How Health Insurance Monopolies Affect Your Care

Not long ago, Dr. Richard Menger, a neurosurgeon, was ready to operate on a 16-year-old with complex scoliosis. A team of doctors had spent months preparing for the surgery, consulting orthopedists and cardiologists, even printing a 3D model of the teen’s spine.

The surgery was scheduled for a Friday when Menger got the news: the teen’s insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, had denied coverage of the surgery. 

It wasn’t particularly surprising to Menger, who has been practicing in Alabama since 2019. Alabama essentially has one private insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, which has a whopping 94% of the market of large-group insurance plansaccording to the health policy nonprofit KFF. That dominance allows the insurer to consistently deny claims, many doctors say, charge people more for coverage, and pay lower rates to doctors and hospitals than they would in other states.

“It makes the natural problems for insurance that much more magnified because there’s no market competition or choice,” says Menger, who in 2023 wrote an op-ed in 1819 News, a local news site, arguing that ending Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama’s health insurance monopoly would make people in the state healthier.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama also has the largest share of individual insurance plans in the state, according to data from the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services. Perhaps not coincidentally, Alabama also had the highest denial rates for in-network claims by insurers on the individual marketplace in 2023, according to a KFF analysis: 34%. Neighboring Mississippi, where the majority insurer has less of the market share at 81%, has an average denial rate of 15%.

Alabama is an extreme case, but people in many other states face health insurance monopolies, too. One insurer, Premera Blue Cross Group, has a 94% share of the large-group market in Alaska, and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming has a 91% market share in that state. In 18 states, one insurer has 75% or more of the large-group health insurance marketplace, according to KFF data.

These monopolies drive up costs, says Leemore Dafny, a professor at Harvard Business School and Harvard Kennedy School who has long studied competition among health insurance companies and providers.

“More competitors tend to drive lower premiums and more generous benefits for consumers,” she says. “There’s a lot of concern from analysts like myself about concentration in a range of sectors, including health insurance.”

Bruce A. Scott, the immediate past president of the American Medical Association, has said that when the dominant insurer in his state of Kentucky was renegotiating its contract with his medical group, it offered lower rates than it had paid six years before. “This same type of financial squeeze play is found nationwide, and its frequency has been exacerbated by health insurance industry consolidation,” he wrote in The Hill in 2023.

What happened to competition? There used to be a lot more regional health insurers, Dafny says. But as costs started to rise, they didn’t have enough leverage to negotiate prices down with providers and stay profitable. As a result, many were happy to be acquired by larger companies. Then hospitals and doctor’s offices merged to get more leverage against the bigger insurers. Now, there’s a lot of concentration among both provider groups and insurers.

“None of this had anything to do with taking better care of patients,” she says. “It had to do with trying to get the upper hand.” 

In a statement to TIME, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama said that it was working to make the prior authorization process more transparent and reverse the requirement of prior authorization for certain in-network medical services. It will attempt to answer at least 80% of requests for prior authorization in near real-time by 2027, it says. (A coalition of major health insurers recently vowed to fix their prior authorization processes under pressure from the federal government.)

The insurer also says it welcomes competition. “We know Alabamians have a choice when it comes to choosing their health insurance carrier and we don’t take that for granted,” a spokesperson said in the statement. In the commercial and underwritten market—which represents the bulk of its business—Blue Cross Blue Shield Alabama competes with four other companies that sell individual, family, and group plans, the company says, and it competes with 68 companies who sell Medicare plans in Alabama. Its success in the state is partly because it sells policies in every county in Alabama, the insurer says, while others do not. 

Other casualties of such a concentrated health-insurance marketplace are rural hospitals and providers. Small rural hospitals are often independent and have not merged with other systems like many of their large urban counterparts, so they have an even harder time negotiating with the one big insurer in the state, says Harold Miller, president and CEO of the Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform, a national policy center that studies health-care costs. That means big insurers will often refuse to cover procedures or pay lower prices for services.

“I’ve had rural hospitals tell me they can’t even get the health plan on the phone,” Miller says.

In the past decade, the Department of Justice has stopped some mergers, but has not been very aggressive at stopping consolidation in the health-care industry, Dafny says. That may be in part because the courts require a high standard of evidence to block a transaction, and the government might have been worried it would have lost whatever cases it brought.

A few factors prevent insurers with a monopoly from driving costs too high, says Benjamin Handel, an economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley who studies health care. One is a regulation called minimum loss ratio that essentially requires insurers to spend a certain share of what they earn from premiums on medical care. Another is that an insurer with a monopoly that angers consumers might attract attention from regulators, he says.

Of course, there’s not a whole lot regulators can do to make a marketplace more competitive. A state could try to incentivize more insurers to enter their states with tax breaks or other sweeteners, but it’s very hard to enter a market and offer low rates right away. The establishment of the health-care marketplaces in the Affordable Care Act allowed new entrants, Dafny says, but many of them did not survive.

Menger, the Alabama doctor, says that he and his colleagues—and therefore their patients—are basically stuck. His staff has to spend 10-15 hours a week negotiating with the insurer to get prior authorizations that sometimes don’t come, even while patients pay higher premiums. 

The teenage boy eventually got approved for the scoliosis surgery, but not after the family went through a lot of stress with postponements and uncertainty. “I think it’s pretty clear that the more competition, the better things are,” Menger says. “This prior authorization nonsense is really hurting patients.”

The Implications of Losing Access to Tax-Exempt Financing

https://www.kaufmanhall.com/insights/thoughts-ken-kaufman/implications-losing-access-tax-exempt-financing

On January 17, 2025, a list of potential cost reductions to the federal budget was released by Republicans on the House Budget Committee. The list is long and covers the federal budget waterfront, but it spends considerable time focusing on reductions to healthcare spending. This laundry list of cost reductions is important because the highest priority of the Trump administration is a further reduction in federal taxes. A reduction in taxes would, of course, reduce federal revenue; if federal expenses are not proportionately reduced then the federal deficit will increase. When the deficit increases then the federal debt must increase and at that point the overall impact on the American economy becomes concerning and possibly damaging. There has already been much public speculation as to how the Federal Reserve might react to such a scenario.

It is not possible right now to highlight and describe all of the House budget proposals, but one proposal absolutely stands out: The suggestion to eliminate the tax-exempt status for interest payments on all municipal bonds, or potentially in a more targeted manner, for private activity bonds, including those issued by not-for-profit hospitals. Siebert Williams Shank, an investment banking firm, described the elimination of tax exemption for municipal bonds as “the most alarming of the proposed reforms impacting non-profit and municipal issuers.”[1] This is certainly true for hospitals, since over the past 60 years the growth and capability of America’s hospitals has been substantially constructed on the foundation of flexible and relatively inexpensive tax-exempt debt. Given all of this, it is not too early to begin speculating on the impact of the elimination of tax-exempt debt on hospital finances and strategy.

We should also point out that a separate topic is under discussion, related to the potential loss of not-for-profit status for hospitals and health systems. Such a maneuver could potentially expose hospitals to income taxes, property taxes, and higher funding costs. For now, that is beyond the scope of this blog but may be something we write about in future posts.

Below is a series of important questions related to the elimination of tax-exempt financing and some speculations on the overall impact:

  1. What immediately happens if 501(c)(3) hospitals lose the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds? Let’s treat fixed rate debt first. Assume for now that only newly issued debt would be affected and that all currently outstanding tax-exempt fixed rate debt would remain tax-exempt. We could see an effort to apply any changes retroactively to existing bonds, but we view that as unlikely. Therefore, our current expectation is that outstanding fixed-rate debt would not see a change in interest expense.

    However, it is possible that outstanding floating rate debt would immediately begin to trade based on the taxable equivalent. Historically the tax-exempt floating rate index trades at about 65% of the taxable index. The difference between the tax-exempt and taxable floating rate indices in the current market is 175 basis points. For every $100 million of debt, this would increase interest expense by $1.75m annually.
  2. How would new hospital debt be issued? New debt would be issued in the municipal market on a taxable basis or in the corporate taxable market. The taxable municipal market would need to adapt and expand to accommodate a significant level of new issuance. The concern in the corporate taxable market is greater. Currently, the corporate market requires issuance of significant dollar size and generally the issuer brings significant name recognition to the market. Many hospitals may have difficulty meeting the issuance size of the corporate debt market and/or the necessary market recognition. As such, smaller and less frequent issuers would expect to pay a penalty of 25-50 basis points for issuing in the corporate market.
  3. If tax-exempt debt goes away will certain hospitals be advantaged and others disadvantaged? Larger hospitals with national or regional name recognition that issue bonds with sufficiently large transaction size and frequency will likely borrow at better terms and lower rates. Smaller- to medium-sized hospitals may find borrowing much more difficult, and borrowing may come with more problematic terms and/or amortization schedules and likely higher interest rates.
  4. Will borrowing costs go up? The cost of funds for new borrowings would increase for all hospital borrowers. For a typical A-rated hospital, annual interest expense would increase by approximately 30%. For example, in the current market, on $100 million of new debt, average annual interest expense would increase by $815,000 annually.
  5. Will debt capacity go down? All other things being equal, interest rates will go up and hospital debt capacity will go down. Also, if the taxable market shortens amortization schedules, then that will decrease overall debt capacity as well.
  6. What would the impact of the elimination of tax-exempt debt be on synthetic fixed rate structures? Hospitals have long employed derivative structures to hedge interest rate risk on outstanding variable rate bonds and loans. The loss of tax-exemption for outstanding variable rate bonds and loans would precipitate an adjustment to taxable rates, but corresponding swap cash flows are not designed to adjust. Interest rate risk is hedged, but tax reform risk is not. The net effect to borrowers would be an increase in cost similar to the cost contemplated above for variable rate bonds.
  7. What are the rating implications of the elimination of the tax-exempt market? Rating implications will be varied. Hospitals with strong financial performance and liquidity are likely to absorb the increased interest expense of a taxable borrowing with little to no rating impact. In fact, over the past decade, many larger health systems in the AA rating categories have successfully issued debt in the taxable market without rating implications despite a higher borrowing rate. Even amid the pandemic chaos of 2021, numerous AA and A rated systems issued sizable, taxable debt offerings to bolster liquidity as proceeds were for general corporate purposes and not restricted by a third-party, such as a bond trustee.

    Lower-rated hospitals with modest performance and below-average liquidity will be at greater risk for a downgrade. These hospitals may not be able to absorb the increased interest expense and maintain their ratings. While interest expense is typically a small percentage of a hospital’s total expenses, it is a use of cash flow.

    We do not anticipate the rating agencies will take wholesale downgrade action on the rated portfolio as there would likely be a phase-in period before the elimination occurs. Rather, we expect the rating agencies will take a measured approach with a case-by-case evaluation of each rated organization through the normal course of surveillance, as they did during the pandemic and liquidity crisis in 2008. A dialogue on capital budgets and funding sources, typically held at the end of a rating meeting, would be moved to the top of the agenda, as it will have a direct impact on long-term viability.
  8. How would the loss of the tax-exempt market impact the pace of consolidation in the hospital industry? If a hospital cannot afford the taxable market, then large capital projects would need to be funded through cash and operations. This inevitably will limit organizational liquidity, which will lead to downward rating pressure. Some hospitals, in such a situation, will be unable to both fund capital and adequately serve their local community and, therefore, will need to find a partner who can. We anticipate that the loss of the tax-exempt bond market will lead to further consolidation in the industry.

Let’s indulge in one last bit of speculation. What is the probability that Congress will pass legislation that eliminates tax-exempt financing? Sources in Washington tell us that it is premature to wager on any of the items put forth by the Budget Committee. And it should be noted that over the years the elimination of tax-exempt financing has been proposed on several occasions and never advanced in Congress. However, one well-informed source noted that as the tax and related legislation moves forward, there is likely to be significant horse-trading (especially in the House) to secure the necessary votes to pass the entire package. What happens during that horse-trading process is anybody’s guess. So the best advice to our hospital readership right now is to not take anything for granted. But be absolutely assured that the maintenance of tax-exempt financing is an essential strategic component for the successful future of America’s hospitals.

The Perfect Storm facing the Healthcare Workforce: Eight Current Issues frame the Challenge

Tonight at midnight, thousands of federal workers face the possibility their jobs will be eliminated as part of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) federal cost reduction initiative under Elon Musk’ leadership. Already, thousands who serve in federal healthcare roles at the NIH, CDC and USAID have been terminated and personnel in agencies including CMS, HHS and the FDA are likely to follow.

The federal healthcare workforce is large exceeding more than 2.5 million who serve agencies and programs as providers, clerks, administrators, scientists, analysts, counselors and more. More than half work on an hourly basis, and 95% work outside DC in field offices and clinics. For the vast majority, their work goes unnoticed except when “government waste” efforts like DOGE spring up. In those times, they’re relegated to “expendables” status and their numbers are cut.

The same can be said for the larger private U.S. healthcare workforce. Per the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, industry employment was 21.4 million, or 12.8% of total U.S. employment in 2023 and is expected to reach 24 million by 2030. It’s the largest private employer in the U.S. economy and includes many roles considered “expendable” in their organizations.

Facts about the U.S. healthcare workforce:

  • More than 70% of the healthcare workforce work in provider settings including 7.4 million who work in hospitals.
  • More than half work in non-clinical roles.
  • Home health aides is the highest growth cohort and hospitals employ the biggest number (7.4 million).
  • 29% of physicians and 15% of nurses are foreign born, almost three-fourths of the workforce are women, two-thirds are non-Hispanic whites, and the majority are older than 50.
  • Its licensed professions enjoy public trust ranking among Gallup’s highest rated though all have declined:
 % 2023‘19-‘23’23 Rank % 2023‘19-‘23’23 Rank
Nurses78-71Pharmacists55-96
Dentists59-2 Psychiatrists36-79
Medical doctors56-95Chiropractors33-810

The Perfect storm

The healthcare workforce is unsteady: while stress and burnout are associated with doctors and nurses primarily, they cut across every workgroup and setting.

Eight fairly recent issues complicate efforts to achieve healthcare workforce stability:

Increased costs of living: 

Consumers are worried about their costs of living: it hits home hardest among young, low-income households including dual eligible seniors for whom gas, food and transportation are increasing faster than their incomes, and rents exceed 50% of their income. The healthcare workforce takes a direct hit: one in five we employ cannot pay their own medical bills.

Slowdown in consolidation: 

The Federal Trade Commission’s new pre-merger notification mandate that went in effect today essentially requires greater pre-merger/acquisition disclosures and a likely slowdown in deals.  Organizations anticipating deals might default to layoffs to strengthen margins while the regulatory consolidation dust settles. Expendables will take a hit.

Uncertainty about Medicaid cuts: 

In the House’ budget reconciliation plan, Medicaid cuts of up to $880 billion/10 years are contemplated. A cut of that magnitude will accelerate closure of more than 400 rural hospitals already at risk and throw the entire Medicaid program into chaos for the 79 million it serves—among them 3 million low-hourly wage earners in the healthcare workforce and at least 2 million in-home unpaid caregivers who can’t afford paid assistance. The impact of Medicaid cuts on the healthcare workforce is potentially catastrophic for their jobs and their health.

Heightened attention to tax exemptions for not-for-profit hospitals: 

Large employers sent this recommendation to Congressional leaders last week as spending cuts were being considered: “Nonprofit hospitals, despite their tax-exempt status, frequently prioritize profits over patient care. Many have deeply questionable arrangements with for-profit entities such as management companies or collections agencies, while others have “joint ventures” with Wall Street hedge funds or other for-profit provider or staffing companies. Nonprofit hospitals often shift the burden of their costs onto taxpayers and the communities they serve by overcharging for health care services, or abusing programs intended to provide access to low-cost care and prescription drugs for low-income patients. By eliminating nonprofit hospital status, resources could be more evenly distributed across the healthcare system, ensuring that hospitals are held accountable for their charitable care both to their communities and the tax laws that govern them.” Pressures on NFP hospitals to lower costs and operate more transparently are gaining momentum in state legislatures and non-healthcare corporate boardrooms. Belt tightening is likely. Layoffs are underway.

Heightened attention to executive compensation in healthcare organizations: 

Executive compensation, especially packages for CEO’s, is a growing focus of shareholder dissent, Congressional investigation, media coverage and employee disgruntlement. Compensation committee deliberations and fair market comparison data will be more publicly accessible to communities, rank and file employees, media, regulators and payers intensifying disparities between “labor” and “management”.

Increased tension between providers and insurers:

Health insurers are now recovering from 2 years of higher utilization and lower profits; hospitals did the same in 2022 and 2023. Neither is out of the woods and both are migrating to tribal warfare based on ownership (not-for-profit vs. investor owned vs. government owned), scale and ambition. Bigger, better-capitalized organizations in their ranks are faring better while many struggle. The workforce is caught in the crossfire.

Increased pressure on private equity-backed employers to exit: 

The private equity market for healthcare services has experienced a slow recovery after 2 disappointing years peppered by follow-on offerings in down rounds. Exit strategies are front and center to PE sponsors; workforce stability and retention is a means to an end to consummate the deal—that’s it.

The AI Yellow Brick Road: 

Last and potentially the most disruptive is the role artificial intelligence will play in redefining healthcare tasks and reorganizing the system’s processes based on large-language models and massive investments in technology. Job insecurity across the entire healthcare workforce is more dependent on geeks and less on licensed pro’s going forward.

These eight combine to make life miserable most days in health human resource management. DOGE will complicate matters more. It’s a concern in every sector of healthcare, and particularly serious in hospitals, medical practices, long-term and home care settings.

‘Modernizing the healthcare workforce’ sounds appealing, but for now, navigating these issues requires full attention. They require Board understanding and creative problem-solving by managers. And they merit a dignified and respectful approach to interactions with workers displaced by these circumstances: they’re not expendables, they’re individuals like you and me.

Pace of Downgrades Slowed in 2024: Five Key Takeaways

https://www.kaufmanhall.com/insights/blog/pace-downgrades-slowed-2024-five-key-takeaways

Downgrades continued to outpace upgrades in 2024 although at a lower rate than in 2023. When combining the rating actions of the three rating agencies, the number of downgrades (95) declined while the number of upgrades (37) increased, compared to 116 and 33, respectively, in 2023. Many of the downgrades reflected ongoing expense pressure that exceeded revenue growth, even as volumes headed back to pre-pandemic levels and the use of contract labor declined. Other downgrades reflected outsized increases in debt to fund pivotal growth strategies. Most of the upgrades reflected mergers of lower-rated hospitals into higher-rated systems. Rating affirmations remained the majority rating action in 2024, as in prior years.

Key takeaways include:

  1. The ratio of downgrades to upgrades narrowed at Moody’s (2.0-to-1 in 2024 from 3.2-to-1 in 2023) and Fitch (1.5-to-1 from 3.5-to-1). S&P saw a wider spread in the ratio: 4.5-to-1 in 2024 from 3.8-to-1 in 2023.
  2. Downgrades reflected a wide swath of hospitals, from small independent providers to large regional systems. Large academic medical centers and children’s hospitals saw downgrades, even with exclusive tertiary services that provided differentiation with payers. Shared, recurring downgrade factors included weaker financial performance, payer mix shifts to more governmental and less commercial, and thinner reserves. Many of the downgrades were concentrated along the two coasts: California and the Pacific Northwest and New York and Pennsylvania. Many of the ratings were already in low or below investment grade categories.
  3. Multi-notch downgrades continued in 2024, ranging from two to four notch movements in one rating action. One of the hospitals that experienced a four-notch downgrade subsequently defaulted on an interest payment (Jackson Hospital & Clinics, AL). Multi-notch upgrades reflected mergers into higher-rated systems, the largest being a seven-notch upgrade of a small, single-site hospital into a 19-hospital system in the Midwest.
  4. Five hospitals experienced multiple rating actions in 2024, with rating committees convening not once but two and three times during the year. These were distressed credits whose financial performance and reserve levels dropped materially from quarter to quarter, a characteristic of high-yield or speculative rated borrowers.
  5. While some of the upgrades followed mergers, other upgrades reflected improved financial performance and stable or growing liquidity. Likewise, some of the upgraded hospitals began receiving new supplemental funds known as Direct Payment Programs (DPPs). Unlike other supplemental funds, DPPs are subject to annual federal and state approval, making their long-term reliability uncertain. Numerous types of providers saw upgrades—including academic medical centers, independent hospitals and regional health systems—and were located across the U.S. Most of the upgraded hospitals (excluding those involved in mergers) were already investment grade.

As in past years, rating affirmations represented the overwhelming majority of rating actions in 2024. This is welcome news for the industry as many hospitals and health systems will turn to the bond market to borrow for their capital projects. Investors’ view of the industry should be bolstered by the change in industry outlooks. S&P moved to Stable from Negative and Fitch moved to Neutral from Deteriorating in December 2024, joining Moody’s revision to Stable from Negative in 2023.

We expect rating affirmations will again be the majority rating action in 2025. However, even with the stability viewed by the agencies, we expect downgrades to outpace upgrades given a growing reliance on government payers, labor challenges and a competitive environment. Policy and funding changes will also cast uncertainty into the mix in 2025 and may cause credit deterioration in future years.

CVSHealth Eyes Breakup: A Reckoning for Corporate Health Care’s Vertical Empire

In a surprising turn of events, sources say that CVS Health is exploring the possibility of breaking up its business empire — a move that could unravel years of aggressive vertical integration, including its $70 billion acquisition of health insurer Aetna back in 2017.

While details are still slim, such a move signals just how dire the situation has become for CVSHealth as it navigates mounting financial and regulatory pressures on multiple fronts.

It’s yet another chapter in a story that has seen CVSHealth evolve from a retail pharmacy chain into a health care behemoth — but perhaps one that grew too big, too fast. And to be honest, I’m not surprised. I’ve seen this movie before. In fact, I saw it many times – although each time with different stars – during my 20 years in the health insurance business. One of the most memorable featured Aetna, which in the late 1990s and early 2000s had to retrench, at Wall Street’s insistence, after a buying spree of smaller health insurers that brought the company a ton of unprofitable accounts and disappointing bottom lines. Aetna followed its buying spree with a purging spree, dumping as many as eight million health plan enrollees in short order to get back into Wall Street’s good graces.

It seems that CVSHealth also bought too much too fast. The results? Rising expenses, frustrated patients, and now potential cracks in the corporate structure itself.

CVS: A Cautionary Tale of Vertical Integration

Large corporations like CVS and its peers have used their size to dominate various aspects of health care—whether it’s insurance, retail pharmacy, physician practices and clinics, and controlling the drug supply chain. But as these mega-corporations continue to grow, they also become harder to manage, and their inefficiencies start to become evident. 

CVS’s acquisition of Aetna was hailed at the time as a strategic masterstroke — a way to streamline health care by bringing together the different parts of the system under one corporate umbrella. It was supposed to deliver “efficiencies” that would benefit both the company and patients. 

But it’s not just the purchase of Aetna. From pharmacy benefit manager Caremark to Aetna to health care providers Signify Health and Oak Street Health — CVS’s business model has become increasingly complex, making it difficult to navigate regulatory scrutiny, rising costs and fierce competition in the retail pharmacy space.

The latest reports suggest that CVS’s board is trying to figure out where Caremark would land in the event of a breakup. Would it stay with the retail side or with the insurance arm?

This isn’t just an internal debate; it’s emblematic of the broader issue—CVS has built a vertically integrated structure that was supposed to work together to improve care, but investors are now questioning how and even if these pieces should fit together. 

It’s Been a Hard Few Years for CVS

Federal Trade Commission’s Legal Action Against CVS’s Caremark and Other PBMs

Instead, those supposed efficiencies have largely translated into higher costs for consumers and increased scrutiny from regulators, especially with CVS’s Caremark at the center of anti-competitive practices allegations by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). PBMs like Caremark control the drug pricing landscape in ways that lack transparency and disproportionately affect patients and independent pharmacies.

Now, as CVS grapples with rising medical costs within its Aetna business — just like its biggest competitors, UnitedHealth and Humana —the company’s management appears to be in damage control mode. While nothing is certain, discussions about splitting the business have reached the boardroom level, according to sources familiar with the matter. This comes as activist investors, like Glenview Capital, push for structural changes to improve CVS’s declining financial performance.

CVS’s Aetna Medicare Advantage Loss in New York City

New York City Mayor Eric Adams had a plan to force city municipal retirees out of traditional Medicare and into a corporate Aetna Medicare Advantage plan. The NYC Organization of Public Service Retirees vehemently opposed the move and spent months fighting it.

In August, a Manhattan Supreme Court judge permanently halted the mayor and Aetna’s attempts.

Wall Street Woes

For CVS Health, 2024 started off bad. CVS missed Wall Street financial analyst’s earnings-per-share expectations for the first quarter of 2024 by several cents. Shareholders’ furor sent CVS’ stock price tumbling from $67.71 to a 15-year low of $54 at one point. 

An astonishing 65.7 million shares of CVS stock were traded that day. The company’s sin: paying too many claims for seniors and people with disabilities enrolled in its Medicare Advantage plans

Also in August, CVS Health cut its 2024 forecast for a third time, citing troubles covering seniors via the company’s private Medicare Advantage business. Operating income for CVS Health’s insurance arm, Aetna, dropped a whopping 39% in Q3, which forced the company to shake up its leadership – moving CEO Karen Lynch into the role of managing insurance and publicly firing one of her lieutenants, Executive Vice President Brian Kane.

What’s Next?

The notion that CVS could split its operations would effectively unwind one of the most high-profile health care mergers in recent memory. A split up of the company would mark the end of an era in which health care conglomerates could grow unchecked. CVS’s struggle isn’t happening in isolation—other companies, like Walgreens and Rite Aid, are facing similar financial difficulties and structural questions.

CVS’s potential breakup could signal a broader industry trend toward unwinding massive, vertically integrated health care corporations. 

Whether CVS breaks up or not, it’s clear that the model of health care mega-mergers, designed to consolidate power and increase corporate profits, is facing serious headwinds. Cigna recently announced that it is getting out of the Medicare Advantage business and Humana is getting out of the commercial insurance market. UnitedHealth, meanwhile, so far seems to be weathering those headwinds, but it, too, will be facing even more scrutiny by lawmakers and regulators in the months and years ahead.

The Presidential Debate will Frustrate Healthcare Voters

Tomorrow night, the Presidential candidates square off in Philadelphia. Per polling from last week by the New York Times-Siena, NBC News-Wall Street Journal, Ipsos-ABC News and CBS News, the two head into the debate neck and neck in what is being called the “chaos election.”

Polls also show the economy, abortion and immigration are the issues of most concern to voters. And large majorities express dissatisfaction with the direction the country is heading and concern about their household finances.

The healthcare system per se is not a major concern to voters this year, but its affordability is. Out-of-pocket costs for prescription drugs, insurance premiums and co-pays and deductibles for hospitals and physician services are considered unreasonable and inexplicably high. They contribute to public anxiety about their financial security alongside housing and food costs. And majorities think the government should do more by imposing price controls and limiting corporate consolidation.

That’s where we are heading into this debate. And here’s what we know for sure about the 90-minute production as it relates to health issues and policies:

  • Each candidate will rail against healthcare prices, costs, and consolidation taking special aim at price gouging by drug companies and corporate monopolies that limit competition for consumers.
  • Each will promise protections for abortion services: Trump will defer to states to arbitrate those rights while Harris will assert federal protection is necessary.
  • Each will opine to the Affordable Care Act’s future: Trump will promise its repeal replacing it “with something better” and Harris will promise its protection and expansion.
  • Each will promise increased access to behavioral health services as memories of last week’s 26-minute shooting tirade at Apalachee High School fade and the circumstances of Colt Gray’s mental collapse are studied.
  • And each will promise adequate funding for their health priorities based on the effectiveness of their proposed economic plans for which specifics are unavailable.

That’s it in all likelihood. They’re unlikely to wade into root causes of declining life expectancy in the U.S. or the complicated supply-chain and workforce dynamics of the industry. And the moderators are unlikely to ask probative questions like these to discover the candidate’s forethought on matters of significant long-term gravity…

  • What are the most important features of health systems in the world that deliver better results at lower costs to their citizens that could be effectively implemented in the U.S. system?
  • How should the U.S. allocate its spending to improve the overall health and well-being of the entire population?
  • How should the system be funded?

My take:

I will be watching along with an audience likely to exceed 60 million. Invariably, I will be frustrated by well-rehearsed “gotcha” lines used by each candidate to spark reaction from the other. And I will hope for more attention to healthcare and likely be disappointed.

Misinformation, disinformation and AI derived social media messaging are standard fare in winner-take-all politics.

When used in addressing health issues and policies, they’re effective because the public’s basic level of understanding of the health system is embarrassingly low: studies show 4 in 5 American’s confess to confusion citing the system’s complexity and, regrettably, the inadequacy of efforts to mitigate their ignorance is widely acknowledged.

Thus, terms like affordability, value, quality, not-for-profit healthcare and many others can be used liberally by politicians, trade groups and journalists without fear of challenge since they’re defined differently by every user.

Given the significance of healthcare to the economy (17.6% of the GDP),

the total workforce (18.6 million of the 164 million) and individual consumers and households (41% have outstanding medical debt and all fear financial ruin from surprise medical bills or an expensive health issue), it’s incumbent that health policy for the long-term sustainability of the health system be developed before the system collapses. The impetus for that effort must come from trade groups and policymakers willing to invest in meaningful deliberation.

The dust from this election cycle will settle for healthcare later this year and in early 2025. States are certain to play a bigger role in policymaking: the likely partisan impasse in Congress coupled with uncertainty about federal agency authority due to SCOTUS; Chevron ruling will disable major policy changes and leave much in limbo for the near-term.

Long-term, the system will proceed incrementally. Bigger players will fare OK and others will fail. I remain hopeful thoughtful leaders will address the near and long-term future with equal energy and attention.

Regrettably, the tyranny of the urgent owns the U.S. health system’s attention these days: its long-term destination is out-of-sight, out-of-mind to most. And the complexity of its short-term issues lend to magnification of misinformation, disinformation and public ignorance.

That’s why this debate will frustrate healthcare voters.

PS: Congress returns this week to tackle the October 1 deadline for passing 12 FY2025 appropriations bills thus avoiding a shutdown. It’s election season, so a continuing resolution to fund the government into 2025 will pass at the last minute so politicians can play partisan brinksmanship and enjoy media coverage through September. In the same period, the Fed will announce its much anticipated interest rate cut decision on the heals of growing fear of an economic slowdown. It’s a serious time for healthcare!

Senator urges Pennsylvania AG to intervene in Crozer sale

Pennsylvania state Sen. Tim Kearney has raised concerns about the lack of transparency and details around the planned sale of Upland, Pa.-based Crozer Health and has called on the state attorney general to step in and conduct a thorough analysis of the deal, the Daily Times reported Aug. 22.

Earlier this month, Los Angeles-based Prospect Medical Holdings and CHA Partners signed a letter of intent for CHA to acquire Crozer. The proposed deal would involve transitioning Crozer’s four hospitals back to nonprofit status.

“Prospect’s proposed sale of Crozer to CHA Partners LLC exemplifies the need for state oversight of hospital sales, as both entities appear to have histories of burning public partners despite demanding hefty subsidies,” Mr. Kearney said in a statement shared with Becker’s.

Unlike many other states, Pennsylvania’s Attorney General lacks statutory authority to deeply evaluate these deals, according to Mr. Kearney. 

“While the AG’s legal settlement with Prospect gives them some oversight of this deal, the legislature needs to provide the AG with greater authority to protect hospitals and the communities that depend on them,” he said. “If the choice is CHA or closure, then we need some assurances that they will be a responsible organization and not just a profiteering speculator.”

Prospect, a for-profit company, plans to sell nine of its 16 hospitals in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Connecticut and is also being investigated by the Justice Department for alleged violations of the False Claims Act. A spokesperson for Prospect told Becker’s the system will continue to cooperate with the investigation, but feels that the allegations have no merit. 

CHA did not respond to Becker’s request for comment.

The hottest market for hospital M&A

Hospital consolidation continues to gather momentum across the country, with one state in particular, Pennsylvania, seeing more merger and acquisition activity than any other.

Here are seven hospital and health system deals announced or completed in Pennsylvania so far this year:

1. Risant Health, part of Kaiser Permanente, acquired Danville, Pa.-based Geisinger Health, a 10-hospital system, on March 31. Oakland, Calif.-based Kaiser said Risant plans to acquire four to five more community-based health systems over the next four to five years.

2. Washington (Pa.) Health, a two-hospital system, joined Pittsburgh-based UPMC in June. UPMC will invest at least $300 million over the next 10 years to improve services at the two hospitals, which have been rebranded as UPMC Washington and UPMC Greene hospitals. 

3. WellSpan Health acquired Lewisburg, Pa.-based Evangelical Community Hospital, effective July 8. York, Pa.-based WellSpan now includes eight hospitals and more than 21,000 team members, including 2,000 employed providers.

4. Philadelphia-based Jefferson Health and Allentown, Pa.-based Lehigh Valley Health Network merged Aug. 1. The combination created one of the 15 largest nonprofit health systems in the U.S., with 32 hospitals and more than 700 sites of care. 

5. Doylestown (Pa.) Health and Philadelphia-based University of Pennsylvania Health System in August signed a definitive agreement for Doylestown to become part of Penn Medicine, a six-hospital system. Pending final federal and state approvals, the systems aim to integrate clinical care and operations by early 2025

6. Franklin, Tenn.-based Community Health Systems plans to sell its three Pennsylvania hospitals to nonprofit organization WoodBridge Healthcare. The $120 million deal is anticipated to close in the fourth quarter. 

7. Los Angeles-based Prospect Medical Holdings and CHA Partners signed a letter of intent in August for CHA to acquire Upland, Pa.-based Crozer Health. The proposed deal would involve transitioning Crozer’s four hospitals back to nonprofit status. CHA, which owns five hospitals in New Jersey, is working to reach a definitive agreement for the acquisition of Crozer.

Corporate Takeover Has Not Been Good for Healthcare

Four decades ago, Paul Starr noted in his landmark history of U.S. healthcare, “The Social Transformation of American Medicine,” that the industry had taken a decisive turn toward corporate ownership. “Medical care in America now appears to be in the early stages of a major transformation in its institutional structure,” he wrote. “Corporations have begun to integrate a hitherto decentralized hospital system, enter a variety of other health care businesses, and consolidate ownership and control in what may eventually become an industry dominated by huge healthcare conglomerates.”

Forty years later, Starr’s prediction has come true. The vast majority of hospitals (other than critical access facilities) are now part of health systems, and some of those belong to giant for-profit or not-for-profit corporations. Nearly 80% of physicians are now employed by hospitals or private companies, including health insurers like United Healthcare. Most community pharmacies have been displaced by enormous chains like CVS, Walgreens and Walmart. Nursing home chains have taken over two-thirds of skilled nursing facilities. A handful of huge firms dominate health insurance, and a dozen drug manufacturers produce and set the prices of the most common prescription medicines.

Private equity (PE) investors focus like a laser beam on generating profits. There can be an amoral quality to PE investing, seeking returns whether or not they create value for customers in the marketplace.

Steward Healthcare, a large hospital chain initially created with PE investment has become, whether fair or not, a poster child for what can go wrong with private investment in healthcare. Steward went bankrupt after aggressively expanding into new markets beyond Massachusetts with funding generated from sales-leaseback arrangements with Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).

But many of the PE firms that now own over 200 acute care hospitals take a similar approach. According to a recent study of PE-owned hospitals, two years after they were purchased, 61% of them had reduced capital assets, compared to 15.5% of control hospitals. Assets decreased by a mean of 15% for acquired hospitals and increased by 9.2% for controls during that period.

Corporate Goals Vs. Value-Based Care
The consolidation of the industry by large corporate entities has received a fair amount of media attention. What has been less noticed is the incompatibility between corporate goals and value-based care. One reason for this is that many big healthcare systems pretend to be interested in population health management. For example, they may operate accountable care organizations (ACOs) that seek to improve the quality of care and reduce costs through better prevention and care coordination. They may also try to reduce readmissions, which helps them avoid Medicare penalties.

Don’t be fooled. There are exceptions — including the few integrated systems like Kaiser and Geisinger that take financial responsibility for care — but most healthcare systems have no intention of turning their business model upside down by using population health management to decrease admissions and empty their beds. When for-profit chains deliver reports to stock analysts, or not-for-profits seek to sell bonds, the metric they most often use to show their financial health is their occupancy rate, not their success in value-based care.

Meanwhile, the healthcare behemoths are continuing to grow larger. While the Department of Justice has ramped up its antitrust activity under the Biden Administration and has discouraged some mergers, this has had relatively little impact on healthcare consolidation. Academic medical centers are acquiring more community hospitals as referral sources, and some large systems like Risant Health, a nonprofit entity created by Kaiser Permanente, are doing interstate deals that help them escape the oversight of state laws.

Physicians have been largely a football in the matches between giant healthcare systems and equally massive insurers. Many independent practices have been forced to sell out to hospitals because Medicare pays hospital outpatient departments more than independent practices for the same services. (That this remains the case nearly 10 years after Congress passed its first “site-neutral” payment law is a testament to the power of regulatory capture.) While there are some sizable independent groups and physician-led ACOs, it is difficult for doctors to determine their own destinies today. And, because of how their corporate overlords affect the practice of medicine, many employed physicians are unhappy with their working conditions and its impact on patients. We’re even starting to see the beginnings of unionization in some systems.

Saving Primary Care
A variety of reforms have been tried to shore up primary care, the cornerstone of value-based care. For example, some primary-care-driven ACOs with value-based contracts generate significant savings that they have shared with their doctors. But the percentage of all payments made in these kinds of arrangements is still fairly small. The risk-taking portion of the healthcare business will not grow substantially as long as hospitals and specialists continue to make good money doing the same old fee-for-service thing.

Insurers have also taken the lead in some efforts to fortify primary care. United, which employs about 10% of the nation’s physicians, has been training them to practice evidence-based medicine and reduce waste. Elevance Health recently struck a deal with PE firm Clayton, Dubilier & Rice to create a new primary care model in Elevance’s Millenium Physician Group and Carelon Health. This “whole-person health” model will emphasize the patient-doctor relationship, along with care coordination, referral management and health coaching within “value-based care” financial arrangements.

This is all to the good. But health insurers don’t make their profits by encouraging primary care doctors to take better care of patients. They use provider networks, prior authorization, high deductibles and other tools to limit access and the cost of services. In Medicare Advantage, carriers like United and Humana have used diagnostic coding to inflate their Medicare payments by an estimated $88 billion just this year. Efforts to infuse value-based care into healthcare delivery have not been a major priority for insurance companies.

Drug Company Profits
Whole books have been written about how the pharmaceutical industry has ripped off the American consumer. Following notorious, out-of-whack price increases over the years for drugs like insulin, Humira and Truvada, in 2022 net prices jumped 6.2% for Darzalex, 6% for Prolia, 7.2% for Xgeva, 6% for Perjeta, and 8.9% for Adcetris, among others. These price hikes, which were unsupported by new clinical evidence of the drugs’ effectiveness, netted from $63 million to $248 million in additional revenue for their manufacturers. Drug companies can get away with it because nothing in U.S. law prevents them from raising prices for patented medications by however much they want to. How they price their drugs can also have a strong impact on health costs as a whole, especially when a lot of people take a particular medication. Current examples include Wegovy, Ozempic and the other high-priced GLP-1 weight-loss drugs, which eventually could cost the health system as much as $1 trillion a year — five times as much as could be saved in lower costs for other conditions — if prescribed to all obese Americans.

The kicker is that we spend nearly three times as much per person on prescription medicines as other leading countries do, because their governments bargain with pharmaceutical companies and ours doesn’t. Yet the drug makers complain that any limitations on their U.S. profits will make it impossible for them to develop more lifesaving medicines.

Overall, it’s clear that the corporatization of our healthcare system is not good for our health. In Portugal, for example, health spending per capita is one-fifth that of the U.S., yet life expectancy there is six years longer, on average, than in our country. The difference is largely rooted in the fact that Portugal has a national health service that guarantees access to healthcare, regardless of ability to pay. In other words, health takes precedence over profits in Portugal.

If we really want good healthcare at an affordable cost — the definition of value-based care — we have to move away from our profit-driven, corporatized healthcare model. As long as corporations are allowed to profit from healthcare, they will maximize those profits, regardless of the impact on consumers. It doesn’t matter how much we talk about value-based care or reforms that merely nip at corporate profits. Until Americans demand the same kind of healthcare that every Portuguese has, and insist that our government rein in the corporate owners of healthcare entities, we will get poorer healthcare and die sooner than citizens of other advanced countries.
Outcomes Matter. Customers Count. Value Rules.

FTC: Big Insurance’s PBMs “Profit at the Expense of Patients by Inflating Drug Costs and Squeezing Main Street Pharmacies”

Regular readers of HEALTH CARE un-covered know that I write frequently about the huge amounts of money the health insurance industry’s pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) extract from the prescription drug supply chain. I also submitted a comment letter to the Federal Trade Commission two and a half years ago urging it to launch an investigation into PBM business practices that have contributed to the closure of hundreds of independent pharmacies across the country and to millions of Americans walking away from the pharmacy counter without their medications. 

On a bipartisan basis, the FTC did launch an inquiry into the PBM business, and today the Commission issued a damning interim report that confirmed what industry critics, including me, have been saying:

Just six companies now control 95% of the pharmacy benefit market, and these Big Insurance-owned middlemen “profit at the expense of patients by inflating drug costs and squeezing Main Street pharmacies.” Below you’ll find the commission’s statement on its preliminary findings.

Last year, we also published a profile of one of the industry’s most vocal critics in Congress, Rep. Earl L. “Buddy” Carter (R-Ga.), a pharmacist by trade who has seen PBM’s profiteering firsthand. In a press release this morning, Carter said:

Since day one in Congress, I’ve been calling on the FTC to investigate PBMs, which use deceptive and anti-competitive practices to line their own pockets while reducing patients’ access to affordable, quality health care. I’m proud that the FTC launched a bipartisan investigation into these shadowy middlemen, and its preliminary findings prove yet again that it’s time to bust up the PBM monopoly. We are losing more than one pharmacy per day in this country, causing pharmacy deserts and taking the most accessible health care professionals in America out of people’s communities. I am calling on the FTC to promptly complete its investigation and begin enforcement actions if – and when – it uncovers illegal and anti-competitive PBM practices.

Carter and several other members of Congress have introduced bipartisan bills to rein in PBMs. The House has passed PBM reform legislation but the Senate has not yet done so, but there is growing support in both chambers to enact one or more bills by the end of the year. The FTC’s interim report should make that more likely to happen.

Read the FTC’s full press release below:

FTC Releases Interim Staff Report on Prescription Drug Middlemen

Report details how prescription drug middleman profit at the expense of patients by inflating drug costs and squeezing Main Street pharmacies

The Federal Trade Commission today published an interim report on the prescription drug middleman industry that underscores the impact pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) have on the accessibility and affordability of prescription drugs.

The interim staff report, which is part of an ongoing inquiry launched in 2022 by the FTC, details how increasing vertical integration and concentration has enabled the six largest PBMs to manage nearly 95 percent of all prescriptions filled in the United States.

This vertically integrated and concentrated market structure has allowed PBMs to profit at the expense of patients and independent pharmacists, the report details. 

“The FTC’s interim report lays out how dominant pharmacy benefit managers can hike the cost of drugs—including overcharging patients for cancer drugs,” said FTC Chair Lina M. Khan. “The report also details how PBMs can squeeze independent pharmacies that many Americans—especially those in rural communities—depend on for essential care. The FTC will continue to use all our tools and authorities to scrutinize dominant players across healthcare markets and ensure that Americans can access affordable healthcare.”

The report finds that PBMs wield enormous power over patients’ ability to access and afford their prescription drugs, allowing PBMs to significantly influence what drugs are available and at what price. This can have dire consequences, with nearly 30 percent of Americans surveyed reporting rationing or even skipping doses of their prescribed medicines due to high costs, the report states.

The interim report also finds that PBMs hold substantial influence over independent pharmacies by imposing unfair, arbitrary, and harmful contractual terms that can impact independent pharmacies’ ability to stay in business and serve their communities. 

The Commission’s interim report stems from special orders the FTC issued in 2022, under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act, to the six largest PBMs—Caremark Rx, LLC; Express Scripts, Inc.; OptumRx, Inc.; Humana Pharmacy Solutions, Inc.; Prime Therapeutics LLC; and MedImpact Healthcare Systems, Inc. In 2023, the FTC issued additional orders to Zinc Health Services, LLC, Ascent Health Services, LLC, and Emisar Pharma Services LLC, which are each rebate aggregating entities, also known as “group purchasing organizations,” that negotiate drug rebates on behalf of PBMs.

PBMs are part of complex vertically integrated​ health care conglomerates, and the PBM industry is highly concentrated. As shown in the below image, this concentration and integration gives them significant power over the pharmaceutical supply chain. The percentages reflect the amount of prescriptions filled in the United States.

The interim report highlights several key insights gathered from documents and data obtained from the FTC’s orders, as well as from publicly available information:

  • Concentration and vertical integration: The market for pharmacy benefit management services has become highly concentrated, and the largest PBMs are now also vertically integrated with the nation’s largest health insurers and specialty and retail pharmacies.
    • The top three PBMs processed nearly 80 percent of the approximately 6.6 billion prescriptions dispensed by U.S. pharmacies in 2023, while the top six PBMs processed more than 90 percent.
    • Pharmacies affiliated with the three largest PBMs now account for nearly 70 percent of all specialty drug revenue.
  • Significant power and influence: As a result of this high degree of consolidation and vertical integration, the leading PBMs now exercise significant power over Americans’ ability to access and afford their prescription drugs.
    • The largest PBMs often exercise significant control over what drugs are available and at what price, and which pharmacies patients can use to access their prescribed medications.
    • PBMs oversee these critical decisions about access to and affordability of life-saving medications, without transparency or accountability to the public.
  • Self-preferencing: Vertically integrated PBMs appear to have the ability and incentive to prefer their own affiliated businesses, creating conflicts of interest that can disadvantage unaffiliated pharmacies and increase prescription drug costs.
    • PBMs may be steering patients to their affiliated pharmacies and away from smaller, independent pharmacies.
    • These practices have allowed pharmacies affiliated with the three largest PBMs to retain high levels of dispensing revenue in excess of their estimated drug acquisition costs, including nearly $1.6 billion in excess revenue on just two cancer drugs in under three years.
  • Unfair contract terms: Evidence suggests that increased concentration gives the leading PBMs leverage to enter contractual relationships that disadvantage smaller, unaffiliated pharmacies.
    • The rates in PBM contracts with independent pharmacies often do not clearly reflect the ultimate total payment amounts, making it difficult or impossible for pharmacists to ascertain how much they will be compensated.
  • Efforts to limit access to low-cost competitors: PBMs and brand drug manufacturers negotiate prescription drug rebates some of which are expressly conditioned on limiting access to potentially lower-cost generic and biosimilar competitors.
    • Evidence suggests that PBMs and brand pharmaceutical manufacturers sometimes enter agreements to exclude lower-cost competitor drugs from the PBM’s formulary in exchange for increased rebates from manufacturers.

The report notes that several of the PBMs that were issued orders have not been forthcoming and timely in their responses, and they still have not completed their required submissions, which has hindered the Commission’s ability to perform its statutory mission. FTC staff have demanded that the companies finalize their productions required by the 6(b) orders promptly. If, however, any of the companies fail to fully comply with the 6(b) orders or engage in further delay tactics, the FTC can take them to district court to compel compliance.

The FTC remains committed to providing timely updates as the Commission receives and reviews additional information.

The Commission voted 4-1 to allow staff to issue the interim report, with Commissioner Melissa Holyoak voting no. Chair Lina M. Khan issued a statement joined by Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya. Commissioners Andrew N. Ferguson and Melissa Holyoak each issued separate statements.  The Federal Trade Commission develops policy initiatives on issues that affect competition, consumers, and the U.S. economy. The FTC will never demand money, make threats, tell you to transfer money, or promise you a prize. Follow the FTC on social media, read consumer alerts and the business blog, and sign up to get the latest FTC news and alerts.