, such as bundled payments for episodic care and capitation for population health, are the
catalyst to value-based care delivery. Transition to value-based care occurs more easily in competitive markets with many attributable lives, numerous provider options and the right mix of willing payers.
As increasing numbers of hospitals struggle financially, the larger and more profitable health systems are expanding their networks, capabilities and service lines through acquisitions. This will increase their leverage with commercial payers and give them more time to adapt to risk-based contracting and value-based care delivery.
COVID also will accelerate acquisition of physician practices. According to an April 2020 MGMA report, 97% of
physician practices have experienced a 55% decrease in revenue, forcing furloughs and layoffs15. It’s estimated the
sector could collectively lose as much as $15.1 billion in income by the end of September 2020.
Struggling health systems and physician groups that read the writing on the wall will pro-actively seek capital or strategic partners that offer greater scale and operating stability. Aggregators can be selective in their acquisitions,
seeking providers that fuel growth, expand contiguous market positions and don’t dilute balance sheets.
Adding to the sector’s operating pressure, private equity, venture investors and payers are pouring record levels of
funding into asset-light and virtual delivery companies that are eager to take on risk, lower prices by routing procedures
and capture volume from traditional providers. With the right incentives, market-driven reforms will reallocate resources to efficient companies that generate compelling value.
As this disruption continues to unfold, rural and marginal urban communities that lack robust market forces will experience more facility and practice closures. Without government support to mitigate this trend, access and care gaps that already riddle American healthcare will unfortunately increase.
WINNING AT VALUE
The average hospital generates around $11,000 per patient discharge. With ancillary services that can often add up to
more than $15,000 per average discharge. Success in a value-based system is predicated on reducing those discharges and associated costs by managing acute care utilization more effectively for distinct populations (i.e. attributed lives).
This changes the orientation of healthcare delivery toward appropriate and lower cost settings. It also places greater
emphasis on preventive, chronic and outpatient care as well as better patient engagement and care coordination.
Such a realignment of care delivery requires the following:
A tight primary care network (either owned or affiliated) to feed referrals and reduce overall costs through
better preventive care.
A gatekeeper or navigator function (increasingly technology-based) to manage / direct patients to the most
appropriate care settings and improve coordination, adherence and engagement.
A carefully designed post-acute care network (including nursing homes, rehab centers, home care
services and behavioral health services, either owned or sufficiently controlled) to manage the 70% of
total episode-of-care costs that can occur outside the hospital setting.
An IT infrastructure that can facilitate care coordination across all providers and settings.
Quality data and digital tools that enhance care, performance, payment and engagement.
Experience with managing risk-based contracts.
A flexible approach to care delivery that includes digital and telemedicine platforms as well as nontraditional sites of care.
Aligned or incentivized physicians.
Payer partners willing to share data and offload risk through upside and downside risk contracts.
Engaged consumers who act on their preferences and best interests.
While none of these strategies is new or controversial, assembling them into cohesive and scalable business models is something few health systems have accomplished. It requires appropriate market conditions, deep financial resources,
sophisticated business acumen, operational agility, broad stakeholder alignment, compelling vision, and robust
Providers that fail to embrace value-based care for their “attributed lives” risk losing market relevance. In their relentless pursuit of increasing treatment volumes and associated revenues, they will lose market share to organizations that
deliver consistent and high-value care outcomes.
CONCLUSION: THE CHARGING GRAY RHINO
America needs its hospitals to operate optimally in normal times, flex to manage surge capacity, sustain themselves
when demand falls, create adequate access and enhance overall quality while lowering total costs. That is a tall order requiring realignment, evolution, and a balance between market and policy reform measures.
The status quo likely wasn’t sustainable before COVID. The nation has invested heavily for many decades in acute and
specialty care services while underinvesting, on a relative basis, in primary and chronic care services. It has excess
capacity in some markets, and insufficient access in others.
COVID has exposed deep flaws in the activity-based payment as well as the nation’s underinvestment in public health.
Disadvantaged communities have suffered disproportionately. Meanwhile, the costs for delivering healthcare services
consume an ever-larger share of national GDP.
Transformational change is hard for incumbent organizations. Every industry, from computer and auto manufacturing to
retailing and airline transportation, confronts gray rhino challenges. Many companies fail to adapt despite clear signals
that long-term viability is under threat. Often, new, nimble competitors emerge and thrive because they avoid the inherent contradictions and service gaps embedded within legacy business models.
The healthcare industry has been actively engaged in value-driven care transformation for over ten years with little to
show for the reform effort. It is becoming clear that many hospitals and health systems lack the capacity to operate profitably in competitive, risk-based market environments.
This dismal reality is driving hospital market valuations and closures. In contrast, customers and capital are flowing to
new, alternative care providers, such as OneMedical, Oak Street Health and Village MD. Each of these upstart
companies now have valuations in the $ billions. The market rewards innovation that delivers value.
Unfortunately, pure market-driven reforms often neglect a significant and growing portion of America’s people. This gap has been more apparent as COVID exacts a disproportionate toll on communities challenged by higher population
density, higher unemployment, and fewer medical care options (including inferior primary and preventive care infrastructure).
Absent fundamental change in our hospitals and health systems, and investment in more efficient care delivery and
payment models, the nation’s post-COVID healthcare infrastructure is likely to deteriorate in many American communities, making them more vulnerable to chronic disease, pandemics and the vicissitudes of life.
Article 2 in our “Future of Hospitals” series will explore the public policy challenges of providing appropriate, affordable and accessible healthcare to all American communities.
New report finds the growth of telemedicine visits has plateaued and accounts for a relatively small percentage of rebounding ambulatory care.
On Monday, 340 organizations signed a letter urging Congress to make telehealth flexibilities created during the COVID-19 pandemic, permanent.
Those signing the letter include national and regional organizations representing a range of healthcare stakeholders in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
Congress quickly waived statutory barriers to allow for expanded access to telehealth at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, providing federal agencies with the flexibility to allow healthcare providers to deliver care virtually.
Stakeholders also want Congress to remove restrictions on the location of the patient to ensure that all patients can access care at home, and other appropriate locations; to maintain and enhance HHS authority to determine appropriate providers and services for telehealth; ensure federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics can furnish telehealth services after the public health emergency; and make permanent the Health and Human Services temporary waiver authority for future emergencies.
While federal agencies can address some of these policies going forward, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid does not have the authority to make changes to Medicare reimbursement policy for telehealth under current law, stakeholders said.
In a statement separate from the letter to Congress, Lux Research Associate Danielle Bradnan said key concerns for legislators are broadband internet access, payer reimbursement and licensure barriers, since, currently, medical licenses are only valid for specific states.
WHY THIS MATTERS
If Congress does not act before the COVID-19 public health emergency expires, current flexibilities will disappear, according to stakeholders.
The PHE is scheduled to expire in July.
In a tweet late yesterday, Michael Caputo, the assistant secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services for public affairs, said HHS is expected to renew the PHE before it expires. It has already been renewed once.
THE LARGER TREND
The use of telehealth has skyrocketed under in-person restrictions under COVID-19.
Private health plans have followed suit, the letter said, resulting in a 4,300% year-over-year increase in claims for March 2020.
However, a new report from the Commonwealth Fund has found that the growth of telemedicine visits has plateaued and account for a relatively small percentage of rebounding ambulatory care services.
As states experiment with reopening – and re-closing – their economies in response to concerns around rising coronavirus cases, the report found that telemedicine visits have actually been declining since April.