It’s no secret the brand name prescription drug costs are high. The rising costs have been blamed by health care analysts on kickbacks within the drug supply chain demanded by the federal government, drug distributors (wholesalers), health insurance companies and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).
How about $356 billion worth of pure glut in the prescription drug supply chain, according to the analysis by DCI. Simply put, the market price established for these drugs by manufacturers has $356 billion worth of markups that mainly accommodate the financial demands (i.e. kickbacks or rebates) of groups that profit off the prescription drug system in the United States, health insurers and their PBMs in particular.
And that’s an all-time record.
Why?
Get ready to choke on your popcorn.
In the 1990s the federal government mandated in the Medicaid program that drug manufacturers offer a minimum rebate of 23% off the purchase price of brand name drugs. The feds also mandated that if drug manufacturers offer a better rebate on those drugs to someone else, the government also gets that same rebate.
The thought was no one gets a better deal than the federal government.
Rebates expanded again as PBMs continued to gain more control over the drug supply chain. The PBMs now force drug manufacturers to offer significant concessions in order to get on the list of approved medications – known as a formulary – available to patients with health insurance.
To account for these demands, drug manufacturers set the list price for their brand name drugs with these price concessions baked into the number.
DCI’s analysis found that baking is $356 billion of goodies for health care companies paid for by the government and you.
It’s the same kind of concept as a U.S. popular clothing retailer that displays inflated retail costs on the tags of goods and then right below displaying a lower “sale” price to make the consumer think they got a deal.
Here’s another way of thinking of it: Just like Congress has a lot of “pork” in its spending bills, there’s also a lot of pork in prescription drug costs that have very little to do with anything, other than increase profits for the health care industry.
Though the federal government intended to create a better system for taxpayers back in the 1990s when it demanded rebates in the Medicaid system, it instead created a feeding frenzy for companies in the drug supply chain.
In the year 2000 just a handful of companies in the drug supply chain dotted the Fortune 100 list of most financially successful companies. Today there are four such companies in the top 10.
The Minnesota-based health care conglomerate UnitedHealth leads that pack. The company’s profits have soared in the last two decades largely due to increasing medical costs and prescription drug costs paid by Americans. It has leaped over companies like Exxon Mobile and Apple to become the third largest company in America. Only Walmart and Amazon take in more revenue.
The company employs more than 400,000, including doctors and clinicians and has its own pharmacy benefits manager called Optum Rx.
We reported last month that Americans spent $464 billion last year on prescription drugs. That was also an all-time record, which will likely be set again and again and again until reforms are enacted.
Elevance, which owns Blue Cross plans, is now reeling from Wall Street losses thanks to its Medicare Advantage business.
The company now known as Elevance, which owns Blue Cross plans in 14 states, took a drubbing on Wall Street yesterday after executives told shareholders that it had to pay out way more in medical claims during the second quarter than expected, especially in its Medicare Advantage business. As a reminder, Wall Street hates to hear such news, so much so that investors rushed to sell their shares in the company, sending the stock price to $296.39 – a 52-week low – before closing at $302.45 yesterday afternoon. That’s down 47% from the all-time high of $567.36 it reached last September.
The news was so distressing for people who still have investments in for-profit health insurers that many of them finally bailed, getting the message that the entire sector is likely not the best place to make money these days. All seven of the companies (Centene, Cigna, CVS/Aetna, Elevance, Humana, Molina and UnitedHealth) saw big drops in their stock price with two others (Centene and Molina) also falling to 52-week lows. The companies’ stock is continuing to tank today as I write this.
When Denial Becomes a Liability
UnitedHealth has historically been the first of the companies to release quarterly earnings, but it stepped back as leader of the pack this quarter after that giant’s recent troubles on Wall Street. UnitedHealth missed financial analysts’ profit expectations last quarter and withdrew its profit guidance for the year, an unprecedented move for that company, which terrified its shareholders. UnitedHealth’s stock price has lost nearly 55% of its value since reaching a high of $630.73 last November.
Like UnitedHealth, Elevance had been a Wall Street darling until a business practice common in the health insurance game – refusing to pay for patients’ medically necessary care – finally caught up with it.
I’m talking about prior authorization, the benign sounding term that covers a number of ways a health insurer banks money by saying no to a doctor’s plea to cover a patient’s treatment or medications. The fundamental problem is that by refusing to pay for care a patient needs, that patient likely will get sicker and wind up needing even more expensive care down the road. Insurance company beancounters know that can happen, but they also know there is a decent chance that that potentially high-cost patients will not even be enrolled in one of the company’s health plans when the day finally arrives that they have to go to the hospital, which, of course, might have been avoided if the initial treatment had been approved in the first place.
We’re not just talking about a stay in the hospital. One permutation of prior auth is called step therapy in which an insurer demands that a patient try other medications on the insurer’s list of preferred drugs (its “formulary”) before approving the drug a doctor believes will work best. Sometimes it’s called “fail first.” In other words, a patient must endure pain and suffering for weeks or months taking an ineffective drug on an insurer’s formulary – the price of which the insurer has negotiated to its financial advantage with a drug maker – before the insurer will agree to cover the medication the doctor believes will be more effective. The doctor will then have to persuade the insurer that the insurer’s preferred drug failed. We’ll dive deeper into that insurer-induced nightmare in a future post, but know for now that it is a big and expensive time-suck that doctors have to endure while insurers can keep unused premium dollars in their investment accounts.
The Conversion That Changed Everything
But let’s go back to Elevance, which until recently was called Anthem and before that WellPoint. Many of its subsidiaries still use the term Anthem in its branding, like the biggest under its corporate umbrella, Anthem Blue Cross of California. All of those Blues plans operated on a nonprofit basis until a savvy executive named Leonard Schaeffer, who was CEO of Anthem of California back when it was still a nonprofit, pulled off a deal that would put him on the path to considerable fame and fortune, a first-of-its-kind “conversion” that would prove to be a major reason why the U.S. has the most complex, expensive and inefficient health care system on the planet.
According to his official bio on the website of the Leonard D. Schaffer Fellows in Government Service, which is affiliated with some of the country’s most prestigious universities, Schaeffer was recruited as CEO of Blue Cross of California in 1986 when, we are told, it was near bankruptcy. We’re also told that Schaeffer “managed the turnaround of Blue Cross of California and the IPO (initial public offering, i.e., converting it to for-profit status) creating WellPoint in 1993. During his tenure, WellPoint made 17 acquisitions and endowed four charitable foundations with assets of over $6 billion. Under Schaeffer’s leadership, WellPoint’s value grew from $11 million to over $49 billion.”
One might think from reading that last sentence that Schaeffer himself wrote big personal checks to endow those foundations, but establishing those nonprofit foundations (which includes the California Endowment, the California Health Care Foundation and the California Wellness Foundation) was demanded by California regulators as a condition of their approval of the IPO. The money was referred to as a conversion fund (converting from nonprofit to for-profit status), and it came from the proceeds of the IPO.
But Schaffer did indeed make a ton of money from the deal and WellPoint’s subsequent acquisition by a rival company that also owned recently converted Blues plans, Anthem, in 2004.
One of the organizations that opposed the WellPoint-Anthem deal, Consumer Watchdog, wrote at the time that:
Payments to WellPoint executives after the company’s buyout by Anthem Inc. could top $600 million if regulators and shareholders do not modify the acquisition terms, according to documents received from California regulators by the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer rights under a Public Records Act Request late Tuesday.
The documents detail potential payments in excess of those estimated by the company to shareholders at $200 million in a recent proxy. Executives will receive cash bonuses worth between $146 million and $365 million under the proposed terms of the company buyout by Anthem, in addition to over $251 million in stock options. WellPoint CEO Leonard Schaeffer has already begun exercising his stock options as of June 1st at sweetheart prices – earning him $16 million on that one day alone and increasing the size of his shares by hundreds of thousands.
When we look back at the history of health insurance in this country, we can thank this one man for the rapid shifting of Americans out of what historically had been nonprofit health insurance plans that initially were community-rated, meaning they charged everybody the same premium, regardless of gender, health status, occupation or address, and did not use gimmicks like prior authorization to boost profits. Being nonprofits, they couldn’t even book profits, although many of them did amass millions more in “reserves” than regulators required for solvency reasons.
I was working at Cigna when WellPoint joined the club of big for-profit insurers in 1993, along with Aetna, Humana (where I also previously worked), UnitedHealth, which was a relatively small player back then, and giant “multiline” insurers like MetLife, Prudential and Travelers. All of those last three decided to sell their health insurance operations to UnitedHealth and Aetna, putting those companies on the path to becoming the behemoths they are today.
And Schaeffer would wind up being one of America’s richest men, and, to his credit, he has been personally philanthropic. We know that because his name shows up all over the place in U.S. health care think-tank world. Indeed, his name is now associated far more with groups and institutions engaged in public policy than the “platinum parachute,” to use Consumer Watchdog’s term, he got when he and a few colleagues engineered the sale of WellPoint to Anthem. As his bio notes:
In 2009, Schaeffer established the Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics at the University of Southern California, which emphasizes the interdisciplinary approach to research and analysis to support evidence-based health policy. In 2015, he established the Schaeffer Fellows in Government Service program which has supported 418 undergraduates to date in high-level, summer government internships. In 2004, he established the Schaeffer Institute for Public Policy & Government Service. He has also endowed chairs in health care financing and policy at the Brookings Institution, Harvard Medical School, the National Academy of Medicine, UC Berkeley and USC.
If Schaeffer still owns shares in Elevance, he is a bit poorer today than he was yesterday morning, but he’s probably still doing OK. Shares of Elevance’s stock have increased 1731% in value since they started trading on the New York Stock Exchange in October 2001, even with the company’s very bad Thursday on the Street.
The healthcare industry is still licking its wounds from $1 trillion in federal funding cuts included in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) signed into law July 4.
Adding insult to injury, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid services issued a 913-page proposed rule last Tuesday that includes unwelcome changes especially troublesome for hospitals i.e. adoption of site neutral payments, expansion of hospital price transparency requirements, reduction of inpatient-only services, acceleration of hospital 340B discount repayment obligations and more.
The combination of the two is bad news for healthcare overall and hospitals especially: the timing is precarious:
Economic uncertainty: Economists believe a recession is less likely but uncertainty about tariffs, fear about rising inflation, labor market volatility a housing market slowdown and speculation about interest rates have capital markets anxious. Healthcare is capital intense: the impact of the two in tandem with economic uncertainty is unsettling.
Consumer spending fragility: Consumer spending is holding steady for the time being but housing equity values are dropping, rents are increasing, student loan obligations suspended during Covid are now re-activated, prices for hospital and physicians are increasing faster than other necessities and inflation ticked up slightly last month. Consumer out-of-pocket spending for healthcare products and services is directly impacted by purchases in every category.
Heightened payer pressures: Insurers and employers are expecting double-digit increases for premiums and health benefits next year blaming their higher costs on hospitals and drugs, OBBBA-induced insurance coverage lapses and systemic lack of cost-accountability. For insurers, already reeling from 2023-2024 financial reversals, forecasts are dire. Payers will heighten pressure on healthcare providers—especially hospitals and specialists—as a result.
Why healthcare appears to have borne the brunt of the funding cuts in the OBBBA is speculative:
Might a case have been made for cuts in other departments? Might healthcare programs other than Medicaid have been ripe for “waste, fraud and abuse” driven cuts? Might technology-driven administrative costs reductions across the expanse of federal and state government been more effective than DOGE- blunt experimentation?
Healthcare is 18% of the GDP and 28% of total federal spending: that leaves room for cuts in other industries.
Why hospitals, along with nursing homes and public health programs, are likely to bear the lion’s share of OBBBA’ cut fallout and CMS’ proposed rule disruptions is equally vexing. Might the high-profile successes of some not-for-profit hospital operators have drawn attention? Might Congress have been attentive to IRS Form 990 filings for NFP operators and quarterly earnings of investor-owned systems and assume hospital finances are OK? Might advocacy efforts to maintain the status quo with facility fees, 340B drug discounts, executive compensation et al been overshadowed by concerns about consolidation-induced cost increases and disregard for affordability? Hospital emergency rooms in rural and urban communities, nursing homes, public health programs and many physicians will be adversely impacted by the OBBBA cuts: the impact will vary by state. What’s not clear is how much.
My take:
Having read both the OBBBA and CMS proposed rules and observed reactions from industry, two things are clear to me:
The antipathy toward the healthcare industry among the public and in Congress played a key role in passage of the OBBBA and regulatory changes likely to follow.
Polls show three-fourths of likely voters want to see transformational change to healthcare and two-thirds think the industry is more concerned with its profit over their care: these views lend to hostile regulatory changes. The public and the majority of elected officials think the industry prioritizes protection of the status quo over obligations to serve communities and the greater good.
The result: winners and losers in each sector, lack of continuity and interoperability, runaway costs and poor outcomes.
No sector in healthcare stands as the surrogate for the health and wellbeing of the population. There are well-intended players in each sector who seek the moral high ground for healthcare, but their boards and leaders put short-term sustainability above long-term systemness and purpose. That void needs to be filled.
The timing of these changes is predictably political.
Most of the lower-cost initiatives in both the OBBBA changes and CMS proposals carry obligations to commence in 2026—in time for the November 2026 mid-term campaigns. Most of the results, including costs and savings, will not be known before 2028 or after. They’re geared toward voters inclined to think healthcare is systemically fraudulent, wasteful and self-serving.
And they’re just the start: officials across the Departments of Health and Human Services, Justice, Commerce, Labor and Veterans Affairs will add to the lists.
Administrative waste, denials, and deadly incentives — the U.S. model shows what happens when profit rules.
The United States is the only country where a health insurance executive has been gunned down in the street. But that’s not the only thing that’s unique about American health insurance.
Almost all of our peer countries – advanced, free-market democracies — have health insurance companies. In some cases (Germany, Switzerland, Japan), private health insurance is the chief way to pay for medical care. In others (such as Great Britain), private insurance works as a supplement to government-run health care systems. But there’s a fundamental difference between health insurance elsewhere and the U.S. system.
In all the other advanced democracies, basic health insurance is not for profit; the insurers are essentially charities. They exist not to pay large sums to executives and investors, but rather to keep the population healthy by assuring that everyone can get medical care when it’s needed.
America’s health insurance giants are profit-making businesses. Indeed, in the insurers’ quarterly earnings reports to investors, the standard industry term for any sums spent paying people’s medical bills is “medical loss.” They view paying your doctor bill as a loss that subtracts from the dividends they owe their stockholders.
When I studied health care systems around the world, I asked economists and doctors and health ministers why they want health insurance to be a nonprofit endeavor. Everyone gave essentially the same answer:
There’s a fundamental contradiction between insuring a nation’s health and making a profit on health insurance.
Health insurance exists to help people get the preventive care and treatment they need by paying their medical bills. But the way to make a profit on health insurance is to avoid paying medical bills. Accordingly, the U.S. insurance giants have devised ingenious methods for evading payment — schemes like high deductibles, narrow networks of approved doctors, limited lists of permitted drugs, and pre-authorization requirements, so that the insurance adjuster, not your doctor, determines what treatment you get.
Other countries don’t allow those gimmicks. In America, the patient pays twice — first the insurance premium, and then the bill that the insurer declines to pay. That’s why Americans hate health insurance companies — as reflected in the tasteless barrage of angry social media commentary aimed at the victim, not the perpetrator, of the sidewalk shooting in 2024 of UnitedHealthcare’s CEO Brian Thompson in New York City.
Another unique aspect of U.S.-style health insurance is the huge amount of money our big insurers waste on administrative costs. Any insurance plan has administrative expenses; you’ve got to collect the premiums, review the patients’ claims, and get the payments out to doctors and hospitals.
In other countries, the administrative costs are limited to about 5% of premium income; that is, insurers use 95% of all the money they take in to pay medical bills. But the U.S. insurance giants routinely report administrative costs in the range of 15% to 20%.
When the first drafts of the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) were floated on Capitol Hill in 2009, the statutory language called for limiting insurers’ admin costs to 12% of premium income. Then the insurance lobby went to work. The final text of that law allows them to spend up to 20% of their income on salaries, marketing, dividends, and other stuff that doesn’t pay anybody’s hospital bill.
There is one American insurance system, however, that is as thrifty as foreign health insurance plans. Medicare, the federal government’s insurance program for seniors and the disabled, reports administrative costs in the range of 3% — about one-fifth as much as the big private insurers fritter away. And Medicare’s administrators — federal bureaucrats — are paid less than a tenth as much as the executives running the far less efficient private insurance firms.
Americans generally believe that the profit-driven private sector is more efficient and innovative than government. In many cases, that’s true. I wouldn’t want some government agency designing my cell phone or my hiking boots.
But when it comes to health insurance, all the evidence shows that nonprofit and government-run plans provide better coverage at lower cost than the private plans from America’s health insurance giants.
If we were to make basic health insurance a nonprofit endeavor, as it is everywhere else, or put everybody on a public plan like Medicare, the U.S. would save billions and improve our access to life-saving care. Then Americans might stop celebrating on social media when an insurance executive is killed.
In a concession to Wall Street investors, starting this summer, UnitedHealth will stop paying commissions to agents and brokers for some new enrollees in nearly 200 UnitedHealthcare Medicare Advantage plans across 39 markets.
And it’s happening not because UnitedHealth can’t afford to pay.As we’ve published previously, the company reported $9.1 billion in profits during the first quarter of 2025 — up from $7.9 billion the year before. But that wasn’t enough to satisfy Wall Street, which punished UnitedHealth with the steepest one-day stock drop in 26 years — a $110 billion free fall in market value — after the company revised its full-year profit guidance downward.
Why the drop?
Because UnitedHealth admitted it may not squeeze quite as much profit from taxpayers this year as expected — mainly due to unexpectedly high care utilization from some of the new Medicare Advantage enrollees it brought on during the last open enrollment period. Particularly enrollees who, as then-CEO Andrew Witty described, came from other insurers exiting the market and hadn’t been properly coded. Yawn.
For Now, Brokers Are UNH’s Patsy
This recent commission cut is less about operational efficiency and more about damage control. UnitedHealth is signaling to investors that it’s willing to shrink its Medicare Advantage footprint — at least temporarily — if that helps preserve profit margins. And Wall Street analysts are eating it up, seeing it as a way to slow the flow of high-cost members and stabilize earnings, according to BarChart.
Off Wall Street, the move has already come under fire. As the National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals put it, UnitedHealth is “cutting off the very people best equipped to help” seniors — especially low-income and rural enrollees who depend on brokers to explain their options.
While we would warn seniors against enrolling in a Medicare Advantage plan in the first place – without brokers, many beneficiaries will be left to fend for themselves in a system that’s already infamously confusing, expensive and deadly.
A Strategic Retreat Disguised as a Cost-Containment Strategy
The problem is the perverse incentive structure UnitedHealth and other insurers helped build — one that rewards risk-coding gamesmanship more than it rewards delivering care. For years, the company thrived by maximizing revenue through “coding intensity” and by acquiring everything from doctors’ offices to behavioral health firms to control more of the health care ecosystem.
Now, UnitedHealth is responding the way Wall Street expects: by slashing anything that isn’t bolted down – including brokers.
So here we are:
UnitedHealth is still wildly profitable, still drawing billions from taxpayer-funded programs like Medicare and Medicaid — and now it’s cutting out the professionals who presumably help seniors navigate a convoluted health care system. All this, mind you, to appease jittery investors. And despite UnitedHealth’s current wobbly share price, analysts expect it to rebound, especially with a continuation of share buybacks on the horizon.
During the first quarter of this year alone, the company bought back $3 billion worth of its own shares. Over the past year, buybacks totaled more than $12 billion. When you factor in dividends, the company said it “returned” more than $16 billion to shareholders in 2024. That’s how you keep investors at least partially satisfied.
In what’s becoming an all-too-familiar pattern, CVS Health announced it will pull Aetna out of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplace in 2026, leaving about a million people across 17 states searching for new health coverage — and in some cases, fighting to afford any at all.
This marks yet another retreat by a major for-profit insurer from a program designed to provide affordable health coverage to Americans who don’t get it through work. CVS made the announcement while simultaneously celebrating a 60% increase in quarterly profit and revealing a new deal to boost sales of the pricey weight-loss drug Wegovy through its pharmacy and pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) arms.
Let me repeat that: Aetna is exiting the ACA because it claims it can’t make enough money on people enrolled in those plans, on the same day its parent company posted nearly $1.8 billion in profits in just the first three months of this year.
This is the same company, by the way, that dumped hundreds of thousands of seniors and disabled people at the end of 2024 because some of them were using more medical care than Wall Street found acceptable. If this doesn’t tell you everything you need to know about who the health insurance industry is really working for, I don’t know what will.
From “Commitment” to Abandonment
Aetna first bailed on the ACA exchanges in 2018, then re-entered in 2022 when insurers could see more clearly how they could make significant profits on that book of business. Now, after just a few years of moderate participation, it’s heading for the exits again. CVS Health executives blamed “regulatory uncertainty” and “highly variable economic factors,” according to a statement to The Columbus Dispatch.
But make no mistake—this was a cold business calculation. Uncertainties and economic variabilities are constants in the insurance game.
CVS’ CEO David Joyner told investors:
“We are disappointed by the continued underperformance from our individual exchange products … this is not a decision we made lightly.”
That’s corporate-speak for “our Wall Street friends weren’t impressed.”
Aetna’s ACA exchange business, covering roughly 1 million people, is just a sliver of CVS’ overall medical membership of 27.1 million. But even though the profits weren’t massive, the people depending on this coverage — many of them self-employed, working multiple part-time jobs, or recently uninsured — will now be thrown into chaos.
And it’s happening at a time when health insurance for many Americans hangs by a thread. Unless Congress acts in the coming months, the ACA’s enhanced tax subsidies—first implemented under the American Rescue Plan—are set to expire at the end of this year.Without them, premiums could spike by 50% to 100% depending on income and geography.
The Congressional Budget Office projects that the lapse in subsidies could leave 3.8 million more Americans uninsured— and now, 1 million more will be forced to find new plans as CVS/Aetna walks away.
Same Song: Prioritizing Profit, Not Patients
Let’s be clear about what CVS is doing here: It’s ditching an essential safety net for millions in order to chase higher profits elsewhere—most notably, in the exploding market for GLP-1 drugs like Wegovy. On the same day it abandoned the ACA, CVS announced a new deal to give Wegovy preferred placement on its PBM formulary, displacing Eli Lilly’s Zepbound. This will help CVS dominate the obesity drug market—and rake in profits through its Caremark PBM and nearly 9,000 retail pharmacies.
It’s a powerful example of vertical integration in action.
CVS owns the insurer (Aetna), the PBM (Caremark), and the pharmacy (CVS retail stores). When it walks away from lower-margin business like ACA plans and doubles down on high-dollar drug deals, we see its true priorities: selling expensive drugs, saddling individuals, families and employers with the costs, and keeping Wall Street happy.
Even worse, the decision is taking place against a troubling political backdrop. The Trump administration has already taken steps to undermine ACA infrastructure and expressed skepticism toward core public health programs. Cuts to navigator funding, changes to vaccine guidelines, and looming uncertainty around tax credits are all part of a slow-motion sabotage of the ACA. This is not to say that the ACA doesn’t have its flaws that need to be addressed.
But instead of penalizing hard-working Americans and their families, lawmakers and the Trump administration should focus instead on lowering the ridiculously high out-of-pocket maximum that the ACA established (and that keeps going up every year) and fixing the medical loss ratio provision that has fueled the vertical integration in the insurance industry.
The Trump administration is moving into its second 100 days facing conditions more problematic than its first 100. For healthcare, this period will define the industry’s near-term future as changes in three domains unfold:
The Economy: The economy is volatile and consumer confidence is waning. The impact of tariffs on U.S. prices remains an unknown and escalating tension between the Ukraine and Russia, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and India are worrisome. Household debt is mounting as student loans, medical debt and housing costs imperil financial security for more than half of U.S. households. The 3 major stock indices remain in the red YTD, prospects for a recession are high and investors are increasingly cautious. Net impact on healthcare organizations and public programs: negative, especially those without strong balance sheets and access to affordable private capital.
The Courts: Recent opinions by the Supreme Court and District Courts suggest a willingness to challenge the administration’s Executive Orders on immigrant deportation and due process, threats and funding cuts aimed at law firms and universities considered “woke” and layoffs initiated by DOGE and more. Court challenges will slow the administration’s agenda and create uncertainty in workplaces. Net impact: negative. Uncertainty paralyses planning and operations in every public and private healthcare organization.
The Public Mood: The afterglow of the election has dissipated and the public’s mood has shifted from guarded optimism to anxiety and despair. The public’s uncertain about tariffs and worried about household expenses. Net impact: negative. Healthcare affordability and prices are major concerns to consumers: the majority (76%) think the system is more concerned about profitability than patient care (Jarrard).
Current events in these areas portend headwinds for most public and private healthcare organizations where attention in the next 100 days will be focused in these areas:
Oversight: New rules, programmatic priorities, key personnel appointments and re-organization in HHS, CMS, the FDA and VA: RFKJ’s MAHA plans and Commission appointees, Oz’ affinity for Medicare Advantage predisposition toward value-based care and Makary’s overhaul of the FDA’s drug oversight process will be “on the table” in the next 100 days.
Funding: Healthcare funding in the FY 2026 federal budget. The GOP-controlled House and Senate can pass a budget with minimal support from Dem’s that reflects a serious effort to reduce the federal debt ($37 trillion/123% of GDP– up from $20 trillion in 2017). Healthcare cuts expected to be significant though rumored massive cuts to Medicaid unlikely.
States: State healthcare referenda and executive actions: states are evaluating price controls on drugs and hospitals, reparations from insurers for delays and prior-authorizations, scope of practice restrictions and more. Topping the watchlist in most states is Medicaid funding and potential fallout from discontinued ACA marketplace subsidies factored into the FY 2026 budget being finalized by the GOP-led Congress in DC.
SCOTUS: Supreme Court decisions will be handed down or before June 30 when SCOTUS’ 2024 term ends including Braidwood Management v. Becerra which will determine whether the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that private insurers cover preventive services without cost-sharing will continue. The court will also opine to the authority of the HHS secretary to appoint members of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. The potential impact of these decisions on coverage, insurance premiums and access to preventive health services is pervasive.
Financial markets: Capital markets are in a watchful waiting mode as US trade policy unfolds, inflation fluctuates, the fed’s interest rate determination is disclosed and consumer spending reacts. Private investing in healthcare remains opportunistic though deal flow is shifting and risk thresholds tightening.
Polls: Polls draw the attention of media and elected officials. They influence how organizations prioritize advocacy strategies, address consumer complaints and concerns and manage reputations. As reflected in numerous national polls, trust in the system and its key players—insurers, hospitals, drug companies—is at a historic low.
Each sector in U.S. healthcare will be impacted differently: Three face the strongest headwinds:
Hospitals: Hospitals face enormous financial challenges, especially not-for-profits, safety net, rural and veteran’s hospitals. Last week’s unfavorable SCOTUS decision against hospitals alleging DSH under-payments will cost $1 billion per year. Congressional adoption of site neutral payment policy could cost $15 billion/year. Drug prices, labor costs, insurer payment cuts and red-tape will negate operating margins and lower investment income knee-capping growth and innovation plans. Complicating matters, employed physicians will demand higher pay and more control. And Congressional budget-creators believe the sector’s 31% share of total healthcare spending makes it ripe for cuts attributable to “waste, fraud and abuse”.
Insurers: Medicare Advantage (which enjoys support by key administrators including CMS’ Mehmet Oz) has become a lightening rod of insurer criticism alongside prior authorization policies that restrict care. Coverage remains key to household financial security but insurers are seen as barriers to rather than facilitators of evidence-based cost-effective care. And the concentration of power in corporate titans (United, Humana, Cigna, CVS, Centene and others) is viewed with skepticism.
Public Health: Public health is not a priority in the U.S. health system despite recognition that social determinants account for 70% of the system’s $5 trillion spending. Most programs are funded by state and local governments with federal support limited. Public health is not seen as an investment and, in some settings treated with disdain as welfare or waste. As Mayors and Governors develop plans for the rest of 2025 and through 2026, public health cuts will be likely as federal co-funding becomes scarce.
The next 100 days will define the national agenda for the mid-term election in November 2026, reflect the solidarity of the MAGA movement and show the impact of tariffs on inflation, consumer prices and the public’s mood.
Healthcare leaders will be watching closely. All will be impacted.
Wall Street is speaking loudly to Medicare Advantage insurers: If you want us to stick with you, keep dumping seniors who are pinching your profit margins.
Investors continue to punish UnitedHealth Group since the company downgraded its 2025 profit expectations on April 17. On Friday, UnitedHealth’s stock price hit not only a 52-week low—$393.11—but its lowest point in years. The last time UnitedHealth’s stock price went below $400 a share was on October 14, 2021.
The company’s shares lost nearly 4.5% of their value during the past week, contributing to a decline that started soon after the company set an all-time high of $630.73 last November. UnitedHealth’s shares have lost more than 33% of their value since then.
Wall Street Sends a Message
Meanwhile, investors have once again embraced UnitedHealth’s top two rivals in the Medicare Advantage business–Humana and CVS/Aetna. Those companies told investors last year, when both were in the Wall Street dog house for spending more than investors expected on patients’ medical care, that they would dump hundreds of thousands of their costliest Medicare Advantage enrollees to improve their profits. They made good on that promise, shedding almost 650,000 seniors and people with disabilities by the end of the year.
Many of those people enrolled in a UnitedHealth Medicare Advantage plan. The company reported 400,000 more Medicare Advantage enrollees in the first quarter of 2025 than in the fourth quarter of 2024. That used to be a good thing, but UnitedHealth’s executives told investors on April 17 that it wouldn’t make as much money for them as the company had assured them just three months earlier because it likely will have to spend more than they expected on those new MA enrollees’ medical care. Investors responded by immediately dispatching the company’s shares to the cellar. Those shares lost about 23% of their value in a single day.
The Street had also punished Humana and CVS last year when they said they were paying more for seniors’ medical care than they’d expected. Shares of both companies cratered, losing around half their value. So, executives at both Humana and CVS started identifying Medicare markets to get out of entirely. The culling was ruthless. CVS shed 227,000 MA enrollees. Humana got rid of 419,000.
Locked Out of Traditional Medicare
Those seniors and disabled people had to scramble to find a new Medicare Advantage insurer because it is difficult for most people to go back to traditional Medicare and find an affordable Medicare supplement policy. Medicare supplement insurers must waive underwriting during the first six months of applicants’ eligibility for Medicare, but people who enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan and want or need to make a change months later find out that insurers will charge them more unless their health is nearly perfect.
Of the seven big for-profit health insurers, four (Cigna, CVS/Aetna, Humana and Centene) collectively cut 1.3 million of their Medicare Advantage enrollees adrift at the end of 2024 in an effort to stay in Wall Street’s good graces. Cigna dumped all 600,000 of its MA enrollees, selling them to the Blue Cross corporation HCSC. For-profit Blue Cross insurer Elevance picked up 227,000; Molina added 18,000, and, as noted, UnitedHealth signed up 400,000 new MA enrollees.
While UnitedHealth’s shares have lost a third of their value, CVS’s shares have increased more than 50% since the first of this year. They even set a 52-week high of $72.51 on Thursday. Humana’s shares closed Friday at $258.48, up 1.88% since January 1. They are out of the Wall Street dog house – for now, anyway.
Profits, Lobbying Soar
I trust you are not feeling sorry for UnitedHealth because of its misfortune on Wall Street. It is still a hugely profitable company–just not profitable enough lately to please investors. This huge corporation, the fourth largest in America, reported $9.1 billion in profits in just the first quarter of this year. If the company makes it more difficult for its health plan enrollees to get the care they need this year, it could make even more than the $34.4 billion in profits it made last year.
And as a group, the seven big for-profits, including those that spent more than Wall Street felt was necessary on patients’ medical care, made $70 billion in profits last year. (UnitedHealth made nearly as much as the other six combined.)
And collectively, those giant corporations took in a record $1.5 trillion in revenue from us as customers and taxpayers last year. They are doing quite well. But that won’t stop them from trying to keep lawmakers and Trump administration officials from cracking down this year on the widespread waste, fraud and abuse in the Medicare Advantage program. You can expect them to spend a record amount of our money on lobbying expenses in Washington this year to keep their Medicare Advantage cash cow well fed.
Wall Street is speaking loudly to Medicare Advantage insurers: If you want us to stick with you, keep dumping seniors who are pinching your profit margins.
Investors continue to punish UnitedHealth Group since the company downgraded its 2025 profit expectations on April 17. On Friday, UnitedHealth’s stock price hit not only a 52-week low—$393.11—but its lowest point in years. The last time UnitedHealth’s stock price went below $400 a share was on October 14, 2021.
The company’s shares lost nearly 4.5% of their value during the past week, contributing to a decline that started soon after the company set an all-time high of $630.73 last November. UnitedHealth’s shares have lost more than 33% of their value since then.
Wall Street Sends a Message
Meanwhile, investors have once again embraced UnitedHealth’s top two rivals in the Medicare Advantage business–Humana and CVS/Aetna. Those companies told investors last year, when both were in the Wall Street dog house for spending more than investors expected on patients’ medical care, that they would dump hundreds of thousands of their costliest Medicare Advantage enrollees to improve their profits. They made good on that promise, shedding almost 650,000 seniors and people with disabilities by the end of the year.
Many of those people enrolled in a UnitedHealth Medicare Advantage plan. The company reported 400,000 more Medicare Advantage enrollees in the first quarter of 2025 than in the fourth quarter of 2024. That used to be a good thing, but UnitedHealth’s executives told investors on April 17 that it wouldn’t make as much money for them as the company had assured them just three months earlier because it likely will have to spend more than they expected on those new MA enrollees’ medical care. Investors responded by immediately dispatching the company’s shares to the cellar. Those shares lost about 23% of their value in a single day.
The Street had also punished Humana and CVS last year when they said they were paying more for seniors’ medical care than they’d expected. Shares of both companies cratered, losing around half their value. So, executives at both Humana and CVS started identifying Medicare markets to get out of entirely. The culling was ruthless. CVS shed 227,000 MA enrollees. Humana got rid of 419,000.
Locked Out of Traditional Medicare
Those seniors and disabled people had to scramble to find a new Medicare Advantage insurer because it is difficult for most people to go back to traditional Medicare and find an affordable Medicare supplement policy. Medicare supplement insurers must waive underwriting during the first six months of applicants’ eligibility for Medicare, but people who enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan and want or need to make a change months later find out that insurers will charge them more unless their health is nearly perfect.
Of the seven big for-profit health insurers, four (Cigna, CVS/Aetna, Humana and Centene) collectively cut 1.3 million of their Medicare Advantage enrollees adrift at the end of 2024 in an effort to stay in Wall Street’s good graces. Cigna dumped all 600,000 of its MA enrollees, selling them to the Blue Cross corporation HCSC. For-profit Blue Cross insurer Elevance picked up 227,000; Molina added 18,000, and, as noted, UnitedHealth signed up 400,000 new MA enrollees.
While UnitedHealth’s shares have lost a third of their value, CVS’s shares have increased more than 50% since the first of this year. They even set a 52-week high of $72.51 on Thursday. Humana’s shares closed Friday at $258.48, up 1.88% since January 1. They are out of the Wall Street dog house – for now, anyway.
Profits, Lobbying Soar
I trust you are not feeling sorry for UnitedHealth because of its misfortune on Wall Street. It is still a hugely profitable company–just not profitable enough lately to please investors. This huge corporation, the fourth largest in America, reported $9.1 billion in profits in just the first quarter of this year. If the company makes it more difficult for its health plan enrollees to get the care they need this year, it could make even more than the $34.4 billion in profits it made last year.
And as a group, the seven big for-profits, including those that spent more than Wall Street felt was necessary on patients’ medical care, made $70 billion in profits last year. (UnitedHealth made nearly as much as the other six combined.)
And collectively, those giant corporations took in a record $1.5 trillion in revenue from us as customers and taxpayers last year. They are doing quite well. But that won’t stop them from trying to keep lawmakers and Trump administration officials from cracking down this year on the widespread waste, fraud and abuse in the Medicare Advantage program. You can expect them to spend a record amount of our money on lobbying expenses in Washington this year to keep their Medicare Advantage cash cow well fed.
To understand the fatal attack on UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson and the unexpected reaction on social media, you have to go back to the 1990s when managed care was in its infancy. As a consumer representative, I attended meetings of a group associated with the health care system–doctors, academics, hospital executives, business leaders who bought insurance, and a few consumer representatives like me.
It was the dawn of the age of managed care with its promise to lower the cost and improve the quality of care, at least for those who were insured.
New perils came with that new age of health coverage.
In the quest to save money while ostensibly improving quality, there was always a chance that the managed care entities and the doctors they employed or contracted with – by then called managed care providers – could clamp down too hard and refuse to pay for treatments, leaving some people to suffer medically. Groups associated with the health care industry tried to set standards to guard against that, but as the industry consolidated and competition among the big players in the new managed care system consolidated, such worries grew.
Over the years the squeeze on care got tighter and tighter as the giants like UnitedHealthcare–which grew initially by buying other insurance companies such as Travelers and Golden Rule–and Elevance, which gobbled up previously nonprofit Blue Cross plans in the 1990s, starting with Blue Cross of California, needed to please the gods of the bottom line. Shareholders became all important. Paying less for care meant more profits and return to investors, so it is no wonder that the alleged killer of the UnitedHealthcare chief executive reportedly left the chilling message:
‘‘DENY. DEFEND. DEPOSE,” words associated with insurance company strategies for denying claims.
The American health care system was far from perfect even in the days when more employers offered good coverage for their workers and often paid much or all of the cost to attract workers. Not-for-profit Blue Cross Blue Shield plans in many states provided most of the coverage, and by all accounts, they paid claims promptly. In my now very long career of covering insurance, I cannot recall anyone in the old days complaining that their local Blue Cross Blue Shield organization was withholding payment for care.
Today Americans, even those who thought they had “good” coverage, are now finding themselves underinsured, as a 2024 Commonwealth Fund study so clearly shows. Nearly one-quarter of adults in the U.S. are underinsured meaning that although they have health insurance, high deductibles, copayments and coinsurance make it difficult or impossible for them to pay for needed care. As many as one-third of people with chronic conditions such as diabetes said they don’t take their medications or even fill prescriptions because they cost too much.
Before he passed away last year, one of our colleagues, Marshall Allen, had made recommendations to his followers on how to deal with medical bills they could not pay. KFF reporters also investigated the problems families face with super-high bills. In 2022 KFF reporters offered readers a thorough look at medical debt in the U.S. and reported alarming findings.
In 2019, U.S. medical debt totaled $195 billion, a sum larger than the economy of Greece. Half of adults don’t have enough cash to cover an unexpected medical bill while 50 million adults – one in five in the entire country – are paying off bills on an installment plan for their or a family member’s care.
One would think that such grim statistics might prompt political action to help ease the debt burden on American families. But a look at the health proposals from the Republican Study Committee suggest that likely won’t happen. The committee’s proposed budget would cut $4.5 trillion dollars from the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program leaving millions of Americans without health care.
From the Democrats, there appear to be no earth-shaking proposals in their immediate future, either. Late last summer STAT News reported, “With the notable exception of calling to erase medical debt by working with the states, Democrats are largely eyeing marginal extensions or reinstatements of their prior policy achievements.” Goals of the Democratic National Committee were shoring up the Affordable Care Act, reproductive rights, and addressing ambulance surprise bills.
A few years ago when I was traveling in Berlin, our guide paused by a statue of Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s chancellor in the late 1800s, who is credited with establishing the German health system. The guide explained to his American travelers how and why Bismarck founded the German system, pointing out that Germany got its national health system more than a hundred years before Obamacare. Whether the Americans got the point he was making, I could not tell for no one in the group appeared interested in Germany’s health care system. Today, though, they might pay more attention.
In the coming months, I will write about health systems in Germany and other developed countries that, as The Commonwealth Fund’s research over many years has shown, do a much better job than ours at delivering high quality care – for all of their citizens – and at much lower costs.
HENRY KOTULA 