On January 17, 2025, a list of potential cost reductions to the federal budget was released by Republicans on the House Budget Committee. The list is long and covers the federal budget waterfront, but it spends considerable time focusing on reductions to healthcare spending. This laundry list of cost reductions is important because the highest priority of the Trump administration is a further reduction in federal taxes. A reduction in taxes would, of course, reduce federal revenue; if federal expenses are not proportionately reduced then the federal deficit will increase. When the deficit increases then the federal debt must increase and at that point the overall impact on the American economy becomes concerning and possibly damaging. There has already been much public speculation as to how the Federal Reserve might react to such a scenario.
It is not possible right now to highlight and describe all of the House budget proposals, but one proposal absolutely stands out: The suggestion to eliminate the tax-exempt status for interest payments on all municipal bonds, or potentially in a more targeted manner, for private activity bonds, including those issued by not-for-profit hospitals. Siebert Williams Shank, an investment banking firm, described the elimination of tax exemption for municipal bonds as “the most alarming of the proposed reforms impacting non-profit and municipal issuers.”[1] This is certainly true for hospitals, since over the past 60 years the growth and capability of America’s hospitals has been substantially constructed on the foundation of flexible and relatively inexpensive tax-exempt debt. Given all of this, it is not too early to begin speculating on the impact of the elimination of tax-exempt debt on hospital finances and strategy.
We should also point out that a separate topic is under discussion, related to the potential loss of not-for-profit status for hospitals and health systems. Such a maneuver could potentially expose hospitals to income taxes, property taxes, and higher funding costs. For now, that is beyond the scope of this blog but may be something we write about in future posts.
Below is a series of important questions related to the elimination of tax-exempt financing and some speculations on the overall impact:
What immediately happens if 501(c)(3) hospitals lose the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds? Let’s treat fixed rate debt first. Assume for now that only newly issued debt would be affected and that all currently outstanding tax-exempt fixed rate debt would remain tax-exempt. We could see an effort to apply any changes retroactively to existing bonds, but we view that as unlikely. Therefore, our current expectation is that outstanding fixed-rate debt would not see a change in interest expense.
However, it is possible that outstanding floating rate debt would immediately begin to trade based on the taxable equivalent. Historically the tax-exempt floating rate index trades at about 65% of the taxable index. The difference between the tax-exempt and taxable floating rate indices in the current market is 175 basis points. For every $100 million of debt, this would increase interest expense by $1.75m annually.
How would new hospital debt be issued? New debt would be issued in the municipal market on a taxable basis or in the corporate taxable market. The taxable municipal market would need to adapt and expand to accommodate a significant level of new issuance. The concern in the corporate taxable market is greater. Currently, the corporate market requires issuance of significant dollar size and generally the issuer brings significant name recognition to the market. Many hospitals may have difficulty meeting the issuance size of the corporate debt market and/or the necessary market recognition. As such, smaller and less frequent issuers would expect to pay a penalty of 25-50 basis points for issuing in the corporate market.
If tax-exempt debt goes away will certain hospitals be advantaged and others disadvantaged? Larger hospitals with national or regional name recognition that issue bonds with sufficiently large transaction size and frequency will likely borrow at better terms and lower rates. Smaller- to medium-sized hospitals may find borrowing much more difficult, and borrowing may come with more problematic terms and/or amortization schedules and likely higher interest rates.
Will borrowing costs go up? The cost of funds for new borrowings would increase for all hospital borrowers. For a typical A-rated hospital, annual interest expense would increase by approximately 30%. For example, in the current market, on $100 million of new debt, average annual interest expense would increase by $815,000 annually.
Will debt capacity go down? All other things being equal, interest rates will go up and hospital debt capacity will go down. Also, if the taxable market shortens amortization schedules, then that will decrease overall debt capacity as well.
What would the impact of the elimination of tax-exempt debt be on synthetic fixed rate structures? Hospitals have long employed derivative structures to hedge interest rate risk on outstanding variable rate bonds and loans. The loss of tax-exemption for outstanding variable rate bonds and loans would precipitate an adjustment to taxable rates, but corresponding swap cash flows are not designed to adjust. Interest rate risk is hedged, but tax reform risk is not. The net effect to borrowers would be an increase in cost similar to the cost contemplated above for variable rate bonds.
What are the rating implications of the elimination of the tax-exempt market? Rating implications will be varied. Hospitals with strong financial performance and liquidity are likely to absorb the increased interest expense of a taxable borrowing with little to no rating impact. In fact, over the past decade, many larger health systems in the AA rating categories have successfully issued debt in the taxable market without rating implications despite a higher borrowing rate. Even amid the pandemic chaos of 2021, numerous AA and A rated systems issued sizable, taxable debt offerings to bolster liquidity as proceeds were for general corporate purposes and not restricted by a third-party, such as a bond trustee.
Lower-rated hospitals with modest performance and below-average liquidity will be at greater risk for a downgrade. These hospitals may not be able to absorb the increased interest expense and maintain their ratings. While interest expense is typically a small percentage of a hospital’s total expenses, it is a use of cash flow.
We do not anticipate the rating agencies will take wholesale downgrade action on the rated portfolio as there would likely be a phase-in period before the elimination occurs. Rather, we expect the rating agencies will take a measured approach with a case-by-case evaluation of each rated organization through the normal course of surveillance, as they did during the pandemic and liquidity crisis in 2008. A dialogue on capital budgets and funding sources, typically held at the end of a rating meeting, would be moved to the top of the agenda, as it will have a direct impact on long-term viability.
How would the loss of the tax-exempt market impact the pace of consolidation in the hospital industry? If a hospital cannot afford the taxable market, then large capital projects would need to be funded through cash and operations. This inevitably will limit organizational liquidity, which will lead to downward rating pressure. Some hospitals, in such a situation, will be unable to both fund capital and adequately serve their local community and, therefore, will need to find a partner who can. We anticipate that the loss of the tax-exempt bond market will lead to further consolidation in the industry.
Let’s indulge in one last bit of speculation. What is the probability that Congress will pass legislation that eliminates tax-exempt financing? Sources in Washington tell us that it is premature to wager on any of the items put forth by the Budget Committee. And it should be noted that over the years the elimination of tax-exempt financing has been proposed on several occasions and never advanced in Congress. However, one well-informed source noted that as the tax and related legislation moves forward, there is likely to be significant horse-trading (especially in the House) to secure the necessary votes to pass the entire package. What happens during that horse-trading process is anybody’s guess. So the best advice to our hospital readership right now is to not take anything for granted. But be absolutely assured that the maintenance of tax-exempt financing is an essential strategic component for the successful future of America’s hospitals.
Health systems are rightly concerned about Republican plans to cut Medicaid spending, end ACA subsidies and enact site neutral payments, says consultant Michael Abrams, managing partner of Numerof, a consulting firm.
“Health systems have reason to worry,” Abrams said shortly after President Donald Trump was inaugurated on Monday.
While Trump mentioned little about healthcare in his inauguration speech, the GOP trifecta means spending cuts outlined in a one-page document released by Politico and another 50-pager could get a majority vote for passage.
Of the insurers, pharmaceutical manufacturers and health systems that Abrams consults with, healthcare systems are the ones that are most concerned, Abrams said.
At the top of the Republican list targeting $4 trillion in healthcare spending is eliminating an estimated $2.5 billion from Medicaid.
“There’s no question Republicans will find savings in Medicaid,” Abrams said.
Medicaid has doubled its enrollment in the last couple of years due to extended benefits made possible by the Affordable Care Act, despite disenrolling 25 million people during the redetermination process at the end of the public health emergency, according to Abrams.
Upward of 44 million people, or 16.4% of the non-elderly U.S. population are covered by an Affordable Care Act initiative, including a record high of 24 million people in ACA health plans and another 21.3 million in Medicaid expansion enrollment, according to a KFF report.Medicaid expansion enrollment is 41% higher than in 2020.
The enhanced subsidies that expanded eligibility for Medicaid and doubled the number of enrollees are set to expire at the end of 2025 and Republicans are likely to let that happen, Abrams said. Eliminating enhanced federal payments to states that expanded Medicaid under the ACA are estimated to cut the program by $561 billion.
If enhanced subsidies end, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the number of people who will become uninsured will increase by 3.8 million each year between 2026 and 2034.
The enhanced tax subsidies for the ACA are set to expire at the end of 2025. This could result in another 2.2 million people losing coverage in 2026, and 3.7 million in 2027, according to the CBO.
WHY THIS MATTERS
For hospitals, loss of health insurance coverage means an increase in sicker, uninsured patients visiting the emergency department and more uncompensated care.
“Health systems are nervous about people coming to them who are uninsured,” Abrams said. “There will be people disenrolled.”
The federal government allowed more people to be added to the Medicaid rolls during the public health emergency to help those who lost their jobs during the COVID-19 pandemic, Numerof said. Medicaid became an open-ended liability which the government wants to end now that the unemployment rate is around 4.2% and jobs are available.
An idea floating around Congress is the idea of converting Medicaid to a per capita cap and providing these funds to the states as a block grant, Abrams said. The cost of those programs would be borne 70% by the federal government and 30% by states.
This fixed amount based on a per person amount would save money over the current system of letting states report what they spent.
Another potential change under the new administration includes site neutral Medicare payments to hospitals for outpatient services.
The HFMA reported the site neutral policy as a concern in a list it published Monday of preliminary federal program cuts totaling more than $5 trillion over 10 years. The 50-page federal list is essentially a menu of options, the HFMA said, not an indication that programs will actually be targeted leading up to the March 14 deadline to pass legislation before federal funding expires.
Other financial concerns for hospitals based on that list include: the elimination of the tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals, bringing in up to $260 billion in estimated 10-year savings; and phasing out Medicare payments for bad debt, resulting in savings of up to $42 billion over a decade.
Healthcare systems are the ones most concerned over GOP spending cuts, according to Abrams. Pharmacy benefit managers and pharmaceutical manufacturers also remain on edge as to what might be coming at them next.
THE LARGER TREND
President Donald Trump mentioned little about healthcare during his inauguration speech on Monday.
Trump said the public health system does not deliver in times of disaster, referring to the hurricanes in North Carolina and other areas and to the fires in Los Angeles.
Trump also mentioned giving back pay to service members who objected to getting the COVID-19 vaccine.
He also talked about ending the chronic disease epidemic, without giving specifics.
“He didn’t really talk about healthcare even in the campaign,” Abrams said.
However, in his consulting work, Abrams said, “The common thread is the environment is changing quickly,” and that healthcare organizations need to do the same “in order to survive.”
With the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issuing a final rule last month that bans noncompete agreements nationwide, the graphic above is our attempt to categorize the current status of complex state noncompete laws that affect physicians.
Except in the event of a business sale, five states—California, North Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oklahoma—ban all noncompete agreements for all employees, and at least 19 states either ban them for physicians or place varying limits on them for physicians.
Examples of these limits include a narrow law in Florida that allows noncompetes to be voided if there is only one employer of a physician specialty in a county, and a Tennessee law that only permits physician noncompetes that bar a physician from practicing at facilities where their former employer provides services.
As a noncompete agreement can restrict a physician’s ability to practice near a former employer for years, bans on physician noncompete agreements have been shown to improve community access to care. One study found that, compared to places that allow them, places that banned noncompetes for physicians saw increased physician employment, the opening of more physician practices, and a lower likelihood of practice closures.
Should the new FTC ban survive the mounting legal challenges it faces, its effect on the physician labor market may be limited, as not-for-profit organizations fall outside the FTC’s traditional enforcement jurisdiction. However, the agency has indicated a willingness to reevaluate an entity’s not-for-profit status and stated that “some portion” of tax-exempt hospitals could fall under the final rule’s purview.
If you’re a U.S. health industry watcher, it would appear the $4.5 trillion system is under fire at every corner.
Pressures to lower costs, increase accessibility and affordability to all populations, disclose prices and demonstrate value are hitting every sector. Complicating matters, state and federal legislators are challenging ‘business as usual’ seeking ways to spend tax dollars more wisely with surprisingly strong bipartisan support on many issues. No sector faces these challenges more intensely than hospitals.
In 2022 (the latest year for NHE data from CMS), hospitals accounted for 30.4% of total spending ($1.35 trillion. While total healthcare spending increased 4.1% that year, hospital spending was up 2.2%–less than physician services (+2.7%), prescription drugs (+8.4%), private insurance (+5.9%) and the overall inflation rate (+6.5%) and only slightly less than the overall economy (GDP +1.9%). Operating margins were negative (-.3%) because operating costs increased more than revenues (+7.7% vs. 6.5%) creating deficits for most. Hardest hit: the safety net, rural hospitals and those that operate in markets with challenging economic conditions.
In 2023, the hospital outlook improved. Pre-Covid utilization levels were restored. Workforce tensions eased somewhat. And many not-for-profits and investor-owned operators who had invested their cash flows in equities saw their non-operating income hit record levels as the S&P 500 gained 26.29% for the year.
In 2024, the S&P is up 5.15% YTD but most hospital operators are uncertain about the future, even some that appear to have weathered the pandemic storm better than others. A sense of frustration and despair is felt widely across the sector, especially in critical access, rural, safety net, public and small community hospitals where long-term survival is in question.
The cynicism felt by hospitals is rooted in four conflicts in which many believe hospitals are losing ground:
Hospitals vs. Insurers:
Insurers believe hospitals are inefficient and wasteful, and their business models afford them the role of deciding how much they’ll pay hospitals and when based on data they keep private. They change their rules annually to meet their financial needs. Longer-term contracts are out of the question. They have the upper hand on hospitals.
Hospitals take financial risks for facilities, technologies, workforce and therapies necessary to care. Their direct costs are driven by inflationary pressures in their wage and supply chains outside their control and indirect costs from regulatory compliance and administrative overhead, Demand is soaring. Hospital balance sheets are eroding while insurers are doubling down on hospital reimbursement cuts to offset shortfalls they anticipate from Medicare Advantage. Their finances and long-term sustainability are primarily controlled by insurers. They have minimal latitude to modify workforces, technology and clinical practices annually in response to insurer requirements.
Hospitals vs. the Drug Procurement Establishment:
Drug manufacturers enjoy patent protections and regulatory apparatus that discourage competition and enable near-total price elasticity. They operate thru a labyrinth of manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors and dispensers in which their therapies gain market access through monopolies created to fend-off competition. They protect themselves in the U.S. market through well-funded advocacy and tight relationships with middlemen (GPOs, PBMs) and it’s understandable: the global market for prescription drugs is worth $1.6 trillion, the US represents 27% but only 4% of the world population.
And ownership of the 3 major PBMs that control 80% of drug benefits by insurers assures the drug establishment will be protected.
Prescription drugs are the third biggest expense in hospitals after payroll and med/surg supplies. They’re a major source of unexpected out-of-pocket cost to patients and unanticipated costs to hospitals, especially cancer therapies. And hospitals (other than academic hospitals that do applied research) are relegated to customers though every patient uses their products.
Prescription drug cost escalation is a threat to the solvency and affordability of hospital care in every community.
Hospitals vs. the FTC, DOJ and State Officials:
Hospital consolidation has been a staple in hospital sustainability and growth strategies. It’s a major focus of regulator attention. Horizontal consolidation has enabled hospitals to share operating costs thru shared services and concentrate clinical programs for better outcomes. Vertical consolidation has enabled hospitals to diversify as a hedge against declining inpatient demand: today, 200+ sponsor health insurance plans, 60% employ physicians directly and the majority offer long-term, senior care and/or post-acute services. But regulators like the FTC think hospital consolidation has been harmful to consumers and third-party data has shown promised cost-savings to consumers are not realized.
Federal regulators are also scrutinizing the tax exemptions afforded not-for-profit hospitals, their investment strategies, the roles of private equity in hospital prices and quality and executive compensation among other concerns. And in many states, elected officials are building their statewide campaigns around reining in “out of control” hospitals and so on.
Bottom line: Hospitals are prime targets for regulators.
Hospitals vs. Congress:
Influential members in key House and Senate Committees are now investigating regulatory changes that could protect rural and safety net hospitals while cutting payments to the rest. In key Committees (Senate HELP and Finance, House Energy and Commerce, Budget), hospitals are a target. Example: The Lower Cost, More Transparency Act passed in the the House December 11, 2023. It includes price transparency requirements for hospitals and PBMs, site-neutral payments, additional funding for rural and community health among more. The American Hospital Association objected noting “The AHA supports the elimination of the Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) reductions for two years. However, hospitals and health systems strongly oppose efforts to include permanent site-neutral payment cuts in this bill. In addition, the AHA has concerns about the added regulatory burdens on hospitals and health systems from the sections to codify the Hospital Price Transparency Rule and to establish unique identifiers for off-campus hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs).” Nonetheless, hospitals appear to be fighting an uphill battle in Congress.
Hospitals have other problems:
Threats from retail health mega-companies are disruptive. The public’s trust in hospitals has been fractured. Lenders are becoming more cautious in their term sheets. And the hospital workforce—especially its doctors and nurses—is disgruntled. But the four conflicts above seem most important to the future for hospitals.
However, conflict resolution on these is problematic because opinions about hospitals inside and outside the sector are strongly held and remedy proposals vary widely across hospital tribes—not-for profits, investor-owned, public, safety nets, rural, specialty and others.
Nonetheless, conflict resolution on these issues must be pursued if hospitals are to be effective, affordable and accessible contributors and/or hubs for community health systems in the future. The risks of inaction for society, the communities served and the 5.48 million (NAICS Bureau of Labor 622) employed in the sector cannot be overstated. The likelihood they can be resolved without the addition of new voices and fresh solutions is unlikely.
PS: In the sections that follow, citations illustrate the gist of today’s major message: hospitals are under attack—some deserved, some not. It’s a tough business climate for all of them requiring fresh ideas from a broad set of stakeholders.
PS If you’ve been following the travails of Mission Hospital, Asheville NC—its sale to HCA Healthcare in 2019 under a cloud of suspicion and now its “immediate jeopardy” warning from CMS alleging safety and quality concerns—accountability falls squarely on its Board of Directors. I read the asset purchase agreement between HCA and Mission: it sets forth the principles of operating post-acquisition but does not specify measurable ways patient safety, outcomes, staffing levels and program quality will be defined. It does not appear HCA is in violation with the terms of the APA, but irreparable damage has been done and the community has lost confidence in the new Mission to operate in its best interest. Sadly, evidence shows the process was flawed, disclosures by key parties were incomplete and the hospital’s Board is sworn to secrecy preventing a full investigation.
The lessons are 2 for every hospital:
Boards must be prepared vis a vis education, objective data and independent counsel to carry out their fiduciary responsibility to their communities and key stakeholders. And the business of running hospitals is complex, easily prone to over-simplification and misinformation but highly important and visible in communities where they operate.
Business relationships, price transparency, board performance, executive compensation et al can no longer to treated as private arrangements.
Last Thursday, Seattle-based Providence Health System announced it is refunding nearly $21 million in medical bills paid by low-income residents of Washington and erasing $137 million more in outstanding debt for others. Other systems are likely to follow as pressure con mounts on large, not-for-profit systems to modify their business practices in sensitive areas like patient debt collection, price transparency, executive compensation, investment activities and others.
Not-for profit systems control the majority of the 2,987 nongovernment not-for-profit community hospitals in the U.S. Some lawmakers think it’s time to revisit to revisit the tax exemption. It has the attention of the American Hospital Association which lists “protecting not-for-profit hospitals’ the tax-exempt status” among its 15 Advocacy Priorities in 2024 (it was not on their list in 2023).
Background: Per a recent monograph in Health Affairs: “The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses the Community Benefit Standard (CBS), a set of 10 holistically analyzed metrics, to assess whether nonprofit hospitals benefit community health sufficiently to justify their tax-exempt status. Nonprofit hospitals risk losing their tax exemption if assessed as underinvesting in improving community health. This exemption from federal, state, and local property taxes amounts to roughly $25 billion annually.
However, accumulating evidence shows that many nonprofit hospitals’ investments in community health meet the letter, but not the spirit, of the CBS.
Indeed, a 2021 study showed that for every $100 in total expenses nonprofit hospitals spend just $2.30 on charity care (a key component of community benefit)—substantially less than the $3.80 of every $100 spent by for-profit hospitals. A 2022 study looked at the cost of caring for Medicaid patients that goes unreimbursed and is therefore borne by the hospital (another key component of community benefit); the researchers found that nonprofit hospitals spend no more than for-profit hospitals ($2.50 of every $100 of total expense).”
In its most recent study, the AHA found the value of CBS well-in-excess of the tax exemption by a factor of 9:1. But antagonism toward the big NFP systems has continued to mount and feelings are intense…
Insurers think NFP systems exist to gain leverage in markets & states over insurers in contract negotiations and network design. They’ll garner support from sympathetic employers and lawmakers, federal anti-consolidation and price transparency rulings and in the court of public opinion where frustration with the system is high.
State officials see the mega- NFP systems as monopolies that don’t deserve their tax exemptions while the state’s public health, mental health and social services programs struggle.
Some federal lawmakers think the NFP systems are out of control requiring closer scrutiny and less latitude. They think the tax exemption qualifiers should be re-defined, scrutinized more aggressively and restricted.
Well-publicized investments by NFP systems in private equity backed ventures has lent to criticism among labor unions and special interests that allege systems have abandoned community health for Wall Street shareholders.
Investor-owned multi-hospital operators believe the tax exemption is an unfair advantage to NFPs while touting studies showing their own charity care equivalent or higher.
Other key NFP and public sector hospital cohorts cry foul: Independent hospitals, academic medical centers, safety-net (aka ‘essential’) hospitals, rural health clinics & hospitals, children’s hospitals, rural health providers, public health providers et al think they get less because the big NFPs get more.
And the physicians, nurses and workforces employed by Big NFP systems are increasingly concerned by systemization that limits their wages, cuts their clinical autonomy and compromises their patients’ health.
My take:
The big picture is this: the growth and prominence of multi-hospital systems mirrors the corporatization in most sectors of the economy: retail, technology, banking, transportation and even public utilities. The trifecta of community stability—schools, churches and hospitals—held out against corporatization, standardization and franchising that overtook the rest. But modernization required capital, the public’s expectations changed as social media uprooted news coverage and regulators left doors open for “new and better” that ceded local control to distant corporate boards.
Along the way, investor-owned hospitals became alternatives to not-for-profits, and loose networks of hospitals that shared purchasing and perhaps religious values gave way to bigger multi-state ownership and obligated groups.
The attention given large NFP hospital systems like Providence and others is not surprising. These brands are ubiquitous. Their deals with private equity and Big Tech are widely chronicled in industry journalism and passed along in unfiltered social media. And their collective financial position seems strong: Moody’s, Fitch, Kaufman Hall and others say utilization has recovered, pandemic recovery is near-complete and, despite lingering concerns about workforce issues, growth in their core businesses plus diversification in new businesses are their foci. (See Hospital Section below).
I believe not-for-profit hospital systems are engines for modernizing health delivery in communities and a lightening rod for critics who think their efforts more self-serving than for the public good.
Most consumers (55%) think they earn their tax exemption but 34% have mixed feelings and 10% disagree. (Keckley Poll November 20, 2023). That’s less than a convincing defense.
That’s why the threat to the tax exemption risk is real, and why every organization must be prepared. Equally important, it’s why AHA, its state associations and allies should advance fresh thinking about ways re-define CBS and hardwire the distinction between organizations that exist for the primary purpose of benefiting their shareholders and those that benefit health and wellbeing in their communities.
PS: Must reading for industry watchers is a new report from by Health Management Associates (HMA) and Leavitt Partners, an HMA company, with support from Arnold Ventures. The 70-page report provides a framework for comparing the increasingly crowned field of 120 entities categorized in 3 groups: Hybrids (6.9 million), Delivery (5.8 million) and Enablers 17.5 million
“At the start of the movement, value-based arrangements primarily involved traditional providers and payers engaging in relatively straight-forward and limited contractual arrangements. In recent years, the industry has expanded organically to include a broader ecosystem of risk-bearing care delivery organizations and provider enablement entities with capabilities and business models aligned with the functions and aims of accountable care…Inclusion criteria for the 120 VBD entities included in this analysis were:
1-Serve traditional Medicare, MA, and/or Medicaid populations. Entities that are focused solely on commercial populations were excluded
2-Operate in population-based, total cost of care APMs—not only bundled payment models.
3- Focus on primary care and/or select specialties that are relevant to total cost of care models (i.e., nephrology, oncology, behavioral health, cardiology, palliative care). Those exclusively focused on specialty areas geared toward episodic models (e.g., MSK) were excluded. –
4-Share accountability for cost and quality outcomes. Business models must be aligned with provider performance in total cost of care arrangements. Vendors that support VBP but do not share accountability for outcomes were excluded.
In Sunday’s Axios’ AM, Mike Allen observed “Republicans know immigration alone could sink Biden. So, Trump and House Republicans will kill anything, even if it meets or exceeds their wishes. Biden knows immigration alone could sink him. So he’s willing to accept what he once considered unacceptable — to save himself.”
Mike called this a “truth Bomb” and he’s probably right: the polarizing issue of immigration is tantamount to a bomb falling on the political system forcing well-entrenched factions to re-think and alter their strategies.
In 2024, in U.S. healthcare, three truth bombs are in-bound. They’re the culmination of shifts in the U.S.’ economic, demographic, social and political environment and fueled by accelerants in social media and Big Data.
Truth bomb: The regulatory protections that have buoyed the industry’s growth are no longer secure.
Despite years of effectively lobbying for protections and money, the industry’s major trade groups face increasingly hostile audiences in city hall, state houses and the U.S. Congress.
The focus of these: the business practices that regulators think protect the status quo at the public’s expense. Example: while the U.S. House spent last week in their districts, Senate Committees held high profile hearings about Medicare Advantage marketing tactics (Finance Committee), consumer protections in assisted living (Special Committee on Aging), drug addiction and the opioid misuse (Banking) and drug pricing (HELP). In states, legislators are rationalizing budgets for Medicaid and public health against education, crime and cybersecurity and lifting scope of practice constraints that limit access.
Drug makers face challenges to patents (“march in rights”) and state-imposed price controls. The FTC and DOJ are challenging hospital consolidation they think potentially harmful to consumer choice and so. Regulators and lawmakers are less receptive to sector-specific wish lists and more supportive of populist-popular rules that advance transparency, disable business relationships that limit consumer choices and cede more control to individuals. Given that the industry is built on a business-to-business (B2B) chassis, preparing for a business to consumer (B2C) time bomb will be uncomfortable for most.
Truth bomb: Affordability in U.S. is not its priority.
The Patient Protection and Affordability Act 2010 advanced the notion that annual healthcare spending growth should not exceed more than 1% of the annual GDP. It also advanced the premise that spending should not exceed 9.5% of household adjusted gross income (AGI) and associated affordability with access to insurance coverage offering subsidies and Medicaid expansion incentives to achieve near-universal coverage. In 2024, that percentage is 8.39%.
Like many elements of the ACA, these constructs fell short: coverage became its focus; affordability secondary.
The ranks of the uninsured shrank to 9% even as annual aggregate spending increased more than 4%/year. But employers and privately insured individuals saw their costs increase at a double-digit pace: in the process, 41% of the U.S. population now have unpaid medical debt: 45% of these have income above $90,000 and 61% have health insurance coverage. As it turns out, having insurance is no panacea for affordability: premiums increase just as hospital, drug and other costs increase and many lower- and middle-income consumers opt for high-deductible plans that expose them to financial insecurity. While lowering spending through value-based purchasing and alternative payments have shown promise, medical inflation in the healthcare supply chain, unrestricted pricing in many sectors, the influx of private equity investing seeking profit maximization for their GPs, and dependence on high-deductible insurance coverage have negated affordability gains for consumers and increasingly employers. Benign neglect for affordability is seemingly hardwired in the system psyche, more aligned with soundbites than substance.
Truth bomb: The effectiveness of the system is overblown.
Numerous peer reviewed studies have quantified clinical and administrative flaws in the system. For instance, a recent peer reviewed analysis in the British Medical Journal concluded “An estimated 795 000 Americans become permanently disabled or die annually across care settings because dangerous diseases are misdiagnosed. Just 15 diseases account for about 50.7% of all serious harms, so the problem may be more tractable than previously imagined.”
The inadequacy of personnel and funding in primary and preventive health services is well-documented as the administrative burden of the system—almost 20% of its spending. Satisfaction is low. Outcomes are impressive for hard-to-diagnose and treat conditions but modest at best for routine care. It’s easier to talk about value than define and measure it in our system: that allows everyone to declare their value propositions without challenge.
Truth bombs are falling in U.S. healthcare. They’re well-documented and financed. They take no prisoners and exact mass casualties.
Most healthcare organizations default to comfortable defenses. That’s not enough. Cyberwarfare, precision-guided drones and dirty bombs require a modernized defense. Lacking that, the system will be a commoditized public utility for most in 15 years.
PS: Last week’s report, “The Holy War between Hospitals and Insurers…” (The Keckley Report – Paul Keckley) prompted understandable frustration from hospitals that believe insurers do not serve the public good at a level commensurate with the advantages they enjoy in the industry. However, justified, pushback by hospitals against insurers should be framed in the longer-term context of the role and scope of services each should play in the system long-term. There are good people in both sectors attempting to serve the public good. It’s not about bad people; it’s about a flawed system.
We’ve been getting more and more questions about our Fair Share Spending work that assesses whether hospitals are giving back enough in financial assistance and community health investments to justify their generous tax breaks. Two new reports—one from a United States Senate committee and one from the American Hospitals Association—delve into this space and provide very different views. Here’s what you need to know.
Sanders report calls out hospitals
Nonprofit hospitals receive an estimated $28 billion in total tax breaks each year, but give back far less in meaningful community benefits. A Lown Institute report found that nonprofit hospitals received $14 billion more in tax breaks than they spent on financial assistance and community health programs in 2020, what we call a Fair Share Deficit. About three quarters of hospitals failed to give back to their communities in amounts commensurate with their tax exemption.
In August, four US Senators sent letters to the IRS asking for clarification on how hospitals are complying with the community benefit standard. And this week majority staff of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee, chaired by Senator Bernie Sanders, released a report showing how some large hospital systems spend little on financial assistance, despite paying their CEOs whopping 8-figure salaries.
The Sanders report highlights examples of nonprofit hospitals engaging in aggressive billing activities such as sending patients’ medical debt to collections and denying care to patients with outstanding medical debt. The report also adds a new analysis of how much the 16 largest nonprofit hospital systems spend on financial assistance (free and discounted care for patients who can’t afford to pay). They find that 12 of these systems spent less than $0.02 for each dollar in revenue on financial assistance, and six gave less than $0.01.
The report also called attention to “massive salaries” for some system CEOs, like Commonspirit whichpaid their CEO $35 million in 2021. Lown Institute data shows vast inequities at some hospitals, with some CEOs making up to 60 times what other hospital workers make.
This underinvestment in financial assistance causes real harm to patients. When hospitals charge patients for care they can’t afford, patients go into debt and often sacrifice basic needs and avoid additional care. An estimated 100 million Americans are in medical debt, and most owe at least some to hospitals.If hospitals paid off their $14 billion fair share deficit, it would be enough to erase the debt of 18 million Americans, which would be a huge step forward for fairness in the country.
AHA provides opposing view
The American Hospitals Association just published their analysis of hospital community benefit spending, finding that hospitals spent $130 billion in 2020, amounting to 15.5% of hospital expenses. That’s far more than other studiesestimate.
How can the AHA estimate be so different? The answer depends on what’s being counted as a “community benefit.” When you imagine programs to improve community health, you might think of free immunizations, health fairs and educational classes, food pantries and other nutritional assistance, investments in affordable housing, healthcare for the homeless, etc. However, spending on those types of programs made up only 1.8% of hospital expenses in 2020, according to the AHA’s report.
Financial assistance, free or discounted care for eligible patients, is another important category of community benefit spending. But the AHA report doesn’t break out this amount on its own; instead, they lump it in together with Medicaid shortfall and other unreimbursed costs of government programs.
While it’s important that hospitals care for patients with Medicaid, the “shortfall” they report does not go towards tangible community programs or into the pockets of patients. Instead, this is an accounting item related to the discounted prices in Medicaid. Hospitals offer discounts on care to insurers all the time, but these aren’t considered community benefits–why should Medicaid discounts be any different? Most hospitals already make up this shortfall from public insurers by charging private insurers more than their costs of care. The same goes for Medicare shortfall, which the AHA report also includes in their total, despite this not even being considered a “community benefit” by the IRS.
The AHA report also includes bad debt, which is money the hospital expected to get from patients but never received. The AHA argues this spending is a benefit to the community because many patients who don’t pay would have qualified for financial assistance. However, in the real world, policies on financial assistance vary widely and getting access to it can be easy or hard. If a hospital goes to great lengths to make their financial assistance application simple and accessible, and give more in assistance as a result, that should be rewarded. On the other hand, if hospitals make getting assistance hard and hound low-income patients to pay their bills or send their debt to collection agencies, that hardly seems like a “community benefit.”
What can policymakers do?
The Sanders report adds to existing evidence that nonprofit hospitals could do much more to improve community health and earn their tax-exempt status. How can federal policymakers improve transparency and incentives around the community benefit standard? See some of our key recommendations for Congress on this issue.
By the end of this week, we’ll know a lot more about the economic trajectory for U.S. healthcare in 2024: it may cause indigestion.
Digesting deal announcements and industry prognostics from last week’s 42nd JPM conference in San Francisco. Notably, with the exceptions of promising conditions for weight loss drugs, artificial intelligence and biotech IPOs, the outlook is cautionary for providers and inviting for insurers and retail health. Expanded conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza loom as threats. The U.S. trade relationship with China and its growing tension with Taiwan poses an immediate threat to the U.S. healthcare supply chain for raw materials in drugs, OTC products, disposables. U.S. public opinion about its institutions is arguably shaped in part in social media: TikTok is owned by Chinese internet tech company ByteDance and operates in 150 countries. The 16 not for profit health system presentations at JPM sounded a chorus in unison: ‘our core business—hospital care– is not sustainable. We need deals with private capital to stay afloat.’ By contrast, national insurers and retailers sang a different tune: ‘the market is receptive to our products and services that are cheaper, better and more easily accessed through digital platforms. The status quo is outdated’.
Digesting results from today’s Iowa GOP Caucus which serves as a gatekeeper for Presidential candidate wannabes. In the run-up to Campaign 2024, polls show voters interested in abortion rights and affordability. But specific health system reforms have not surfaced to date in this election cycle and understandably: per the November 2023 Keckley Poll, 76% of U.S. adults agree that “Most politicians avoid healthcare issues because solutions are complicated and they fear losing votes” vs. 6% who disagree. Thus, the Iowa results might narrow the President contestant pool, but it will do little to clarify U.S. health policies in 2025 and beyond.
Digesting takeaways from the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos. The annual confab draws world leaders and big-name consultancies and bankers who want to rub elbows with them. It’s notable that the WEF pre-conference Global Risk Survey indicated growing concern about a looming “global catastrophe” and its agenda includes sessions on women’s health, misinformation and artificial intelligence—all central to healthcare’s future. The world is small: 8 billion inhabitants in 195 countries. There’s growing global attention to healthcare and recognition that the integration of social services (nutrition, housing, transportation, et al) and elimination of structural barriers that limit access are necessary to the effectiveness of their systems. The U.S. lacks both though it’s the world’s most expensive system. Thus, U.S.-based solutions to enhance clinical efficacy for specialty care are accessible to global markets at prices significantly lower than what U.S. taxpayers pay because their government’s refuse to pay U.S. rates.
Digesting where Congress lands this week on the fiscal 2024 budget. A deal was reached tentatively yesterday on a short-term funding bill that would avert a partial government shutdown this Friday. The $1.6 trillion continuing resolution funds the government through March 1 and March 8 and includes $886B for defense and $704B for other total discretionary programs. While payments for social security and Medicare are not impacted, most other federal health programs are impacted and therefore caught in the Congressional crossfire between budget hawks wary of the ballooning federal deficit ($34 trillion) and progressives who think the federal government spends too much on the ‘have’s’ and not enough, including health and social services, on its ‘have not’s.’ And this deal is TENTATIVE!
My take:
The cumulative effect of these events in economic indigestion for the entire U.S. economy and especially for those of us who work in its healthcare industry. So, for the balance of 2024, the realities for U.S. healthcare are these:
Public support for the health system is eroding. Trust and confidence in the U.S. health system is low. No sector in U.S. healthcare is immune though some (community hospitals, public health programs, independent physicians) are more favorably viewed than others. Confidence in government agencies (CDC, FDA, CMS) is fractured due to misinformation and disinformation. ‘Not-for-profit’ designation is a meaningful distinction to some but secondary to characteristics more readily understood and valued.
Federal policies toward healthcare are increasingly antagonistic. They’re popular and in most cases, bipartisan. Federal policies that expand price transparency (drugs, hospitals, health insurance), constrain on consolidation (horizontal) and private equity investing, expose/reduce conflicts of interest, address workforce resilience (compensation, work-rules) and protect consumers will be prominent. Beyond these, court actions and budgetary negotiations will define/refine federal health policies. Notably, the rumored DOJ antitrust action against Apple will be a closely watched barometer as will the government’s attention toward Microsoft given its leading role in ChatGPT and AI platform Copilot et al.
The big players enjoy advantages over smaller players. It’s a buyer’s market for them. The corporatization of U.S. healthcare has rewarded big operators in each sector and punished smaller, independent operators. More regulation, higher operating costs, escalating administrative complexity and shifting demand require capital that’s increasingly unaffordable/inaccessible to less credit-worthy players. In 2024, in every sector, bigger fish will eat the smaller as readily-accessible private capital is deployed to welcoming sellers. But mechanisms whereby ‘independents’ are protected and growing disparity in how care is financed and delivered will be a prominent concern to policymakers.
Regrettably, an off-the-shelf Pepto-Bismol is not available to the U.S. system. It is complex, fragmented, inequitable and expensive, but also profitable for many who benefit from the status quo.
So, the conclusion that can be deduced from the four events this week is this: economic indigestion in U.S. healthcare will persist this year and beyond because there is no political will nor industry appetite to fix it. Darwinism aka ‘survival of the fittest’ is its destiny unless….???
This discussion was recorded on November 16, 2023. This transcript has been edited for clarity.
Robert D. Glatter, MD: Welcome. I’m Dr Robert Glatter, medical advisor for Medscape Emergency Medicine. Joining me today is Dr Brian Miller, a hospitalist with Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine and a health policy expert, to discuss the current and renewed interest in physician-owned hospitals.
Welcome, Dr Miller. It’s a pleasure to have you join me today.
Brian J. Miller, MD, MBA, MPH: Thank you for having me.
History and Controversies Surrounding Physician-Owned Hospitals
Miller: Thank you. I should note that my views are my own and don’t represent those of Hopkins or the American Enterprise Institute, where I’m a nonresident fellow nor the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, of which I’m a Commissioner.
The story about physician-owned hospitals is an interesting one. Hospitals turned into health systems in the 1980s and 1990s, and physicians started to shift purely from an independent model into a more organized group practice or employed model. Physicians realized that they wanted an alternative operating arrangement. You want a choice of how you practice and what your employment is. And as community hospitals started to buy physicians and also establish their own physician groups de novo, physicians opened physician-owned hospitals.
Physician-owned hospitals fell into a couple of buckets. One is what we call community hospitals, or what the antitrust lawyers would call general acute care hospitals: those offering emergency room (ER) services, labor and delivery, primary care, general surgery — the whole regular gamut, except that some of the owners were physicians.
The other half of the marketplace ended up being specialty hospitals: those built around a specific medical specialty and series of procedures and chronic care. For example, cardiac hospitals often do CABG, TAVR, maybe abdominal aortic aneurysm (triple A) repairs, and they have cardiology clinics, cath labs, a cardiac intensive care unit (ICU), ER, etc. There were also orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals, which were sort of like an ambulatory surgery center (ASC) plus several beds. Then there were general surgical specialty hospitals. At one point, there were some women’s health–focused specialty hospitals.
The hospital industry, of course, as you can understand, didn’t exactly like this. They had a series of concerns about what we would historically call cherry-picking or lemon-dropping of patients. They were worried that physician-owned facilities didn’t want to serve public payer patients, and there was a whole series of reports and investigations.
Around the time the Affordable Care Act passed, the hospital industry had many concerns about physician-owned specialty hospitals, and there was a moratorium as part of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act. As part of the bargaining over the hospital industry support for the Affordable Care Act, they traded their support for, among other things, their number one priority, which is a statutory prohibition on new or expanded physician-owned hospitals from participating in Medicare. That included both physician-owned community hospitals and physician-owned specialty hospitals.
Glatter: I guess the main interest is that, when physicians have an ownership or a stake in the hospital, this is what the Stark laws obviously were aimed at. That was part of the impetus to prevent physicians from referring patients where they had an ownership stake. Certainly, hospitals can be owned by attorneys and nonprofit organizations, and certainly, ASCs can be owned by physicians. There is an ongoing issue in terms of physicians not being able to have an ownership stake. In terms of equity ownership, we know that certain other models allow this, but basically, it sounds like this is an issue with Medicare. That seems to be the crux of it, correct?
Miller: Yes. I would also add that it’s interesting when we look at other professions. When we look at lawyers, nonlawyers are actually not allowed to own an equity stake in a law practice. In many other professions, you either have corporate ownership or professional ownership, or the alternative is you have only professional ownership.I would say the hospital industry is one of the few areas where professional ownership not only is not allowed, but also is statutorily prohibited functionally through the Medicare program.
Unveiling the Dynamics of Hospital Ownership
Glatter: A recent study done by two PhDs looked at 2019 data on 20 of the most expensive diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). It examined the cost savings, and we’re talking over $1 billion in expenditures when you look at the data from general acute care hospitals vs physician-owned hospitals. This is what appears to me to be a key driver of the push to loosen restrictions on physician-owned hospitals. Isn’t that correct?
Miller: I would say that’s one of many components. There’s more history to this issue. I remember sitting at a think tank talking to someone several years ago about hospital consolidation as an issue. We went through the usual levers that us policy wonks go through. We talked about antitrust enforcement, certificate of need, rising hospital costs from consolidation, lower quality (or at least no quality gains, as shown by a New England Journal of Medicine study), and decrements in patient experience that result from the diseconomies of scale. They sort of pooh-poohed many of the policy ideas. They basically said that there was no hope for hospital consolidation as an issue.
Well, what about physician ownership? I started with my research team to comb through the literature and found a variety of studies — some of which were sort of entertaining, because they’d do things like study physician-owned specialty hospitals, nonprofit-owned specialty hospitals, and for-profit specialty hospitals and compare them with nonprofit or for-profit community hospitals, and then say physician-owned hospitals that were specialty were bad.
They mixed ownership and service markets right there in so many ways, I’m not sure where to start. My team did a systematic review of around 30 years of research, looking at the evidence base in this space. We found a couple of things.
We found that physician-owned community hospitals did not have a cost or quality difference, meaning that there was no definitive evidence that the physician-owned community hospitals were cheaper based on historical evidence, which was very old. That means there’s not specific harm from them. When you permit market entry for community hospitals, that promotes competition, which results in lower prices and higher quality.
Then we also looked at the specialty hospital markets — surgical specialty hospitals, orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals, and cardiac hospitals. We noted for cardiac hospitals, there wasn’t clear evidence about cost savings, but there was definitive evidence of higher quality, from things like 30-day mortality for significant procedures like treatment of acute MI, triple A repair, stuff like that.
For orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals, we noted lower costs and higher quality, which again fits with operationally what we would know. If you have a facility that’s doing 20 total hips a day, you’re creating a focused factory. Just like if you think about it for interventional cardiology, your boards have a minimum number of procedures that you have to do to stay certified because we know about the volume-quality relationship.
Then we looked at general surgical specialty hospitals. There wasn’t enough evidence to make a conclusive thought about costs, and there was a clear trend toward higher quality. I would say this recent study is important, but there is a whole bunch of other literature out there, too.
Exploring the Scope of Emergency Care in Physician-Owned Hospitals
One thing I want to bring up — and this is an important issue — is that the risk for patients has been talked about by the American Hospital Association and the Federation of American Hospitals, in terms of limited or no emergency services at such physician-owned hospitals and having to call 911 when patients need emergent care or stabilization. That’s been the rebuttal, along with an Office of Inspector General (OIG) report from 2008. Almost, I guess, three quarters of the patients that needed emergent care got this at publicly funded hospitals.
Miller: I’m familiar with the argument about emergency care. If you actually go and look at it, it differs by specialty market. Physician-owned community hospitals have ERs because that’s how they get their business. If you are running a hospital medicine floor, a general surgical specialty floor, you have a labor delivery unit, a primary care clinic, and a cardiology clinic. You have all the things that all the other hospitals have. The physician-owned community hospitals almost uniformly have an ER.
When you look at the physician-owned specialty hospitals, it’s a little more granular. If you look at the cardiac hospitals, they have ERs. They also have cardiac ICUs, operating rooms, etc. The area where the hospital industry had concerns — which I think is valid to point out — is that physician-owned orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals don’t have ERs. But this makes sense because of what that hospital functionally is: a factory for whatever the scope of procedures is, be it joint replacements or shoulder arthroscopy. The orthopedic surgical specialty hospital is like an ASC plus several hospital beds. Many of those did not have ERs because clinically it didn’t make sense.
What’s interesting, though, is that the hospital industry also operates specialty hospitals. If you go into many of the large systems, they have cardiac specialty hospitals and cancer specialty hospitals. I would say that some of them have ERs, as they appropriately should, and some of those specialty hospitals do not. They might have a community hospital down the street that’s part of that health system that has an ER, but some of the specialty hospitals don’t necessarily have a dedicated ER.
I agree, that’s a valid concern. I would say, though, the question is, what are the scope of services in that hospital? Is an ER required? Community hospitals should have ERs. It makes sense also for a cardiac hospital to have one. If you’re running a total joint replacement factory, it might not make clinical sense.
Glatter: The patients who are treated at that hospital, if they do have emergent conditions, need to have board-certified emergency physicians treating them, in my view because I’m an ER physician. Having surgeons that are not emergency physicians staff a department at a specialty orthopedic hospital or, say, a cancer hospital is not acceptable from my standpoint. That’s my opinion and recommendation, coming from emergency medicine.
Miller: I would say that anesthesiologists are actually highly qualified in critical care. The question is about clinical decompensation; if you’re doing a procedure, you have an anesthesiologist right there who is capable of critical care. The function of the ER is to either serve as a window into the hospital for patient volume or to serve as a referral for emergent complaints.
Glatter: An anesthesiologist — I’ll take issue with that — does not have the training of an emergency physician in terms of scope of practice.
Miller: My anesthesiology colleagues would probably disagree for managing an emergency during an operating room case.
Glatter: Fair enough, but I think in the general sense. The other issue is that, in terms of emergent responses to patients that decompensate, when you have to transfer a patient, that violates Medicare requirements. How is that even a valid issue or argument if you’re going to have to transfer a patient from your specialty hospital? That happens. Again, I know that you’re saying these hospitals are completely independent and can function, stabilize patients, and treat emergencies, but that’s not the reality across the country, in my opinion.
Miller: I don’t think that’s the case for the physician-owned specialty cardiac hospitals, for starters. Many of those have ICUs in addition to operating rooms as a matter of routine in addition to ERs. I don’t think that’s the case for physician-owned community hospitals, which have ERs, ICUs, medicine floors, and surgical floors. Physician-owned community hospitals are around half the market. Of that remaining market, a significant percentage are cardiac hospitals. If you’re taking an issue with orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals, that’s a clinical operational question that can and should be answered.
I’d also posit that the nonprofit and for-profit hospital industries also operate specialty hospitals. Any of these questions, we shouldn’t just be asking about physician-owned facilities; we should be asking about them across ownership types, because we’re talking about scope of service and quality and safety. The ownership in that case doesn’t matter. The broader question is, are orthopedic surgical specialty hospitals owned by physicians, tax-exempt hospitals, or tax-paying hospitals? Is that a valid clinical business model? Is it safe? Does it meet Medicare conditions of participation? I would say that’s what that question is, because other ownership models do operate those facilities.
Glatter: You make some valid points, and I do agree on some of them. I think that, ultimately, these models of care, and certainly cost and quality, are issues. Again, it goes back to being able, in my opinion, to provide emergent care, which seems to me a very important issue.
Miller: I agree that providing emergent care is an issue. It’s an issue in any site of care. The hospital industry posits that all hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) have emergent care. I can tell you, having worked in HOPDs (I’ve trained in them during residency), the response if something emergent happens is to either call 911 or wheel the patient down to the ER in a wheelchair or stretcher. I think that these hospital claims about emergency care coverage —these are important questions, but we should be asking them across all clinical settings and say what is the appropriate scope of care provided? What is the appropriate level of acuity and ability to provide emergent or critical care? That’s an important question regardless of ownership model across the entire industry.
Deeper Dive Into Data on Physician-Owned Hospitals
Glatter: We need to really focus on that. I’ll agree with you on that.
There was a March 2023 report from Dobson | DaVanzo. It showed that physician-owned hospitals had lower Medicaid, dual-eligible, and uncompensated care and charity care discharges than full-service acute care hospitals. Physician-owned hospitals had less than half the proportion of Medicaid discharges compared with non–physician-owned hospitals. They were also less likely to care for dual-eligible patients overall compared with non–physician-owned hospitals.
In addition, when COVID hit, the physician-owned hospitals overall — and again, there may be exceptions — were not equipped to handle these patient surges in the acute setting of a public health emergency. There was a hospital in Texas that did pivot that I’m aware of — Renaissance Hospital, which ramped up a long-term care facility to become a COVID hospital — but I think that’s the exception. I think this report raises some valid concerns; I’ll let you rebut that.
Miller: A couple of things. One, I am not aware that there’s any clear market evidence or a systematic study that shows that physician-owned hospitals had trouble responding to COVID. I don’t think that assertion has been proven. The study was funded by the hospital industry. First of all, it was not a peer-reviewed study; it was funded by an industry that paid a consulting firm. It doesn’t mean that we still shouldn’t read it, but that brings bias into question. The joke in Washington is, pick your favorite statistician or economist, and they can say what you want and have a battle of economists and statisticians.
For example, in that study, they didn’t include the entire ownership universe of physician-owned hospitals. If we go to the peer-reviewed literature, there’s a great 2015 BMJ paper showing that the Medicaid payer mix is actually the same between physician-owned hospitals vs not. The mix of patients by ethnicity — for example, think about African American patients — was the same. I would be more inclined to believe the peer-reviewed literature in BMJ as opposed to an industry-funded study that was not peer-reviewed and not independent and has methodological questions.
Glatter: Those data are 8 years old, so I’d like to see more recent data. It would be interesting, just as a follow-up to that, to see where the needle has moved — if it has, for that matter — in terms of Medicaid patients that you’re referring to.
Miller: I tend to be skeptical of all industry research, regardless of who published it, because they have an economic incentive. If they’re selecting certain age groups or excluding certain hospitals, that makes you wonder about the validity of the study. Your job as an industry-funded researcher is that, essentially, you’re being paid to look for an answer. It’s not necessarily an honest evaluation of the data.
Glatter: I want to bring up another point about the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) and the data on how physician-owned hospitals compared with acute care hospitals that are non–physician-owned and have you comment on that. The Dobson | DaVanzo study called into question that physician-owned hospitals treat fewer patients who are dual-eligible, which we know.
Miller: I don’t think we do know that.
Glatter: There are data that point to that, again, looking at the studies.
Miller: I’m saying that’s a single study funded by industry as opposed to an independent, academic, peer-reviewed literature paper. That would be like saying, during the debate of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), that you should read the pharmaceutical industries research but take any of it at pure face value as factual. Yes, we should read it. Yes, we should evaluate it on its own merits. I think, again, appropriately, you need to be concerned when people have an economic incentive.
The question about the HRRP I’m going to take a little broader, because I think that program is unfair to the industry overall. There are many factors that drive hospital readmission. Whether Mrs Smith went home and ate potato chips and then took her Lasix, that’s very much outside of the hospital industry’s control, and there’s some evidence that the HRRP increases mortality in some patient populations.
In terms of a quality metric, it’s unfair to the industry. I think we took an operating process, internal metric for the hospital industry, turned it into a quality metric, and attached it to a financial bonus, which is an inappropriate policy decision.
Rethinking Ownership Models and Empowering Clinicians
Glatter: I agree with you on that. One thing I do want to bring up is that whether the physician-owned hospitals are subject to many of the quality measures that full-service, acute care hospitals are. That really is, I think, a broader context.
Miller: Fifty-five percent of physician-owned hospitals are full-service community hospitals, so I would say at least half the market is 100% subject to that.
Glatter: If only 50% are, that’s already an issue.
Miller: Cardiac specialty hospitals — which, as I said, nonprofit and for-profit hospital chains also operate — are also subject to the appropriate quality measures, readmissions, etc. Just because we don’t necessarily have the best quality measurement in the system in the country, it doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t allow care specialization. As I’d point out, if we’re concerned about specialty hospitals, the concern shouldn’t just be about physician-owned specialty hospitals; it should be about specialty hospitals by and large. Many health systems run cardiac specialty hospitals, cancer specialty hospitals, and orthopedic specialty hospitals. If we’re going to have a discussion about concerns there, it should be about the entire industry of specialty hospitals.
I think specialty hospitals serve an important role in society, allowing for specialization and exploiting in a positive way the volume-quality relationship. Whether those are owned by a for-profit publicly traded company, a tax-exempt facility, or physicians, I think that is an important way to have innovation and care delivery because frankly, we haven’t had much innovation in care delivery. Much of what we do in terms of how we practice clinically hasn’t really changed in the 50 years since my late father graduated from medical school. We still have rounds, we’re still taking notes, we’re still operating in the same way. Many processes are manual. We don’t have the mass production and mass customization of care that we need.
When you have a focused factory, it allows you to design care in a way that drives up quality, not just for the average patient but also the patients at the tail ends, because you have time to focus on that specific service line and that specific patient population.
Physician-owned community hospitals offer an important opportunity for a different employment model. I remember going to the dermatologist and the dermatologist was depressed, shuffling around the room, sad, and I asked him why. He said he didn’t really like his employer, and I said, “Why don’t you pick another one?” He’s like, “There are only two large health systems I can work for. They all have the same clinical practice environment and functionally the same value.”
Physicians are increasingly burned out. They face monopsony power in who purchases their labor. They have little control. They don’t want to go through five committees, seven administrators, and attend 25 meetings just to change a single small process in clinical operations. If you’re an owner operator, you have a much better ability to do it.
Frankly, when many facilities do well now, when they do well clinically and do well financially, who benefits? The hospital administration and the hospital executives. The doctors aren’t benefiting. The nurses aren’t benefiting. The CNA is not benefiting. The secretary is not benefiting. The custodian is not benefiting. Shouldn’t the workers have a right to own and operate the business and do well when the business does well serving the community? That puts me in the weird space of agreeing with both conservatives and progressives.
Glatter: I agree with you. I think an ownership stake is always attractive. It helps with retention of employed persons. There’s no question that, when they have a stake, when they have skin in the game, they feel more empowered. I will not argue with you about that.
Miller: We don’t have business models where workers have that option in healthcare. Like the National Academy of Medicine said, one of the key drivers of burnout is the externalization of the locus of control over clinical practice, and the current business operating models guarantee an externalization of the locus of control over clinical practice.
If you actually look at the recent American Medical Association (AMA) meeting, there was a resolution to ban the corporate practice of medicine. They wanted to go more toward the legal professions model where only physicians can own and operate care delivery.
Miller: It’s not just doctors. I think nurses want a better lifestyle. The nurses are treated as interchangeable lines on a spreadsheet. The nurses are an integral part of our clinical team. Why don’t we work together as a clinical unit to build a better delivery system? What better way to do that than to have clinicians in charge of it, right?
My favorite bakery that’s about 30 minutes away is owned by a baker. It is not owned by a large tax-exempt corporation. It’s owned by an owner operator who takes pride in their work. I think that is something that the profession would do well to return to. When I was a resident, one of my colleagues was already planning their retirement. That’s how depressed they were.
I went into medicine to actually care for patients. I think that we can make the world a better place for our patients. What that means is not only treating them with drugs and devices, but also creating a delivery system where they don’t have to wander from lobby to lobby in a 200,000 square-foot facility, wait in line for hours on end, get bills 6 months later, and fill out endless paper forms over and over again.
All of these basic processes in healthcare delivery that are broken could have and should have been fixed — and have been fixed in almost every other industry. I had to replace one of my car tires because I had a flat tire. The local tire shop has an app, and it sends me SMS text messages telling me when my appointment is and when my car is ready. We have solved all of these problems in many other businesses.
We have not solved them in healthcare delivery because, one, we have massive monopolies that are raising prices, have lower quality, and deliver a crappy patient experience, and we have also subjugated the clinical worker into a corporate automaton. We are functionally drones. We don’t have the agency and the authority to improve clinical operations anymore. It’s really depressing, and we should have that option again.
I trust my doctor. I trust the nurses that I work with, and I would like them to help make clinical decisions in a financially responsible and a sensible operational manner. We need to empower our workforce in order to do that so we can recapture the value of what it means to be a clinician again.
The current model of corporate employment: massive scale, more administrators, more processes, more emails, more meetings, more PowerPoint decks, more federal subsidies. The hospital industry has choices. It can improve clinical operations. It can show up in Washington and lobby for increased subsidies. It can invest in the market and not pay taxes for the tax-exempt facilities. Obviously, it makes the logical choices as an economic actor to show up, lobby for increased subsidies, and then also invest in the stock market.
Improving clinical operations is hard. It hasn’t happened. The Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the private community hospital industry has had flat labor productivity growth, on average, for the past 25 years, and for some years it even declined. This is totally atypical across the economy.
We have failed our clinicians, and most importantly, we have failed our patients. I’ve been sick. My relatives have been sick, waiting hours, not able to get appointments, and redoing forms. It’s a total disaster. It’s time and reasonable to try an alternative ownership and operating model. There are obviously problems. The problems can and should be addressed, but it doesn’t mean that we should have a statutory prohibition on professionals owning and operating their own business.
Glatter: There was a report that $500 million was saved by limiting or banning or putting a moratorium on physician-owned hospitals by the Congressional Budget Office.
The CBO is not transparent about what its assumptions are or its analysis and methods. As a researcher, we have to publish our information. It has to go through peer review. I want to know what goes into that $500 million figure — what the assumptions are and what the model is. It’s hard to comment without knowing how they came up with it.
Glatter: The points you make are very valid. Physicians and nurses want a better lifestyle.
Miller: It’s not even a better lifestyle. It’s about having a say in how clinical operations work and helping make them better. We want the delivery system to work better. This is an opportunity for us to do so.
Glatter: That translates into technology: obviously, generative artificial intelligence (AI) coming into the forefront, as we know, and changing care delivery models as you’re referring to, which is going to happen. It’s going to be a slow process. I think that the evolution is happening and will happen, as you accurately described.
Miller: The other thing that’s different now vs 20 years ago is that managed care is here, there, and everywhere, as Dr Seuss would say. You have utilization review and prior authorization, which I’ve experienced as a patient and a physician, and boy, is it not a fun process. There’s a large amount of friction that needs to be improved. If we’re worried about induced demand or inappropriate utilization, we have managed care right there to help police bad behavior.
Reforming Healthcare Systems and Restoring Patient-Centric Focus
Glatter: If you were to come up with, say, three bullet points of how we can work our way out of this current morass of where our healthcare systems exist, where do you see the solutions or how can we make and effect change?
Miller: I’d say there are a couple of things. One is, let business models compete fairly on an equal playing field. Let the physician-owned hospital compete with the tax-exempt hospital and the nonprofit hospital. Put them on an equal playing field. We have things like 340B, which favors tax-exempt hospitals. For-profit or tax-paying hospitals are not able to participate in that. That doesn’t make any sense just from a public policy perspective. Tax-paying hospitals and physician-owned hospitals pay taxes on investments, but tax-exempt hospitals don’t. I think, in public policy, we need to equalize the playing field between business models. Let the best business model win.
The other thing we need to do is to encourage the adoption of technology. The physician will eventually be an arbiter of tech-driven or AI-driven tools. In fact, at some point, the standard of care might be to use those tools. Not using those tools would be seen as negligence. If you think about placing a jugular or central venous catheter, to not use ultrasound would be considered insane. Thirty years ago, to use ultrasound would be considered novel. I think technology and AI will get us to that point of helping make care more efficient and more customized.
Those are the two biggest interventions, I would say. Third, every time we have a conversation in public policy, we need to remember what it is to be a patient. The decision should be driven not around any one industry’s profitability, but what it is to be a patient and how we can make that experience less burdensome, less expensive, or in plain English, suck less.
Glatter: Safety net hospitals and critical access hospitals are part of this discussion that, yes, we want everything to, in an ideal world, function more efficiently and effectively, with less cost and less red tape. The safety net of our nation is struggling.
Miller: I 100% agree. The Cook County hospitals of the world are deserving of our support and, frankly, our gratitude. Facilities like that have huge burdens of patients with Medicaid. We also still have millions of uninsured patients. The neighborhoods that they serve are also poorer. I think facilities like that are deserving of public support.
I also think we need to clearly define what those hospitals are. One of the challenges I’ve realized as I waded into this space is that market definitions of what a service market is for a hospital, its specialty type or what a safety net hospital is need to be more clearly defined because those facilities 100% are deserving of our support. We just need to be clear about what they are.
Regarding critical access hospitals, when you practice in a rural area, you have to think differently about care delivery. I’d say many of the rural systems are highly creative in how they structure clinical operations. Before the public health emergency, during the COVID pandemic, when we had a massive change in telehealth, rural hospitals were using — within the very narrow confines — as much telehealth as they could and should.
Rural hospitals also make greater use of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs). For many of the specialty services, I remember, your first call was an NP or a PA because the physician was downstairs doing procedures. They’d come up and assess the patient before the procedure, but most of your consult questions were answered by the NP or PA. I’m not saying that’s the model we should use nationwide, but that rural systems are highly innovative and creative; they’re deserving of our time, attention, and support, and frankly, we can learn from them.
Glatter: I want to thank you for your time and your expertise in this area. We’ll see how the congressional hearings affect the industry as a whole, how the needle moves, and whether the ban or moratorium on physician-owned hospitals continues to exist going forward.
Miller: I appreciate you having me. The hospital industry is one of the most important industries for health care. This is a time of inflection, right? We need to go back to the value of what it means to be a clinician and serve patients. Hospitals need to reorient themselves around that core concern. How do we help support clinicians — doctors, nurses, pharmacists, whomever it is — in serving patients? Hospitals have become too corporate, so I think that this is an expected pushback.
Glatter: Again, I want to thank you for your time. This was a very important discussion. Thank you for your expertise.
Robert D. Glatter, MD, is an assistant professor of emergency medicine at Zucker School of Medicine at Hofstra/Northwell in Hempstead, New York. He is a medical advisor for Medscape and hosts the Hot Topics in EM series.
Brian J. Miller, MD, MBA, MPH, is a hospitalist and an assistant professor of medicine at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. He is also a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. From 2014 – 2017, Dr Miller worked at four federal regulatory agencies: Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and the Food & Drug Administration (FDA).
Does hospital ownership matter? According to a study published last week in Health Affairs Scholar, NOT MUCH. That’s a problem for not-for-profit hospitals who claim otherwise.
58% of U.S. hospitals are not-for-profit hospitals; the rest are public (19%) or investor-owned (24%). In recent months, not-for-profit systems have faced growing antagonism from regulators and critics who challenge the worthwhileness of their tax exemptions and reasonableness of the compensation paid their top executives.
The lion’s share of this negative attention is directed at large, not-for-profit hospital system operators. Case in point: last week, Banner Health (AZ) joined the ranks of high-profile operators taken to task in the Arizona Republic for their CEO’s compensation contrasting it to not-for-profit sectors in which compensation is considerably lower.
Unflattering attention to NFP hospitals, especially the big-name systems, is unlikely to subside in the near-term. U.S. healthcare has become a winner-take-all battleground increasingly dominated by large-scale, investor-owned interests in hospitals, medical groups, insurance, retail health in pursuit of a piece of the $4.6 trillion pie.
The moral high ground once the domain of not-for-profit hospitals is shaky.
The NYU study examined whether hospital ownership influenced decisions made by consumers: they found “Fewer than one-third of respondents (29.5%) indicated that hospital status had ever been relevant to them in making decisions about where to seek care…significantly more important to respondents who indicated the lowest health literacy—74.7% of whom answered the key question affirmatively—than it was for people who indicated high health literacy, of whom only 18.3% found hospital ownership status to be relevant…also considerably more relevant for people working in health care than for those who did not work in health care (61.0% vs 24.5%)…
We found little evidence that hospital nonprofit status influenced Americans’ decisions about where to seek care. Ownership status was relevant for fewer than 30% of respondents and preference was greatest overall for public hospitals. Only 30–45% of respondents could correctly identify the ownership status of nationally recognized hospitals, and fewer than 30% could identify their local hospitals.
These findings suggest that contract failure does not currently provide a justification of nonprofit hospitals’ value; further scrutiny of tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals is warranted.”
Are NFP hospitals concerned? YES. It’s reality as systems address near term operational challenges and long-term questions about their strategies.
Last weekend, I facilitated the 4th Annual Chief Strategy Officers Roundtable in Austin TX sponsored by Lumeris. The group consisted of senior-level strategists from 11 not-for-profit systems and one for-profit. In one session, each reacted to 50 future state scenarios in terms of “likelihood” and “disruptive impact” in the NEAR term (3-5 years) and LONG TERM (8-10 years) using a 1 to 10 scale with 10 HI.
From these data and the discussion that followed, there’s consensus that the U.S. healthcare market is unlikely to change dramatically long-term, their short-term conditions will be tougher and their challenges unique.
‘Near-term cost containment is a priority. Hospitals are here-to-stay, but operating them will be harder.’
‘Increased scale and growth are necessary imperatives for their systems.’
‘Hospital systems will compete in a market wherein private capital and investor ownership will play a growing role, insurers will be hostile and value will the primary focus of cost-reduction by purchasers and policymakers.’
‘Distinctions betweennot-for-profit and for-profit hospitals are significant.’
‘Conditions for hospitals will be tougher as insurers play a stronger hand in shaping the future.’
Given the NYU study findings (above) concluding NFP ownership has marginal impact on hospital choices made by consumers, it’s understandable NFPs are anxious.
My take:
The issues facing not-for-profit hospitals in the U.S. are unique and complex. Per the commentary of the CSOs, their market conditions are daunting and major changes in their structure, funding and regulation unlikely.
That means lack of public understanding of their unique role is a conundrum.
Paul
PS: Issues about CEO compensation in healthcare are touchy and often unfair.
In every major NFP system, comp is set by the Independent Board Compensation Committee with outside consultative counsel. The vast majority of these CEOs aren’t in the job for the money joining their workforce in pursuit of the unique higher calling afforded service leaders in NFP healthcare.