I’ve been at thisfor so long and have seen so much. And it’s hard to overstate how significant the latest revelations from The Wall Street Journal are. According to its reporting, the U.S. Department of Justice’s criminal health care-fraud unit is questioning former UnitedHealth Group employees about the company’s Medicare billing practices regarding how the company records diagnoses that trigger higher payments from taxpayers.
For years, independent policy experts and *some* regulators have warned that the private Medicare Advantage program has become a breeding ground for upcoding and tax dollar waste. The tactic being scrutinized by the DOJ is called “upcoding.” Essentially, Medicare Advantage companies have an incentive to “find” new illnesses — even among patients who might not need additional treatment because the more serious the diagnoses, the bigger the government payouts to the company.
According to the Journal, prosecutors, FBI agents, and the Health and Human Services Inspector General have been asking ex-employees about special training for doctors, software that flags profitable conditions, and even bonuses for physicians who recode patient files. One former UnitedHealth doctor told the Journal that prosecutors inquired about pressure to use certain diagnosis codes and bonus pay for certain health care decisions that financially favored UnitedHealth.
The Journal’s data shows that UnitedHealth’s members received certain lucrative diagnoses at higher rates than patients in other Medicare Advantage plans — billions of extra dollars that ultimately come from taxpayers. In one example, they reportedly pulled in about $2,700 more taxpayer dollars per patient visit when nurses went into seniors’ homes to hunt for additional conditions.
In a statement, UnitedHealth insists they “remain focused on what matters most: delivering better outcomes, more benefits, and lower costs for the people we serve.”
This latest criminal investigation joins at least two other DOJ probes into UnitedHealth’s billing and potential antitrust violations. And it’s yet another reminder that the Medicare Advantage program — which, much to many advocates alarm, now covers more than half of all Medicare enrollees – is desperately in need of real oversight.
If there’s any silver lining, it’s that courageous former employees are speaking up. They know what I know: This “profit-maximizing” through “upcoding” and “favorable selection” drains billions that could be better spent on actual patient care and pad Wall Street profits.
Abuses by payers are myriad, but these five areas could bear the most fruit for federal antitrust investigators.
Earlier this month, the U.S. Department of Justice announced it has haunched an investigation into “issues regarding payer-provider consolidation” along with other problems associated with mergers and acquisitions in health care. This is significant. For years Washington has trained its oversight authority on pharmaceutical manufacturers, private equity investments in health care and, more recently, pharmacy benefits managers controlled by big insurers. This has held bad actors like Martin Skhreli and Steward Healthcare accountable. But, it has also let insurers grow ever larger, under the radar.
No longer.
This task force will specifically evaluate the following, as an example: “A health insurance company buys several medical practices that compete with each other. It also prohibits its medical practices from contracting with rival health insurance companies.” The government will also dig into “anticompetitive uses of health care data,” “preventing transparency,” “price fixing,” and other areas that could drag nefarious activities of insurers into the spotlight.
I applaud the Department of Justice’s continued focus on these issues, building on the Department’s action announced in February to begin an antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth Group. (If you haven’t read the piece we published in February on UnitedHealth’s self-dealing that helped lead DOJ to open that antitrust inquiry, you can do so here.) The following are a few areas of low-hanging fruit that I hope the task force will focus on as they consider the impact insurers’ ongoing vertical integration has had on the overall health care system.
1. Insurers purchasing physician practices
Once a low-profile issue, Congress and the Biden administration alike have increasingly turned their focus to insurance companies – often referred to as payers – that now own and operate physician practices and clinics – those being paid. Even for someone without a law degree, it is easy to see the conflict this creates, particularly at scale.
There is the oft-cited statistic that UnitedHealth has said that through its Optum division, the company employs or otherwise controls about 10 percent of doctors in the U.S. – around 130,000 physicians and other practitioners in 16 states. This prompted me to take a closer look at publicly available information on the number of doctors employed by other insurers to get a better handle on how much control of physician practices payers now have.
It is difficult to put a percentage on physicians employed by each insurer, but it is clear that the others are following UnitedHealth’s lead. CVS/Aetna purchased Signify Health in 2023, adding 10,000 clinicians to its portfolio. The company says it supports “more than 40,000 physicians, pharmacists, nurses and nurse practitioners.”
Clearly taking a page out of UnitedHealth’s playbook, Elevance (formerly Anthem), which owns Blue Cross Blue Shield plans in 14 states announced last month a “strategic partnership” with 900 providers across several states. Elevance did not disclose the terms of the deal except to say it, “will primarily be through a combination of cash and our equity interest in certain care delivery and enablement assets of Carelon Health.”
As insurers have acquired physician practices, they also have created a rinse-and-repeat strategy associated with kicking physicians they don’t own out of network, and in some cases targeting those same practices for acquisition. Aetna and Humana recently told investors they will be reviewing their networks of physicians, signaling they’ll soon be further narrowing their networks. A good question for this task force: when insurers review those contracts with doctors, do they ever kick the doctors they employ out of network? (Doubtful.) This could specifically draw attention from the task force’s focus on “health care contract language and other practices that restrict competition,” such as contract provisions that require or encourage patients to seek care from doctors directly employed or closely controlled by patients’ insurers.
Additionally, UnitedHealth CEO Andrew Witty recently told analysts, “As I think you see some of the funding changes play out across the — across the next few years, I suspect that may also create new opportunities for us as different companies assess their positions.” My translation:UnitedHealth’s burdensome business practices and the way it shortchanges doctors (those “funding changes” he referenced) contribute to the financial distress that is forcing many health care providers to “assess their positions.”
As the task force continues to consider the impact of private equity in health care monopolies, transactions like this one should receive equal consideration for their lack of transparency and overall impact on market consolidation.
2. Co-mingling of middlemen
I have watched with interest for over the past year as both Democrats and Republicans in Washington increasingly trained their fire on pharmacy benefit managers. The natural next area of focus in that space, which this new task force could advance, should be around how the
three PBMs that control 80 percent of market share are all combined with health insurance companies – namely CVS/Aetna (Caremark), UnitedHealth (Optum Rx), and Cigna (Express Scripts).
An important, and politically popular, area where this consolidation has played out is in the squeeze placed on small, independent pharmacists across the country. More than 300 community pharmacies have closed in the past year alone, out of an inability to operate or push back on unfair margins pushed by these PBM-insurer monopolies. As we have written here, the fees these PBMs charge have increased more than 100,000 percent over the past decade, and are quietly contributing significantly to the profits of the largest health insurers.
We still have little insight into how these business lines interact with each other, and the ultimate impact that has on patients. Given the enormous influence just three insurance companies have over what prescriptions Americans can receive, and how much should be paid for each prescription, the task force would do well to focus on what insurers and PBMs are doing behind the scenes to maximize profits and limit patient access to prescription drugs. It’s already gaining traction on Capitol Hill, with one Congressman recently saying, “I’ll continue to bust this up … this vertical integration in health care.”
3. Prior authorization requests
CVS/Aetna shares were hammered after the company reported a significant increase in payment of Medicare Advantage claims during the first three month is of this year. Expect all insurers to notice. And as they have seen their forecasts fall short of Wall Street’s expectations – particularly because of increasing scrutiny in Washington of Medicare Advantage – these corporations will look to increase their already aggressive use of prior authorization to limit claims payments.
It is not as though insurers make seeking the care you need easy. Far from it. Prior authorization has become “medical injustice disguised as paperwork,” as the New York Times said in a recent, excellent video detailing the widespread nature of this profiteering practice.
While not a stated direct focus of this task force, the increased impact of prior authorization in care delivery is a direct outgrowth of a few large health insurers effectively controlling the marketplace. As insurers directly employ more doctors and enroll more Americans in their plans, they can use prior authorization to increasingly determine whether a patient can get care, period.
Scrutiny in this space could add momentum to increasing activity in state legislatures and Washington to rein in excessive prior authorization. As of early March, nine states and the District of Columbia had passed bills to limit how far insurers could go with prior authorization. And earlier this year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid released a final rule that is expected to save physicians $15 billion over the next decade by putting limits on insurer prior authorization tactics.
4. Rising out-of-pocket costs
Regular readers of this newsletter know one of my crusades is to ensure folks who pay good money for health insurance – out of their paychecks or through their tax dollars – can use it when they need it. It was a big win earlier this year for the Lower Out of Pockets Now coalition (which I lead) when President Biden called for a cap on prescription drug out-of-pocket costs of $2,000 annually for everybody, not just Medicare beneficiaries.
If there was true competition and real consumer choice in health insurance, payers wouldn’t be able to get away with increasingly shifting patients into high-deductible plans. But the fact that a few big players control the health insurance market has allowed the oligopoly of payers to do just that, with ever-rising deductibles alongside ever-rising premiums.
The task force’s focus on price fixing, collusion, and transparency in health care costs will, I hope, include some focus on how insurers use their size and clout to drive up out-of-pocket costs and premiums simultaneously – with little recourse to employers or their employees.
5. Implementing crystal clear laws and rules in health care
You know you’re a monopoly or close to it when you can pretty much do whatever you want and get away with it. Look no further than America’s health insurance companies and implementation of the No Surprises Act.
As I wrote earlier this year, Congress and CMS have been clear about how out-of-network hospital bills should be negotiated between insurers and physicians. Yet in case after case, including many that have become the basis of lawsuits, insurers are clearly flouting the Act passed by Congress and the rules promulgated by CMS. Payers are doing this, doctors have said, simply because of their size and ability to weather criticism from physicians, regulators, and the courts – while doctors struggle to pay their bills with significant payments still owed pending out-of-network negotiations with insurers.
One would hope, at a minimum, this task force, focused on rooting out the ills of monopolies, would document how insurers are well aware of how they are supposed to implement legislation like the No Surprises Act, but flout it anyway.
Regulators sued the PE firm last year for consolidating anesthesiology services in Texas with its portfolio company, U.S. Anesthesia Partners. Now, a judge is holding Welsh Carson blameless.
A Texas federal judge has dismissed the Federal Trade Commission’s antitrust lawsuit against Welsh, Carson, Anderson and Stowe in a big win for the private equity firm. However, the government’s suit against Welsh Carson’s portfolio company U.S. Anesthesia Partners was allowed to continue.
Last year, the FTC sued Welsh Carson and USAP, alleging they pursued a buying spree of anethesiology practices in Texas to create a dominant provider that used its market power to suppress competition and increase the cost of anesthesiology services.
Welsh Carson, which formed USAP in 2012, has since whittled down its ownership of the provider from more than 50% to 23%, and argued that precludes it from being included in the suit. The FTC argued the firm effectively remains in control of USAP.
However, U.S. District Judge Kenneth Hoyt granted Welsh Carson’s motion to dismiss the suit on Tuesday, essentially finding that private equity firms are not liable for the actions of their portfolio companies.
The FTC was unable to prove “any authority for the proposition that receiving profits from an entity that may be violating antitrust laws is itself a violation of antitrust laws,” Hoyt wrote in his opinion.
Hoyt found that Welsh Carson holding a minority share in USAP does not reduce competition, despite USAP’s acquisitions potentially being anticompetitive themselves. In addition, comments from Welsh Carson executives expressing a desire to consolidate other healthcare markets don’t show that the PE firm plans to violate antitrust laws.
If Welsh Carson signals “beyond mere speculation and conjecture” that it’s actually about to violate the law, the FTC can lodge a new lawsuit, the judge wrote.
A spokesperson for Welsh Carson said the firm is “gratified” that the court dismissed the case.
”As we have said from the beginning, this case was without factual or legal basis,” the spokesperson said.
However, Hoyt denied USAP’s motion to dismiss.
The FTC is arguing that USAP — which is the largest anesthesia practice in Texas — leveraged its size to raise prices in the state, resulting in patients, employers and insurers paying tens of millions of dollars more each year for anesthesia services. In addition, USAP allegedly paid a competitor, Envision Healthcare, $9 million to stay out of the Dallas market for five years.
USAP has been criticized for using similar practices to grow in other states, including Colorado.
USAP argued the FTC was overreaching its authority, and regulators’ allegations of anticompetitive conduct were meritless. Hoyt disagreed, pointing out that USAP continues to own the acquired anesthesia groups and continues to charge high prices, including under price-setting agreements. Overall, USAP’s “monopolization scheme remains intact,” according to the opinion.
“The FTC has plausibly alleged acquisitions resulting in higher prices for consumers, along with a market allocation and price-setting scheme. It would be premature to dismiss these claims at this stage,” Hoyt said.
Either way, the dismissal against Welsh Carson is a setback for the FTC, which has taken a more aggressive stance against anticompetitive behaviors in the healthcare industry under the Biden administration.
In December, the FTC and the Department of Justice finalized new guidelines for merger reviews taking aim at previously overlooked practices. Those include private equity roll-ups, when firms acquire and merge multiple small businesses into one larger company — like Welsh Carson’s strategy to grow USAP.
PE firms have acquired hundreds of physician practices across the U.S. in recent years, despite controversy over negative effects on medical quality and cost. One study from 2022 found when private equity took over physician practices, they raised prices by 20% on average.
The U.S. Department of Justice has announced the formation of the Antitrust Division’s Task Force on Health Care Monopolies and Collusion (HCMC), which will guide the division’s enforcement strategy and policy approach in healthcare.
This will include facilitating policy advocacy, investigations and, where warranted, civil and criminal enforcement in healthcare markets.
“Every year, Americans spend trillions of dollars on healthcare, money that is increasingly being gobbled up by a small number of payers, providers and dominant intermediaries that have consolidated their way to power in communities across the country,” said Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division.
The task force is intended to identify and root out monopolies, as well as any collusive practices that increase costs and decrease quality, according to the DOJ.
WHAT’S THE IMPACT
The HCMC will consider widespread competition concerns shared by patients, healthcare professionals, businesses and entrepreneurs, including issues regarding payer-provider consolidation, serial acquisitions, labor and quality of care, medical billing, healthcare IT services, and access to and misuse of healthcare data.
The task force will also bring together civil and criminal prosecutors, economists, healthcare industry experts, technologists, data scientists, investigators and policy advisors from across the division’s Civil, Criminal, Litigation and Policy Programs, and the Expert Analysis Group to identify and address pressing antitrust problems in healthcare markets.
The HCMC will be directed by Katrina Rouse, a long-serving antitrust prosecutor who joined the Antitrust Division in 2011. She previously served as chief of the division’s Defense, Industrials and Aerospace Section, assistant chief of the division’s San Francisco office, and a special assistant U.S. attorney and a trial attorney in the division’s Healthcare and Consumer Products Section.
Rouse holds degrees from Columbia University and Stanford Law School, and has clerked for federal judges in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. She will also serve as the division’s deputy director of civil enforcement and special counsel for healthcare.
The Antitrust Division said it welcomes input from the public, including from practitioners, patients, researchers, business owners and others who have direct insight into competition concerns in the healthcare industry.
Where appropriate, the division will refer matters to other federal and state law enforcers, the DOJ said.
Members of the public can share their experiences with the task force by visiting HealthyCompetition.gov.
THE LARGER TREND
Healthcare monopolies, which can be spurred by hospital consolidation, could have a detrimental effect on consumers’ premiums and out-of-pocket spending due to the resulting outpatient facility fees, a 2023 report found.
Consumer advocates, payers and state regulators flagged a range of issues related to outpatient facility fees. Both consumer advocates and regulators expressed concerns about the financial exposure facility fees created for consumers via increased out-of-pocket spending – driven by plans with high deductibles and other benefit design features that increase patients’ exposure to cost-sharing – and higher premiums resulting from increased spending on ambulatory services.
Policymakers and the media have been increasingly attentive to mergers and acquisitions and other potentially anticompetitive practices of hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers.
Consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency and help some struggling providers to keep their doors open in relatively underserved areas, but it can also reduce market competition and ease pressure on providers to lower prices or invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear evidence of improvements in quality, which has implications for consumers and employers. As a result, some have proposed strengthening antitrust regulation—which aims to protect competitive markets—as a tool for tackling rising health care costs, increasing the affordability of care, and reducing the large number of adults with medical debt.
Federal and state antitrust agencies play a role in challenging anticompetitive practices of health care providers and other businesses. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for enforcing federal antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. State attorneys general (AG) offices also have the authority to bring action under federal antitrust law, as well as under state statutes, which sometimes expand upon federal law.
This issue brief explains the role of federal and state antitrust agencies in challenging anticompetitive practices among health care providers, including the legal authority of federal and state agencies, the role that they play in enforcing antitrust laws, and proposed options for strengthening their authority. The brief focuses on health care providers, though many of the principles discussed in this issue brief apply to the practices of other health care entities as well, such as health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) (which are currently being reviewed by the FTC). While the focus of this brief is on the role of government agencies, antitrust law also authorizes private parties, such as employer health plans, to challenge anticompetitive practices in the courts.
What types of anticompetitive practices do governments challenge and why?
Governments challenge anticompetitive practices to promote competitive markets, often for the benefit of consumers (e.g., patients and health plan enrollees).1 Governments seek to address a variety of anticompetitive practices that may lead to higher prices without commensurate improvements in quality of care. These include anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions (referred to as “mergers” in this brief), and other activities that hinder competition (referred to as “nonmerger anticompetitive practices” in this brief).
Provider consolidationcan be beneficial to consumers in some instances and detrimental in others. On the one hand, consolidation has the potential to increase efficiency, such as by allowing providers to purchase supplies in bulk at a discount or by facilitating the coordination of care across different providers. On the other hand, consolidation has the potential to lead to worse outcomes for consumers by increasing providers’ market power and decreasing competition, which enhances the ability of providers to negotiate for higher prices (increasing costs for consumers and employers) and reduces the pressure on providers to invest in quality improvements. A substantial body of evidence shows that consolidation has led to higher prices without clear indications of quality improvements, though the strength of this evidence varies based on the type of consolidation and provider.
There are three main types of mergers:
Horizontal mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer the same or similar services, such as when a health system acquires a hospital or when two physician practices that provide overlapping services merge. Horizontal mergers can raise concerns about competition because they, by definition, reduce competitiveness when occurring between providers in the same market, and because consolidated entities can take actions to increase and protect their market power.
Vertical mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that offer different services along the same supply chain, such as when a hospital acquires a physician practice. Vertical mergers can raise anticompetitive concerns, for example, if physicians refer patients to hospitals within their health system rather than to competing hospitals. Some mergers may entail both vertical and horizontal consolidation (e.g., if a health system acquires a physician group that provides services offered by the system’s existing physician group).
Cross-market mergers occur when there is consolidation between providers that operate in different geographic markets.2 Cross-market mergers may raise concerns about competition, for example, if a health system with providers in different areas of a state is able to use its dominant position in one market to negotiate higher prices in another when contracting with a given health plan (e.g., a state employee plan with enrollees that reside in several markets).
Governments also challenge other types of anticompetitive practices, such as the use of anticompetitive clauses in contracts between providers and insurers or providers and workers. Anticompetitive contract clauses give dominant parties an unfair advantage over potential competitors and can lead to higher prices. For example, some health systems have highly regarded hospitals (also known as “must have” hospitals) that insurers need to include in their provider networks in order to attract enrollees, which gives these systems substantial bargaining leverage over insurers. These health care systems can in turn use this bargaining leverage to pressure insurers to contract with all providers in the system (through “all-or-nothing clauses”), shielding expensive or low-quality members from competition with more desirable providers. The textbox below provides definitions of various anticompetitive contract clauses.
All-or-nothing clauses require an insurer that wants to contract with a particular provider in a system (such as a must-have hospital) to contract with all providers in that system.
Anti-tiering/anti-steering clauses prevent an insurer from putting a given provider in a non-preferred provider network tier or from using other incentives or tools to steer patients to competing providers. This can incentivize patients to use that provider, even if a higher-value provider is also in-network.
Exclusive contracting clauses prohibit an insurer from including competing providers in their provider network, so that a given provider is the only in-network option in a given area.
Non-compete clauses prevent a worker employed with a given provider from taking a job with a competing provider or starting a new practice within a certain distance for some duration of time.
Most favored nation clauses require a provider to offer an insurer the lowest rates of all the insurers with which it has contracted. While the examples above create favorable terms for providers in their contracts with insurers, most favored nation clauses create favorable terms for insurers in their contracts with providers.4
What federal antitrust laws govern anticompetitive practices?
There are three primary federal antitrust laws—the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act—that prohibit anticompetitive mergers and other anticompetitive practices.
The Sherman Act (1890) broadly prohibits anticompetitive practices. It has been used to challenge various anticompetitive practices, such as mergers, wage suppression, agreements among competing businesses to fix prices, and anticompetitive contracting clauses.
The Clayton Act(1914) builds on the Sherman Act by explicitly prohibiting anticompetitive mergers as well as other types of anticompetitive practices that are not clearly addressed by the Sherman Act (such as by barring the same individual from serving on the board of directors for two competing health systems, with some exceptions). Additionally, as amended under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976, the law requires that merging entities report their plans in advance to federal regulators in certain cases where the transaction exceeds a specified value ($111.4 million in 2023), which gives regulators time to investigate and intervene if needed.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act(1914) created the FTC and prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The FTC Act encompasses the same types of violations that are covered by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, in addition to other anticompetitive practices, and grants the FTC regulatory authority. Unlike the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities.5
Some forms of business practices, such as almost all instances where competitors coordinate to raise prices, are inherently illegal under federal law. The legality of other types of business practices depends on the context. For instance, when government agencies challenge a merger, courts assess whether the merger would likely harm competition in a given market.
What is the FTC’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?
Two federal agencies—the FTC and DOJ—have overlapping, as well as distinct, authority to challenge anticompetitive practices under federal law. The FTC is the only entity that can enforce the FTC Act. Although this Act generally cannot be applied to nonprofit entities, the FTC has the authority to enforce the Clayton Act against nonprofit entities (in addition to for-profit entities), such as by challenging anticompetitive mergers among nonprofits. The DOJ has the authority to enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts. States can also bring lawsuits under federal antitrust law, as can some private parties, such as competing providers.
The FTC focuses on “protecting the public from deceptive or unfair business practices and from unfair methods of competition.” This includes challenging activities such as misleading advertisements, violations of consumers’ data privacy, and efforts to accumulate market power through mergers and other anticompetitive practices. For instance, the FTC sued Facebook in 2020, alleging, in part, that the company had sought to maintain its monopoly power by buying up competitors, such as Instagram and WhatsApp.
The FTC plays a larger role than the DOJ in enforcing federal antitrust law in health care provider markets, though there are gaps in its authority. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in certain areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets (see more below). However, although the FTC has broad authority to challenge anticompetitive mergers, its authority to challenge other anticompetitive practices often excludes nonprofits. Nonprofit ownership is common in provider markets. For example, nonprofits account for about three-fifths (58%) of community hospitals in 2023. The DOJ may fill in for the FTC when the FTC does not have the authority to challenge nonprofit providers that are engaging in certain anticompetitive practices (see example of Atrium Health below).
The FTC has successfully challenged several hospital mergers over the past two decades. Beginning in the 1990s and for several years afterwards, the FTC had difficulty challenging hospital mergers in the courts, allowing rapid consolidation in the hospital sector to continue unabated.6 Since the late 2000s, the FTC has since been more successful in challenging hospital mergers, reflecting advances in both economics and the FTC’s new legal strategies.7 However, the FTC challenges only a fraction of hospital mergers, and it is difficult to know the extent to which mergers that go unchallenged have an adverse impact on consumers, in terms of costs and quality. For instance, in 2022, the FTC challenged 3 hospital mergers and, in each case, the hospitals abandoned their plans to merge, while one analysis documented 53 hospital merger announcements in that year. The same analysis identified more hospital merger announcements in the years prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., 92 in 2019).
Example: FTC & Advocate Health Care Network
In 2015, the FTC brought a legal challenge against a proposed merger of two Chicago-area health systems: Advocate Health Care Network and NorthShore University Health System. The FTC argued that the combined entity would control over half of the market for general acute care inpatient hospital services, compared to the next largest provider, which would have only controlled 15% of the market. The court placed a temporary block on the merger, and the systems ultimately abandoned their plans to merge before the case went to trial.
The FTC has played a smaller role in challenging physician mergers. A key challenge is that physician mergers tend to be smaller, and physician groups often grow slowly over time by acquiring small group practices and hiring new physicians. As a result, physician groups often do not need to report mergers to federal regulators as their transactions tend to fall below Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting thresholds (though regulators can still challenge mergers that they learn about in other ways). Additionally, because they tend to be small, any given merger may not have an appreciable effect on market power, even if the cumulative effect of these mergers leads to a large concentration of market power over time.
Vertical mergers in health care provider markets have largely escaped FTC enforcement and the FTC has never challenged a cross-market merger, though it has expressed interest in both practices. For instance, in 2021, the FTC announced that it would begin to study the effect of vertical mergers between health care facilities and physician groups. The FTC previously conducted studies of horizontal mergers in advance of successful litigation. The FTC has also investigated specific instances of cross-market mergers, although it has yet to bring a challenge.
Example: FTC & St. Luke’s Health System
In 2012, St. Luke’s Health System in Idaho attempted to acquire Saltzer Medical Group, a physician practice group. Although this proposed acquisition had elements of a vertical merger, the FTC challenged it as a horizontal merger, i.e., on the basis that St. Luke’s would obtain a dominant market share for adult primary care physician services. Courts ruled in favor of the FTC and ordered that St. Luke’s divest Saltzer Medical Group. This was the first time that the FTC received a court decision for a case challenging a hospital or health system’s acquisition of competing physician practices.
The FTC has not played a large role in overseeing nonmerger anticompetitive practices in nonprofit health care provider markets, such as the use of anticompetitive contract clauses. This may reflect the fact that the FTC’s authority to challenge and regulate nonmerger anticompetitive practices generally excludes nonprofit entities. Nonetheless, the FTC has brought legal challenges in some instances, such as cases where separate physician groups have coordinated with each other to raise prices. Relatedly, the FTC drew on its regulatory authority when it proposed a rule in 2023 that would ban non-compete clauses between employers and workers.
What is the DOJ’s role in enforcing federal antitrust law?
The DOJ enforces a wide range of laws on behalf of the federal government, including—through its Antitrust Division—anticompetitive practices. For instance, in one landmark antitrust case in the 1990s, the DOJ sued Microsoft, alleging that the company had illegally sought to protect its monopoly power. The DOJ argued that the company had done so, in part, by requiring computer manufacturers that wanted to use Microsoft’s popular Windows operating system to also include Internet Explorer as a default.
Although the FTC typically oversees the conduct of health care providers, the DOJ has occasionally done so as well (see example below).
Example: DOJ & Atrium Health
In 2016, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Carolinas Healthcare System, also known as “Atrium Health.” The DOJ claimed that Atrium had violated federal antitrust law by, among other things, entering into contracts with insurers that contained anti-steering and anti-tiering clauses. Atrium Health system and the DOJ reached a settlement agreement before trial where the system agreed, in part, to stop using these contract clauses.
The DOJ typically takes the lead in promoting competition in health insurance markets. For instance, in 2017, the DOJ, along with some state governments, successfully prevented a proposed merger between Anthem and Cigna—which would have been the largest merger of health insurance companies on record—and a proposed merger between Aetna and Humana.
How do the FTC and DOJ work together on antitrust issues?
The FTC and DOJ have a clearance process to determine which agency will investigate and challenge a given merger. The FTC and DOJ have each developed expertise in different areas and have tended to divide merger oversight accordingly, with the FTC typically overseeing provider markets and the DOJ typically overseeing insurance markets. The division of labor is formalized through a clearance process that determines which agency will investigate a proposed transaction based on its expertise and other factors, such as its capacity and ties to a given case.
The FTC and DOJ collaborate on guidelines that establish how they determine whether to challenge a given merger. This includes the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which, as the name suggests, outline the criteria that the FTC and DOJ consider when reviewing horizontal mergers. For instance, the guidelines indicate that the agencies evaluate the effects of a merger on market concentration based on a measure known as the “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” (HHI) (see textbox below). The guidelines also indicate that the agencies consider the possible benefits of a given merger, such as whether a merger might allow research to be conducted more effectively.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The HHI is calculated based on provider market shares for a given product—such as inpatient general acute care services or inpatient orthopedic surgical services—and geographic market. The HHI for a market can range from nearly 0 (a perfectly competitive market) to 10,000 (a market with a single provider). The Horizontal Merger Guidelines define the level of market concentration as follows:
Unconcentrated: HHI < 1,500
Moderately concentrated: HHI between 1,500 and 2,500
Highly concentrated: HHI > 2,500
Although markets for inpatient hospital services are now often highly concentrated, there is wide variation across the country. For instance, one study estimated that, in 2021, the New York City metro area had an HHI of 753 for inpatient hospital services, while the Wilmington, North Carolina metro area had an HHI of 7,600.
The FTC and DOJ have also released a set of Vertical Merger Guidelines, though the FTC withdrew from these guidelines in 2021. Some economists are more critical of the Vertical Merger Guidelines than the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, perhaps reflecting the fact that there is less consensus about the effects of vertical consolidation and the proper role of antitrust enforcement.
In July 2023, the FTC and DOJ released a draft version of their updated merger guidelines, which would apply to both horizontal and vertical mergers and which indicate that the agencies will be scrutinizing a broader range of mergers. Among other changes, the draft guidelines expand the definition of highly concentrated markets, rely on a lower threshold for identifying large changes in market concentration, consider the combined effect of a series of acquisitions (e.g., of a health system acquiring several small physician practices over time), and add an explicit discussion of the agencies’ views on how workers may be negatively impacted when their employers merge. These guidelines might also be used to challenge cross-market mergers, although this is not yet clear. The deadline for public comments on the draft guidelines is September 18, 2023.
In addition to working together on general merger guidelines, the DOJ and FTC have in the past collaborated on antitrust policy statements that are specific to health care, though both agencies withdrew from these statements in February 2023 and July 2023, respectively, arguing that the statements are outdated based on changes in health care markets.8
What is the role of states in enforcing antitrust law?
States can bring legal challenges under federal antitrust law. States may do so through their AG offices as either a purchaser of health care (for instance, through state employee health plans) or on behalf of their residents. States sometimes file lawsuits jointly with each other or with the federal government, which can help overcome resource constraints. States and the federal government may play complementary roles, with the federal government providing greater resources and general antitrust expertise and states providing more specialized knowledge of local market conditions.
Most states have passed laws that expand oversight of provider mergers, which may lead to additional legal challenges. Thirty-four states and DC require that at least some hospitals notify state AG offices of their plans to merge, expanding on federal reporting requirements. For instance, Rhode Island requires all hospitals to do so, regardless of the value of the transaction. Additionally, thirteen states and DC require that some or all types of providers receive approval from the government prior to merging, instead of requiring that the government file a lawsuit to challenge a merger. Eleven states require AG offices to consider relatively expansive criteria when reviewing health care mergers. For instance, California law requires the AG office to consider criteria such as the general public’s interest and the effect of a merger on access to care.
Some states have prohibited certain types of anticompetitive contract clauses. These laws either broadly prohibit a given type of clause or ban their use in only specific circumstances. Regarding contracts between insurers and dominant providers, two states (Massachusetts and Nevada) have laws restricting at least some all-or-nothing clauses and anti-tiering or anti-steering provisions, and five states (Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin) have laws restricting exclusive contracting. Additionally, 22 states restrict non-compete provisions—which dominant providers sometimes use in contracts with their workers—and 20 states restrict most favored nation clauses, which dominant insurers sometimes use in their contracts with providers.
Example: California & Sutter Health
In 2018, the California AG joined a lawsuit that had been initiated on behalf of some group health plans against Sutter Health, a large nonprofit health system in the state. The parties argued that Sutter had used anticompetitive contract clauses—such as all-or-nothing and anti-tiering provisions—to increase prices. In 2019, Sutter agreed to a settlement agreement that required the system to abandon the relevant contract clauses and to pay $575 million in damages, among other things.
Some states have enacted laws that have the potential to shield health care providers from antitrust scrutiny in certain instances. For example, 19 states have Certificate of Public Advantage (COPA) laws, which immunize a merger from antitrust challenges while directly regulating the merged entity for a period of time, such as by limiting price increases or prohibiting certain contracting practices. The intent of COPA laws is to facilitate mergers that are perceived as being beneficial overall while mitigating anticompetitive concerns through state oversight. However, the FTC and some researchers have been critical of these laws, arguing, for example, that states have not followed through in providing ongoing oversight following a given merger. Other state policies, such as Certificate of Need (CON) statutes—which attempt to reduce costs by restricting, for example, the construction of new facilities when they do not meet a community need—may also play a role in limiting competition or preventing antitrust scrutiny.
What are the potential remedies in antitrust enforcement?
Federal or state agencies challenging a merger can seek structural remedies or conduct remedies (also known as “behavioral remedies”).
Structural remedies mitigate consolidation by preventing a merger from moving forward, breaking up mergers that have already taken place, or requiring a merged entity to sell off a portion of its business.
Conduct remedies entail restrictions or requirements imposed on providers after a merger, such as by limiting the prices providers can charge, prohibiting providers from engaging in certain contracting practices, or requiring providers to spend a minimum amount on community benefits.
Conduct remediesmay be less effective than structural remedies in certain circumstances, as they tend to be time-limited and government agencies may not have the resources to monitor and enforce them. However, where markets are already concentrated and regulators are reluctant to break up merged entities, conduct remedies may be the only option.
When the government challenges proposed mergers before they occur, the recourse is typically to prevent the merger from moving forward. Antitrust enforcers have only infrequently attempted to unwind mergers that have already taken place, which the FTC describes as a “difficult and potentially ineffective” process.
There are other ways in which the government can be successful in challenging anticompetitive mergers. For example, the government and merging providers may avoid trial through a settlement agreement or consent decree. In this scenario, the government drops its legal challenge in exchange for structural or conduct remedies. Additionally, providers may abandon a merger after a lawsuit is announced or a court makes a preliminary ruling against the merger or may decide not to attempt to merge in the first place in anticipation that doing so would be successfully challenged in court.
Example: FTC & Phoebe Putney Health System
In 2011, Phoebe Putney Health System acquired a hospital from HCA in Albany, Georgia. The FTC challenged the merger and eventually reached a settlement agreement with the providers. The settlement agreement allowed the merger to persist but imposed conduct remedies, including that Phoebe Putney notify the FTC before acquiring other health care providers in the area.
The outcomes of successful legal challenges to nonmerger anticompetitive practices are similar, though the remedy would involve abandoning the relevant business practice (e.g., no longer using anticompetitive contract clauses).
What are some practical challenges facing antitrust enforcement?
There are at least a few challenges that may limit the ability of the federal government and states to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust enforcement:
It is difficult to break up mergers after they have already occurred, and many provider markets are already highly concentrated. For example, one study estimated that the vast majority (90%) of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) had highly concentrated hospital markets in 2016 (i.e., with an HHI above 2,500), most (65%) had highly concentrated specialist physician markets, and nearly two in five (39%) had highly concentrated markets for primary care physicians. Breaking up a merger after providers have already consolidated can be difficult. At the same time, regulating the behavior of merged providers—such as through restrictions on the prices they charge—may be difficult to do on an ongoing basis.
Some regions cannot support competitive provider markets. For instance, rural communities may not have enough residents to support several providers that offer the same service.
Antitrust litigation can be complex and expensive. Without adequate funding, it may be impractical to challenge a large number of provider business practices that raise anticompetitive concerns.
Antitrust agencies may have difficulty staying ahead of market trends. For example, it could take time for the government to develop strong guidelines for challenging vertical or cross-market mergers and to accumulate enough evidence to convince courts that these practices harm competition. In the meantime, these mergers will likely continue.
The benefits of competitive provider markets for individuals with health insurance will depend in part on the competitiveness of health insurance markets. The study referenced above also estimated that most MSAs (57%) had highly concentrated insurance markets in 2016. When insurance markets are not competitive, cost savings from competitive provider markets might not be fully passed along to consumers.
What policies have been proposed to strengthen antitrust law and enforcement?
Several federal and state policy proposals have been floated to help antitrust regulators more easily identify and challenge anticompetitive mergers and regulate markets that are already concentrated. One set of policies would make it easier for governments to enforce antitrust law, such as by requiring more providers to report any planned mergers, lowering the legal standards by which mergers are deemed anticompetitive, and mandating that providers receive approval from the government before merging. Another set of policies would increase the scope of antitrust law, such as by giving the FTC full authority to regulate nonprofit providers and outlawing certain anticompetitive contracting clauses. A third set of proposals would improve the infrastructure of antitrust enforcement, such as by increasing funding for antitrust agencies, creating agencies to monitor health care markets (as some states have done), and establishing specialized courts for antitrust cases.
Discussion
The FTC, DOJ, and states seek to promote competition in health care markets to encourage providers to lower costs for consumers and provide high quality medical care. Over the years, FTC, DOJ, and some states have challenged mergers as well as other anticompetitive practices. Nonetheless, there are inherent challenges to an approach that relies solely on efforts to foster competitive provider markets through antitrust regulation, particularly given the already high level of market concentration of providers across the country.
Several policy ideas have been floated at the federal and state level that are intended to strengthen antitrust regulation. However, given the challenges facing antitrust regulation and pro-competition policies, some policymakers have proposed a more direct regulatory approach, such as by capping prices or price growth or by establishing global budgets for hospitals. Someproponents of these approaches have highlighted that antitrust efforts and regulatory approaches could play complimentary roles. For instance, caps on health care prices could serve as a backstop in concentrated markets where at least some providers would not otherwise offer competitive rates or in small markets that are unable to support competition. Antitrust regulation may also play a useful role under price regulation, for example, by encouraging providers to compete for patients by offering higher quality care.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has been investigating UHG for anticompetitive behavior since last October, as first revealed by the Examiner News earlier this week and subsequently confirmed by the Wall Street Journal.
The DOJ is reportedly interested in Optum’s acquisitions of physician groups and how their relationships with UHG’s health plans affects competition.
The probe appears to be wide-ranging, but there are no indications of if or when the DOJ plans to file charges. UHG is no stranger to antitrust attention: the DOJ failed to block its purchase of Change Healthcare in 2022, and its planned acquisition of home healthcare company Amedisys is still subject to a federal probe.
The Gist: The Biden administration has made antitrust scrutiny a key plank of its policy platform, having recently launched high-profile investigations into several large companies including Apple, Amazon, and Google.
Although these probes span major sectors of the US economy, healthcare consolidation has been a particular focus for the White House.
As the nation’s both largest employer of physicians and largest health insurance company,UHG is an unsurprising target within the healthcare industry. Recently finalized federal merger guidelines have changed how the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) gather M&A information, but not the laws or legal precedent upon which cases are ruled, so it remains to be seen if regulators’ new approach will translate into stronger enforcement.
Tuesday, the, FTC, and DOJ announced creation of a task force focused on tackling “unfair and illegal pricing” in healthcare. The same day, HHS joined FTC and DOJ regulators in launching an investigation with the DOJ and FTC probing private equity’ investments in healthcare expressing concern these deals may generate profits for corporate investors at the expense of patients’ health, workers’ safety and affordable care.
Thursday’s State of the Union address by President Biden (SOTU) and the Republican response by Alabama Senator Katey Britt put the spotlight on women’s reproductive health, drug prices and healthcare affordability.
Friday, the Senate passed a $468 billion spending bill (75-22) that had passed in the House Wednesday (339-85) averting a government shutdown. The bill postpones an $8 billion reduction in Medicaid disproportionate share hospital payments for a year, allocates $4.27 billion to federally qualified health centers through the end of the year and rolls back a significant portion of a Medicare physician pay cut that kicked in on Jan. 1. Next, Congress must pass appropriations for HHS and other agencies before the March 22 shutdown.
And all week, the cyberattack on Optum’s Change Healthcare discovered February 21 hovered as hospitals, clinics, pharmacies and others scrambled to manage gaps in transaction processing. Notably, the American Hospital Association and others have amplified criticism of UnitedHealth Group’s handling of the disruption, having, bought Change for $13 billion in October, 2022 after a lengthy Department of Justice anti-trust review. This week, UHG indicates partial service of CH support will be restored. Stay tuned.
Just another week for healthcare: Congressional infighting about healthcare spending. Regulator announcements of new rules to stimulate competition and protect consumers in the healthcare market. Lobbying by leading trade groups to protect funding and disable threats from rivals. And so on.
At the macro level, it’s understandable: healthcare is an attractive market, especially in its services sectors. Since the pandemic, prices for services (i.e. physicians, hospitals et al) have steadily increased and remain elevated despite the pressures of transparency mandates and insurer pushback. By contrast, prices for most products (drugs, disposables, technologies et al) have followed the broader market pricing trends where prices for some escalated fast and then dipped.
While some branded prescription medicines are exceptions, it is health services that have driven the majority of health cost inflation since the pandemic.
UnitedHealth Group’s financial success is illustrative:
it’s big, high profile and vertically integrated across all major services sectors. In its year end 2023 financial report (January 12, 2024) it reported revenues of $371.6 Billion (up 15% Year-Over-Year), earnings from operations up 14%, cash flows from operations of $29.1 Billion (1.3x Net Income), medical care ratio at 83.2% up from 82% last year, net earnings of $23.86/share and adjusted net earnings of $25.12/share and guidance its 2024 revenues of $400-403 billion. They buy products using their scale and scope leverage to pay less for services they don’t own less and products needed to support them. It’s a big business in a buyer’s market and that’s unsettling to many.
Big business is not new to healthcare:
it’s been dominant in every sector but of late more a focus of unflattering regulator and media attention. Coupled with growing public discontent about the system’s effectiveness and affordability, it seems it’s near a tipping point.
David Johnson, one of the most thoughtful analysts of the health industry, reminded his readers last week that the current state of affairs in U.S. healthcare is not new citing the January 1970 Fortune cover story “Our Ailing Medical System”
“American medicine, the pride of the nation for many years, stands now on the brink of chaos. To be sure, our medical practitioners have their great moments of drama and triumph. But much of U.S. medical care, particularly the everyday business of preventing and treating routine illnesses, is inferior in quality, wastefully dispensed, and inequitably financed…
Whether poor or not, most Americans are badly served by the obsolete, overstrained medical system that has grown up around them helter-skelter. … The time has come for radical change.”
Johnson added: “The healthcare industry, however, cannot fight gravity forever. Consumerism, technological advances and pro-market regulatory reforms are so powerful and coming so fast that status-quo healthcare cannot forestall their ascendance. Properly harnessed, these disruptive forces have the collective power necessary for U.S. healthcare to finally achieve the 1970 Fortune magazine goal of delivering “good care to every American with little increase in cost.”
He’s right.
I believe the U.S. health system as we know it has reached its tipping point. The big-name organizations in every sector see it and have nominal contingency plans in place; the smaller players are buying time until the shoe drops. But I am worried.
I am worried the system’s future is in the hands of hyper-partisanship by both parties seeking political advantage in election cycles over meaningful creation of a health system that functions for the greater good.
I am worried that the industry’s aversion toprice transparency, meaningful discussion about affordability and consistency in defining quality, safety and value will precipitate short-term gamesmanship for reputational advantage and nullify systemness and interoperability requisite to its transformation.
I am worried that understandably frustrated employers will drop employee health benefits to force the system to needed accountability.
I am worried that the growing armies of under-served and dissatisfied populations will revolt.
I am worried that its workforce is ill-prepared for a future that’s technology-enabled and consumer centric.
I am worried that the industry’s most prominent trade groups are concentrating more on “warfare” against their rivals and less about the long-term future of the system.
I am worried that transformational change is all talk.
It’s time to start an adult conversation about the future of the system. The starting point: acknowledging that it’s not about bad people; it’s about systemic flaws in its design and functioning. Fixing it requires balancing lag indicators about its use, costs and demand with assumptions about innovations that hold promise to shift its trajectory long-term. It requires employers to actively participate: in 2009-2010, Big Business mistakenly chose to sit out deliberations about the Affordable Care Act. And it requires independent, visionary facilitation free from bias and input beyond the DC talking heads that have dominated reform thought leadership for 6 decades.
Or, collectively, we can watch events like last week’s roll by and witness the emergence of a large public utility serving most and a smaller private option for those that afford it. Or something worse.
P.S. Today, thousands will make the pilgrimage to Orlando for HIMSS24 kicking off with a keynote by Robert Garrett, CEO of Hackensack Meridian Health tomorrow about ‘transformational change’ and closing Friday with a keynote by Nick Saban, legendary Alabama football coach on leadership. In between, the meeting’s 24 premier supporters and hundreds of exhibitors will push their latest solutions to prospects and customers keenly aware healthcare’s future is not a repeat of its past primarily due to technology. Information-driven healthcare is dependent on technologies that enable cost-effective, customized evidence-based care that’s readily accessible to individuals where and when they want it and with whom.
And many will be anticipating HCA Mission Health’s (Asheville NC) Plan of Action response due to CMS this Wednesday addressing deficiencies in 6 areas including CMS Deficiency 482.12 “which ensures that hospitals have a responsible governing body overseeing critical aspects of patient care and medical staff appointments.” Interest is high outside the region as the nation’s largest investor-owned system was put in “immediate jeopardy” of losing its Medicare participation status last year at Mission. FYI: HCA reported operating income of $7.7 billion (11.8% operating margin) on revenues of $65 billion in 2023.
Last week, Congress avoided a partial federal shutdown by passing a stop-gap spending bill and now faces March 8 and March 22 deadlines for authorizations including key healthcare programs.
This week, lawmakers’ political antenna will be directed at Super Tuesday GOP Presidential Primary results which prognosticators predict sets the stage for the Biden-Trump re-match in November. And President Biden will deliver his 3rd State of the Union Address Thursday in which he is certain to tout the economy’s post-pandemic strength and recovery.
The common denominator of these activities in Congress is their short-term focus: a longer-term view about the direction of the country, its priorities and its funding is not on its radar anytime soon.
The healthcare system, which is nation’s biggest employer and 17.3% of its GDP, suffers from neglect as a result of chronic near-sightedness by its elected officials. A retrospective about its funding should prompt Congress to prepare otherwise.
U.S. Healthcare Spending 2000-2022
Year-over-year changes in U.S. healthcare spending reflect shifting demand for services and their underlying costs, changes in the healthiness of the population and the regulatory framework in which the U.S. health system operates to receive payments. Fluctuations are apparent year-to-year, but a multiyear retrospective on health spending is necessary to a longer-term view of its future.
The period from 2000 to 2022 (the last year for which U.S. spending data is available) spans two economic downturns (2008–2010 and 2020–2021); four presidencies; shifts in the composition of Congress, the Supreme Court, state legislatures and governors’ offices; and the passage of two major healthcare laws (the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and the Affordable Care Act of 2010).
During this span of time, there were notable changes in healthcare spending:
In 2000, national health expenditures were $1.4 trillion (13.3% of gross domestic product); in 2022, they were $4.5 trillion (17.3% of the GDP)—a 4.1% increase overall, a 321% increase in nominal spending and a 30% increase in the relative percentage of the nation’s GDP devoted to healthcare. No other sector in the economy has increased as much.
In the same period, the population increased 17% from 282 million to 333 million, per capita healthcare spending increased 178% from $4,845 to $13,493 due primarily to inflation-impacted higher unit costs for , facilities, technologies and specialty provider costs and increased utilization by consumers due to escalating chronic diseases.
There were notable changes where dollars were spent: Hospitals remained relatively unchanged (from $415 billion/30.4% of total spending to $1.355 trillion/31.4%), physician services shrank (from $288.2 billion/21.1% to $884.8/19.6%) and prescription drugs were unchanged (from $122.3 billion/8.95% to $405.9 billion/9.0%).
And significant changes in funding Out-of-pocket shrank from 14.2% ($193.6 billion in 2020) to (10.5% ($471 billion) in 2020, private insurance shrank from $441 billion/32.3% to $1.289 trillion/29%, Medicare spending grew from $224.8 billion/16.5% to $944.3billion/21%; Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program spending grew from $203.4 billion/14.9% to $7805.7billion/18%; and Department of Veterans Affairs healthcare spending grew from $19.1 billion/1.4% to $98 billion/2.2%.
Looking ahead (2022-2031), CMS forecasts average National Health Expenditures (NHE) will grow at 5.4% per year outpacing average GDP growth (4.6%) and resulting in an increase in the health spending share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 17.3% in 2021 to 19.6% in 2031.
The agency’s actuaries assume
“The insured share of the population is projected to reach a historic high of 92.3% in 2022… Medicaid enrollment will decline from its 2022 peak of 90.4M to 81.1M by 2025 as states disenroll beneficiaries no longer eligible for coverage. By 2031, the insured share of the population is projected to be 90.5 percent. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is projected to result in lower out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs for 2024 and beyond as Medicare beneficiaries incur savings associated with several provisions from the legislation including the $2,000 annual out-of-pocket spending cap and lower gross prices resulting from negotiations with manufacturers.”
My take:
The reality is this: no one knows for sure what the U.S. health economy will be in 2025 much less 2035 and beyond. There are too many moving parts, too much invested capital seeking near-term profits, too many compensation packages tied to near-term profits, too many unknowns like the impact of artificial intelligence and court decisions about consolidation and too much political risk for state and federal politicians to change anything.
One trend stands out in the data from 2000-2022: The healthcare economy is increasingly dependent on indirect funding by taxpayers and less dependent on direct payments by users.
In the last 22 years, local, state and federal government programs like Medicare, Medicaid and others have become the major sources of funding to the system while direct payments by consumers and employers, vis-à-vis premium out-of-pocket costs, increased nominally but not at the same rate as government programs. And total spending has increased more than the overall economy (GDP), household wages and costs of living almost every year.
Thus, given the trends, five questions must be addressed in the context of the system’s long-term solvency and effectiveness looking to 2031 and beyond:
Should its total spending and public funding be capped?
Should the allocation of funds be better adapted to innovations in technology and clinical evidence?
Should the financing and delivery of health services be integrated to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the system?
Should its structure be a dual public-private system akin to public-private designations in education?
Should consumers play a more direct role in its oversight and funding?
Answers will not be forthcoming in Campaign 2024 despite the growing significance of healthcare in the minds of voters. But they require attention now despite political neglect.
PS: The month of February might be remembered as the month two stalwarts in the industry faced troubles:
United HealthGroup, the biggest health insurer, saw fallout from a cyberattack against its recently acquired (2/22) insurance transaction processor by ALPHV/Blackcat, creating havoc for the 6000 hospitals, 1 million physicians, and 39,000 pharmacies seeking payments and/or authorizations. Then, news circulated about the DOJ’s investigation about its anti-competitive behavior with respect to the 90,000 physicians it employs. Its stock price ended the week at 489.53, down from 507.14 February 1.
And HCA, the biggest hospital operator, faced continued fallout from lawsuits for its handling of Mission Health (Asheville) where last Tuesday, a North Carolina federal court refused to dismiss a lawsuit accusing it of scheming to restrict competition and artificially drive-up costs for health plans. closed at 311.59 last week, down from 314.66 February 1.
STAT News today published an op-ed I coauthored with Dr. Philip Verhoef, president of Physicians for a National Health Program, making the point that investors are among the growing number of stakeholders who are souring on big, for-profit insurance companies like the ones I used to work for (Cigna and Humana).
We focused specifically on investors’ concerns about the continued profitability of Medicare Advantage plans most of the big insurers own and operate.
Several companies have lost billions of dollars in market capitalization over the past several weeks as they have reported what they maintain is higher than usual utilization of health care goods and services by seniors enrolled in MA plans.
Today, the companies–especially UnitedHealth Group, the market leader with 7.6 million Medicare Advantage enrollees–are losing billions more in market cap on the news, broke yesterday by the Wall Street Journal, that the Department of Justice is investigating UnitedHealth’s many acquisitions over the years.
UnitedHealth and most of the other companies are no longer just insurance companies. They’ve moved rapidly into health care delivery by buying physician practices and clinics, and three of them, UnitedHealth, Cigna and CVS/Aetna, control 80% of the pharmacy benefit management business.
Investors in MA insurance companies experienced a rude awakening in late January, with insurer stocks plummeting in the face of earnings reports showing profits falling far below expectations in the last quarter of 2023. Companies like CVS Health and UnitedHealth Group saw losses of 5.2% and 6.2% respectively, while Humana, whose business model relies heavily on the MA program, fell an astonishing 14.2%. These insurers cited higher than average health care utilization rates as the culprit and warned that 2024 would likely see more of the same. At the same time, private equity investment in MA has fallen, showing waning confidence in the program.
We went on to note that both Democrats and Republicans in Congress are increasingly concerned about MA insurers’ business practices and, among other things, have introduced bills to crack down on egregious overpayments to MA plans.
The WSJ reported yesterday that the Justice Department has launched an antitrust investigation into UnitedHealth, which has become not only the country’s biggest U.S. health insurer but also a leading manager of drug benefits “and a sprawling network of doctor groups.”
The investigators have in recent weeks been interviewing healthcare-industry representatives in sectors where UnitedHealth competes, including doctor groups, according to people with knowledge of the meetings.
The DOJ’s investigation of UnitedHealth is wide-ranging. Among other things, according to the Journal, “investigators have asked whether and how the tie-up between UnitedHealthcare [the insurance division] and Optum’s medical groups might affect its compliance with federal rules that cap how much a health-insurance company retains from the premiums it collects. (Optum is the company’s division that encompasses the pharmacy benefit manager Optum Rx and the many clinics and physician practices it owns.)
HEALTH CARE un-coveredexplained last month how UnitedHealth essentially is paying itself billions of dollars every month and circumventing the intent of a federal law that requires insurers to spend at least 80% of premium dollars on their health plan enrollees’ health care.
I know from sources within the Justice Department that investigators saw that piece, as well as the comprehensive analysis we published earlier of the scores of acquisitions UnitedHealth has made in recent years that have enabled it to catapult to the top five of the Fortune 500 list of American companies.
Those sources told me that the DOJ is very concerned about the consolidation within both the health insurance business and the hospital industry. Many U.S. hospitals, in an ongoing effort to negotiate from an enhanced position of strength with UnitedHealth and the other vertically integrated insurers, have merged with each other in recent years and become part of huge health-care delivery systems.
At the close of trading on the New York Stock Exchange yesterday, shares of UnitedHealth Group’s share were down $11.90 or 2.27%. Investors are continuing to head for the exits today. As I write this, the company’s stock price has fallen another $20 (4%) to $494.00. That’s way down from the company’s 52-week high of $554.70.
Shares of most of the other big publicly traded insurers (Centene, Cigna, CVS/Aetna, Elevance, Humana and Molina) are also down, ranging from $.83 at CVS to $11.51 at Humana.
As first half 2023 financial results are reported and many prepare for a busy last half, strategic planning for healthcare services providers and insurers point to 4 issues requiring attention in every boardroom and C suite:
Private equity maturity wall:
The last half of 2023 (and into 2024) is a buyer’s market for global PE investments in healthcare services: 40% of PE investments in hospitals, medical groups and insurtech will hit their maturity wall in the next 12 months. Valuations of companies in these portfolios are below their targeted range; limited partner’ investing in PE funds is down 28% from pre-pandemic peak while fund raising by large, publicly traded, global funds dominate fund raising lifting PE dry powder to a record $3.7 trillion going into the last half of 2023.
In the U.S. healthcare services market, conditions favor well-capitalized big players—global private equity funds and large cap aggregators (i.e., Optum, CVS, Goldman Sachs, Blackstone et al) who have $1 trillion to invest in deals that enhance their platforms. Deals done via special purpose acquisition corporations (SPACS) and smaller PE funds in physicians, hospitals, ambulatory services and others are especially vulnerable. (see Bain and Pitchbook citations below). Addressing the growing role of large-cap PE and strategic investors as partners, collaborators, competitors or disruptors is table stakes for most organizations recognizing they have the wind at their backs.
Consolidation muscle by DOJ and FTC:
Healthcare is in the crosshair of the FTC and DOJ, especially hospitals and health insurers. Hospital markets have become increasingly concentrated: only 12% of the 306 Hospital Referral Regions is considered unconcentrated vs. 23% in 2008. In the 384 insurance markets, 23% are unconcentrated, down from 35% in 2020. Wages for healthcare workers are lower, prices for consumers are higher and choices fewer in concentrated markets prompting stricter guidelines announced last week by the oversight agencies. Big hospitals and big insurers are vulnerable to intensified scrutiny. (See Regulatory Action section below).
Defamatory attacks on nonprofit health systems:
In the past 3 years, private, not-for-profit multi-hospital systems have been targeted for excess profits, inadequate charity care and executive compensation. Labor unions (i.e., SEIU) and privately funded foundations (i.e., West, Arnold Venture, Lown Institute) have joined national health insurers in claims that NFP systems are price gaugers undeserving of the federal, state and local tax exemptions they enjoy. It comes at a time when faith in the U.S. health system is at a modern-day low (Gallup), healthcare access and affordability concerns among consumers are growing and hospital price transparency still lagging (36% are fully compliant with the 2021 Executive Order).
Notably, over the last 20 years, NFP hospitals have become less dominant as a share of all hospitals (61% in 2002 vs. 58% last year) while investor-owned hospitals have shown dramatic growth (from 15% in 2002 to 24% last year). Thus, the majority of local NFP hospitals have joined systems creating prominent brands and market dominance in most regions. But polling indicates many of these brands is more closely associated with “big business” than “not-for-profit health” so they’re soft targets for critics. It is likely unflattering attention to large, NFP systems will increase in the next 12 months prompting state and federal regulatory actions and erosion of public support. (See New England Journal citation in Quotables below)
Campaign 2024 healthcare rhetoric:
Republican candidates will claim healthcare is not affordable and blame Democrats. Democrats will counter that the Affordable Care Act’s expanded coverage and the Biden administration’s attack on drug prices (vis a vis the Inflation Reduction Act) illustrate their active attention to healthcare in contrast to the GOP’s less specific posturing.
Campaigns in both parties will call for increased regulation of hospitals, prescription drug manufacturers, health insurers and PBMs. All will cast the health industry as a cesspool for greed and corruption, decry its performance on equitable access, affordability, price transparency and improvements in the public’s health and herald its frontline workers (nurses, physicians et al) as innocent victims of a system run amuck.
To date, 16 candidates (12 R, 3 D, 1 I) have announced they’re candidates for the White House while campaigns for state and local office are also ramping up in 46 states where local, state and national elections are synced. Healthcare will figure prominently in all. In campaign season, healthcare is especially vulnerable to misinformation and hyper-attention to its bad actors. Until November 5, 2024, that’s reality.
My take:
These issues frame the near-term context for strategic planning in every sector of U.S. healthcare. They do not define the long-term destination of the system nor roles key sectors and organizations will play. That’s unknown.
What’s known for sure is that AI will modify up to 70% of the tasks in health delivery and financing and disrupt its workforce.
Black Swans like the pandemic will prompt attention to gaps in service delivery and inequities in access.
People will be sick, injured, die and be born.
And the economics of healthcare will force uncomfortable discussions about its value and performance.
In the U.S. system, attention to regulatory issues is a necessary investment by organizations in every state and at the federal level. Details about these efforts is readily accessible on websites for each organization’s trade group. They’re the rule changes, laws and administrative actions to which all are attentive. They’re today’s issues.
Less attention is given the long-term. That focus is often more academic than practical—much the same as Robert Oppenheimer’s early musings about the future of nuclear fusion. But the Manhattan Project produced two bombs (Little Boy and Fat Man) that detonated above the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, triggering the end of World War II.
The four issues above should be treated as near and present dangers to the U.S. health system requiring attention in every organization. But responses to these do not define the future of the U.S. system. That’s the Manhattan Project that’s urgently needed in our system.
HENRY KOTULA 