This week’s graphic features our assessment of the many emerging competitive challenges to traditional health systems.
Beyond inflation and high labor costs, health systems are struggling because competitors—ranging from vertically integrated payers to PE-backed physician groups—are effectively stripping away profitable services and moving them to lower-cost care sites. The tandem forces of technological advancement, policy changes, and capital investment have unlocked the ability of disruptors to enter market segments once considered safely within health system control.
While health systems’ most-exposed services, like telemedicine and primary care, were never key revenue sources (although they are key referral drivers), there are now more competitors than ever providing diagnostics and ambulatory surgery, which health systems have relied on to maintain their margins.
Moving forward, traditional systems run the risk of being “crammed down” into a smaller portfolio of (largely unprofitable) services: the emergency department, intensive care unit, and labor and delivery.
Health systems cannot support their operations by solely providing these core services, yet this is the future many will face if they don’temulate the strategies of disruptors by embracing the site-of-care shift, prioritizing high-margin procedures, rethinking care delivery within the hospital, and implementing lower-cost care models that enable them to compete on price.
West Reading, Pa.-based Tower Health continues to make progress on its performance improvement plan as its operating margin for the three months ended Sept. 30 rose to -4.2% from -8% during the same period in 2022. Its operating cash flow margin also increased from -0.9% to 2.3%.
During the first quarter of fiscal 2024, the three months ending Sept. 30, revenue decreased 2.9% year over year to $457.4 million. Expenses decreased 6.4% to $476.5 million.
Tower’s operating loss for the period was $19.1 million, compared with a loss of $37.6 million for the prior-year period.
As of Sept. 30, total balance sheet unrestricted cash and board-designated investment funds for capital improvements totalled $154 million — a decrease of $54 million from June 30, 2023. The main factors for the decrease were $15 million of debt service payments, physician incentive compensation payments of $9 million, capital expenditures of $6 million, negative changes in working capital of $32 million, partially offset by EBITDA of $10 million.
Total days of cash on hand for the system was 30 on Sept. 30.
After including the performance of its investment portfolio and other nonoperating items, the health system ended the three-month period with a net loss of $20.9 million, compared with a net loss of $37.6 million for the same period in 2022.
“Insurtechs” Clover Health, Oscar Health, and Bright Health all went public in the midst of the hot equity market of 2021. Investors were excited by the fast growth of these health insurer startups, and their potential to revolutionize an industry dominated by a few large players.
However, the hype has dissipated as financial performance has deteriorated. After growing at all costs during a period of low interest rates, changing market conditions directed investors to demand a pivot to profitability,which the companies have struggled to deliver—twoyears later,none of the three has turned a profit.
Oscar and Bright have cut back their market presence significantly, while Clover has mostly carried on while sustaining high losses. In the last two years, only Oscar has posted a medical loss ratio in line with other major payers, who meanwhile are reporting expectation-beating profits. While Oscar has shown signs of righting the ship since the appointment of former Aetna CEO Mark Bertolini,
the future of these small insurers remains uncertain. As their losses mount and they exit markets, they may become less desirable as acquisition targets for large payers.
Politicians, economists, auto industry analysts and main street business owners are closely watching the UAW strike that began at midnight last Thursday. Healthcare should also pay attention, especially hospitals. medical groups and facility operators where workforce issues are mounting.
Auto manufacturing accounts for 3% of America’s GDP and employs 2.2 million including 923,000 in frontline production. It’s high-profile sector industry in the U.S. with its most prominent operators aka “the Big Three” operating globally. Some stats:
The US automakers sold an estimated 13.75 million new and 36.2 million used vehicles in 2022.
The total value of the US car and automobile manufacturing market is $104.1 billion in 2023:
9.2 million US vehicles were produced in 2021–a 4.5% increase from 2020 and 11.8% of the global total ranking only behind China in total vehicle production.
As of 2020, 91.5% of households report having access to at least one vehicle.
There were 290.8 million registered vehicles in the United States in 2022—21% of the global market.
Americans spend $698 billion annually on the combination of automobile loans and insurance.
By comparison, the healthcare services industry in the U.S.—those that operate facilities and services serving patients—employs 9 times more workers, is 29 times bigger ($104 Billion vs. $2.99 trillion/65% of total spend) and 6 times more integral in the overall economy (3% vs. 18.3% of GDP).
Surprisingly, average hourly wages are similar ($31.07 in auto manufacturing vs. $33.12 in healthcare per BLS) though the range is wider in healthcare since it encompasses licensed professionals to unskilled support roles. There are other similarities:
Each industry enjoys ubiquitous presence in American household’ discretionary. spending.
Each faces workforce issues focused on pay parity and job security.
Each is threatened by unwelcome competitors, disruptive technologies and shifting demand complicating growth strategies.
Each is dependent on capital to remain competitive.
And each faces heightened media scrutiny and vulnerability to misinformation/disinformation as special interests seek redress or non-traditional competitors seek advantage.
Ironically, the genesis of the UAW dispute is not about wages; it is about job security as electric-powered vehicles that require fewer parts and fewer laborers become the mainstay of the sector. CEO compensation and the corporate profits of the Big Three are talking points used by union leaders to galvanize sympathizer antipathy of “corporate greed” and unfair treatment of frontline workers.
But the real issue is uncertainty about the future: will auto workers have jobs and health benefits in their new normal?
In healthcare services sectors—hospitals, medical groups, post-acute care facilities, home-care et al—the scenario is similar: workers face an uncertain future but significantly more complicated. Corporate greed, CEO compensation and workforce discontent are popular targets in healthcare services media coverage but the prominence of not-for-profit organizations in healthcare services obfuscates direct comparisons to for-profit organizations which represents less than a third of the services economy. For example, CEO compensation in NFPs—a prominent target of worker attention—is accounted differently for CEOs in investor-owned operations in which stock ownership is not treated as income until in options are exercised or shares sold. Annual 990 filings by NFPs tell an incomplete story nonetheless fodder for misinformation.
The competitive landscape and regulatory scrutiny for healthcare services are also more complicated for healthcare services. Unlike auto manufacturing where electric vehicles are forcing incumbents to change, there’s no consensus about what the new normal in U.S. healthcare services will be nor a meaningful industry-wide effort to define it. Each sector is defining its own “future state” based on questionable assumptions about competitors, demand, affordability, workforce requirements and more. Imagine an environmental scan in automakers strategy that’s mute on Tesla, or mass transit, Zoom, pandemic lock-downs or energy costs?
While the outlook for U.S. automakers is guardedly favorable, per Moody’s and Fitch, for not-for-profit health services operators it’s “unsustainable” and “deteriorating.”
Nonetheless, the parallels between the current state of worker sentiment in the U.S. auto manufacturing and healthcare services sectors are instructive. Auto and healthcare workers want job security and higher pay, believing their company executives and boards but corporate profit above their interests and all else. And polls suggest the public’s increasingly sympathetic to worker issues and strikes like the UAW more frequent.
Ultimately, the UAW dispute with the Big Three will be settled. Ultimately, both sides will make concessions. Ultimately, the automakers will pass on their concession costs to their customers while continuing their transitions to electric vehicles.
In health services, operators are unable to pass thru concession costs due to reimbursement constraints that, along with supply chain cost inflation, wipe out earnings and heighten labor tension.
So, the immediate imperatives for healthcare services organizations seem clear as labor issues mount and economics erode:
Educate workers—all workers—is a priority. That includes industry trends and issues in sectors outside the organization’s current focus.
Define the future. In healthcare services, innovators will leverage technology and data to re-define including how health is defined, where it’s delivered and by whom. Investments in future-state scenario planning is urgently needed.
Address issues head-on: Forthrightness about issues like access, prices, executive compensation, affordability and more is essential to trustworthiness.
Stay tuned to the UAW strike and consider fresh approaches to labor issues. It’s not a matter of if, but when.
PS: I drive an electric car—my step into the auto industry future state. It took me 9 hours last Thursday to drive 275 miles to my son’s wedding because the infrastructure to support timely battery charges in route was non-existent. Ironically, after one of three self-charges for which I paid more than equivalent gas, I was prompted to “add a tip”. So, the transition to electric vehicles seems certain, but it will be bumpy and workers will be impacted.
The future state for healthcare is equally frought with inadequate charging stations aka “systemness” but it’s inevitable those issues will be settled. And worker job security and labor costs will be significantly impacted in the process.
Health plan and health system CFOs point to the current economic situation when asked to identify their top concern, according to a Sept. 14 survey from Deloitte.
The consulting firm surveyed 60 finance chiefs at American health plans and health systems about their priorities and paths forward and shared their findings with Becker’s.
Inflationary pressures have created a cost-heavy operating model for many organizations, CFOs told Deloitte. Coupled with higher care delivery, labor and supply costs — and slowed revenue growth
— financial viability weighs heavily on leaders.
More than 40 percent of health system CFOs believe their health systems may need more than two years to reach the profit levels they generated before the COVID-19 pandemic.
Seventy percent of CFOs identified the current economic situation as a greater concern than it was last year. Meanwhile, 57 percent pointed to new regulatory requirements as a growing concern, and 51 percent said the same of the current operating model and structure.
Mountain View, Calif.-based El Camino Health ended the first quarter with an impressive operating margin of 10.2 percent when many health systems saw their margins hover above zero or fall into the red. The system’s revenue for the quarter totaled $131,290.
For the nine months ended March 31, the two-hospital system posted an operating gain of $141.4 million on revenue of just over $1 billion.
However, like most health systems, El Camino’s expenses are substantially higher than the same period last year, increasing 10.6 percent year over year for the nine months ending March 31, 2023, to $881.9 million.
The system is making a conscious effort to march down labor costs while also placing a significant emphasis on retention. In June, El Camino agreed a deal to increase pay for nurses by 16 percent over three years.
“Like nearly all hospitals, our nursing staff comprises the largest part of our workforce. With the recruitment of a single nurse estimated to be nearly $60,000, our primary strategy to reduce labor costs is to focus on decreasing turnover,” El Camino CEO Dan Woods told Becker’s.
“Our turnover rate for nurses is just about 8 percent while the turnover rate nationally is still running at 22 percent.”
In March, the system also received a credit rating upgrade from Moody’s, which noted the system’s “superlative cash metrics and operating performance.” Fitch Ratings also revised El Camino’s outlook to positive in February, noting that the system has a history of generating double-digit operating EBITDA margins, driven by a solid market position that features strong demographics and a very healthy payer mix.
So far, 2023 is shaping up to be a slightly better year for hospital performance, but it comes on the heels of unprecedented financial difficulties for the sector.
In the graphic above, we evaluated nearly 30 years of historical data from Kaufman Hall and the American Hospital Association to provide a broader perspective on hospital operating margins over time. 2020 and 2022 have been the only years in which a majority of hospitals—53 percent—posted a negative operating margin.
During the most comparable periods of recent economic hardship, the “dot-com bubble burst” of the late 1990s and the 2009 Great Recession, the share of hospitals with negative operating margins amounted to only 42 and 32 percent, respectively.
With this context, hospitals’ current financial distress is more severe than anything we’ve seen in the past three decades.
Healthcare is clearly no longer recession-proof: a four percent operating margin—the level needed for health systems to not only sustain operations but also invest in growth—feels even more elusive as labor costs remain high, surgical care continues to shift to outpatient settings, the second half of the Baby-Boom generation ages into Medicare, and deep-pocketed competitors compete for profitable services.
Here is a summary of recent credit downgrades and outlook revisions for hospitals and health systems.
The downgrades and downward revisions reflect continued operating challenges many nonprofit systems are facing, with multiyear recovery processes expected.
Downgrades:
Yale New Haven (Conn.) Health: Operating weakness and elevated debt contributed to the downgrade of bonds held by Yale New Haven (Conn.) Health, Moody’s said May 5. The bond rating slipped from “Aa3” to “A1,” and the outlook was revised to stable from negative.
The system saw a second downgrade as its default rating and that on a series of bonds were revised one notch to “A+” from “AA-” amid continued operating woes, Fitch said June 28.
Not only have there been three straight years of such challenges, but the operating environment continues to cast a pall into the second quarter of the current fiscal year, Fitch said.
UC Health (Cincinnati): The system was downgraded on a series of bonds, Moody’s said May 10.
The move, which involved a lowering from a “Baa2” to “Baa3” grade, refers to such bonds with an overall value of $580 million.
In February, UC Health suffered a similar downgrade from “A” to “BBB+” on its overall rating and on some bonds because of what S&P Global termed “significantly escalating losses.”
UNC Southeastern (Lumberton, N.C.): The system, which is now part of the Chapel Hill, N.C.-based UNC Health network, saw its ratings on a series of bonds downgraded to “BB” amid operating losses and sustained weakness in its balance sheet, S&P Global said June 23.
While UNC Southeastern reported an operating loss of $74.8 million in fiscal 2022, such losses have continued into fiscal 2023 with a $15 million loss as of March 31, S&P Global said. The system had earlier been placed on CreditWatch but that was removed with this downgrade.
Butler (Pa.) Health: The system, now merged with Greensburg, Pa.-based Excela Health to form Independence Health System, saw its credit rating downgraded significantly, falling from “A” to “BBB.”
The move reflects continued operating challenges and low patient volumes, Fitch said June 26.
Such operating challenges, including low days of cash on hand, could result in potential default of debt covenants, Fitch warned.
Outlook revisions:
Redeemer Health (Meadowbrook, Pa.): The system had its outlook revised to negative amid “persistent operating losses,” Fitch Ratings said June 14. The health system, anchored by a 260-bed acute care hospital, reported a $37 million operating loss in the nine months ending March 31, Fitch said.
Thomas Jefferson University (Philadelphia): The June 9 downward revision of its outlook, which includes both the health system and the university’s academic sector, was due to sustained operating weakness, S&P Global said.
IU Health (Indianapolis): While it saw ratings affirmed at “AA,” the 16-hospital system had its outlook downgraded amid persistent inflationary pressures and large capital expense, Fitch said May 31.
UofL Health (Louisville, Ky.): Slumping operating income and low days of cash on hand (42.8 as of March 31) contributed to S&P Global revising its outlook for the six-hospital system to negative May 24.
That’s the amount you arrive at if you multiply the number of physicians employed by hospitals and health systems (approximately 341,200 as of January 2022, according to data from the Physicians Advocacy Institute and Avalere) by the median $306,362 subsidy—or loss—reported in our Q1 2023 Physician Flash Report.
Subsidizing physician employment has been around for a long time and such subsidies were historically justified as a loss leader for improved clinical services, the potential for increased market share, and the strengthening of traditionally profitable services.
But I am pretty sure the industry did not have $104 billion in losses in mind when the physician employment model first became a key strategic element in the hospital operating model. However, the upward reset in expenses brought on by the pandemic and post-pandemic inflation has made many downstream hospital services that historically operated at a profit now operate at breakeven or even at a loss. The loss leader physician employment model obviously no longer works when it mostly leads to more losses.
This model is clearly broken and in demand of a near-term fix. Perhaps the critical question then is how to begin? How to reconsider physician employment within the hospital operating plan?
Out of the box, rethink the physician productivity model. Our most recent Physician Flash Report data shows that for surgical specialties, there was a median $77 net patient revenue per provider wRVU. For the same specialties, there was a median $80 provider paid compensation per provider wRVU. In other words, before any other expenses are factored in, these specialties are losing $3 per wRVU on paid compensation alone. Getting providers to produce more wRVUs only makes the loss bigger.
It’s the classic business school 101 problem.
If a factory is losing $5 on every widget it produces, the answer is not to produce more widgets. Rather, expenses need to come down, whether that is through a readjustment of compensation, new compensation models that reward efficiency, or the more effective use of advanced practice providers.
Second, a number of hospital CEOs have suggested to me that the current employed physician model is quite past its prime. That model was built for a system of care that included generally higher revenues, more inpatient care, and a greater proportion of surgical vs. medical admissions. But overall, these trends were changing and then were accelerated by the Covid pandemic. Inpatient revenue has been flat to down. More clinical work continues to shift to the outpatient setting and, at least for the time being, medical admissions have been more prominent than before the pandemic.
Taking all this into account suggests that in many places the employed physician organizational and operating model is entirely out of balance. One would offer the calculated guess that there are too many coaches on the team and not enough players on the field. This administrative overhead was seemingly justified in a different loss leader environment but now it is a major contributor to that $104 billion industry-wide loss previously calculated.
Finally, perhaps the very idea of physician employment needs to be rethought.
My colleagues Matthew Bates and John Anderson have commented that the “owner” model is more appealing to physicians who remain independent then the “renter” model. The current employment model offers physicians stability of practice and income but appears to come at the cost of both a loss of enthusiasm and lost entrepreneurship. The massive losses currently experienced strongly suggest that new models are essential to reclaim physician interest and establish physician incentives that result in lower practice expenses, higher practice revenues, and steadily reduced overall subsidies.
Please see this blog as an extension of my last blog, “America’s Hospitals Need a Makeover.”It should be obvious that by analogy we are not talking about a coat of paint here or even new appliances in the kitchen.
The financial performance of America’s hospitals has exposed real structural flaws in the healthcare house. A makeover of this magnitude is going to require a few prerequisites:
Don’t start designing the renovation unless you know specifically where profitability has changed within your service lines and by explicitly how much. Right now is the time to know how big the problem is, where those problems are located, and what is the total magnitude of the fix.
The Board must be brought into the discussion of the nature of the physician employment problem and the depth of its proposed solutions. Physicians are not just “any employees.” They are often the engine that runs the hospital and must be afforded a level of communication that is equal to the size of the financial problem. All of this will demand the Board’s knowledge and participation as solutions to the physician employment dilemma are proposed, considered, and eventually acted upon.
The basic rule of home renovation applies here as well: the longer the fix to this problem is delayed the harder and more expensive the project becomes. The losses set out here certainly suggest that physician employment is a significant contributing factor to hospitals’ current financial problems overall. It would be an understatement to say that the time to get after all of this is right now.
HENRY KOTULA 